

**“DECONSTRUCTING DEPENDENCY”:
OSAGE SUBSISTENCE AND UNITED STATES INDIAN
POLICY, 1800-1830.**

by
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For most Americans, the western fur trade represents an extremely adventurous and positive era within American history and folklore. Nothing embodies the symbol of American freedom and self-reliance more than that of the lone trapper who conquered the wilderness and carved a place in the West for future generations. American textbooks, literature, and movies abound with portrayals of physically and morally superior mountain men whose courage dwarfed both their contemporaries and modern man. (Who can forget Robert Redford’s stirring performance as Jeremiah Johnson, conqueror of grizzlies, Indians, and the mountains themselves?!) Trappers were also seen as ambassadors to the western Indian tribes, helping to open the way for the settlement of the West for industrious white farmers and ranchers. Trading posts, such as St. Louis, blossomed into industrious and burgeoning towns. However, trading posts established by these bold trappers provided more than commercial exchange and jumping off points for settlers headed west.

Historian David Wishart stated that these posts became cultural meeting places where news, customs, and beliefs were exchanged between Indians and traders.¹ He also noted that the Indian-trader relationship offered the most natural and congenial interaction between whites and Indians.² This benevolent view of the American fur trade permeated United States school systems for decades, and perpetuated an idealized view towards the fur trade and trappers. However, within the last twenty-five years historians have revisited this topic

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and presented a far less flattering picture of the machinations of the American fur trade.

For many of today's historians, instead of building a cultural bridge between Indian tribes and the United States, the fur trade came to represent a weapon used for the subjugation and exploitation of Native Americans. The widely accepted theory pertaining to dependency holds that as Native American tribes began to trade for European goods, such as rifles and manufactured goods, they became completely dependent upon those goods. Once dependent, the tribes became easily manipulated by the American government into accepting federal demands. Thus, through dependency, they lost their land, tribal autonomy, and way of life. Historian Bernard Sheehan demonstrated clearly in, *Seeds of Extinction* that the United States attempted to use Indian dependency upon trade goods not only to obtain Indian land, but also as a means to force tribes to assimilate to American culture.³ As Sheehan's subtitle denotes, Jeffersonian philanthropic ideology maintained that it was in the Indian's best interest to divest them of their native culture and create "Americanized" yeoman farmers out of savages. The primary method used in "civilizing" the natives involved allowing the Indians to build a substantial debt to the traders, and then accepting land as payment for these debts. According to Sheehan, the acquisition of land provided two distinct benefits for the United States; it encouraged the migration of white settlers to new fertile territories, and forced the "nomadic" Indians to settle down and cultivate their ever-dwindling lands.

Other historians such as Anthony F. C. Wallace and Richard White shared similar, and sometimes more insidious, views pertaining to the fur trade. Wallace placed the practice of encouraging Indian tribes to establish a large trade debt in order to obtain diplomatic concessions as being the most successful method for United States land acquisition.⁴ Richard White went further yet, stating that the establishment of the fur trade brought tribes into a world market economy that eventually overwhelmed them, thus creating a complete economic dependence upon the United States.⁵ It should be noted that these historians do not see dependency alone as the only variable in the equation of subjugation; it is, however, presented as the *primary* factor in the downfall of Native American societies. Interestingly, many social historians have examined the fur trade without delving deeply into the topic of dependency, but instead focusing on its social and cultural machinations. For example, Sylvia Van Kirk explored

the role women played in fur trade society, and Jennifer S. H. Brown studied the similar topic of fur trade families.⁶

The wide pendulum swing in fur trade historiography over the last two or three decades created a dependency bandwagon that most historians of the fur trade eagerly climbed aboard. It is difficult to find a recent study of the fur trade that does not record the devastating effects suffered by Indian tribes at the hands of the United States market economy. While it is irrefutably true that commercial dependence upon the United States did cause severe problems for most Native American tribes, it is also true that trade dependency alone did not lead to complete tribal subjugation to the United States. Other forces besides trade dependency led to the destruction of Native American tribal power and autonomy. This study will demonstrate that American attempts to subdue Indian tribes by creating a trade dependency among tribal societies failed in the absence of other vital conditions. These conditions included the destruction of tribal economic infrastructures, a complete trade monopoly for the United States, territorial incursions by large numbers of Indian or white migrants, and most importantly, a strong federal military presence.

As the United States expanded its borders westward it came into conflict with more and more tribes. Those tribes residing east of the Mississippi River faced increased pressure from the United States to relocate west of the Mississippi in order to provide land for white settlers. However, these Western lands were the home of many tribes that resisted the migration of large numbers of alien Native Americans into their territory. One such Western tribe, the Osage, who dominated most of the southern plains until the 1830s, will be the center of this study.

The Osage tribe, which numbered 6,300 in 1806,⁷ controlled the lands bounded by the Missouri, Red, and Mississippi rivers and the Rocky Mountains.⁸ This region included most of the present states of Arkansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, and the southeastern area of Nebraska. By 1800 the Osage tribe contained three distinct bands, the Great Osage that lived near the Osage River, the Little Osage that resided about six miles from them, and the Arkansas Osage, that lived on the river of the same name.⁹ At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Osage lived as semi-nomadic hunters and agriculturists. They made yearly buffalo hunts onto the southern plains in order to obtain a supply of winter meat. The Osage also cultivated crops of corn, pumpkins, and beans in the region's numerous river valleys. The tribe wintered in semi-

permanent villages in these protected river valleys of the Mississippi river's western tributaries.¹⁰

More importantly, the Osage traded furs and pelts with the Spanish, French, and English in order to acquire muskets and rifles, ammunition, gunpowder, horses, blankets, clothing, and other European manufactured merchandise.¹¹ The trade network that developed in the eighteenth century on the southern plains allowed the Osage to exploit their position near the Mississippi river; thus allowing the tribe greater access to European goods, especially weapons, than their western and southern enemies. The Osage preferred to trade with the French, and developed a close allegiance to them, because the Spanish refused to trade weapons with Indian tribes and the English seldom traded with the Osage.¹² This trade alliance with the French gave the Osage a technological advantage over their southern and western foes that traded primarily with the Spanish, which allowed the Osage to dominate a large and productive region. While the French traders themselves often remained behind, the French supplies of weapons and other goods disappeared with their defeat in the French and Indian War. English traders from the Great Lakes region now vied with American and Spanish traders for access to valuable furs and pelts procured and processed by Indians. However, when the United States purchased the Louisiana Territory from France in 1803, the dynamics of the fur trade and the Osage-United States relationship changed considerably.

The Osage tribe's regional power and strategic location near the Mississippi River, and its western tributaries, made them the center of United States Indian policy and trade interests after the Louisiana Purchase.¹³ This region contained some the best hunting and trapping west of the Mississippi River and the Osage and other tribes traded eagerly with anyone who could supply good quality merchandise.¹⁴ However, the Osage also possessed something far more valuable than furs and pelts in the eyes of the United States government; they controlled large amounts of land.

As the population of the United States increased following the American Revolution a great westward migration occurred in the United States. Shortly after the Louisiana Purchase both Northerners and Southerners pulled up stakes and headed west in search of economic opportunities. The increased national hunger for land led to hostilities with eastern tribes such as the Shawnee, Kickapoo, and Delaware in the Ohio Valley and the Creek, Choctaw, and Cherokee in the South. American efforts to "civilize" and "assimilate" Native

Americans into white society failed, leaving removal as the only alternative to extinction.¹⁵ In order to accomplish the task of Indian removal the United States needed to provide land for the migrating tribes to inhabit. The Osage tribe's territorial lands occupied the perfect region for the proposed relocation of eastern tribes.

During the first two decades of the nineteenth century the United States attempted to obtain Osage lands by creating a tribal dependence upon American trade goods; these attempts, however, failed to persuade the Osage to surrender their lands. Throughout this period the United States sought to open land for eastern tribes by forcing the three bands of Osage to reunify near the Osage River in the northern area of their territory.¹⁶ The Arkansas band, which inhabited the southern part of Osage lands, became the central target of United States efforts to consolidate the tribe. These efforts failed primarily because the United States did not maintain a trade monopoly in the region, the Osage economic base remained intact, and the American presence in the region was insufficient to force these concessions.¹⁷ The United States did succeed in eventually subjugating the Osage, but not solely through the machinations of trade dependency. The United States succeeded primarily through military threats, the destruction of the Osage tribe's economic foundation and by inundating the region with enough white and Indian enemies to overwhelm the tribe militarily.

After the acquisition of the Louisiana Territory the United States, eager to establish control over their newly acquired territory, quickly opened two federally run trading posts in Osage territory. The first began operations in 1805 on the Arkansas River, while the second opened in 1808 at Fire Prairie, Missouri.¹⁸ The trading house's purpose did not include the accumulation of profit; instead these factories traded goods at a rate meant only to maintain the capital investment. The factories hoped to control the abuses of private traders by requiring them to obtain licenses from either the local factory superintendents or the Secretary of War. While these developments sometimes created favorable relations with the Native American tribes, the factory trade system failed to control the misconduct of private traders. Moreover, the primary goal of the factories focused on producing a trade monopoly for the United States, not the establishment of good relations with the Osage, nor the control of abusive traders.¹⁹ The United States hoped that once the factories drove off English, Spanish, and private competition, trade bans or the threat of trade bans

might force the Osage to agree to cede some of their territory. Interestingly, despite the historical condemnation of the fur trade as a weapon used in the destruction of Native American societies, the United States factory system is often portrayed as a benevolent institution.²⁰

Ironically, the first such trade bans occurred in 1805 just before the establishment of the Arkansas Trading House, when, after accepting French trader Pierre Chouteau's advise, Governor John Wilkinson cut off trade with the Arkansas band of the Osage.²¹ The purpose of this ban aimed at forcing the southern Arkansas band to move northward and join their brethren on the Osage River. Wilkinson believed that this relocation would not only create room for the Cherokee and other migrating eastern tribes, it would also make trade with St. Louis much easier.²² The Governor's ban failed despite creating a shortage in essential supplies for the Arkansas band. First of all, the federal trading houses did not enjoy a trade monopoly, and secondly the Osage tribe's ability to provide sufficient food and other essentials remained intact.²³ A trader that visited the Arkansas band reported that the Osage told him that, "they will cultivate corn, which God will cause to grow in abundance," and that there was plentiful game in the south, and therefore no reason to leave.²⁴

In addition to rigid Indian determination, Governor Wilkinson also had to contend with the actions of Secretary of War, Henry Dearborn. Dearborn issued a two-year trading license to Jacob Bright, of the Morgan and Bright Trading Company of New Orleans, which allowed Bright to trade with the Arkansas band of the Osage despite Wilkinson's trade ban.²⁵ This situation allowed the Osage to bypass the Governor's ban and obtain needed supplies. Eventually, Secretary of War Dearborn removed Wilkinson's ban and trade continued unabated.²⁶ For two years all three Osage bands fought to keep both encroaching eastern tribes and white hunters from trespassing on their hunting territory. The Osage bands depended on their hunts to provide the furs and pelts that they traded for weapons, ammunition, and other goods. The increased hunting activity of migrating tribes such as the Cherokee, and whites, reduced the numbers of game animals on tribal lands, thus weakening the Osage economic foundation. When the Osage encountered foreign hunting parties they harassed them and stole their possessions. Moreover, if the hunting party consisted of Indians they often killed the offending tribesmen. This struggle for control over what is now eastern Arkansas and Missouri continued until the spring of 1808, when a new territorial governor arrived.

The new governor, Meriwether Lewis, resolved to end Osage depredations and consolidate the United States' control over the region. When the Osage refused to stop their resistance to Indian and white territorial infringements, Governor Lewis again banned trade with the Osage. Lewis stated that the United States needed to withhold merchandise from the Osage whenever necessary. Furthermore, he believed it vital to prevent the British traders from supplying the tribe during the trade ban. Lewis also ordered the departing licensed traders to remove all gunpowder from Osage possession in an obvious attempt to weaken the tribe militarily.²⁷ However, Governor Lewis realized that a trade ban alone could not succeed in forcing the Osage to cede the disputed eastern regions of their territory.

Lewis believed war with the Osage to be inevitable; therefore, the Governor resorted to far less passive actions in his attempt to gain control of Osage lands and establish United States regional domination.²⁸ Disregarding Henry Dearborn's intention of building a trading house near the Osage River villages, Lewis decided instead to construct the new post at Fire Prairie on the Missouri River, eighty miles north of Dearborn's intended location.²⁹ The reason behind the placement of the new post involved the freeing up even more land for eastern tribes faced with removal. Lewis then met with a delegation of the Osage tribe's bitter enemies from the northeast, the Shawnee, Delaware, Kickapoo, Miami, and Potawatomi. The Governor told these tribes that any "malcontent" Osage that refused to move to the post at Fire Prairie no longer enjoyed United States protection. He encouraged these tribes to form an alliance and attack any Osage not at the post. Lewis went on to instruct the tribal alliance to attack with enough force to cut the Osage off from any possible assistance and drive them out of their country.³⁰

These tribes gathered 1,200 warriors and designed a plan to attack the Osage as they returned from their summer buffalo hunt. They hoped to surprise the Osage before they could re-supply themselves with ammunition and gunpowder after their long hunt. After approving the plan Lewis then sent Captain William Clark and his company through Osage territory to build a post at Fire Prairie.³¹ On the way to Fire Prairie Captain Clark stopped at the Little Osage village near the Osage River and told Chief Pawhuska to move to the new post or face attack by the Indian alliance. When the chief acquiesced, Captain Clark seized the opportunity and negotiated a peace treaty between the Osage and the United States.³² The leaders of the Little Osage signed the

treaty on September 14, 1808. In doing so the entire Osage tribe gave up 50,000 square miles of territory, an area roughly the size of the state of Virginia.³³

Despite the supposed American success, this treaty failed to subjugate the Osage tribe under United States domination, or even gain undisputed access to the ceded lands. Many Osage, including many principal Osage leaders, refused to accept the terms of the treaty because they had not attended the negotiations. According to Osage tribal custom a majority of the tribe needed to approve such an agreement and the Treaty of 1808 did not meet this requirement. Moreover, many of the Little Osage leaders stated that they misunderstood the meaning of the treaty and believed they would retain their lands.³⁴ In order to quell the rising complaints concerning the treaty, Governor Lewis sent Pierre Chouteau back to the tribe at Fort Osage to acquire the signatures needed to make the treaty official.³⁵ Chouteau's instructions from Governor Lewis included using threats of trade bans and military actions against the Osage if they did not sign the treaty and move to Fire Prairie.³⁶ George Sibley, a witness to the treaty negotiations, stated that "so much were the Osages awed by the threat of Mr. Chouteau, that a very unusual number of them touched pen; many of whom knew no more the purpose of the act than if they had been a hundred miles off."³⁷ The Great and Little Osage signed the treaty on November 10, 1808 under the threat of war and destitution.³⁸

However, the effect of the treaty on the Arkansas band proved minimal. The Arkansas band did not attend the second meetings either. They considered the idea to move to Fire Prairie a plot of Pierre Chouteau and refused to accept the agreement.³⁹ The Arkansas band remained under trade ban until they agreed to the treaty in August of 1809.⁴⁰ Despite the Arkansas band's acceptance of the treaty it still refused to move north to Fire Prairie; furthermore, all three bands of the Osage continued to hunt on the ceded lands, which made conflicts with eastern Indian and white hunters more frequent and violent. The United States closed the Arkansas trading house in 1810, hoping that the lack of trade might force the Arkansas band to join the northern bands at Fire Prairie, but the band still refused to abandon its home. Furthermore, the location of the trading house at Fire Prairie proved so vulnerable to attack by eastern tribes that in 1810 the Great Osage returned to the Osage River. The Little Osage followed two years later.⁴¹

Governor Lewis's struggle to drive the Osage out of their eastern hunting territory failed for several reasons. The Osage still obtained needed supplies

such as ammunition and gunpowder from either the English or other tribes.⁴² Furthermore, the Osage could still support themselves by hunting and farming and did not rely completely upon the United States for sustenance. And finally, the United States military and civilian populations remained too distant to be able to strictly enforce the terms of the treaty that forbid the Osage to hunt on the ceded lands.⁴³

The American victory in the War of 1812 changed the dynamics of the United States-Osage relationship dramatically. The eventual removal of the English traders from the Great Lakes region meant that the Osage lost a vital avenue for circumventing American trade restrictions. This left the tribe increasingly dependent upon American arms and ammunition in order to fight the invading eastern tribes. As the pressure for Indian removal increased, more eastern tribes poured across the Mississippi River and moved into the lands ceded by the Osage in the Treaty of 1808. By 1817 the eastern tribes outnumbered the Osage substantially, with six thousand Cherokee, and many other Indians of various tribes, now occupying lands that once belonged to the Osage.⁴⁴ As the competition for meat and trade furs escalated the Osage found themselves losing ground to the eastern tribes, especially the more numerous Cherokee. The Osage tribe's economic foundation was beginning to crumble.

By 1817, increased white and Indian incursions into Osage territory, coupled with ever-dwindling economic stability, and a near United States trade monopoly, left the tribe weakened significantly. In October 1817, a Cherokee raiding party came upon an unguarded Osage village occupied by one old chief, women, and children. The Cherokee knew that the Osage tribe's buffalo hunts kept the men away from their villages for long periods during the fall and hoped to find just such an unprotected camp. When the old chief went out to meet the Cherokee warriors, they butchered him and attacked the camp. They killed thirty-eight women and children and took more than one hundred prisoners.⁴⁵

The fear of angering the Americans, and increased raids from non-Osage tribes, led the Osage to proceed cautiously in seeking a resolution to this attack. However, the Cherokee, long-time neighbors of the Americans, and therefore more familiar with United States Indian policy, used the incident to gain federal support for more land cessions from the Osage.⁴⁶ The Cherokee sent a letter to the secretary of war claiming that they had defeated the Osage in battle and therefore should be granted their territory as spoils of war. The secretary of war agreed and ordered the governor to negotiate a new treaty with the

Osage.⁴⁷ Unwilling to fight the United States and the Cherokee at the same time, the Osage traveled to St. Louis to meet with the Cherokee. The new treaty, signed on September 25, 1818, ceded over three million acres of excellent prairie land east of the Verdigris River. The only concession requested of the Cherokee involved the return of the prisoners taken on the raid.⁴⁸

For the Osage this treaty proved an especially bitter pill to swallow; only a few of the 104 captives taken by the Cherokee ever returned to their villages. Furthermore, the Osage recognized that the influx of eastern tribes was a deliberate United States policy designed to overwhelm them. The Osage knew that the United States controlled vast military power because their chiefs visited Washington DC and toured cities like New York and Boston. Having visited these seemingly miraculous cities they realized what great forces could be brought against them. Nonetheless, the Osage continued to resist United States regional domination.⁴⁹ In 1820 the Osage still presented a formidable enemy; they harassed white hunters that trespassed on their territory and continued to resist the tide of eastern tribes that threatened their lands. Moreover, Osage warriors greatly outnumbered American military contingents in the area. The Osage believed that they could perpetuate their regional hegemony by keeping the eastern tribes at bay and reinforcing their dominance over the western parts of their territory.⁵⁰ However, the Osage tribe's ability to withstand the American onslaught lasted only another five years.

The third decade of the nineteenth century began with the Osage facing a number of serious threats to its regional hegemony. By 1820 hundreds of white settlers found their way to Osage lands and thousands of Indians still crossed the Mississippi River in an unstoppable torrent that would end the Osage tribe's ability to resist American domination.⁵¹ As previously noted, a regional trade monopoly achieved by the United States shortly after the War of 1812 made the threat of trade bans a more effective weapon in federal Indian policy pertaining to the Osage. Moreover, the Osage economy, while still able to provide some level of sustenance for the tribe, declined rapidly because of increased competition for meat and furs in the first two decades of the nineteenth century. Unfortunately, the Osage tribe's ability to feed itself afforded them no protection against the flood of invaders that encroached upon their homeland. The United States, while able to maintain peaceful trade relations with the Osage, encouraged and supported the migration of eastern Indian tribes that came into violent conflict with the Osage.

The battles between the Osage and the eastern tribes continued for five years following the signing of the Treaty of 1818. During this period the United States showed little concern over the Indian conflicts until November 1823 when one event forever changed the course of southern plains hegemony. That fall a hunting party, comprised of nine white men and twelve Quapaw mixed bloods, started a hunt in Osage territory near Blue River. An Osage party led by Mad Buffalo, a Little Osage Chief, attacked the hunting camp and killed at least four hunters, including Major Curtis Welborn, the leader of the ill-fated expedition.⁵²

Although the United States realized that Welborn's trespassing on Osage lands led to the attack, the United States government dared not appear to accept the apparent murder of white men at the hands of the Osage.⁵³ The commander of Fort Smith immediately demanded the surrender of the Osage tribesmen guilty of the attack. Soon after this demand the war department sent five companies of soldiers to construct a new fort only a few miles from the Little Osage villages.⁵⁴ This aggressive move convinced the tribe to hand over Mad Buffalo and five other Osage leaders to the United States government on 8 June 1824.⁵⁵ The final blow for Osage hegemony came in June of 1825, when the tribe ceded all of their remaining lands to the United States, except for a small fifty-mile strip in the northern part of their old territory.⁵⁶ This strip of land, which is located in what is today the northern part of the state of Oklahoma, is all that is left of the once far ranging Osage domain.

By 1825 the United States had achieved regional hegemony over the southern plains. By confining the Osage to a small fraction of the vast territory they controlled at the turn of the century the United States created space for eastern tribes, such as the Cherokee and Choctaw, to relocate west of the Mississippi River. However, the destruction of Osage territorial domination did not fit any set pattern of American westward expansion, for no such pattern exists. The evolution of American domination of the southern plains involved a complex and unpredictable process. While this process at times shared conditions commonly seen in American policy towards other Indian tribes, such as trade dependency and the threat of military attack, it also possessed its own unique evolution.

Soon after the Louisiana Purchase the United States recognized the need to acquire land for the resettlement of eastern tribes. In order to obtain the desired land the United States attempted to establish a territorial trade monopoly that would permit the federal government to deal with the Osage from a position

of strength. The American victory in the War of 1812 presented the United States with a true regional trade monopoly by eliminating the only European power in the area that traded weapons to Native Americans. Ironically, the tribe had no other choice than to turn to the United States for supplies and assistance in maintaining Osage regional control. As more eastern tribes and white settlers encroached upon Osage territory, the tribe asked the federal government to use its great power to stem the tide of invading peoples.⁵⁷ However, this request ran counter to contemporary American Indian policy and the United States continued to encourage the westward movement of eastern tribes into Osage territory. The increased competition for food and furs soon left all three bands of the Osage in severe economic distress, which in turn provided the United States with greater influence over the tribe because of the Osage tribe's dependence upon American arms and ammunition.

However, trade dependency upon the United States did not by itself end Osage regional hegemony. The eventual subjugation of the Osage tribe occurred because of the mass migration of Indians and whites into Osage territory, which eventually destroyed their tribal economy. The thousands, and then tens of thousands, of eastern Indians that migrated across the Mississippi River proved too numerous and aggressive to defeat. Moreover, the expanded presence of United States military detachments near Osage villages both increased American control over tribal political decisions and consolidated United States regional hegemony. For example, both the 1808 and the 1825 treaties emerged from the direct threat of United States military action against the Osage. Clearly, American attempts to use trade as a weapon in order to subjugate the Osage could not, and did not, solely lead to the tribe's loss of regional hegemony. Instead, the United States obtained territorial domination through a non-systemic combination of a United States' trade monopoly, the destruction of the Osage tribe's economic system, Native American janissaries, and federal dragoons.

NOTES

1. David J. Wishart, *The Fur Trade of the American West, 1807-1840, A Geographical Synthesis* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979), 88.
2. *Ibid.*, 214-215.
3. Bernard W. Sheehan, *Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1973), 154-155, 170-171.

4. Anthony F.C. Wallace, "The Obtaining of Lands: Thomas Jefferson and the Native American," in *Thomas Jefferson and the Changing West: From Conquest to Conservation* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1997), 39.
5. Richard White, *The Roots of Dependency: Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change among the Choctaws, Pawnee, and Navajos* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983). Since this publication Richard White renounced his own thesis, which stated that capitalism was the driving force behind the subjugation of Indian tribes to the United States government. His latest theory, found in his text *Middle Ground*, is much less deterministic, and yet it still presents trade dependency as the primary cause of Native American subjugation to federal authority.
6. Sylvia Van Kirk, *Many Tender Ties: Women in Fur-Trade Society, 1670-1870* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980), and Jennifer S.H. Brown, *Strangers in Blood: Fur Trade Company Families in Indian Country* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980). Both these works, published in the same year and at the same university press, are outstanding examinations of the complex relationships that developed between the traders and trappers and the Indian tribes with whom they lived so closely during the extended intercultural contact that the fur trade afforded.
7. *American State Papers: Indian Affairs*, (Washington DC: Gales and Seaton, 1832-1834), 4:707-708.
8. John B. Treat to Henry Dearborn, November 15, 1805, *Letter book of the Arkansas Trading House, 1805-1810*, Microcopy No. 142-Reel No. 1, U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, National Archives Microfilm Publications.
9. Willard H. Rollings, The Osage: *An Ethnohistorical Study of Hegemony on the Prairie-Plains* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1992), 215-216; *American State Papers: Indian Affairs*, 4: 707-708.
10. Rollings, *The Osage*, Chapters 7 and 8. For a history of Osage see Rollings' text, which delineates the Osage rise and fall from regional dominance in the period from 1673-1840, he also examines their social and economic lifeways during the same period.
11. Paul Chrisler Phillips, *The Fur Trade*, (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1961), 2:488; Treat to Dearborn, November 15, 1805, *Letter book of the Arkansas Trading House, 1805-1810*.
12. Donald Jackson, ed., *The Journal of Zebulon Montgomery Pike: With Letters and Related Documents*, Vol. 2 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), 37.
13. Rollings, *The Osage*, 215.
14. John B. Treat to Henry Dearborn, November 15, 1805, *Letter book of the Arkansas Trading House, 1805-1810*. Treat was the superintendent, or "factor," at the newly established Arkansas Trading House, and Dearborn was the Secretary of War.
15. Sheehan, *Seeds of Extinction*, 119-181. Part two of Sheehan's text discusses American attempts and failures to "civilize" Native Americans.
16. Governor John Wilkinson to Henry Dearborn, July 27, 1805, Clarence Edwin Carter, ed., *The Territorial Papers of the United States*, (Washington DC: Government Printing

Office, 1953), 13: 170.

17. Governor John Wilkinson to Henry Dearborn, September 22, 1805, *ibid.*, 230. "When I estimate the number and force of the Indian nations, who inhabit the Country watered by the Missouri and Mississippi, and who if not made our friends will become our enemies. . . when I cast my eyes over the expanse of Territory to be occupied or controlled [sic] that we are not in sufficient strength, of men or means, to meet the occasion and profit by the favorable [sic] circumstances of the moment." Wilkinson also mentioned the threat of British trade from Lake Superior to the Mississippi River.

18. Phillips, *The Fur Trade*, 497-499; Dearborn to Treat, March 3, 1805, *Letter book of the Arkansas Trading House, 1805-1810*. Lewis to Dearborn, December 15, 1808, *Letters Received by the Secretary of War, Main Series*, Microcopy No. 221-Reel No. 25, National Archives, Washington DC, 1954.

19. Treat to Davy, November 15, 1805, *Letter book of the Arkansas Trading House, 1805-1810*; Jackson, *The Journal of Zebulon Montgomery Pike*, 37.

20. Robert A. Trennert, Jr., *Indian Traders on the Middle Border: The House of Ewing, 1827-1854* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), 2-3. Trennert called the factory system an "attempt to counteract some of the inherent abuses in the private Indian trade by licensing traders and. . . ensuring that the tribes were not cheated." He also stated that the factory system aimed to foster "good relations with the Indians."; Jerome O. Steffen, *William Clark: Jeffersonian Man on the Frontier* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1977), 55-60; and Sheehan, *Seeds of Extinction*, 154-155, 170-171. Both Steffen and Sheehan agree with Trennert's view, however, they also see the factory system as an attempt to integrate the Native Americans into American society by depriving them of their land and forcing the Indians to become yeoman farmers.

21. Governor John Wilkinson to Henry Dearborn, July 27, 1805, Carter, *Territorial Papers*, 13: 170.

22 *Ibid.*

23. Rollings, *The Osage*, 218.

24. Treat to Dearborn, December 27, 1805, *Letter book of the Arkansas Trading House, 1805-1810*.

25. Treat to Davy, February 27, 1806, *ibid.*; Treat to Davy, April 15, 1806, *ibid.*

26. Dearborn to Treat, April 29, 1806, *ibid.*

27. Lewis to Dearborn, July 1, 1808, *Letters Received by the Secretary of War, Main Series*, Reel 25.

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*

31. *Ibid.*

32. Rollings, *The Osage*, 224.

33. Institute for the Development of Indian Law, *Treaties and Agreements of the Eastern*

- Oklahoma Indians* (Washington DC: Institute for the Development of Indian Law, 1975), 21-25; Kate L. Gregg, ed., *Westward With Dragoons: The Journal of William Clark on His Expedition to Establish Fort Osage, August 25 to September 22, 1808* (Fulton, Missouri: Ovid Bell Press Inc., 1937), 37-43.
34. Clark to Dearborn, December 2, 1808, *Letters Received by the Secretary of War, Main Series*, Reel No. 20.
35. *American State Papers*, 766-767.
36. Lewis to Dearborn, December 15, 1808, *Letters Received by the Secretary of War, Main Series*, Reel No. 25.
37. Lewis Edwin James, comp., *Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains Performed in the Years 1819 and 1820, By Order of the Hon. J.C. Calhoun, Secretary of War, Under the Command of Maj. S.H. Long, Early Western Travels, 1748-1846*, edited by Reubon Gold Thwaites (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1905), 16: 276.
38. Institute for the Development of Indian Law, *Treaties and Agreements*, 21-25.
39. Thomas Maitland Marshall, ed., *The Life and Papers of Frederick Bates*, (St. Louis: Missouri Historical Society, 1926), 2:44-45.
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