


AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

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Abstract approved: 

A study comparing three populations (violent offenders versus nonviolent offenders versus a general population) for irrational beliefs was conducted. In addition, comparisons were made according to felony offense by race. The subjects were 120 felony offenders incarcerated at the Kansas Industrial Reformatory (KSIR) in Hutchison, Kansas. The control group consisted of 177 individuals from the general population sample used by Jones (1968) in constructing the Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT). Statistical data regarding demographic variables and type of offense were obtained from the Kansas Department of Corrections. The data were examined to determine if there was a significant association between criminal behavior and irrational beliefs. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedures indicated that there was no significant association between criminal behavior and irrational beliefs. Such findings are consistent with theories which describe the criminal as both sane and rational. Other data were examined using t-test procedures to determine if there was an association between felony offense by race and by irrational beliefs. Results indicated no significant association between race, felony offense and

irrational beliefs. Recommendations are given promoting research methodology that adequately distinguishes between the psychopathic and non-psychopathic offender in the criminal justice system.

IRRATIONAL THINKING IN
CRIMINALS AND NONCRIMINALS

A Thesis
Submitted to
The Division of Psychology
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Master of Science

by
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My greatest thanks to my past supervisor, Dr. Jay Memmott who provided on the spot assistance in my many times of need. The extra time and attention he provided me without necessity will be fondly remembered.

I would also like to dedicate this thesis to the future research students who might review this study. Hopefully, all of you will persevere and soon thereafter finish your study. It is worth the efforts.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Cognitive therapy refers to a variety of therapeutic approaches whose primary focus is modifying an individual's irrational premises, assumptions or beliefs that are closely associated with the client's presenting problem or emotional disturbance. The cognitive approach that has received the most attention is Ellis' rational-emotive therapy (RET). The basic philosophy of (RET) (Ellis, 1962) is that much, if not all, emotional disturbance is due to the irrational ways that people construe their world and the nonrational assumptions they make. Ellis (1962) has identified at least ten of these beliefs that he has found to be prevalent in our culture and related to neurotic and other emotional disturbances (See Appendix A for complete derivation). Jones (1968) designed the Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT), a 100-item test which can be answered by the subject for agreement/disagreement using a Likert-type scale from one to five. The IBT yields a total score reflective of general rationality/irrationality and ten subscale scores corresponding to the ten irrational beliefs identified by Ellis (1962) (See Appendix B for a complete derivation).

In their landmark two-volume work, *The Criminal Personality*, Yochelson and Samenow (1976, 1978) describe cognitive processes that operate in individuals as a tenable explanation for criminal conduct. Their research is the end result of 15 years of work with individuals who were

admitted to St. Elizabeths Hospital in Alexandria, Virginia, after being found not guilty for criminal actions by reason of insanity. Continual research and interviews with these criminals led the research team to identify 52 patterns of irresponsible thinking (See Appendix C for a complete derivation). These criminal thinking patterns were formulated into a theory of criminality. This theory of criminality postulates that criminal behavior is directly linked to criminal or irresponsible thinking. In choosing terminology describing cognitive processes as either irresponsible or responsible, Yochelson and Samenow (1976) have not adequately operationally defined such constructs. Yochelson and Samenow (1976) depict responsible and irresponsible thinking processes as if on a continuum. This continuum places the responsible thinking processes of the non-offender at one end and those thinking processes defined as irresponsible and criminal at the other. However, Yochelson and Samenow (1976) do not adequately explain whether irresponsible criminal thinking is actually a derivative of illogical or irrational processes. Morris (1977) established that criminals think in an illogical and irrational manner. He administered the Adult Irrational Ideas Inventory (AIII) to 53 male prisoners whose sentences varied from six months to two years. Morris concluded: "prison inmates function in an illogical manner....an analysis of such beliefs indicates that the inmate appears to be motivated to seek love and approval from others,

realizes the benefits of manipulating his surroundings, and becomes deeply concerned over other peoples' problems....and in doing so he gains their respect and approval" (p.58). Morris surmizes that the inmate may feel it is only by exercising his power and dominance that his needs for involvement and approval can be met. In concert with this view, Yochelson and Samenow (1976) describe the criminal as manifesting the irresponsible thinking patterns of "Power Thrusting" and "Image of Self As a Good Person" (See Appendix B for a complete derivation). Unfortunately, the methodology used by Yochelson and Samenow lacked scientific rigor which has left little room for other researchers to replicate and validate findings directly. However, by borrowing from Ellis' RET and Jones IBT., it may be possible to shed light on the concept of irrational/irresponsible thinking in criminals and non-criminals. Any study that reveals significant differences between these two groups may lay the groundwork for developing an instrument that assesses those thinking patterns described by Yochelson and Samenow. Definitive findings may also be viewed as indirect evidence of the presence of irrational/irresponsible thinking in criminals versus non-criminals.

Though Yochelson and Samenow (1976) did not refer to their method as a cognitive one, there is little doubt that their theory and treatment strategy are of a cognitive nature. Burchard (1977) reports "that by focusing on the thought processes of the criminal, Yochelson and Samenow

have taken a refreshing step away from the rather futile and unsuccessful attempts to understand and cope with the criminal in terms of the psychodynamic model" (p.443). Recent reviews by Mills (1977) and Ciale (1980) support the view that analyzing the thinking that is operating in the criminal lays the groundwork for more effective psychotherapeutic methods of change than those which currently exist. Toch (1978): stated, "the approach is cognitive and pragmatic. It is cognitive because it defines the problem as thinking and it is pragmatic because it assumes that change occurs as new options are rehearsed" (p.258). Mills (1977) indicated that "the major portion of the book is devoted to a detailed description of the thinking patterns of the criminal which support his antisocial habits" (p.302).

In many ways, the work of Yochelson and Samenow (1976, 1978) closely resembles Ellis' (1962) RET. Both approaches view the individual's problem as related to the thinking patterns or assumptions to which they adhere. Ellis (1978) explains that psychological problems are a result of misconceptions about what happens to us at point A, the activating event. The activating event is the experience in the environment to which we react. This reaction is governed by point B, the belief system. This may be either an irrational or rational belief. It is at this point that the individual's belief system governs the outcome of point C, the consequence. For example, when any event in the

individual's environment is responded to, this is the activating event. At that time, the individual may react one of two ways. The individual may either respond in a rational manner, which will result in a consequence that is appropriate (i.e., necessary concern, rational problem solving) or the individual may react in an irrational way, which will result in irrational and unnecessary consequences (i.e., undue anxiety, depression, or illegal behavior).

In the conceptual sense, Yochelson and Samenow (1976) have failed to buttress their approach with such a theoretical framework. Carlson (1976) noted:

They offer a good conceptual system which may be good at explaining behavior retrospectively, but may not be so good at predicting future behavior. In addition, the authors' rejection of the concept of causality may unnecessarily limit the application of their findings beyond changing criminal thinking. It is also important to discover the factors that may increase the likelihood of a given person becoming criminal, even though no single element can be said to cause criminality (p.72).

In general, cognitive therapy and Ellis' model have been useful in determining many of the cognitive processes that have been shown to be related to various emotional disturbances. Yet, other than research by Morris (1977), and Yochelson and Samenow (1976, 1978), there has been a

dearth of cognitive research with regard to criminal behavior. The efficacy of cognitive research has been enhanced by Jones' (1968) introduction of the IBT.

Trexler and Karst (1972) administered the IBT to 17 females and 16 male undergraduates enrolled in their first course on public speaking. Data suggested that those subjects who received rational-emotive therapy (RET) showed a significant decrease in anxiety and a reduction in subscribing to irrational beliefs. Reviewing results from their prior research, Trexler and Karst (1973) analyzed their data to assess the reliability and construct validity of the IBT. The IBT was shown to have highly significant test-retest reliability when comparing initial and two week total scale test scores. Validation of the IBT was experimentally demonstrated when changes in IBT total test scores showed rational-emotive therapy (RET) as more favorable than placebo or no treatment. Based on these results the authors concluded; "with regard to the measurement of cognitive change in psychotherapy and its psychometric qualities the IBT appears to be the most carefully developed instrument of its kind to date".(p. 150).

Lohr and Bonge [1980] administered the Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) to 25 females and 29 males on two different occasions with an eight week latency between test and retest. Means from the test-retest did not significantly differ. Pearson product moment correlations

calculated for each of the ten subscales and total score were highly significant. In summary, Lohr and Bonge (1982) report the IBT to have good temporal consistency, retest reliability and factorial validity. They also found it to be useful in group research.

Recent research by Lapoint and Crandel (1980) utilized the Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) to study 85 students from the University of Georgia who were identified as normal, psychologically distressed and depressed as measure by the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and the neuroticism subscale of the Maudsley Personality Inventory (MPI). Using analysis of variance procedures, these investigators found a significant main effect for the total irrationality score. A Scheff post-hoc analysis demonstrated that depressed persons scored significantly higher on irrationality than did either psychologically distressed or normal subjects. Futhermore, psychologically distressed subjects had a significantly higher irrationality score than did normals. Nelson (1977) examined the relationship between depression and irrational beliefs using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and the Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT). The BDI and the IBT were administered to 65 males and 91 females. Male and female subsamples were compared to assess the possibility of sex differences. Subjects from depressed and nondepressed groups were also compared. Significant differences according to sex were foound for the Demand For Approval subscale. Female subjects more

frequently endorsed items that reflected a greater need for approval than did male subjects. In terms of depression, the total irrational beliefs score, the need to excel in all areas to feel worthwhile score, frustration reactivity score, the anxious overconcern score, and the helplessness scores were found to be the strongest correlates of depression.

Schill, Adams and Ramanaiah (1982) administered the Life Experience Survey (stress test), the Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) to 105 males and 85 females. They split the negative impact of stress scores at the median, and using a depression score of ten, identified a high stress-depressed or poor coping group, and a high stress nondepressed or efficient coping group (n=58). Statistically significant results demonstrated that individuals who were poor copers subscribed to irrational beliefs more frequently than those designated as efficient copers. Analysis of the subscales revealed that poor copers more strongly endorsed items associated with the subscale anxious overconcern, the frustration reactivity subscale, the problem avoidance subscale and for females the helplessness for change subscale. As such, the researchers recommended focusing on specific cognitive factors and irrational belief symptoms in stress management programs for persons experiencing acute or chronic depression.

Other studies (Burgio, Glass & Merluzzi, 1981;

Goldfried & Subocinski, 1975; Gormally, 1981; Lohr & Bonge, 1981; Lohr & Rea, 1981; Sutton & Goldfried, 1979; Trexler & Karst, 1979) have focused on the relationship between irrational beliefs and several types of anxiety (e.g., situational/pervasive, social, social-dating, fear of public speaking). In general, these studies found the IBT to be useful in discerning the types of irrational beliefs that maintain various anxiety states.

Although much of the cognitive research has focused on depression and anxiety, there has been some investigation of the relationship between assertiveness and irrational beliefs using the IBT. Derry and Stone (1979) concluded that individuals who received cognitive self-statement training were better able to maintain their learned level of assertiveness than those who received no such training. Results of Lohr and Bonge (1982) showed that self-reported assertiveness deficits were associated with demand for approval, high self-expectations, problem avoidance, and the total irrational beliefs score.

A comprehensive literature review reveals that Ellis (1962) defined at least ten types of thinking that lead to psychological disturbance. Jones (1968) developed the IBT., which allowed for research to be performed establishing the relationship between various psychological disturbances and irrational beliefs. However, there is a paucity of research regarding irrational beliefs and criminal behavior. Yochelson and Samenow (1976) described

52 irresponsible thinking patterns believed to be related to criminal behavior. However, they admit their work eludes the preciseness involved in valid scientific research (i.e., the lack of any reliable empirical method to assess irresponsible thinking). Ellis (1962) and Yochelson and Samenow (1976, 1978) describe their investigations of cognitive processes in terms of irrational and irresponsible thinking patterns respectively. Similarly, these investigators believe the frequency, intensity and duration of irrational/irresponsible thinking are related to the degree of psychological disturbance and/or the criminal behavior of an individual. Due to these similarities, it seems appropriate to view Ellis (1962) and Samenow and Yochelson (1976, 1978) as describing fundamentally the same cognitive processes. It is important to note that the structure of the theories of Ellis, Yochelson, and Samenow is similar to the structure of the legal system in Kansas, which concerns itself with the seriousness and degree of criminal behavior. This is especially true when discussing violent (A, B, C) felonies and non-violent (D and E) felonies. Of these two categories, violent offenders tend to be viewed by society as more dangerous, thus receiving longer sentences than the non-violent offenders. Taking theoretical and societal perspectives into account, it could be concluded that (1) as a person's thinking becomes more irrational (2) so does the likelihood of him/her committing a more serious criminal offense. With respect to this line

of thinking, the present study was conducted to analyze the cognitive processes of A, B, and C felons found guilty of violent offenses, D and E felons found guilty of nonviolent offenses, and individuals from the general population. In addition, a comparison of subjects by race was performed to assess any racial differences.

CHAPTER 2

METHODS

Subjects

Subjects were selected from two distinct populations that served in constructing the experimental groups and a control or comparative group. The experimental subjects were obtained through data collected by the Kansas Department of Corrections. The data were generated from the main data base in Topeka, Kansas controlling for sex, age, race, level of education, location of incarceration, and type of offense; that is, violent offenses (A,B,C felony) or non-violent offenses (D or E felony) (N=773). Specifically, subjects in this data base included those inmates incarcerated at the Kansas State Industrial Reformatory (KSIR) in Hutchison, Kansas for commission of an A, B, C, D, or E felony. Subjects were males, 18 years of age or older, who had completed high school, attained a General Education Degree (GED), and had no greater than 6 hours of college credit. Other races, Asian, Hispanic, and Native Americans (n = 40) were eliminated as potential experimental subjects leaving only black and white felony offenders in the subject pool (n=733). Using this smaller sample, subjects were categorized according to type of offense (either violent or non-violent) and assigned to their respective experimental group. The violent offenders group (A, B, & C felons) (n=394) was comprised of black and white violent felony offenders who met the experimental criteria. Similarly, the

non-violent group (D and E felons) was composed of black and white non-violent offenders who met experimental criteria (n = 339). Using this sample, subjects in each category, (violent or non-violent) were numbered consecutively and randomly assigned, using a computer generated table of random numbers, to either Group-1, (Grp-1, Violent) or Group-2 (Grp-2, Non-violent). Both Grp-1 and Grp-2 were subdivided to allow equal representation according to race. Group-1 (Grp-1), was divided into two subgroups allowing for a maximum number of 60 subjects or 30 black and 30 white A, B, and C felons in each subgroup. Similarly, Group-2 (Grp-2) was subdivided forming two subgroups providing a maximum sample size of 60 subjects or 30 black and 30 white D and E felons in each respective subgroup. The control group (n = 177), Group-3 (Grp-3), was composed of a subsample from the general population sample (N=447) used as the normative group in Jones' (1968) construction of the Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT). Subjects included in this sample were a heterogeneous group of school teachers, salesman, nurses, secretaries, business executives, United States Air Force (USAF) personnel, and housewives. All subjects were between 18 and 60 years of age with the majority being between 25 and 48 years of age.

The mean scores for Grp-1, Grp-2 and Grp-3 were analyzed using analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedure for groups of unequal sizes. As previously mentioned, subjects were assigned to either Grp-1 or Grp-2 according to type of offense (violent or non-violent) with equal representation

for race (black and white). Grp-3 was comprised of individuals from the general population. In order to examine potential differences for race, subjects from Grp-1 and Grp-2 were reassigned to either Group-4 (Grp-4, black A, B, C, D and E felons) or Group-5 (Grp-5, white A, B, C, D and E felons). Analysis according to t-Test procedures were employed comparing Grp-4 to Grp-5 to assess differences according to race.

The Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) was developed by Jones (1968) to assess the extent to which an individual adheres to the irrational beliefs described by Ellis (1962). The IBT is a 100-item test based on a Likert-type scale ranging from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1). Items are randomly alternated in order to prevent a subject from developing an acquiescence set to the items. Interpretation of subjects scores yields a total irrational beliefs index score and scores corresponding to the ten subscales.

CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

The independent variables in the present study were type of offense (violent or non-violent) and race (black and white). The dependent measure was the mean scores of the ten subscales combined providing general irrationality/rationality total index score of the Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT). Subjects were selected according to sex, age, education, type of felony offense and place of incarceration. The obtained sample means of the five groups, as identified in this study, along with the number of respondents and standard deviations for each group are noted in Table 1 (see Table 1).

Table 1

Sample Sizes (n), Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) by race and offense.

Group	n	M	SD
A B C Violent Felons	60	282.2	21.2
D E Non-violent Felons	60	284.5	18.4
Normative Group (Control)	177*	283.3	28.7
Black Felons	60	284.7	20.1
White Felons	60	281.9	21.1

* Control was not separated by sex or race.

Initially, Grp-1 (Violent), Grp-2 (Non-violent) and Grp- 3 (Control) data were analyzed by employing a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedure for groups of unequal size. Next, t-test analyses were performed comparing Grp-4 (Black Felons) to Grp-5 (White Felons) to determine if significant differences existed. When comparing all felons by race, (Grp-4, all black felons versus Grp-5, all white felons), t-test analysis failed to yield significant difference, $t(59) = .79, p > .05$. As shown in Table 2 there was no significant association between type of offense and irrational beliefs total test score

Table 2

ANOVA Summary Table of Violent, Non-violent and Non-offenders.

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Between Groups	153	2	--	.117
Within Groups	193,577	294	76.5	--
Total	193,730	296	655.67	--

* $p > .05$.

Based on these analyses, the present study found no association between criminal behavior and irrational thinking. Futhermore, there was no significant association between type of offense and irrational thinking in terms of race.

Chapter 4

Discussion

Several points of interest are prompted by the present findings. First, it was interesting that the data indicated no significant association between criminal behavior and irrational thinking. Such results offer no validation for Morris (1977), whose study described inmates as being irrational in their thinking. Instead, data from the present study represents offenders, violent and nonviolent, as being as rational in their thinking style as individuals from the general population. Thus, the notion that the irresponsible thinking patterns described by Yochelson and Samenow (1976) in their work, *The Criminal Personality*, are indices of irrational cognitive processes is not supported by the present findings. However, such findings offer support for theories that view the criminal as both sane and rational. Such a view is espoused by Cleckley (1955) in his historic work, *The Mask of Sanity*:

The so-called psychopath is ordinarily free from signs or symptoms traditionally regarded as evidence of psychosis. Genuine delusions cannot be demonstrated. There is no valid depression, consistent pathologic elevation of mood, or irresistible pressure of activity. Outer perceptual reality is accurately recognized, social values and generally accredited personal standards are accepted verbally. Excellent logical

reasoning is maintained and, in theory, the patient can foresee the consequences of injudicious or antisocial acts, outline acceptable or admirable plans of life and ably criticize in words his former mistakes. The results of direct psychiatric examination disclose nothing pathologic, nothing that would indicate incompetency or that would arouse suspicion that such a man could not lead a successful and happy life (p. 383).

Outstanding in Cleckley's (1955) work, is the distinction of the psychopathic personality disorder from other disorders by virtue of the subject's ability to think methodically, logically and rationally. The view of the criminal or psychopath as a rational being is also supported by Conklin (1981) who reports, "Most criminals plan their crimes to some extent. In some cases the planning of the crime is elaborate and takes place over months....criminals consider the crime and the things that may go wrong for them....they may need to secure certain materials for the crime" (p.309). In scrutinizing this view, it becomes obvious that a lengthy series of logical and rational steps are necessary in the organization and commission of an illegal act.

Considering that the present study promotes criminals as rational beings, it would be important to determine empirically the characteristics that separate the offender from the non-offender and the psychopath from the

nonpsychopathic offender. According to Cleckley (1955) the primary difference lies in the psychopath's inability to be empathic. He reports, "By saying that a good deal of the affective substance which people find in life experiences is lacking in the psychopath's responses we seek only to point out that he is not adequately moved, that he does not find subjective stimuli to make the major issues of life matter sufficiently to promote consistent striving" (p.429). Future research may include some measure of empathy or the ability to feel for others, in distinguishing the nonpsychopathic from the psychopathic individual.

From another perspective, it would seem important to point out that the present study did not attempt to distinguish between psychopathic and nonpsychopathic individuals in the criminal justice system. This was beyond the scope of the current research project. An illustration of this phenomenon may be found in comparing subjects used in the present study to those subjects obtained by Yochelson and Samenow (1976). For example, the present study utilized random sample procedures to select subjects who had been convicted of either an A, B, or C felony (violent offenses) or an D or E felony (non-violent offenses). Incorporating random sample procedures would promote attaining an heterogeneous sample of offenders who varied dramatically in their demographics. Specifically, the offenses for which they were incarcerated, the type of offenses committed, and the number of prior offenses. In comparison, Yochelson's and Samenow's (1976), subjects were a more homogeneous group

who were sentenced to St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Alexandria, Virginia, after being found not guilty for their actions by reason of insanity. Also, their subject's thinking patterns were construed by evaluating phenomenological data (self report) without utilizing a valid and reliable instrument designed to assess cognitive processes. In addition, no control group was used for comparison. Though both groups are classifiable as criminals, the disparity between the two groups is reflected in Frank's (1977) critique of Yochelson's and Samenow's approach. Frank (1977) reports, "The work can be criticized in that it is derived from a small sample that may be a biased one. The subjects are 'deep end' criminals mostly, yet the authors make inferences about the entire continuum of criminality" (p.72). This criticism seems well founded and points toward a fundamental error made by Samenow and Yochelson (1976). Specifically, in their haste to generalize their findings to the entire spectrum of criminality they seem to have overlooked the fact that they may have tapped into the cognitive processes of the "true" psychopath. Certainly, one would not expect to find cognitive processes typical of the psychopath in a heterogeneous group of offenders who vary dramatically on the continuum of criminality from nonpsychopathic to psychopathic. The fact that not all offenders are psychopathic is supported in research by Pennington and Berg (1954). Future research may incorporate methodology that clears up semantic and classificatory issues between

psychopathic and non-psychopathic offenders in the criminal justice system. Using an instrument such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) and selecting those individuals whose scores and profiles warrant classification as psychopathic or non-psychopathic could provide such clarification. Such classification could be allied with criteria from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual Three (DSM 3) to provide further delineation. After such screening procedures, administering an instrument such as the IBT to the psychopathic and non-psychopathic offender may shed light on the cognitive processes typical of the "true" psychopath versus the non-psychopathic offender.

Recapitulating, no strong or significant correlations were found between type of criminal offense and irrational thinking. Similarly, the present study found no relationship between the race of the offenders and the presence of irrational beliefs. As previously mentioned, violent and non-violent offenders scored as rational in their thinking styles as did individuals from the general population. Due to such findings, theories were presented which support the view of the criminal as both sane and rational. In addition, research using subjects in the criminal justice system has failed to delineate between the psychopathic and non-psychopathic offender. It is recommended that future research include methodology that distinguishes between the psychopathic and non-psychopathic with hopes of more closely examining the cognitive processes typical of the "true" psychopathic offender versus the

nonpsychopathic offender.

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APPENDIX A

ELLIS' IRRATIONAL BELIEFS

1. It is essential that a person be loved or approved by virtually everyone in the community.
2. A person must be perfectly competent, adequate, and achieving to be considered worthwhile.
3. Some people are bad, wicked, or villainous and therefore should be blamed and punished.
4. It is a terrible catastrophe when things are not as a person wants them to be.
5. Unhappiness is caused by outside circumstances, and a person has no control over it.
6. Dangerous or fearsome things are cause for great concern, and their possibility must be continually dwelt upon.
7. It is easier to avoid certain difficulties and self-responsibilities than to face them.
8. A person should be dependent on others and should have someone stronger on whom to rely.
9. Past experiences and events are the determinants of present behavior; the influence of the past cannot be eradicated.
10. A person should be quite upset over their or other people's problems and disturbances.
11. There is always a right or perfect solution to every problem and it must be found or the results will be catastrophic.

Appendix B

Irrational Beliefs Test Profile

IRRATIONAL BELIEFS	(Standard Score)										RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Love from most is desireable		Love from everyone is necessary
Competency in some area is necessary		Competency in some area is necessary
People are partly bad		Villans should be punished
It is desireable to have hopes satisfied		Disaster if hopes are not satisfied satisfied
Unhappiness is a state of mine		Unhappiness is externally caused
Prepare for negative outcomes and forget		Dwell on negative possiblities
Difficulties when faced usually solve themselves		Difficulties should be avoided
Need other people for advice		Depending on others generates anxiety
Have control over current decisions		Doomed by past and present limitations
Partial solutions can be expected		Expect precise solutions to problem

APPENDIX C

Criminal Thinking Patterns

1. Energy: Rapid, continuous, intense mental and physical activity. Fatigued and bored with normal responsible activities.
2. Fear: Widespread, persistent, intense and pervasive. Unreasonable fear of injury, death, putdown, illness, pain, dark, etc. Denies, eliminates, attacks and negates fear.
3. Zero State: Short periods of no self esteem, worthlessness, hopelessness, futility, failure which are characterized by blazing anger and lack of power. He feels he is a zero, others know he is a zero, and that this condition will last forever. He pulls self out through sheer force of will.
4. Anger: Pervasive chronic anger which boils within when not apparent. Basic to personality. Reaction to fear, putdown, boredom, deterrence and a method or reestablish control. Stir up action, and establish status.
5. Criminal Pride: Extreme and inflexible high evaluation of self. Proud of success in crime, sex, being a good person, and not backing down regardless of consequences.
6. Power Thrust: Need to be Number One everywhere, control all situations, more knowledgeable than others, outwits others, impress others, makes others suffer, to exploit and manipulate others.

7. Sentimentality: Not operative in criminals. It gives way to desires of the moment and is only used to enhance opinion of self as good.
8. Religion: Criminal takes religion serious and is overly frightened by hell. He uses religion for self serving purposes.
9. Concrete Thinking: Failure to recognize similarity between situations with respect to responsibility. Does not internalize concepts except those which are self serving.
10. Fragmentation: Inconsistencies and contradictions in attitude and behavior. Sincere momentary convictions that give way to desires and excitement of moment.
11. Uniqueness: Criminal emphasizes his differences. Does not feel bound to rules of society since they apply to others.
12. Perfectionism: In areas which he chooses, when he chooses.
13. Suggestibility: Suggestible to criminal acts but not to responsible behavior
14. Loner: Outsider, secretive, aloof, refuses to reveal self, one sided relationships without loyalty or love. Views self as one of a kind and sets self apart by secrecy and belief in uniqueness.
15. Sexuality: Seeks control, fidelity and accountability in partner, exploitive relationships.

16. Lying: Essential, justifiable, and way of life. Habitual, automatic, and often without purpose. Existence entails living a lie.

Automatic Errors of Thinking

17. Closed Channel: Secretive, closed mind, and selfrighteous. These elements render any attempt to change him futile.
18. "I Can't": Term used only to express refusal or to avoid unpleasant things.
19. Victim Stance: When held accountable criminal portrays self as a victim. Refuses to take responsibility for action and blame others or situation.
20. Lack of Time Perspective: Does not consider past or future except as necessary for criminal acts. Instance pervades time perspective.
21. Failure to Put Self in Another's Position: Demands every consideration for self with no consideration for others.
22. Failure to consider Injury to Others: Outcome of error 21. Does not view self as injuring anyone. Blames others or minimizes harm.
23. Failure to Assume Obligation: Does not consider self bound by obligations but expects others to live up to their obligations to him.
24. Failure to Assume Responsible Initiatives: No guarantee of gain from responsible initiatives. May fail and appear ignorant or weak. Initiatives in crime but not responsible activities.

25. Ownership: If he wants something he is automatically entitled to it. No concept of other's rights yet his are unlimited.
26. Fear of Fear: Is eliminated in planning crimes and not operative to prevent injury.
27. Lack of Trust: Weakness which makes them dependent. Demands others trust him and exploits those who do.
28. Refusal to be Dependent: Depends on others yet refuses to see interdependence as necessary part of living. Exploits those who depend on him.
29. Lack of Interest in Responsible Performance: Wants benefit of status but doesnot want to achieve responsibly.
30. Pretentiousness: Unrealistic view of self not matched by skill or achievement.
31. Failure to Make Effort to Endure Adversity: Refuses to endure adversity of responsible living. Quits or escapes rather than deal with responsibilities.
32. Poor Decision Making for Responsible Living: No weighing of pros and cons, no ascertaining of facts, no thought of consequences. Forms erroneous conclusions and makes faulty decisions.
33. Extensiveness of Criminal Thinking: Criminal thoughts constantly pass through mind without restraint. Fantasies and schemes of all levels and seriousness.
34. Deterrents: External (fears that he will be caught, maimed or killed) and internal (conscience, sentimentality, and religious).

35. Corrosion and Cutoff: Corrosion (mental process in which internal and external deterrents are eliminated until desire outweighs fears). Cutoff (rapid and deliberate elimination of fear).
36. Building up the Opinion of Oneself as Good: Belief that he is a good person, therefore, he has no need to justify actions. Image of self as good gives license for more crime.
37. Deferment: Putting off, self reform and responsibilities that are incompatible with crime.
38. Super Optimism: Closer he gets to committing crime more he is sure it will go as planned. He will not get caught, the perfect crime, money is his.
39. Emergence of Non Psychotic Hallucinatory Deterrents: Hearing voices just before or during crime urging him to stop.
40. Reemergence of Fear During Execution of Crime: State of hyperactivity and excitement partly due to rise in fear he might get caught. May cut off, use caution, or may cause him to harm or kill victim.
41. When the Criminal Remains Unapprehended: Afraid of apprehension, hyper alert to strangers. Later sense of triumph.
42. Celebration after Crime: Sex, alcohol, and drugs to eliminate fears and seek new excitements. Brags, flashes money, flaunts prestige, power and criminal image.
43. The Criminal Apprehended: Feeling of injustice and scheming to get out. Does not worry until trial.

44. The Psychology of Accountability: Responds in whatever way will serve him. Show psychiatric symptoms though never views self as mentally ill and uses excuses to absolve responsibility.
45. Premeditation vs. Impulse-Compulsion: Crime preceded by long term violating patterns in thought and action. He has control over thoughts and actions.
46. Effectiveness of Deterrents: Deterrents cut off and criminal becomes superoptimistic. Not worried about punishment because he will not get caught.
47. Criminal Equivalents: Nonarrestable but will seek crime later. Seek power, achieve influence, promote self at expense of others.
48. Limbo Phase: Mainly in older criminals who have lost agility. Age and health deters from some crimes or commits less of them.
49. Monasticism: Eradicates past, purifies self, and becomes clean (good). Sincere state that may last for months. Considers self purified and almost always returns to past behavior.
50. Suicide: Collapse of his opinion of self as good person. Angry because work is not giving him his just due. Considers self to be too good to be less than Number One. Majority resolve by resumption of criminal thinking and acting.
51. Psychosis: Cannot be psychotic and succeed in crime. Must be in touch with reality when commits crime.

52. Psychosomatic Symptoms: Develop when deferred from doing what he wants or is doing what he dislikes. Begin when depressed or bored. Gain sympathy and attention to avoid responsibility.

APPENDIX D

Voluntary Consent

I _____ . hereby volunteer to participate in the study conducted by Mr. Randy Noble. In signing this document my signature certifies that I understand and agree to cooperate in the study.

I do not expect to receive any favor or gain any special privileges for my involvement.

The study is designed to assess and compare styles of thinking in inmates to those individuals who have never been convicted of an offense. This will be measured by completing a 100-item test that can be completed in approximately thirty to forty minutes. At my request, a tape recorded version of the test will be available to assist me in my efforts. Throughout the study I am assured that in no way shall my identity be disclosed. This provides confidentiality during administration, analyzing the data and the actual written report. It is my privilege to have any questions answered concerning the proposed procedures. I understand that participation is voluntary and that at any time I may withdraw my consent and discontinue participation in the study.

Signed

Witnessed

Examiner

Date