

insignificant, positive relationship between the characteristics of moral reasoning ability as assessed by the Defining Issues Test, and narcissism, as assessed by the Narcissistic Personality Inventory. The study also indicates that educational level is significant in the degree to which these characteristics are present. Further investigation of these traits and their relationship to other personality characteristics is suggested by this study.

A CORRELATIONAL STUDY OF
MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND NARCISSISM

A Thesis

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
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
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

For centuries people have been faced with the task of deciding which behaviors constitute "right" or "wrong." Just as the great philosophers of ancient times struggled with the question, modern people, too, must distinguish right from wrong, good from bad. As our society has become more complex, the number of choices each person must make has increased. If an individual in the 20th century has any advantage over those ancient philosophers, it is because of the research of this century that has led to increased understanding of the processes involved in decision making. Philosophers such as John Dewey and researchers such as Lawrence Kohlberg have provided a wealth of knowledge in such areas as values and moral judgment, knowledge which has laid the groundwork for hundreds of subsequent studies.

Moral Development

Morals, according to Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1981), are principles of right and wrong that influence human behavior. Rushton (1982) defined morals as "internal standards against which events are judged" (p. 463). These simplistic definitions do not describe the range of variables that affect the process used in making moral judgments. One of the first to

identify these complex processes was John Dewey. Dewey (1930) concluded that there are three levels of moral development: (1) The preconventional or premoral level, where one's behavior is motivated by biological or social impulses; (2) the conventional level, where the individual unquestioningly accepts group standards for behavior; and (3) the autonomous level, where the individual makes his or her own judgments of appropriate behavior and may or may not follow group standards.

Piaget (1948) modified Dewey's definition to fit his developmental schemata: (1) The premoral stage, observed in young children, where the child has no obligation to rules; (2) the heteronomous stage, where one is obligated to follow rules and to submit to powerful others, and even to submit to punishment for not following rules; and (3) the autonomous stage, where one's obligation to follow rules is dependent upon the rule and the situation to which the rule is applied. The primary difference between Dewey's and Piaget's definitions is Piaget's application of moral development to the child as a developing human, equating primitive moral development with a very young age, and the acquisition of higher levels of moral development as the person ages. Dewey, on the other hand, made no differentiation of moral development based on age.

Dewey's and Piaget's models can best be described as cognitive-developmental. This theoretical model, according to Kohlberg (1981), uses the cognitive structure that involves "active

judgment" (p. 136). Kohlberg believed that at different ages an individual has different cognitive abilities, and that the moral judgment of that individual corresponds with those abilities. Kohlberg began his studies of moral development in 1958, while a student at the University of Chicago. Following the lead of Dewey and Piaget, Kohlberg chose the cognitive-developmental model for his conceptual framework.

Kurtines and Greif (1974) refer to Kohlberg's work as merely an extension of Piaget's model. However, Kohlberg's research went far beyond Piaget's theoretical position, for Kohlberg developed a means of measuring an individual's level of moral development. Using the Moral Judgment Interview, a subjectively scored test of nine hypothetical moral dilemmas followed by an interview with the subject, Kohlberg (1958) believed he could determine one's level of moral development. Kohlberg's study was conducted by interviewing 50 Chicago boys, 10 to 16 years of age, from middle and working class families. For the next 15 years Kohlberg (1975) followed up this study by retesting each person every three years.

Kohlberg, like his two predecessors, described three levels of moral development. However, within each of these levels he believed there were two stages. Level I, the Preconventional level, is where the person relates to the physical consequences experienced as a result of good or bad behavior. Stage 1 of this level is one's orientation to punishment and obedience, and Stage 2 is what Kohlberg describes as one's "instrumental-relativist

orientation" (p. 671). At this stage an individual seeks to satisfy his or her own needs, and the needs of others only occasionally, and for the most part, accidentally. Level II is the Conventional level, where one's values are placed in upholding the expectations of one's family, group, or nation, regardless of the consequences. This begins at Stage 3, where one is oriented to maintaining a "good" image in the eyes of others. Stage 4 is called the "law and order orientation" (p. 671). At this stage the maintenance of authority is important. At Level III, the Post-Conventional level, one's values and principles are defined apart from group influences. A Stage 5 orientation is where the person's reasoning is not authoritative, but legalistic. Values are democratically determined views, and are valid beyond the group. At Stage 6 one's moral standards are based upon individual principles of conscience, without influence by others' opinions or values. This highest stage is what Kohlberg describes as the universal-ethical principle orientation.

Using the data acquired during his 1958 study and subsequent retests at three year intervals, Kohlberg (1969, 1973, 1975; Kohlberg & Turiel, 1971) concluded that the stages of development in his theory follow a stepwise, invariant sequence. Kohlberg believed that every individual must pass through each of the developmental stages in his theory, and that the person could not skip from one stage to a stage two or more levels higher. Kohlberg also believed that once a person had attained a stage, that individual would not

revert to an earlier, lower stage. Other researchers questioned Kohlberg's results. Kramer (1968) evaluated Kohlberg's data and discovered that only 19% of the longitudinal subjects moved up only one level. Holstein (1976) criticized Kohlberg's studies, noting that Kohlberg used cross-sectional data, which shows the trends of group data based on subject age. Holstein believed that the results of the 1969 Kohlberg and Kramer study are equally suspect, for it is similar to Kohlberg's original study, differing only in that it combined cross-sectional data with longitudinal data. Holstein believed that a strictly longitudinal study would be necessary to accurately assess Kohlberg's claims. Holstein's (1976) study used 53 upper-middle class families, each with a 13 year old son or daughter. Five of Kohlberg's moral judgment dilemmas were used, and 53 fathers, 53 mothers, 24 sons, and 29 daughters were tested. After three years the study was followed up by retesting 48 fathers, 49 mothers, and 52 adolescents from the original study. Holstein found that the young males moved from Stages 1 or 2 to Stage 4, a two to three stage jump, while young girls were more likely to move one step, from Stage 2 to Stage 3. Virtually no change in stages was noted for the fathers or mothers in the study. Holstein concluded that a three year test-retest interval is too long for adolescents, because of the potential of unobserved sequential movement over time. She was unable to substantiate Kohlberg's claim of a stepwise sequence from stage to stage, but did observe that movement was sequential

from level to level. Holstein also noted that there was minimal regression to lower stages for those subjects at lower levels of moral development (0-2%), but found that for subjects in higher levels regression varied from 20% to 33%. This regression was observed when comparing initial test results with retest results and noting those subjects who scored at a higher stage on the initial test than they did on the retest. Holstein proposed two reasons for this regression. First, measurement error may have been a factor. Second, higher level stages differ in terms of content, and a subject may choose to use a mode of reasoning that is at a lower stage than that he or she is actually capable of. This latter view was also expressed by Alston (1971) in a discussion of Kohlberg's theory.

Turiel (1966) provided more specific evidence to support Kohlberg's theory than did Holstein. In his study Turiel tested 44 seventh grade boys, ages 12 and 13, to determine their stage of moral development. Turiel used Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, as Holstein had done in her study. Turiel's subjects were divided into three experimental groups and one control group. Each experimental group was exposed to one of three conditions. The first group was exposed to concepts representing moral stages one stage above (+1) the stage determined during initial testing. The second group was exposed to concepts two stages (+2) higher than each subject's original level, and the third group was exposed to concepts one stage below (-1) the original stage. Exposure to

these various conceptual stages was accomplished by having the subject role play a situation of the determined stage with an adult experimenter. Following the role playing each subject was retested, to determine the influence of the experimental condition by comparing posttest results to the results obtained on the initial test. Turiel found that the subjects of the +1 group assimilated those concepts more readily than did the subjects of either the +2 group or the -1 group. He also observed that the -1 group assimilated their concepts more readily than did the +2 group. These results led Turiel to believe that an individual will tend to move one stage higher than his original stage before he will regress to a lower stage. Turiel also believed that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for an individual to move to a stage two or more stages higher than one's current stage without going through the intervening stages. The data from this study supports Kohlberg's claims, for it indicates that movement is typically from one stage to the next higher stage.

A similar study by Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg (1969) yielded similar results. In their study 11 male and 11 female students, 10 to 12 years of age, were pretested, using the Moral Judgment Interview. The subjects were then presented booklets that had stories representing conflict situations. After reading each story each subject was given a list of potential conflict solutions, each solutions at a different moral stage, and was asked to rate these solutions as the "Best," "Worst," "Smart," or "Good" advice.

The subjects in the study tended to choose advice above their own moral stage as the "Best" advice, and chose advice below their own moral stage as the "Worst" advice. Two factors were found that influenced the decision making process for these subjects: The subject's preference for a particular stage of thinking, and the highest level of thinking they were able to comprehend. Rest et al. contended that +1 thinking is more difficult to understand than -1 thinking, but nevertheless, the individual prefers higher levels of reasoning to lower levels.

A study by Walker in 1982 was similar to Turiel's (1966) study, and provided similar results. Like Turiel, Walker exposed his subjects, 101 fifth through seventh grade children, to -1, +1, and +2 levels of moral reasoning following administration of Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview. Walker's results indicated no stage skipping and no regression. There was no difference in results of exposure to +1 or +2 reasoning, for exposure to either level resulted in a one stage increase in level of thinking, as determined by posttesting. Again, these results further support Kohlberg's theory of an invariant, sequential pattern of moral development.

Rest's 1973 study sought to determine the ability of subjects to comprehend information presented to them at various stages of moral reasoning. He used 47 volunteers from twelfth grade classes at a Chicago high school, pretesting them with the Moral Judgment Interview to determine their current level of moral reasoning.

The subjects were then presented statements designed to correspond with each of the six levels of moral development, and asked to read, and then to answer, a series of prepared questions. Comprehension of each statement was determined by comparing each subject's answers to predetermined criteria. Rest found that subjects who showed high comprehension at any given stage also showed high comprehension at all preceding stages. Forty-five of the subjects were perfect in cumulative comprehension of stages up to their highest stage of understanding, and two subjects missed only one stage prior to their highest stage. Rest also noted that the highest stage of comprehension determined by the above procedure was also the preferred stage of development determined on the pretest for 20 of the subjects. Twenty-three of the subjects had comprehension scores that were one stage beyond their pretest scores. Rest believed that the highest stages used during pretesting, rather than the predominant pretest stage, are better indicators of comprehension than the pretest stage itself. This finding also supports the Rest et al. (1969) study that indicated that an individual's preference for a level of reasoning may influence his or her predominant stage of moral development.

In 1974 Rest, Cooper, Coder, Masanz, and Anderson worked together to alleviate the deficiencies they believed were inherent in Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview. These researchers felt there were other ways of viewing moral decision making than the method used by Kohlberg (1958). Rest et al. (1974) believed that

while Kohlberg's method of basing moral judgment strictly upon an individual's own thinking is important, it is also important to consider the judgments one makes about the judgments of other people. This involves not only the person's own thoughts, but also thoughts about the reasoning of others. Rest et al. (1974) believed this is especially important in today's society, where "people are influenced not only by the conclusions that another person advises but also by the way that other person defines the problem" (p.491). The researchers also found limitations in the manner in which moral stage determination is made on Kohlberg's test. The Moral Judgment Interview assesses a subject's level of moral development by requiring the subject to react to a moral dilemma and then determine how one should behave. The subject must then justify his or her course of action. This is accomplished during an interview process that depends upon the skills of the interviewer in eliciting responses from the subject, as well as the subject's ability to express himself or herself. To Rest et al. this method is very subjective. Too, it does not include the information they feel is important in making moral decisions, specifically the influence others' judgments have on one's own judgments. Rest et al. (1974) agreed with Kohlberg about the use of moral stages and levels to describe an individual's level of moral reasoning. Further, they saw no need to develop dilemmas other than those previously used by Kohlberg. The primary need, as these researchers viewed it, was to develop an objective means of

collecting, measuring, and analyzing the data, while providing a means of presenting a "conceptual framework for interpreting social interrelationships and mutual responsibilities" (p. 492).

Because Rest et al. felt each moral judgment stage has its own unique characteristics that define a given moral dilemma, they believed they could design a list of statements that represent the various stages of moral development. This list was to be presented to each subject, who would rate the individual statements by noting their importance in relation to the particular dilemma. After rating each of the 12 statements for the dilemma, the subject was to rate which of the 12 he or she believed was the most important to the issue, which was the second most important, and which were the third and fourth most important. Rest et al. (1974) called this test the Defining Issues Test (DIT). The DIT may be found in Appendix A. In this initial study using the DIT, Rest et al. also administered the Comprehension of Social-Moral Concepts Test, the Law and Order Attitude Test, the Libertarian Democracy Test, Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, and the Differential Ability Tests. Also taken into consideration were such demographic variables as the father's level of education and occupation.

The major scale on the DIT is the "P" score, which Rest et al. use to describe an individual's "principled morality." This score is the number of Stage 5 and Stage 6 responses made by the subject. Test-retest correlation of the DIT, using a sample of 28 ninth grade students, was .81. Correlations between the DIT and the

Other scales used in the study were also figured, following test administration to three samples. Sample 1 consisted of 193 junior high, senior high, college, and graduate school students. Sample 2 consisted of 65 students from the same categories as Sample 1, and Sample 3 consisted of 85 nonstudent adults. Correlations between the DIT and the Comprehension Test were .62, .67, and .52, for Samples 1-3, respectively. Correlations between the DIT and the Law and Order Test were -.60, -.48, and -.46. The correlation between the DIT and the Libertarian Test, using only Sample 1, was .63. All the above correlations were at the .01 level of confidence. Rest et al. believed that these correlations were strong indicators of the DIT's validity, and also pointed out the significant correlation between the DIT and the Differential Abilities Tests ($r = .35$, $p < .01$). The correlation between the DIT and Kohlberg's test was .68, which the researchers did not believe was high enough to consider the two as equivalent tests. When one considers the reasons for development of the DIT and the differences in administration and scoring, however, this is to be expected. Overall, the authors were able to clearly differentiate between levels of moral development.

Rest (1975) retested 88 of the subjects used in the Rest et al. (1974) study, nearly two years after the earlier study. The subjects ranged in age from 16 to 20 years, and consisted of 47 females and 41 males. The subjects were retested on the DIT, the Comprehension of Social-Moral Concepts Test, and the Law and Order

Attitude Test. In this two year period a significant gain in principled moral thinking was found. Using matched pairs of male and female subjects, Rest (1975) noted a significant increase in DIT "P" scores, $t(40) = 4.04$, $p < .0001$, and $t(46) = 3.71$, $p < .001$, respectively. When the subjects were divided into two groups, those completing junior high and those completing senior high, a pattern of upward movement was observed. The correlation between scores obtained during the first and second studies was .68 for the younger group and .54 for the older group. Rest explained the higher correlation found with the younger group by noting that the increase in level of reasoning was generally from Stages 1 and 2 to Stages 3 and 4, or from what he describes as preconventional morality to conventional morality. In the older group the change in thinking was generally from Stages 3 and 4 to Stage 5, or from conventional morality to principled morality. Because in the younger group fewer individuals obtained scores in Stages 5 or 6, which determine the "P" score, the correlation between the two sets of data is higher than that for the older group, who tended to have an increased number of Stage 5 or 6 scores on the followup test. Although Rest acknowledged an overall gain in moral thinking, he stated that this does not necessarily indicate a change in the subject's stage of moral development. Rather, it merely indicates that the subject has chosen a higher number of Stage 5 or Stage 6 statements as important, which Rest believed is not directly comparable to that subject's predominant

level of development. Rest also hoped to discover what factors influenced changed moral reasoning. By interviewing each subject and evaluating their experiences over the two year period between tests, Rest found that most gains were related to increased education of the subjects, much more so than chronological age.

A number of other studies have noted the effect of education on moral development. Arbuthnot and Gordon (1986) stated that "moral reasoning is dependent upon prior acquisition of basic logical reasoning abilities, and active construction of world views" (p. 208). Hanks (1985) studied the difference in moral judgment ability of children ages 12 to 15. The children in the sample were divided into three groups, based upon educational placement in school as a result of specific cognitive abilities. The first group consisted of 40 "normal" children, the second group consisted of 40 "mildly educationally subnormal" (p. 43), but stable, children, and the third group consisted of 64 subnormal children who were also considered maladjusted. Hanks stated that if one compares normal children with subnormal children the difference in moral reasoning ability will be the same as the difference in cognitive ability, which may allow one to draw conclusions by generalizing test results to other populations of children with varying degrees of intelligence. As predicted, significant differences between the performances of the children in all three groups were observed, with the moral judgment of the normal children significantly higher than either of the subnormal

groups. The performance of the children in the two subnormal groups was also compared, and the reasoning of the stable group was found to be significantly higher than the reasoning of the maladjusted group. Subjects in the latter two groups were matched in age, sex, schools, and other controllable variables. Hanks found that when statistically controlling factors of intelligence, there was virtually no difference between the two subnormal groups. This, to Hanks, "suggests that intelligence level, rather than a personality factor, holds the key in determining the quality of their judgments" (p. 53).

Rest and Thoma (1985) continued the study originated by Rest et al. (1974), retesting the subjects every two years. Fifty-two of the subjects were retested for this study, including 38 with college education, 18 with no college education, and 3 who were unclear in making this determination. Once again the DIT, the Comprehension Test, and the Law and Order Test were administered. Additionally, a history of the subjects' lives over the past years was obtained. Subjects were classified into two groups, the college group and the noncollege group. A significantly different pattern of moral development was noted between the two groups, with the high education group showing continuously increasing levels of moral judgment over the six year period since the first testing. The low education group, on the other hand, showed an initial increase at the first two year retest, but had decreasing levels of moral development at each of the following

two retest periods. These data graphically detail the effect of education on moral reasoning, for those with college education obtained P scores some 14% higher than those with no college education. The more years of post-high school education, the higher the level of reasoning, according to Rest and Thoma (1985). The researchers also analyzed the data cross-sectionally, and found similar results. Rest et al., in reviewing other studies that focused on the effect of education on moral reasoning, found six other studies that have shown significant increases in the DIT P score with higher levels of education, and one that showed an insignificant, but positive, increase. The researchers could not find a single study that provided evidence to the contrary.

In addition to education, a number of other factors may influence moral thinking. Rest and Thoma (1985) summarized five of these influences: (1) socialization skills learned in college; (2) increased verbal skills and other knowledge learned through higher education; (3) the general socio-moral perspective attained as one attends college; (4) general intellectual stimulation received through higher education; and (5) the effect based on the general characteristics of those who go to college (i.e., individual predispositions). Logical thinking is also related to level of moral reasoning, according to Zeidler (1985). Zeidler studied the relationship between the DIT and the Test of Logical Thinking and found a significant correlation ($\underline{r} = .43$, $\underline{p} < .0001$) between them. Zeidler believed that the ability to think logically

is a very important variable in one's ability to use high level moral reasoning.

One aspect of education may have no effect upon one's moral reasoning, however. According to Evans (1982), prior knowledge of Kohlberg's stages of development has no apparent effect on one's own level of development. In his study, which consisted of a sample of 96 high school students, Evans pretested two groups of subjects, an experimental group and a control group, administering one group Form A of Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview and the other group Form B. The experimental group was then instructed on the principles of Kohlberg's theory. The two groups were then retested, using the form opposite of that used on the pretest. Test results indicated that the instruction provided the experimental group made no significant difference in test results. Unfortunately, these results may be invalid because Evans found that the correlation between Form A and Form B was only .66, which Evans believed was too low to describe the two forms as equivalent tests. Evans suggested that the forms are either nonequivalent forms and/or one or both of the forms is not a valid measure of moral development when given in the written version.

As Rest (1984, 1986a) continued his research in the area of moral development he became increasingly aware that there are many complex processes that affect moral behavior in addition to specific factors such as intelligence or education. Understanding the processes that humans use in determining moral behavior became the

focus of Rest's research, and he eventually developed the "Four Component Model" (1984). With this model he proposed a "framework for viewing the major components of morality and their interrelationships" (p. 19). Rest identified four psychological processes that he believed all persons go through when they seek to behave morally in a given situation. Component I occurs at the beginning of a situation requiring moral decision-making. The individual must first interpret the situation, determining who is involved, what possible options for behavior are available, and how each of these options may affect each person involved. After completing the processes involved in the first component, the individual moves on to Component II. At this point the person must analyze each potential behavior and rank it according to fairness, justness, and moral "rightness." After identifying the various lines of behavior, the person moves to Component III, where he or she must choose a specific behavior over other possibilities. At Component IV the individual must implement and follow through with the behavior chosen in the previous component. Under ideal circumstances, the person will follow the four components of this model, working through each one until the problem is solved and an appropriate behavior is selected and utilized. Under other, less than ideal circumstances, the person may not proceed through one or more of the stages, or may make less than adequate choices of behavior. Rest's model is much more complex than the moral development theory proposed by Kohlberg, which tends to reduce the

process to an either/or, yes or no decision. Rest recognized that the reasoning process is a far more complicated operation, and believed that only by understanding the process can individuals, and society as a whole, progress toward higher standards of moral behavior. Berndt (1985) also believed that studies should now examine the experiences that influence moral development and the personal characteristics that influence situations that require moral judgments, instead of merely focusing upon simple measurement of moral stage development. As Rest (1986a) stated, research is now "moving away from issues of instrumentation to the more substantive theoretical questions of life conditions that influence life directions" (p. 20). It is with this statement in mind that the present study has been undertaken.

Narcissism

One of the many characteristics that make up the personality of each human being is the trait of narcissism (Freud, 1914). Although narcissism is not a recently developed concept (Mone, 1983), only in the past two decades has it become a trait of frequent consideration. Two primary approaches have been described when referring to narcissism. Lasch (1978) discussed the cultural aspects of narcissism, and viewed the trait as one that is becoming more prevalent in our society, having developed over the years as a response to changing cultural demands. Kernberg (1976a), on the other hand, views narcissism as a psychological phenomenon that is

a basic characteristic of all humans. Both approaches have their proponents, and each has merit in its own right. Unfortunately, the limited research in the area has only recently allowed definitive statements to be made about the trait, both as a normal human characteristic (Freud, 1914) and as a pathological disorder (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1980).

The term "narcissism" originated in Greek mythology, where the young Narcissus was punished for his failure to return an admirer's love, and condemned to view his own reflection in a spring until his love for himself caused him to be turned into a narcissus plant. It is from this tale that the simple, but generally accepted definition of narcissism was derived, and described as the "love of oneself."

According to Mone in his 1983 literature review, "narcissism was first adopted as a psychological concept in 1899 by Paul Nacke, who described it as a form of autoeroticism in which the self is treated as a sexual object" (p. 107). Freud (1914) later regarded narcissism as a character trait of importance in the development of an individual. He believed that narcissism surfaces in two forms. The first is known as primary narcissism, which is first evident in infants as original energy within the ego, or what Freud called libido. Freud believed primary narcissism to be a normal aspect of development with the focus of energy upon the self. As a child the person is unable differentiate self from nonself. He or she is, in a sense, omnipotent, able to control and direct

those around him or her, as they seek to provide food, shelter, and nurturance. At this young age, primary narcissism is a "natural, nonpsychopathological self-concept" (Gottschalk, 1988, p. 6).

As the child continues to develop, it begins to view the world in a different manner. It finds that those things previously taken for granted as existing for its benefit can no longer be assumed to exist for him or her alone. The child must now begin to develop a sense of independence and assume responsibility for behavior. If the child has received adequate care, support, and nurturance, it will adapt to these new conditions with little difficulty, for it will have developed a normal, secure sense of self. With successful adaptation the child's libidinal energy will be directed outward, to external objects. However, if the child's self-concept is debilitated due to immaturity or excessive threats to the ego, it may regress to the safety of the earlier stage of development, where libidinal energies are once again directed inward (Burstein & Bertenthal, 1986; Modell, 1975). It is this nonnormal development to which Freud (1914) affixes the name secondary narcissism, which at extremes is often referred to as pathological narcissism (Kernberg, 1974, 1976a; Kohut, 1971; Stolorow, 1975).

Not all theorists agree with Freud's views. To Kohut (1971), behavior is a continuum that ranges from normal to psychosis, with narcissism somewhere in between. Narcissism, if viewed as a characteristic of human development, may follow two general paths (Kohut, 1971; Rubins, 1983). The first path results in a

narcissistic self, with symptoms of grandiosity or exhibitionism. The second path leads to a self with little narcissism, where the individual will idealize parents rather than self, giving them perfection and power. Under normal circumstances these two conditions are introjected, or internalized, allowing the individual to develop a stable ego-ideal, which Freud describes as an ideal established by the individual "by which he measures his own ego" (1914, p. 51). If introjection is not accomplished, the individual's resulting fragile self-esteem is further hampered by a dominating superego. The individual will tend to set unrealistically high goals that may not be attainable, leading to insecurity and shame. In order to prevent this the person must develop complete control in order to protect the self. Failure to attain, and maintain, this level of control may lead to extreme behaviors more closely aligned with psychosis than narcissism (Rubins, 1983). In fact, Kohut labels various levels of narcissistic disturbance based on severity. These levels, from least to greatest severity, are; "shame, fear of loss of object, fear of loss of love of object, and finally, castration anxiety" (Kohut, 1971, p. 20).

Kernberg is another theorist whose work centers on narcissism, with views quite different than those expressed by Kohut. Kernberg (1976b) believed that development of the structures on which one bases self-view occur during the first five to six years of life. He labels four stages; (1) Normal autism, or the Primary

Undifferentiated Stage. This occurs during the first month of life, where the infant is totally unable to differentiate; (2) normal symbiosis, or the Primary, Undifferentiated Self-Object Representations Stage. From the second to eighth month of life, the child remains incapable of differentiation. It does, however, begin to sense good and bad emotions expressed by the parent or other significant adults; (3) the Differentiation of Self from Object Representations Stage, beginning at the ninth month and lasting through the third year. The child begins to differentiate, but is able only to perceive the extremes of all good self, all good object, or all bad self, all bad object; (4) the final stage of development is the Integration of Self-Representation and Development of Higher Level Intrapsychic Object-Relations Derived Structures. From the third year on, the child begins to fuse concepts of good and bad into whole representations of both self and object. It is at this point that a balance between ego and superego structures is attained.

If for some reason this delicate balance is interfered with, perhaps because of substandard relationships with significant objects (such as parents), the individual may acquire narcissistic traits as he seeks to defend himself from the perceived threat to his or her identity (Kernberg, 1976b). This defense may result in grandiosity, as the individual seeks to replace the inadequate object (parent) with an over-idealized self, a rather primitive form of ego-ideal. Along with the grandiose feeling of omnipotence,

the person devalues others by his conviction of superiority over them (Kernberg, 1968). In spite of these distorted relations with others, Kernberg (1974) believed that persons with these narcissistic traits may be quite functional in their social relationships, however superficial these relations may be. In general, Kernberg's theory is based upon one's relation to, and development of, the self, or ego. The development of normal narcissistic tendencies is related to real needs that one can reasonably expect to fulfill as well as establishing relations with significant others (Kernberg, 1974; Marks, 1985).

To others, narcissism plays a different, but equally important role. Stolorow (1975) believed that narcissism is not merely a result of self and object-relations, but that it is mental activity that functions to structure and control self-representations. Thus, narcissism is not equated with ego or self-esteem. Instead, it is a function that maintains the base upon which self-esteem is built.

Van Der Waals (1965) believed that narcissism is not only a normal aspect of development, but also that it is a very necessary condition if one is to establish relationships with others. He agrees with Freud that primary narcissism is essentially object-less, since the infant is basically unaware of the external world. He adds to this, however, by stating that the child is equally unaware of the internal world, reacting to objects only as they give pleasure or displeasure. This is an obvious adaptation

of Freud's idea of the "pleasure principle," a view which is used by other researchers as well (Parkin, 1985). This principle is important to Van Der Waals, for he states that "narcissism...is a means for the individual to seek a comfortable level" (1965, p. 195). In seeking this level, one's narcissistic tendencies are modified to become compatible with full object-love, and as one's development continues these two characteristics become even more dependent upon each other.

Modell (1975) believed that subtle environmental trauma is the primary cause of narcissism. He gave an example of a mother who does not respect her child's autonomy or separateness: "It is as if the child states: I cannot trust my own mother; therefore I will become a better mother to myself" (p. 278). Unfortunately, this is not true autonomy, and the child must defend himself or herself against anything that threatens this fragile viewpoint. The child may deny the existence of the object, thus removing himself or herself from the fear of coming too close to that object. These defenses, according to Modell, are like a cocoon, where nothing enters and nothing can leave.

The variety of narcissistic theories presented here, while providing a number of views on which to base observation of behavior, do little in terms of allowing systematic assessment of that behavior. In fact, prior to 1980 the diagnosis of pathological narcissism was largely based upon the subjective views of therapists treating clients who possessed narcissistic tendencies such as

extreme self-centeredness or extreme reactions to criticism.

Several attempts to use existing tests or to develop specific tests to detect narcissism were made, but few were successfully validated.

The Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) was used by Grayden (1958), but he was unable to develop a means of interpreting results that would accurately predict narcissism. Young (1959) also used the TAT, and was able to show that there is a significant positive relationship between narcissism and degree of psychopathology, using a sample of normal, neurotic, and schizophrenic individuals.

Neither Wolman's (1967) narcissism-egocentrism scale nor Rothburd's (1970) exhibitionism-voyeurism scale were successfully validated.

Urist was able to use the Rorschach to measure pathological narcissism in 1977, but the method relied extensively on the skills of the examiner because of the complexity of the test and the multiple interpretations that can be made.

The addition of the diagnostic category of narcissistic personality disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 3rd Edition (DSM-III), published by the American Psychiatric Association in 1980, established the first consistent diagnostic criteria for the trait of narcissism. As in all diagnostic categories in the DSM-III, a number of explicit criteria were established on which to base behavioral observations. The criteria for determining pathological narcissism eliminated the subjectivity of labelling that was previously the unavoidable consequence of lack of criteria. In 1987 the Manual was revised,

and the DSM-III-R is now in use. The DSM-III-R behavioral criteria for determination of the category of narcissistic personality disorder may be found in Table 1.

Table 1

DSM-III-R Criteria for the Narcissistic Personality Disorder

A pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), lack of empathy, and hypersensitivity to the evaluation of others, beginning by early childhood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by at least five of the following:

1. reacts to criticism with feelings of rage, shame, or humiliation (even if not expressed)
 2. is interpersonally exploitative: takes advantage of others to achieve his or her own ends
 3. has a grandiose sense of self-importance, e.g., exaggerates achievements and talents, expects to be noticed as "special" without appropriate achievement
 4. believes that his or her problems are unique and can be understood only by other special people
 5. is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty, or ideal love
 6. has a sense of entitlement: unreasonable expectation of especially favorable treatment, e.g., assumes that he or she does not have to wait in line when others must do so
 7. requires constant attention and admiration, e.g., keeps fishing for compliments
 8. lack of empathy: inability to recognize and experience how others feel, e.g., annoyance and surprise when a friend who is seriously ill cancels a date
 9. is preoccupied with feelings of envy
-

The DSM-III-R classification created a turning point in the history of studies relating to narcissism. These criteria made diagnosis of the disorder relatively consistent from clinician to clinician. More importantly, inclusion of the disorder in the DSM-III-R and development of the criteria for diagnosis established universal standards. This created a base on which researchers could be used to accurately assess the trait of narcissism.

The effect of the DSM-III criteria was soon apparent as researchers began to develop test instruments based on these standards. Raskin and Hall (1979) developed the Narcissistic Personality Inventory, basing their test on the DSM-III criteria. The authors state that their test is "not necessarily a measure of a personality disorder" (p. 590). Raskin and Hall attempted to develop an instrument that was sensitive enough to measure any degree of narcissistic traits, not just pathological levels of the characteristic. The authors believed that the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) was a "measure of the degree to which individual's differ in a trait we have have labeled 'narcissism'" (p. 590). The NPI (Raskin, 1980) originally consisted of 81 pairs of statements, from which the subject chose the statement that he or she most identified with. An example of these pairs of statements was:

- a. I am a fairly sensitive person.
- b. I am more sensitive than most other people.

Choice "b" is the narcissistic statement in the example presented. Scoring is done on a cumulative basis, with a high number of narcissistic choices indicative of an individual with high levels of narcissism. A low score indicates an individual with fewer narcissistic tendencies.

Ashby, Lee, and Duke (1979) also introduced a test of narcissism. The Narcissistic Personality Disorder Scale was presented to the American Psychiatric Association National Convention in New York. The test uses items from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). The relevant items on the MMPI were discerned through an item analysis of the test results from a sample of clinically diagnosed narcissistic personality disordered patients. Nineteen items on the MMPI were chosen as significant in identifying narcissism. These items may be administered separately or scored as a subscale if the entire MMPI is to be administered. The theoretical framework that guided Ashby et al. during development of this test comes from the work of Kohut (1971). The authors state that they believe that narcissism can only be identified through mirroring or idealizing transference, and the items on the MMPI were chosen with these considerations in mind.

A third test to assess narcissism was developed by Phares and Erskine in 1984. These researchers called their test the Selfism Scale. They use the term "selfism" because in their research they chose to view narcissism as a cognitive variable, rather than as a

need or a drive. They hoped to avoid psychoanalytic implications by using this rather unique term. The Selfism Scale consists of 40 items, 28 of which correlated well with the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964), an instrument that Phares and Erskine (1984) believed was successful in differentiating the items that best fit their definition of "selfism." Twelve items were included as filler items. Scoring is done by using a five point Likert Scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree.

The development of these three test instruments has led to an immense amount of research in the area of narcissism. Some of the research has been designed to test the reliability and validity of each instrument (Auerbach, 1984; Emmons, 1984; Prifitera & Ryan, 1984; Raskin & Hall, 1981; Solomon, 1982; Watson, Grisham, Trotter & Biderman, 1984). Other research has focused on the relation of narcissism to other personality characteristics in order to better understand the factors that make up or influence the trait. Raskin's (1980) study used the NPI to measure narcissism and the Barron Symbolic Equivalents Test to measure his subjects' level of creativity. High scores on the Barron test suggest a person who is independent in making judgments, self-assertive, dominant, concerned with power and personal recognition, and quite impulsive. In Raskin's study 71 subjects ranging in age from 18 to 38 were divided into four groups based upon their responses on the Barron test and a self-report. The groups were: (1) a high-creativity/

high-self-report group; (2) high-creativity/low-self-report; (3) low-creativity/high-self-report; (4) low-creativity/low-self-report.

The subjects were then administered the NPI. A significant difference was found between the high-creativity/high-self-report group and all other groups. The subjects in the high-creativity/high-self-report group scored highest on the NPI, while the subjects in the low-creativity/low-self-report group scored lowest on the NPI. When correlating the scores on the Barron test and the NPI Raskin found a low, but significant, positive correlation ($r = .25$, $p < .05$). This correlation, while low, suggests that there are similarities in the personality makeup of narcissistic individuals and creative individuals.

Emmons (1981) also used the NPI in a study. He hypothesized that narcissistic tendencies in an individual would correlate highly with a need for sensation seeking. Thirty-five female and 29 male undergraduate students were used in the study. The subjects' need for sensation seeking was assessed by administering Form IV of the Sensation Seeking Scale. Emmons believed that the narcissistic individual needs variety, and he or she tends to be "autonomous, dominant, and exhibitionistic" (p. 248). He cited the tendency for creativeness (Raskin, 1980) as support for these beliefs, and in reviewing studies of sensation seeking, felt that the characteristics of the high sensation seeker are consistent with those of the narcissistic person as well. Using the Pearson r , Emmons found a positive correlation between narcissism and each

of the subscales on the Sensation Seeking Scale. The highest correlation, .49 ($p < .01$) was with the Disinhibition subscale. The correlation with the Experience Seeking subscale was .37 ($p < .05$), Boredom Susceptibility was .31 ($p < .05$), and the overall correlation was .25 ($p < .05$). The correlation on the fifth subscale, Thrill and Adventure Seeking, was not significant (.13), although it too was a positive relationship. Additional points of interest noted by Emmons were the assumptions made by his subjects about the purpose of the NPI. High scorers believed it was a test of self-esteem, while low scorers felt it measured conceit. This suggests that narcissistic individuals lack insight into their own personality, because the NPI is not a self-esteem measure. Those with high narcissistic traits may actually use this as a means of defending themselves against criticism, because their beliefs prevent them from identifying, and accepting, the reality of their behavior (Lasch, 1978).

Several studies have been done that relate narcissism to empathy. Webster (1981) defined empathy as the intellectual identification of oneself with another individual. Narcissism, on the other hand, is "grandiosity, extreme self-centeredness, and a remarkable absence of interest in and empathy for others" (Kernberg, 1976a, p. 228). If one assumes that these definitions are accurate, it would be expected that measures of narcissism would correlate negatively with measures of empathy. Biscardi and Schill (1985) tested this assumption, using the NPI, the Defense Mechanisms

Inventory, (Gleser & Ihilevich, 1969), the Machiavellianism V Scale (Christie & Gies, 1970), and Hogan's (1969) Empathy Scale. Ninety-seven undergraduate men were administered these tests. Correlations between the NPI and the Defense subscales of Turning Against Object ($\underline{r} = .36$, $\underline{p} < .05$) and Projection ($\underline{r} = .27$, $\underline{p} < .05$) indicate that there is a significant relationship between narcissism and the tendency to express aggression outwardly. At the same time there were significant negative correlations between the NPI and subscales that involve defenses that inhibit or avoid outward expression of aggression; Reversal ($\underline{r} = -.22$), Turning Against Self ($\underline{r} = -.21$), and Principalization ($\underline{r} = .22$). The correlation between the NPI and the Machiavellianism Scale was small, but positive ($\underline{r} = .21$). Correlations between the Tolerance and Considerateness ($\underline{r} = -.29$) and the Social Self-confidence subscales ($\underline{r} = .64$) of the Empathy Scale were significant. Biscardi and Schill noted that the items on the Social Self-confidence subscale are similar to those on the NPI, such as "I have a natural talent for influencing people." Although the correlations with these measures are low, they are significant, and support for the NPI as a "valid indicator of a pattern of narcissistic traits" (p. 354).

Watson, Grisham, Trotter, and Biderman (1984) found that the NPI correlated negatively with two scales of empathy, the Mehrabian-Epstein Empathy Scale (MEES) ($\underline{r} = -.20$), and the Smith Empathic Personality Questionnaire (SEPQ) ($\underline{r} = -.37$). The 160

undergraduate subjects also took the Hogan Empathy Scale, with a correlation between it and the NPI of $r = .04$. Watson et al. observed a consistent relationship of the Exploitativeness/Entitlement subscales of the NPI to the three empathy measures. Correlations with the MEES ($r = -.24$, $p < .01$), SEPQ ($r = -.35$, $p < .001$), and HES ($r = -.20$, $p < .01$) indicate that empathy and the aspect of narcissism called Exploitativeness/Entitlement are very dissimilar concepts. Further testing was done, using the Crowne-Marlow Social Desirability Scale (CMSDS) and the Edwards Social Desirability Scale (ESDS). Low negative correlations were found between these scales and the NPI ($r = -.11$, and $r = -.06$, respectively), but significant relationships were again noted between the E/E subscale of the NPI and these two scales (CMSDS, $r = -.43$, $p < .001$; ESDS, $r = -.34$, $p < .001$). The authors feel that these correlations are strong indications of the construct validity of the NPI.

The relationship of social interest to narcissism has also been investigated (Miller, Smith, Wilkenson, & Tobacyk, 1987). The authors describe social interest as a matter of valuing things that go beyond the self. Thus, it is the opposite of self-centeredness, which Webster (1981) defined as egoistic. The NPI and Crandall's (1975) Social Interest Scale were administered to 78 subjects. The correlation of the scores on these two tests was $r = -.28$, $p < .01$. This relationship, according to the authors, provides evidence that narcissism is a true personality

characteristic, and one that is negatively related to characteristics that are other directed, such as social interest.

The negative relationship of narcissism to empathy or social interest is of great importance to the present study. Svrakic' (1986) believed that an area that is neglected in the study of narcissism is "narcissistic morality," which he refers to as "a unique ethical profile" (p. 56). He believed that narcissistic individuals have a unique moral belief system, based upon their underdeveloped superego and identification with the grandiose self. The poorly developed superego results in the absence of internalized values, ego ideals, and higher goals. At the same time, their grandiose self allows them only activities designed to gain attention or appreciation, with little or no regard for others. This is often well hidden. Svrakic' noted, "Narcissistic persons disguise their immorality by projecting an image of being highly ethical" (p. 58). Svrakic' also believed that narcissists generally imitate established moral standards, although this is done only for outward appearances, seldom with any internalization of these beliefs.

It is interesting that while many theorists write about moral development, linking it to empathy, or about narcissism, linking it to ego development, the two have not been directly compared. Perhaps this is because empathy and ego are considered two very dissimilar concepts. It may be, however, that the two are related in ways as yet unexamined. Lutwak (1984) proposed that ego, morals,

and concepts are positively related. The subjects for his study consisted of 102 late adolescents and adult undergraduate students. Each subject was administered the Sentence Completion Test (Loevinger, Wessler, & Redmore, 1970) to measure ego development, the DIT to measure moral development, and the This I Believe Test to measure conceptual system development. The correlation between ego and moral development, while low ($r = .29$), was significant. This suggests that higher levels of ego development relate positively to higher moral development. The correlation between the DIT and the This I Believe Test was .46, and the correlation between the This I Believe Test and the Sentence Completion Test was .29. Lutwak believed that cognitive abilities are important in ego development and moral development, and feels that the positive correlation between each of these areas and conceptual development supports this. According to Kernberg (1975), narcissists have an inadequately developed ego. As a result, the superego becomes the overcontrolling influence on the individual's life, in an attempt to protect the weak ego, and thus, the fragile self-esteem (Freud, 1914; Kohut, 1971; Rubins, 1983). If one agrees with Kernberg that poor ego development tends to correspond with narcissistic traits, and also considers Lutwak's positively correlated ego and moral development, one may then assume that a person with poor ego development (high narcissism) would also have a lower level of moral reasoning ability. Conversely, higher ego development should indicate higher moral development. Wilson and Prabucki (1983) also

believed that low ego development is related to narcissism. They stated, "healthy ego development is associated with realistic self-worth and the ability to set high levels of aspiration without the narcissistic need to exploit others" (p. 1232). They also noted that there is a negative relationship between psycho-social maturity and the development of narcissistic personality characteristics.

Sullivan, McCullough, and Stager (1970) administered the Loevinger Sentence Completion Test (SCT) and the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview to 120 students, ages 12, 14, and 17, in an attempt to compare ego development to moral development. When disregarding variations due to the subjects' age differences a correlation of .66 was found. When statistically eliminating age differences, a correlation of .40 was noted. In either case a significant relationship was reported.

Another study relating ego and moral development was done by Liberman, Gaa, and Frankiewicz (1983), and also used the Sentence Completion Test and the Moral Judgment Interview. However, instead of using a linear method of correlating the results as Sullivan et al. (1970) had done, they chose to use a nonlinear method, the Van der Waerden inverse normal-scores test. Liberman et al. (1983) believed that different rates of maturation may cause enough variation in test results to invalidate those results, or at least cause inaccuracies. Using graduate students as subjects, the researchers administered the SCT to 97 individuals. From this group 21 subjects, whose scores were at the upper level of ego

development as measured by the SCT, were chosen. These subjects were then administered the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI). The resulting correlation, using the nonlinear method, was .42. In addition to providing evidence of a moderate relation between the two developmental measures, the study also indicated that "individuals at the higher ego levels had significantly higher moral development scores" (p. 64). Again, this can be seen as a link between the ego characteristics of narcissism and one's level of moral reasoning.

Moral reasoning ability has also been compared to open and closed belief systems, which may be defined as the manner in which a person defines and evaluates moral dilemmas (Nichols & Stults, 1985). When these researchers compared the results of the DIT to Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale there were significant negative correlations ($r = -.22$ to $-.35$) between the DIT and each of the four Dogmatism subscales. These subscales detect such characteristics as primitive beliefs, intolerance, aloneness, and isolation. These characteristics are quite comparable to the criteria for narcissism listed in the DSM-III-R, particularly that of intolerance. If dogmatism, defined by Webster (1981) as an assertion of opinion without reference to evidence, is viewed as a characteristic typical of narcissists, then one could suggest that the results of Nichol and Stults' study indicate that a negative relationship exists between narcissism and moral development.

Guthrie's (1985) study investigated the relationship of locus of

control to moral development. She found that internal locus of control tends to facilitate the development of principled moral reasoning. Using Rotter's Internal-External Scale and the DIT, Guthrie found that those highest on the Internal-External Scale, with high scores indicating an internal locus of control, were also those with the highest level of moral reasoning. If internally controlled individuals do tend to have higher levels of moral development, it is reasonable to assume that externally controlled individuals will tend to function at a lower level of moral development. Guthrie believed that internal control is essential to moral development, and allows the person to "solve problems by appealing to a set of personally constructed principles" (p. 13). Svrakic' agreed, and emphasized the importance of an internalized system of goals, ego ideals, and values. Failure to develop the superego to a degree that allows attainment of this internalized system not only results in what Svrakic' calls "ethical poverty," but also results in high levels of narcissism as the individual identifies with the grandiose self as a defense against frustration.

A case can also be built for empathy as a factor relating to both narcissism and moral development. The negative relationship between narcissism and empathy has previously been established. Indeed, one of the DSM-III-R criteria for narcissism is "a lack of empathy" (APA, 1987). Moral development may easily be related to empathy, for how can one truly be concerned with others if one is unable to empathize with them? Unfortunately, narcissists may not

Always exhibit true behavior. Rubins (1983) stated, "Narcissists can be charming or helpful to other, giving the impression that they love people; this is rarely true caring concern. In reality narcissists are really unrelated to others in close relations. Narcissists are usually unscrupulous and unreliable" (p. 12). Svrakic' (1986) agrees that narcissists often do not project an accurate picture of themselves, tending to act as they believe others wish to see them instead of behaving as they really are.

Erskine (1981), in an attempt to validate the Selfism Scale, made several observations. As mentioned earlier, selfism is a term used in place of narcissism by the authors of the Selfism Scale (Phares & Erskine, 1984). Erskine (1981) stated that one would not expect high selfists (high narcissists) to be very empathic, and that those high selfists are very cynical. She also noted that low selfists base their judgments on "moralistic grounds" (p. 36).

Although the link between moral development and narcissism may not be direct, the evidence available from a great many studies suggests the same conclusion; the personality characteristics inherent in determining one's level of moral reasoning are negatively related to the characteristics that make up the narcissistic personality. Examination of research in the areas of moral development and narcissism has not revealed any studies that directly compare these two concepts.

The present study, then, is designed to address this issue.

The hypothesis is that the level of moral development, as measured by the Defining Issues Test (using the "P" score of principled morality), is negatively related to the degree of narcissism, as measured by the Narcissistic Personality Inventory. According to this hypothesis, those individuals utilizing high levels of moral reasoning will exhibit a low degree of narcissism. Conversely, those with lower levels of moral reasoning will exhibit high levels of narcissism. It is further hypothesized that the Exploitativeness subscale of the NPI will correlate negatively with the DIT, much as this same subscale correlated negatively with empathy measures in the Watson et al. (1984) study. Correlations between the DIT and each of the other six subscales on the NPI (Authority, Exhibitionism, Superiority, Entitlement, Self-Sufficiency, and Vanity) will also be obtained. Although previous research has not noted any significant differences in gender in studies of moral development or narcissism (Phares & Erskine, 1984; Rest, 1986a; Thoma, 1984), a trend for females to score higher on the DIT than males has been observed (Thoma, 1984). This will be observed in the current study, as will any other variations based on gender.

CHAPTER 2

METHOD

Subjects

The sample used in this study was drawn from the coworkers, friends, acquaintances, and family members of this researcher. This allowed the study to include individuals from diverse backgrounds, having a wide range of ages and occupations. One-hundred-nineteen subjects volunteered to participate in the study, including 69 females and 50 males. The female subjects ranged in age from 13 to 62, with a mean age of 34.3. The male subjects ranged in age from 17 to 56, with a mean age of 30.0. Twenty-one subjects (11 females and 10 males) were eliminated from the study because they did not complete the tests or because the responses given on the DIT did not pass the consistency checks of that test instrument, leaving a final n of 58 females and 40 males.

Testing Instruments

Defining Issues Test (DIT) (Rest, 1979). The test consists of six hypothetical moral dilemmas, presented in the form of six short stories. Each subject is required to make a number of moral decisions, as presented for each story. Twelve statements are presented for each of the six dilemmas. The subject is asked to rate the importance of each statement. A Likert Scale is used, with the following rankings: (1) Great; (2) Much; (3) Some; (4) Little; and (5) No. Following the completion of the rating of these 12 statements the subject is asked to rank the four statements

he or she feels are the most important issues for that dilemma.

Several scores may be obtained on the DIT. For the present study the P score (principled morality) was used. The P score is described as the importance a subject gives to principled moral considerations in a moral decision making process. It is obtained by taking the four statements chosen by the subject on each dilemma as the first, second, third, and fourth most important and weighting them. The weighted score for each of the four choices is noted in a column of the score sheet that has broken down levels of moral reasoning. When weighted scores for all six dilemmas are noted, totals for each column are obtained. The P score is the sum of weighted ranks given to Stages 5A, 5B, and 6. Stage 5A relates to the "morality of social contract," Stage 5B corresponds with the "morality of intuitive humanism," and Stage 6 relates to the "morality of principles of ideal social cooperation," as discussed by Rest (1979). The sum of these three stages determines the P score.

There are two primary methods that can be used to check the reliability of each subject's test. The first method, the Consistency Check, simply compares the subject's rankings of most important, second most important, third most important, and fourth most important statements to the individual ratings of the 12 statements about each story. The most important statement should also have the highest rating (Great, for example). The second highest rating should have the same, or a slightly lower rating,

and so on. An unreliable subject would be indicated if, for example, the most important ranking was a statement rated "No." This check assesses the subject's seriousness in taking the test as well as his understanding of the questions.

The second check for subject reliability is the M score. The M score is derived from statements included in the test that are designed to sound pretentious rather than meaningful (Rest, 1986b). A high M score suggests that the person is answering only in terms of the style of language used in a statement, not the meaning of the statement. The DIT is presented in Appendix A.

Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) (Raskin & Hall, 1979).

The NPI was originally designed with 81 pairs of statements. Within each pair, one statement was designed to indicate narcissism, while the other statement is nonnarcissistic. The subject is to choose the statement of each pair that best describes his feelings about the topic. The test was reduced to 54 items after further investigation, and has recently been further reduced, to the present total of 40 items.

The test is broken down into seven subscales: (1) Authority; (2) Exhibitionism; (3) Superiority; (4) Entitlement; (5) Exploitativeness; (6) Self-Sufficiency; and (7) Vanity.

Intercorrelations between the subscales ranged from $r = .17$ to $r = .61$, and correlations between subscales and the overall NPI range from $r = .51$ to $r = .83$. Scoring of the NPI is done by comparing subject responses to the score sheet supplied with the test. A

Copy of the NPI appears in Appendix B.

Procedure

The subjects used in this study were approached on an individual basis and were asked to volunteer to participate in a study developed as part of the requirements for completion of the graduate program at Emporia State University. It was next explained to the subjects that the purpose of the study was to determine the relationship between the personality characteristics of moral development and narcissism, as these characteristics are measured by the tests used in the study. It was then explained that these tests are based entirely on individual opinion, and therefore have no correct or incorrect answers. The subjects were then given the option of signing their names on the answer sheets. Each subject was asked to sign a release form explaining the purpose of the tests and giving permission to use the results of the tests in the study. A copy of this release form appears in Appendix C.

For purposes of making statistical determinations in this study the subjects were asked to provide their age, gender, years of formal education, occupation, and whether they wished to know the results of the study upon its completion. It was explained that the test results would be kept strictly confidential, and each subject's test results would be shared only with that subject. The one exception to this was the inclusion of the numerical data from the test results (ages, gender, and years of education of the subjects) in the statistical analysis to be done at the conclusion

the administration of the tests.

The test administration was done at each subject's convenience. Completion of the two tests, which were administered during a single sitting, was accomplished without specific time limits, and ranged from just over one hour for some subjects to nearly three hours for other subjects. Half of the subjects were administered the DIT first, while the remaining subjects were administered the NPI first. Instructions for the test to be administered first to each subject were given in a verbal manner, and were followed along by the subject on the questionnaire sheet provided. The standard instructions for the DIT are given on the first two pages of the questionnaire, in order to allow each subject to review them at any time during the testing session. The directions include a sample story and statements similar to those that appear on the test. The subjects who were administered the NPI first were also given verbal directions in addition to following along as those directions were read from the NPI questionnaire form. Particular care was taken to emphasize that there are no right or wrong answers on either test, and that each subject's opinion about social matters is the important concern on the DIT, while on the NPI the subject's identification of his or her feelings is of primary importance.

Following completion of the first test, each subject was given the remaining test, and appropriate instructions were given as described above. For those subjects who had difficulty understanding the instructions on the DIT, which proved to be much

more difficult than the NPI instructions, the test administrator was available to direct the subjects to the specific portion of the written directions that apply to the question, or use the sample presented in the DIT to further illustrate the correct manner of responding to test items.

The data accumulated during this study included the P score obtained on the DIT, numerical data referring to the number of narcissistic responses on the NPI, and the subject's age, years of education, and gender. The Pearson correlation coefficient was used to correlate the results of the two tests. First, an overall correlation between the NPI and the DIT was done. Next, test results were examined to determine the effect of gender, using the Newman-Keuls' Test to compare scores of male and female subjects. The third relationship examined was that of the effect of education on test results. Three educational groups were used: (1) those with 12 or fewer years of formal education; (2) those with post-high school education (up to and including 15 years of formal education); and (3) those who are college graduates (16 or more years of formal education). The final correlations completed in this study were done between the results of the DIT and each of the seven subscales of the NPI. The test of significance for this study was performed at the .05 level of confidence, and was derived from the table presented in Linton and Gallo (1975, p. 375).

CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

One-hundred-nineteen subjects were administered the DIT and the NPI. Three tests were not used because the subjects failed to complete all items, and 18 tests were discarded because results of the DIT were considered invalid by one or the other of the two internal validation measures (the majority by failed Consistency Checks). The remaining 98 pairs of tests were analyzed to obtain the results of this study. Fifty-eight subjects were females, ranging in age from 13 to 62, with a mean age of 34.3. Forty subjects were males, ranging in age from 18 to 56, with a mean age of 30.0.

Thoma (1984) found that females tended to score higher on the DIT than did his male subjects. In this study the reverse was found to be true. The mean DIT score for males was 23.3, while the mean score for female subjects was 21.5. There were no significant differences found on test scores based upon gender differences, which has previously been observed (Phares & Erskine, 1984; Rest, 1986a; Thoma, 1984). This was found to be true on the NPI as well as the DIT.

The correlational analysis of score data obtained from the DIT (the P score) and the NPI indicated that a small positive correlation between the two measures was present ($r = .11$, $p > .05$). The mean scores and standard deviations for the NPI, the seven NPI

subscales, and the DIT are presented in Table 2.

Table 2

Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for the DIT, the NPI, and the
NPI Subscales

VARIABLE	N	M	SD
DIT (P score)	98	22.71	8.75
NPI (overall score)	98	11.02	7.28
I Authority	98	3.52	2.35
II Exhibitionism	98	1.43	1.47
III Superiority	98	1.60	1.27
IV Entitlement	98	1.03	1.20
V Exploitativeness	98	1.13	1.35
VI Self-Sufficiency	97	1.58	1.41
VII Vanity	97	0.67	1.02

Note. Roman numerals indicate NPI subscales.

Table 3 lists the intercorrelations between the seven NPI subscales as well as the correlations between the subscales and the DIT.

Table 3

Correlations between the NPI and NPI subscales, and the DIT

	NPI	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
NPI	1.00*							
I Authority	0.83*	1.00*						
II Exhibitionism	0.74*	0.53*	1.00*					
III Superiority	0.65*	0.47*	0.44*	1.00*				
IV Entitlement	0.69*	0.46*	0.39*	0.42*	1.00*			
V Exploitativeness	0.76*	0.55*	0.61*	0.29*	0.51*	1.00*		
VI Self-Sufficiency	0.71*	0.53*	0.37*	0.45*	0.51*	0.48*	1.00*	
VII Vanity	0.51*	0.42*	0.37*	0.22*	0.27*	0.33*	0.17	1.00*
DIT	0.11	0.13	-0.04	0.18	0.09	-0.03	-0.02	0.24*

* $p < .05$

In order to determine the effect of education on scores obtained on each of the test instruments an analysis of variance was conducted. As noted earlier, subjects were grouped according to years of education; Group 1 consisted of those subjects with 12 years, or less, education ($N = 29$); Group 2 with 13 to 15 years of education ($N = 41$); and Group 3 with 16 or more years of education

($n = 28$).

The analysis of variance conducted on the NPI indicated that there was a relationship between test scores and years of education. This may be observed in Table 4.

Table 4

NPI Summary Table: One-Way ANOVA

SOURCE	df	SUM OF SQUARES	MEAN SQUARE	F VALUE
Education Levels	2	366.15	183.08	3.64*
Error	95	4773.81	50.25	
Total	97	5139.96		

* $p < .05$

The mean NPI score for all subjects was 11.02. The mean scores of the three educational level groups were: Group 1 = 8.24; Group 2 = 12.88; and Group 3 = 11.18. A Newman-Keuls' Test was performed to determine if specific differences in group mean scores were significant. Results of this procedure indicate that there were significant differences between the mean scores of Group 1 and Group 2. Group 3 was not significantly different from either Group 1 or 2.

A similar procedure was performed on the DIT, using the same educational level groups. Results of this study are similar to the findings of other researchers who noted a significant effect of education on individual moral development scores. Results of

the analysis of variance performed on the DIT are found in Table 5.

Table 5

DIT Summary Table: One-Way ANOVA

SOURCE	df	SUM OF SQUARES	MEAN SQUARE	F VALUE
Education Level	2	1589.25	794.63	12.92*
Error	95	5842.75	61.50	
Total	97	7432.00		

* $p < .05$

The overall DIT mean score was 22.71. Mean scores for the three educational groups were: Group 1 = 18.03; Group 2 = 22.07; Group 3 = 28.50. The Newman-Keuls' Test was performed next, and it was found that the mean scores of each of the three groups was significantly different from each of the other groups ($p < .05$).

CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION

If Raskin and Hall (1981) are correct in their belief that narcissism is composed of the characteristics of authority, exhibitionism, superiority, entitlement, exploitativeness, self-sufficiency, and vanity, the results of the present study provide supportive evidence. These characteristics, which have been utilized as subscales of the NPI, correlate well with the overall NPI, as well they should. In the present study the correlations between the subscales and the overall NPI score were much higher than those computed during the norming of the test. The normative sample consisted of 1018 college students, including 479 males and 539 females. Table 6 lists the intercorrelations between subscales and the overall NPI, and includes results from the present study as well as from Raskin and Halls' normative study. A difference in mean NPI scores may also be noted between the normative study and the present study. The normative mean score was 15.55 and the mean score of the current study was 11.02. Although one may only speculate about the factors that contribute to these differences, it is possible that the differences in sample size and makeup are responsible for the score variations. For instance, the normative sample consisted of college students, while the present study consisted of high school as well as undergraduate and graduate collge students and nonstudents. The normative data presented by

Table 6

Comparison of NPI Intercorrelations

Subscale	Overall NPI	
	Normative Study	Present Study*
I Authority	.58	.83
II Exhibitionism	.51	.74
III Superiority	.48	.65
IV Entitlement	.43	.69
V Exploitativeness	.41	.76
VI Self-Sufficiency	.40	.71
VII Vanity	.30	.51

* $p < .05$

Raskin and Hall did not include the age range of their subjects, and defined the population only as college students, but one may assume that the ages of those subjects was in the general range of 19 to 24 years of age. This substantially lower than the mean age of 32.2 of the subjects in the present study. It is possible that these presumed age differences may have some effect on scores, but it is unlikely that age alone has a significant effect. Raskin and Halls' research indicates that age has little effect on score variation ($r = -.01$ on the 40 item NPI). There is, however, no data that notes the effect of education upon test scores measuring narcissism. In the present study the results of the analysis of variance on the NPI followed by the Newman-Keuls' Test indicates that a significant

difference exists between two of the three educationally determined groups. Group 1, consisting of those with 12 years or less education, was significantly different than Group 2, which consisted of subjects with 13 to 15 years of education (Group 1: $\underline{N} = 29$, $\underline{M} = 8.24$; Group 2: $\underline{N} = 41$, $\underline{M} = 12.88$). Group 3, consisting of subjects with 16 or more years of education, was not significantly different from either Group 1 or Group 2 (Group 3: $\underline{N} = 28$, $\underline{M} = 11.18$). These data indicate a trend for narcissism to increase as one's educational level increases, at least up to the 16th year. At this point the degree of narcissism tends to decrease slightly, although the reason for this change is not evident in the data collected.

A possible reason for this change may be that the necessity of committing oneself to the task of completing college leads one to become more self-focused, becoming more authoritative as one's knowledge increases, more self-sufficient as one learns to live on his or her own, and perhaps with increasing feelings of entitlement as one nears the attainment of a degree, or even a willingness to exploit others if necessary to accomplish that goal. Following one's graduation from college and entry into the job market or into postgraduate training one's priorities may change, as he or she must focus on their job, family, or other factors that are outside oneself. The simple realities of the "real world" may bring the individual to the unconscious or conscious realization that he or she is not as self-sufficient or authoritative as they once thought, and this may lead to a decrease in narcissistic tendencies.

Whether this shift actually occurs in this manner, and if so, at what time during the individual's development, are questions that must be further studied before a conclusive statement may be made.

The primary purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship of moral development and narcissism, with the hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between the traits. As the results of this study indicate, the correlation between the two test measures was insignificant ($\underline{r} = .11$). Correlations between the DIT and the NPI and the NPI subscales may be found in Table 3. Only one correlation between the DIT and an NPI subscale was significant, that being the correlation between the Vanity subscale and the DIT ($\underline{r} = .24$, $\underline{p} < .05$). Webster (1981) defines vanity as excessive self-satisfaction or pride in one's qualities. The connection between vanity and moral development is unclear, and suggests the need for further study to examine the relationship. Negative correlations were noted between the DIT and three of the NPI subscales (Exhibitionism: $\underline{r} = -.04$; Exploitativeness: $\underline{r} = -.03$; Self-Sufficiency: $\underline{r} = -.02$). Little can be drawn from these insignificant negative correlations, with the possible exception of the negative correlation between the DIT and the NPI Exploitativeness subscale. Watson, Grisham, Trotter, and Biderman (1984) noted that the NPI Exploitativeness subscale correlated negatively with the empathy measures they used in their study, the Mehrabian-Epstein Empathy Scale and the Smith Empathic Personality Questionnaire. In the present study, the similarities in qualities

between empathy and moral development was discussed, with the suggestion that because the two characteristics are similar one may expect a similar negative relationship with the Exploitativeness subscale of the NPI. This was found to be true, although the correlation between the subscale and the DIT was insignificant.

Even though the results obtained in this study do not fulfill the hypothesis, they do provide additional information about the traits of narcissism and moral development. Future studies could expand this data by using test instruments that assess any number of traits, and develop studies that allow for analysis of the relationship of those traits to narcissism or moral development. For instance, a direct comparison of empathy to moral development could be accomplished by using the previously mentioned empathy measures along with the DIT. Correlations using the NPI could be supplemented by using the Selfism Scale and the MMPI Narcissistic Personality Disorder Scale. Each of these comparisons would add to the knowledge of the qualities that relate to the traits of moral development and narcissism. This knowledge could be useful in the treatment of narcissistic personality disorders or in establishing methods to further the development of moral standards that are beneficial to each individual as well as contributing to society as a whole.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

DEFINING ISSUES TEST

Opinions about Social Problems

The purpose of this questionnaire is to help us understand how people think about social problems. Different people have different opinions about questions of right and wrong. There are no "right" answers to such problems in the way that math problems have right answers. We would like you to tell us what you think about several problem stories.

You will be asked to read a story from this booklet. Then you will be asked to mark your answers on a separate answer sheet. More details about how to do this will follow. But it is important that you fill in your answers on the answer sheet with a #2 pencil. Please make sure that your mark completely fills the little circle, that the mark is dark and that any erasures that you make are completely clean.

In this questionnaire you will be asked to read a story and then to place marks on the answer sheet. In order to illustrate how we would like you to do this, consider the following story.

FRANK AND THE CAR

Frank Jones has been thinking about buying a car. He is married, has two small children and earns an average income. The car he buys will be his family's only car. It will be used

mostly to get to work and drive around town, but sometimes for vacation trips also. In trying to decide what car to buy, Frank Jones realized that there were a lot of questions to consider. For instance, should he buy a larger used car or smaller new car for about the same amount of money? Other questions occur to him.

We note that this not really a social problem, but it will illustrate our instructions. After you read a story you will then turn to the answer sheet to find the section that corresponds to the story. But in this sample story, we present the questions below (along with some sample answers). Note that all your answers will be marked on the separate answer sheet.

First, on the answer sheet for each story you will be asked to indicate your recommendation for what a person should do. If you tend to favor one action or another (even if you are not completely sure), indicate which one. If you do not favor either action, mark the circle by "can't decide."

Second, read each of the items numbered 1 to 12. Think of the issue that the item is raising. If that issue is important in making a decision, one way or the other, then mark the circle by "great." If that issue is not important or doesn't make sense to you, mark "no." If the issue is relevant but not critical, mark "much," "some," or "little"---depending on how much importance that issue has in your opinion. You may mark several items as "great" (or any other level of importance)---there is no fixed number of

SAMPLE ITEMS AND SAMPLE ANSWERS

Frank and the Car: 0 buy new car 0 can't decide 0 buy used car

Great Some No
 Much Little

0	0	0	0	●	1.	Whether the car dealer was in the same block as where Frank lives.
●	0	0	0	0	2.	Would a used car be more economical in the long run than a new car.
0	0	●	0	0	3.	Whether the color was green, Frank's favorite color.
0	0	0	0	●	4.	Whether the cubic inch displacement was at least 200.
●	0	0	0	0	5.	Would a large, roomy car be better than a compact car.
0	0	0	0	●	6.	Whether the front connibillies were differential.
						<u>1</u> <u>2</u> <u>3</u> <u>4</u> <u>5</u> <u>6</u> <u>7</u> <u>8</u> <u>9</u> <u>10</u> <u>11</u> <u>12</u>
Most important item	0	0	0	0	●	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Second most important	0	●	0	0	0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Third most important	0	0	●	0	0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fourth most important	●	0	0	0	0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

items that must be marked at any one level.

Third, after you have made your marks along the left hand side of each of the 12 items, then at the bottom you will be asked to choose the item that is the most important consideration out of all the items printed there. Pick from among the items provided even if you think that none of the items are of "great" importance. Of

the items that are presented there, pick one as the most important (relative to the others), then the second most important, third, and fourth most important.

Note that in our sample responses, the first item was considered irrelevant; the second item was considered as a critical issue in making a decision; the third item was considered of only moderate importance; the fourth item was not clear to the person responding whether 200 was good or not, so it was marked "no"; the fifth item was also of critical importance; and the sixth item didn't make any sense, so it was marked "no."

Note that the most important item comes from one of the items marked on the far left hand side. In deciding between item #2 and #5, a person should reread these items, then put one of them as the most important, and the other item as second, etc.

Here is the first story for your consideration. Read the story and then turn to the separate answer sheet to mark your responses. After filling in the four most important items for the story, return to this booklet to read the next story. Please remember to fill in the circle completely, make dark marks, and completely erase all corrections.

HEINZ AND THE DRUG

In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was

charging ten times what the drug cost to make. He paid \$200 for the radium and charged \$2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about \$1,000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and began to think about breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. Should Heinz steal the drug?

ESCAPED PRISONER

A man had been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however, he escaped from prison, moved to a new area of the country, and took on the name of Thompson. For eight years he worked hard, and gradually he saved enough money to buy his own business. He was fair to his customers, gave his employees top wages, and gave most of his own profits to charity. Then one day, Mrs. Jones, an old neighbor, recognized him as the man who had escaped from prison eight years before, and whom the police had been looking for. Should Mrs. Jones report Mr. Thompson to the police and have him sent back to prison?

NEWSPAPER

Fred, a senior in high school, wanted to publish a mimeographed newspaper for students so that he could express many of his opinions. He wanted to speak out against the use of the military in

international disputes and to speak out against some of the school's rules, like the rule forbidding boys to wear long hair.

When Fred started his newspaper, he asked his principal for permission. The principal said it would be all right if before every publication Fred would turn in all his articles for the principal's approval. Fred agreed and turned in several articles for approval. The principal approved all of them and Fred published two issues of the paper in the next two weeks.

But the principal had not expected that Fred's newspaper would receive so much attention. Students were so excited by the paper that they began to organize protests against the hair regulation and other school rules. Angry parents objected to Fred's opinions. They phoned the principal telling him that the newspaper was unpatriotic and should not be published. As a result of the rising excitement, the principal ordered Fred to stop publishing. He gave as a reason that Fred's activities were disruptive to the operation of the school. Should the principal stop the newspaper?

DOCTOR'S DILEMMA

A lady was dying of cancer which could not be cured and she had only about six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good dose of pain-killer like morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask the doctor to give her enough morphine to kill her. She said she couldn't stand the pain and

that she was going to die in a few months anyway. Should the doctor give her an overdose of morphine that would make her die?

WEBSTER

Mr. Webster was the owner and manager of a gas station. He wanted to hire another mechanic to help him, but good mechanics were hard to find. The only person he found who seemed to be a good mechanic was Mr. Lee, but he was Chinese. While Mr. Webster himself didn't have anything against Orientals, he was afraid to hire Mr. Lee because many of his customers didn't like Orientals. His customers might take their business elsewhere if Mr. Lee was working in the gas station.

When Mr. Lee asked Mr. Webster if he could have the job, Mr. Webster said that he had already hired somebody else. But Mr. Webster had not hired anybody, because he could not find anybody who was a good mechanic besides Mr. Lee. Should Mr. Webster have hired Mr. Lee?

STUDENT TAKE-OVER

Back in the 1960s at Harvard University there was a student group called Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). SDS students were against the war in Viet Nam, and were against the army training program (ROTC) that helped to send men to fight in Viet Nam. While the war was still going on, the SDS students demanded that Harvard end the army ROTC program as a university course. This would mean that Harvard students could not get army training as part of their regular course work and not get credit for it towards their degree.

Harvard professors agreed with the SDS students. The professors voted to end the ROTC program as a university course. But the President of the University took a different view. He stated that the army program should stay on campus as a course.

The SDS students felt that the President of the University was not going to pay attention to the vote of the professors, and was going to keep the ROTC program as a course on campus. The SDS students then marched to the university's administration building and told everyone else to get out. They said they were taking over the building to force Harvard's President to get rid of the army ROTC program on campus for credit as a course.

Were the students right to take over the administration building?

Please make sure that all your marks are dark, fill the circles, and that all erasures are clean.

THANK YOU.

APPENDIX B

NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY INVENTORY

Name _____ Date _____
 Sex _____ Age _____ Education _____ Occupation _____

INSTRUCTIONS: The NPI consists of a number of pairs of statements with which you may or may not identify. Consider this example:
A "I like having authority over people," verses B "I don't mind following orders." Which of these two statements is closer to your own feelings about yourself? If you identify more with "liking to have authority over other people," than with "not minding following orders," then you would choose option "A."

You may identify with "A" and "B." In this case you should choose the statement which seems closer to your personal feelings about yourself. Or, if you do not identify with either statement, select the one which is least objectionable or remote. In other words, read each pair of statements and then choose the one that is closer to your own feelings. Indicate your answer by writing the letter ("A" or "B") in the space provided to the right of each item. Please do not skip any items.

1. A I have a natural talent for influencing people.
 B I am not good at influencing people. 1. _____

2. A Modesty doesn't become me.
B I am essentially a modest person. 2. _____
3. A I would do almost anything on a dare.
B I tend to be a fairly cautious person. 3. _____
4. A When people compliment me I sometimes get
embarrassed.
B I know that I am good because everybody keeps
telling me so. 4. _____
5. A The thought of ruling the world frightens the
hell out of me.
B If I ruled the world it would be a much better
place. 5. _____
6. A I can usually talk my way out of anything.
B I try to accept the consequences of my behavior. 6. _____
7. A I prefer to blend in with the crowd.
B I like to be the center of attention. 7. _____
8. A I will be a success.
B I am not too concerned about success. 8. _____
9. A I am no better or no worse than most other people.
B I think I am a special person. 9. _____
10. A I am not sure if I would make a good leader.
B I see myself as a good leader. 10. _____
11. A I am assertive.
B I wish I were more assertive. 11. _____
12. A I like having authority over people.
B I don't mind following orders. 12. _____
13. A I find it easy to manipulate people.
B I don't like it when I find myself manipulating
people. 13. _____
14. A I insist upon getting the respect that is due me.
B I usually get the respect that I deserve. 14. _____
15. A I don't particularly like to show off my body.
B I like to display my body. 15. _____

16. A I can read people like a book.
B People are sometimes hard to understand. 16.____
17. A If I feel competent I am willing to take
responsibility for making decisions.
B I like to take responsibility for making
decisions. 17.____
18. A I just want to be reasonably happy.
B I want to amount to something in the eyes of
the world. 18.____
19. A My body is nothing special.
B I like to look at my body. 19.____
20. A I try not to be a show off.
B I am apt to show off if I get the chance. 20.____
21. A I always know what I am doing.
B Sometimes I'm not sure of what I am doing. 21.____
22. A I sometimes depend on people to get things done.
B I rarely depend on anyone else to get things done. 22.____
23. A Sometimes I tell good stories.
B Everybody likes to hear my stories. 23.____
24. A I expect a great deal from other people.
B I like to do things for other people. 24.____
25. A I will never be satisfied until I get all that
I deserve.
B I take my satisfactions as they come. 25.____
26. A Compliments embarrass me.
B I like to be complimented. 26.____
27. A I have a strong will to power.
B Power for its own sake doesn't me. 27.____
28. A I don't very much care about new fads and
fashions.
B I like to start new fads and fashions. 28.____
29. A I like to look at myself in the mirror.
B I am not particularly interested in looking at
myself in the mirror. 29.____

30. A I really like to be the center of attention.
B It makes me uncomfortable to be the center of attention. 30.____
31. A I can live my life in any way I want to.
B People can't always live their lives in terms of what they want. 31.____
32. A Being an authority doesn't mean that much to me.
B People always seem to recognize my authority. 32.____
33. A I would prefer to be a leader.
B It makes little difference to me whether I am a leader or not. 33.____
34. A I am going to be a great person.
B I hope I am going to be successful. 34.____
35. A People sometimes believe what I tell them.
B I can make anybody believe anything I want them to. 35.____
36. A I am a born leader.
B Leadership is a quality that takes a long time to develop. 36.____
37. A I wish someone would someday write my biography.
B I don't like people to pry into my life for any reason. 37.____
38. A I get upset when people don't notice how I look when I go out in public.
B I don't mind blending into the crowd when I go out in public. 38.____
39. A I am more capable than other people.
B There is a lot that I can learn from other people. 39.____
40. A I am much like everybody else.
B I am an extraordinary person. 40.____

APPENDIX C

CONSENT FORM

I, _____, do agree to participate in a study conducted by Steven L. Christenberry as partial fulfillment of his graduate program at Emporia State University. I understand that I will be asked to take two tests, the Defining Issues Test and the Narcissistic Personality Inventory, and that the scores obtained on these tests will be used in the study. I have also been informed that the results of my tests will be strictly confidential, and that I have the right to obtain the results of my tests at the completion of the study. I also understand that I may withdraw from this study at any time if I should, for any reason, decide that I do not want the results of my tests included.

Signature of testee

Date