


AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

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Title: The Revolt of the Generals: Army Opposition to the New Look

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Why did Generals Matthew Ridgway, Maxwell Taylor, and James Gavin oppose New Look? Why did these professional officers end their careers over a disagreement with the Eisenhower administration concerning defense policy? Did a connection exist between those distinguished officers and their views of defense policy in the 1950s? Why did Eisenhower support New Look? Whom had a better understanding of American defense needs at the time, the president or his former lieutenants? Likewise, why did Admiral Arthur Radford and General Nathan Twining support President Eisenhower? It is the purpose of my thesis to answer those questions in an examination of Dwight Eisenhower's defense policy in the 1950s from available archival material and secondary sources.

THE REVOLT OF THE GENERALS:
Army Opposition to the New Look

A Thesis

Presented to

The Division of Social Sciences

EMPORIA STATE UNIVERSITY

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree


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
Regena M. Bailey

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PREFACE

This thesis explores the Eisenhower Administration's stance on defense spending and the opposition that developed among the generals serving in the defense bureaucracy. This thesis relies upon documents from the Eisenhower Presidential Library, memoirs of the staff officers, and articles from the press at the time of the controversy.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Dwight D. Eisenhower campaigned for the presidency in 1952 on a platform of economic stability. Americans feared a return to the depression that existed before World War II. Many feared the threats of inflation, recession, and unemployment. During the Truman administration, the nation consistently operated over budget as domestic programs and military programs increased expenditures to fight the Cold War. When World War II had ended in 1945, America established a series of military bases around the world. Eisenhower, the former general, assured the nation he could cut waste in government and still maintain a strong national defense. Americans believed their hero turned politician and elected Eisenhower president in November 1952.

Eisenhower brought with him to Washington a staff of men to help him give the military a New Look. Among these men, Eisenhower chose Charles Wilson as Secretary of Defense. Wilson had worked successfully revamping General Motors and Eisenhower hoped he could do the same type of work for the government. Wilson and Eisenhower introduced the idea of “more bang for the buck” as a slogan to describe their efforts to economize defense spending. The plans set forth by the administration relied mostly upon air power and reduced the number of ground forces. Eisenhower and Wilson developed programs that ran counter to those of other top military leaders.

General Matthew B. Ridgway served as Army Chief of Staff from August 1953 to June 1955. Although Ridgway began term with the Joint Chiefs of Staff with an open mind and a willingness to work with his peers, events soon discouraged him. Ridgway

believed the administration made a mistake when it reduced ground forces and relied too much on air power. Ridgway explained this to his colleagues and civilian superiors; however, a solution to the problem eluded them. Instead, the administration continued to pursue policies that Ridgway felt were destructive.

Ridgway began opposing his superiors openly. He talked to the press about disagreements among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued with his civilian superiors, and testified candidly to Congress about his opinions on defense. Eisenhower, angry with Ridgway's dissent, refused to renew his term as Army Chief of Staff in 1955. Critics charged that Ridgway was only concerned with the needs of the Army and not the nation as a whole. Ridgway replied that he disagreed with defense policies and the system was flawed. After his retirement, Ridgway continued to voice his discontent in his memoirs and articles in the popular press about his service in Washington.

General James M. Gavin also disagreed with the policies of Eisenhower's New Look. Gavin served in the Pentagon during Eisenhower's administration as Weapons System Analyst, Deputy Chief of Plans and Research, and Chief of Research and Development for the Army. Gavin disagreed with Eisenhower's defense policies for the "long haul" and wanted more technology than just bombers and missiles in the US arsenal. General Maxwell Taylor tried to silence Gavin's criticism of the administration's defense policies; however, Gavin refused to cooperate.

Gavin disagreed with several specific defense issues. Gavin wanted a greater emphasis on helicopters and continued research in the use of airborne forces. The general warned the administration not to get involved in a war in Indochina because of the losses

and problems it would cause. General Gavin thought paper divisions and other force reductions threatened the security of the United States. Even after threats of court martial, Gavin testified frankly before Congress in December 1957.

Gavin retired from the Army in 1958. After his retirement, Gavin wrote extensively on defense issues. In addition to his memoirs, Gavin published other books and many articles in the popular press. After short service in the private sector, Gavin became US Ambassador to France during the Kennedy Administration.

Maxwell D. Taylor served as Army Chief of Staff from June 1955 to January 1959. After long interviews, the administration believed it was replacing a partisan Ridgway with a much more cooperative Maxwell Taylor as Army Chief of Staff. For about a year, Taylor cooperated with the administration. As Taylor saw a need for change in the doctrine of Massive Retaliation, he explained his ideas to his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, his colleagues were unwilling to adapt New Look in accordance with recent events. General Taylor went on the offensive.

Taylor announced the doctrine of Flexible Response in October 1956. Beginning in October 1956, he stressed a need for more emphasis on the US Army, on the strengthening of American reserve forces, and on conventional weapons. Taylor saw a need for limited war forces and the administration refused to listen. Before he ended service under Eisenhower, General Taylor published a book detailing the disagreements among the Joint Chiefs and the weaknesses in American defense. This angered Eisenhower and Taylor's term was not renewed.

After he retired from the Eisenhower administration, Taylor continued to influence defense policy. He wrote numerous works on defense policy. John F. Kennedy recalled Taylor from retirement and used him as a personal military advisor before making him Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962. After Taylor retired in 1964, he became the US Ambassador to South Vietnam. Between 1965 and 1969, Taylor served on President Lyndon Johnson's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Admiral Arthur W. Radford became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1953. Early in his career, Radford attempted to voice his opinions and change policy during an episode that became known as the "Revolt of the Admirals." Radford also tried to protect funding for naval aviation and push for a war in Indochina. After failures in all these efforts, the admiral became much more congenial. He faithfully served the Eisenhower administration and supported New Look. Admiral Radford retired in August 1957. After his retirement, he still continued to support the administration's policies; however, he did note deficiencies at that time. Radford's memoirs seem mild compared to those of the Army leaders.

General Nathan F. Twining was appointed Air Force Chief of Staff and served between June 1953 and August 1957. As Air Force Chief of Staff, Twining saw the Air Force gain prominence. New Look stressed a large air force and a reliance upon strategic bombing. Twining did not disagree with his superiors because his service experienced growth. In August 1957, Twining became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Twining maintained support for Eisenhower's policies. After retirement, Twining wrote a book detailing his views on defense.

Each of these general officers opposed Eisenhower's New Look. A careful examination of the careers of these men shows how their characters developed and why they disagreed or agreed with their superiors. International events that occurred while they men served the administration also explained why some of them challenged Eisenhower's program. The books they men published after their service explain why they opposed the President Eisenhower. Eisenhower refused to alter his defense policy even when his chief lieutenants opposed him; however, the ideas of the rebels did change defense policy in the next administration. Both sides in the New Look debate had valid points and contributed to American success in the cold war.

CHAPTER 2:
PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
ARCHITECT OF NEW LOOK

“We must achieve both solvency and security.”¹

Dwight D. Eisenhower followed Harry Truman and realized that the Truman administration had operated over budget. One area of particular concern involved defense spending. As the Soviet threat loomed and the Cold War became more intense in the 1950s, Eisenhower faced spiraling defense expenditures. He believed that the current economic situation threatened the foundation of the United States. Eisenhower embarked on a program of economizing American defense spending in order to deal with recession, inflation, unemployment, and economic instability. As President Eisenhower diligently pursued the goal of a cost conscious defense program, his aims ran counter to those of several general officers serving on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in Washington.

In 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower campaigned on a platform of reduced defense expenditures. This stand helped alleviate criticism that Eisenhower was not a viable candidate but simply a military hero. Admitting his forty years of service in the military, Eisenhower criticized the US military because planning was not farsighted, unification had never been achieved, and it pushed America toward economic collapse. Eisenhower carefully exempted the chiefs of staff in his criticism.

During the campaign, Eisenhower focused on government waste. In order to show the public what he would cut Eisenhower related the following:

It has meant an attempt, for example, by our Air Force to buy 20,000 super de luxe desk chairs at \$10 above the standard model price. It has meant

our Navy laying in a fifty year supply of anchors all at once. It has meant our Army buying enough front-axle gaskets for jeeps to last one full century.²

The candidate stressed a need to reeducate the military. Military leadership had to consider both economics and how to win the next war. Congress and civilian leaders needed to question future military requests to ensure the necessity of acquisitions.

President Eisenhower began his quest to balance the budget in 1953 while planning for Fiscal Year 1954. Whereas defense spending for FY1955 had been \$41 billion, the president targeted a budget of \$36 billion for defense.³ While cutting the massive defense budget seemed simple on the surface, it provided Eisenhower with a daunting problem that expanded and continued throughout his presidency. Expensive programs of research and development required billions of dollars. In addition, the budget needed to support troops at home and those serving abroad with allies. Programs in nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and weapons modernization added to the already costly total.

Eisenhower, as a military strategist, quickly evaluated and considered defense shortcomings. In a letter to John Foster Dulles in October 1953, Eisenhower described some of his concerns. “What should we do,” wrote Eisenhower,

if Soviet political aggression as in Czechoslovakia, successfully chips away exposed portions of the free world? So far as our resulting economic situation is concerned, such an eventuality would be just as bad for us as if the area had been captured by force. To my mind, this is a case where the theory of ‘retaliation’ falls down.⁴

Eisenhower knew that too many defense precautions could turn America into a fortress or a dictatorship. Too few preparations meant weakness facing the Soviet war machine.

According to Eisenhower, the United States simply needed a balance between these two extremes. A sustainable, long-haul defense program that offered America the protection it needed with the freedom it required seemed like the answer to Eisenhower.

This long-haul defense program needed to be flexible and technologically advanced. Technology and flexibility allowed the United States to spend less than the Soviets. Eisenhower carefully tried to reassure the military leadership. In a letter to General Alfred Gruenther in May 1953, the president said the following:

As you know, we are trying to bring the total expenditures of the American Government within reasonable limits. This is not because of any belief that we can afford relaxation of the combined effort to combat Soviet communism. On the contrary, it grows out of a belief that our organized, effective resistance must be maintained over a long period of years and that is possible only with a healthy American economy.⁵

Eisenhower continued to hawk his new program to the facets of the administration.

In an early 1953 message to Congress, Eisenhower hinted at his future policy. The president told Congress that military buildup, “without regard to our economic capacity would be to defend ourselves against one kind of disaster by inviting another.”⁶

According to Eisenhower, the United States faced two threats. “The external Soviet menace and the internal danger that the costs of defending the free world,” the president feared, “may seriously weaken the economy of the United States and thus destroy the very freedom, values, and institutions which we are seeking to maintain.”⁷ Critics feared a weakening American defense.

Eisenhower reassured the critics of military cutbacks by supporting a gradual reduction program. The president said:

Hasty and ill considered action of any kind could seriously upset the subtle equation that encompasses debts, obligations, expenditures, defense demands, deficits, taxes and the general economic health of the Nation. Our goals can be clear, our start toward them immediate--but action must be gradual.⁸

Eisenhower thought a better economy meant more jobs and domestic security. Although the State Department's Policy Planning Staff recommended a defense budget of about \$50 billion each year after 1950, Congress allowed the president to formulate his policy.⁹ This is notable because most congressmen previously endorsed Truman's high defense spending for containing Soviet expansion. Earlier plans obviously influenced Eisenhower's defense policy.

The Truman administration left Eisenhower a certain legacy. In the wake of the Korean War, America possessed a large Army and an Air Force that was growing with the rise of the doctrine of air superiority. In 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a goal of 143 wings for the US Air Force by 1952.¹⁰ A wing is a collection of squadrons. A collection of wings is called a group. The Army needed 21 combat divisions, according to the Joint Chiefs.¹¹ Naval strength hovered at 408 combat vessels with support.¹² These numbers, according to Truman's plans, could be attained by mid-1954 or 1955. This projected expansion was under way when Eisenhower assumed the presidency in January 1953.

Truman wanted \$20.7 billion for the Air Force, \$13.2 billion for the Navy, and \$14.2 billion for the Army in 1953.¹³ The trend continued with projected budgets of \$16.7 billion for the Air Force, \$11.3 billion for the Navy, and \$12.1 billion for the Army in 1954.¹⁴ Eisenhower, who campaigned on a platform of fiscal responsibility, faced a

daunting problem. In 1952, Eisenhower told the *New York Times*, “The foundation of military strength is economic strength. A bankrupt America is more the Soviet goal than an America conquered on the field of battle.”¹⁵ Eisenhower also campaigned on the popular slogan that his military program would, “keep the boys at our side instead of on a foreign shore.”¹⁶ In order to help with his economic goals, Eisenhower chose successful businessmen for his cabinet. For example, Eisenhower offered Charles Wilson the post of Secretary of Defense because of his impressive record at General Motors. The president hoped Wilson could help work an economic miracle for the government.

Eisenhower discussed defense policy and budgets with his Joint Chiefs in August 1953 and with several cabinet members in November 1953. Not all of the service chiefs agreed with Eisenhower’s suggested reductions. General Matthew Ridgway particularly disliked the administration’s plan to remove American forces and rely on native troops. Ridgway argued that native troops simply were not ready nor able to defend American interests around the world. The cabinet greeted Eisenhower’s suggestion warmly and agreed to personnel reductions and a greater reliance on nuclear weapons to cut defense costs.¹⁷ Eisenhower reassured the cabinet that, “national security must not be endangered merely for the sake of balanced budgets.”¹⁸ Pursuit of the new policy soon began.

Much to Eisenhower’s chagrin, the budget could not be reduced as quickly as he had hoped. The Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the new defense policy and recommended an Army of about 20 divisions and 1.5 million men.¹⁹ The chiefs recommended a Navy with more than 1,100 ships and a three division, three air wing Marine Corps.²⁰

Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a new aircraft carrier for the Navy and 120 wings for the Air Force.²¹ These numbers overshot Eisenhower's goals.

Eisenhower asked Admiral Arthur W. Radford, his Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to reconsider needs and project long-term requirements. Radford agreed that if America could use nuclear weapons whenever advantageous, more cuts could be made. In response, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that cutting conventional forces allowed the Air Force to build long-term resources and overall budget reductions. The generals decided that by 1957, the Army needed to lose 6 divisions and 500,000 men.²² Naval forces needed to drop about 125,000 sailors from the active roster.²³ Balancing these losses, the Air Force projected a gain of 35,000 men and 22 wings.²⁴ The projected cost of this budget pleased Eisenhower more because it sat at about \$33-34 billion.²⁵ How could the Joint Chiefs cut the Army so much and still maintain a strong defense posture?

Admiral Radford explained to his service chiefs that the new defense plan allowed the reductions. First, Radford planned to use native troops to replace US soldiers deployed around the world. These native troops, provided by the nation in which the troops were stationed, would allow cuts in American forces. American reserve forces could reinforce and deter aggression against the local troops provided by allies.²⁶ Second, Radford saw a greater reliance on nuclear weapons in the future. Tactical nuclear weapons increased American firepower, so the United States needed fewer men to cause the same impact. Aircraft with nuclear weapons replaced ground troops in some situations. Additionally, reductions occurred mostly in reserve combat support units. Neither General Ridgway nor Admiral Carney believed nuclear weapons could replace

manpower; however, they continued to work with the administration while voicing their concerns.²⁷

Admiral Radford first introduced the so-called “New Look” policy in an address before the National Press Club in Washington, DC in late 1953.²⁸ This was the first public announcement of the policy. President Eisenhower then used the term “New Look” to describe his defense policy in a January 1954 budget message to Congress.²⁹ Opposition took time to develop. Most people trusted Eisenhower’s judgment because he held many posts that gave him experience and he was, after all, a hero of World War II.

Eisenhower’s experiences with military planning included many posts. In the early 1930s, he served in the Assistant Secretary of War’s office and drafted plans for wartime mobilization. Eisenhower had also lobbied congress for money when he served as an aide to the Army Chief of Staff, Army Chief of Staff, and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. NATO service also gave Eisenhower experience in budgetary matters. He well understood nations that owed great sums of money for defense appropriations. Lastly, according to biographer Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower, “often solicited lectures on economics from his contacts in the business world.”³⁰ The president certainly had no economic expertise but he did possess a basic understanding of the topics at hand.

Eisenhower expected his administration and military leaders to back his policy. If people disagreed with his ideas, he expected arguments in private during planning. After a decision was made, however, the Joint Chiefs and administration’s officials needed to back the policy in question. There should be no public display of nonconformity with the president’s policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff; however, served in a particularly difficult

situation. When testifying before Congress, they did so under oath and often faced difficult questions about their opinions and policy. An officer was forced to make a decision between honesty and conformity. This made a precarious situation for a professional officer who did not wish to go against his superiors or lie to Congress.

As opposition in the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed, Eisenhower clearly stated his feelings concerning disagreement. “Everyone in the Defense Establishment should nail his flag to the staff of the United States of America, and think in terms of the whole.”³¹ Dissension and service rivalry angered Eisenhower and derailed his plans for smooth, gradual change. As New Look theory emerged and evolved, dissension and interservice rivalry grew. In retrospect, as the four services fought over fewer budget dollars this conflict was inevitable.

New Look evolved toward greater reliance upon atomic forces in order to allow reductions in conventional forces. Eisenhower told the National Security Council in early 1954:

Our only chance for victory . . . would be to paralyze the enemy at the outset of war. Since we cannot keep the United States an armed camp or a garrison state, we must make plans to use the atom bomb if we become involved in a war. We are not going to provoke war. . . . If war comes, the other fellow must have started it. Otherwise we would not be in a position to use the nuclear weapons, and we have got to be in a position to use that weapon if we are to preserve our institutions in peace and win the victory in war.³²

Critics pounced on Eisenhower’s reliance on atomic weapons. General Ridgway and Admiral Radford of the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed with Eisenhower’s reliance on atomic weapons delivered by the Air Force. Ridgway felt America could not always use

its atomic arsenal and that any war would eventually need the infantry. Radford also did not believe strategic bombing could protect the United States. The administration believed both disagreements were related to service interests influencing these men rather than defense requirements. Eisenhower replied to these critics that they focused on defense and he wanted to focus on offense. In a letter to John Foster Dulles in December 1955, the president said, “there is only one factor, always important in a military struggle . . . This is the selectivity and flexibility that always belong to the offensive. The defensive must normally try to secure an entire area, the offensive can concentrate on any point of its own selection.”³³

Eisenhower showed his anger with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a telephone conversation with George Humphrey in December 1954. The president said he had been, “working on getting the Army to see sense, to produce efficiency with less money and fewer men . . . the foremost thing is the protection of America by air.”³⁴ Eisenhower tried to stop criticism by not offering to renew General Ridgway’s term as Chief of Staff.

Realistically, although the Army endured the most cuts in the budget and manpower, the other services also faced downsizing. Each service possessed an expensive wish list. The Army wanted more limited war forces and money for active defense operations. The Navy wanted money for Polaris submarines.³⁵ The Air Force consumed about half the defense budget and wanted to protect that share. Each budget presented a battle of wills between the service chiefs and the administration.

In 1954 and 1955 the budget battle continued. Eisenhower supported New Look in his 1954 budget battle for fiscal year 1955. Eisenhower tried to explain the long haul

approach to Congress. Rather than focusing on a fixed date for reductions, his appropriations assumed the US budget should be, “aimed instead at providing a strong military position which can be maintained over the extended period of an uneasy peace.”³⁶ Eisenhower encouraged his generals to support his stance on defense.

Admiral Radford conscientiously supported the administration’s policies. In *US News and World Report* in 1954, he projected a long-term threat from the Soviets. Of the Soviet threat, Radford said: “They prefer tension and discord, hoping that we will destroy ourselves. At the same time, such a dictatorship can make sudden, and sometimes illogical decisions. What it boils down to is that we have to be ready for almost anything, anytime.”³⁷ Radford testified in a similar manner before Congress in 1954. Radford explained the world situation to Senators: “I honestly felt and still feel that the economic stability of the United States is a great factor of military importance over the long pull. I know from traveling abroad that our allies are almost as afraid of a depression in the United States as they are of a Communist attack.”³⁸ Charles Wilson joined Radford in supporting New Look.

Wilson tried to convince critics that the next war could be won with fewer men and more materiel. “I think it is clear,” said Wilson,

to all Americans that we do not expect to fight with land armies in our country. It is also clear that our country can supply the material for war better than we can the men, and many of our allies can supply the men better than they can the material. So the defense of the free world has to be worked out on an international balance and not on a national balance, if I make my point clear.³⁹

These comments worked to neutralize those of the angry Joint Chiefs. Additionally, Wilson's comments supported Eisenhower's plan to rely on indigenous forces more and use US forces in reserve. American industry also profited from a greater materiel commitment, thereby adding to Eisenhower's overall desire for economic stability and growth.

President Eisenhower carefully supported New Look, partly by publicly insisting that it had full support. Eisenhower surprised the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he announced, "The defense program recommended in the 1955 budget . . . is based on a new military program unanimously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by me following consideration by the National Security Council."⁴⁰ General Ridgway, who accepted the program only because of the attachment of certain assumptions, felt betrayed by this announcement.

Ridgway disagreed with the plan and under questioning from Congress, the true nature of his assent surfaced. To Congress, Ridgway would only say, "I accept this program as sound."⁴¹ When asked, Ridgway told Congress that he operated within a ceiling or under the approved limits. No matter what his opinion, he eventually had to conform to what he called a "preconceived politico-military party line."⁴² As opposition mounted and public outcry began after leaks to the press, Eisenhower mobilized damage control among his supporters.

Radford testified before Congress, "I did not feel in this case that we were operating under a ceiling or directive."⁴³ The admiral added, "We did feel--at least I did, and I thought the others did--that we came up with a military program adequate for the

security of the United States.”⁴⁴ Eisenhower hoped many of his problems would disappear when General Ridgway’s term of service expired in 1955.

When the Joint Chiefs retired in August 1955, Ridgway left his post with dignity. Later, General Ridgway wrote articles about his opposition and in 1956 published memoirs that detailed his disagreements with the administration. Admiral Carney, the retiring Chief of Naval Operations, announced his discontent when he retired. Carney wrote the following to Eisenhower:

Today we are maintaining virtually the same deployments that we did during the Korean conflict and heavy new commitments--unforseen at the time of the ‘New Look’. . . evolved upon the Navy. And yet, we are rapidly approaching the level off figures which are arrived at on the basis of New Look assumptions while our assigned commitments are increasing.⁴⁵

After a short period of relative calm, criticism only increased as the new chiefs assumed their posts and New Look continued to evolve.

Eisenhower carefully chose replacements for the retiring Joint Chiefs of Staff. The president had named Admiral Arthur W. Radford as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in 1953. He served until 1957 when he retired. In 1955 General Maxwell Taylor replaced Matthew Ridgway as Army Chief of Staff. Taylor underwent a detailed interview to determine his suitability. Eisenhower certainly did not want another Ridgway. General Nathan F. Twining had assumed the post of Chief of Staff of the Air Force in 1953. After years of faithful service to the administration, he moved up to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1957.

In August 1956, President Eisenhower suggested a new cost reducing measure that particularly targeted the Army. Eisenhower told Wilson and Radford that an Army division could be reduced from 17,000 men to 10,000-12,000 men.⁴⁶ The administration assigned General Maxwell Taylor the job of reorganizing Army structure. Taylor worked on the pentomic division, made up of five combat groups, five batteries of light artillery, and one Honest John battery. Airborne divisions reduced from 17,000 men to 11,500 men and infantry divisions reduced from 17,400 men per division to 13,700 men per division.⁴⁷ After implementation, this plan governed Army operations until 1959.⁴⁸ Unfortunately for Eisenhower, support for New Look waned long before 1959.

Secretary of Defense Wilson disappointed Eisenhower. Although he backed New Look in the beginning, by 1956 he began questioning the level of defense expenditures. The Joint Chiefs of Staff convinced the secretary of defense that technological developments in the defense industry required higher budgets. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff tried to get Eisenhower to raise defense budgets more than just an adjustment for inflation. Congress started influencing the budget more and this also frustrated Eisenhower. Congress imposed cuts on the Army and raised, for example, bomber production. Eisenhower felt his military chiefs went to Congress with service bias related requests that unfairly raised the defense budget ceiling.

In 1958 criticism of New Look expanded, but Eisenhower still supported the program. He said to Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey in July, "I think nothing is more necessary in our domestic affairs than to examine, each day, our economy, as well as our government receipts and expenditures, and to act prudently."⁴⁹ Obviously, the

president truly believed in his program. As usual, Eisenhower relied upon Admiral Radford for support of New Look. Radford said in an address to Congress, “In analyzing these peaks and valleys of military preparedness we find that they are most expensive. Waste and inefficiency under such circumstances are the inevitable result.”⁵⁰ Additionally, in a time of heightened tensions, Radford said, “such a system is that these valleys of preparedness constitute an invitation to aggression.”⁵¹ Opposition to the plan included Maxwell Taylor and congressional Democrats..

In 1958, John F. Kennedy spoke for the Senate Democrats who opposed New Look. “We have extended our commitments,” said Kennedy, “around the world, without regard to the sufficiency of our military posture to fulfill those commitments.”⁵² In assigning blame for the US defense situation, Kennedy cited the president’s “willingness to place fiscal security ahead of national security.”⁵³ The Democrats who saw the communists gaining power in Africa, Asia, and Latin America argued that increased defense expenditures fueled the US economy. A small deficit might result in more jobs and improve domestic security.

In fairness to President Eisenhower, military expenditures did increase in 1958 in reaction to crises and world events. Events in Lebanon, Quemoy, and Matsu forced the defense budget to rise. Eisenhower responded by saying Americans, “must rise above personal selfishness, above sectional interests, above political partisanship. . . . We must make the necessary sacrifices.”⁵⁴ Eisenhower referred to necessary domestic cutbacks to make up for the higher defense expenditures in that statement. Eisenhower also blamed the defense industry and congressional ties for the desired increases in budgets.

In 1959 Eisenhower clarified his position and went on the offensive concerning New Look. Eisenhower directly accused Senator Stewart Symington of Missouri of being partial to the interests of Convair, a defense contractor. The president said, “The munitions makers are making tremendous efforts toward getting more contracts and in fact seem to be exerting undue influence over the Senators.”⁵⁵ As Eisenhower focused on fighting congressional opposition, new attacks came from the military.

Army Chief of Staff Maxwell Taylor openly criticized personnel reductions and budget ceilings in 1959. When Taylor testified before Senator Lyndon Johnson’s Preparedness Subcommittee in February 1959 he said, “The trend of relative military strength is against us.” This statement angered the president and he considered a formal reprimand. But at this stage in the political game, Eisenhower feared a reprimand would make Taylor a martyr.⁵⁶ By May 1959, comments by the Joint Chiefs infuriated the president enough that he mentioned them to the National Security Council. Congress could exploit the situation if the division in the administration continued. “Every military man,” said the president, “should support the final decision of those in positions of authority after he has had the opportunity to state his own personal view.”⁵⁷ Eisenhower compared the situation to a disastrous one in wartime where all the junior commanders questioned the orders of their superiors.

In reality, Eisenhower’s administration did not have a weak defense stance. Critics of New Look talked about the missile gap and a weak defense but it was the Eisenhower administration that established the triad defense that served the United States until the end of the cold war. With stable defense spending, Eisenhower was able to add

ICBMs and SLBMs to the Strategic Air Command's bomber threat. According to historian Peter Roman, American forces included over 1,500 bombers, 130 ICBMs, and 48 SLBMs in 1957.⁵⁸ By 1961, when Eisenhower left office, the totals included over 1,700 bombers, over 800 ICBMs, and almost 400 SLBMs.⁵⁹ The Eisenhower administration made important decisions about which weapons to develop and what systems seemed too costly. The Eisenhower administration set up the foundation of America's successful cold war defense establishment.

NOTES

1. James Reston, "Eisenhower Asks 'Security' for U.S. and 'Solvency,' Too," *New York Times*, 26 September 1952, p. 12.
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CHAPTER THREE:
MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY
MEN AND MISSION

“The Army cannot perform the missions and commitments as presently existing with the planned new strength.”¹

Matthew Bunker Ridgway, born 3 March 1895, grew up on military posts because his father served as an artilleryman. Ridgway’s father instilled in his son respect for the military, an easiness with the sounds of battle, and independence. These qualities later influenced Ridgway’s actions as Chief of Staff of the Army. Although his mother and father did not direct him toward the military as a career, young Ridgway wanted to attend his father’s alma mater, West Point. Because his family moved frequently, Ridgway’s education proved inadequate in some subjects, such as mathematics. Searching his soul for the needed discipline, Ridgway spent two terms at the preparatory school and then passed his entrance exams for West Point.

The regimented life of the academy pleased Ridgway, although the physical and emotional stress of beast barracks challenged his commitment. Ridgway recalled, “Your father endured this thing [West Point], and thousands of other men went through it without breaking down. And if they did it, you can.”² Not all of Ridgway’s experiences at West Point proved pleasant. After a tactical officer caught him hazing an underclassmen, he earned demerits and punishment tours. However, his hard work paid off after these tours when he earned a position of authority in the cadet corps. Ridgway learned early in his career how to treat his subordinates.

Ridgway's character developed at West Point. Falling from his mount one day, while completing the dreaded horsemanship portion of training, Ridgway fractured his sacroiliac.³ Unwilling to admit his conditions because he feared a medical discharge, Ridgway endured great pain for the rest of life due to this injury. However, Ridgway did not let the injury modify his behavior. Ridgway completed jump school when he worked with the 82nd Airborne Division, parachuted into battle with his men in World War II, and bivouacked on the front lines under harsh conditions. No matter the pain involved for Ridgway, he firmly believed, "The place of a commander is where he anticipates the crisis of action is going to be."⁴

Ridgway graduated from West Point in 1917, was promoted to the grade of temporary captain by August, and attained the rank of permanent captain in 1919. Although his tour of duty as a company commander and adjutant with the 3rd Army proved less than exciting, Ridgway's next post seemed even less opportune for a young officer who wanted to make a name for himself. From 1918 to 1924, Ridgway served as an instructor of Spanish and Physical Education at West Point.

Ridgway's luck seemed to change when he attended and graduated from Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. From 1925-1927 Ridgway served with the 15th Infantry in China and the 9th Infantry in Texas. While in China, Ridgway served with George Marshall, an association that later proved beneficial. As an infantryman, Ridgway followed the old army adage, "mission first, men always." While studying tactics Ridgway discovered a troubling event. According to Ridgway,

A division commander in World War I said he would give 10,000 men to take a hill. One of his battalion commanders said, 'Generous son-of-a-bitch, isn't he?' I've never admired such generosity, and I shall go to my grave humbly proud of the fact that on at least four occasions I have stood up at the risk of my career and denounced what I considered to be useless slaughter.⁵

This would not be the last time Ridgway expressed such a strong concern for his men.

Headquarters recommended Ridgway go to Central America in 1927, because of his hard work and the sponsorship of George Marshall. Ridgway enjoyed foreign service duty and his knowledge of Spanish finally paid off. In Central America, Ridgway served on the American Electoral Commission and the Bolivia-Paraguay Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation until 1929. Next, Ridgway served with the 33rd Infantry in the Panama Canal Zone between 1931-1932, when he moved on to the post of technical advisor to the governor general of the Philippines. Although these prestigious, political posts seemed important, Ridgway really wanted a combat command.

As a major, Ridgway continued his military education when he attended the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth in 1935 and the Army War College in 1937. Between 1939-1942, Major Ridgway's assignments included assistant chief of staff for the Sixth Corps and a tour with the War Plans Division of the General Staff. Between July 1940 and August 1942, Ridgway attained the grades of lieutenant colonel, colonel, and brigadier general. However, he still lacked combat experience.

Ridgway's combat command begins in 1942. Ridgway was assigned to World War I's "All-American" 82nd Division, recently reactivated and converted to an airborne

division. For inspiration with the new airborne troops, Ridgway turned to the writings of Benjamin Franklin. In 1763, Franklin watched a balloon flight and later wrote to a friend:

It appears to be a discovery of great importance, and what may possibly give a new turn to human affairs . . . [for] where is the prince who can so afford to cover his country with troops for its defense as that ten thousand men descending from the clouds might not in many places do an infinite deal of mischief before a force could be brought together to repel them?

Ridgway believed Franklin's prediction would be proved on World War II's battlefields.

Ridgway wanted to instill pride and esprit de corps in his troops. His efforts do so included a speech by Alvin C. York, a member of the 82nd during World War I and a Congressional Medal of Honor winner. Additionally, to make the men more comfortable with the rigors of airborne training and to quell fears of flying, Ridgway arranged glider flight demonstrations. Ridgway also instilled confidence with a new division march.

Ridgway trained with his men and clearly understood the capabilities and limitations of airborne troops. In the next few years, Ridgway led his elite troopers into battle many times.

Ridgway led the newly outfitted 82nd Airborne Division against Axis forces in Sicily, Italy, and France between 1942-1944. During this time, events that greatly influenced Ridgway's character occurred. Before the Sicily drop, Ridgway ran afoul of Eisenhower. Lieutenant General "Boy" Browning led the British airborne and served on Eisenhower's staff. Browning angered Ridgway by ignoring the chain of command and treating airborne troops in Africa as his own toys. The British general pushed Ridgway too far when he requested invasion plans for Sicily.

Ridgway, concerned for his troops, sent a harsh reply. In an offensive tone, Ridgway wrote, "There were no plans for the Sicily invasion until such time as they had been approved by General Patton, my commander."⁶ Patton agreed with Ridgway's appraisal of the situation and stood up for him. Patton's support allowed Ridgway to maintain his command position. Ridgway received a stern lecture at Eisenhower's headquarters. This rebuke, however, did not prevent Ridgway from honestly expressing his opinion to his superiors when he felt it necessary to protect his men.

During the early World War II air drops, the airborne troops worked the kinks out of operations. Ridgway worked hard to instill confidence in his men. Ridgway often jumped with his troops and led them on the battlefield. In the spirit of General Patton, Ridgway liked to be at the front. To this end, he often moved his command post closer and closer to the action. In Sicily, Patton said, "That damned Ridgway has got his CP [command post] up where his outposts ought to be. Tell him to get it back."⁷ Ridgway felt it was a compliment from the hard-charging and much respected Patton. It was a point of honor for Ridgway that he willingly risked his life, but conscientiously protected the lives of his men.

As the Allies prepared for a drop near Rome in 1944, Ridgway expressed his concern to his superiors, who assured him that his lightly armed troops could take Rome from the entrenched Germans.⁸ Ridgway argued that plans placed his division beyond the range of fighter support and called for his troops to fight six good German divisions while relying upon the Italians for his logistics. Ridgway sought advice from Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff, and took his problem to Field Marshall Alexander, the Supreme

Commander in the Mediterranean. Dismissed by Alexander, Ridgway turned to his own resources and doggedly pursued a satisfactory solution.

Ridgway called his artillery commander, Maxwell Taylor and explained the problem to him. The two discussed the matter and came up with a risky plan for sending officers to Rome on a reconnaissance mission.⁹ It would be dangerous, but Ridgway knew it could save lives. Field Marshall Alexander rejected Ridgway's plan and the 82nd prepared for the its dangerous mission. Ridgway once again appealed to Bedell Smith. This resulted in a trip to Rome for Maxwell Taylor and Colonel Gardner of the Air Corps.

In the guise of capture airmen, these two soldiers went to Rome with the assistance of the resistance. Once in Rome, they reported the mission could not succeed as planned via code.¹⁰ The 82nd sat in the transport aircraft waiting to be deployed when the word arrived to abort the mission. Of this episode, in which Ridgway openly opposed his superiors and risked his career, Ridgway said:

When the time comes to meet my Maker, the source of most humble pride to me will not be accomplishments in battle, but the fact that I was guided to make the decision to oppose this thing, at the risk of my career, right up to the top . . . we saved the lives of thousands of brave men.¹¹

In the end, Ridgway's appraisal of the situation proved correct that the operation could become a meat-grinder, resulting in excessive casualties. In his memoirs, Ridgway reflected; "The most precious asset any nation has is its youth, and for a battle commander ever to condone the needless sacrifice of his men is absolutely inexcusable."¹² Although headquarters promised ground troops in five days, it actually

took them seven months to move into Rome. Ridgway's vision saved thousands of lives in this practical, but unpopular, action.

Ridgway felt the high command saw the airborne division as a new toy to be used in any battle. He cautioned that the airborne troops carried no heavy weapons so they had to rely on fighter-bombers in the place of heavy artillery.¹³ Placing airborne units beyond the range of this support, consigned them to slaughter. Additionally, airborne operations involved precise timing, logistics, and coordination for success. When General Mark Clark wanted to use the 82nd in a drop on Capua, Italy, Ridgway again protested and prevented what he saw as unnecessary loss of life.

In 1944, Ridgway took over command of the XVIII Airborne Corps in the European Theater of Operations and held that post until the German surrender in 1945. Ridgway's core values continued to develop during this service, as well as his relationships with various generals. The troops under Ridgway's direct command included James Gavin's 82nd Airborne, Maxwell Taylor's 101st Airborne, and Bud Miley's 17th Airborne.¹⁴

A message from General Hodges sent the XVIII from reserve duty into a new area. Gavin's 82nd Airborne Division went to Werbomont and Taylor's 101st drew duty in Bastogne.¹⁵ Taylor, however, was in Washington discussing airborne matters with General Marshall. Ridgway sent Taylor to argue that the airborne divisions should be increased from 8,000 to 15,000 men.¹⁶ Taylor carried this important message, but while he was away, the Germans counterattacked near Bastogne. This engagement turned into

the famous Battle of the Bulge. Marshall later increased the number of troops allowed in airborne divisions, as requested by Ridgway.

Although offered an ambassadorship after World War II, after much thought General Ridgway declined the political posting.¹⁷ While meeting with President Truman Ridgway said, “I want to make it clear . . . I am trained only as a soldier, and I make no pretense at being a diplomat.”¹⁸ General Marshall, an old friend, allowed Ridgway to determine his own future. The next time Marshall called Ridgway into his office, he offered him command of troops in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. “General,” said Ridgway, “I don’t even have to think that one over. That is a troop command. Nothing could please me more.”¹⁹ Ridgway found this duty difficult because politics forced him to demobilize the US Army. Ridgway reacted by harshly criticizing demobilization.

Ridgway witnessed demobilization and its effects after World War II. Reflecting on demobilization Ridgway said:

During that particular tour of duty [Commander in the Mediterranean Theater], I had the unhappy responsibility of tearing down a great military establishment . . . We were plunging headlong into the shameful demobilization of one of the greatest military organizations the world has ever see, the magnificent US Army that had won its full share in beating the German, Italian, and Japanese armies to their knees. We have paid dearly for that disgraceful demobilization in the years since the war, and we will suffer from the consequences of that unwise act for years to come.²⁰

Ridgway supported the policy that Secretary of War Stimson outlined in 1945. Stimson felt the United States achieved a pinnacle of leadership and influence in World War II. In

the time after the war, the United States needed to protect its position of power.

Outlining his views, Stimson stressed a need to maintain the military at a level capable of leading the world and a need to make the sacrifices necessary to keep that force at a high state of readiness.

Ridgway particularly disliked the process for demobilization in which troops with enough points went home regardless of the military's needs. Ridgway found it difficult to maintain combat readiness during this time. Losing key leaders hamstrung the post-World War II army. The men who replaced the battle-hardened veterans really did not want to be in the US Army. Ridgway's assessment of weakness materialized during the Korean War.

Ridgway's dilemmas in the Mediterranean included a situation in which he disobeyed orders to maintain the viability of the troops in his command. Higher headquarters ordered Ridgway to send nurses with enough points home immediately. Unfortunately, Ridgway had no replacements. "Obviously I could not permit these nurses just to walk off the job, so, on my own authority, taking full responsibility, I refused to release them until their replacements had arrived."²¹ Thus Ridgway's position again forced him to contradict orders. He faced no disciplinary action because his superiors later deemed his response reasonable. The stress of Ridgway's rigorous service soon pressured him toward retirement.

While inspecting the harbor at Trieste, Ridgway lost consciousness boarding a launch. When he awoke, doctors told him he suffered a heart attack. Dr. Dupuy said,

“There’s only one thing for you to do. You must ask to be relieved from duty and return to the United States. And in my opinion you must retire.”²² Ridgway, the veteran of many battles and commander of an important theater of operations, shortly replied to the doctor’s advice.

I’ll do nothing of the kind. I won’t even request return to the US for examination. If I did, it would mean the termination of my service. It would set in train a whole set of circumstances which never could be arrested, much less reversed. I’m going to stay her and do my job.²³

Ridgway made his decision quickly. He chose arduous duty in the service of his nation, although he knew the result could be invalidism or death.

On 1 January 1946, Ridgway received orders to represent General Eisenhower on the UN Military Staff Committee. He and his fellow officers endured the difficult, important task of negotiating with representatives of the USSR. Ridgway described the Soviets as “pouting children.”²⁴ The general greatly disliked his political posting at the United Nations. Later, Ridgway sent General Marshall a letter explaining his discontent with the assignment. Ridgway wrote,

We have dogged along like a hound on a dusty country lane, snuffling about under every bush, trying to find some trail that would lead us to mutual understanding and agreement. In the nine months of our existence, we have laid a firm and potentially useful basis of cordial personal relationships on which to build for the future. This is a material accomplishment, but beyond that, the results have been pitifully meager.²⁵

It is no surprise that duty at the United Nations disappointed the combat veteran who felt he should be protecting the interests of a command of troops.

While serving on this committee in London, Ridgway saw American soldiers protesting to go home. The episode disgusted him so much he wrote to Eisenhower. In

his normal, straight-forward manner Ridgway honestly expressed discontent to his superior. When Eisenhower answered Ridgway's letter, he admitted problems faced the military and informed the junior officer that an investigative board would work on such matters. Ridgway again helped set structure for the post-World War II military.

Ridgway moved to New York to continue work with the delegation. He continued to oppose the views of other officers on the committee, even when they outranked him. An Air Force general on the committee suggested that the entire US contribution should be air power. Ridgway fundamentally disagreed because he felt ground troops to be more vital to world security than complete reliance on air power. After conferring with General Eisenhower, Ridgway continued firm opposition to Kenney's proposal and ultimately his opposition helped defeat Kenney's proposal.²⁶

United Nations discussions centered on the contributions of each nation and service to the Security Council. The delegates came to no agreement. "We debated that point throughout the two and a half years I served with the Military Staff Committee, and today, nearly ten years later, it is still on the agenda, and is about as near solution now, so far as I know, as it was then."²⁷ Disgusted with the time he spent among bickering representatives, Ridgway gladly moved to a new assignment. However, before he left the committee Ridgway noted his observations to of Soviet actions and motives. Dean Acheson later used Ridgway's observations to formulate basic US policy toward the Soviets.²⁸

Next, Ridgway served as chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board. The general felt more comfortable in this capacity and the board later developed into the

Organization of American States.²⁹ In this capacity, Ridgway argued with the US State Department over Latin American defense policy. The State Department felt that military aid to Latin America propped up dictatorships and increased the threat of war. Ridgway, on the other hand, argued that, “the political, the military, and the economic are no longer separable. We must, therefore, make equally intense efforts to strengthen the military elements in this unique system.”³⁰

Staying in Latin America, Ridgway continued to work in the Caribbean Command as commander in chief from June 1948 until 1949.³¹ This assignment in Latin America pleased Ridgway because his family accompanied him to the post. Ridgway enjoyed more free time and spent it with his family and old friends in the region. Unfortunately, as other officers changed positions Ridgway faced reassignment. This time, he drew Pentagon duty.

Although he did not enjoy the Pentagon, Ridgway acted as Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration between 1949-1950.³² Desk duty did not appeal to Ridgway, but his opposition to current Defense Department theories seemed far more difficult to handle.

Ridgway recalled:

It was a time [post-World War II] to give a soldier deep concern, for in that period following the end of World War II, there was a growing feeling that in the armies of the future the foot soldier would play only a very minor role. Two factors stimulated this thinking—the earnest desire of the nation to cut down on its military expenditures, and the erroneous belief that in the atomic missile, delivered by air, we had found the ultimate weapon.³³

Ridgway understood the fallacies of these efforts, and his appraisal proved correct. He believed that troop strength in the Far East was inadequate, American troops performed police rather than security duties, and that these men needed more mental and physical preparation for battle.³⁴ Events soon confirmed Ridgway's fears when the war began in Korea.

On 21 June 1950, fighting began in Korea. High level commanders felt that air and naval power could handle this situation. Ridgway immediately realized the problems this caused. American troops lost ground and retreated from Chosin to the sea in late 1950. For a time, US forces faced the danger of massive casualties. "We were," in short, "in a state of shameful unreadiness when the Korean War broke out and there was absolutely no excuse for it. The only reasons a combat unit exists at all is to be ready to fight in case of sudden emergency."³⁵

Although great losses occurred, the troops narrowly avoided even more serious defeats. Unprepared troops soon fell back from Hamhung and regrouped from Pusan. Ridgway felt his desk job at the Pentagon meant very little during this time and he wanted to serve with the men on the front lines in Korea. General Joe Collins sent Ridgway to command of the Eighth Army when General Johnny Walker died in a jeep accident in December 1950.³⁶ Ridgway mourned Walker's death and prepared for arduous, front-line duty once again. Ridgway confirmed his fears concerning defense policy when he served in Korea.

Ridgway went to command an army suffering from low morale, poor supplies, and a host of other problems. Ridgway blamed demobilization for many of the problems the troops experienced in Korea.³⁷ Later, Ridgway said,

It was this bitter lesson, learned through experience in Korea at such a cost in blood and national prestige, that steeled me in my resolution later, when, as Chief of Staff, I protested with the greatest vehemence against 'economies' which would have placed us in the same relative state of ineffectiveness. When urged to cut combat forces in Korea below 100 percent strength, I reported to Mr. Wilson in writing, over my signature, that any such reductions would be made only on direct orders from competent authority.³⁸

To instill pride in NATO troops, Ridgway immediately issued orders prohibiting the use of tops on jeeps in the combat zone. He felt that if his men saw him endure the same hardships, it would raise their morale. Ridgway traveled in an open jeep even though he did not have a winter uniform. Additionally, Ridgway felt "a closed vehicle in a battle area put a man in the wrong frame of mind."³⁹ Ridgway reinforced troop positions along the Han River and prepared to restore the Army's prestige. The general told his men why they should fight. According to his appraisal, the enemy would attack on New Year's Eve so Ridgway prepared his troops. Again, his analysis proved correct.

At the front, Ridgway and Syngman Rhee encouraged troops to fight a delaying action that allowed the UN forces to retreat across the Han River and retrench. Through his efforts, Ridgway restored the confidence of a once beaten army. Reflecting, Ridgway agreed with the decision to stop the advance because it saved more lives. Ridgway led the Eighth Army from defeat and discontent to victory. He led from the front and

conditions were dangerous enough to require Ridgway to wear grenades on his web gear. Ridgway put his reputation on the line to pull UN troops through the Korean War.

Ridgway learned much from his Korean War service. Of the early idea that air and naval power alone could win the conflict in Korea, Ridgway reasoned,

All modern military history is filled with these records of failure in which a nation places its reliance on one single arm and learns too late that that arm will not suffice. It is a tragic lesson and its message is clear, but to date we have not learned from it, for we still find political leaders—and plenty in uniform too—forlornly hoping that we can defend ourselves, save ourselves, by choosing what appears to be the easiest, cheapest way.⁴⁰

Additionally, the general felt that loss of focus on artillery greatly hampered UN forces in Korea. Divisions worked with greatly reduced resources that hurt operational readiness and capability. Ridgway had little time to contemplate the war. At this time, Ridgway learned that President Truman had removed General Douglas MacArthur.

Although he had not known it, Ridgway became Supreme Commander in the Far East when MacArthur was removed. Ridgway soon received a promotion to full general in 1951. He filled the posts of American and Supreme Allied Commander in the Far East between 1951-1952. His next posting was to Europe.

In 1952, General Ridgway took over as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe until 1953. The general felt that his duties in Europe differed from those of his predecessor. Of the situation in Europe when he took over command Ridgway said,

General Eisenhower's job had been primarily a political one. Mine was essentially military. His was the task of using his great powers of charm and persuasion to bring together the nations of free Europe into a coalition for mutual defense—to get them to agree on a common plan of action. Mine was to get them to do what they had promised to do. He was the eloquent salesman who persuaded the housewife to subscribe to pretty

magazines. I was the So-and-So with the derby hat and cigar, who came around to collect at the first of the month.⁴¹

Ridgway felt his duty in Europe was constructive. He recounted, “when General Eisenhower went to SHAPE in 1950, there was practically nothing to prevent a Soviet advance overland to the English Channel.”⁴²

When Ridgway arrived troops on the continent numbered approximately those of an armored division. When Ridgway left, his legacy on the continent included fifteen divisions ready for service and more in reserve. Of the situation Ridgway said,

We had to increase our active land forces; we had to give higher priority to our air forces, we had to increase our overall supply levels, sometimes in critical shortage. We had to improve our training, a vital point, for the bravest men in the world, with the best arms and equipment in the world, are mere liabilities unless they are properly trained.⁴³

Later, Ridgway’s structure firmly withstood the Soviet threat during the Cold War.

NATO’s force structure, said Ridgway, “included air forces, atomic weapons, and troops in sufficient strength to meet the threat.”⁴⁴

Pentagon duty again removed Ridgway from combat command and placed him behind a desk. Ridgway understood his assignment as Chief of Staff and knew his career could only last two more years. The mandatory retirement age for troops on active duty was sixty. Although duty on the front lines-may have seemed more physically difficult, the issues at stake in the Pentagon made Ridgway’s last post as challenging as his combat commands. Apparently, his superiors anticipated some difficulty with Ridgway and long debated his appointment. In his memoirs Ridgway said, “There was quite a little delay, back in Washington, in arriving at a decision as to my future. In the spring of 1953,

Charles Wilson, the Secretary of Defense, and Robert Stevens, the Secretary of the Army, had visited Europe.”⁴⁵

Months later, Ridgway was confirmed as Army Chief of Staff. He took, the job seriously and felt honored to work with other notable military figures. Upon meeting Admiral Radford and General Twining, Ridgway tried to express his passion for his new post. “We must think, now, not in terms of our own arm of the service. We must broaden our concepts to embrace the defenses of the whole free world, by all the combat elements—land, sea, and air.”⁴⁶ However, good relations with his new colleagues did not develop.

Interservice rivalry reared its ugly head during Ridgway’s term. To the accusations that he possessed bias Ridgway replied, “I would like to say that I have never subscribed to the Air Force and Navy view that they should have the cream of the nation’s young men because of the greater complexity of their weapons and machines. All branches of the military today require men of the highest type, the Army no less than its sister services.”⁴⁷ Far more difficult than interservice rivalry was the tension between Ridgway and his civilian superiors.

Ridgway felt that the soldier serving the bureaucracy needed to honestly relate needs to goals. Under no circumstances could Ridgway understand the sacrificing of soldiers for political goals. Under Secretary of Defense Wilson, Ridgway lost two billion dollars in funding and a proportionate number of troops.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, Ridgway noted the country’s national production increased from \$360 billion to \$500 billion. Ridgway felt that \$2 billion would not “bankrupt the country” and that the military budget, “was

not based so much on military requirements, or on what the economy of the country could stand, as on political considerations.”⁴⁹ Political concerns being placed above military needs disgusted Ridgway.

Ridgway particularly argued with Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson.

Comparing his experiences with Secretary Robert Lovett to those with Secretary Wilson, Ridgway explained,

I had the greatest respect for Mr. Lovett as a dedicated, nonpartisan, public servant of the ideal type. Afterward, when I was Chief of Staff, beset by the many vexations and frustrations which I will discuss in detail later, I thought many times how much happier my service would have been—and how different, perhaps, the course of history—if I had been dealing with Mr. Lovett, instead of Mr. Wilson, as Secretary of Defense.⁵⁰

Of discussion with Secretary Wilson, Ridgway said, “The long and frequently fruitless sessions with Mr. Wilson often consumed half a working day.”⁵¹ Wilson also required the key members of Ridgway’s staff to attend these meetings. Meetings thus halted all other activity and hampered the Chief of Staff’s effectiveness.⁵² Ridgway’s conflicts with Wilson involved more than procedural differences.

Wilson, for example, wanted Ridgway to cut troop strengths in Europe to 85 percent and deactivate units.⁵³ Ridgway wrote his strong opinions on this matter and later presented them to Congress.⁵⁴ The general told Wilson that the Army could not be cut by 500,000 men nor could the budget fall from \$16.9 billion to billion without seriously weakening the Army.⁵⁵ Opposition and honesty did little to help Ridgway’s situation.

Ridgway felt betrayed when Eisenhower’s State of the Union message in 1954 included the following phrase, “the defense program recommended for 1955 . . . is based

on a new military program unanimously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”⁵⁶

The frustrated general had honestly presented his opposition to the plan before the announcement. The plan won Ridgway’s endorsement only with certain assumptions. Ridgway believed politics dictated defense policy more than security needs. “The Secretary of Defense,” Ridgway believed, “and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs were directed toward securing the unanimous assent of the country’s top military men to these pre-set plans.”⁵⁷

When Ridgway honestly expressed his objections to policies, the political actors in the administration tried to convince him to abandon his principles. Secretary Wilson repeatedly told Ridgway that suggestions came from the president, Ridgway’s commander-in-chief. This allusion to subordination did not scare Ridgway. After one such meeting with Wilson, Ridgway told him:

I had profound respect for the President’s military judgment. And I would hope that my views on military matters would always be in accord with his. However, I added, if my deep convictions led me to take an opposite view, I would adhere to that judgment until purely military arguments proved me wrong. I would not be swayed by arguments that what I advocated would be politically unacceptable, or that its cost was greater than the administration felt we could afford.⁵⁸

General Ridgway maintained that position in his later dealings with the administration. He wrote in one Chief of Staff’s report that he understood his duty to advise the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and the president.⁵⁹ In addition his advice, “should be based on my honest, fearless, objective estimate of what the Army needs to serve the national interest, and it should have no reference to the impact my recommendations might have on the national economy, on domestic politics, or on

administration policy at any particular time.”⁶⁰ Ridgway maintained his credibility for the rest of his career.

To critics, who accused Ridgway of wanting to bankrupt the United States for the sake of Army development, Ridgway replied with reasoned responses. First, he felt the economic situation in the United States was favorable to his budget. “Economists,” reported Ridgway, “predict[ed] that within the next five years the national production was going to rise from \$360 billion to \$500 billion.”⁶¹ The two billion dollars Ridgway wanted for the Army did not seem too high a price, in his mind, in light of the economic situation. Ridgway said, “The military budget was not based so much on military requirements, or on what the economy of the country could stand, as on political considerations.”⁶² Lastly, Ridgway felt that the Joint Chiefs should not be asked to endorse policies in public, if they recommended against them in closed meetings.⁶³

Ridgway also voiced discontent that, “76% of the proposed reduction was to be made in Army funds.”⁶⁴ Ridgway felt the Eisenhower administration relied too heavily on Massive Retaliation and did not take into account the need for selective retaliation. “My belief was simple,” explained Ridgway, “that we must possess the power of swift and devastating retaliation.”⁶⁵ However, Ridgway also saw a need for, “the capability for selective retaliation, the capacity to use one arm, or two, or all three.”⁶⁶

General Ridgway felt non-military planners did not understand the complexities of battle. He knew long-range bombers could not replace infantrymen. “What branch of the service is best equipped to ‘put out big fires or little ones wherever the communists

might set them’,” contemplated Ridgway. “The answer,” according to Ridgway, “is the . . . foot soldier, the man with a rifle.”⁶⁷

Ridgway argued that bombs could hamper a nation’s ability to wage war but not occupy the land. Ridgway asked, “who is going to move into the vacuum of chaos and destruction that the bomber creates, to assure that another evil conspiracy does not arise from the atomic avalanche?”⁶⁸ Ridgway considered Naval contributions and still felt the Army would hold the key to future victories.⁶⁹ The general reasoned:

Man is a land animal, his dwelling place is on the earth, and the Navy takes and holds no ground. Despite all the new and terrible weapons our generation has devised, the foot soldier is still the ultimate weapon. Wars are still fought for little bits of bloody earth, and they are ended only when the enemy’s will to resist is broken, and armed men stand victorious on his home soil.⁷⁰

Ridgway considered the impact of nuclear weapons and other innovations but felt unable to rely upon them totally. Of nuclear weapons, Ridgway said the following:

Under these conditions, since national objectives could not be realized solely by the possession of nuclear capabilities, no nation would regard nuclear capabilities alone as sufficient, either to prevent, or to win a war.⁷¹

General Ridgway disliked total reliance upon nuclear weapons, but his opposition did not end on that point. The general later spent more time outlining his views concerning nuclear weapons.

Ridgway outlined the weaknesses of nuclear weapons in several areas. First, Ridgway noted that only a limited number of nuclear weapons could be produced. Limited numbers of weapons further made reliance upon them less logical. Second, Ridgway believed nuclear weapons seemed vulnerable due to the difficulty of concealing

them. Ridgway realized that in the future many nations might possess nuclear weapons and proliferation would make them less decisive. Finally, Ridgway understood that nuclear weapons required a great deal of political maneuvering that might not always be practical.

In the area of reserve strength and reliance upon reserves, Ridgway raised criticism. Reserve components, Ridgway felt, could not mobilize in time nor serve as well as predicted.⁷² Ridgway did not feel that US security interests should be based totally on the contributions of NATO. Particularly, Ridgway felt uncomfortable relying on the development of the West German Army.

Additionally, the general knew cuts would hurt the morale of combat soldiers. Members of the administration suggested cutting servicemen's family benefits, PX privileges, dependent medical benefits, and guaranteed retirement benefits to reduce costs.⁷³ Ridgway disagreed and explained his point of view. Ridgway said that if benefits stayed the same, there would be a corresponding savings in training costs as satisfied soldiers re-enlisted. The general felt the suggested cuts, "would leave us dangerously overextended geographically, with a personnel base incapable of supporting the overseas deployment we had considered essential to our safety since the Korea War."⁷⁴

Ridgway voiced the opinion that superior firepower meant little if logistics functioned poorly. He learned this lesson in Korea. This related to his constant requests for air power support for the Army.

A wide choice of military means, resulting from properly proportioned, modernized forces, is required to fill the present large gap in effective deterrence resulting from the United States preoccupation with long-range bombers as the principle deterrent.⁷⁵

Ridgway said the Air Force overemphasized the long-range bombers and that the Army needed other types of planes. The Army needed transport planes, fire support planes, and logistical planes.

Air Force pilots, reasoned Ridgway, would not want to fly support aircraft. What pilot would want to fly a cargo or troop transport rather than a jet? The general felt that not giving the Army mobility and aerial fire support drastically hurt effectiveness.

Ridgway thought the nation focused too much on making the foot soldier obsolete. “It was clear to me,” said Ridgway, “as to every other even moderately intelligent infantry officer, that the army of the future must be very greatly dependent upon aircraft of one form or another.”⁷⁶ Ridgway saw a need for new types of aircraft and wanted to fund their development.

As Chief of Staff, Ridgway understood the types of aircraft the US Army needed to perform its missions. In the area of troop deliver and logistical support he felt the US did not, “possess that air armada now, nor do we yet have the prototype planes of which it might be composed.”⁷⁷ Of the Army’s needs he listed, “aircraft that can carry heavy loads, land on very rough fields or no fields at all, and take off after very short runs.”⁷⁸ Additionally, Ridgway thought helicopter development needed to focus on Army needs. He pointed out that no vehicle existed to replace the glider. Criticism to Ridgway’s viewpoint naturally emerged.

Critics claimed Ridgway did not feel the Air Force, as a new branch of the service, held as high an importance as the Army. Ridgway responded that as a paratrooper he served as a hybrid and he understood the need for air power. In his defense, the general stated:

The Army and Air Force have entirely different concepts of the numbers of planes of the various types we will need to fight the wars of the future. The Air Force thinks mainly in terms of bombers of longer and longer range, for so called 'massive retaliation,' and all-weather fighter planes of greater and greater speeds, which can protect this country from the intercontinental bombers of the enemy. These are essential, but they are not enough.⁷⁹

Thus, General Ridgway did not begrudge the Air Force its aircraft; however, he wanted his Army to have what it needed as well. Explaining his feelings concerning the air power conflict Ridgway said, "When a man is given a job to do, he is entitled to receive the means with which he can reasonably be expected to accomplish his mission."⁸⁰ Experiences from Korea created these opinions.

Ridgway replied to these critics that his ideas would remove a burden from the Air Force and allow the Army to complement, not replace, it. For example, the airmen really preferred to fly more glamorous aircraft than the heavy transports and flying gun platforms the Army needed. Allowing the Army to develop its own air support would also help relieve the Air Force's already overburdened budget. Ridgway concluded by saying, "All the reductions in the Army's strength, all the failure to provide for the Army the mobility and the aerial fire support it needs, is merely a reflection of the point of view which I have referred to before—the erroneous attitude that air is all powerful and the foot soldier is obsolete."⁸¹

As Chief of Staff, Ridgway worked on three main tasks. First, he needed to keep the Army from being subordinated to the other services. Second, he tried to make sure deployment and support matched commitments. Lastly, Ridgway tried to oversee an Army capable of implementing atomic weapons in its battle plans. Of his time as Chief of Staff, Ridgway said:

It was clear to me throughout my service that if it was our basic mission to keep the peace of the world, to deter aggression wherever it might appear, then it was my duty to create and keep in being combat-ready forces. It must be properly proportioned force of all arms, so deployed in danger spots around the world that each different component—land, sea, and air—can bring its own special forms of firepower most effectively to bear, as a member of a combined force of all arms. It must be adequately trained, properly armed, highly mobile, and strong in the active elements which can strike back without delay in answer to any armed attack.⁸²

Ridgway gave this goal all his efforts during his service on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As Ridgway left his post, his concerns centered on the future of his beloved Army. The administration he worked for considered some weighty problems that Ridgway felt would resurface. Many of Ridgway's predictions later occurred in Indo-China. For example, Ridgway served as an instrumental part of the Eisenhower policy team considering action in Vietnam. It was Ridgway that convinced Eisenhower not to intervene in the conflict. Ridgway feared a long war in Vietnam focusing too much on air power, supported by too few ground troops, and not properly understood or backed on the home front.⁸³ Ridgway predicted that US involvement might incur "losses and costs higher than Korea."⁸⁴ Ridgway expressed concern that:

Individuals of great influence, both in and out of government, raising the cry that now was the time, and here in Indo-China was the place to 'test

the New Look,' for us to intervene, to come to the aid of France with arms.⁸⁵

Of the commitment that these men wanted to make to the conflict in Vietnam Ridgway said, "the same old delusive idea was advanced—that we could do things the cheap and easy way, by going into Indo-China with air and naval forces alone."⁸⁶ Again, history later demonstrated Ridgway's vision in this matter. Before his death, Matthew B. Ridgway witnessed the tragedy in Vietnam.

General Matthew B. Ridgway served as Chief of Staff of the United States Army from 1953-1955. After dealing with a multitude of post-war problems including demobilization, training the South Korean Army, strengthening the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, managing crises in Indochina, and dealing with budgets cuts Ridgway retired in June 1955. Of his service as Chief of Staff Ridgway noted:

When I did retire at the age of sixty, there was some public speculation that I was forced into retirement, owing to the fact that my views on military matters did not coincide, in many fields, with those of my civilian superiors. I am well aware that my retirement as Chief of Staff may have been accepted by my superiors with a sense of relief. But I do want to make clear that the decision was my own, made long before any points at issue had arisen between me and the Department of Defense, and with the statutory right to retire at any time of my own choosing in well mind.⁸⁷

Matthew B. Ridgway published his memoirs in 1956 as well as a series of articles in the *Saturday Evening Post*. Ridgway's relationship with the press and his outspoken opinions continued to bother the Eisenhower administration. General Ridgway died in July 1993.

NOTES

1.General Matthew B. Ridgway, Testimony to Congress, March 1955. White House Office Files. Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Name Subseries, General Ridgway, Testimony to Congress, RE: Strength, March 1955, DDE Library.

2.Beast barracks refers to the harsh period of indoctrination that every new cadet at West Point experiences. Beast barracks is an immediate immersion into military discipline. Ridgway, Matthew B. *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (Harper and Brothers: New York, 1956), 23.

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4.Ibid., 13.

5.Ibid., 29.

6.Ibid., 67.

7.Ibid., 74.

8.Bradley Biggs, *Gavin* (Archon Books: Hamden, Connecticut, 1980), 47.

9.Ibid.

10.Ibid.

11.Ridgway, 82.

12.Ibid., 83.

13.Ibid., 94.

14.James M. Gavin, *On to Berlin*. (Viking Press: New York, 1978), 147.

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16.Ridgway, 114.

17.Ibid., 155.

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20.Ibid., 157.

21.Ibid., 158-159.

22.Ibid.,161.

23.Ibid.

24.Ibid., 164.

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30.Ridgway,174.

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33.Ibid., 190.

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36.Stephen Jurika, *From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam* (Hoover Institution Press: Stanford, 1980), 247.

37.Note to Radford, 18 July 1953, Box 27, Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, United States Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

38.Ridgway, 191.

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41.Ibid., 239.

42.Ibid., 241.

- 43.Ibid., 244.
- 44.Ibid., 245.
- 45.Ibid., 260.
- 46.Ibid., 266.
- 47.Ibid., 270.
- 48.Ridgway letter to Robert Stephens, 9 December 1953, Box 28, Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, United States Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
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- 50.Ibid., 234.
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- 52.James M. Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age* (Harper and Brothers, 1958), 155.
- 53.Ridgway, 286.
- 54.Iwan Morgan, *Eisenhower Versus 'The Spenders'*, (St. Martin's Press: New York, 1990), 55.
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- 57.Matthew B. Ridgway, "My Battles in War and Peace." *The Saturday Evening Post*, 21 January 1956, 46.
- 58.Ridgway, 287.
- 59.Ridgway letter to Wilson, 27 June 1955, from *US News and World Report*, 29 July 1955, 74.
60. Ibid.
- 61.Ridgway, 272.
- 62.Ibid.
- 63.Ridgway letter, 74.
- 64.Ridgway, 272.

- 65.Ibid., 274.
- 66.Ibid.
- 67.Ibid., 290.
- 68.Ibid.
- 69.Ridgway letter, 74.
- 70.Ridgway, 290.
- 71.Ridgway letter, 71.
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- 73.Ridgway, 307.
- 74.Ibid., 304.
- 75.Ridgway letter, 72.
- 76.Ridgway, 312.
- 77.Ibid., 313.
- 78.Ibid.
- 79.Ibid., 312.
- 80.Ibid., 311.
- 81.Ibid., 316.
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- 83.No Author, "What Ridgway Told Ike," *US News and World Report*, 25 June 1954, 30.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
GENERAL JAMES M. GAVIN
THE POLITICS OF SOLDIERING

“I’ll not be a party to another Korea and this is what the country is facing up to.”¹

Although Dwight D. Eisenhower firmly supported his administration’s defense policy, General James Gavin opposed New Look’s reliance on the doctrine of massive retaliation. Rather than compromise his principles, Gavin served his country until he could no longer do so. Gavin’s disagreements with the Washington military establishment and the administration made him a casualty of the New Look conflict.

James Gavin’s life began with hardship. Gavin’s parents died before he reached the age of two, and a Pennsylvania family adopted him.² Gavin searched for his ancestors but failed to find even his birth parents. His adoptive parents taught him the qualities of hard work, discipline, and honesty. These characteristics allowed Gavin to advance quickly in the United States Army. Eventually, Gavin’s character and beliefs forced him to retire rather than give up his principles concerning national defense policy.

Although Gavin possessed no plans for a career, he joined the United States Army in an effort to escape the coal mines. Gavin joined the Army when he was seventeen under false pretenses.³ After a short period of service Gavin’s superiors noticed his potential and selected him from the enlisted ranks for a slot at the United States Military Academy.⁴ Despite having only an eighth grade education, Gavin passed the West Point entrance exams.⁵ Gavin successfully completed four years at West Point and studied the

strategy and tactics of great captains. Even without combat experience, Gavin realized that air power and mobility held the potential to decide future wars.

Gavin commanded the elite 82nd Airborne Division during World War II. In combat, Gavin led his troops with an M-1 Garand and always jumped from the first aircraft. He felt that other commanders had lost touch with their troops by not being up front on the battlefield. Thus, Gavin jumped with his troops in several World War II operations. Along with the elite paratroopers of his units, he parachuted into Sicily, Normandy, and Holland.⁶ Since he observed airborne operations from the perspective of the troops, Gavin presented significant ideas concerning drop zone accuracy, ground fire exposure, and unit integrity that other tacticians missed. His innovations and ideas still apply to airborne operations today.

At the end of World War II and after the occupation of Berlin, Gavin led the 82nd Airborne in the Victory Parade down 5th Avenue in New York City.⁷ Gavin, always a man of principle, insisted that all the troops in his command march in the parade. This included the black troops of the 555th.⁸ Gavin, as commander of the 82nd at Fort Bragg, later supervised the desegregation of airborne units and airborne training. To Gavin, the Triple Nickels were paratroopers like all others. Gavin even worked with Fayetteville authorities to better relations between locals and black troops stationed at Fort Bragg.

The post World War II demobilization frustrated Gavin, especially the point program that sent troops back to the states without regard for military needs. Gavin said, "It [the point system] came close to destroying the military establishment."⁹ According to Gavin, the military faced huge burdens administratively after the war. The point system

removed troops too quickly. Replacements could not be found. The structure of the military simply destructed as cooks, medics, and clerks packed their bags and went back to civilian life.

During his post-war service as commander of the 82nd, Gavin evaluated and tested the usefulness of the helicopter to airborne operations. The Air Force controlled the acquisition of helicopters and expressed little interest in procuring any for the Army. Gavin said, “It was a frustrating experience trying to sell the idea of air mobility and its rapidly expanding field of tactical application.”¹⁰ After pursuing helicopter procurement through the proper channels, Gavin hit an impasse. The Director of Requirements of the Air Force told him,

I am the Director of Requirements and I will determine what is needed and what is not. . . . The helicopter is aerodynamically unsound. . . . It is no good as an air vehicle and I am not going to procure any. No matter what the army says, I know it does not need any.¹¹

Gavin understood the importance and innovation of the helicopter long before it proved itself in the Korean War.

General Gavin served in Korea and endured hardship like the men of his command. He felt responsible for logistical and equipment difficulties during the conflict.¹² Particularly, Gavin advocated more funding and greater mobility in the United States Armed Forces.¹³ In general, Gavin wanted to build a stronger military because he saw the military deteriorate after World War II and feared a repeat of such mistakes. Gavin realized such policy failures cost lives on the battlefield.

Gavin's next assignments placed him in Washington as Deputy Chief of Plans and Research in early 1955 and Army Chief of Research and Development in October 1955. In this assignment, Gavin learned how military politics worked. Congress would ask if cuts were possible and the Army would reply that it could not reduce troops and maintain commitments. Congress next asked where the Army would make cuts if it were able to do so. When the Army replied to this query, Congress made those cuts and thanked the Army for recommending an affordable program.¹⁴

In 1956, Gavin's frustration over limitations on the Army increased. The Army had to limit "the range of surface-to-air missiles to two hundred miles."¹⁵ Gavin disliked this policy because Army missiles already had greater range than 200 miles. Additionally, the Department of Defense limited the weight of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters to five thousand pounds and ten thousand pounds, respectively.¹⁶ Gavin, always an advocate for research and development, felt hampered by these political limitations. Later, because of these restrictions, the Army lacked the ability to "air lift a single division either tactically or strategically."¹⁷

Although he acted as a strategic planner in the post World War II Pentagon, Gavin felt uncomfortable with his role of Chief of Research and Development for the Army.¹⁸ Gavin attended nuclear weapons school and helped develop the 280 millimeter gun, better known as the atomic cannon.¹⁹ This weapon filled the need for tactical battlefield nuclear weapons. However, the general never felt that the future held a need for a massive nuclear attack. Rather, General Gavin thought nuclear weapons should be, "smaller and more useful, more flexible in their applications."²⁰ Gavin later stated, "I

think they [nuclear weapons] are here to stay, and we would be absolutely foolish not to develop the most useful, best controlled weapon. We may need them very badly.²¹

At a subcommittee meeting on preparedness in December 1957, Lieutenant General Gavin expressed his plans to retire.²² Retirement seemed the only option for a man disenchanted with the New Look national defense policy that the Eisenhower administration doggedly pursued. Gavin's plans shocked many in Washington's military and political circles, but he had struggled with his conscience as long as he felt able to do so.

After four years of service in Washington DC, General Gavin could no longer work in Research and Development. Gavin cited his wife's discontent with political bickering as well as growing tension in his reasons for announcing his retirement.²³ Additionally, he believed Army development and preparations in the next five years to be of great importance. Gavin thought artificial limitations hampered Army preparedness. The general feared another period of deterioration similar to that after World War II and additional bloodshed in another Korea.

Specifically, Gavin listed the use of paper divisions and unrealistic restrictions on Army aircraft as major problems.²⁴ An example of a paper division was the grouping of soldiers stationed in Alaska with those stationed in Florida. Realistically, these troops cannot function as a unit. Gavin called the pairings "Wilson" divisions because Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson advocated them.²⁵ By using these divisions, the administration implied that divisions were not reduced as manpower dwindled. Finally,

Gavin felt a unified command staff should replace the Joint Chiefs of Staff to increase the efficiency of the United States military and to counter inter-service rivalry.²⁶

Gavin's idea about replacing the Joint Chiefs proved controversial. The general felt the individual service chiefs worked against each other. Of the operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gavin said:

The marines are only there presumably for matters of concern to the Marine Corps, the others were there for a time, but the Marines make it a point to be there all the time anyway. They checkmate each other. You find the Chief of Staff of the Air Force will want a B-1 in the program and you want a new Trident submarine so I'll support you and you support me and the Army doesn't need anything now and the divisions aren't very glamorous anyway. The interests of national defense are secondary to the interests of the particular services.²⁷

As Gavin's theory concerning the Joint Chiefs surfaced, criticism of the general developed. Gavin handled all criticism. In response to charges that the Army did not manage its missile and satellite development programs very well, Gavin said the Joint Chiefs checkmated his actions.

According to a 1975 interview, the Joint Chiefs ordered Gavin not to launch a satellite in 1956.²⁸ This was a year and a half before the Army took a beating for not sending up a satellite when the Soviets launched Sputnik. Gavin said he felt, "Like the kids out there with their radars out of Oahu, seeing the Japanese planes coming and couldn't get anybody convinced that's what they were looking at."²⁹ Discontent with the Joint Chiefs led to additional trouble for Gavin.

At a congressional hearing in early December 1957, Gavin told Congress that he felt the Joint Chiefs should be reorganized.³⁰ At the same time, he announced his plans to

retire. Gavin's announcement shocked the Senate Subcommittee on Preparedness and angered Eisenhower. According to Gavin, Eisenhower held particular fondness for the Joint Chiefs structure because he served as the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.³¹

Soon after his departure from the meeting, the subcommittee recalled him and tried to convince him to reconsider retirement. Meanwhile Maxwell Taylor, "dressed me down a bit for recommending this, and that's the way it went."³² Although Gavin reconsidered his decision, he eventually refused to change his retirement plans. Amid media speculation and criticism from many Gavin stated, "It is a sad and difficult moment, but one must live with one's self."³³ He planned on retiring in March 1958. Gavin said the letters he received from soldiers raised his spirits, but it was because of those men's lives that he could not continue service in a weakening United States Army.

Critics in the military responded and said Gavin just wanted a promotion to the rank of four-star general. Additionally, critics felt he wanted a choice assignment in the United States Army rather than a command his superiors suggested. The Pentagon offered Gavin a fourth star and command of the Seventh US Army stationed in Germany. Arguments for these actions included the idea that Gavin seemed wound up from his tenure fighting politicians and bureaucrats in Washington and the fact that as a combat soldier Gavin simply needed a field command. In addition, the Pentagon felt he possessed the charisma to lead the critically important Seventh Army successfully.

Gavin disagreed with the justifications for the offer of command of the Seventh Army. The general felt the Army tried to bribe him. General Maxwell Taylor told Gavin

that if he would stay in Washington DC at his post, then he would be sent to the German command. Of the situation Gavin said, "I was going to be kept on to defend a budget I could not agree to and I simply could not go along, and I decided to retire."³⁴ Gavin added that he felt command of the Seventh Army simply served as a way of sending him away from the controversy and keeping him quiet.

Analyzing the situation, Gavin said, "People were lying an awful lot then. And I can't help but feel that this was the beginning of some of the things that led to things that happened in Vietnam."³⁵ To explain his statement, Gavin recounted the questions posed by a subcommittee about future wartime casualty figures. Gavin said,

When Senator Dunn, a Republican, a died-in-the-wool Republican, a devoted follower of Eisenhower looks across the counter at me at the hearing and said, 'General, what would the casualties be if the present nuclear war plans were carried out?' I know what they would be, they would be 425,000,000 people killed. And that would included Greeks, Turks, Poles, Czechs, Japanese all over the place. And this is why I opposed it. But I couldn't tell them that, I would have been attacked for being an antistaff and therefore, against massive retaliation and testifying against it. So, I said, 'You better get the answer from someone in Strategic Air Command, but I can tell you its' going to be on the order of several hundred million casualties.'³⁶

According to Gavin, he did not release this testimony, but received a lecture for it anyway.

Gavin garnered some criticism for not arguing his case and his views on defense policy at this time. Gavin explained, "A lot of people still wonder why I didn't defend myself more vigorously; because defending myself would have been attacking General Taylor and Admiral Radford and a lot of people, for doing things that were absolute wrong."³⁷ Gavin felt the truth would come out later and it was not his place to attack

these men of national stature. Internal weakness catered to the needs of the enemy.

Additionally, he remained vulnerable to the threat of a court-martial, as long as he served in the military.

Gavin's views may be tainted by the fact that his relationship with General Maxwell Taylor never worked. Dislike for Taylor's methods went back to Gavin's days at West Point. At that time, Gavin served as a cadet first sergeant. During the summer, Taylor served as tactical officer of Gavin's company. According to Gavin, "He [Taylor] showed not the slightest interest in the troops; he didn't give a damn about them."³⁸ Gavin said, he never wanted to serve under Taylor because he was, "cold and impersonal. He wasn't interested in the troops at all. He was just interested in himself, in being protected."³⁹ Additionally, Gavin described Taylor as, "brilliant, very intelligent . . . so ambitious that he is almost ruthless in trying to satisfy that ambition."⁴⁰ Gavin never doubted Taylor's intelligence, just his creativity and judgment.

Taylor and Gavin also served together in World War II. Gavin commanded the 82nd Airborne Division and Taylor the 101st. These two units competed for glory on the battlefield. As the war came to a close, Taylor tried to keep the 101st on active duty and Gavin wanted the 82nd to stay active. In the days of troop reductions following World War II, planners told the leaders that there would be only one airborne division. Taylor's political resources were more numerous and it seemed that his division would be retained. However, after Gavin's troops served in Berlin it was he who led the victory parade down 5th Avenue, not Taylor.

Of his days with Taylor, Gavin explained that he believed the Army wanted a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs so badly, it overlooked Taylor's shortcomings and tried to extend help for him to reach that goal. According to Gavin, the Army sent several very capable colonels as advisors to Taylor, but Taylor, "cut their throats and scattered ten to the four winds."⁴¹ These officers often postulated alternatives to Massive Retaliation but Gavin said, "Well, Taylor was absolutely ruthless with them, because it hurt his chances, you see."⁴² Gavin claimed self interest ruled Taylor's judgment. Taylor's actions influenced Gavin's retirement in other ways.

According to Gavin, he requested a transfer to an airborne command after serving two years in Washington. Taylor played Gavin and repeatedly told him he would get the command he desired. After three years, Gavin knew Taylor did not plan to transfer him to an Airborne unit. Gavin pursued his retirement and made the following promise to himself, "I will not stay in Washington more than four years under any circumstances."⁴³ As the third year expired and the fourth approached, Taylor called on Gavin and told him, "Well, I've decided to keep you on beyond the fourth year and make an exception to the policy and so on."⁴⁴ Gavin replied, "I'll retire right now."⁴⁵ He returned to his office and completed the necessary paperwork.

In the years after his retirement, Gavin searched for a job in the civilian sector to augment his meager pension. After reviewing numerous offers, Gavin decided he could work for a small firm called Arthur D. Little. ADL provided research and development. Gavin, who always expressed an interest in new ideas, succeeded as a leader at ADL. His work at ADL allowed Gavin to write extensively on defense issues.

James Gavin published *War and Peace in the Space Age* in 1958. In addition to this book describing his struggles with Washington politics Gavin continued to produce opinions in other works. Gavin also wrote *Crisis Now* and *On to Berlin*. In addition to his books, Gavin explained defense issues to a variety of audiences from the people who read *Reader's Digest*, to the military planners, who read his articles in trade journals.

Although no longer serving in the active military structure, Gavin continued to serve his country after his retirement. Gavin served as United States Ambassador to the court of Charles de Gaulle in 1961-62. At Gavin's request, the company allowed him to take a leave of absence to serve in the Kennedy administration. Critics expressed dismay at Gavin's appointment, but the old soldier served admirably in his diplomatic post.

Always willing to speak out on defense matters, Gavin urged the end of the Vietnam war by whatever means available in 1966. He felt the war would cost far too many American lives because of defense strategies in use at the time. American policy simply prevented victory.⁴⁶ Always willing to express a controversial opinion Gavin said, "I do not for a moment think that if we should withdraw from Vietnam the next step would be Waikiki."⁴⁷ With that statement, Gavin became the first notable military figure to speak against the domino theory. Gavin died in 1990 at the age of 82.⁴⁸

Never straying from his principles, this combat soldier opposed New Look's policy of Massive Retaliation. Gavin favored nuclear weapons but in a more flexible plan. He ended his military career over disagreements with the Eisenhower administration's defense plans. The general felt that the Army received too little in the budget, that the Joint Chiefs represented a flawed system, and that deception in

Washington would lead to many problems in the future. Gavin did not want to see young men die on foreign battlefields as a result of the administration's defense policy.

Additionally, his personal conflict with Admiral Arthur Radford and General Maxwell Taylor contributed to his desire to leave the service. This soldier had a conscience and could no longer deceive Congress, so he left his beloved Army.

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CHAPTER 5:

GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

A DIFFERENT LOOK

“If we act in consistence with the principle of deterrence, we should make ample provisions for those forces contributing to the deterrence of general war, the deterrence of local aggression, and the defeat of local aggression before seeking to satisfy the full requirement for survival or victory in general war.”¹

Maxwell Taylor joined the New Look debate on 30 June 1955 when he became US Army Chief of Staff.² Taylor tried to work with his superiors and colleagues in the Eisenhower administration; however, New Look soon forced him into the role of opposition leader. General Taylor, a brilliant analyst, saw the fallacies of Massive Retaliation strategy and suggested that Flexible Response replace it. Eisenhower, unwilling to reshape New Look, forced Taylor to lead the opposition against the administration.

Maxwell D. Taylor was born in Keytesville, Missouri in 1901. He graduated fourth in his class at the United States Military Academy in 1922. Taylor exhibited excellent ability with languages while at West Point, so the Army posted him in Europe to learn French. While in Paris, Taylor also learned Spanish. He returned to West Point and taught those two languages for five years before being sent to the Far East.³

In the Far East, Taylor spent his spare time learning more languages. The young officer added Japanese, Italian, and German to his capabilities. Maxwell Taylor attended the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth between 1933 and 1935.⁴ He also completed training at the Army War College. World War II interrupted Taylor’s education but only temporarily.

Taylor helped develop airborne doctrine in World War II as commander of the 101st Airborne Division. He accompanied his troops on jumps and was the first American general to land in Normandy in 1944.⁵ Taylor and his troops parachuted into Holland in Operation Market Garden in 1944. The final big battle for Taylor's 101st Airborne was to hold the Germans back at Bastogne in the Battle of the Bulge.

Taylor acted as soldier and diplomat in World War II operations. Eisenhower sent Taylor into occupied Italy in 1943 to negotiate the Italian surrender.⁶ Taylor went into Rome, a city still fully occupied by the Germans, in full uniform and stayed there for 24 hours negotiating with the Italians.⁷ After completing the negotiations, Taylor carefully made his way through the enemy lines to rejoin his troops.

After the war, Taylor became superintendent at West Point between 1944 and 1949. Continuing his trend of modernizing and improving, the general added economics and political science to the curriculum at West Point.⁸ In 1949, Taylor served as Chief of Staff for American Forces in Europe. Beginning in 1949, General Taylor was commander of the American Military Government and of US Army forces in Berlin for three years. During Taylor's tenure in Berlin, he dealt with the political problem and aftermath of the Berlin Airlift.⁹ In his spare time, Taylor added Chinese to his list of languages.

Taylor returned to combat duty in 1953, when he was posted to Korea to command the Eighth Army. He immediately bought an English-Korean dictionary and started learning the local language.¹⁰ By 1954, Taylor moved up to become commander

of the US Army Forces in the Far East. General Taylor became US and United Nations commander in chief in the Far East in March 1955.

In May 1955, Taylor returned to Washington. In June 1955 he took over as Chief of Staff of the US Army when Matthew Ridgway retired. Taylor served as Army Chief of Staff until he retired in 1959. Taylor's brilliant military career ended only temporarily. In 1961, John F. Kennedy asked Taylor to serve as his personal military advisor. Between 1962 and 1964, Taylor served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He retired from the military again in 1964 to become United States Ambassador to South Vietnam, a post he held until 1965. In 1965, Taylor joined the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (FIAB) of President Lyndon B. Johnson. Taylor served on the FIAB until 1969.

Historically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had always offered nonpolitical advice to the secretary of defense, the National Security Council, and the president.¹¹ Chiefs, as military professionals, honestly offered their opinions without regard to political or economic factors. Under questioning by Congress, the chiefs sometimes disagreed with their civilian superiors. Following early difficulties, the Eisenhower administration attempted to change the role of the service chiefs in defense policy.¹² General Taylor said the changes would, "plague the formulation of our military strategy."¹³

President Eisenhower replaced General Bradley with Admiral Arthur Radford. According to Taylor, the switch took place because Radford preferred Pacific/Asian affairs to European affairs and because Bradley strongly believed in the military policies of the Truman administration.¹⁴ In an effort to avoid more troublesome disagreements between the administration and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Wilson interviewed

prospective candidates and questioned their loyalty to the administration. The administration looked for appointees who possessed team spirit and a willingness to follow the orders of civilian superiors. The administration wanted controllable chiefs.

Secretary Wilson interviewed General Taylor for the position of Army Chief of Staff in 1955. Of the incident, Taylor said: "As was his custom, Mr. Wilson did not get down to brass tacks at once but approached the real issue by way of a long, rambling discussion of conditions in the Orient. He began to cross-examine me on my readiness to carry out civilian orders even when contrary to my own views."¹⁵ General Taylor, after serving for almost forty years without any difficulty following orders said that he could follow civilian orders. Next, on February 24, the president met with Taylor and discussed the same issues. After passing the first two rounds of interviews, Taylor learned the extent of planned control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Wilson told Taylor the type of cooperation he would expect after the general accepted the post of Chief of Staff of the Army. The administration wanted the chiefs to:

Avoid submitting contentious or embarrassing recommendations . . . accept responsibility for the actions of the administration in the field of military policy, regardless of their own views . . . and avoid any impression of disunity that in public or before Congress.¹⁶

In order to enforce these demands, the new chiefs would receive no specified term of office. The normal procedure involved a two year term. The implication of this alteration in policy was that discontent could result in punishment. The new joint chiefs operated in a tense environment.

The general encountered some policies held over from the earlier work of the joint chiefs. For example in December 1953, Eisenhower's earlier appointees had created the generalities for troop requirements from 1953 to 1957.¹⁷ Manpower requirements for the United States forces were set at about 2,800,000 men and the Army's proposed strength included about 1,000,000 men.¹⁸ The administration estimated the cost of this force at approximately \$34 billion.¹⁹ When Taylor joined the Joint Chiefs in 1955, even these assumptions were attacked by the budget-conscious administration. Cuts in manpower in the United States Army were directly related to the modernization of nuclear air forces. Taylor's discontent with New Look began to grow.

General Taylor disliked New Look because it, "could offer our leaders only two choices, the initiation of general nuclear war or compromise and retreat."²⁰ Atomic weapons, according to Taylor simply did not ensure the security of the United States and its allies. Taylor did not believe massive retaliatory power provided the needed deterrent to all aggression. Taylor said, "In the final analysis, sizable ground forces must be used if the enemy, his people and his land are to be brought under control."²¹

In 1952 the United States announced the existence of a "megaton weapon" after tests at Enewetok, and the Soviets exploded a hydrogen bomb in August 1953. As Soviet atomic capability evolved, the relative advantage of Massive Retaliation waned. Taylor understood the long-term effect Massive Retaliation had on the American defense structure. He said,

We have lost our atomic monopoly. We are probably inferior to the USSR in numbers of ballistic missiles. We have no antiballistic missiles as a defense to offset this superiority in offense. We have made no realistic

effort to cope with Communist strength on the ground. Anemia is afflicting many of our military alliances.²²

Taylor tried to explain the fact that no weapon could replace men on the battlefield; however, his superiors wanted to rely on the new technology. Taylor's viewpoint was that men would use these new weapons, not be replaced by them.²³

New Look failed to address the threat of limited war. According to General Taylor, "While our massive retaliatory strategy may have prevented the Great War—a World War III—it has not maintained the Little Peace."²⁴ Many notable incidents occurred after 1945 that proved the seriousness of the threat of limited war. General Taylor cited the Chinese civil war, guerilla warfare in Greece, and the guerilla war in Vietnam as instances when weapons of mass destruction proved less than appropriate.

In addition, General Taylor noted that the trouble in Hungary, Taiwan, Laos, and the Middle East could not be solved simply with nuclear weapons. Taylor said, "The atomic weapon has existed since 1945, and during this period several wars have been fought, but no atomic weapons have been used at all, anywhere."²⁵ Additionally, Taylor feared that, "a limited war which we cannot win quickly may result in our piecemeal attrition or involvement in an expanding conflict . . ."²⁶ The American experience in Vietnam appears to have proved General Taylor's fears were correct.

New Look focused almost all resources on air forces and ignored the continued need for ground troops. This premise is based on the theories of General Giulio Douhet, outlined in his book *The Command of the Air*, who believed that the strategic bombing of industrial centers could win future wars. Douhet published his thoughts in the years

between World War I and World War II. Events of World War II indicate that although massive bombing can physically devastate a nation, it does little to reduce output and support for the war. However, Douhet's theories still retained popularity after the war in circles supporting strategic air force development.

Perhaps the atomic explosions that ended the Japanese efforts against America solidified this view. General Taylor aptly pointed out that, "Nuclear weapons began to exert an important influence on military policy . . . although their capabilities, limitations, and political implications were only vaguely understood."²⁷ Nuclear weapons, to the American planners, offered a cheap way to fight a war in which "manpower" met with "mechanical power."²⁸ Great numbers of Communists could be overwhelmed by American technology. This idea is summed up in the slogan, "More bang for a buck."²⁹ And yet, America's experience in the Korean War had shown that it was ground troops holding hilltops that won wars, not atomic superiority.

According to General Taylor, the reasons to not use atomic weapons outnumbered the reasons to employ them. In the political arena planners feared that using a costly weapon on a secondary enemy might cause trouble. First of all, Pentagon leaders wanted to preserve the surprise effect of atomic weapons for a situation of greater need. Additionally, one had to consider the international reaction to the use of atomic weapons. Other countries might react against our allies for atomic weapon use; our allies might disapprove of atomic weapon use; and the nation where the atomic bombs were used might not want to deal with the aftermath. In the back of their minds, many planners also questioned the effectiveness of weapons of mass destruction. However, these objections

did not stop the rise of the theory of Massive Retaliation because planners wanted a cheap, simple solution to costly, bloody war.

Ground troop numbers withered after World War II and under New Look. Policy makers assumed that reserves of trained men and supplies need not be maintained because limited wars would not occur. This saved budget dollars for more aircraft. Army expenditures decreased in “Fiscal Years 1948, 1949, and 1950, while Air Force expenditures showed a sharp upward turn.”³⁰ The Army, according to Taylor, fell from a strength of “eighty-nine divisions in 1945 to ten divisions in 1950.”³¹ America paid for these mistakes when the Korean War began. The Army long remembered what branch suffered the most loss of life in the bloody Korean Conflict.

As early as 1954, the need for a new approach appeared in the writings of noted cold warriors such as George F. Kennan. In *The Realities of American Foreign Policy*, a book written in 1954, Kennan said, “the day of total war has passed . . . from now on limited military operations are the only ones which could conceivably serve any coherent purpose.”³² Perhaps Kennan had evaluated the fall of Dien Bien Phu or other world events before writing his opinion. Other sources also understood the need for policy review, but the process proved long and difficult. In January 1955, the National Security Council reviewed the 1953 New Look statement. Although the National Security Council recognized a need for plans involving “mutual deterrence” and “versatile, ready forces” to fight “limited aggression” little changed in written plans.³³

Taylor began 1956 with a new set of objectives. Taylor said he wanted to increase the range of Army artillery. He also wanted to increase development of the Reserves.³⁴

An interview in *US News and World Report* in February quoted the general as saying, “We’re very anxious as always to develop our Reserve; that’s an area in which we’ve never been satisfied with progress.”³⁵ Taylor knew that the nation’s war plans included a reliance on reserve forces he considered unready. The general knew it would be at least three years before America could rely on Allied forces from countries like Germany.

Taylor also restated his earlier feelings on the need for ground forces. “The warmaking resources of any enemy, as well as our own, are rooted in the ground, so that the final acts of any war, regardless of what may have occurred beforehand, will inevitably be those of the ground forces.”³⁶ In another break with administration policy Taylor said, “It seems to me that, as the day of atomic parity approaches, no sane leader of any country will ever embark intentionally on this kind of big war.”³⁷ Taylor wanted to develop more weapons that could fire either conventional or nuclear ammunition. Taylor said he felt the administration needed an army of 1,025,000 quality men to do its job.³⁸ The Army also faced a problem in airlift because it could not transport even a division on its own.

General Taylor felt America still needed a strong military to meet the challenges of the cold war. “We still have no push-button method of waging war,” said Taylor, “and the man . . . who lives under the gun for a long period of time is still the man who wins the battle in the end.”³⁹ To prove his point, Taylor brought up the American experience in the Korean War. “We had,” explained Taylor, “the greatest Navy in the world in the waters around Korea; we had the greatest Air Force in the sky overhead—the

purpose of all of which was to help a few men to seize an objective on the ground.”⁴⁰

Men win wars with weapons; weapons do not function nearly as well without men.

Taylor revealed his theories to his colleagues at Ramey Air Force Base in March 1956. General Taylor noted that all services had a role to play in future wars. He ended his presentation with the idea that Massive Retaliation “offers only unlimited destruction with nothing beyond.”⁴¹ Secretary Wilson and the other chiefs allowed Taylor to speak but politely set aside his views. In the budgetary discussion that followed Taylor’s presentation, the chiefs recognized a need for up to \$40 billion a year, excluding foreign aid, until 1960.⁴² The administration did not believe the nation could support a defense budget of more than \$36 billion and convinced Admiral Radford of necessary cuts.

Admiral Radford’s analysis led to suggested cuts in conventional forces in July 1956. While debating this proposal, Taylor witnessed the disagreements among the Joint Chiefs of Staff at their worst. Radford’s proposal would provoke Taylor’s outright opposition to administration policy. Beginning in 1957, the Radford initiative would “reduce Army deployments in Europe and Asia . . . to small atomic task forces. Resistance to hostile ground attack would be left to these token US forces, supplemented by the indigenous forces of our allies. The Army in the United States was also to be greatly reduced and limited primarily to civil defense missions. The business of fighting limited wars would be given to air and naval forces, with the Marines doing the ground fighting.”⁴³ General Taylor understood the ramifications of this policy and attacked it on July 9, 1956, because he knew it would undermine alliances and basically eliminate the

US Army.⁴⁴ Taylor's opposition led to the defeat of Radford's initiative. However, Taylor's troubles began in earnest with the Radford proposal.

Someone in the administration leaked to the press the proposed cut to 800,000 men in the Radford plan, and it appeared on the front page of the *New York Times*.⁴⁵ As the administration focused on finding the leak, the world reacted to the announcement. The Germans sent a representative to the United States to determine the size of actual cuts. The German representative left only after Secretary Wilson "assured him that no significant reduction in our European deployments was intended."⁴⁶ Radford withdrew his proposal in the wake of the damage it caused but it reappeared at a later date in basically the same form.

Taylor turned to the press in order to express his ideas. In March 1956 the Joint Chiefs discussed the problem of going to the press with matters of service rivalry. The administration wanted to stop "the aggressive public relations policy of the Services, especially the Army."⁴⁷ Radford said such problems simply distracted the Joint Chiefs and kept them from solving real problems. President Eisenhower also noted that he told the Joint Chiefs when they signed on that such relations with the press would not be tolerated.

General Taylor heeded this warning and next tried to pursue the exploration of his policies in scholarly circles. A frustrated General Taylor tried to explain his own theories in an article for *Foreign Affairs*. The article discussed a need for both Flexible Response for future wars and something to reassure America's allies. Neither the Department of Defense nor the Department of State cleared the article. Admiral Radford obtained the

draft and worked to get Taylor “in line with departmental policy.”⁴⁸ Analysts objected and said Taylor’s “views were in conflict with approved policy, that they should be argued out before the JCS and not in public, and that their expression could seriously jeopardize our international relations.”⁴⁹ Analysts told Taylor he had failed to note the total failure of communist aggressive action. In response, Taylor mentioned communist gains in China, the stalemate in Korea, the situation in Vietnam, and the situation with communist guerrillas in Malaya. The censors replied that America should “admit no weaknesses in our reliance on atomic weapons and our faith in their deterrent effect.”⁵⁰

After the summer of 1956, the administration looked for more ways to reduce other expenditures as heavy weapons and missile programs consumed more of the total budget. Fortunately for the Army and American interests, events precluded the suggestion of great manpower cuts in the ground forces. Events in Hungary and the Suez kept Army strength at a level no lower than 900,000 (a ten percent reduction) through Fiscal Year 1958.⁵¹ Taylor fought to keep the administration’s focus on the possibility of limited war, but the administration only recognized limited wars as those occurring in less-developed regions of the world. Taylor’s definition of a limited war included small-scale conflict anywhere in the world. Crises in 1957 later convinced doubters that possibilities other than general war indeed existed.

In October 1956, as a Joint Chief, Taylor worked on a national security program that could provide: “The kind of military program we felt the country required during the coming years. As such it was the first coherent statement of the new strategy of Flexible Response which was taking form to oppose the orthodox strategy of Massive

Retaliation.”⁵² Taylor foresaw a military program that could deter general war, deter limited war, defeat limited war, fight a general war, and maintain peace. General Taylor admitted the threat of general war existed but felt the threat of limited war more likely in the age of mutual deterrence. Although his colleagues agreed, Taylor’s plan did not move forward.

During 1957 the Soviets warned Norway, Denmark, Greece, and Iceland not to allow United States troops to enter their territory. In October 1957, the Soviets launched Sputnik. Interestingly, these developments created a desire to increase missile efforts, and Radford suggested a cut in Army manpower by 200,000 men and 11 divisions.⁵³ Reductions in equipment and manpower allowed greater investment in weapons of mass destruction. Wilson agreed with Radford on this issue. Wilson noted the policy followed administration plans to “maximize air power and minimize the foot soldier.”⁵⁴ Radford said “the program was merely a logical extension of the New Look.”⁵⁵

Taylor opposed the Wilson-Radford proposal on the basis that a cold war or limited war seemed more likely than general war. Under Wilson’s directive, the Army would be reduced to thirteen divisions and 850,000 men.⁵⁶ Taylor argued that the Army needed at least fifteen divisions and 925,000 men to fill its commitments.⁵⁷ After long discussion, the Army won a manpower level of 900,000.⁵⁸ Victory lasted only a short time. The Department of Defense cut the Army manpower to 870,000 men. Massive Retaliation thus won yet another round of cuts in Army appropriations.

Meanwhile, in some circles Massive Retaliation lost credibility. John Foster Dulles publicly announced a need for change in the October 1957 issue of *Foreign*

Affairs. This is notable because Dulles had helped determine the policy of Massive Retaliation. From such a noted source, public admission that defense policy needed revision lent credence to the arguments of Massive Retaliation opponents. Mainly, the idea that limited war would not occur seemed outdated. This led to long discussions among the joint chiefs of staff.

The Air Force refused to accept the fact that ideas of nuclear parity and mutual deterrence required changes in the doctrine of Massive Retaliation.⁵⁹ The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps realized that American security needed to evolve with world events. The Air Force argued that Soviet advances simply increased American needs in long range bombers and atomic weapons. Planners in the Air Force felt that any change in policy denoted a weakness in US strategy and sent the wrong message to American allies. Responding to the Air Force, Taylor argued that “Massive Retaliation could not be the answer to everything—perhaps not the answer to anything.”⁶⁰

Taylor continued to explain his point by noting recent Soviet successes and the inadequacy of American military strategy. As Soviet power grew the western alliance system seemed to weaken. For example, communist advances in Indonesia threatened the credibility of SEATO.⁶¹ In an attempt to obtain more support for his initiative, Taylor explained that improved delivery methods and higher-yield warheads meant “reduction in size without reduction in deterrent capability.”⁶² America needed to redefine its defense policy to include wars that did not threaten national survival. Taylor finished by explaining “The atomic retaliatory force had become the shield of protection warding off the threat of hostile atomic attack, while the forces of limited war provided the flexible

sword for parry, riposte, and attack. Hence the quality of this sword assumed a new and greater importance.”⁶³ The Air Force remained unmoved by Taylor’s reasoning.

Secretary McElroy soon announced that no changes would be made in the “Basic National Security Policy.”

Under the continuing defense policy, the Army received about 10 percent of the modernization funds and the Air Force received about 60 percent.⁶⁴ Army strength, without regard to world events, remained at 870,000 men and reserves decreased by ten percent. Meanwhile, the Air Force maintained 845,000 men and received a lion’s share of the budget. The Soviets focused on advances in the missile field while Air Force planners predicted advances in long-range bombers. Taylor felt, “the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body took no part in the formulation of the 1960 budget.”⁶⁵

In 1958 a frustrated Taylor again tried to introduce beneficial changes. In an address at the Secretaries’ Conference in June 1958 Taylor outlined his ideas as follows:

You will note that I am supporting an increase in personnel from 870,000 to 915,000. I recognize that I am reflecting a point of view contrary to that which one often hears advanced—namely, that improved modern weapons will continue to reduce the requirements for military manpower.⁶⁶

Taylor continued with a long list of improvements he wanted to achieve in 1958. Taylor outlined a need for continued emphasis on improving the Reserves and to improve conditions for the people who “make up the Army.”⁶⁷ In this category, Taylor described a need for better housing, more stable duty assignments, and improved living conditions.

General Taylor explained that defense appropriations might be lessened and these goals achieved if the government pursued horizontal rather than vertical budget-making.

In horizontal budget making, the services would plan together to meet the needs of the nation. In vertical plans, each service worked independently of the others and many programs overlapped. Dollars could be saved and priorities realized with Taylor's plan. The administration refused to reconsider the budget process and continued to work without standard policies. Taylor noted that, "the Department of Defense builds the defense structure of the nation without blueprints, design models, or agreed factors of safety."⁶⁸

Taylor felt the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a body, needed more input in the specifics of the budget. These pleas fell on deaf ears. Because the chiefs could not agree on a budget, it went to the National Security Council with only the signature of General Twining, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Twining believed "the budget would provide a sound program for the defense of the nation for the period under consideration."⁶⁹

Under congressional scrutiny, the division among the joint chiefs and the problems concerning the budget surfaced. Senator Johnson's Preparedness Subcommittee, "pounced . . . and soon called us before the klieg lights of the committee room to express our views of the budget publicly and under oath and later to file written statements explaining in detail our reservations."⁷⁰ Finally, General Taylor had an opportunity to express his views on the need for Army modernization, Army manpower requirements, and Army programs. The Congressional interviews made a difference. According to Taylor, "the strategy of Massive Retaliation came to a dead end in the years 1959 and 1960."⁷¹

“The strategic doctrine which I would propose to replace Massive Retaliation is called herein the Strategy of Flexible Response. This name suggests the need for a capability to react across the entire spectrum of possible challenge, for coping with anything from general atomic war,” explained Taylor, “to infiltrations and aggressions such as threaten Laos and Berlin in 1959.”⁷² As Massive Retaliation declined, the idea of Flexible Response gained ground. However, the fight continued for many years as theorists argued out their strategies.

General Taylor reflected in his later writings that New Look did not cause all of the problems facing the Joint Chiefs during the Eisenhower administration. After serving on the committee, Taylor felt the joint chiefs represented an outdated, flawed system. Taylor admitted that the joint chiefs as a body included the nation’s greatest military leaders and a great deal of experience in military matters. He said, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff have all the faults of a committee in settling important controversial matters. They must consider and accommodate many divergent views before action can be taken.”⁷³ Additionally, the joint chiefs only advised because civilian leadership made decisions.

In addition to disagreements over New Look, the chiefs disagreed over the conduct of future wars, technical matters, and service responsibilities. The Army wanted forward depots of equipment and adequate forces for limited war situations in Europe and Asia. In order to move troops for this contingency, the Army wanted control of sea or air lift. Each service happily attacked the requests of the others. Not all disagreements occurred over interservice rivalry. In many cases, the services simply fought for funding. “The fixed budget,” said Taylor, “by accentuating the interservice struggle for funds, has

become the prime cause of the service rivalry which is undermining national confidence in our military programs.”⁷⁴

The Army recognized the needs and importance of the Air Force but felt it relied too long and too much on manned aircraft. In this respect, the Army was wrong. Manned aircraft are still an integral part of Air Force policy today. The Army felt the Air Force regarded Massive Retaliation as the only possible strategy for America and ignored important world events after 1953 that suggested limited responses. Army leadership rejected the Air Force proposals that “overseas deployments should be reduced to trip-wire forces, and strategic mobile reserves at home limited to relatively small forces.”⁷⁵

In regard to the Navy, the Army admitted the need for Polaris type programs. In addition, the Army backed antisubmarine warfare efforts by the Navy. However, the Army rejected the Navy’s bid to handle strategic bombardment and limited ground warfare through use of the Marines. The Navy, relatively happy with the status quo, refused to admit the Army’s needs for air and sea lift capabilities. Navy-Marine support for Army programs grew after Admiral Radford left the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Normally, the Chairman supports his service of origin in most votes.

Taylor discussed difficulties with Admiral Radford in great detail. The general described Radford as a “ruthless partisan” but admitted, “I always had a grudging admiration for his singleness of purpose and his undeniable effectiveness in driving through the programs of the New Look.”⁷⁶ Taylor felt Radford stifled dissent and imposed views upon the other service chiefs. Radford made the chiefs unwilling to discuss issues before the committee. General Twining served with less partisanship than

Admiral Radford but always supported the position of the Air Force. Therefore, he was uninterested in reviewing defense policy and changing American reliance on strategic air forces.

General Taylor particularly disliked testifying before congress. Budget hearings usually brought out differences in opinion. The military leadership had to choose between loyalty to the executive branch or the legislative branch. Loyalty to the legislative branch may have expressed honesty but it appeared to be opposition to civilian leadership. Loyalty to the executive branch meant lying under oath. This was a difficult position for the joint chiefs.

New weapons programs faced harsh criticism from the joint chiefs. Unfortunately, not all of the criticism was based on valid reasoning. The service that wanted the program invariably backed the proposal. If another service had a similar program, it rejected the new idea fearing the end of its own program. Companies, meanwhile, made claims that nobody could check. The resulting problems provided America with less than the defense it deserved.

General Taylor may not have convinced the administration to change its policies, but he certainly made an impression. Taylor left the administration when he retired in January 1959. In late 1959, Eisenhower noted his displeasure with Taylor because he published *The Uncertain Trumpet* and in it detailed the bickering among the Joint Chiefs.⁷⁷ Continuing the meeting, the president expressed a desire to cut the reserves to 630,000 men from 700,000 men in order to stabilize the economy.⁷⁸ Eisenhower said that although the manned bomber admirably protected the US for many years, he felt it was

time to place more emphasis on missiles. In addition, the president said he no longer⁷⁹ “saw the use for carriers . . . in all-out war.” Eisenhower next targeted European Allies and said they relied too much on US forces for their defense. Apparently in the wake of Taylor’s book, no one pleased Eisenhower. Perhaps Eisenhower realized that some of Taylor’s ideas were correct.

After serving in the Eisenhower administration, General Taylor not only published his views but also worked in later administrations. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson both called on Taylor’s expertise in defense matters. Taylor continued to serve his country as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs between 1962 and 1964. After that, he served on the Foreign Relations Intelligence Board until 1969. Taylor also published three more books on defense matters before his death in 1987.

NOTES

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CHAPTER SIX:

ADMIRAL ARTHUR W. RADFORD

THE PARTISAN CHAIRMAN

“Economic collapse would follow any attempt by the United States to station combat-effective units of superior strength every place where aggression might occur.”¹

Admiral Arthur W. Radford served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1953 to 1957, when he retired from the United States Navy. Mild-mannered and loyal to the Eisenhower Administration, Radford never outwardly opposed policy. After the unification struggle and Revolt of the Admirals in the late 1940s, he followed orders and vigorously pursued the policies of his civilian superiors. The Navy often received preferential treatment and benefitted from air power technology while Radford served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When Radford retired in 1957, the administration replaced him with another general officer willing to follow orders.

Arthur W. Radford was born in Chicago in 1896. In 1916, he graduated from the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis. After short tours of duty as a secretary and an aide on the naval staff, Radford trained as a naval aviator at Pensacola Air Station in 1920. Naval air power became Radford's area of speciality, as his later assignments show.

Radford served on the Bureau of Aeronautics, qualified in carrier landings, commanded an aviation unit on the battleship *Colorado*, and commanded the Second Aerial Survey Detachment in Alaska by 1929. Before he earned a promotion to commander in 1936, Radford served as Flight Deck Officer for the *Saratoga* and completed another tour with the Bureau of Aeronautics. Radford took initiative in

Washington and suggested, to the amazement of many, the use of females in the Navy to fill positions that men vacated during wartime. His idea eventually led to the creation of the WAVES, who served admirably in World War II. Additional postings for Radford included a fighter squadron command and sea duty as a navigator on the *Wright*. By May 1941 Radford had earned a promotion to captain after serving as Tactical Officer for an Aircraft Battle Force, Commander of the Naval Air Station at Seattle, and Commander of the Trinidad Naval Operating Base in the West Indies.

As World War II heated up, Radford earned a promotion to rear admiral in April 1943 and took command of Carrier Division 2. Although planes from Radford's ships flew sorties into combat, the admiral never faced the enemy himself. The closest combat episode described in his memoirs happened when Japanese planes flew over his ship. Radford's flagship was not moving and the Japanese did not notice the ships below. In July 1943, Radford took command of Carrier Division 11. In a few months, he moved up to Chief of Staff to the Commander of Aircraft in the Pacific Fleet. Most of the rest of Radford's career was duty in Washington DC.

In March 1944 Radford served in Washington DC as an assistant to the Deputy Chief of Naval Air Operations. Radford's ability to analyze and plan earned him special duty with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in May 1944. The Joint Chiefs appointed a special committee on Defense Organization, and Radford served to protect the interests of the Navy. The topic of defense reorganization and unification surfaced again in November 1945, and Radford again served the interests of the Navy as an Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy.

Naval efforts concentrated on protecting their aviation wing. While Radford realized the power of aircraft, he thought at least the Navy and Air Force should have aviation functions instead of just the Air Force. Some planners argued that only the Air Force, if created, should handle air matters. Many of the participants disliked the idea of a Department of Defense but that issue passed. Participants exhausted all avenues of dissent in an effort to find an amiable compromise over missions and roles. However, a solution eluded the military leadership.

Eventually, Harry S Truman stepped in and told his military leadership to agree on a plan of unification. Radford spoke his mind during the discussions but really did not make any stands against his civilian superiors. Radford's troubles rested with the control some advocates wanted for the new, independent Air Force. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Eisenhower expressed the concern that economy would drive future defense planning.

Radford received a promotion to vice admiral in December 1945 when he obtained an assignment as Deputy Commander of Naval Air Operations. In February 1947, Radford took command of the Second Fleet. Radford voiced the unpopular opinion in 1947 that helicopters would be instrumental in future warfare and tried to procure the machines. Other planners did not see the same potential in the helicopter and the Navy did not buy many. In January 1948, Radford again moved to duty in Washington as Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Radford toured the world with the Royal Navy in December 1948. After this duty he moved to the rank of full admiral in April 1949 and

the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. Dissension in the Department of Defense returned Radford to congressional hearings in August 1949.

Service disagreement over unification and funding caused many problems. The Air Force wanted to use funding to procure B-36 bombers, and many in government opposed this action because they felt the B-36 was inadequate and a waste of funds. Even the Air Force had earlier planned to cut funds for the B-36 because it proved inadequate.² However, Air Force personnel mobilized to protect their service and the B-36 in the wake of the Berlin Blockade and trouble in Czechoslovakia. General Carl A. Spaatz testified that he thought the Air Force should have preferential treatment.³ Meanwhile, the Navy lost funding for an important, previously-approved carrier program.

Admiral Radford, a respected and high ranking US Naval officer, testified on behalf of the Navy. In his memoirs, Radford downplayed his role and described his participation as reluctant. Radford said:

They [those wanting the hearings] were convinced that only a congressional investigation would bring out facts that were being suppressed. . . . These Young Turks were convinced that the Air Force so controlled public opinion through the normal communications media that the Navy could not get a fair hearing in the court of public opinion. . . . Most of these young men were good friends of mine, and some had asked for my blessing in their efforts. In every case I tried to stop them, feeling that theirs was a hazardous and insubordinate course and one not likely to succeed.⁴

Naval research officers compiled information supporting the carrier project and critical of the B-36. Eventually, criticism of top Air Force personnel surfaced as well. Many other naval officers and people with naval interests joined the melee. Some presented straight-

forward, honest testimony about unification and funding as well as covert operations to discredit others. Congressional hearings exposed Washington's dirty political game.

Naval sources accused the Air Force advocates of playing dirty politics and even of contributing to the death of James Forrestal.⁵ The Navy's negative campaign against the Air Force crumbled after testimony by respected Air Force officers and technological circles showed the usefulness of the B-36. The Air Force benefitted from the testimony of General Nathan Twining, General Hoyt Vandenburg, and General Curtis LeMay. The Navy simply failed to support the efforts of its spokesmen with facts. At this time, Radford expressed the belief that strategic bombing did not fulfill the needs of the nation in the defense arena. In his memoirs, Radford wrote "I did not believe that the threat of atomic blitz would be an effective deterrent to a war or that it would win a war."⁶ Other naval officers agreed with Radford.

The other branches of the military mobilized to support the administration and the Air Force. Generals Dwight Eisenhower and Omar Bradley supported the Air Force position. General Eisenhower said, "the services had to learn to work together."⁷ In response, the proponents spoke of a need to reeducate the top naval personnel. Supporters of the carrier cut mentioned a need for civilian authorities to rein in the military.

Naval planners felt that in an era of shrinking budgets, the money could be used more wisely than for B-36 procurement. The long debate on this issue, which lasted until October 1949, resulted in what is referred to as the Revolt of the Admirals. Naval officers bluntly told congressional planners they wanted to stop the B-36 program.

Apparently Admiral Radford learned his lesson in the Revolt of the Admirals, because he did not oppose the policies of his superiors in the rest of his career.

Congress recognized the problem between the services and even tried to solve the problems between the joint chiefs of staff. Congress stated in its final report on the matter,

Should the time ever come when personnel of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine corps, or other officers or employees of the Executive branch, are fearful of, unwilling to, or restrained from voicing their frank opinions and convictions before Congressional Committees, then will be the time when effective representative government in this country is gravely imperiled.⁸

Unfortunately, this statement supporting free discussion was lost in the years following the revolt, and the same problems later surfaced under Eisenhower. Dwight D.

Eisenhower should have remembered this point because he was involved in the “Revolt of the Admirals” when he testified before Congress as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1949. Unfortunately, neither the resolutions by Congress nor actions of Eisenhower prevented the problems between the services from arising in later years.

Congress also made clear that loyalty to civilian superiors did not include false testimony before the legislative branch. If this principle had been stressed more, then some of the problems in the Eisenhower years might have been averted. Radford recalled that civilian superiors did not always understand or read military reports that disagreed with the government’s policies.⁹ Therefore, although the military analyzed the events in

Korea and made recommendations for changes it did little good. Civilian superiors thus doomed the military to repeat the mistakes made in Korea in the Vietnam era.

When the Korean War began in 1950, Radford was serving as Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. During the war, his command transported supplies and men to Korea. In addition, Radford's ships provided support for landing operations and offshore shelling. Radford backed General Douglas MacArthur's plan for taking the war directly to the Chinese. President Truman refused to take the war over the Yalu River and he also disapproved of a Radford plan to blockade the Chinese coast.

After traveling with Eisenhower to Japan and Korea in 1952, Radford received a nomination for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in May 1953. Radford feared his earlier participation in the Revolt of the Admirals might compromise his candidacy, but Radford's superiors must have felt his reeducation was successful because he became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 August 1953.

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford proposed American air and naval forces help the French in North Vietnam. Radford negotiated with the British and French; however, he was disappointed because neither agreed to his plan for Vietnam. Admiral Radford turned his full attention to his post as chairman.

Radford served as advocate of Eisenhower defense policy for the next four years. At an address before the Secretaries' Conference in 1957, Radford reflected on his service of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The admiral stressed the progress he felt the administration made. Radford noted a strong defense structure proved the viability of the

administration's policies. Describing the post of chairman, Radford called it the "most frustrating" and the "most rewarding" he ever held.¹⁰ Admiral Radford ended his address with a plea for the reduction of US troops abroad, less expensive programs for improving Allied militaries, and cooperation among the services. Radford retired on 15 August 1957. Admiral Radford died at Bethesda Naval Hospital in August 1973.

When President Eisenhower announced his New Look defense program, Admiral Radford fully backed the president's initiative. Due to his allegiance to the Navy, Radford believed that air power would be instrumental in future wars but not the only line of defense. According to Radford, "Each of our armed services is essential. Each has a vital role to perform."¹¹ Radford explained the concept of defense for an "uneasy peace" rather than a "crisis year."¹² Following the administration's line, Radford said, "My own feeling is that the Soviets do not want a shooting war at this time. They prefer tension and discord, hoping that we will destroy ourselves."¹³

Admiral Radford expressed some controversial opinions in his support of the New Look. For example, when asked if atomic weapons should be used in battle just like other explosives, Radford replied in the affirmative.¹⁴ Under similar questioning, Radford said that atomic weapons would be used in future conflicts. So far, history has proved the admiral wrong. Atomic weapons have not been used in modern conflicts.

Apparently, Radford followed the cues of his superiors. When the administration changed its mind, Radford continued to back their policies. In 1954 in an early interview, Radford assured the public that the Army would have at least a million men.¹⁵ Two years later, in 1956, he backed cuts what would reduce the Army significantly to less than one

million men. The admiral explained that defense policy needed to have an “emphasis on the new weapons and less dependence upon manpower in the Army.”¹⁶ Radford said, “When you improve your weapons and equipment as greatly as we have in the past decade, you are bound to create a great combat power, even with less man power.”¹⁷ In 1956, the chairman concluded with the idea that “maintenance of large ground forces is an unnecessary expense nowadays.”¹⁸

In March 1956, Radford stated the administration’s defense policy in an address at the National War College. Radford said, “it is our task—our military task—to design, develop, and maintain combat-ready Armed Forces which can meet the aggressive actions of militant Communism, and which can preserve the security of the United States.”¹⁹ Radford continued, “Our present military force structures and our war plans provide for the use of atomic weapons when it is to our military advantage.”²⁰ Of military assistance, Radford said our task was to help the Allies take more responsibility. When discussing the issue of service relations, Radford noted, “No one weapon, or one Service, or one form of military action is sufficient to meet all our security needs.”²¹ In the area of mobility, Radford explained a need for US rapid deployment and flexible planning. In order to achieve mobility, Radford advocated overseas bases. Radford concluded his remarks with a plea for teamwork.

Admiral Radford continued to back Eisenhower’s New Look policies, even after retirement. In defense of the support he gave, Radford said in his memoirs:

President Eisenhower has been criticized by many, in and out of the services, for some of his military policies. It has been my experience that most of his service critics were simply not familiar with the details of the

reorganization he demanded and the rationales on which his decisions were based. The others, many senior officers, were familiar with the President's orders and the background for them, but each felt his particular service had not been given what it needed.²²

Radford went on to explain the lack of will among the service chiefs to give any ground in budgetary matters. According to the admiral, these problems crippled relations between the services and the Eisenhower Administration.

Radford felt Eisenhower set the stage for excellent relations with the Joint Chiefs. The admiral thought he could go and talk to Eisenhower whenever necessary and said the same of his other civilian superiors. Unfortunately, the open-door policy these men may have had with the amiable, loyal Admiral Radford did not exist with the other service chiefs. The division of the Joint Chiefs into separate camps each eyeing the resources of the other service greatly hurt relations with superiors and colleagues.

Radford analyzed the strained relationship between the Army and the administration. In reference to General Ridgway, Radford said, "I understood Ridgway's problems. Although I did not agree with him on many of them I did sympathize with him."²³ Radford went on to explain that Ridgway could not confront Eisenhower directly because they were both career Army officers. "Ridgway could justify his support of important JCS decisions and then, shortly afterward make public remarks that in effect indicated his disagreement with these decisions."²⁴ Admiral Radford felt Ridgway understood the president's goals when he signed on as Army Chief of Staff and had a duty to back the resolutions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Comments during Radford's chairmanship differ from his post-service opinions.

When a reporter asked Radford in 1954 if “bitter bickering” occurred when the chiefs discussed issues, the admiral replied that it did not.²⁵ Radford explained the situation much differently than his colleagues did. The admiral said, “What is sometimes purported to be bitter squabbling is nothing more than resolving differences of opinion, and agreeing upon the best ideas.”²⁶

Looking at the evidence provided by the other men who served the Eisenhower Administration, it is clear that bickering did occur during the discussion of policy. Critics view Radford’s tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff differently. General Maxwell Taylor said,

Admiral Radford was an able and ruthless partisan, who did his utmost to impose his views upon the Chiefs. For the two years during which I sat with the Chiefs under him, I rarely engaged in a serious discussion with my other colleagues.²⁷

A victim of earlier pressure to conform to other views, Radford apparently did not advocate free testimony for the Joint Chiefs of Staff who served under him. Taylor did note, “I always had a grudging admiration for his singleness of purpose and his undeniable effectiveness in driving through the programs of the New Look.”²⁸ Taylor further explained that Radford not only opposed the Army but also convinced the other chiefs of staff to support his point of view.

Admiral Radford backed the idea of collective security because he believed the US could never match communist manpower. Rather than spend money on ground forces, Radford felt “the countries of Western Europe can and should provide the ground

forces needed for their own protection.²⁹ Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey and Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson appreciated Radford's support in cutting the budget.

While serving with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford followed the leadership of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Behind closed doors, he said, he was able to oppose policies proposed by the administration. But according to his colleagues, he did not oppose administration policies even behind the security of closed doors. In the spotlight of public scrutiny, Radford loyally backed the plans of his civilian superiors. It appears Radford's support did not ebb when his personal opinion differed from that of his superiors. In the end, Radford would come to feel that Eisenhower's policies worked well because they prevented World War III and held the communists at bay more successfully than the policies of the Kennedy Administration.³⁰

NOTES:

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CHAPTER SEVEN:
GENERAL NATHAN F. TWINING
AIR OF SUPREMACY

“If it were not for the power of the U.S. Strategic Air Command, all Europe would have been overrun and communized.”¹

Nathan F. Twining supported President Eisenhower’s New Look national defense policy. Twining had advanced through the ranks to the grade of sergeant before earning an appointment to the United States Military Academy in May 1917. During service to his country, Twining had changed jobs quickly and served in many varied roles, spending a great deal of his duty assignments in Washington D.C. Before Twining was appointed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he served Secretary of Defense Wilson as a special assistant. To an Air Force general whose service received a lion’s share of the budget and experienced a period of growth in the 1950s, New Look national defense policy seemed quite reasonable.

Nathan Farragut Twining was born in October 1897 in Wisconsin.² Family tradition pointed Twining toward a career as a naval officer; however, he broke tradition and joined the Oregon National Guard as an infantryman in 1916. In World War I, Twining served in the Oregon National Guard on the Mexican border; however, he did not serve in combat. Through his National Guard position, Twining earned a nomination to the United States Military Academy in May 1917.³ After completing a military education, Twining served as an officer cadet at the academy until 1919.

In July 1919, Twining joined the American Expeditionary Forces in Germany.⁴ He filled the position of post-war observer and toured World War I's great battlefields. In September 1919, Twining began Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia and he graduated in January 1920.⁵ After he graduated, the Army posted him to the 29th Infantry at Fort Benning. In February 1922 Lieutenant Twining began service as an aide to General B.A. Poore, a position in which he served until 1923.

Twining's career diversified in the next few years. In August 1923, Twining entered Primary Flying School at Brooks Field, Texas.⁶ After graduation from Primary Flying School, Twining then moved to Advanced Flying School and graduated from that program at Kelly Field, Texas in 1924. Twining served as an instructor at Brooks Field for a short time. In November 1926, Twining transferred to the Army Air Corps and in September 1927 he served as a flying instructor at March Field, California.⁷ After failing to signal a flight student to take over the controls during a landing, Twining received a transfer out of flight instruction and moved through several postings.⁸

First, Twining served with the 18th Pursuit Group stationed in Schofield Barracks, Hawaii in 1929. At Schofield, Twining filled the positions of adjutant, personnel officer, headquarters detachment commander, and commander of the 26th Attack Squadron.⁹ In March 1932, General Twining reported to Fort Crockett, Texas to command the Third Attack Group.¹⁰ After only five months, Twining joined the 90th Attack Squadron. One month later he served in the 60th Service Squadron.

The next phase of his career took General Twining to Chicago, where he served as engineering officer for the US Army Mail Service Central Zone beginning in February-

May 1934.¹¹ In June 1934, Twining returned to Fort Crockett and served as adjutant to the Third Attack Group. Moving to another command, Twining served as Assistant Operations Officer of the Third Wing at Barksdale Field, Louisiana from March 1935 to August 1935.¹² Leaving Barksdale, Twining entered Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabama for one year.

After completing Tactical School, Twining reported to the Command and General Staff College(CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for one year. After completing CGSC in 1937, Twining returned to Texas in July and served as Air Corps Technical Supervisor at the San Antonio Air Depot at Duncan Field. This posting, one of his longer assignments, lasted until 1940. Twining faced reassignment in August 1940.

Continuing his early trend of multiple postings in a short amount of time, Twining served in many capacities in Washington, DC. The general worked as Assistant Chief of the Inspection Division and then as Chief of the Technical Inspection section between August 1940 and December 1941.¹³ In late 1941, Twining moved to the Operations Division. In only two months he became Assistant Executive in the Office of the Chief of Air Corps. In three more months, Twining took a new assignment as Director of War Organization and Movements. Apparently, Twining served well in these positions because the Army Air Corps promoted him to Lieutenant Colonel in July 1941.¹⁴ In July 1942, he began service as the Chief of Staff to Major General M.F. Harmon in the South Pacific, a posting which lasted one year.¹⁵

In January 1943, General Twining assumed command of the 13th Air Force, serving in the Hebrides and Solomon Islands until July 1943.¹⁶ In an interesting turn of

events, Twining's aircraft was forced down in the Coral Sea in February 1943. Twining and his crew survived on life rafts for five days before being rescued. The Thirteenth next moved to support operations around Guadalcanal. In July 1943, Twining moved to a joint command in the Solomon Islands that consisted of Army, Navy, Marines, and other Allied Air Forces.¹⁷ Duty in command in the Solomon Islands became the first of many pioneering achievements by Twining as he served in one of the nation's first Joint Air Commands.

In November 1943, Twining took command of the 15th Air Force in Italy. As commander, Twining sent bombers to attack targets in the Balkans and Romania. After only two months, the general became Commander of the Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air Forces. In this capacity, the general helped shape the air war in Europe. As commander of the 20th Air Force in the Pacific from 2 August 1945-October 1945, Twining again made history when his troops dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima.¹⁸

In October 1945, General Twining served at Continental Air Force Headquarters in Washington, DC.¹⁹ Two months later he moved to command the Air Materiel Command at Wright Field. In his two years at this command, Twining earned a place in the files of the conspiracy theory and paranormal enthusiasts. Memoranda exist among conspiracy theorists in which General Twining confirmed the existence of "flying discs" and reportedly said, "The phenomenon reported is something real and not visionary or fictitious."²⁰ The National Archives received so many requests for information regarding a Majestic or "MJ-12" memo involving General Twining that it filed a ten-point response on the subject in 1987.²¹ Whether or not the claims of the paranormal enthusiast are true,

Twining's link to MJ-12 and Area 51 assured him a place in the popular mythology of extraterrestrials and the suspicions in some circles that there was a secret government.

Twining's next postings seem somewhat obscure, compared to his high profile service in many important, history-making commands. On 1 October 1947, Twining took command of the Alaskan Department.²² Three weeks later he was Commander-in-Chief of the Alaskan Command based at Fort Richardson where he remained at this post until July 1950. Thus, this period of exile in Alaska became another of Twining's longest assignments.

Moving back to Washington, Twining's next posting occurred as Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. This temporary posting lasted from July 1950-October 1950, when Twining became the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force.²³ As Vice Chief of Staff, Twining again made history when he oversaw Air Force efforts to convert from propeller to jet propulsion.²⁴

In June 1953, the Secretary of the Air Force named Twining Chief of Staff.²⁵ Duty in Washington suited Twining. In the fall of 1953, Twining led the fight for expansion to a 137 wing Air Force. In the era of Massive Retaliation, this viewpoint proved popular. During Twining's tenure as Chief of Staff, the general stressed training as well as research and development. Twining added a few more historic firsts to his resume. The first advanced aerial refueling, jet-to-jet, occurred under Twining's tenure in September 1953.²⁶ Additionally, in October 1953, the first ramjet missile flew and so did the F-102 supersonic fighter. In December 1953, a proud Twining witnessed Chuck Yeager's flight in the Bell X-1A at over 1,600 miles per hour.²⁷

New developments marked the next few years of Twining's career as well. In 1955, industry honored Twining for his efforts in the development of the B-52 bomber.²⁸ In February 1955, General Twining announced progress on the development of the ATLAS missile.²⁹ In 1956, in response to a Soviet request, the president directed Twining to visit the Soviet Union to look at Soviet aircraft and technological development. After seeing the Soviet demonstrations and meeting many Soviet dignitaries, Twining returned to the United States and reported a need to make greater efforts at research and development. Continuing his advocacy of air forces, Twining asked for more airbases and more personnel in 1956.

In March 1957, President Eisenhower nominated Twining as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.³⁰ Twining replaced Admiral Radford as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs after serving as a Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense Wilson from 1 July to 15 August 1957.³¹ Twining became the first Air Force officer to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He retired from that post in 1960. General Twining died on 29 March 1982.³²

In the capacity of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Twining served as a reliable ally in support of the administration's defense policy and a staunch defender of air power in the atomic age. In response to questions of defense problems stemming from budget cuts, Twining said before Congress, "Ours is a collective defense; it is not United States solely. We would like to beat them on ICBM numbers; maybe we won't. But that doesn't mean we have lost the war."³³ Even in years when the Air Force lost budget

dollars, Twining supported the administration. In January 1960, Chairman Twining defended the Eisenhower budget of forty-one billion dollars as adequate.³⁴

Critics believed the Air Force received so much of the budget, it just wanted to maintain the status quo. Realistically, the Air Force received almost half the entire defense budget. Even in years when the administration recommended cuts for the Air Force, advocates in Congress provided more funding. In 1956, Congress appropriated an extra, unsolicited nine-hundred million dollars to the Air Force and cut funding from other programs to provide it.³⁵ Twining did not ask for this funding, but after the vote he said he would have voted for it if he had been a senator.

As New Look aged, criticism grew. When many other generals opposed New Look or sought modifications in the policy, Twining usually maintained his advocacy. Although he opposed the Radford cuts in 1956, Twining still supported New Look in 1960.³⁶ In the *New York Times* in January of 1960, General Twining said to the Senate Armed Services Committee, "There is no deterrent gap."³⁷ Also in 1960, Twining submitted a budget with his endorsement alone, because the service heads would not agree on funding. General Twining's loyalty to the defense policies of the Eisenhower Administration is explained in *Neither Liberty Nor Safety*, a book he published after retirement.

Examining recent history, Twining felt nuclear scarcity, had rather than interservice rivalry, complicated defense decision making in the 1950s. The general explained he felt the Air Force needed most of the materiel to protect the nation because the "Army and Navy delivery [of weapons] were smaller and far less efficient in the use

of scarce nuclear material than were the larger bombs which the Air Force could use with its existing bombardment forces.”³⁸ General Twining thought that the years of small defense budgets had simply made the services compete for scarce resources.

Analyzing the Korean War, Twining found reasons for American problems that went beyond austere budgetary programs and shrinking numbers of unprepared troops mentioned by Army leadership. Twining thought the effort in Korea had faced an uphill battle because the American people were not mobilized to support the action, and America had announced it would not use the atomic bomb. The Soviets took advantage of America’s lack of enthusiasm and announcement by launching attacks. Because America limited its forces with defense policy announcements, the Soviets gained an advantage.

Foreign nations in the 1950s, according to Twining, did not need more American troops on their soil, they needed assurance that the United States would back them in a crisis. The Baghdad Pact failed after 1955 because America refused to commit.³⁹ America committed resources and rhetoric to NATO, so it functioned. Collective security, asserted Twining, cannot be half-hearted or one-sided. Departing somewhat from this point, Twining later said that other nations must take up the burden of providing ground troops. Additionally, Twining stated a need for more airbases around the world to increase Air Force power and effectiveness. Apparently, no troops would be assigned to the air bases and airmen do not count as troops abroad.

General Nathan Twining saw the Air Force as the world’s savior after World War II. Ignoring the contributions of the other services, Twining said:

Up through 1960, 'strategic deterrence' was the real teeth in the policy of containment. Strategic deterrence, until the advent of ballistic missiles, meant only one thing—the U.S. Strategic Air Command: the bombers, the tankers for mid-air refueling, the trained crews, the support structure, the organization, the plan, the will, and the weapons. SAC held the enemies of freedom and democracy at bay for more than a dozen years.⁴⁰

All branches of the military brag about achievements and capabilities; however, General Twining believed his branch of the military single-handedly held communism at bay during the 1950s. Loyal support is admirable, but zealotry has earned Twining criticism in some circles. The question arises, how can one ignore the efforts of other US forces in Korea and stationed around the world? Twining's statement seems unrealistic due to the number of later military engagements that did make substantial use of ground troops.

Twining, like his colleagues, criticized the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military in his post-career writings; however, Twining's criticism is much less direct and his solutions simply favor air power and unified commands. Twining felt, for example, the Navy should not have independent control of the POLARIS program.⁴¹ It now seems clear that he simply wanted more control for the Air Force in all defense areas. Twining's heavy reliance on the doctrine of strategic air power hurts the credibility of his views.

At times, Twining's defense theories are purely contradictory. For example, at one point in his book *Neither Liberty Nor Safety* Twining states that there is no such thing as a limited war. Limited war, in his opinion, was created by the other services to try to sap the strength of the Strategic Air Command. Twining said, "The philosophy of limited war offered a convenient bandwagon, the music was pleasing, and some got on it."⁴² Just

because the other branches needed more, it was not right to take resources from the Air Force. Twining disliked the concept of limited war so much that he chastised those who used it and stated that they should have come up with real reasons rather than “a blind hodgepodge created to support the meaningless term, limited war.”⁴³ A few paragraphs later, Twining explained, “The Korean War was probably a limited war by anybody’s definition. It was limited in terms of geography, weaponry, participants, and political objective.”⁴⁴ Twining carefully exempted Vietnam as a police action rather than a war. Thus, according to Twining, limited wars do not exist, yet he believed the Korean War to be a limited war. Contradictions such as this in Twining’s philosophy surely reflect on the credibility of his strategic views.

Twining admitted that ground troops needed strengthening, but not to fight a physical war. National prestige, according to Twining, required more troops in forward areas. It was not that America lacked the ability for Flexible Response, rather that America lacked the will to use its resources. The only way America could improve its flexibility would be to stop telling the communists America would not use nuclear weapons or cross certain borders.

In the matter of the economics of defense spending in the 1950s, Twining felt expenditures proved adequate. When listening to complaints, Americans needed to remember that even economists cannot agree on what is true. According to Twining America needed a strategic deterrent force, an American defense force, and deployable troops.⁴⁵ The Air Force filled the first two missions and a small contingency of other services could fill the third. “If the services couldn’t have everything,” said Twining,

“one had to sacrifice to the strength of another.”⁴⁶ In this way, the Army and Navy endured cuts to allow the Air Force to protect the world. Had resources been dispersed, Twining felt all the branches would have weakened and America been overrun.

Twining criticized the deployment of large numbers of American troops abroad. The general felt that overseas bases were hard to maintain and costly to procure. In addition, when a nation sends troops overseas, it must also calculate the cost of sending dependents, support units, and other perks. Lastly, deploying troops abroad created a big transportation problem that fell into the lap of the Air Force. Twining felt that bases already available in the United States should be used instead and only small numbers sent abroad. Apparently, General Twining forgot what he learned at Infantry School because he said, “There is no significant difference between three U.S. divisions on station and five divisions, or seven.”⁴⁷ In the face of the communist threat and troop concentrations in Europe, this statement seems ridiculous.

General Twining’s career is as confusing as were his views on defense policy. A young man from a family with a Naval Academy tradition enlisted in the infantry. After attaining a few promotions, he received an appointment to the United States Military Academy. The Army taught him to fly but he was not effective as an instructor. His career moved him into a variety of posts in which he spent only a few months. After disturbing rumors surfaced concerning General Twining and the Majestic 12, he was sent to an obscure Alaskan command for three years. In addition to his connection with the secret government, Twining’s career is notable for several development events.

Never one to fight against his superiors, Twining earned the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Eisenhower. Rarely disagreeing with his superiors, the administration appreciated Twining's loyalty. In his post-service writing, Twining mentions little of the service rivalry about which others wrote volumes. After his retirement, Twining did much less than his more vocal colleagues and received little publicity compared to his Army colleagues. What Twining did write, seems contradictory and too steeped in the dogma of air power to be credible. Twining ended his career in the same obscurity with which he began it.

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35. C.P. Trussell, "Twining Warns Congress of New Soviet Weapons," *New York Times*, 11 July 1956, p. 1.
36. Anthony Leviero, "Radford Seeking 800,000-Man Cut; 3 Services Resist," *New York Times*, 13 July 1956, p. 8.
37. Raymond, p. 1.
38. Twining, 23.
39. Ibid., 66.
40. Ibid., 87.

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42.Ibid.,115.

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44.Ibid., 116.

45.Ibid., 123.

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CHAPTER 8:

CONCLUSION

President Eisenhower introduced a more conservative national defense policy because he feared fighting the cold war might bankrupt the United States. When he campaigned, Eisenhower focused on cutting the defense budget and mobilized the public. When he became president in 1953, Eisenhower found it was more difficult to economize on defense and reduce the budget to more modest levels. Therefore, Eisenhower embarked on a mission to reduce the defense budget by adapting a new American defense policy.

During the New Look era, the United States relied upon strategic bombers and atomic weapons to keep the Soviets at bay. The money for these technological developments had to come from other programs because Eisenhower pledged an economical defense program. Eisenhower targeted the Army for many cuts as he expanded the Air Force. Eisenhower realized that cutting manpower in saved money. He theorized that the troops of other nations could fill the gaps left by shrinking numbers of US soldiers. As research and development increased in the areas of bombers and nuclear projects, more conventional programs withered.

Eisenhower chose Admiral Arthur Radford for his Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1953 because he knew Radford's character. Radford was a visionary naval leader who early on realized the importance of naval aviation and suggested many useful improvements, such as the WAVEs, however, Radford's initiatives were not entirely well-received. Eisenhower and Radford found themselves on opposite sides in the

“Revolt of the Admirals.” After Radford’s side lost that struggle, he became less willing to become engaged in a controversy. Radford later lost several other arguments in his career and realized that his opinion could not really change policy. As a result, Radford became a yes-man.

Eisenhower needed the support of loyal colleagues and appreciated Radford. Radford had a good relationship with President Eisenhower and assumed the other service chiefs also had a good relationship with their commander-in-chief. Unfortunately, in ignoring the conflicts among the Joint Chiefs, Radford exacerbated the administration’s problems. When the chiefs could not take up their problems with Radford or President Eisenhower, they turned to the press. Even in his memoirs, Radford refused to admit that disagreements existed among the Joint Chiefs in the Eisenhower administration. The memoirs of the other chiefs indicate that bickering did occur. Radford was simply tired of fighting losing battles.

General Matthew Ridgway tried to work with the proponents of New Look for a short time before becoming disenchanted and going on the offensive. Ridgway had served in Korea and he knew what future battles would look like. His theories were proven in Vietnam, a war in which he never believed the United States should become involved. Ridgway chose a path that led to retirement rather than compromising his principles. Critics say he could have done more if he had stayed in the Army. However, the decision was not his. Ridgway retired at the age of sixty and would have needed clearance from Eisenhower to serve longer. Eisenhower was not ready to renew the term of such a vocal critic.

General James Gavin also retired rather than cower in the face of threats from his superiors. Under the threat of court-martial Gavin told Congress what he thought about defense. Gavin was a visionary leader who foresaw the utility of helicopters and the trouble Vietnam could cause America. Gavin retired soon after his testimony to Congress. As a civilian, Gavin wrote extensively on defense issues. He later served in the Kennedy administration and continued to shape defense policy.

General Maxwell Taylor tried to support Eisenhower's policies but soon found that others in Washington unwilling to listen to his views. Taylor, a brilliant scholar and analyst, realized that the changing nature of the world required a change in defense policy. As his superiors and colleagues dismissed Taylor's ideas, Taylor turned to the media and continued to express his opinions. Although he retired from the Army under Eisenhower, he was recalled by John F. Kennedy and served for several more years. Taylor's doctrine of Flexible Response eventually replaced Eisenhower's New Look, but his advice alienated Gavin and others during Vietnam.

Eisenhower replaced Admiral Radford with General Twining in 1957. General Twining had served as Chief of Staff of the Air Force before moving up to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As Air Force Chief of Staff, Twining had no reason to oppose the policies of the administration because his service was growing and receiving preferential treatment. When Twining moved up, he continued to support the administration. Support for the administration and the doctrine of air power continued after Twining retired from the Air Force. In his memoirs, Twining maintained his support and explained his reasoning.

A close look at Twining's career brings to mind questions about his suitability for service with the Joint Chiefs. Few postings in Twining's career lasted more than a few months. He rarely stayed at an assignment long enough to learn the job or influence actions. Although numerous noteworthy events are connected to Twining, it is unclear how he contributed to these achievements. Twining is connected to a memo that affirms the existence of UFOs. After the appearance of this memo, Twining was transferred to a remote posting for three years. Although there is little proof in the theories of conspiracy and secret government, one cannot help but wonder if Eisenhower chose Twining because of his ability to follow orders and to keep quiet.

Twining also loses credibility in his memoirs because many of his opinions are clearly flawed. For example, Twining said that there was no difference in putting one division in Germany and seven US divisions in Germany. Both actions showed the same commitment from the United States. A single division would not have held back the Soviets. America had to make a major commitment to hold the Communists at bay during the cold war. Twining also makes many contradictory statements in his memoirs. Twining dismisses the complaints of the other services by blaming interservice rivalry. In Twining's defense, he was right about the missile gap. When the world trembled because America feared the Soviets were ahead in missile development and numbers of bombers, Twining tried to tell the world there was no gap.

The arguments of the opposition to New Look are powerful. While Eisenhower made valid observations about the economy, the situation was not as serious as he thought. The very military-industrial complex he tried to prevent helped fuel the

economy. Defense expenditures were directly related to jobs and prosperity.

Eisenhower's policy was no longer valid after the Korean Conflict because limited war was more likely than total war in the age of nuclear parity. Eisenhower watched his military leaders resign because he was simply unable to admit that the world situation had changed and his defense policy needed reworking.

One factor that unites the opposition to Eisenhower's New Look is the fact that Ridgway, Gavin, and Taylor all served together in airborne divisions during World War II. Combat veterans who went to battle with their troops, these men understood war's complexities. Ridgway felt that Eisenhower did not understand the implications of his policy because he served in political postings, rather than in combat during World War II. Eisenhower sent soldiers to war, but he did not lead them in war.

A second commonality between the complaints of the opposition was a dislike for Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson. Ridgway thought Wilson had no idea of military needs, distracted the chiefs, and never listened to them. Maxwell Taylor agreed with Ridgway and greatly disliked Wilson. A close examination of documents from the time period shows that Congress also disliked Wilson. Senator Russell called Wilson arrogant, vane, and inept. In one article, Wilson is quoted as saying that America had no commitment to NATO. No senator defended Wilson when Russell said he was unfit to serve in the cabinet. Many senators also thought he intimidated the Joint Chiefs. The Joint Chiefs noted the fact that he was most uninformed and very inclined to stay that way.

After careful study, it seems that Eisenhower heard the complaints his chiefs made. He heard them and he understood them. However, he was not willing to change policy. At a press conference in 1957, Eisenhower admitted that nuclear weapons would probably never be used. His chiefs had expressed that view for years. Still, Eisenhower did not change his defense policy.

In the years after Eisenhower's presidency, the United States embarked on a program of massive military buildup. The Soviets and the Americans raced to build large numbers of both atomic and conventional weapons. Under the Kennedy administration, a shift occurred and Maxwell Taylor's theory of Flexible Response augmented Massive Retaliation. America and the Soviets reached Mutual Assured Destruction in the 1960s and realized that more nuclear weapons would not benefit either side. In the end, it was the Soviet government that went bankrupt trying to match the incredible capability of American defense initiatives.

Today, our military is again being reduced. Without attention to history, our leadership is increasing reliance upon reserves and cutting troop strength. Our commitments around the world have not lessened, if anything they have expanded. Since World War II, nuclear weapons have never been used in time of war. It is soldiers on the ground, not nuclear weapons, that keep the warring sides in Bosnia apart. American troops stationed on the DMZ in Korea still keep the peace between North and South Korea. These facts, as well as other incidents, prove that Ridgway, Gavin, and Taylor were right about American defense policy.

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| | |
|--------------------|--|
| May 7, 1945 | The Germans surrender unconditionally at Rheims, France. |
| August 14, 1945 | Japan surrenders to the United States. |
| August 26, 1945 | American announces its intention to occupy Korea south of the 38 th parallel. The Soviets occupy the northern part of Korea. |
| September 2, 1945 | Ho Chi Minh's forces seize power in Hanoi and proclaim an independent Vietnam. |
| September 22, 1945 | French forces returned to Vietnam. |
| November 1945 | Arthur Radford serves on the Unification Committee. Soviets begin to consolidate power in Hungary. Marshall Tito rules Yugoslavia as a Federal Republic. |
| March 5, 1946 | Winston Churchill announces "iron curtain" has come down across Europe. |
| June 30, 1946 | Poland begins communist reforms after a national referendum. |
| December 20, 1946 | French-Indochina War begins. |
| March 12, 1947 | Truman announces \$400 million in grants to aid Greece and Turkey fight against communist guerrillas. |
| May 31, 1947 | Hungary taken over by a communist government. |
| June 5, 1947 | Marshall Plan discussions begin. |
| July 1947 | George F. Kennan writes about containment and Soviet expansion. |
| July 26, 1947 | National Security Act creates new defense establishment. |
| December 30, 1947 | Communists take over Romanian government. |
| February 25, 1948 | Communist coup in Czechoslovakia. |
| April 1, 1948 | Soviets blockade Berlin. |
| August 15, 1948 | Republic of South Korea founded. |
| September 9, 1948 | Korean People's Democratic Republic formed. |
| April 4, 1949 | NATO founded. |
| May 12, 1949 | Berlin blockade ends. |
| August 1949 | Soviets explode an atomic bomb. Revolt of the Admirals begins in Washington, D.C. |
| October 1, 1949 | People's Republic of China formed. Revolt of the Admirals concludes. |
| December 7, 1949 | Chinese Nationalist government moves to Taiwan. |
| January 1950 | Truman approves development of the hydrogen bomb. |
| February 1950 | Soviets and the Chinese sign a bilateral defense pact. |
| April 1950 | NSC 68 issued and calls for a buildup of nuclear weapons. |
| May 9, 1950 | Truman announces aid to the French in Indochina. |
| June 25, 1950 | North Korea invades South Korea. Admiral Radford serves as Commander of the Pacific Fleet during the Korean War. |

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| October 19, 1950 | Chinese forces cross the Yalu River into North Korea. Gavin tours Korea as part of the Weapon Systems Evaluation Group. |
| December 22, 1950 | Ridgway learns he is to go to Korea to command the Eighth Army. |
| December 23, 1950 | United States signs Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Vietnam. |
| April 1951 | Ridgway made Supreme Commander Far East when MacArthur removed. |
| May 1951 | Tibet taken over by the Chinese. |
| November 1, 1952 | United States explodes a hydrogen bomb at Enewetok. |
| November 4, 1952 | Eisenhower elected president. |
| March 5, 1953 | Joseph Stalin dies. |
| June 30, 1953 | General Twining sworn in as Air Force Chief of Staff. |
| July 27, 1953 | Korean War armistice signed. |
| August 14, 1953 | Soviets explode a hydrogen bomb. |
| August 15, 1953 | Admiral Radford sworn in as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. |
| August 15, 1953 | General Ridgway made Chief of Staff of the US Army. General Taylor takes command of the Eighth Army in Korea. Admiral Radford introduces New Look policy in an address. |
| August 22, 1953 | US intervenes to restore the Shah of Iran. |
| January 1954 | Eisenhower announces New Look Defense Policy. |
| May 8, 1954 | Fall of Dien Bien Phu. |
| July 1954 | Vietnam divided at the 17 th parallel. |
| September 7, 1954 | SEATO formed. Chinese shell Quemoy and Matsu. US decides not to react. |
| February 1955 | Baghdad Pact forms. Gavin becomes Deputy Chief of Plans and Research. |
| May 14, 1955 | Warsaw Pact signed. |
| June 29, 1955 | Ridgway retires from the US Army. US deploys B-52 bombers. |
| June 30, 1955 | General Taylor becomes Army Chief of Staff |
| October 1955 | Gavin becomes Chief of Research and Development for the US Army. |
| July 1955 | Fear of Soviets increases with purported "Bomber gap." |
| November 19, 1955 | Baghdad Pact forms. |
| January 1956 | Ridgway publishes <i>Soldier</i> , "My Battles in War and Peace." |
| July 26, 1956 | Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal. |
| October 1956 | Hungarian Revolt begins. US sends no aid. Soviets crush resistance. Maxwell Taylor announces the idea of Flexible Response. |
| November 6, 1956 | Eisenhower reelected. |
| December 22, 1956 | Cease-fire in the Suez Crisis. |
| January 5, 1957 | Eisenhower Doctrine announced putting US troops in the Middle |

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| | East. |
| March 25, 1957 | Common Market begins in Europe. |
| August 15, 1957 | Admiral Radford retires from US Navy and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. |
| | General Twining becomes Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. |
| August 26, 1957 | Soviets announce the launch of an ICBM. |
| October 4, 1957 | Soviets launch Sputnik. |
| November 3, 1957 | Soviets launch Sputnik 2. |
| December 1957 | US launches an ICBM. |
| | Fear of missile gap develops after publication of the Gaither Report. |
| | Gavin testifies before Congress on defense issues, announces retirement. |
| January 31, 1958 | US launches first satellite. |
| March 1958 | Gavin retires from the US Army. |
| June 1958 | Gavin begins work for Arthur Daniel Little. |
| | Gavin publishes <i>War and Peace in the Space Age</i> . |
| July 1958 | US Marines enter Lebanon at request of President Chamoun. |
| October 1, 1958 | NASA established. |
| 1959 | Taylor publishes <i>Uncertain Trumpet</i> . |
| | Iraq withdraws from the Baghdad Pact and it collapses. |
| | CENTO forms to replace the failed Baghdad Pact. |
| January 1, 1959 | Cuban Revolution. Fidel Castro takes over. |
| | Gavin serves as US Ambassador to France. |
| | Taylor retires as Army Chief of Staff. |
| December 1, 1959 | Antarctica Treaty signed. |
| 1960 | Twining publishes <i>Neither Liberty Nor Safety</i> . |
| March 1960 | Eisenhower agrees to train Cuban exiles for the Bay of Pigs. |
| May 1, 1960 | U-2 shot down over the USSR. |
| September 1960 | General Twining ends his tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. |
| November 8, 1960 | JFK elected president. |
| January 17, 1961 | Eisenhower leaves office and warns of Military-Industrial Complex. |
| | Taylor becomes a military advisor to John F. Kennedy |
| April 17, 1961 | Bay of Pigs landing to liberate Cuba fails. |
| May 11, 1961 | Kennedy authorizes US advisors to aid South Vietnam. |
| 1962 | General Taylor becomes Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. |
| Oct. 1962 | Gavin ends his service as US Ambassador to France, returns to ADL. |
| 1964 | General Taylor resigns from his post as Chairman of the JCS. |
| | Taylor becomes US Ambassador to South Vietnam. |
| 1965: | Taylor retires from the post of US Ambassador to South Vietnam. |

Taylor serves on the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under President Lyndon Johnson.

1967: Taylor publishes *Responsibility and Response*.

1968: James Gavin publishes *Crisis Now*.

1969: Taylor ends service on the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

August 17, 1973: Admiral Radford dies.

1978: James Gavin publishes *On to Berlin*.

March 29, 1982: Nathan Twining died.

April 19, 1987: Maxwell D. Taylor dies.

March 5, 1990: James M. Gavin dies.

July 26, 1993: Matthew B. Ridgway dies.

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Regena M. Bailey
Signature of Author

9 December 1998
Date

The Revolt of the Generals: Army
Opposition to the New Look
Title of Thesis/Research Project

Doug Cooper
Signature of Graduate Office Staff

December 9, 1998
Date Received

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