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Title: SOVIET MILITARY POWER: THE DOMINANT RESOURCE FOR

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Abstract approved:

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In just sixty-five years, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has grown to the status of world super power, flaunting the world's largest military forces, and exhibiting considerable influence in international affairs.

Through a combination of their size, composition, capabilities and strategic worldwide distribution, the Soviet Army, Navy, and Airforce have become the dominant resource of power for the Kremlin leadership.

As a result, the Soviets have capitalized on the opportunities within the past 12-15 years to exert their influence into the countries of the Third World. This has been accomplished in part through the use advisors, arms sales, troop emplacements and the use of proxy forces, to support Third World national liberation struggles.

Soviet goals in the Third World are underpinned with ideological and nationalistic objectives. In the recent past however, it has

become more evident that strategic positioning of military forces in these areas afford the Soviets a sphere of influence outside the Eurasian landmass never before realized in Russian history.

The Soviet leadership have carefully and meticulously weighed the probabilities of success or failure in their Third World adventures. Coupled with a certain restraint on the part of the United States to interfere directly in these activities and the powerful military machine supporting the Kremlin's foreign policy decisions, the Russians found the decade of the 1970's an excellent period for expanding their worldwide influence.

Future activities by the Soviet Union in the conduct of their foreign affairs, is a complex issue. However, there does appear a direct correlation between Soviet adventurism in the Third World and the reliance on their massive military power as the "arm of influence" that supplies the necessary muscle to enable the Kremlin to exploit opportunities of intervention.

The Soviet leadership firmly believes that military power is decisive in international affairs and is the prerequisite for advancing political goals. As long as the buildup and modernization of military hardware continues, the U.S.S.R. will pose a real and tangible threat to the free nations of the world.

SOVIET MILITARY POWER: THE DOMINANT
RESOURCE FOR SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

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PREFACE

The purpose of this thesis is to examine one aspect of Soviet foreign policy--adventurism--and its relationship to the growth of the Soviet military power during the past decade. The hypothesis is that the greater the Soviet military power, the more it will be the dominant Soviet foreign policy resource.

It is clearly understood that other major factors shape Soviet foreign policy. Instruments such as economic aid, trade, propaganda, diplomatic ties, cultural exchanges and technical assistance all affect decisions concerning foreign policy for the Soviets. However, this research will isolate a single instrument, that of military power, and examine its effects on the aspect of Soviet foreign policy which is the use of this power outside the confines of the Soviet borders and Warsaw Pact nations to exploit and develop the ideological goals of Soviet supremacy.

In order to make this research plausible, the following definition of Soviet adventurism will be utilized:

the use of a national resource of military power overtly or covertly, in any foreign country or territory of the Third World, for the purpose of gaining political or military influence in order to establish favorable conditions for the building of socialism and communism.

The model presented depicts the two major concepts, Soviet Military Power (independent variable) and Soviet

Foreign Policy--Adventurism--(dependent variable) with their variables and operational definitions. The method of research utilized is a combination of historical and typology, e.g., the examination of the variable "size" and its effects on the principles stated in the dependent variable during the past decade. This procedure will be utilized until all variables have been examined and factual information presented. The paper will conclude with the author's evaluation of the relationship between the two major variables which will either support or negate the original hypothesis.

CONCEPT

VARIABLES

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION

Size — Numerical strength in personnel
equipment
weapon systems
manpower pool (reserves)

Soviet
Military
Power
(independent)

Composition and
Capabilities

Organization of the—
Strategic Nuclear Forces
Ground Forces
Air Forces
Air Defense Forces
Naval Forces

Quantities of nuclear weapons
Types of nuclear systems
Quantities of conventional weapons
Types of conventional weapons
Military production base
Extent of preinduction training

Disposition — Location of forces within
USSR
Third World
Warsaw Pact

CONCEPT

VARIABLE

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION

Ideological and nationalistic objectives

Use of military power to support national liberation struggles through:

1. advisors
2. arms sales
3. Soviet troops
4. proxy forces

Soviet Foreign Policy (Dependent)

--- -- Adventurism

Soviet military activities in the Third World 1970-1980

INTRODUCTION

As self-designated leader of the communist world and as a superpower with global ambitions, the U.S.S.R. and its expansionist efforts abroad are targeted at spreading and solidifying U.S.S.R. political, economic and military influence and drawing nations into its orbit. 'The Soviets view the projection of power in much more comprehensive terms than commonly understood in the West.' 'Their programs seek to integrate all instruments at their disposal in pursuit of their goals.' 'In the past decade, Moscow's increasing boldness can be linked directly to the growing capabilities and utility of its military forces, applied in a pragmatic, coordinated and flexible manner with other military, political, economic and subversive measures to influence world events.' The U.S.S.R.'s enhanced confidence in its capabilities to project power through a variety of military and non-military means has widened Soviet options and has been a key factor underlying its increased activities in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America. 'In the military realm alone, involvement abroad has progressed steadily from the limited use of military assistance in the 1950's, to the occasional use of its armed forces in defensive roles in the early 1970's, to the extensive use of proxies in advisory positions and combat operations over the last five years, to

the direct application of large scale Soviet military force in Afghanistan since December 1979.'

'To comprehend the threat to Western strategic interests posed by the growth and power projection of the Soviet Armed Forces, it is useful to consider in detail the composition, size, capabilities and disposition of these forces, their ideological underpinning and their steady acquisition of new, increasingly capable conventional, theater nuclear and strategic nuclear weapons systems.'

Chapter 1 begins with a brief account of the history of the Soviet Red Army since 1917, with particular emphasis placed upon the recent expansion of the numbers of men, material and equipment during the period 1968-1980. The chapter concludes by highlighting certain areas where the Soviet's Armed Forces have expanded in size by tremendous proportions as compared to their pre-1969 status. Those mentioned are the Ground Forces, the Soviet Navy and the Soviet Strategic Forces.

Chapter 2 discusses the composition and capabilities of the Soviet Armed Forces. The main topic of discussion contained in this chapter is the composition and capabilities of four of the five major branches of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Air Defense Forces were eliminated from analysis due to their almost completely defensive mission and lack of relevance toward the development of the hypothesis. The major point developed, is that 'the Soviets have a

military might which is now capable of interdiction anywhere in the world with air, ground and naval forces.'

Chapter 3 is concerned with the illustration of the world wide power distribution that the Soviet Armed Forces now possess. 'Outside of the Eurasian land mass the Soviets have developed naval port facilities in seven Third World countries, and are continuing, and have troop/advisor/military technicians placed in at least seventeen countries.' 'With a combination of their size, composition and capabilities, the Soviet Union now has strategically placed armed forces capable of conducting combat operations in more than one major offensive.'

Chapter 4 briefly examines the relationship between Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology and nationalistic goals. In addition, a brief account of the development and utilization of Soviet military doctrine contributes to the understanding of how the leadership utilizes their military power to support ideology and national goals. This chapter concludes with an examination of the use of Soviet proxy forces and the utilization of arms sales as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy.

In Chapter 5, a summary of recent Soviet activities conducted in the Third World is developed. In almost every case, the Soviets have used the influence of their powerful armed forces to assist in gaining influence in Third World countries. This chapter also discusses the reasons for

Soviet adventurism in the Third World and a brief analysis of their successes and failures.

The final chapter is titled "Conclusions" and presents the findings gathered in the research and development of this thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF TABLES	xiii
Chapter	
1. SIZE OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCES	1
2. SOVIET MILITARY COMPOSITION AND CAPABILITIES	13
3. SOVIET MILITARY POWER DISTRIBUTION	40
4. IDEOLOGY AND DOCTRINE: THE SOVIET APPROACH	48
5. SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD: A DECADE OF ADVENTURISM	67
6. CONCLUSIONS	76
BIBLIOGRAPHY	87
APPENDICES	93
A. SOVIET NAVY ORDER OF BATTLE (December 1980)	94
B. AREA OF NIZHNIY TAGIL TANK PLANT (Superimposed on Washington, D. C.)	96
C. SOVIET MILITARY FORCES	97
D. SOVIET TROOPS ELSEWHERE	98

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. A 12 YEAR FORCE COMPARISON (1968-1980) U. S. vs U.S.S.R. MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS	6
2. SOVIET MIRVed ICBMs (Nuclear)	19
3. NUCLEAR BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES AND MISSILES	22
4. LONG RANGE STRIKE AND SUPPORT AIRCRAFT	24
5. FRONTAL AVIATION GROUND ATTACK AIRCRAFT	28
6. SOVIET MILITARY HARDWARE PRODUCTION 1976-1980	36
7. SOVIET MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ADVISORS (Major Significant Locations)	43

Chapter 1

SIZE OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCES

The aims of Soviet military policy have evolved since 1917 from preservation of the Soviet state and defense against external threat to expansion of the Soviet empire and promotion of global objectives.¹ The basic aim is still to defend the homeland of the Soviet Union, a dominant theme that Soviet leaders espoused during the 1917-1945 period. The annexations of Warsaw Pact nations, and Soviet expansion after World War II, provided the military with the additional task of defending the entire Communist camp. As a result of direct assistance rendered by the Red Army, the People's Republic of China and North Korea consolidated their power in the Far East. The Soviets deployed military units in occupied Germany and Austria, and then reached bilateral agreements in Poland, Hungary, and Romania. Through these efforts the Soviet military was capable of providing security to the Soviet Union and help the emerging communist regimes in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria to take power and initiate a

¹Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since WW II Imperial and Global (Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1981), p. 166.

gradual social transformation. This combination of moves helped to fulfill the basic goals of Soviet foreign policy at the conclusion of the second World War: the capitalist encirclement of the USSR and its isolation were broken, a belt of socialist states along Soviet borders was created, and the Soviet Union quickly acquired the position of a world leader.²

' At the end of the second World War the Soviet military was rapidly demobilized from 11 million men to around 3 million by 1948. Estimates of the numbers killed have ranged anywhere between 20-30 million Soviet soldiers and citizens during the war. Postwar Russia was truly a devastated country.'

' Joseph Stalin, then leader of the Kremlin, realized that in the postwar situation the only nation with the potential to harm the Soviet Union or to inhibit its activities was the United States. Through Stalin's personal guidance, the Soviets maintained the military doctrine that Russia's supply of manpower in large quantities would continue to be the primary source of military power. Stalin never accepted the nuclear weapon as a decisive instrument of war, and it was not until after his death that his successors, now in possession of nuclear technology, articulated

²Ibid., p. 167.

a military doctrine which recognized the destructive potential of nuclear weapons.³

Khrushchev became convinced that nuclear war would be decisive and devastating. General warfare was irrational because any conflict would inevitably escalate into general nuclear war. It was the opinion of the Soviet leader that large ground forces were unnecessary.⁴

With the ouster of Khrushchev, military authorities convinced the new political leadership that the Soviet Union was at a serious disadvantage in its efforts to support "wars of national liberation," ambitions with respect to third world powers or any other interests in areas not immediately adjacent to the Soviet Union. With this realization, the Soviet leadership developed a new doctrine that synthesized the large military forces under Stalin with the highly mobile, nuclear technology created under Khrushchev. A period of rapid research and development and modernization with a more flexible doctrinal view followed. By 1969, the military establishment was authorized to build up its forces in all arms. Strength levels of personnel were brought back to those of pre-Khrushchev times and naval rocket forces were rapidly expanded.⁵

³Captain Robert W. Caspers, Briefing Officer on Soviet Military, (Fort Benning, Georgia, 1979).

⁴Ibid.

⁵U. S. Department of State, Area Handbook for the Soviet Union, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 578-580.

' In 1969, there were about 3.2 million men in the Soviet military services. The Army consisted of about 2 million, organized into 140 divisions. The navy with approximately 500,000 men, 130 first line ships, 2,200 small vessels, nearly 400 submarines and a newly formed marine infantry group, emerged as the world's second largest behind the United States. The airforce had approximately 300,000 men and just over 10,000 aircraft. The newly formed Strategic Rocket Force had about 250,000 men and missiles deployed at about 750 medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile launchers and about 1,000 intercontinental ballistic missile launchers.⁶ 'There are several opinions as to the reason for the apparent change in Soviet policy during the later 1960's and early 1970's that accounted for the buildup of the armed forces and in particular the Strategic Rocket Forces.' Some historians have argued that the origins of the cold war and subsequent buildup of the military began on 2 July 1947 when Molotov broke off negotiations in Paris, announcing that the Soviet Union would not take part in the Marshall Plan for European Recovery Program.⁷ Others contend that the major emphasis in the arms buildup did not

⁶Ibid., p. 569.

⁷Robin Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1962-1973: The Paradox of Super Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 1.

occur until after the United States successfully subdued the Soviet efforts to establish the nuclear missile arsenal in Cuba in 1962.⁸ It should be noted that this is a very short summary that accounts for only two periods in history where the Soviets may have had the impetus to start an arms build-up. By no means have all possibilities for a start date been exhausted.

The establishment of an actual date or general time period for the commencement of major Soviet plans to build and strengthen its military forces is not of great concern. That question seems ex post facto in light of the current numbers and capabilities of Soviet military forces.

The period 1968-1980 will be utilized and examined because of the relevance to the topic under investigation and because it represents a period of time when the largest increases in Soviet military capabilities have occurred within a single decade.

Table 1 illustrates the development and changes in major Soviet forces over a twelve year period. The United States is only shown for comparison because of its position as a recognized military power in the international context during the same period of time.

The statistics contained in Table 1 are supportive of the inclination of the USSR to maintain a steady growth

⁸Ibid., p. 1.

TABLE 1
 A 12 YEAR FORCE COMPARISON (1968-1980)
 US vs USSR MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS

	SOVIET		US	
	1968	1980	1968	1980
Personnel	3,220,000	3,658,000	3,500,000	2,050,000
Army Divisions	140	173	18+	16+
Marines	8,000	12,000	302,000	189,000
Tactical Fighter Aircraft	4,000	5,000	2,800	1,870
Interceptors	3,700	2,600	588	327
Strategic Aircraft	155	156	520	381
Major Surface Ships	130	289	337	173
Patrol Torpedo Boats	400	460	0	3
Attack Carriers	1	4	15	13
Attack Submarines	187	189	113	79
Missile Submarines	43	87	41	41
SLBM's	545	1,003	656	656
ICBM's	1,000	1,400	1,054	1,054
Tanks	30,000	50,000	8,000	10,900
Tube Artillery	15,000	20,000	4,800	6,500
Tactical Nuclear Missiles	800	1,300	456	108

Source: "Special Report--The Status of Freedom A Year-End Assessment 1980" Association of the United States Army, 1980, p. 4.

in the development of military weapons. However, there are some important areas that should be expanded.

Ground Forces

The ground forces dominate the Soviet defense establishment. From 1968 to 1980 Soviet ground forces rose from 140 divisions to 173, an increase of 23.5 per cent, and were extensively redeployed. The largest increase took place in the Far East, where approximately thirty divisions of Category 1 troops are currently deployed.⁹ In the western Soviet Union where the immediate strategic reserve for war in Europe is located, the number of divisions is approximately eighty, the majority at Category 3 level.¹⁰

The ground forces, with a strength of 1,825,000, constitute the largest of the five major components of the Soviet Armed Forces. As noted before, historically both Imperial Russia and Soviet armies have been characterized by great numbers. Today, the ground forces are highly modernized and well equipped, possessing great firepower and mobility. Manpower and material combine to make the present Soviet ground forces the most powerful land army in the world.¹⁰

⁹Soviet ground forces are described by categories: Category 1, Combat ready, 75-100% authorized wartime strength. Category 2, Reduced strength, 50-75% authorized wartime strength. Category 3, Cadre strength below 50% authorized wartime strength.

¹⁰U. S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 27.

The Soviet Navy

Over the last two decades the Soviet Navy has been transformed from a basically coastal defense force into an ocean-going force designed to extend the military capability of the USSR well out to sea and to perform the functions of tactical, theater and strategic naval power in waters distant from the Soviet Union. The Soviets have a larger array of general purpose submarines, surface warships and combat naval aircraft than any other nation.¹

The submarines, about 70 of which carry antiship cruise missiles, constitute the most serious threat to US and allied naval forces and the world wide sea lines of communication. In 1968 the Soviets had 155 major surface ships. In 1980 they had increased this force to 289 which represents a 122.3% increase. It should also be noted that the increase of 44 missile submarines during the same period represents a 102.3% increase.¹¹

Soviet Strategic Forces

The last major area of concern indicated in Table 1 is that of nuclear weapon systems. Since the mid 1970's, the Soviet Union has completely upgraded its strategic Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force with the introduction of the SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19, equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV)

¹¹Ibid., p. 53.

missiles with improved reliability, range, payload accuracy and survivability.'

Under Brezhnev, the Soviet missile forces have moved from a position of clear inferiority in the early-to-middle 1960's to one in which they are generally recognized as equal or superior in certain measures to those of the West.¹²

In 1964, the Soviets had only a few operational SLBM's, many of which had to be launched from surface submarines. While the USSR had more ICBM's than SLBM's, the number was significantly fewer than US ICBM's. Moreover, the majority of Soviet ICBM's were inaccurate systems housed in launchers that were clustered together and unhardened, making them vulnerable to attack. The USSR then embarked on high-priority development programs first focused on increasing single-silo ICBM deployment to a level greater than that of the United States. A similar buildup of SLBM launchers on modern, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) was underway by the late 1960's. These massive 1960's ICBM and SLBM deployment programs, largely centered on the SS-9 and SS-11 ICBM's and the SS-N-6/YANKEE SLBM/SSBN weapon systems, provided the foundation from which subsequent strategic nuclear modernization programs were to grow.¹³

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid., p. 54.

The Soviet military forces have grown at a tremendous rate over the past decade and there are no signs of abatement. Listed below is a distillation of briefings provided to the NATO Ministers of Defense in May 1981:

1. The Soviet Ground Forces have grown to more than 180 divisions--motorized rifle divisions, tanks divisions and airborne divisions--stationed in Eastern Europe, in the USSR, in Mongolia, and in combat in Afghanistan. Soviet Ground Forces have achieved the capacity for extended intensive combat in the Central Region of Europe.

2. The Soviets have fielded 59,000 tanks and 20,000 artillery pieces. Soviet divisions are being equipped with the newer, faster, better armored T-64 and T-72 tanks. Some artillery units, organic to each division, include new, heavy mobile artillery, multiple rocket launchers and self-propelled, armored 122-mm and 152-mm guns.

3. More than 5,200 helicopters are available to the Soviet Armed Forces, including increasing numbers of Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopter gunships used in direct support of ground forces on the battlefield.

4. More than 3,500 Soviet and Warsaw Pact tactical bombers and fighter aircraft are located in Eastern Europe alone. In each of the last eight years, the Soviets have produced more than 1,000 fighter aircraft.

5. Against Western Europe, China and Japan, the Soviets are adding constantly to deliverable nuclear

warheads, with the number of launchers growing, with some 250 mobile, SS-20 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile launchers in the field, and with three nuclear warheads on each SS-20 missile.

6. The Soviets continue to give high priority to the modernization of their Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force and their Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) force stressing increased accuracy and greater warhead throwweight. The Soviet intercontinental strategic arsenal includes 7,000 nuclear warheads, with 1,398 ICMB launchers, 950 SLBM launchers and 156 long-range bombers. This does not include some 150 nuclear-capable BACKFIRE bombers.

7. The Soviets have eight classes of submarines and eight classes of major surface warships, including nuclear-powered cruisers and new aircraft carriers, presently under construction. This growing naval force emerging from large, modern shipyards is designed to support sustained operations in remote areas in order to project Soviet power around the world.

8. The Soviet Air Defense Forces man 10,000 surface-to-air missile launchers at 1,000 fixed missile sites across the Soviet Union.

9. The growth of the Soviet Armed Forces is made possible by the USSR's military production base which continues to grow at the expense of all other components of the Soviet economy. There are 135 major military

industrial plants now operating in the Soviet Union with over 40 million square meters in floor space, a 34 per cent increase since 1970. In 1980, these plants produced more than 150 different types of weapons systems for Soviet forces and for export to client states and developing countries.

There is nothing hypothetical about the Soviet military machine. Its expansion, modernization, and contribution to projection of power beyond Soviet boundaries are obvious.

In summary the NATO ministers concluded,

The more constructive East-West relationship which the Allies seek requires tangible signs that the Soviet Union is prepared to abandon the disturbing buildup of its military strength, to desist from resorting to force and intimidation and to cease creating or exploiting situations of crisis and instability in the Third World.¹⁴

¹⁴Ibid., p. 1.

Chapter 2

SOVIET MILITARY COMPOSITION AND CAPABILITIES

Immediate control of Soviet land, sea and air forces is exercised by the Minister of Defense. Within the Soviet Government, the Minister of Defense is a member of the Council of Ministers, appointed by and technically answerable to the Supreme Soviet or to its Presidium.¹ In practice he is responsible to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and its Politburo. The current Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, is a member of the Politburo, as was his predecessor.² The Defense Council, a subset of the Politburo chaired by the General Secretary of the CPSU, in effect functions as the controlling authority. In 1976, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev was awarded the highest military rank, that of Marshal of the Soviet Union,² possibly indicating that ultimate operational--as well as policymaking--control of the Soviet Union's Armed Forces was being vested in the Defense Council.

¹Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 383.

²Ibid., p. 384.

The key point to understand about the Soviet military control is that the reins of the instruments of state policy and power--not just the purely military--are in the hands of a tested political leadership supported by very experienced and long established staffs. President L. I. Brezhnev and his key colleagues have been at the center of power for decades. Ustinov has guided the Soviet armaments industry since the early 1940's and has proven to be an able and decisive leader. These men, aided by such others as KGB Chief Yu. V. Andropov, Premier N. A. Tikhonov, Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko, the ageless ideologue M. A. Suslov, (since deceased), Chief of General Staff N. V. Ogarkov, Warsaw Pact Commander V. G. Kulikov and lesser but equally experienced subchiefs of the military industry, know how the Soviet military machine runs and what they want to achieve. They are able to marshal all available Soviet resources toward their strategic objective. They exercise absolute control of all instruments of Soviet power.³

It should be noted that the analysis of the "reins of the instruments of state policy and power" is accepted by some political analysts and still questioned by others such as Jerry Hough who contends that the Ministry of Defense does not possess a monopoly over actual or potential influence over state policy. It is simply one department that must

³Seweryn Bialer, The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 131-132.

operate within a complex system of government in conjunction with many other governmental agencies.

A description of high level commands cannot omit the political organization which parallels, and is a part of the military establishment. According to Jerry Hough in his book How the Soviet Union is Governed:

The most distinctive feature of the Soviet armed forces is the Main Political Administration, which has subunits within each of the five services and in military units down to the company level and which simultaneously functions as a department of the party Central Committee.⁴

Besides the responsibility for political indoctrination, Party activities within military units, political controls and a myriad of other functions, the Main Political Administration (MPA) also supervises many day-to-day activities including propaganda work, publication of books and journals, trade union activities and sports programs. The major point here is that unlike any other military establishment in the world, the Soviets have ensured through the close observations of the MPA, that continued loyalty to the Communist Party is an inherent obligation of all citizens, especially the military.

In the organizational structure of the Soviet chain-of-command, there is only one man who acts as the First Deputy Minister of Defense, and his official title is the Chief of the General Staff (of the armed forces). Below the

⁴Hough, p. 392.

Chief are the commanders-in-chief of the five major components of the Soviet Military Forces. They are, the Commanders-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, the Naval Forces, the Air Forces, the Strategic Rocket Forces, and the Air Defense Forces."

"In order to appreciate fully the capabilities of the total Soviet Armed Forces, individual examination of the five major services is necessary." Discussion of the Air Defense Forces will be omitted because it has no relevance to the composition of military capabilities that may be projected outside of the Soviet borders.

"Until the early 1970's the Soviet Union lacked the military capability to project military power in a decisive role outside of the Eurasian land mass, a shortcoming that hampered the conduct of a forward policy in the Third World.⁵ This is no longer a factor today." The Soviets have developed long range air transport capability, constructed a blue-water fleet and a large, versatile merchant marine. The Kremlin has also ensured that there is a readily available large stockpile of surplus weapons and equipment that have in the past provided the military clout when needed for interventions in Africa, the Middle East, and Vietnam.⁶

⁵Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since WW II Imperial and Global (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1981), p. 176.

⁶The availability and shipment to countries engaged in armed conflict such as Angola, Egypt, and North Vietnam, are clear examples of this point.

Only a few people in the Soviet Politburo know or at least can claim with any confidence what the real motives are behind the continued Soviet military buildup.⁶ Is there a "grand design"? If so, what constitutes the grand design and what direction is the USSR taking in international affairs with their mighty military machine? Unmistakenly these are questions that have puzzled world political leaders and policy makers for generations. One thing, however, remains factual whether there is a "grand design" or not, and that is the current capabilities of the USSR constitute the largest mass of military might assembled anywhere on earth.⁷

Examination of the four branches of the armed forces begins with the one that has the longest reaching and most destructive capability, the Strategic Nuclear Forces.

The primary emphasis on growth of Soviet strategic weapons has continued in recent years.⁸ We have witnessed the steady growth of Soviet nuclear advantage in almost all areas. Soviet efforts over the last two decades to improve and enlarge their strategic forces have brought them from a position of clear inferiority to one of at least overall parity.⁷

There are three major components of the Soviet strategic forces, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

⁷Maj. General Edmund R. Thompson, "Intelligence Chief Assesses World Threats of the '80's." Army, October 1981, p. 241.

(ICBMs), Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and bombers. A closer look at each of these major weapon systems will clarify the capabilities of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces.

ICBMs

The Soviet ICBM force currently consists of over 580 SS-11s, 60 SS-13s, 150 SS-17s, 308 SS-18s, and about 300 SS-19s.¹ The greater majority of the 17s, 18s, and 19s are equipped with MIRVs.⁸ Table 2 shows the Soviet Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRVed) ICBM force.⁹

The SS-17 first became operational in 1975 and is now deployed at over 150 reconverted silos that were used in the past for the outmoded SS-11s. The SS-17 has both single and multiple reentry vehicle capability,¹⁰ but the majority of the missiles currently deployed are of the multiple type. Because of the cold launch technique, that is, the main ignition is delayed until the missile leaves the silo, minimum damage is done to the silo and facilitates a quick reload capability.

⁸U. S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1982, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 45.

⁹A MIRV is a missile payload comprising two or more warheads that can engage separate targets.

¹⁰Single reentry is one missile with one warhead aimed at one target. Multiple reentry is one missile with several warheads all aimed at the same target.

TABLE 2

SOVIET MIRVed ICBMs (NUCLEAR)

Missile	SS-17		SS-18			SS-19	
Number De- ployed	About 150		Over 300			About 300	
MOD No.	1	2	1	2	3	1	2
Warheads	4	1	1	8/10	1	6	1
Maximum Range (km)	10,000	11,000	12,000	11,000	16,000	9,600	10,000
Launch Mode	Cold	Cold	Cold	Cold	Cold	Hot	Hot
Fuel	Liquid	Liquid	Liquid	Liquid	Liquid	Liquid	Liquid

Source: U. S. Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1982, p. 45.

The SS-18 which is the largest of the Soviet ICBMs also has single and multiple reentry capability and utilizes the cold launch technique. This missile has a greater range capacity than the SS-17 or the SS-9, which it replaced. The SS-18 has a more improved degree of accuracy built into its guidance system than the SS-17, and contains a high probability of destroying any known fixed target.

The SS-19 is similar in payload capacity to the SS-17 and SS-18, but has a shorter maximum effective range. As noted in Table 2, the MIRVed version of the SS-19 is believed capable of delivering six RVs to a range of about 9,000 kilometers.¹¹

SLBMs

The Soviet ballistic missile submarine force currently consists of SS-N-6 missiles on YANKEE class submarines, SS-N-6s on a GOLF class submarine, SS-N-8s on DELTA I and II class SSBNs, SS-N-8s on GOLF and HOTEL classes, and MIRVed SS-N-18s on the DELTA III class.¹²

The Soviets have continued to develop and expand their SLBM force which now consists of over 62 submarines carrying a total of 2,000 possible nuclear warhead reentry vehicles. In the past seven years, the USSR has produced 30

¹¹U. S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, p. 56.

¹²U. S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1982, p. 46.

Ballistic Missile Submarines, Nuclear-Powered (SSBNs), and the new 20 tube, very large TYPHOON SSBN which was launched in 1980. The SS-N-8 and the new SS-N-18 permit the Soviets to attack the United States from their home ports. Table 3 illustrates the current composition and capabilities of the Soviet Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Force.

Long Range Aviation


In the past ten years the capabilities of Soviet Frontal Aviation have increased fourfold in payload and two and one-half times in range.¹³ Soviet priority for air defense from its Frontal Aviation has changed radically in recent years to the concept of air attack in all forms. That is, no longer does the Frontal Aviation have a purely defensive mission, but they have a wide range of missions also offensive in nature.

Soviet Long Range Aviation (LRA) consists of three air components, two deployed in European USSR and one in the Soviet Far East. The two components deployed in western Russia constitute approximately 75 percent of the Long Range Aviation strength. The Soviet LRA operational force of long range bombers consists of 49 BISON bombers (being phased out) and 100 BEAR bombers and Anti-Submarine (ASM) carriers,

¹³Phillip A. Peterson, Soviet Air Power and the Pursuit of New Military Options (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 17.

TABLE 3

NUCLEAR BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES AND MISSILES



Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1981, p. 58.

plus Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) aircraft. In addition, the Soviet LRA force of bombers includes about 70 BACKFIRES, about 320 BADGERS and about 140 BLINDERS.¹⁴

The primary mission of the LRA is to perform inter-continental and peripheral nuclear or conventional strike operations. In addition, the aircraft performs long range reconnaissance, anti-naval strikes, and electronic warfare missions.¹⁵ The LRA provides the Soviet military planners a great deal of flexibility and diversity in their strategic attack forces not available with ballistic missiles. Table 4 lists the major aircraft currently deployed in the Soviet LRA force and their capabilities.

The discussion so far has centered around the Soviet military forces that are capable of immediate action outside the confines of the Soviet borders or that of their allies. These forces are lumped together under the title of Soviet Strategic Forces.

There is, however, another area of concern for development of the total picture of Soviet military capabilities which is the Soviet Theater Forces. The Theater

¹⁴U. S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1982, p. 46.

¹⁵Electronic warfare missions would entail jamming, monitoring, or using voice deception in order to disrupt radio communications. It is highly effective using aircraft because of their extended range of capability.

TABLE 4

LONG RANGE STRIKE AND SUPPORT AIRCRAFT

	Tu-96 BEAR	M-TYPE BISON	BACKFIRE B	Tu-16 BADGER	Tu-22 BLINDER
METERS					
48					
36					
24					
12					
0					
UNREFUELED COMBAT RADIUS (KM)	8,300	5,500	5,500	2,900	3,100
MAX SPEED (KTS)	800	540	1,100	500	800

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1981, p. 60.

Forces are comprised of six major components, Long Range Missile and Air Forces, Ground Forces, Frontal Aviation, Military Transport Aviation, Special Purpose Forces and the Navy. Investigation of each of these major combatants will illustrate that they are extremely sophisticated in composition, highly mobile and very lethal.¹⁶

Long Range Theater Missiles

In a report prepared for the Office of Director of Defense, Research and Engineering and Defense Nuclear Agency in 1975, several major conclusions were drawn concerning the Soviet theater nuclear weapons. Among the conclusions stated, the Soviet's theater nuclear weapons will be used as a fundamental part of their warfighting capability, as opposed to use only as a deterrent adjunct to conventional force. Also, an in-depth, massive, surprise, nuclear strike, in conjunction with an immediate, high-speed air and ground exploitation, is still the dominant Soviet concept for war against NATO.¹⁷

Although the findings of this investigation were concluded over seven years ago, the basic principles implied are still applicable today. The only major difference today is in the type of missile systems currently deployed.

¹⁶U. S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1981) p. 25.

¹⁷Joseph D. Douglass, The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 4.

In the late 1960's, the Soviet's primary theater nuclear weapon systems were the SS-4 and SS-5. Both of these systems had single warheads and the maximum range was 4,100 kilometers, and they were based in fixed silos at over 700 locations in and around the Soviet Union. This situation was changed in 1977 with the employment of the new SS-20 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM). The SS-20 is highly mobile and is filled with three very accurate and independently targetable warheads. As of July 1981, some 250 SS-20 launcher/missile sets equipped with a total of 750 nuclear warheads had been deployed. Of these, 175 with 525 warheads are deployed opposite the NATO European countries.¹⁸

Soviet Ground Forces

As previously mentioned, the Soviet ground forces comprise the bulk of the military power. Seventy-one percent of the forces are motorized rifle divisions, twenty-five percent are tank divisions, and four percent are airborne divisions. Notice the absence of any foot soldiers. All of these forces are highly modernized and well equipped, possessing great firepower and mobility.

The major weapon systems of the Soviet Ground Forces are, the 122mm and 152mm self-propelled howitzers, with both conventional and nuclear firing capability, the T-64A and T-72 main battle tanks, and the BMP, personnel

¹⁸U. S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, p. 27.

carrier with 3,000 meter range SAGGER missiles. Augmentation forces to support ground actions consist of the 203 and 240mm FROG, SCUD B and SS-12/SCALEBOARD surface-to-surface nuclear missiles.¹⁹

Frontal Aviation

The Soviet Frontal Aviation Force can be compared to the United States Air Force Tactical Air Command for composition and mission purposes. Currently the Soviets have over 5,000 fixed-wing tactical aircraft and the mission of providing air support to the ground forces. It is organized into tactical air armies located in military districts of the USSR and groups of forces in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.






In wartime, one tactical air army is assigned to each Soviet Army Front.²⁰ Although there is no fixed organization, a typical tactical air army would be composed of divisions of fighters, bombers, fighter-bombers and regiments of assault helicopters and reconnaissance aircraft. Table 5 shows the current aircraft that comprise the Soviet Frontal Aviation Forces.

¹⁹There are numerous other ground force weapon systems that are not mentioned such as anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft guns, amphibious vehicles, mortars, multiple rocket launchers, and anti-aircraft guided missiles.

²⁰The Front is the largest Soviet ground force field command. It is a tactical and administrative unit; its size varies depending on the mission and area of operation.

TABLE 5

FRONTAL AVIATION GROUND ATTACK AIRCRAFT

	Su-24	MIG-23	MIG-27	Su-17	MIG-25	MIG-21
	FENCER A	FLOGGER B/G	FLOGGER D/J	FITTER D/H	FOXBAT B/D	FISHBED L
METERS						
22						
11						
0						
SPEED (KTS)	540	1,350	540	540	1,625	1,206
RADIUS (KM)	1,800	1,300	1,200	700	900	900
ARMAMENT	2,500 KG Bombs	6 AAMs	3,000 KG Bombs	3,000 KG Bombs	-	4 AAMs
WINGSPAN (M)	10.2 (swept)	8.1 (swept)	8.1 (swept)	9.9 (swept)	13.4	7.7

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1981, p. 34.

As illustrated in Table 5, Soviet ground attack fighters can carry payloads of about 4,000 pounds over distances greater than 300 nautical miles. Over shorter ranges, new Soviet ground attack fighters can deliver more than 10,000 pounds of bombs, rockets and guided missiles.²¹

There are over 3,000 helicopters in Frontal Aviation, most of which are high performance ground attack helicopters. The HIP-E is the most heavily armed helicopter in the world. The HIND-E is the most maneuverable, combat effective, best quality attack helicopter found anywhere. Both aircraft are equipped with 57mm rockets, AT-2 SWATTER anti-tank guided missiles, and a 12.7mm nose mounted machine gun.

Rounding out the list of aviation capabilities for the Soviet Frontal Aviation are the transport aircraft. The Soviets have employed over 600 medium and long range cargo transports capable of flight ranges over 5,300 kilometers. The primary purpose of these aircraft is to airlift the Soviet Airborne troops and air assault brigades. They also have secondary missions to operate an air logistics system to supply other deployed Soviet and allied armed forces and to support other Soviet political and economic interests.²²

²¹Lieutenant Colonel Richard S. Kosevich, "Soviet Military Capabilities and Power Projection," (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combined Arms Developments Activity, 1981), p. 3.

²²Peterson, p. 17.

Soviet Special Purpose Forces

The Soviet Special Forces consist of a variety of military and para-military personnel who conduct unconventional warfare operations including partisan warfare, subversion and sabotage, conducted during periods of peace and war.

Historically, the Soviets have used unconventional forces many times. One needs only to recall the Bolsheviks' partisan guerrilla units that operated against the Czarists and other opponents during the Russian Civil War of 1917 to 1920, not to mention special Soviet partisan forces used against the Germans in World War II, the Czechoslovakians in 1968 and most recently in Afghanistan, that played a major role in the elimination of President Amin.

The Soviet Navy

In the words of T. B. Hayward, Admiral, U. S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations:

During the past decade, the Soviet Navy has expanded its forces significantly. It acts as a potent instrument of Soviet foreign policy in peacetime and has developed the capability to conduct coordinated operations on all of the world's oceans.²³

"At the end of World War II the Soviet Navy had a mission and capability which had remained unchanged since the time of Peter the Great. This mission was the defense

²³U. S. Department of the Navy, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), p. iii.

of USSR coastal waters. Soviet global operations and crises of the late 1950's and early sixties such as in Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, and the Cuban missile crises, demonstrated the need for a broadly-based, general purpose Navy. During the past two decades the USSR has systematically developed at enormous cost, a modern blue-water Navy capable of projecting military, political and economic influence throughout the world.²⁴ They have access to many ports in the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. Soviet Naval units regularly operate in Caribbean waters from bases in Cuba.

The Northern Fleet, based at Murmansk and Pechenga, is the most powerful of the four Soviet Fleets and poses the greatest threat to activities in the Atlantic Ocean. It is well armed with modern surface combatants, submarines, aircraft, and ballistic missiles which can strike the North American Continent and interdict North Atlantic sea lanes.

The Pacific Ocean Fleet, which includes the Indian Ocean squadron, is a smaller mirror image of the Northern Fleet. It is based primarily in two complexes at Vladivostok and at Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula.

The Baltic and the Black Sea Fleets are tailored for support of ground operations and seizure of critical

²⁴Kenneth R. McGruther, The Evolving Soviet Navy (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 1978), pp. 1-2.

water passages such as the Danish Straits, the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.²⁵

Overall the Soviet Navy has nearly four times the total number of active vessels than does the U. S. Navy. Appendix A is the most current Soviet Naval Order of Battle.

Soviet Naval Aircraft (separate from the Air Force), an adjunct of the Soviet Navy, increase the capabilities of the surface ships through long range reconnaissance, and ocean surveillance.

The prime strike force of Soviet Naval Aviation consists of over 300 twin-jet BADGER and BLINDER aircraft which are fitted to carry one or two of several types of anti-ship cruise missiles with "standoff"²⁶ ranges varying from 90 to over 300 kilometers. In addition there are over 390 strike/bombers, 70 fighter/fighter bombers, 180 reconnaissance/electronic warfare aircraft, 400 anti-submarine aircraft, 70 fuel tankers, and 330 transport training aircraft.'

The newest addition to the Soviet Naval capabilities, deployed in the Indian Ocean in April 1980 is the IVAN ROGOV,²⁷ an amphibious assault ship designed to carry both helicopters and high-speed air-cushioned landing craft. The ROGOV can

²⁵U. S. Department of the Navy, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, pp. 15-20.

²⁶"Standoff" means that the vessel has the capability of conducting long range ship-to-ship warfare without the threat of direct fire weapons being used against it. This is made possible through radar and missiles.

embark about 550 naval infantry troops and significantly enhance Soviet amphibious warfare projection to distant areas, especially the Third World.²⁷

In summary, we see that the Soviet Navy of today incorporates a strategic strike and defense capability to support sea denial operations, and can project power to distant areas for military or political purposes.

Our focus so far has centered on the size and capabilities of the military personnel and weapon systems that comprise the massive military war machine created by the USSR. The production of such massive amounts of military equipment, obviously requires tremendous economic support and the allocation of human resources to operate the production facilities. A brief examination of the Soviet military production base is necessary in order to understand the momentum that has been generated over the past decade or two for the purpose of creating such a large reservoir of hardware.

In the annual report from the Department of Defense to the President and Congress of the United States, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown reported in January 1981 that three critical conclusions emerge concerning Soviet expenditures for military capabilities:

Soviet expenditures for defense are larger than ours; they have increased steadily over time; and they absorb a larger share of total national resources than

²⁷Ibid., p. 118.

do ours. The comparative estimates show that the Soviet Union spent about 50 percent more than the United States in 1980 using estimated dollar costs. Even using the inherently much more conservative estimated ruble costs, the Soviets outspent us by 30 percent in 1979. Two defense spending trends are especially significant; the investment effort (research and development, procurement, and military construction) and the pattern of increase Cumulative Soviet investment from 1968 through 1979 has been about \$270 billion more than ours.

The important point is that the effect of today's investment balance will be seen in the military balance in future years.²⁸

Since World War II, the Soviets have devoted a large portion of their Gross National Product to the fielding of their armed forces. Today, an estimated 14 to 15 percent of the Soviet GNP is earmarked for military spending.²⁹ The Soviet military industrial base is by far the world's largest in number of facilities and physical size. The commitment of huge financial and human resources is a dynamic aspect of the USSR's military production capabilities but more important is the cyclical production. Production plants remain in operation at all times, and while the old weapon systems are being phased out, new ones are rolling off the assembly lines.

The military production facilities in the USSR consist of over 135 major final assembly plants supported by

²⁸U. S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1982, pp. 15-16.

²⁹"Force Modernization, the Army's Greatest Need," Association of the United States Army, 1981, p. 7.

3,500 individual factories and related installations located throughout the USSR.³⁰ In order to formulate an idea as to the complexity of this system of military production, Appendix B illustrates the Nizhniy Tagil Tank Plant superimposed on Washington, D. C. It is noteworthy to point out that the Nizhniy Tagil Tank Plant is the largest of three such facilities located within the USSR, and that all of the United States tank producing facilities easily fit within the Soviet one.

An examination of Table 6 will point out the capabilities of a high sustained rate of production over a five year period.

Having examined the capabilities of Soviet military power in terms of quantity, quality and the industrial production base that supports these efforts, a question arises about the utilization of this equipment. What about the human factor, the Soviet soldier, sailor and airman that have the responsibility of operating these weapon systems? Does the mandatory pre-induction training influence or enhance the overall capabilities of the Soviet military?

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union dominates all aspects of life within that country and the military is no exception. Its pervasive influence within the armed forces extends from the Ministry of Defense down to the

³⁰U. S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, p. 10.

TABLE 6

SOVIET MILITARY HARDWARE PRODUCTION
1976 - 1980

System	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Aircraft					
Bombers	25	30	30	30	30
Fighters- Bombers	1,200	1,200	1,300	1,300	1,300
Transports	450	400	400	400	300
Trainers	50	50	50	25	225
Helicopters	1,400	900	600	700	750
Anti-Submarine	5	10	10	10	10
Missiles					
ICBMs	300	300	200	200	200
IRBMs	50	100	100	100	100
SRBMs	100	200	250	300	300
SLCMs	600	600	600	700	700
SLBMs	150	175	225	175	175
ASMs	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500
SAMs	40,000	50,000	50,000	50,000	50,000
Naval Ships					
Submarines	10	13	12	12	11
Major Combatants	12	12	12	11	11
Minor Combatants	58	56	52	48	52
Auxiliaries	4	6	4	7	5
Ground Forces					
Tanks	2,500	2,500	2,500	3,000	3,000
Armored Vehicles	4,500	4,500	5,500	5,500	5,500
Self-Propelled Artillery	900	950	650	250	150

Source: U. S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1981, p. 12.

lowest service member. The Minister of Defense and eleven of his thirteen Deputies are full members of the Communist Party Central Committee. So are the Chief of the Main Political Administration and commanders of selected Military Districts. Most of those men and more also sit with the Supreme Soviet. Intermarriage between Military Service and the civil power structure continues at almost every level, in both party and government.³¹

For several decades, the Soviet Government has proclaimed that its goal is to produce an individual who is qualitatively different from his non-communist counterpart. While growing up, the Soviet young man becomes a product of the Soviet system. As a youth he was a member of the Little Oktoberists, Young Pioneers and by the age of seventeen he is probably a member of the Komsomol.³² His educational level at seventeen is equivalent of a U. S. high school graduate, and military service is his next step in fulfilling his obligations to his country.³³

³¹U. S. Department of State, Area Handbook for the Soviet Union, p. 589.

³²Military membership in the Communist Youth League in 1980 was estimated at over 28 million. See John M. Collins' account in U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 1960-1980 Concept and Capabilities, p. 80.

³³U. S. Department of the Army, Understanding Soviet Military Developments, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 35.

In 1967, the Military Service Law, established a two year draft for all Soviet young men. The law also provided for a program of preinduction training which consists of 140 hours ranging from specialist to civil defense training. The emphasis of the premilitary training has always been technical. It includes indoctrination into service life, regulations and the oath of allegiance, small arms firing, individual combat techniques, and specialized training in a military technical specialty. This could consist of instruction as a motor vehicle driver or operator of a piece of radar equipment or any other of a number of special skills.

Any statement regarding the impact of premilitary training on the overall effectiveness of the Soviet's military capabilities would be purely speculative without further investigation or elaboration. However, it would appear at least two facts are obvious: first, there is less time wasted teaching the new recruit fundamental skills common to all soldiers etc.; and second, as a result of this time saved, the servicemember can be utilized almost immediately in his "combat" role with a regular unit. This point is significant when one considers that every six months approximately twenty-five percent of the entire conscripted force rotates off active duty.

In this chapter, we have examined the organization and capabilities of the Soviet military forces. It is evident from the facts presented that the USSR's war machine is the largest in the world today. It is also clear that

the Soviet leadership have dedicated a great amount of financial and human resources toward developing and sustaining this great military industrial complex.' By comparison with the United States, the Soviets have achieved and in many cases surpassed the military technology not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively. The Soviets have produced a military might capable of interdiction anywhere in the world with air, ground, and naval forces, and a nuclear superiority capable of worldwide destruction.

Where does this might and power place the Soviets in the international context of world leadership and power? How are the Soviets using or planning to utilize this accumulated wealth of power? In the next chapter, we shall examine the current disposition of these forces and the implications that they present.

Chapter 3

SOVIET MILITARY POWER DISTRIBUTION

Since 1945 the Soviet Union has assembled an impressive display of military forces that, unlike the earlier years of development of the USSR, are deployed in, around and outside the motherland.

Opposing the NATO forces in Europe is the seven-nation Warsaw Pact consisting of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and of course, the USSR. The Soviets have twenty divisions of tank and mechanized infantry combat ready soldiers in East Germany alone. There are three more Soviet divisions in Poland, five in Czechoslovakia, and three in Hungary for a total of thirty-one fully operational combat ready divisions outside the USSR.¹

In addition, the Soviets have 43-45 divisions spread out along the Chinese border and five in Afghanistan.

On the northern KOLA Peninsula where Murmansk is located, there is also the town of Pechanga, the headquarters of the largest combined military arms base in the

¹Gene N. Chomko, "Soviet Threat," Leavenworth Times, 26 August 1980, p. 10.

world. The Soviet Northern Fleet, amphibious forces, submarine forces, air forces and Northern Land Forces are based there.

In addition to the Northern Fleet, the Soviets have a Baltic Fleet, the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, the Black Sea Fleet and the Indian Ocean Fleet which will become more active in the near future.²

The Soviet submarine Fleet consists of both diesel and nuclear powered combatants, a large number of which convey ballistic missiles with multiple nuclear warheads.

The surface vessels consist of KRIVAK destroyers and KARA, cruisers, the most heavily armed surface combatants in any Navy. These vessels sail in waters and make port calls where Soviet vessels were hitherto unseen.

In conjunction with and in support of the Soviet ground and naval forces, the Soviet's airforce make daily reconnaissance flights outside Soviet air space. Bear D bombers fly in pairs daily from the Kola Peninsula westward and then down through the Iceland Faeroes gap, along the eastern coast of Canada and the U. S. and on to Cuba. Others fly to Conakry, Guinea and Luanda, Angola. The important point here is that as little as ten years ago, Soviet aircraft, with the exception of the commercial Aeroflot, were rarely seen outside of the Soviet Union.³

²Ibid., p. 10.

³Ibid., p. 10.

An illustration of the deployment of the Soviet forces (Appendix C) demonstrates the concern that the Soviet leadership has over the military power for immediate support against aggression of any kind in Eastern Europe, and along the Chinese border.

At this point it is not necessary to discuss the composition or capabilities of any of these forces, since this was accomplished in the two previous chapters.

It is important, however, to address the disposition of Soviet forces outside the confines of the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies.

Using a contingency of 200 uniformed military personnel as a base, we can determine that there are at least seventeen countries in the Third World where USSR troops are deployed.⁴

The largest of these concentrations is Afghanistan with 87,000 and the smallest is Tanzania with 300. The major Soviet troop concentrations outside of the Soviet-bloc are listed in Table 7.

When viewed from a strategic perspective, with an awareness of current Soviet military capabilities, a very awesome world wide picture of the Soviet military force concentrations quickly emerges.¹ In addition to the actual troop/advisor/military technicians deployment, the Soviets have also assembled overseas naval facilities in Cuba,

⁴"As Kremlin Flexes Muscles Around World," U. S. News and World Report, 2 November 1981, p. 45.

TABLE 7

SOVIET MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ADVISORS
(Major Significant Locations)
(As of July 1981)

LATIN AMERICA

CUBA	12,000
NICARAGUA	50
PERU	175

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

ANGOLA	700
CONGO	850
ETHIOPIA	2,400
GUINEA	375
MALI	635
MADAGASCAR	370
MOZAMBIQUE	500
TANZANIA	300

MID-EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ALGERIA	8,500
IRAQ	8,000
LIBYA	2,300
NORTH YEMEN	475
SOUTH YEMEN	2,500
SYRIA	4,000

ASIA

AFGHANISTAN	87,000
INDIA	1,550

Source: This table is a combination of information gathered from U. S. News and World Report and Soviet Military Power.

Note: For graphic illustration see Appendix D.

Angola, Syria, North and South Yemen, Ethiopia and Vietnam. And to round out the total picture, Soviet reconnaissance aircraft can now stop at facilities in Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia, North and South Yemen, and Vietnam.⁵

The Soviet's distribution and emplacement of their armed forces provides them with a power projection never before realized outside the mainland area of the Eurasian land mass.

The Soviets have the capability of conducting more than one offensive operation at a time, although it should be noted that they have been careful in the past not to come into direct confrontation with any major western power. Nevertheless, this conduct cannot always be counted on in the future. For example, how would the world have reacted to a crisis in Berlin, while the Soviets were invading Afghanistan? And who is to say that the Castro government or Vietnam or the North Koreans would not take advantage of a similar situation in order to exploit their surrounding neighbors? The point is, the Soviets through very careful planning have now positioned their armed forces so neatly around the globe that virtually nowhere remains safe from the possibility of very rapid Soviet reinforcements in the event of a confrontation!

In a recent interview in U. S. News and World Report, Stephen S. Kaplan, a member of the Brookings Foreign Policy

⁵Soviet Power, p. 85.

Studies and a noted authority on Soviet military power, was asked how heavily the Soviets rely on their military power as a political instrument to gain advantages around the world short of war. In his reply Mr. Kaplan stated:

What my study established is that the Soviet Union has often used military power to achieve political objectives without going to war. Since 1944, there have been at least 190 incidents in which Soviet armed forces were used as a political instrument. In 158 of those incidents, Russian military power was used in a coercive manner--that is, to deter an antagonist from certain behavior or to compel another country to perform according to Kremlin wishes--as in Czechoslovakia in 1968. In the other 32 incidents, Soviet military units were used cooperatively to improve relations with another country or to obtain certain political objectives without coercion. For example, on several occasions Soviet air or naval detachments paid special visits to Western countries to strengthen detente.⁶

In a somewhat concurring statement in his article, "The Soviet Military Reappraised," C. G. Jacobsen said:

There is no question that in the past Moscow has embraced and pursued non-conventional strategies (ranging from ideological subversion through industrial espionage to instances of sabotage and, in extremes, terrorism) as part and parcel of the deliberate manufacture of a deterrence image, and hence a freedom to maneuver, that has been far out of proportion to real Soviet strength. The current status of this unorthodox component of Moscow's military-political stance warrants attention.

The image of unremitting Soviet success in expanding influence and empire is equally unfortunate. Yes, apparent success in Angola, Ethiopia and South Yemen did give Soviet power a global credibility that it had previously lacked, and the supporting role played by

⁶Stephen S. Kaplan, "Military Blackmail, Kremlin Style--an Expert's Size-Up," U. S. News and World Report, 11 May 1981, p. 32.

Cuba and, to a lesser extent, other allies again pointed to the fact that Soviet power projection was not one-dimensional.⁷

From this we can develop a clear picture concerning the military power distribution of Soviet forces. What is more important however, is the fact that the Soviets have used this power to support their adventurism into the Third World political structure. As stated previously, the Soviet armed forces are not just one-dimensional; their strategic positions around the globe have afforded them the opportunities to act decisively in many instances, which fifteen to twenty years ago were not possible.

Thus far, we have analyzed the Soviet military forces in the context of size, capabilities/composition and finally their current dispositions around the world.

It is now time to examine how these forces have been used as instruments of foreign policy to support Soviet adventurism. Questions need to be answered concerning the ideological and nationalistic objectives of the Soviet Union and how the armed forces assist in obtaining these objectives. What is the military doctrine of the Soviet Union? What effect does the use of proxy forces, or arms sales have on Soviet foreign policy? And finally, what are the implications for the next decade? Can we safely say that the Soviets will continue with their unrelenting military buildup?

⁷C. G. Jacobsen, "The Soviet Military Reappraised," Current History, Vol. 80, No. 468, October 1981, p. 336.

Do their past and current experiences in Third World Affairs warrant continued interference there in the years ahead, or will the Soviets turn toward a more cautious form of adventurism?

It is with these thoughts in mind that we turn to the next chapter which develops the nationalistic and ideological goals of Soviet foreign policy and what effects the buildup of military power has had on them.

Chapter 4

IDEOLOGY AND DOCTRINE: THE SOVIET APPROACH

At the time of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, political power was shared throughout the world by many nations. This situation is described by the concept known as a multi-polar system. At this period in history, Russia was at best a middle-level power whose major concern was the preservation of the Bolshevik Revolution and the protection of the nation's borders from outside invasion. However, at the conclusion of a World War II, the Russian leadership had a new concept confronting them. Political power, thanks to the defeat of Nazi Germany and the break up of the Axis Powers, was now concentrated in the hands of the United States and the USSR.¹ This type of political power configuration is known as bi-polar. No longer were the Soviet leaders solely concerned with the defense of Mother Russia and security of the relatively new but effective Communist Party. Now the leadership had to develop foreign policy on a much grander scale in order to deal with the newly acquired position of world leadership.¹

¹Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Noguee, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, (New York: Pergamon Press Inc., 1981), p. 10.

It is not the intent of this thesis to develop or explain the varied concepts of international political actions by the USSR in the context of Communist ideology. It is important, however, to develop a brief summary of the fundamentals of Soviet foreign policy and in particular the Marxist-Leninist ideology before attempting to relate the Soviet military buildup to the national objectives of the Soviet Union.

All Soviet leaders have defended their foreign policy actions on the ideological premise that Marxism-Leninism is a scientific system which has uncovered and rivaled the fundamental and implacable laws of social evolution and, hence, affords its adherents the unique advantage of prediction and partial control of events.¹

Soviet diplomacy . . . wields a weapon possessed by none of its rivals or opponents. Soviet diplomacy is fortified by a scientific theory of Marxism-Leninism. This doctrine lays down the unshakeable laws of social development. By revealing these norms, it gives the possibility not only of understanding the current tendencies of international life, but also of permitting the desirable collaboration with the march of events. Such are the special advantages held by Soviet diplomacy. They give it a special position in international life and explain its outstanding successes.²

The XXIIIrd Congress of the CPSU in March 1966 adopted a resolution that established the four basic tasks of Soviet foreign policy. They are:

²Vernon Aspaturian, Power and Process in Soviet Foreign Policy, (New York: Little Brown and Co., 1971), p. 338, citing V. P. Potemkin, ed. Istoriya Diplomatii (Moscow, 1945), III, pp. 763-764.

1. To secure, together with the other socialist countries, a favorable condition for the building of socialism and communism;
2. To strengthen the unity and solidarity of the socialist countries, their friendships and brotherhood;
3. To support the national-liberation movement and to effect all-round cooperation with the young, developing countries;
4. Consistently to uphold the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, to offer decisive resistance to the aggressive forces of imperialism, and to save mankind from a new world war.³

The exact relationship between Soviet ideology and foreign policy has been subject to great controversy, ranging from the view that it is substantially irrelevant to the conviction that foreign policy is rigidly dictated by ideology. It is clear, however, that there are many varied attitudes in Marxist-Leninist theory that characterize the Soviet's view of the political world and their relationship to it.

Basic Leninist ideology rests upon the fundamental premise that all political activity involves conflict.⁴

Marx and Lenin both viewed politics as a struggle between two opponents that could only be resolved with one gaining victory over the other, in terms of the dialectic process.⁵

They both held the point of view that communism would eventually defeat capitalism.⁶

³Edmonds, p. 2.

⁴Nogee and Donaldson, p. 33.

They find it difficult to imagine an intermediary position between total victory and complete defeat. Until they have achieved a global victory for communism, they are faced with the ever present prospect of being annihilated. Any position between these two extremes can only be viewed as temporary and unstable. Out of this insecurity emerges an aggressive posture. It is difficult for communists to contemplate a condition of security that does not ultimately require the destruction of all opposing political systems.⁵

Another major fundamental principle of Soviet ideology is that all international affairs are in a state of flux. It is within this principle that the Soviet leadership finds the necessary justification for the spread of communism.¹ With nothing being fixed or permanent in the international political arena, the Soviets (according to Leninist doctrine) must promulgate the spread of communism.¹ It is this Marxist-Leninist doctrine more than anything else, that supports the aggressive character of Soviet foreign policy.¹

The question of the relationship between Soviet ideology and their actions in the realm of international politics is puzzling at best.¹ Do the ideological teachings of Marx and Lenin have anything to do with current Soviet actions? After all, it is characteristic for the Soviet leadership to refer to Marx or Lenin for foundational support or justification for most political decisions made in the Kremlin.¹

⁵Nogee and Donaldson, p. 34.

In the book, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, the authors, Joseph Noguee and Robert Donaldson, argue that ^{Soviet} today's leadership is the least ideologically inclined of all those who have exercised power since the revolution. They feel that Brezhnev is far removed from the ideologies of Lenin's time, and that the current leadership is composed of pragmatic politicians who merely pay lip service to the Marxist-Leninist doctrines when it comes to foreign policy decision-making.

However, the authors are also quick to point out that one cannot go to the opposite extreme and conclude that ideology is totally and always irrelevant to Soviet decision making. They conclude their argument by stating that "there is a compatibility between Marxist-Leninist theory and most theories of international relations."⁶

Even though many noted political scientists agree that there is a declining trend in the ideological aspects of Soviet foreign policy, many still concur that ideology is the most cohesive moral force in Soviet society.⁴ The Soviet citizenry is indoctrinated with the teachings of Marx and Lenin from a very early age. And in a country where the leadership cannot claim legitimacy on the basis of elections, or adherence to a formal constitution or rule by virtue of blood (monarchy), one wonders about the political stability and authority of the leadership that holds together and

⁶Noguee and Donaldson, p. 38.

makes the decisions for the masses. It appears that even today that those individuals who have acquired control over the Communist Party must be obliged to justify their positions of power and authority on Marxist-Leninist ideology.⁷

With these thoughts in mind, let us turn to a brief discussion of Soviet military doctrine and its relationship to ideology, national objectives and the decision made concerning foreign policy.

The Soviet military plays an important role in Soviet society. Since World War II, the Soviet military has achieved a position of prestige, esteem, and power.

In the Soviet Union military doctrine is very carefully defined and promulgated. It is worked out in conjunction with the political leadership, and it represents their guidance to the military in preparing for war. As stated in Military Strategy, military doctrine is:

the expression of the accepted views of a state regarding the problems of political evolution of future war, the state's attitude toward war, a determination of the nature of future war, preparation of the country for war in the economic and moral sense, and regarding the problems of organization and preparation of the armed forces, as well as of the methods of waging war. Consequently, by military doctrine one should understand the system of officially approved, scientifically based views on the basic fundamental problems of war.⁸

⁷Ibid., p. 39.

⁸V. D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy, (1968 ed., ed. and trans. Harriet Fast Scott, New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1975), p. 38.

Sokolovskiy went on to say that:

The high and noble aims of the Soviet government and its Armed Forces determine the nature and essence of Soviet military strategy. Soviet military strategy serves the interests of the most advanced and progressive socialist system; its efforts are directed toward the solution of problems of increasing the defensive potential of the Soviet government and toward the organization of its Armed Forces for successful repulsion of aggression. This is the class essence of Soviet military strategy.

Soviet military strategy is guided by progressive, national, and completely scientific theory of Marxism-Leninism, by the philosophy of dialectic and historical materialism, which makes possible scientific utilization of the objective laws determining victory in modern wars.⁹

In a concurring statement found in the Soviet Union's Officers Hand Book, the author pointed out that:

Soviet military doctrine has an offensive character . . . The Soviet Union . . . will conduct the war which the enemies impose on them in the most offensive manner in order to attain the smashing of the enemy in short times.

Soviet military doctrine allocates the decisive role in contemporary war to nuclear missile weapons. At the same time, it considers that along with the nuclear missile strikes of a strategic and operational tactical character the armed forces will employ conventional armament.¹⁰

Unlike most nations of the world, Soviet military doctrine represents the officially accepted views on the nature of contemporary wars, the use of the armed forces in them, and the requirements for war preparedness. The two

⁹V. D. Sokolovskiy, (Marshal of the Soviet Union), Ed. Scott, p. 45-46.

¹⁰S. N. Kozlov, Spravochnik Ofitsera The Officer's Hand Book (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), trans., U. S. Air Force Foreign Technology Division.

essential components of Soviet military doctrine are political and military technical. Soviet military doctrine specifies the structures of the Soviet Armed Forces, allocates industrial resources and output and orients research and development efforts to support armed forces. Their doctrine is a blueprint drawn up by the highest Soviet political leaders that describes in specific detail the shape of the armed forces and the way they are to be used.

Soviet perspectives on and prescriptions for armed conflict require that tactical success leads to operational results; similarly, operational results contribute to strategic success. The concept of Military Art and its role in Military Science is not simply another exercise in Marxism-Leninism dialectics. Soviet military officers, a large number of whom hold degrees in Military Science, are serious and intense in their study and in their conviction of the superiority of this methodology before preparing their armed forces to achieve success in modern war.

The dialectic method underlying development fosters the idea that for any given combat situation there is a correct response. The "correctness" achieved by a Soviet troop leader or staff officer is measured, to a large extent, by his application of established "norms."

Norms appear in mathematical prescriptions for proper action. They are based on historical analyses, analyses of exercises and client wars, and on the results of predictive combat models. Emphasis on standards and set

patterns can have an extensive impact on battlefield behavior. One result, an immediate advantage is that such thoroughly prescribed and rehearsed preparations and executions can lead to a high degree of battlefield readiness, at least in the initial stages. If troops are following ingrained instructions, the commander has a confident awareness of where elements and equipment will be disposed; he is aware in advance of how well his units can cope with time and space factors in the normal combat situations.

On the other hand, there are obvious disadvantages in using such a comprehensively regimented and structured system. Primarily, there is no provision for the unexpected. When initiative is seen in terms of finding a correct solution within patterns, a sudden lack of norms may place a commander, at whatever level, in an unexpected and perilous situation. The Soviet leader who can assess his situation and select the "proper" tactical guidelines based on appropriate norms is lauded. However, despite all the exhortations for a commander's use of initiative, he will be condemned if his initiative fails and he has not followed prescribed norms.¹¹

✓ The ideological and national objectives of the Soviet Union have been transported throughout the world by means of a dominant source of power that has emerged in

¹¹U. S. Department of the Army, Soviet Army Operations, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, April 1978), pp. 1-5 and 1-6.

recent years as the largest and most powerful in the world, namely their military forces.⁷ There are four major areas of consideration that have played a dominant role in the extension of world influence that have definite military implications. They are Soviet advisors, Soviet troops, arms sales and the use of proxy forces.

The previous chapter on composition and distribution sufficiently detailed the location of Soviet troops and military advisors and no further elaboration of these two instruments of foreign policy will be discussed.

There does remain, however, the influence of proxy forces and the sale of Soviet military weapons and their impact on the countries that comprise the Third World.

Arms sales to Third World countries by major suppliers has increased from \$9.4 billion in 1969 to over \$20 billion in 1980.¹² Although the United States has been the major supplier in the past, indications are that the Soviet Union has taken over the role of being the world's largest producer and provider of military weapons to the Third World developing countries.¹²

There are three major trends that have developed recently that combine to give arms sales to Third World Countries greater saliency. First, the sheer quantity of

¹²Andrew J. Pierre, "Arms Sales: The New Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs, (Council on Foreign Relations Inc., New York, New York: Winter 1981-82), p. 267.

arms being sold; second, the qualitative upgrading of arms sales. (Today the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. sell their most sophisticated weapon systems), and third, the shift from the recipient of arms sales in the 1960's of already developed countries to the 1980's of emerging or Third World developing countries.¹³

Arms sales have emerged as a key instrument of diplomacy for the weapon suppliers, offsetting the traditional instruments of reassurance and diplomacy, such as formal alliances, the stationing of forces abroad, and the threat of direct intervention. At a time when the major powers are less likely to intervene with their own forces, they are more prone to shore up friendly states through the provisions of arms or to play out their own competition through the arming of their proxies.¹⁴

The Soviet Union has for a long time remained as the world's second largest supplier of arms, surpassed only by the U. S. However, between 1977 and 1980 the Soviet Union sent to the Third World 5,750 tanks and self-propelled guns in comparison with America's 3,030; 11,400 surface-to-air missiles in comparison with 4,960; and 1,780 supersonic combat aircraft in comparison with America's 510.¹⁵

¹³Ibid., p. 267.

¹⁴The U.S.S.R. economic and military support to the Castro government in Cuba is an excellent example of this point.

¹⁵Pierre, p. 272.

In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, Andrew J.

Pierre stated that:

Moscow's arms sales have been carefully calibrated to serve its political purposes. Arms have been supplied to national liberation movements to demonstrate solidarity and foster ideological affinity, as well as to Marxist regimes and to other countries whose favor the Soviets have wanted to count or whose political leanings they have wanted to influence. Arms have been supplied to Castro in exchange for his support for Soviet aims in Africa and Central America. Middle East countries received over half of the Soviet arms sent to the Third World in the past five years, and the U.S.S.R. became the largest supplier to sub-Saharan Africa.

For a long time arms were delivered either free or at low cost with very favorable conditions, including long-term credits of eight to twelve years, and minimal interest rates of 2.5 per cent often repayable in soft, local currency which was then used for the purchase of goods from the weapons-receiving country.

In recent years, however, arms sales have become an important earner of scarce hard currency, as weapons have been sold to oil-rich countries such as Iraq, Libya and Algeria, thereby greatly assisting Moscow's trade balance. Thus, lucrative arms sales to the Third World are now helping Moscow finance its purchases of Western technology and food.¹⁶

In the recent past and foreseeable future, it appears that the main battleground in ideological competition between East and West will be the Third World.¹ The Soviet use of military assistance through arms sales has long been applied opportunistically, taking advantage of instabilities, created by regional conflict or international crisis, and there appears to be no change in this policy.¹

¹⁶Ibid., p. 272.

On the question of Soviet proxy or surrogate forces, the evidence is not quite as strong; however, there are implications that deserve attention.

The major Soviet proxy force is obviously the Cuban military.¹⁶ While Cuba has never signed a security treaty with the Kremlin, it still acts as a cat's paw and pawn to a greater extent than any other country? Fidel Castro long ago chose to commit forces overseas for reasons that seem to transcend superpower rivalry. He devised a "sacred duty" to encourage insurgents around the world during the reign of Khrushchev and retains his revolutionary élan today.¹⁷

The first tentative exports took place in 1961, when a handful of Cubans began training guerrillas in Ghana. Castro committed a dozen small contingents during that decade. The tempo stepped up in the 1970's. Something like 20,000 soldiers and 6,000-8,000 civilians still assist the Soviet-backed struggle to control Angola, a potential platform for further interventions in Zimbabwe, Zaire, Namibia, and South Africa. Another 17,000 or so in Ethiopia and South Yemen bracket the Bab-el-Mandeb. Cubans tutor Latin American leftists, like the Sandanistas in Nicaragua and insurgents in El Salvador. All told close to 35,000 troops, teachers, and technicians support subversion on four continents.¹⁸

¹⁷John M. Collins, U. S. - Soviet Military Balance Concepts and Capabilities 1960-1980, (McGraw-Hill Pub. Co.)

¹⁸Collins, p. 180.

In the center of the Caribbean lies the crown colony of Soviet imperialism, Cuba. The Castro government is becoming increasingly a direct military threat to the region and an indirect threat as an arms depot and logistics base for new imperial annexations in Africa and Central America.

Cuba's military personnel strength has increased and its military capabilities have improved dramatically over the last five years. A significant trend has been the development of an effective ready reserve which gives Castro and his Soviet masters a well trained and, to a large extent, battle-experienced mercenary force which can be activated on short notice. About 70 per cent of Cuba's forces in Angola and Ethiopia are these ready reservists who were recalled to active duty.¹⁹ The Cuban military capability is far in excess of any actual or imaginary needs. Cuban armed forces include an army of over 225,000, a navy of about 11,000, and air defense forces of 16,000. These figures do not include hundreds of thousands of paramilitary forces which in many instances are better trained and equipped than the regular armed forces of other Caribbean countries.

Not only are the Cuban armed forces well supported with personnel and a vast manpower supply, but they have the very latest and most technologically advanced military equipment. The Cubans have over 200 MIG fighter aircraft, 650

¹⁹Fred C. Ikle, "Soviet Imperialism Spreads South," Defense 82, March 1982, p. 22.

tanks, 90 helicopters, two FOXTROT attack submarines, one KONI-Class frigate, and about 50 torpedo and missile attack boats.²⁰

The Soviet influence in Cuba is all pervasive. The Soviet brigade with a strength of about 2,600-3,000 is located near Havana. In this area, the Soviets have a major intelligence collection facility which can easily monitor U. S. Communications. There are also an estimated 6,000-8,000 Soviet civilian advisors on the island. About 2,000 Soviet military advisors provide technical advice in support of such sophisticated weapons as the MIGs, surface-to-air missiles, and the Cuban FOXTROT submarines.

The U.S.S.R. has a tremendous amount of influence over the proxy government (and subsequently its armed forces) of Fidel Castro for two major reasons. First, the Soviets provide Cuba's principal economic support. Second, the presence of Soviet personnel on the island, especially the large embassy staff and advisors in the economic and military spheres, allow the Soviet imperial masters to monitor closely their Caribbean crown colony.

If the mere buildup of the Cuban armed forces is not enough to upset the stability of a region of the world where 44 per cent of all foreign trade tonnage and 45 per cent of

²⁰Ibid., p. 22.

²¹Ibid., p. 26.

the crude oil to the United States are shipped through the Caribbean, consider then the growing use of Soviet proxy forces (Cuba) in South and Central America.

There are now between 4,000 and 5,000 Cuban Civilian advisors and about 1,500 Cuban military and security advisors in Nicaragua. Cuban advisors are believed to be serving in key posts throughout the government in which they exert considerable influence. Cuba is also getting considerable help from East European nations.

There are also advisors in Nicaragua from East Germany, Bulgaria, North Korea, and the Soviet Union to assist in building the Sandinista Army from its currently estimated strength of 60,000 into a force of 250,000.²²

There are approximately seventy Nicaraguans being trained in Bulgaria as jet pilots, and recent photographs have indicated that through the assistance of the Soviet Union and Cuban advisors, the country of Nicaragua is constructing runways capable of handling Soviet MIG-21 fighters. The Soviet Union has, of course, bankrolled and assisted its Cuban proxy at a cost of \$3 billion annually and by supporting efforts to collect funds, arms, and supplies from the Communist Bloc for delivery to the guerrillas.²³

²²Ibid., p. 26.

²³Ibid., p. 26.

Attention toward expansionist activities by the Cubans within the region have not been solely confined to Nicaragua and El Salvador, but has likewise coordinated clandestine support organizations in Honduras, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. In fact, convincing evidence of Cuban subversion activities has surfaced in virtually every Caribbean Basin country. In Grenada, Cuban influence has reached such a high level that it can be considered a Cuban satellite. The Cubans are constructing air and naval facilities there that far exceed the requirements of this tiny island nation.²⁴

Having discussed in general terms the Soviet's use of arms sales and proxy forces in the Third World, a short analysis of the impact of these actions is in order.

In the past, many leaders of the emerging Third World countries, motivated by their own political and economic aspirations, have turned to Moscow for support.¹ The question remains, why Moscow?¹ The answer is complex, but can be summarized as follows. First, peoples of the developing countries have traditionally been regarded by Soviet theoreticians as potential allies of the Communist world.¹ Second, in a milieu of foreign assistance, Moscow has come to regard this instrument (foreign military aid) of policy as somewhat of an index of its power and influence in the

²⁴Ibid., p. 27.

Third World. Third, low interest rates that span a long period of pay-back is an attractive bargain. Fourth, Soviet equipment sold to the Third World is the latest and most sophisticated available. Fifth, with the equipment comes an assorted group of military and civilian "technicians" that provide instruction to the purchasers on how to utilize and maintain their highly regarded new possessions. Sixth, indigenous trainees are sent to the Soviet Union (or other East European countries) for further training. And finally, the Soviet leadership provides a great deal of assistance to develop local arms industries and maintenance facilities in the developing countries.

On the surface it would appear that this program is one of mutual assistance. The Soviets gain an area for military influence while the developing countries receive necessary military hardware at very liberal terms. But what is the effectiveness of the program in relation to Soviet objectives? In the book, The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures, the author, Robert H. Donaldson, stated:

Of the various types of foreign assistance employed by the Soviets--military, economic, and technical--military aid has proven to be the most dramatic and consequential. Besides directly contributing to the emergence, growth, and survival of nonaligned regimes, arms aid has fostered an image of the Soviet Union as a benign but powerful anticolonialist power. It has served as the primary Soviet vehicle for acquiring influence in regions important to Western interests, often providing the Soviets with political entry into

countries where their role had hitherto been limited or nonexistent.²⁵

Although with the exception of Afghanistan (and even that is questionable) the Soviets have not acquired an ideological convert directly through its arms aid, but it has acquired a substantial though unquantifiable degree of influence in the Third World. Through its military training and technical assistance program, in conjunction with economic assistance training, the Soviet Union has exposed many of the nationals of these countries to a Communist orientation--an exposure Moscow hopes will influence institutional developments occurring in the Third World.

Whether or not this program is durable remains for history to tell. It is at least clear that military assistance has increased Moscow's potential influence in many developing states, while at the same time it has not enabled the Soviets to control the domestic or foreign policies of these countries.¹

This chapter has dealt with many aspects of Soviet foreign policy, from the ideological and nationalistic objectives through a brief examination of the use of military power in the Third World as a means of developing and supporting Soviet goals.

The next chapter is primarily concerned with recent activities by the Soviets in the Third World.

²⁵Donaldson, p. 393.

Chapter 5

SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD: A DECADE OF ADVENTURISM

Between June 1944 and June 1967, a period spanning 23 years, there were 120 incidents in which Soviet armed forces were used as a political instrument. That is to say, the Soviets utilized their military might to further their sphere of influence in international affairs. Even more dramatically, between January 1968 and March-April 1981, a period covering only eleven years, there have been 71 such incidents of the use of military force. These figures show a dramatic increase in the Soviet leadership's reliance on the armed forces during the last ten to thirteen years. As noted before, this is the same period of time during which the Soviet military buildup took place. Not only do the Soviets now possess the necessary military might to back up their political adventures, but they have also clearly demonstrated no hesitancy in the use of these forces to support political objectives.

Listed below is a summary of major incidents that have occurred since January 1968 in which the Soviet military

¹Stephen S. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institute, 1981, p. 32.

muscle was utilized:

1. January 1968--North Korea. Harasses U. S. Naval units in Tsushima Strait to intimidate Washington following seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo, American spy ship, by North Koreans.

2. August, 1968--Czechoslovakia. Invades Czechoslovakia with approximately 400,000 Soviet and Eastern European troops to overthrow Dubcek Government and restore orthodox Communist regime. Invasion follows five months of military maneuvers in and around the country aimed at coercing Prague.

3. August, 1968--Rumania. Builds up forces near Rumania's border to intimidate Ceausescu regime and possibly set stage for invasion.

4. March-September, 1969--China. Series of major border attacks mounted in response to Chinese ambush of Soviet patrol culminating in brief invasion of Shinkiang. Moscow's aim: Force Peking into border settlement on Kremlin terms, dissuade China from further frontier pinpricks, impress international Communist movement with Soviet superiority over China.

5. February, 1970--Egypt. Sets up air defense system of 12,000 to 15,000 missile crewmen, nearly 85 surface-to-air missiles, 150 fighter planes to help Egypt in war of attrition on Suez Canal.

6. September, 1970--Jordan. Reinforces naval squadron in Mediterranean, shadows U. S. Sixth Fleet to forestall any American support for Jordan in showdown with Syria and Palestine Liberation Organization.

7. December, 1971--India-Pakistan War. Shadows American and British task forces in Indian Ocean as Soviet troops move closer to Chinese border to deter U. S. and Chinese support for Pakistan against Russia's Indian ally.

8. October, 1973--Arab-Israeli War. Mounts series of major military operations to support Arabs, intimidate Israel and deter U. S. from aiding Jewish states. Includes airlift and sealift to Egypt and Syria, large-scale naval deployment in Mediterranean, alert of seven airborne divisions in U.S.S.R., dispatch to Egypt of Soviet freighter with cargo, . . . that support[s] presence of nuclear weapons.

9. July, 1974--Cyprus. Moves naval task group toward Cyprus and alerts airborne divisions and transport

aircraft in Soviet Union to intimidate Turkish invasion Army in Cyprus.

10. Fall, 1975--Angola. Airlifts Cuban troops, transports military equipment, deploys naval forces in regions, maintains close surveillance of American naval units--all to help Marxist guerrilla forces seize power in Angola and keep U. S. from aiding pro-Western forces.

11. November, 1977--Ethiopia-Somalia War. Send armaments by air and sea to support Cuban forces and Ethiopian troops. Soviet officers direct combat, Soviet-piloted helicopters participate in operations, naval presence in Indian Ocean is reinforced. The aim--help Ethiopians defeat Somalis in disputed Ogaden region, solidify Soviet strategic positions on Horn of Africa.

12. 1978-79--Japan. Builds up troops on Kurile Islands to discourage Japan from pressing claim.

13. February, 1979--China-Vietnam War. Deploys naval task force near Vietnam, conducts air-reconnaissance operations in area, mounts limited airlift to Vietnam to aid Hanoi against Chinese.

14. December, 1979--Afghanistan. Intervenes with combat forces to overthrow Amin government, installs a puppet regime, launches campaign to crush anti-Communist insurgency.

15. March-April, 1981--Poland. Conducts extended maneuvers with Czechoslovakian and East German troops in and around Poland to coerce independent solidarity trade union, prod Communist leaders to resist liberal reforms.²

In a recent interview with Stephen S. Kaplan, authority on Soviet Military Power, Kaplan was asked:

Q. Why did they (Soviets) take so long to use force in the Third World?

A. Before the June, 1967, war in the Middle East, the Soviets had used military force in the Third World very sparsely, in a very hesitant way--just putting a toe in the water, nothing more. With the end of the '67

²"Where the Soviets Flexed Their Military Muscle," U. S. News and World Report, pp. 30-31.

war, however, they were in a different position. Their capabilities by then had improved immensely. They had a forward-deployed Navy; they had developed a strategic-airlift capability of significance; they were beginning to achieve parity with the United States. At the same time, the United States was suffering the trauma of the Vietnam War.

The Soviets became extraordinarily active, first in the Middle East and then elsewhere in the Third World in the period of 1967 to 1973. We see the Soviets in the '67 Mideast War, in the Suez Canal War which followed, in Sudan, in the Iran-Iraq struggles; Soviet naval units bolstered regimes in Somalia and Guinea; there was Soviet involvement in the Jordan-Syrian Palestine Liberation Organization conflict in 1970, in the India-Pakistan War in 1971 and, of course, in the 1973 Middle East War.³

In addition to the fifteen incidents previously mentioned where the Soviets have recently used military power to support political objectives, there are several other implications of Soviet influence within the countries of the Third World. The invasion of Afghanistan more than anything else has demonstrated to the world that the leadership in the Kremlin is more than willing to pay the price of worldwide denunciation and increased international tension by using military power to secure political objectives. It appears that the resolution of a political conflict involving the use of military force or conducted in the shadow of "wars of national liberation" have become a primary means of securing fundamental changes in the Third World.⁴

³Stephen S. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institute, 1981, p. 32.

expanded their influence in the Third World. A real question that needs to be answered is why the Third World? Why do the Soviets need to expand their sphere of influence beyond the Eurasian land mass? Don't they have enough power and influence within Europe alone to keep them well occupied?

Rationale for Soviet involvement in the Third World has an ideological, political, economic and strategic dimension. However, an area of prime consideration is the importance of the Third World as a component of international politics. The size, population, land area give the Third World the physical dimensions of a new center of international power and influence. By possessing raw material resources vital to the progress of the industrialized nations and by having the will to organize and use economic leverage for political as well as economic purposes, the leaders of the Third World have drawn attention to the importance of their new power center in this era of interdependence. The instability of the Third World countries has drawn great powers into regional disputes, risking confrontations sometimes of grave magnitude. The existence of vital strategic sea communications along their littoral has generated great power involvement. And growing military capabilities of the Third World have limited great power freedom of action. Contemporary history has shown that developments in the Third World have contributed to the rise and fall in the prestige, power and influence of great powers, invariably affecting their standing in world affairs.

The Soviets now have eight major countries under direct domination and control. "They are the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Afghanistan, and Mongolia." In addition to these there are at least twelve countries that are under direct Soviet influence. They are Cuba, Libya, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Angola, Mozambique, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, Iraq, Syria, and India.⁴

Since mid-1971, the Soviet Union has signed "Friendship and Cooperation Treaties" with eleven Third World countries, nine of which are currently in effect and two which have been abrogated.⁴ Those still valid treaties are with India (August 1971), Iraq (April 1972), Angola (October 1976), Mozambique (March 1977), Vietnam (November 1978), Ethiopia (November 1978), Afghanistan (December 1978), South Yemen (October 1979), and Syria (October 1980). The treaties of friendship abrogated were with Egypt (May 1971-March 1976) and Somalia (July 1974-November 1977).⁵

It is obvious that the Soviet Union during the last decade has expended a tremendous amount of time, energy and money supporting countries of the Third World. Through military and economic and friendship treaties the Soviets have

⁴U. S. Department of the Army, U. S. Army Overview FY 82, Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, May 1981, pp. 2-3.

⁵Ibid.

In brief, the Third World cannot be ignored; nor has it been ignored by the Soviet Union which has looked upon it as a vital component in the correlation of world forces and an integral part of the Soviet ideological design of the world as seen from Moscow.⁶

The Soviet Union has reckoned with this new power reality for reasons that are rooted in its political, economic, ideological, and strategic interests. 'For the Soviets, the Third World is an integral part of their ideological design of the world as they now perceive it and as they theoretically expect it to be with the unfolding of history; it is a vital component in the correlation of world forces that in the Soviet view implies a shift in the balance of world power in their favor.' 'The Third World presents them, moreover, with political opportunities to achieve the goals of this design and to fulfill their historic expectations, for it has become the instrumentality for expanding and globalizing Soviet influence and power, and for reducing or denying that of the United States, the West, and Communist China.'⁷

Economically, the Third World serves as a market for Soviet economic goods, military weapons, supplies and

⁶U. S. Department of State, The Soviet Union and the Third World, A Watershed in Great Power Policy, Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 3.

⁷Ibid., p. 3.

equipment; a source of raw materials; and an opportunity for economic integration to the Soviet advantage.

In the political and ideological realm the Soviet Union puts itself forward as an appealing model for development and progress toward modernity, and pursues a carefully designed political and propaganda campaign to win over the friendship and loyalty of the Third World.

The pursuit of a globalist policy imposes on the Soviets the imperative need to control strategic areas in the Third World. Accordingly, Soviet aid and political energies have been directed toward expanding Soviet influence and power in the "national liberation zone" of Asia, Africa and Latin America.^{8/}

Joseph Noguee and Robert Donaldson, for example, have noted that during the Brezhnev era Soviet activities in the Third World have been precisely for the satisfaction of Soviet military and economic interests, at a time when the Soviets have:

. . . lowered the expectation that Third World regimes are viable candidates for the rapid transformation in socialism. The Soviet timetable is longer and the style more cautious than it was in Khrushchev's time, and in addition to such general and long-standing objectives of increasing Moscow's own influence, there are now more concrete goals such as gaining access to key resources or support facilities for naval expeditions or trade routes. For these objectives and the supporting range of tactics the term "counterimperialism" indeed seems most appropriate. This complex of interests, much more

⁸Ibid., p. 84.

than the revolutionary impulse of ideological affinity, seems to provide Moscow's major criteria for the concentration of its energies and resources in the Third World.⁹

For many reasons, therefore, the Third World is important in Soviet foreign policy. Each element--political, economic, ideological, and strategic--relates to the other to form an integrated whole. The composite suggests one transcending idea: namely, a surge toward globalism.

⁹Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Noguee, Soviet Policy Since World War II, (New York: Pergamon Press Inc., 1981), p. 184.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSIONS

There are numerous opinions among today's political analysts concerning the U.S.S.R. and its conduct of foreign affairs. But one area of general consensus seems apparent, and that is the important role that the availability of a powerful military force plays in support of Moscow's adventures.

It should not be construed that the Soviet government is run by a bunch of mad Marxists who are willing to risk anything for the spread of communism. The Soviet leadership cannot afford to take great risks without carefully calculated plans that weigh the probability of success or failure when it comes to international politics. However, certain events have developed within the last decade that have lessened the risks for Soviet adventurism. First, the availability of strategic confidence, through the capabilities and disposition of their armed forces. Secondly, the United States has shown a certain restraint in its willingness to intervene during the past decade. That, too, has lowered the risk. The timing of the Soviet involvements in Angola and in the Ethiopian-Somalian conflict indicates a certain attentiveness to U. S. policy. When the Soviets

intervened in both cases, their military capabilities and U. S. behavior created situations in which the risks were not high.

On the whole, an evaluation of Soviet success and failures in the Third World would probably net a balanced sheet. Soviet attempted assertiveness in the Third World is only a relatively recent form of Moscow's foreign diplomacy. The fact that they have a massive military has given them the edge to lower the risk of confrontation as ironic as that may seem. So just by having a tremendous military power capability one must say that Soviet adventures into the Third World have been productive, at least in this respect. It must, however, be viewed in context. The Soviets are facing ever-increasing economic and social problems at home. Their ideology is not being accepted by Third World peoples, many who have just emerged from the grasps of eighteenth century colonial powers. Problems have arisen in the Eastern Warsaw Pact nations that have caused a great deal of unrest with the Kremlin. And the situation in the Middle East continues to be an area of major concern, not only for the Soviet leadership, but for the peace and stability of the whole world.

The question of Soviet intentions in the Third World remains a very complex issue. It does appear evident that there is a direct correlation between Soviet activities in the Third World and the reliance on their massive military power as the "arm of influence" that supplies the necessary

muscle to enable the Kremlin to exploit opportunities of intervention.

Speaking about the buildup of Soviet military power in the 1980's recently in Foreign Affairs, William G. Hyland said:

This accumulation of military power was not a product of the momentum of a massive bureaucracy, rather . . . it was a systematic and purposeful effort to meet the requirements laid down by Soviet doctrines which prescribed: (a) overall strategic superiority, (b) the necessity to prepare forces for both deterrence and actual warfighting, (c) the possibility of achieving victory in a general nuclear war, and (d) the decisiveness of striking first.

. . . on close examination, it could be seen that the fundamental underpinnings of the Soviet system were weakening--and this weakening was manifested in the accumulating internal and external crises. The Soviet state and Russian Communism had entered a historical decline.

Yet, it was argued that for the next few years this very trend was cause for even further apprehension. For if a Great Power saw that it had passed its zenith or soon would, and if that power was inherently aggressive and expansionist, it followed that it would desperately try to retrieve its historical fortunes through a series of forays and adventures. The Soviets, of course, were true believers in the "correlation of forces." History was predetermined in a broad Marxist sense, but the world position of the Soviet Union could be altered by skillful strategies and tactics, so long as the bedrock of massive military power remained unaffected. Thus, an unique and bizarre combination of strength and weakness made for a period of particular danger.¹

¹In retrospect, it should be understood that the U.S.S.R. is a military, and then a colonial, creation that is not confronted--though she may be challenged (as in

¹William G. Hyland, "U. S.-Soviet Relations: The Long Road Back," Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., Vol. 60, No. 3, 1981, pp. 526-527.

Poland or Afghanistan)--so long as the Moscow center is seen to be successful.¹ The Soviets may not be well thought of, but they are certainly respected.² The imperial holdings in Eastern Europe have a Janus-like quality about them. They are a defensive glacis, physically separating the peoples of the U.S.S.R. from Western Europe; but they are also a constant source of weakness. The West has long abandoned them to the Soviet sphere of influence.

The imperial thesis is vital because it settles, persuasively, arguments about Soviet intentions. Paul Nitze wrote recently that ¹"The Kremlin leaders do not want war; they want the world."² The Soviet Union has to seek to expand her area of control precisely because nothing she holds is, or can be, secure enough. Everything in the U.S.S.R. (and beyond) protects everything else. The legitimacy of the Soviet state has nothing to do with a social contract of any kind; it rests instead upon the bizarre facts that a handful of adventurers, having turned some nineteenth-century political-economic theorizing on its head, seized a country as the vehicle for their Historic Mission.³ The Soviet empire has to expand, in influence if

²"Strategy in the Decade of the 1980's," Foreign Affairs, Fall, 1980, p. 90.

³Colin S. Gray, "The Most Dangerous Decade: Historic Mission, Legitimacy, and Dynamics of the Soviet Empire in the 1980's," Orbis, Spring 1981, p. 15.

not physically, or risk collapse. At home and abroad, the entire structure rests on force, though generally latent force.

The Soviet Union has not sought "strategic superiority"--as understood in the narrow military terms of the West. Instead, the Soviet Union has sought and achieved a cumulatively dramatic reversal in the "correlation of forces." The "correlation of forces" encompasses political, economic, technological, and psychological dimensions of account that are totally absent from Western assessments of the strategic balance.

There is no single factor, no one dominant reason why the Soviets have acquired a massive military machine, equal to and greater in many respects to that of the United States. Maybe inaction on the part of NATO or the U. S. could be used in order to lay the blame. But who is to say NATO or the U.S. really could have done anything about the buildup in the first place?

In way of summary there are several reasons that help to account for the buildup of the Soviet military forces.

First, very large armed forces have always been the Russian/Soviet modus operandi, as prudently benefits a very large continental power. Second, in Soviet understanding, more military power is always to be preferred to less military power, both because the Soviet perspective on international politics (derived from geopolitics and ideology)

holds that there are always audiences who need to respect Soviet military power and because war is an ever-present possibility. Third, the regeneration of Soviet military power is like a perpetual-motion machine. The Soviet Union is a very highly militarized society, perpetually semi-mobilized for war, and she could not easily "switch off" much of her defense preparation even if she so wished. Domestic stability, to a significant degree, depends upon near ready-state defense preparation on what, by Western standards, is a heroic scale.

Fourth, the Soviet Union is an empire sustained, very largely, by the "awe of the power of the state." As proprietor of an unstable empire, the Soviet leadership has impressively substantial military requirements. The Soviet armed forces, in all their various ramifications, act as a vehicle in which "national unity" may be forged (Kazakhs and Georgians became Soviet soldiers); represent the overwhelming power of the Kremlin; overcome and enforce socialist discipline on East European "allies"; ensure political respect abroad; and, if need be, defend the homeland.

Fifth, military power is recognized to be the one dimension of interstate competition by means of which the U.S.S.R. can control its external environment to a degree useful for benign ends. Military power may be a rather blunt policy instrument, but it seems to guarantee respect. Overall, Soviet grand strategy warrants characterization as prudent and purposeful opportunism. The "prudent"

qualifications stem from the fact that under Leonid Brezhnev the U.S.S.R. has endeavored, successfully, to build a military machine of appropriate size and capable of supporting an ambitious foreign policy; the "purposeful" qualification refers to the fact that the Soviet Union has sought, through patient and expensive efforts, to help create opportunities that she could later exploit.

Finally, there has to be something said about the sheer fact of having military power. Think of the pride and enjoyment the Soviet leadership must feel knowing that only a few short years ago, they were a backward country with very little influence in Europe, not to mention virtual non-recognition as an international leader.⁴

Even though Soviet industry and agriculture remain backward (as compared with the United States, West Germany, or Japan) in the 1980's, for the first time in her history, the Soviet Union is not militarily inferior to her prospective enemies.

The recorded annals of history will reflect a long period of Soviet adventurism during the 1970's. This was a period of history in which the Soviets reached strategic nuclear parity with the United States and overcame all Western conventional forces in quantity and quality. It was

⁴Gray, Orbis.

with this "at hand" capability that enabled the Soviets' adventuristic opportunities with minimal risks.

The period of the 1980's (as can be determined so far) will reflect a more cautious attitude among the Soviet leadership in their role as perpetrator of political activities within the Third World.

There are several reasons why the Soviets have been cautious in their adventuristic exploitation during the early phase of the 1980's. Probably the main reason for a decline in Soviet activity is that there have not been very many opportunities for Soviet expansion like Angola in 1975 or Ethiopia in 1977-78. Throughout 1981, in each of the minor crises--Syrian missiles in Lebanon, the shootdown of the Libyan aircraft, the Sudanese-Chad-Libyan dispute, even El Salvador and Nicaragua--the Soviets did not continue the broad offensive of the late 1970's, but stopped well short of their capabilities for exploitation.

There are several reasons for this apparent cautious attitude on the part of the Soviet leadership. First, the Reagan administration has applied pressure on the Soviets and has accused them of supporting international problems of insurrection and terrorism. Soviet officials have even indicated that it was desirable to insulate regional conflicts from broad U. S.-Soviet relations, thus acknowledging the practical impact of linkage. Second, the Soviets have been faced with internal problems that have diverted their attention. The problems of Afghanistan and Poland, the inability

to formulate a new five-year plan and the need to evaluate very carefully the Reagan policies, all combined to recommend a Soviet holding action. Third, Middle East and Persian Gulf tensions have also altered Soviet intentions. The Iraqi attack against Iran opened the door for Soviet decisions. If they supported their treaty partner, Iraq, then they would have shut out the door on possible future influence in Iran.

The death of Sadat, the new alliance of Libya, South Yemen and Ethiopia, and the struggle for Chad and the Sudan also contributed to a "wait and see" attitude among the Soviet leaders.⁵

In spite of these actions, the importance of Soviet military power remains, and not because all else has failed. It is important precisely because the Soviet leaders believe that military power is decisive in international affairs and is the prerequisite for advancing political goals. Major turning points in Soviet history have been reached by military means; the Civil War, the German invasion, the Hungarian uprising, and the Prague spring and Afghan winter. In confronting the United States in an era of American nuclear monopoly, Stalin maintained huge conventional forces. In an era of United States missile preponderance, Nikita Khrushchev countered with large medium-range missile forces in Europe. In the era of strategic competition, Soviet leaders have

⁵Hyland, p. 538.

demonstrated a determination to build massive forces, at least equal to their opponents and enemies. The Red Army saved the Soviet Union from the brink of extinction forty years ago, and it remains the means to global power.

Trends in the Soviet military force buildup over the past fifteen years have resulted in a number of improvements allowing for the increased use of military power to support foreign policy goals. Primary among these have been the development of an effective Navy with global capability and the expansion of strategic airlift capability. Soviet military leaders have long recognized the political significance of these improvements, and in the early 1970's began making authoritative statements about the utility of Soviet Armed Forces beyond the borders of the U.S.S.R.

Soviet adventurism has been buttressed by the U.S.S.R.'s belief that the "correlation of forces" have shifted in Moscow's favor. Soviet leaders continue to refute any inconsistency between detente with the West and their growing support of revolutionary activism and the insurgencies in the Third World. They believe that comprehensive aid to progressive forces is a moral requirement rather than interference by an external power.

There are many areas of Soviet foreign policy that were not discussed in the context of this thesis due to the isolation of the major variables and their relationships. Likewise, there exists a tremendous amount of material to be examined before future predictions could be made concerning

Soviet actions in the international arena. It does appear, however, that for the immediate future we shall see a continued reliance by the Soviet leadership on their military might, one major dominant resource for the guaranteed "arm of support" for their political actions in the Third World.

It is the expressed hope of this author that one does not misconstrue the intent of this thesis. The U.S.S.R. is not a country without its problems. Questions of the aging leadership, a failing economy, dependence upon Western technology, social discontent, East European worker uprisings, the strengthening ties between China and the U. S., and the ever present threat of U. S.-Soviet confrontation over mutual interest in the Third World, are only a part of the daily considerations that concern the decision-makers in Moscow. It should be clear, however, that there does exist a real and tangible Soviet threat, that is demonstrated by the continued buildup and use of the Soviet armed forces in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A SOVIET NAVY ORDER OF BATTLE (December 1980)

1. Active Ships

Submarines—Nuclear Powered

*SSBN	Ballistic Missile Submarines (YANKEE, DELTA classes)	62
SSBN	Ballistic Missile Submarines (HOTEL class)	8
*SSGN	Cruise Missile Submarines	50
*SSN	Torpedo-Attack Submarines	55

Submarines—Diesel-electric Powered

SSB	Ballistic Missile Submarines	17
SSG	Cruise Missile Submarines	20
*SS	Torpedo-Attack Submarines	160

Aircraft Carriers and Helicopter Cruisers

CVHG	VSTOL Carriers (KIEV class)	2
CHG	Helicopter Cruisers (MOSKVA class)	2

Cruisers

*CGN	Guided Missile Cruiser (Nuclear) (KIROV class)	1
*CG	Guided Missile Cruisers (SAM/SSM**)	25
CL	Light Cruisers (SVERDLOV class)	9

Destroyers

DDG	Guided Missile Destroyers (SAM/SSM**)	3
DD	Destroyers	3

Frigates (Escorts)

*FFG	Guided Missile Frigates (KRIVAK class)	2
*FF/FFL	Frigates/small frigates	14

Small Combatants

*Missile Craft	14
*Patrol/ASW/Torpedo Craft	39
*Minesweepers (Fleet, Coastal, Inshore)	40

Amphibious Ships

*LPD	Amphibious Assault Transport Dock (IVAN ROGOV class)	
LST	Amphibious Vehicle Landing Ships (ALLIGATOR, ROPUCHA classes)	2
LSM	Medium Landing Ships (POLNOCNY/MP-4 classes)	6

Auxiliary Ships

*Mobile Logistics Ships	15
*Other Auxiliaries Ships	61

*Indicates additional units under construction in these categories.

**All Armed with Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM); some additionally armed with Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSM).

***Numbers are approximate in many instances. It is noted that "Small Combatants" and "Auxiliary Ship" categories include a large number of craft which would not be "commissioned" ships in the U.S. Navy.

Appendix A (continued)

**2. Active Aircraft
(including helicopters)**

Strike/Bombers 370

BACKFIRE
BADGER
BLINDER

Fighter/Fighter Bombers 90

FITTER
FORGER

Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare Aircraft . 170

BADGER
BEAR D
BLINDER

Antisubmarine Aircraft 390

BEAR F HOUND
HAZE MAIL
HORMONE MAY

Tanker Aircraft 70

BADGER

Transport/Training Aircraft 340

Total approximately 1,430

3. Personnel Strength

Afloat 185,000

Naval Aviation 59,000

Coastal Defense 8,000

Naval Infantry 12,000


Training 54,000

Shore Support 125,000

Total 443,000


Source: U.S. Department of the Navy, Understanding Soviet Naval
Developments, 1981, p. 69-70.

APPENDIX B **AREA OF NIZHNIY TAGIL TANK PLANT**
(Superimposed on Washington, D.C.)



Source: U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*, 1981, p. 11.

APPENDIX C **SOVIET MILITARY FORCES**



NORTHERN FLEET
TOTAL NUMBER IN FLEET 517
SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION 319

BALTIC FLEET
TOTAL NUMBER IN FLEET 548
SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION 319

**BLACK SEA FLEET/
CASPIAN FLOTILLA**
TOTAL NUMBER IN FLEET 547
SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION 306

PACIFIC FLEET
TOTAL NUMBER IN FLEET 728
SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION 438

NAVAL FORCES

SURFACE COMBATANTS 1,287
SUBMARINES 317
AUXILIARIES 76
SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION 1,406

AIR DEFENSE FORCES

INTERCEPTORS 2,500
SAM LAUNCHERS 10,000
ABM LAUNCHERS 32

AIR FORCES

LONG RANGE AVIATION 690
BACKLIRE BADGER BEAR
FRONTAL AVIATION 4,800

GROUND FORCES

MOTORIZED INFANTRY 1,000,000
TANK DIVISIONS 47
AIRBORNE DIVISIONS 7
COMBAT READY: 100% AUTHORIZED WARTIME STRENGTH
MOTORIZED INFANTRY 1,000,000
TANK DIVISIONS 47
AIRBORNE DIVISIONS 7
COMBAT READY: 100% AUTHORIZED WARTIME STRENGTH

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

ICBMs
SS 11 500
SS 12 40
SS 13 150
SS 14 300
SS 15 300
SS 16 300
SS 17 300
SS 18 300
SS 19 300

IRBMs/NIRBMs
SS 4 300
SS 5 30
SS 6 250
SS 7 250

SLBMs
SS N 1 960
SS N 2 960
SS N 3 960

SOVIET TROOPS ELSEWHERE

