

350-7175

AL-FATAH

"THE PALESTINE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT"

A Thesis

Presented to

the Division of Social Sciences

Kansas State Teachers College of Emporia

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Science

by

Mohsen Mohamed Abubaker Fareed

February 1973

Earl L. Rohrbaugh
Approved for the Major Department

John E. Peterson
Approved for the Graduate Council

335154

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The writer wishes to express his appreciation to many people who have made it possible to conduct this study. Appreciation is extended to the Al-Fatah sources in Beirut, Lebanon and other places, for their kind cooperation and help in obtaining a great deal of the sources of this study.

The writer wishes to thank members of his thesis committee, Mr. Dale M. Garvey and Dr. Peter Geib, for their constructive criticisms in the organization of this study. Grateful acknowledgment is given to Mr. Earl Rohrbaugh, who served as chairman of the thesis committee. His generosity in giving of time, encouragement, and valuable advice was most helpful in making this study possible.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. THE PROBLEM AND THE GOAL	1
The Problem	1
Statement of Purpose	2
The Importance of the Study	2
The Sources	2
II. THE PALESTINE PROBLEM	4
The Zionist Idea	4
The Balfour Declaration	6
The Creation of the State of Israel	9
The Refugee Problem	10
III. THE EMERGENCE OF AL-FATAH MOVEMENT	13
The Idea	14
The Underground Years: 1958-1964	16
From Theory to Practice	22
The Al-Fatah Movement and the 1967 War	27
The Battle of Al-Karameh	29
The Israeli View of Palestinian Guerrillas	35
The Structure of Al-Fatah	39
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF THE AL-FATAH MOVEMENT	44
Ideology (definition)	45
The Characteristics of Ideology	46

Chapter	Page
The Functions of Ideology	47
THE DOCTRINE OF THE AL-FATAH	
VIS-A-VIS THE ARAB REGIMES	48
Arab Unity or Liberation of Palestine? . . .	48
Conventional War or Guerrilla Warfare?	55
The Palestinian Identity	60
Palestinian Armed Struggle: The New Alternative	65
Al-Fatah and the International Theories of Guerrillas Warfare	70
Al-Fatah's Social Ideology	73
V. AL-FATAH'S SOLUTION	
"A DEMOCRATIC NON-SECTARIAN STATE IN PALESTINE"	79
The Palestine of Tomorrow	80
PROFILE OF THE PALESTINE OF TOMORROW	84
The Country	84
The Constituents	84
The Ideology	86
Is The "Palestine of Tomorrow" Viable? . . .	88
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	90
SUMMARY	90
CONCLUSIONS	98
BIBLIOGRAPHY	101
A. ENGLISH LANGUAGE	102
B. ARABIC LANGUAGE	109

Chapter I

THE PROBLEM AND THE GOAL

The Problem

After the creation of the State of Israel in Palestine in 1948, the assumption which underlay the attitude of Israel and the Western Powers was that sooner or later the Palestinian refugees would melt away, absorbed into the surrounding Arab countries, and then the problem of Palestine would cease to exist.¹ But this was a false assumption. The Palestinian people remained in being as a people who had lost almost everything, but were determined to continue to exist.

The solution to the Palestine problem, the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed, would come with time--when a new generation of Palestinians emerged free from association with Palestine and without memory of the land and its past.² Far from proving Dulles' prophecy, the new Palestinian generation has produced a guerrilla movement dedicated to the principle that the liberation of Palestine from Zionism is a national duty and can only be achieved by

¹Alen R. Taylor and Richard N. Tetlie, Palestine: A Search for Truth. Approaches to the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1970), p. 162.

²Hisham Sharabi, Palestine Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1970), p. vii.

armed struggle.

Statement of Purpose

Since "The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Al-Fatah," has been the largest and best known Palestinian guerrilla organization, it is the purpose of this study to examine the development and doctrine of this organization and, accordingly, to examine its place as an important factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Importance of the Study

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not of mere academic interest. There is another important reason why people everywhere should know the nature of that conflict. The conflict, in fact, is a permanently explosive issue which could lead to world upheaval. It now affects the lives of millions of people in the Middle East. If it widens, it could affect the lives of tens of millions of people elsewhere. Therefore, since the Palestinians are a principle party immediately concerned in most of the issues at stake in the Middle East today, it seems appropriate to examine and analyze their thoughts and problems.

The Sources

The sources of this study consist of books, scholarly journals, articles, the publications of AL-FATAH (in English and Arabic) and its most important memoranda and handbills. Because of the nature of the study, it was necessary to rely upon some important materials in the Arabic language. At the

same time, since Al-Fatah has been a secret organization in its structure and, therefore, not open to detailed scrutiny, it was necessary to draw some conclusions as to the attitudes and motives of its leaders by inference, after analyzing the material at hand.

Chapter II

THE PALESTINE PROBLEM

The Al-Fatah movement is not an isolated phenomenon. On the contrary, it is a natural product of the Palestine problem. Without understanding, first, the Palestine problem itself, one cannot understand the Al-Fatah organization.

It is the object of this chapter to outline the main elements of that problem. It will include a discussion of the Zionist movement, when and how it emerged, the meaning and significance of the Balfour Declaration, the disappearance of the Palestinians as a political entity and the emergence of the State of Israel in 1948.

The Zionist Idea

The idea of creating a Jewish State originated at the end of the last century with the aim of finding a home for the Jews of Europe, who for a long time had suffered from discrimination and persecution.¹ In a pamphlet named Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State), published in 1896, Theodor Herzl, an Austrian Journalist, developed the theme that creation of a "Jewish State" was the answer to "antisemitism,"² and the

¹Paul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1961), p. 177.

²The term "antisemitism" implies antagonism to all persons of Semitic origin and their culture; it actually means hatred of the Jews.

solution of the Jewish problem.³ As for the location of the proposed state, Herzl suggested the choice of Palestine or Argentina, but observed, "we shall take what is given us and what is selected by Jewish public opinion."⁴ He stated that Argentina had a sparse population and that infiltration of Jews there had produced some discontent.⁵

In 1897, Herzl, by his plan, convened the first Zionist Congress at Basle, Switzerland.⁶ Zionist leaders at the congress concluded that Palestine offered to the Jews an emotional and religious appeal which no other territory offered.⁷ The Congress, therefore, recommended the promotion of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish workers and the strengthening of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness.⁸

Herzl, accordingly, made efforts to secure the support of the German Kaiser and the Sultan of Turkey in favor of Jewish colonization in Palestine, but the efforts failed.⁹ He

³Israel Cohen, A Short History of Zionism (London: Frederick Muller, Ltd., 1951), p. 41.

⁴Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State (London: Zionist Organization, 1934), p. 30.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Jeremiah Ben-Jacob, The Rise of Israel (New York: Judicial Printing Company, Inc., 1949), p. 58.

⁷Gershon Winer, The Founding Fathers of Israel (New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1971), p. 33.

⁸M. I. Bodenheimer, Prelude to Israel (New York: A.S. Barnes and Company, Inc., 1963), p. 103.

⁹Desmond Stewart, The Middle East: Temple of Janus (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1971), pp. 155, 165.

then turned to the British Government with suggestion that Uganda, in Africa, be handed over to the Zionist Organization for the purpose of colonization.¹⁰ The British Government accepted Herzl's proposal, but Herzl died in 1904 and the Seventh Zionist Congress, held in the following year, turned down the Uganda project and declared that Zionism was concerned solely with Palestine.¹¹

The Balfour Declaration

The Zionist plan to colonize Palestine remained dormant until the First World War, when the Zionists saw a chance of winning political support for their program. Under the leadership of Dr. Weizmann, a Russian-born chemistry professor at Manchester University, the Zionists concentrated their efforts on the British Government.¹² On November 2, 1917, the British Government took a step of momentous significance which gave the signal for the beginning of the conflict. It was the proclamation of what was called the "Balfour Declaration."

His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish

¹⁰John H. Davis, The Evasive Peace: A Study of the Zionist-Arab Problem (London: Cox and Wyman Ltd., 1969), p. 3.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Hector Bolitho (ed.), Twelve Jews (New York: Books for Libraries Press, Inc., 1967), p. 280.

communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.¹³

This was something of a contradictory declaration, since it was difficult to create a Jewish national home in Palestine without prejudicing the rights of the Palestinian Arab community; especially when the Arabs of Palestine did then number 92% of the population and the Jews, only 8%.¹⁴

On the other hand, while the British Government was assuring the Zionist Jews of its sympathy with their aspirations in Palestine, it was also giving profuse assurance and pledges to the Arabs that their independence from Turkey would be established as soon as the war ended.¹⁵ Britain, therefore, encouraged the Arabs to revolt against the Turks. The Arab revolt, led by King Hussein of Hejaz, in 1917, and reinforced by the Arabs of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, made, as a British minister indicated, a substantial contribution to the Allied victory in the First World War.¹⁶

Meanwhile, as was later revealed, the British and the French had, in 1916, entered into the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement under which these two major powers were to divide

¹³Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961), p. 548.

¹⁴Majdia D. Khaduri (ed.), The Arab-Israeli Impasse: Expressions of Moderate Viewpoints on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Robert B. Luce, Inc., 1968), p. 54.

¹⁵Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East 1914-1956 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), p. 27.

¹⁶Anthony Nutting, The Arabs (New York: The New American Library, 1964), p. 283.

between themselves control of much of the Arab world as soon as the Turkish empire could be destroyed.¹⁷ That agreement was translated into the League of Nations' Mandate System under which Britain took over the supervision of Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq, while France acquired dominance in Lebanon and Syria.¹⁸

By the mid-1920's with British administrators and occupation forces installed in Palestine, a seemingly irreconcilable conflict was emerging. The "Holy Land" was claimed by growing groups of Jewish newcomers, gathering in from many parts of the world. It was also claimed by the long-settled Arab (Muslim and Christian) majority who took it for granted that they should in time control their own political destiny.¹⁹

The Palestinians did not succeed in their efforts to stop Zionism. Beginning in the 1920's, accelerating in 1930's and 1940's, the violent struggle of Jew against Arab and Arab against Jew, and sporadic attacks by extremist terrorist gangs on both sides against the British, repeatedly broke the calm which the British mandate government tried to maintain.²⁰

¹⁷Jukka Nevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab Middle East 1914-1920 (London: University of London, The Athlone Press, 1969), p. 44.

¹⁸Don Peretz, The Middle East Today (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971), pp. 105-106.

¹⁹David Waines, The Unholy War: Israel and Palestine 1897-1971 (Wilmette, Illinois: Medina University Press International, 1971), p. 58.

²⁰Arthur Koestler, Promise and Fulfillment: Palestine 1917-1949 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 90.

Well warned though the British and the world were, by these disorders, no solution to the problem was found. Study commission followed study commission, but the international community paid little attention to what was happening then and gave scant thought to what might happen later.²¹

The Creation of the State of Israel

One of the first problems faced by the infant United Nations was the collapse of the British Mandate and the necessity to find some internationally acceptable solution to the Palestinian-Jewish conflict in Palestine. The United Nations' study commission recommended partition of Palestine and creation of separate Jewish and Arab States as the only solution with any hope of success.²²

This United Nations plan of partition was approved by two-thirds vote of its members but it was never accepted by the Palestinians nor by any of the Arab States.²³ Armed conflict in Palestine broke out almost as soon as the first news of the United Nations' partition decision reached the Middle East. Violent reprisals and counter-reprisals between the Palestinians and the Jews spread all over Palestine. By

²¹Jon and David Kimche, A Clash of Destinies: The Arab-Jewish War and the Founding of the State of Israel (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1960), p. 20.

²²David Horowitz, State in the Making (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953), p. 281.

²³Malcolm H. Kerr, The Middle East Conflict (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 1968), p. 4.

May 14, 1948, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were forced to leave their homes and were driven to the borders around Palestine.²⁴ This is what David Ben Gurion, Israel's first Prime Minister, meant when he wrote that, "by May 14, 1948, Zionism had reached its goal in a state made larger and Jewish by Haganah,"²⁵ the Zionist military organization created in 1920. Later, it was to form the core of the Israeli army.

Thus, fifty-two years after Theodor Herzl had published his book Der Judenstaat, his dream of a Jewish State became a reality. For the Zionist Jews, May 14, 1948, was a day of triumph and jubilation. For the Arabs, it was a day of bitter humiliation and of determination to reclaim the soil of Palestine.²⁶

The Refugee Problem

In the wake of the creation of Israel in 1948, the Palestinians disappeared as a political entity and no longer possessed the characteristics of a distinct people. They scattered in several camps around the borders of Palestine

²⁴Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History (London: Oxford University Press, Vol. 8, 1963), p. 290; Munya Mardor, Haganah (New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1964), p.89; Alan R. Taylor, Prelude to Israel (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), p. 113.

²⁵David Ben Gurion, Rebirth and Destiny of Israel (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), p. 292.

²⁶John H. Davis, The Evasive Peace, p. 39.

(Israel after 1948) and became known to the world as "refugees."²⁷

From 1948 onward, the life of the Palestinian refugees has been hard and full of bitter disappointments.²⁸ The United Nations promised them in many resolutions "the free choice" of repatriation or compensation, but only supplied them with "some flour, oil and second-hand clothing."²⁹ The Arab rulers coined liberation slogans. They gave the Palestinians endless promises that the time would come very soon when they (the Arab rulers) would "liquidate" the State of Israel and bring them (the Palestinian refugees) back to their homes and lands.³⁰

27 The Palestinian Population 1970

Jordan	900,000
West Bank	670,000
Gaza Strip	364,000
Israel	340,000
Lebanon	240,000
Syria	155,000
Kuwait	140,000
U.A.R.	33,000
Iraq	14,000
The Arabian Gulf	15,000
Libya	5,000
Saudi, Arabia	20,000
U.S.A.	7,000
Latin America	5,000
West Germany	15,000
Total	<u>2,923,000</u>

Journal of Palestine Studies (Beirut: Vol. No. 2, Winter 1972), p. 81.

²⁸Michael Curtis (ed.), People and Politics in the Middle East (Newark: Transaction, Inc., 1971), p. 87.

²⁹Shlomo Avineri (ed.), Israel and the Palestinians (New York: Published by Shlomo Avineri, 1971), p. 93.

³⁰George M. Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, Publishers, Inc., 1971), p. 46.

The Palestinians, after about twenty years of promises, became convinced that unless they took their issue into their own hands, others (The UN, the Big Powers and the Arab States) would do nothing for them. Thus, without much choice, they found themselves, on the eve of 1965, taking up arms; starting their long and painful struggle for "the liberation of Palestine."³¹

These, briefly, were the circumstances which led to the birth of "The Palestine National Liberation Movement Al-Fatah."

³¹Elizabeth Monroe and others, Time Bomb in the Middle East (New York: Friendship Press, 1969), p. 82.

Chapter III

THE EMERGENCE OF AL-FATAH MOVEMENT

The preceding chapter of this study aimed to point out the events that have led up to the present impasse in the Middle East. In other words, it indicated briefly, the origins of what has been commonly called "The Palestine Problem." It indicated also how the Al-Fatah movement came into being as a logical response to the Palestinian bitterness and frustrations.

In this chapter, the effort will be concentrated on an attempt to explore when and how the idea of establishing the Al-Fatah organization was born. An attempt will be made to follow the development of this organization from being merely an idea in the early fifties to its first military operation against the State of Israel on the eve of 1965.

Special treatment will be devoted to two significant events in the history and destiny of the Al-Fatah movement. The "1967 War," and the "battle of Al-Karamah," on March 21, 1968. Since the Israelis are the other party of that conflict, identifying their view of Al-Fatah will become necessary. Finally, a general look at the organizational structure of Al-Fatah will be the closing section of this chapter.

The Idea

A man by the name of Yasser Arafat, who had been known since 1965, as "Abu Ammar," was, from the very beginning, the leader of the founding group of Al-Fatah movement.¹ To a great extent, the history of Arafat and that of Al-Fatah--especially in the underground years--almost coincide.

In the early 1950's, Yasser Arafat, began his studies in the school of engineering in Cairo University. The university offered him an ideal atmosphere to begin his political activity. It is well-known that the students have always been the most active body in Egyptian political life.² After the creation of Israel in 1948, hundreds of young Palestinians came to study in Egyptian schools and universities, searching for new hope and seeking new fields for action.³ This was the atmosphere in which Arafat started his long way in establishing the Al-Fatah organization.

At that time, Arafat had no detailed ideas. What he had in mind was that something must be done. The struggle against the new State of Israel should be launched and continued, and the Palestinians should be the vanguard of this struggle.⁴

¹Eugene M. Fisher and M. Cherif Bassiouni, Storm Over the Arab World: A People in Revolution (Chicago: Follett Publishing Company, 1972), p. 270.

²Anour Abdel Malek, Egypt: Military Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 23.

³Eugene M. Fisher and M. Cherif Bassiouni, Storm Over the Arab World, p. 45.

⁴David Waimes, The Unholy War, p. 173.

In 1952, Arafat founded the "Union of Palestinian Students in Egypt." In the Union, he first met several young Palestinians who were to become his colleagues in Al-Fatah leadership. Arafat was elected to serve as the Union's first chairman, a post which he held until 1956.⁵

The idea of the creation of an independent Palestinian underground organization began in 1956 after the British, French and Israeli invasion of Egypt in the wake of the nationalization of the Suez Canal. When Israel occupied the Gaza Strip as a result of that invasion, many Palestinians were disillusioned by the Arab States' inability to regain Palestine. This was epitomized in Egypt's failure to defend the Gaza Strip.⁶ Arafat and his colleagues came to the conclusion that the Palestinians had to take their destiny into their own hands. In 1958, the organization was formed under the name of *"The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Al-Fatah"*⁷

In the late fifties, Arafat and his colleagues were forced to leave Egypt. They saw no chance of the government's granting them freedom of movement and activity. They were afraid that if they did not leave the country that their "Union of

⁵Shatah Mousa, "The General Union of Palestinian Student's Experiment," Palestine Affairs - a bimonthly journal published in Arabic by the Palestine Research Center, Beirut, No. 4 (November 1971), 181.

⁶Y. Harkabi, Fedayeen Action and The Arab Strategy (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, September 1970), p. 6.

⁷Eugene M. Fisher and M. Cherif Bassiouni, Storm Over the Arab World, p. 270.

The word "Al-Fatah" means "conquest" but is also the reverse initials of "The Palestine National Liberation Movement" in Arabic.

Palestinian Students in Egypt" would be dissolved.⁸ By this time, some of the Al-Fatah leaders had completed their studies and wanted to start work. Most of them traveled to Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf Shiekdoms, which had become prosperous through their oil, thus attracting thousands of Palestinians in exile. Arafat, having in mind these thousands of Palestinians, joined his older brother (who already had migrated to Kuwait), who helped him to obtain a job as an engineer in the Department of Public Works.⁹

By leaving Egypt, Arafat and his colleagues had closed the first chapter in Al-Fatah history. They remained outside Egypt, never setting foot in Egypt again until 1968.

The Underground Years: 1958-1964

In Kuwait, Arafat and his colleagues had to start from the beginning to build the Palestinian organization of their dreams. At first, Arafat worked as a public service engineer; then he left the job and opened a private contractor's office. He became a well-to-do man, and was free to devote himself more and more to the founding of the organization he dreamed of. Arafat preached to his acquaintances the urgent necessity of doing something to put an end to the suffering from hunger and cold in the refugee camps of hundreds of thousands of

⁸p. J. Vatikiotis, Conflict in the Middle East (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1971), p. 164.

⁹Edmund Gareeb, "An Interview With Abu-Ammar," The Arab World (New York), XV, No. 5 (May 1969), 27.

Palestinians. He urged the Palestinians to break loose from the guardianship of the Arab regimes.¹⁰

Kuwait and the oil shiekdoms of the Arabian Gulf, as was indicated earlier, were the homes of thousands of Palestinian refugees. Learned Palestinians filled positions in the educational system and held numerous posts in the local public administration and the oil companies.¹¹ The Al-Fatah founding group approached people of their own age, teachers, engineers, workers, students and business men, "most of whom were relatively well-off and unburdened with a family and were both politically alert and free to devote themselves to public activities."¹²

In the beginning of 1960, the Al-Fatah founding group established a secret center in Beirut, Lebanon to prepare the ground for the transfer of the Al-Fatah headquarters from distant Kuwait to Beirut, near Israel and the main Palestinian concentrations.¹³ In Beirut, the Al-Fatah leaders hoped to break the isolation they had known in Kuwait. Beirut is well known as a center of Arab politics and propaganda. At the same time, it is a center for foreign correspondents and diplomats. Above all, it is, as indicated above, the residence

¹⁰Gerard Chaliand, The Palestinian Resistance (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1972), p. 55.

¹¹Nabeel Shaath, "High Level Palestinian Manpower," Journal of Palestine Studies (Beirut), I, No. 2 (Winter 1972), 89.

¹²Gerard Chaliand, The Palestinian Resistance, p. 72.

¹³Ehud Yaari, Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah - Translated from the Hebrew by Esther Vaari (New York: American-Israeli Publishing Co., Ltd., 1970), p. 31.

of tens of thousands of the Palestinians. For these reasons, Beirut seemed desirable as a headquarters for this secret organization.

While the founding group of Al-Fatah was trying to transfer their headquarters to Beirut, the political climate of the Arab world was showing signs of important changes. Two important events took place in 1961 and 1962. These two events gave Al-Fatah a tremendous push and more determination to continue in its path, regardless of any sacrifices. The first event was the disintegration of the United Arab Republic in 1961 with the withdrawal of Syria. After that event, the Palestinians, who had rushed to join the pan-Arab parties (the Baath Party and the Arab Nationalist Movement) and to bathe in the rising star of Nasserism, grew gradually disappointed with Egypt's chances for uniting the Arab world under its wings and leading it to struggle for the liberation of Palestine. In 1962, the Palestinians found additional reason for their disappointment when President Nasser, in one of his speeches, clearly declared, "We do not have a plan for the liberation of Palestine."¹⁴

As hope for deliverance by Nasser's hands was diminishing, the second important event, which captured the hearts of the Palestinians, took place in 1962. It was the success of the Algerian Revolution. To Al-Fatah leaders, Algeria's

¹⁴Russell Stetler (ed.), Palestine: The Arab-Israeli Conflict (San Francisco, California: Ramparts Press, Inc., 1972), p. 129.

victory was interpreted as a new proof of their theory that a long and stubborn struggle with its enormous casualties could win them a victory over Israel.¹⁵

The Algerian victory had opened a new chapter in Al-Fatah's history. In 1962, while almost all the Arab regimes were causing great difficulties for members of Al-Fatah, Algeria was granting them her advice and support.¹⁶ Arafat and some of his colleagues were invited to come to Algeria in December 1962. They met with President Ben-Bella and Boumedienne (the latter is the President of Algeria today). Al-Fatah leaders asked the Algerians to support their struggle, to train Palestinians and to help Al-Fatah launch the Palestinian revolution. The Algerian government's response was positive. It put at Al-Fatah's disposal a large building in the capital, Algiers, where Al-Fatah opened its first official office under the name of the "Palestine Bureau."¹⁷ Those were the first ties between the Al-Fatah Movement and Algeria, ties which have been maintained in varying forms until today.

¹⁵Al-Fatah Pamphlets: Series of "Revolutionary Lessons and Trials," From the Starting Points of Fedayeen Action (in Arabic), New Reprint, August 1967, pp. 29-30.

¹⁶Mohammed Yazid (Algeria's Ambassador in Lebanon), "Algeria and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," Journal of Palestine Studies, I, No. 2 (Winter 1972), 6.

¹⁷The Palestine National Liberation Movement, AL-FATAH, "The Armed Palestinian Revolution and Its Developments," (In Arabic), Beirut: No. 106, 1967, p. 10.

During Al-Fatah's underground years (1958-1964), one of its central objectives was capturing the "General Union of Palestinian Students." The Union brought together tens of thousands of Palestinian students in most parts of the Arab world, Western Europe and the United States of America.¹⁸ Al-Fatah's aim was to set-up secret cells among the students and finally to take control over the various branches of the Union. Arafat exploited his prestige as the founder of the Union's Egyptian branch. Al-Fatah was quite successful in recruiting Palestinian students in Lebanon and Algerian colleges, but its greatest accomplishment in this respect was among the thousands of Palestinian students in West Germany. Hani el-Hassan, one of Al-Fatah's well-known leaders in the Arab world and Western Europe today, was the head of the Union of Palestinian Students' German branch.¹⁹

Al-Fatah still was surrounded by a hostile atmosphere from the Arab regimes. The Arab press did not give it a chance to declare and defend its doctrine. Therefore, Al-Fatah's leaders found it necessary to issue their own paper in which they could spread and defend their ideas.

In the early 1960's, a small monthly periodical made its appearance in Beirut under the name "Our Palestine," a seemingly innocuous Palestinian political-literary review, but,

¹⁸Shatah Mousa, "The General Union of Palestinian Student's Experiment," Palestine Affairs, pp. 183-184.

¹⁹Ehud Yaari, Strike Terror, p. 39.

in fact, the organ of the underground Al-Fatah organization.²⁰

In 1963, the Arab States and Israel entered into a dispute over the issue of the water of River Jordan. When Israel announced its intention to divert the water of upper Jordan, an Arab summit meeting was held in Alexandria, Egypt. The Arab rulers declared that the Israeli plan constituted an act of aggression against Arab rights and threatened to meet it by force.²¹

At the end of 1963, when Israel actually started carrying out her plan, the Arab Kings and Presidents delivered no more than their customary enthusiastic speeches.²² Al-Fatah, accordingly, called the Arab masses to revolt against their corrupted leaders and governments. It called, too, to break the barriers that Arab regimes had mounted along the way to a revolutionary struggle by the Palestinians, themselves. Al-Fatah stated:

. . . All we demand is that you "Arab regimes" surround Palestine with a preventative belt of defenses, and watch the battle between us "Palestinians" and the Zionists. . . . All we want is that you "Arab regimes" take your hands off Palestine.²³

In this period of 1963, Al-Fatah's leaders continued obstinately to preach the need for setting-up an independent

²⁰Abdullah Schleifer, "Palestine Liberation Movement," The Arab World (New York: May 1969), p. 19.

²¹Russell Stetler (ed.), Palestine: The Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 131.

²²Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abdel Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 99.

²³Al-Fatah Pamphlets: Series of "Revolutionary Lessons and Trials," Revolutionary Stands (In Arabic) (Beirut: New Print, May, 1968), p. 9.

Palestinian Fedayeen (self-sacrificers) Movement, far from the Arab government's guardianship, which would begin the struggle for the return to Palestine. In order to make the founding of such a movement feasible, all Palestinians who were working within the different Arab political parties, were called upon to leave these formations and work only, and directly, for the cause of Palestine liberation.²⁴ All Arab governments and ruling parties were requested to allow the Palestinians to dedicate themselves solely to the Palestine cause and not push them into "raging partisan side-issues" or "inter-state" disputes which would consume their energy and divert their attention. In the final analysis, Al-Fatah's leaders completely believed that the attempt to deal with the Palestine problem on an all-Arab basis had failed and, therefore, it urged the return to a regional basis; to the separate Palestinian framework.²⁵ (This subject will be treated in detail in the next chapter).

From Theory to Practice

Towards the end of 1963, Al-Fatah's founding group had almost completed the establishment of the necessary cells of their organization. By this time, Al-Fatah was composed of a few hundred Palestinian youth throughout the Arab World

²⁴Abdullah Schleifer, "Palestine Liberation Movement," The Arab World, p. 19.

²⁵Hani el-Hassan (Member of Al-Fatah's Central Committee), "Al-Fatah: In Theory and Practice," Palestine Affairs (Beirut: The Palestine Research Center, No. 7, March 1972), pp. 17-18.

and West Germany.²⁶ Al-Fatah's leaders were waiting for the "zero hour." They were haunted by anxiety, fearing if they did not hurry, they would never accomplish their objective.²⁷ In August, 1963, "Our Palestine," Al-Fatah's monthly periodical, wrote:

The Palestinian multitudes will soon, very soon, go forth with the help of the Arab masses. They will shatter all borders, chains and barriers, and plundering Zionist imperialist existence.²⁸

By the middle of 1964, an analysis of the Arab States' situation and the international situation, as well, convinced Al-Fatah's leadership of the futility of the Palestinian's dependence on the Arab States and the United Nations. They realized that the Palestinian people can not achieve their goal of return to Palestine at the hands of the Arab rulers who employed the Palestinian problem for their internal consumption.²⁹

Out of this analysis and conviction, and after about six years of preparations, the Al-Fatah leadership decided to launch the "Palestinian Struggle for the Liberation of Palestine." On New Year's Eve, 1964-1965, one of "Al-Assifa"³⁰

²⁶Jean Larteguy, The Walls of Israel (New York: M. Evans and Company, Inc., 1968), p. 219.

²⁷Al-Fatah Pamphlets: Revolutionary Stands, p. 5.

²⁸Ibid., p. 10.

²⁹The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Al-Fatah, The Armed Palestinian Revolution and Its Developments (in Arabic), Beirut: No. 106, 1967, p. 12.

³⁰An Arabic word meaning "the storm."

(the military wing of Al-Fatah) units carried out, deep inside Israel, the first military operation.³¹ With this military action, which has been called "the opening shot of the Palestinian Revolution," the Al-Fatah organization made its first public appearance upon the Middle East political scene. Since then, it has won newspaper headlines and a world-wide reputation. The moderate Lebanese journalist Ghassan Tueini described the emergence of Al-Fatah movement as "the single most significant event in the Arab world for the last 50 years."³²

With the birth of the Palestinian resistance, Al-Fatah issued the "Military Communique No. I," which read in part:

. . . Sixteen years have elapsed while our people live detached from their cause which has been shelved at the United Nations as a problem of displaced refugees, whereas the enemy plans, with all his means, on the local and international levels, for an extended stay on our homeland.

In the light of this distressing fact and because of the adverse effect of the lapse of time, Al-Assifa (the storm) forces have been launched forth to reiterate to the enemy and the world at large, that this people (of Palestine) did not die and that armed revolution is the road to the return and to victory.³³

In the Arab capitals, the news of that first command's operation was quoted without comment. Most of the Arab States

³¹Michael Howard and Robert Hunter, Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of 1967 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967), p. 12.

³²Herbert Moson (ed.), Reflections on the Middle East Crisis (New York: Mouton and Co., 1970), p. 78.

³³Al-Fatah Pamphlets: Revolution Until Victory (Beirut: 1969), pp. 4-5.

were taken by surprise. The veil of mystery surrounding the Al-Fatah Movement (1965) made it more difficult for the Arab masses to define an unequivocal position toward it. The most interesting reaction came from the pages of "Al-Anwar," a Lebanese newspaper, when it wrote, directly after Al-Fatah's first military operation that:

. . . Al-Fatah organization has connections with Western agents and with Israel . . . the aim is to offer Israel an excuse for attacking Arab States and for preventing the diversion of the River Jordan tributaries³⁴

Arab public opinion continued for some time to vacillate between admiration for the unknown commandos who had robbed the Arab regimes of the initiative, and uneasiness with regard to the consequences of their deeds.

Al-Fatah military activities grew more popular in the Arab world as the other methods of struggle against Israel proved ineffective. Many Palestinians began to join Al-Fatah cadres. Its news and ideas began to spread (in spite of Arab governments' censorship) and to occupy the headlines of the Arab newspapers.³⁵ At this stage, Al-Fatah military activities were not considered an aim in themselves. The intent of Al-Fatah, at this take-off stage between 1965 and 1967, was:

³⁴Ehud Yaari, Strike Terror, p. 61; Russell Stetler, Palestine: The Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 129.

³⁵Eugene M. Fisher and M. Cherif Bassiouni, Storm Over the Arab World, p. 277.

1. To personify the Palestinian refusal of the status quo; present the Palestinian cause to international public opinion as a cause of liberation, rather than a problem of refugees, mobilize the Arab masses and instigate them to armed revolutionary action.³⁶

2. To incarnate the authentic revolutionary means for the liberation of Palestine through armed violence and prevent attempts by the Arab regimes to contain the Palestine struggle.³⁷

3. To create a revolutionary atmosphere in the refugee camps aiming at ripening the objective conditions necessary for the emergence of armed revolution.³⁸

4. To give the new generation of the Palestinian refugees the opportunity to become accustomed to taking up arms and to acquaint them with the Palestinian soil through armed raids.

5. To focus the true nature of the struggle in the Middle East to allow the Palestinian people to assume their leading role in the liberation of their homeland and thereby prevent the presentation of the problem of Palestine as a regional one over disputed borders.³⁹

³⁶Al-Fatah Pamphlets: Revolution Until Victory, p. 6.

³⁷Al-Fatah Pamphlets: series of "Revolutionary Lessons and Trials," This Is Our Revolution (In Arabic), October 1968, p. 6.

³⁸Al-Fatah Pamphlets: Series of "Revolutionary Lessons and Trials," How Will The People's Armed Revolution Explode (in Arabic), New Reprint, August 1967, p. 29.

³⁹Al-Fatah Pamphlets: Revolution Until Victory, p. 7.

Al-Fatah military operations in early 1967 started to escalate and the Palestinian resistance began to grow and to muster increased mass support. On the other hand, Al-Fatah cadres were exposed to imprisonment and torture at the hands of both Israel and some of the Arab regimes. For example, the first casualty of Al-Fatah's commandos was killed, not at the hands of the Israeli army, but by King Hussein's troops.⁴⁰ But arrests and sacrifices only helped increase Al-Fatah's prestige in the eyes of the Arab masses. The turning point in Al-Fatah history came on June 5, 1967.

The Al-Fatah Movement and the 1967 War

The Six Day War of 1967 constituted a military, political, economic and psychological diaster for the Arab Nations. But the Al-Fatah Movement was the only one which saw, in the June defeat, the beginning of a victory.⁴¹ "The Victors of the 1967 War," a French writer wrote, "were the Israelis and the Palestinians" because the conflict resumed, for the first time since 1948, its true character as a conflict between the Zionists from one side, and the Palestinians from the other.⁴²

⁴⁰John Law, "Why War Threatens Again in the Middle East," U.S. News and World Report (September 30, 1968), p. 73.

⁴¹Gerard Chaliand, The Palestinian Resistance, p. 5.

⁴²Ibid., p. 76.

On June 31, three weeks after the 1967 War, the Al-Fatah Central Committee decided to resume the armed struggle with the intent of undoing the effect of the Israeli victory.⁴³ The aim, at the same time, was to make the Palestinian's voice heard by the world and to introduce the Palestinian element through the practice of "armed propaganda."⁴⁴

A million Palestinians who were now (after the 1967 War), under Israeli rule in the occupied territories of the West Bank of Jordan and Gaza Strip, furnished, from the Al-Fatah point-of-view, the opportunity for realizing the doctrine of the popular war of liberation. Al-Fatah's leaders thought that the sympathetic population in the new occupied territories created an adequate foundation for initiating irregular warfare on a mass scale.⁴⁵

To accomplish this goal, Al-Fatah decided to transfer its headquarters to the occupied territories. Yasser Arafat, the top leader of Al-Fatah, left Syria in July 1967 and went to the West Bank. Arafat was accompanied by several veteran Al-Fatah military commanders. Each man used one or more "noms de guerre," and his subordinates also took on underground pseudonyms.⁴⁶

⁴³Al-Fatah Pamphlets: Political and Armed Struggle, Beirut: 1969, p. 31.

⁴⁴Al-Fatah Pamphlets: Revolution Until Victory, p.

⁴⁵Al-Fatah Pamphlets: Revolution Until Victory, p. 7.

⁴⁶Ehud Yaari, Strike Terror, p. 127.

Al-Fatah's self-organization plan was quite ambitious and, by the end of 1967, it was embracing several hundred commandos and volunteers. The groups that infiltrated the occupied territories after the 1967 War from Syria and Jordan first took positions in villages and began numerous attempts to activate the villages through political instructors, following the example of the Viet-Cong's propaganda groups.⁴⁷ Al-Fatah members would enter a village, try to assemble the inhabitants for lectures and thus encourage contributions and volunteering.

It became clear that the Al-Fatah Movement, to a great extent, succeeded during the last fatal four months of 1967 and the beginning of 1968 in recapturing the attention of the world and its operations began to inject the feeling of victory into the Arab people. Its greatest achievement was its success in awakening the Palestinian people in re-viving their hopes for a better future, filled with dignity and respect, in their own land.⁴⁸

The Battle of Al-Karameh

The military invincibility of Israel and the corresponding ineptitude of the Arab States constituted the central psychological and actual fact in the Middle East after the 1967 War. The Arab masses were led to believe, especially

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 132.

⁴⁸Elizabeth Monroe, Time Bomb in the Middle East (New York: The Friendship Press, 1969), p. 81.

through the Egyptian propaganda, that when the chance comes, the United Arab Republic's army alone can crush the Israeli army in a matter of days, if not hours. Therefore, the Arabs were deeply shocked at the unexpected outcome of the War of 1967. The Six Day War showed how weak and corrupt the Arab armies were. The Israeli propaganda exploited that fact to its greatest extent. Israel's aim was to convince the Arabs that there is no way and no hope but to recognize the fact--regardless whether it is right or wrong--that the State of Israel is there to stay.

Since Israel had guaranteed that the Arab army would not recover from their defeat for many years to come, and since Al-Fatah was the only military active element which refused to accept the defeat,⁴⁹ its ultimate goal was to hit that commando organization before it strikes, to deprive it of the initiative, to keep it off balance and to destroy its training and planning basis.⁵⁰ In other words, the goal of Israel during 1968 was to shake the Arab masses' confidence in the Palestinian Resistance Movement and to shake the commandos' own confidence in themselves as well. To achieve this goal, Israel deemed it necessary to destroy the Al-Fatah, the only active element in the area.⁵¹

⁴⁹Malcolm H. Kerr, The Middle East Conflict (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 1968), p. 49.

⁵⁰Joseph Churba, Fedayeen and the Middle East Crisis (Alabama: Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, May, 1969), p. 48.

⁵¹"Foray into Jordan" Time, March 29, 1968, p. 30.

On March 21, 1968, in what was clearly the most serious outbreak since the Six Day War, between 10,000 to 15,000 Israeli infantry, with well over one hundred tanks, armed half-tracks and under the cover of air support, struck across the Jordan River.⁵² Their objective was Al-Karameh, a Jordanian town of more than 50,000 Palestinians which was gradually asserting itself as an agriculture beehive and marketing and export center. It lay four kilometers to the East of the river Jordan and was the Al-Fatah's main arms depot and training base.⁵³

The question which faced the Al-Fatah's military General Command was, "should the Palestinian guerrillas stay-put or retreat?" It was a critical moment, not only in the Al-Fatah's fate, but in the history and destiny of the Palestinian Resistance Movement as well.⁵⁴ Mao Tse-Tung's principle of guerrilla warfare "when the enemy advances, we retreat,"⁵⁵ was clear in the minds of the commandos. Nevertheless, the military General Command of Al-Fatah had to decide whether to stand in the face of the Israeli advance and, therefore, break the principle of guerrilla warfare, or to

⁵²John K. Cooley, "Arab Guerrillas Undeterred," The Christian Science Monitor, March 27, 1968, p. 1.

⁵³Joseph Churba, Fedayeen and the Middle East Crisis, p. 49.

⁵⁴David Waines, The Unholy War: Israel and Palestine 1897-1971, p. 189.

⁵⁵Reo M. Christenson and others, Ideologies and Modern Politics (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, Inc., 1971), p. 156.

retreat. The decision to break the rule and confront the Israeli's advance, rather than to retreat, was taken a few hours before the Israeli offensive.⁵⁶

Al-Fatah's General Command made this decision in order to achieve the following objectives:⁵⁷

1. Consecration of the idea of steadfastness before the Israeli offensive so as to raise the morale of the Palestinian and Arab masses in the wake of the June setback.

2. Destruction of Israeli morale by inflicting on their forces the heaviest losses possible.

3. Realization of complete integration between the commandos and the masses and increasing the people's confidence in the fedayeen and their ability to confront and defeat the enemy.

4. "Pulling the rug" from under the feet of the proponents of the political solution by raising the confidence of the Arab masses in their ability to achieve victories in a popular war led by its commando vanguard.

5. Testing the confidence of the commandos, themselves, and their ability to move into the phase of limited confrontation in all operations.

Though outnumbered and outgunned, the Palestinian commandos in and around Al-Karameh, put up a fierce hand-to-hand and house-to-house fight which frustrated the hopes of

⁵⁶Al-Fatah Pamphlets: Revolution Until Victory, p. 9.

⁵⁷"At Al-Karameh: Al-Fatah Knowingly Broke Guerrilla Rules," AL-FATAH (monthly newspaper), Beirut: III, No. I (March 23, 1971), 12.

entrapping them.⁵⁸ In the face of the unexpectedly fierce fighting, the Israeli forces retreated.⁵⁹ The battle resulted in 150 commandos killed, while the Israeli lost around 100 soldiers and officers.⁶⁰

What happened during the fifteen hours fighting between the invading Israeli forces and the Palestinian commandos, has marked, as many writers and reporters indicated, a turning point in the history of the Palestinian Resistance Movement.⁶¹ The Palestinian's ability to resist and bring heavy casualties to the invading forces led to the realization in the mind of many Palestinians that they could fight and defend what is "rightly theirs."⁶² The outcome of the battle of Al-Karameh raised Palestinian and Arab morale to an unprecedented level.⁶³ Under the title "First Defeat," the British Daily Telegraph wrote on February 28, 1969:

⁵⁸Herbert Mason, Reflections on the Middle East Crisis, p. 79.

⁵⁹Eugene M. Fisher and M. Cherif Bassiouni, Storm Over the Arab World, p. 274; Herbert Mason (ed.), Reflections On the Middle East Crisis, p. 79.

⁶⁰Joseph Churba, Fedayeen and the Middle East Crisis, p. 49; Michael Curtis (ed.), People and Politics in the Middle East (New York: Transaction Books, Inc., 1971), p. 91.

⁶¹David Waism, The Unholy War: Israel and Palestine 1897-1971, p. 189; Edward Hughes, "A Brotherhood of Terror," Time, March 29, 1968, p. 29.

⁶²Yasumasa Kuroda, "Young Palestinian Commandos in Political Socialization Perspective," The Middle East Journal (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, XXVI, No. 3 (Summer 1972), 265.

⁶³"Deadly Stalemate," Newsweek, March 29, 1968, p. 40.

Al-Fatah's greatest victory was in March 1968 in the battle of Al-Karameh when a strong Israeli force which attacked the Jordanian town was repulsed with heavy casualties after a day's fighting. It was the first time for many years that an Israeli military expedition had been seriously challenged, let alone defeated.⁶⁴

As pictures of the captured Israeli equipment flashed across the Arab world, and even penetrated, via the courtesy of the Jordanian television, into Israeli homes, a new element in the Middle East political scene was created.⁶⁵ Within weeks, thousands of young men and women volunteered for Al-Fatah movement.⁶⁶ The turning point had arrived; the Al-Fatah which had started off in a hostile atmosphere and against the Arab regimes' rigid opposition became, after the battle of Al-Karameh, the hero and the hope of the Arab masses.⁶⁷

If Al-Fatah became the hero and the hope of the Arab masses, it is, therefore, necessary to identify the view of the other party of the conflict; the Israeli view of that new element in the conflict--the Palestinian guerrillas.

⁶⁴Copyright of the article in, Al-Fatah Pamphlet; Revolution Until Victory, p. 12.

⁶⁵Elizabeth Monroe, Time Bomb in the Middle East, p. 81.

⁶⁶Hisham Sharabi, Palestine Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness, p. 24.

⁶⁷"The Mideast: Is Compromise Possible? New Elements in an Explosive Situation: Soviet Power and the Palestinian Terrorists," Newsweek, February 17, 1969, p. 44; Malcolm H. Kerr, The Middle East Conflict, p. 46.

The Israeli View of Palestinian Guerrillas

From the very beginning, the Israeli official position, in regard to the Palestinians as a whole, is clearcut.

There are no Palestinians, there are no Palestinian rights. In the words of Golda Meir, Israeli Prime Minister, to the Time of London on June 15, 1969,

There is no such thing as Palestinians . . . It was not as though there was a Palestinian people and we came and thre them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist.⁶⁸

Palestinians, according to this Israeli position, do not have a legal personality; they can put forward no collective claims, and, as far as Israel is concerned, they cannot be a party to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Israelis have repeatedly declared that the parties with whom they want to negotiate are the Arab States, not the Palestinians.⁶⁹

The Palestinians, from this standpoint, are recognized only as refugees and, in the occupied territories (after the Six Day War), as the "local population."⁷⁰ The Israeli position has always been that the Arab States were responsible

⁶⁸Copyright: "Gold Meir Speaks Her Mind," The Middle East Newsletter, (Published by: Americans for Justice in the Middle East, Beirut, Lebanon), III, no. 5 and 6 (September 1969), 3; Russell Stetler (ed.), Palestine: The Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 16.

⁶⁹I. F. Stone, "Where Was Nixon When Sadat Gave The Russians the Boot," The New York Times Review of Books, XIX, No. 3 (August 31, 1972), 11.

⁷⁰Marie Syrkin, "Who Are the Palestinians?", Midstream (a monthly Jewish Review), Published by the Theodor Herzl Foundation, Inc., New York, XVI, No. I (January 1970), 11.

for creating the refugee problem because of their refusal to resettle the Palestinians in the Arab countries and are, therefore, responsible for solving it.⁷¹ The only claim that the Palestinians, as refugees, may have on Israel is a humanitarian one.⁷² It is within this general framework that Israeli analysis views Palestinian people and formulates policies to cope with them.

In regard to the Palestinian guerrillas, Israeli authorities have never recognized the existence of a Palestinian resistance movement; the guerrillas are terrorists, infiltrators and saboteurs.⁷³ Palestinian guerrillas falling into Israeli hands are treated as criminals, even though they may be wearing uniforms and belong to military units.⁷⁴

It is natural that in Israeli terms, the guerrillas, since they do not represent a people, should represent some other interest. Thus, rather than being the "vanguard of the Palestinian Liberation Movement," as the Palestinian guerrillas claim to be, they are an instrument of Arab strategy.⁷⁵ The

⁷¹"How Israel Feels About War and Peace," Time, April 12, 1971, p. 32.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Moshe Dayan (Israeli Defence Minister), "Jewish-Arab Coexistence," Midstream, XV, No. 6 (June 1969), 27.

⁷⁴Joseph Churba, Fedayeen and the Middle East Crisis, p. 49.

⁷⁵Embassy of Israel, Washington, D.C., The Lesson of Munich, September 14, 1972, p. 2.

Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Abba Eban, defines the Palestinian guerrillas as "terrorist organizations, which present themselves as a Palestine Liberation Movement," but which in reality are, "a weapon that all the Arab countries use against Israel in the inter-Arab rivalries."⁷⁶

Relying on this self-conviction policy, the Israeli spokesmen and officials, therefore, have consistently maintained that the Palestinian guerrillas represented no serious threat and dismissed them as a passing phenomenon on the Middle East political scene. In 1967, Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Defense Minister, declared that the Palestinian resistance was like an egg in his hand, which he could crush anytime.⁷⁷ The Embassy of Israel, in Washington, stated lately,

. . . But for a few isolated incidents, occasional raids across the Lebanese and Syrian borders . . . the terrorists have been unable to carry out their missions of murder inside Israel and the occupied territories.⁷⁸

On the other side, reports by foreign correspondents from inside Israel do not support the view expressed by Dayan and other Israeli sources.

For example, an American reporter, writing from Israel in June, 1969, maintains that the Palestinian guerrillas have

⁷⁶Richard Crossman, "An Open Letter to the Israeli Foreign Minister," Midstream, XVI, No. 8 (October 1970), 9.

⁷⁷Walter Laquer (ed.), The Israel-Arab Reader, (2nd ed., New York: B. L. Mazel, Inc., 1970), p. 384.

⁷⁸The Lesson of Munich, Embassy of Israel, Washington, D.C., September 14, 1972, p. 2.

become a "real and aggressive component in the Israeli nightmare."⁷⁹ The reporter continues:

. . . every month . . . there are dozens of incidents the Israelis never report--highly competent jobs of cutting telephone wires, railway tracks, mining roads, harassing military camps . . .⁸⁰

Another American journalist, visiting Israel in the Summer of 1969, notes that, "thirteen times a day Israelis stop whatever else they are doing to learn whether there has been some crippling new act of terror by their Arab enemies."⁸¹ Still another American journalist, stationed in Israel, points out that it is no longer possible to brush aside the Palestinian guerrillas who have become, "a strategic factor in the Arab-Israeli struggle."⁸² Another Western writer wrote, in 1971:

The strength of the Palestinian resistance lies in the fact that it enjoys the undivided support of the people of the Arab world. Israel has underestimated its strength, partly because it looked upon it simply from a military angle.⁸³

Moshe Dayan, himself, after his declaration in 1967 that he could crush the Palestinian guerrillas at anytime,

⁷⁹John K. Cooley, "Afternoons We Learn To Shoot," Christian Science Monitor, June 21, 1969, p. 9.

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹A. H. Raskin, "Israel Tells the World: Keep Hands Off," The New York Times, July 7, 1969, p. 32.

⁸²James Feron, "Israel Has the Image Problem Of a Tough Victor," The New York Times, July 20, 1969, p. 4.

⁸³A. C. Forest, The Unholy Land (Toronto, Canada: McClelland and Stewart, Limited, 1971), p. 107.

was quoted, in 1969, as advising the Israelis to "deepen their graves."⁸⁴ Finally, Dan Adams Schmidt, the New York Times correspondent in the Middle East, wrote, in December 1968, that the Palestinian guerrillas, "are too big, too successful, and too popular to be suppressed, even if anyone wanted to do so."⁸⁵

The Structure of Al-Fatah

The members of Al-Fatah, whether the leaders, the guerrillas or the civilians, take refuge in absolutely anonymity and keep their identities and numbers scrupulously secret. Therefore, it is very hard to find adequate information regarding its organizational structure. Nevertheless, a general picture of the organization can be drawn.

There is a "regional committee" set up in every area that contains Palestinian refugees. Each region is a self-contained unit, with its own organization: a political bureau, an information center, and a military bureau.⁸⁶ At the base of the pyramid there are cells, for each refugee camp, for each university in the case of students and for each company in the case of workers.⁸⁷ Liaison with the regional committees

⁸⁴Walter Laqueur (ed.), The Israel-Arab Reader, p. 384.

⁸⁵Dan Adams Schmidt, "Fatah Leader Stresses Militancy," (An interview with Abu Ammar, the top leader of Al-Fatah), The New York Times, December 3, 1968, p. 6.

⁸⁶Gerard Chaliand, The Palestinian Resistance, p. 67.

⁸⁷Jean Larteguy, The Walls of Israel, p. 222.

is effected via a refugee committee responsible for various camps within a given area, a students' committee responsible for all Palestinian students within a given country, and a worker's committee responsible for workers in factories and farms over a given region.⁸⁸

By 1968, in every part of the Arab world where some of the two and one-half million Palestinians live, Al-Fatah has a regional committee. Its cells exist in virtually every refugee camp, every university campus, most major Arab towns, and many industrial establishments in the Arab world from Iraq to Morocco.⁸⁹

Al-Fatah organization appoints no chairman, secretary-general or president. Yasser Arafat (Abu Ammar), himself, once declared that the Al-Fatah is headed by a "collective leadership."⁹⁰ Arafat explains that the Al-Fatah Movement is characterized by "complete democracy" in all decision-making and "dictatorship" comes into force only at the executive level.⁹¹

Nevertheless, it is quite clear today (1973) that the Al-Fatah organization is controlled by a group of four or

⁸⁸From Al-Fatah Unpublished Material, Why Do I Belong To Al-Fatah? (In Arabic), No. 1, 1967, p. 6.

⁸⁹John K. Cooley, "Afternoons We Learn To Shoot," p. 9.

⁹⁰Edmund Gareeb, "An Interview With Abu Ammar," The Arab World (New York: May, 1969), p. 28.

⁹¹Ibid.

five men rather than by one individual. Besides Arafat, the most powerful figure in Al-Fatah leadership, the rest of the first "echelon" probably includes Khalid el-Wazir (his code name is "Abu-Jihad"), Salah Khalaf (his code name is "Abu-Ayad"), a 38-year old school teacher who, since May 1969, has been described as the "number two" man in Al-Fatah,⁹² and Faruk el-Kadumi (his code name is "Abu-Lutf"), who was once described as "the best political brain in Al-Fatah."⁹³

There is a "Central Committee" composed of about ten members, most of Al-Fatah founding group. Most of them have acquired an academic education.⁹⁴ Several members of this Committee participate also in Al-Fatah's military "General Command" of Al-Assifa (storm) forces, the Al-Fatah's top military body. Right below the Central Committee lies the "Revolutionary Council" with more extensive representation--around fifty members--which convenes whenever top decisions are to be made.⁹⁵

There is also a General Congress that meets once a year to elect members of the Central Committee and Revolutionary Council and to formulate courses of action for the next

⁹²P. J. Vatikiotis, Conflict in the Middle East, p. 166.

⁹³Leila S. Kadi (ed.), Basic Political Documents of the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement (Beirut: Palestine Research Center, 1969), p. 101.

⁹⁴Yasumasa Kuroda, "Young Palestinian Commandos in Political Socialization Perspective," p. 265.

⁹⁵Al-Fatah Unpublished Material, Why Do I Belong To Al-Fatah? No. 1, 1967, p. 8.

stage.⁹⁶

All these political institutions, however, have nothing to do with day-to-day military planning. The military activity, for example, is the domain of the General Command of Al-Assifa Forces.

Al-Fatah representatives have been stationed in almost all Arab capitals to maintain links with the Arab masses, conduct fund-raising drives, recruit new members and direct all publicity campaigns. In addition, propaganda centers have been set-up in many Western countries such as France, Britain and Scandinavia, and in Muslim countries.⁹⁷

It is impossible to arrive at any definite or exact figures on Al-Fatah's strength. However, in the middle of 1970, the organization's combat forces numbered, according to some estimates, more than 20,000 men.⁹⁸ Each volunteer, upon entry into Al-Fatah, swears by the Koran in a solemn initiation ceremony that he withdraws from all other organizations or parties and will devote himself to the armed struggle as the only means for the liberation of Palestine.⁹⁹

⁹⁶The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Al-Fatah, The Armed Palestinian Revolution and Its Developments (in Arabic), Beirut: No. 106, 1967, p. 8; Jean Larteguy, The Walls of Israel, p. 222.

⁹⁷Yaakov Ravravai (ed.), To Make War Or Make Peace: Symposium on the Middle East (Tel Aviv: Publishers New Outlook, 1969), p. 217; Eugene M. Fisher and M. Cherif Bassioni, Storm Over the Arab World, p. 277.

⁹⁸Hisham Scharabi, Palestine Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness, p. 23; Edward Hughes, "A Brotherhood of Terror," Time, March 29, 1968, p. 29.

⁹⁹Al-Fatah Unpublished Materials, Why Do I Belong To Al-Fatah?, p. 3.

The preceding was a brief description of history, development and structure of "The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Al-Fatah." Having accomplished this goal, the ground is prepared for the next task, the presentation of the doctrine of Al-Fatah Movement.

Chapter IV

THE DOCTRINE OF THE AL-FATAH MOVEMENT

In the preceding chapter, an attempt has been made to point out why, how, and when "The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Al-Fatah" came into being. The writer of this study followed the development of the Al-Fatah Movement from the time it was an idealistic idea wandering in the Cairo University campuses in the early fifties until it became a popular movement in the Arab world when it reached its peak in the wake of the battle of Al-Karameh on March 21, 1968.

In this chapter, a definition and general characteristics and functions of ideology will be pointed out first. Then, in the light of this introduction of ideology, the doctrine or philosophy of Al-Fatah Movement will be examined. What are the fundamental principles and ideas of Al-Fatah? How did Al-Fatah view the Arab thinking and strategies with regard to the Palestine problem? What alternatives and substitutions has the Al-Fatah organization offered to the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular? How did Al-Fatah conceive the theories and experiences of guerrilla warfare and to what extent was it influenced by them. Finally, the last section will be allotted to point out the social ideology of this guerrilla organization.

Ideology (definition)

An agreement on the meaning of the "ideology" is more difficult than it may seem because the word has been, as Herbert Waltzer indicated, an "epithet."¹ The concept behind the word is a complex one and there is considerable controversy among scholars as to what ideology is and is not.² Nevertheless, the word "ideology" is always used to refer to a system of ideas or beliefs. It consists of the ideas and beliefs of particular people or group of people, or a particular epoch.³

Beliefs to be ideological must be shared by a group of people; they must concern matters important to the group and must be in some way functional in relation to it: they must serve to hold it together or to justify activities and attitudes characteristic of its members.⁴ The definition which will be used in this study is the following:

Ideology is "a set of closely related beliefs or ideas, or even attitudes, characteristic of a group or community."⁵

¹Reo M. Christenson and others, Ideologies and Modern Politics (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1971), p. 3.

²David E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 296; Willard A. Mullins, "On the Concept of the Ideology in Political Science," The American Political Science Review, June 1972, Vol. 66, No. I, p. 498.

³John Plamenatz, Ideology (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 27.

⁴Ibid., p. 31.

⁵Ibid., p. 15.

This definition fits to a great extent the doctrine of the Al-Fatah Movement. Al-Fatah's doctrine, as will be examined in this chapter, is composed, in fact, of "a set of closely related ideas and attitudes" which concentrate mainly around the principles of the liberation of Palestine, and the creation of a democratic nonsectarian state where Jews, Christians, and Muslims could work, worship and live together peacefully.

The Characteristics of Ideology

1. "Ideologies arise in conditions of crisis and in sections of society to whom the hitherto prevailing outlook has become unacceptable."
2. Ideology has a broad but varying scope.
3. Ideology is "systematic" patterns of political thought.
4. Ideology is "persuasive" argument designed normally to motivate active involvement.⁶

Since the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the Palestinians had experienced the most severe crisis in their history. After three defeats, (1948, 1956 and 1967), the Arab ideologies proved the failure in their dealing with the Palestinian problem. Out of this crisis, Al-Fatah's doctrine arises and spreads among the Palestinians. It composes of a set of flexible ideas ranging from the starting point of how to liberate Palestine, to the general characteristics of the

⁶Reo M. Christenson, Ideologies and Modern Politics, pp. 9-12.

political form of the "Palestine of tomorrow."

The Functions of Ideology

Ideology is usually employed to accomplish the following:

1. To provide a formula of ideas through which the "universe" is perceived, understood and interpreted.⁷
2. It serves, especially in the underdeveloped countries, an integrating function (and this has been the case with the "nascent" Palestinian community).⁸
3. Ideology serves as a dynamic force in individual and community life, providing a "sense of mission" and purpose and resulting commitment to action.⁹

As a result of their affiliation with the Arab political parties, the Palestinians were divided into several groups. After more than twenty years of the Arab failure, Al-Fatah came to provide the Palestinians with a new "formula of ideas through which they could perceive and understand" correctly their situation, or ideologically speaking, their "universe." These ideas of Al-Fatah would serve, at the same time, an integrating function within the Palestinians who were scattered through the Arab world and the world at large.

⁷Ibid., p. 14.

⁸Michael C. Hudson, "Developments and Setbacks in the Palestinian Resistance Movement 1967-1971," Journal of Palestine Studies (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, I, No. 3 (Spring 1972), 80; Leonard Binder, The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 127.

⁹Reo M. Christenson, Ideologies and Modern Politics, p 17.

From a different aspect, the doctrine of the Al-Fatah would serve as a "dynamic force" in the Palestinian's life. To the Palestinians who suffered from agony of defeats, deprivation and refugee status, Al-Fatah's doctrine, especially in its emphasis on "the Palestinian identity," and "the Palestinian armed struggle" provides the Palestinians with a "sense of mission." Al-Fatah's doctrine, in its essence, aims to motivate the Palestinians to become the driving force in their own problem. It signifies a serious attempt to transfer the Palestinians in their refugee camps from passive onlookers into dynamic fighters.

These general characteristics and functions of the doctrine of the Al-Fatah Movement would be clarified by examining the content of that doctrine itself.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE AL-FATAH VIS-A-VIS THE ARAB REGIMES

Arab Unity or Liberation of Palestine?

Since 1958, through its mouthpiece "Our Palestine," then during the sixties, through its pamphlets, memoranda, handbills and periodical publications, the Al-Fatah Movement outlined its basic principles and ideas. But, any attempt to examine the doctrine of Al-Fatah in its various aspects would be incomplete unless it has been seen against the general context of the Arab thinking with regard to the Palestine problem.

Since the Arab defeat in 1948 and the creation of Israel, the Arabs have published copious materials on the

Arab-Israeli conflict.¹⁰ This literature deals in great length with the Arab's basic position, the justification of their case, and why they cannot agree to the existence of Israel in their midst. Much less attention has been allotted to the problem of how to achieve their objective in the conflict. In other words, most of the Arab literature dealt emotionally with the Palestine problem. The Arab thinkers, in most of their writings, asserted the Palestinians' rights in Palestine. The optimistic tone of a coming victory over Israel was the general character of these writings. But, how this victory could be achieved, when and by what means, there was no adequate answer.¹¹ This way of thinking, in fact, is not unusual, for the political parties and leaders in the Arab world tend to concentrate more on criticism of the situation they aspire to remedy, and on the elaboration of their goal than on spelling out how it will be reached.

In the lessons drawn by Arab writers, from the 1948 defeat, the theme that the Arab's failure was due to basic weaknesses in the Arab society often recurs. Lack of genuine unity, defective thinking, backward mentality, egoism, narrow

¹⁰There are about eight hundred books in the Arabic language dealing with the different aspects of the Arab position in this conflict. Palestine Affairs (a bi-monthly journal published in Arabic) (Beirut: The Palestine Research Center, 1971), No. 4, p. 178.

¹¹Walter Laqueur (ed.), The Israel-Arab Reader (New York: B. L. Mazel, Inc., 1968), pp. 434-435.

and conflicting interests, improvisations, and lack of scientific approach are all mentioned.¹² These conditions and short-comings were again presented as being among the decisive causes of the Arab defeat in 1967.¹³

On the other hand, since the creation of Israel, the Arab regimes' official position was: war with Israel is inevitable, but, "we, 'the Arab regimes' should first prepare ourselves thoroughly and should not precipitate a war prematurely."¹⁴ This approach, as advocated by President Nasser, was based on a strategy of quick surprise attack after the Arab armies had reached common agreement, or had been unified and were in position to assault Israel and liquidate her in a period of not more than a week.

From a different point-of-view, the Arab nationalist parties and movements conceived the remedy of all the Arab diseases and weaknesses in the "Arab Unity." They indicated that there would be no victory over Israel, and Palestine would not be regained unless the Arab unity had first taken place.¹⁵ Accordingly, the slogan, "Arab Unity Is the Road to the Liberation of Palestine," was the slogan of almost all

¹²Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 275.

¹³Russell Stetler (ed.), Palestine: The Arab-Israeli Conflict (San Francisco, California: Ramparts Press, Inc., 1972), p. 41.

¹⁴Michael Howard and Robert Hunter, Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of 1967 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, October 1967), p. 10.

¹⁵Irene Gendzier (ed.), A Middle East Reader (New York: Western Publishing Company, Inc., 1969), pp. 286-287.

these nationalist movements. President Nasser--used to be the hero of the Arab masses--used to announce that achieving Arab unity was a prerequisite for any actual Arab success over Israel.¹⁶

Thus, the idea of unification of the Arab countries occupies a central place in the writings and thinking of the Arabs. Arab unity seemed to many of them so natural and obvious that for a long period they did not deem it necessary to spell out by what means it should be achieved, as if the aspiration for unity were alone adequate to call it into being. The consideration of its modality was viewed as mere technical subsidiary detail.¹⁷ Paradoxically, treating unity in this vague manner enabled Arabs to see its realization as imminent. Only a few obstacles set up by the "machinations of imperialism" would have to be cleared away for a united Arab State to emerge.¹⁸

As the course to Arab unity suffered many reverses, culminating in the breaking-up of the United Arab Republic in September 1961, many of the Arabs began to realize that they, themselves, bore at least some blame for their disunity.¹⁹

¹⁶Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abdal-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 48.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 26.

¹⁸Y. Harkabi, Fedaveen Action and Arab Strategy (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, December 1968), p. 4.

¹⁹On October 16, 1961, President Nasser, himself, announced, "We must have the courage to confess our errors, we must blame ourselves for the collapse of the union with Syria," Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War, p. 26.

This insight into the inherent difficulties lying in the road to Arab unity made its achievement look like a long, drawn-out process. The secession of Syria created a real dilemma in the Arab world. So long as the attainment of Arab unity was considered imminent, it was acceptable to make the liberation of Palestine conditional on unity. But, when Arab unity began to be seen, after the secession, as a long-term proposition, advocating that unity, still, should precede the war with Israel, brought the patience of the Palestinians to the breaking-point.²⁰

The dilemma, whether Arab unity or a showdown with Israel should be given precedence, was a very real one in the Arab thinking. If achieving Arab unity required a "big push," such as a victory over Israel, defeating Israel required Arab unity to rally the necessary forces.

What has been indicated in the preceding pages was the general character of the prevailing thinking and conditions in the Arab world when Al-Fatah Movement came into being in 1965. From the outset, Al-Fatah rejected all these conditions and justifications and held in contempt all the Arab approaches with regard to the Palestinian problem.

The proposition that the Arabs should first set their house in order, as part of the preparation for the showdown with Israel, is viewed by Al-Fatah as a proposition which is

²⁰Yaakov Ravravai (ed.), To Make War or Make Peace: Symposium on the Middle East (Tel Aviv: Publishers New Outlook, 1969), p. 200.

suffering from a basic inner contradiction. The Arabs can neither unite themselves, Al-Fatah explains, nor remedy their internal shortcomings so long as Israel exists.²¹ This idea, from the very beginning, constituted a cardinal tenet in the Al-Fatah doctrine.

Al-Fatah arrived at this fundamental principle not by chance, but after analyzing the foundations of the Israeli policy in dealing with the Arabs. It (Al-Fatah) found that since the creation of Israel, the axiom of Israeli policy has been "irreconcilable hostility to Arab aspirations to unity and national emancipation."²² Israel has seen its highest wisdom in keeping the Arab divided and backward and in "playing their reactionary Kings and other feudal elements against the national revolutionary forces."²³ Ben Gurion and Dayan (the founders of Israel) conceived "Arab disunity and backwardness" as "essential elements for Israeli security and growth."²⁴

Accordingly, Al-Fatah declared that:

The Zionist existence is the cause of all our 'Arabs' problems and the cause for the defeat of our expectations of a new dawn for the Arab nation . . . The Zionist existence is the root of all our diseases and not one of their consequences.²⁵

²¹Hani-el Hassan (Member of Al-Fatah's Central Committee), "Al-Fatah In Theory and Practice," Palestine Affairs (Beirut: The Palestine Research Center, March 1972), No. 7, p. 16.

²²Russell Stetler (ed.), Palestine: The Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 34.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Walter Laqueur (ed.), The Israel-Arab Reader, p. 311.

²⁵Hani el-Hassan, "Al-Fatah In Theory and Practice," p. 16.

Deferring the battle with Israel, as advocated by President Nasser and the Arab nationalist movements, until after Arab unity is achieved, was therefore under severe attack from Al-Fatah. It elaborated, in almost all its publications, on the theme that there will be no Arab unity so long as Israel exists. Israel's existence, Al-Fatah pointed out, is the very cause of Arab disunity.²⁶ This can be learned, Al-Fatah once announced, from the specific example of the rift between Egypt and Syria in 1961:

The Zionist's wedge in Palestine prevented the interaction of this "Egyptian-Syrian" unity and its development and expansion, and thus there was setback that caused the miscarriage of this guiding experiment.²⁷

The order, Al-Fatah pointed out, should be reversed. The liquidation of the "State" of Israel should precede Arab unity and actually cause it. Al-Fatah, therefore, formulated and extended its new principle, "Liberation of Palestine Is the Road to Arab Unity," as the correct revolutionary alternative to the slogan which was commonly accepted in the Arab world, "Arab Unity Is The Road to Liberation of Palestine."²⁸

The hopes and aspirations of the Arab nation and the solution for all the Arab problems can, in Al-Fatah's new

²⁶The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Al-Fatah, Palestine Problem: The Core of Arab Revolution (in Arabic) (Beirut: No. 107, 1967), p. 15.

²⁷The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Al-Fatah, Series of "Revolutionary Lessons and Trials," (in Arabic), From the Starting Points of Fedayeed Action (Beirut: New Reprint, August 1967), p. 13.

²⁸Ibid., p. 55.

formula, by no means be achieved unless all efforts are concentrated for the sake of the liberation of Palestine and fully confront the challenge of the "Zionist State."²⁹

Conventional War or Guerrilla Warfare?

"Conventional War," which should be based upon the principles of a long preparation of the Arab armies and a quick surprise attack on Israel, as was indicated, was the official strategy of the Arab States. The Al-Fatah Movement challenged this strategy and pointed-out its impracticality and weaknesses. It based its challenge and rejection on the fact that Israel and imperialism have already succeeded in "seeding" and exploiting the contradictions in the Arab world to the extent of preventing any possibility of Arab preparation or unity. Al-Fatah declared, in this respect, that:

All these contradictions thwarted the reaching of common agreement on preparation to engage the enemy at a given hour and a given place.³⁰

Apart from the military weaknesses, the Arab strategy of conventional war had, from Al-Fatah's point-of-view a "nefarious" psychological influence on the Palestinians. The Palestinian individual under conventional war strategy, Al-Fatah explained, began to feel that he had no role in his "own" battle, so long as it was a surprise "Blitzkrieg" which

²⁹"Dangerous Deadline for the Middle East," Time Magazine, November 9, 1970, p. 20.

³⁰Al-Fatah, From the Starting Points of Fedayeen Action, p. 13.

would wipe out Israel in a matter of a week.³¹ Al-Fatah clarified this point when it stated:

He, the Palestinian, did not experience the campaign or its preparations, so that members of other Arab peoples lived it more than we, the Palestinian people, because they recruited, trained and breathed the warm air of activities.³²

Having rejected the strategy of conventional war, Al-Fatah extended its practical and revolutionary strategy: the guerrilla warfare strategy, which by time would be turned into "popular war of liberation" where the Arab masses would participate in it.³³ In its analysis, Al-Fatah tended to conceive the weak elements of conventional war as automatically the stronger elements in guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is endlessly eulogized. In it the main Arab advantages, which are summarized as a preponderance in manpower, the vastness of Arab territories and a long breath which the Arabs have, will come to full fruition.³⁴ Guerrilla warfare will have other beneficial consequences. It will ensure the

³¹From Al-Fatah Unpublished Material, Why Do I Belong To Al-Fatah? (in Arabic) (no place of publishing is mentioned), No. I, 1967, p. 5.

³²Ibid., p. 6.

³³The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Al-Fatah, Series of "Revolutionary Lessons and Trials," (in Arabic) How Will the People's Armed Revolution Explode? (Beirut: New Reprint, August 1967), p. 14.

³⁴The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Al-Fatah, Series of "Revolutionary Lessons and Trials," (in Arabic) The Liberation of the Occupied Lands and the Methods of Struggle Against Direct Colonialism (Beirut: New Reprint, September 1967), p. 9.

"vitality" and the "centrality" of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It will fire all Arabs' emotions, generate devotion to the Palestinian cause and will attract support from public opinion in the world at large.³⁵ Al-Fatah, therefore, stated that getting the Palestinian masses, in the first place, and the Arabs in the second, involved in the struggle for the liberation of Palestine is the practical and only alternative before the Arabs. It advocated, at the same time, the idea that all Arab dissensions would be cured by starting the battle with Israel. In a memorandum to the Third Arab Summit Meeting in Morocco, 1965, Al-Fatah said:

The rallying of the forces of the Arab fatherland in a single crucible of struggling will be able to melt the dissensions, fuse the contradictions and mobilize the Arab people since the battle will be a fateful, decisive, dreadful and ruinous one. Al-Fatah concurs with those who believe that the disputes and divisions in the Arab fatherland may have already reached a level of irresolution, and that the attempt to settle them in political transactions has resulted, time-after-time, in a devastating failure. Hence the chemical operation of very high heat, we mean a liberation war, is the only possibility of uniting the nation and fusing the cleavages and rifts in its set-up.³⁶

In yet another of its writings, Al-Fatah explained how the popular war of liberation will act as a catalyst in the development of Arab unity:

The reason for reversing this slogan, "Arab Unity Is The Road to Palestine," is that every revolutionary slogan,

³⁵Ibid., p. 12.

³⁶The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Al-Fatah, Series of "Revolutionary Lessons and Trials," Revolutionary Stands, (in Arabic), (Beirut: May, 1968), pp. 7-8.

such as the "Arab Unity" when it is carried out, ineluctably creates a new situation, differing qualitatively from the previous situations; moreover, it negates them. Such a weighty event as this cannot be achieved in the life of nations in a short time unless that nation undergoes a violent shock producing deep tracks in the life of its society, its people and its comportment.³⁷

The theme is further elaborated:

In order that the slogan of Arab unity will materialize, there is an inevitable need for introducing a historic change and fundamental transformation in the shape of Arab society, in short, causing a revolution in the life of this society.³⁸

The nearest means of producing such an historic change in the course of the national development of the Arab nation is, as Al-Fatah stated, by "creating an appropriate environment," for a decisive fateful battle between the Arabs and the "Zionist enemy."³⁹

Besides the need to achieve absolute success in a short time, the Arab States' strategy of prolonged preparation for a conventional war has, in Al-Fatah analysis, other drawbacks. It identified these drawbacks when it said that:

The enemy "Israel" could take measures to counter a surprise "Blitzkrieg" by a strategy of mobility and decentralization of his forces, so that he can hold his ground for a longer time.⁴⁰

³⁷From Al-Fatah unpublished material, The Palestinian Revolution: The New Dimensions (in Arabic) (no place of publishing is mentioned), 1968, p. 6.

³⁸Ibid., p. 7.

³⁹Al-Fatah, Revolutionary Stands, p. 7.

⁴⁰Al-Fatah, From the Starting Points of Fedayeen Action, p. 53.

Furthermore, Israel could keep the balance by acquiring weapons and the capability to use them without being affected by the Arab's numerical superiority, so long as the war is a classical war in which only trained regular soldiers can be used.⁴¹ For according to the conventional war strategy, the Arab masses are excluded, and their numerical superiority cannot be used to tilt the scales in their favor.⁴²

In an announcement to an Arab journalists' conference in 1965, Al-Fatah pointed-out that there was great urgency in starting its guerrilla warfare, specifically in 1965. It explained that as Israel would shortly (1965) succeed in her project of settling the "Negev,"⁴³ her industry and population would then be dispersed and would then be less "vulnerable to Fedayeen attacks."⁴⁴ Furthermore, acquiring a nuclear capability would enable Israel to challenge the Arab main stock; the manpower superiority. Al-Fatah concluded its announcement by saying that:

The present stage is decisive in our history. We must get moving quickly in order to prevent the enemy from carrying out his strategic projects. Otherwise, the "fait accompli" will become an eternal reality.⁴⁵

⁴¹Ibid., p. 56.

⁴²The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Al-Fatah, Political and Armed Struggle (Beirut: 1969), p. 34.

⁴³An agricultural project where new thousands of emigrant Jews were to be settled.

⁴⁴Al-Fatah, From the Starting Points of Fedayeen, p. 56.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 57.

By challenging the Arab strategy, Al-Fatah, in fact was turning everything in the Arab world upside-down. Up until its emergence in 1965, Arab leaders and politicians, in spite of their verbal enthusiasm, used to subordinate the Palestinian problem to their own interests and policies and manipulated it accordingly. The Al-Fatah Movement emergence signified an attempt to reverse this trend and to subordinate all other Arab problems and policies to the goal of liberating Palestine. In other words, before 1965, the Palestinians orbited around the Arab States; now, Al-Fatah has been trying to reverse the relationship.

The Palestinian Identity

For a decade or more, following the 1948 war and the creation of Israel, the shock of defeat and dispersion had caused a considerable decline to the Palestinian identity. The tendency of rival Arab States to try to co-opt the Palestinian cause for their own advantage reinforced that decline. After 1948, the majority of the Palestinians scattered, as indicated earlier, in refugee camps around the borders of Palestine. The youth from these camps scattered throughout the Arab countries looking for a remedy for their tragedy. In their despair and wandering, they thought that an affiliation with the Arab political movements was the shortest way for

⁴⁶Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War, p. 133.

going back to Palestine.⁴⁷

Thus, in the fifties, it was rare to find a Palestinian youth who was not affiliated with an Arab party or political movement, and those who were not, were considered a burden on society and were not respected.⁴⁸ The affiliation of the Palestinian youth ranged from the extreme right (the Muslim Brotherhood Organization)⁴⁹ to the extreme left (the Arab Communist Parties). Some of these youths thought that religious affiliation could solve their problem. Others thought that Communism could achieve this end. A third group, the majority, adopted a nationalist line, namely, the nationalist parties represented in the Baath Party⁵⁰ and

⁴⁷"Talks With the Resistance's Leaders," Palestine Affairs (Beirut: No. 5, November, 1971), p. 30.

⁴⁸Leila S. Kadi, Basic Political Documents of the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement (Beirut: The Palestine Research Center, December 1969), p. 54.

⁴⁹A political-religious revivalist association founded in Egypt in 1929. Its ideology was based on the thesis that Sharia (Divine Law) had established for all times the most perfect guidance in private as well as public life. Its branches spread over Egypt and the rest of the Arab world. After an attempt on the life of President Nasser in 1954, it was liquidated in Egypt. It still is an underground force in Egypt, Syria, Sudan and Kuwait.

⁵⁰Founded after World War II, it has branches in most of the Arab countries. The Baath program pursues Arab unity and radical socio-economic reforms. It is influential among urban intellectuals and younger officers of the Armed Services. It is the current ruling party in Syria and Iraq.

later in the Arab Nationalist Movement.⁵¹

Around 1960, Al-Fatah, as a secret movement, was representing a group of Palestinian youths who had revolted against the existing conditions, as exemplified by the divisions among the Arab States, and the failure of nationalist Arab parties and movements to take any practical measures for the Palestinian problem. Out of their own experiences and affiliations with the Arab parties and governments, the leadership of Al-Fatah realized that Arab promises and big words were of no use, and accordingly, the practical struggle must be carried out by the "Palestinians" themselves.⁵²

The "Palestinian identity" and "Palestinization" of the conflict increasingly became the dominant theme of Al-Fatah publications.⁵³ Al-Fatah launched its campaign urging the Palestinians to revolt and to take their own problem into their own hands. It exhorted them to become the driving force in Arab-Israeli conflict, not by agitation in the Arab countries as they had previously and not by pushing the Arab States to action, but by starting actual fighting, themselves.⁵⁴

⁵¹A political movement founded in the early fifties in Lebanon, by George Habash (Christian). Its slogan was "Revenge, Blood, Iron and Fire." It has secret branches in some Arab countries. It has been the constant rival of Baath Party, and it moved swiftly toward the extreme left in early sixties. In 1967, after the Six Day War, it became the "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine."

⁵²Al-Fatah, From the Starting Points of Fedayeen Action p. 11.

⁵³The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Al-Fatah, This Is Our Revolution (in Arabic), Beirut: October 1968, p. 7.

⁵⁴Al-Fatah, How Will the People's Armed Revolution Explode, p. 5.

Al-Fatah explained that the Palestinians would be able to concentrate on their problem only if they extricated themselves from inter-Arab rivalries and exercised neutrality. The Palestine cause, in Al-Fatah doctrine, should be put above Arab politics. And, only by freeing themselves from Arab rivalries, the Palestinians, as Al-Fatah indicated, will be able to acquire liberty of action in their affairs.⁵⁵

The struggle is called, in Al-Fatah parlance, the "Palestinian Revolution," to signify as well the transformation the revolution will cause in the Palestinians themselves. who from passive onlookers will become dynamic fighters.⁵⁶ The emergence of the Al-Fatah organization as a Palestinian guerrilla organization far from the Arab guardianship, has marked, to a great extent, a remarkable stride in this respect. Also, the emergence of Al-Fatah has signified a turning point in reverting the Arab-Israeli conflict to its original dimension, which was first and foremost a struggle between Palestinians and Israelis.⁵⁷ In fact, this development of the Palestinians' re-assertion embodied elements of both protest and reproach toward the Arab States for their failure to fulfill their obligation and promises

⁵⁵Al-Fatah, This Is Our Revolution, p. 8.

⁵⁶Y. Harkabi, Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy, p. 12.

⁵⁷Gerard Chaliand, The Palestinian Resistance (Maryland: Penguin Books, Inc., 1972), p. 7.

toward the Palestinians.⁵⁸ By emphasizing that the "Palestinian people is the only true available stock for the war of return,"⁵⁹ the Al-Fatah insinuates that the Arab regimes are not trustworthy.

Accordingly, the military operation of Al-Fatah in mid 1960's came to be cherished widely in Palestinian circles all over the Arab world and abroad. Al-Fatah's initiative seems vital to the Palestinians after the Arab States' failure. To those who suffered from the agony of defeats, deprivation and refugee status, the allure of Al-Fatah's commandos was irresistible. Armed struggle for a large portion of the Palestinians is conceived as a means of gaining self-respect, especially the younger generation.⁶⁰

The re-emergence of the Palestinian personality through Al-Fatah's ideas and military operations, has the

⁵⁸"The Mideast: Is Compromise Possible? New Elements in an Explosive Situation: Soviet Power and the Palestinian Terrorists," Newsweek, February 17, 1969, p. 37.

⁵⁹Al-Fatah, How Will the People's Armed Revolution Explode?, p. 15.

⁶⁰One of Al-Fatah commandos clarified this point when he was interviewed by the correspondent of Newsweek magazine:

You asked me why I am doing this. I had a lovely family and a decent job with an oil company when I joined the commandos in 1960. I had an offer of a scholarship abroad. I could have emigrated. But the point is that even if I had become a millionaire outside Palestine, I would still be a refugee, homeless. So I chose to dedicate my life to restoring to my people their country and to myself, my self-respect.

"Palestine Is My Country," Newsweek, February 17, 1969, p. 38.

psychological function of atoning for past Arab's and Palestinian's failings and inadequacies. Dan Adams Schmidt, the New York Times correspondent in the Middle East, mentioned that fact when he wrote to his paper that:

After the humiliation they suffered at the hands of the Israelis in the fighting of 1948, 1956 and 1967, Arabs everywhere--but Palestinians in particular--have found a new self-respect in Al-Fatah's ideas and military operations.⁶¹

Palestinian Armed Struggle: The New Alternative

By rejecting and challenging the Arab States' strategy of conventional war, the Al-Fatah Movement was obliged to present a substitute strategy of its own.

The "Palestinian Armed Struggle" strategy was presented by Al-Fatah as the revolutionary substitution for the Arab's strategy and the only possible way to combat Israel.⁶² The leadership of Al-Fatah, therefore, set forth the principles by which the Palestinians were to be guided in their long long struggle. In clear and definite form, Al-Fatah outlined, in 1962, the principles of Palestinian armed struggle. In "Revolutionary Lessons and Trials," a series of theoretical studies put out in Arabic, Al-Fatah examined and analyzed various theories of revolutionary activity from Mao Tse-Tung to Regis Debray, and applied them to the Palestinian

⁶¹Dan Adams Schmidt, "Fatah Leader Stresses Militancy," The New York Times, December 3, 1968, p. 6.

⁶²Hisham Sharabi, Palestine and Israel, The Lethal Dilemma (New York: Western Publishing Company, Inc., 1969), p. 183.

situation.⁶³

The strategy of the Palestinian Armed Struggle became, then, the new "Koran" of the Al-Fatah Movement. From its very beginning it saw the Palestinian armed struggle as a necessity that could not be escaped, and as the only alternative still open to the Palestinians.⁶⁴ The armed struggle, thus, found expression in almost every possible slogan, as can be seen in the following examples:

"We do not seek bloodshed--the armed struggle is an indispensable means."⁶⁵

"The world never pities victims. It only honors victorious fighters."⁶⁶

"We have nothing to lose, but our tents."⁶⁷

"Death in action for the annihilation of the enemy is preferable to waiting for a slow and miserable death in desert tents."⁶⁸

⁶³The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Al-Fatah, Series of "Revolutionary Lessons and Trials," (in Arabic) Revolution and Violence: The Road to Victory (Beirut: New Reprint, August 1967), p. 3.

⁶⁴Herbert Mason (ed.), Reflections On the Middle East Crisis (Paris: Mouton and Co., 1970), p. 112.

⁶⁵The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Al-Fatah, The Freedom Fighters, (Beirut: 1968), p. 3.

⁶⁶AL-FATAH (official paper of the movement), (Beirut: III, No. 1 (March 23, 1971), 13.

⁶⁷Aid Karaoglen (ed.), The Struggle Goes On (Beirut: The Palestine Research Center, 1969), p. 144.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 12.

"Al-Fatah's fighters specialized in the art of death for the sake of life."⁶⁹

From this revolutionary stand, Al-Fatah repeatedly declared its disbelief in politics with regard to the Palestinian problem. Politics are sickening in its writings when juxtaposed with the sublimity of "violence" and "armed struggle." Al-Fatah pointed out, in this respect, that violence and violence only will bring Israel to terms with the Palestinians. Furthermore, violence, Al-Fatah advocates, will play a tremendous role in the Palestinian case. It stated in one of its publications that:

Violence will purify the individuals from venom, it will redeem the colonized from inferiority complex, it will return courage to the countryman.⁷⁰

In its memorandum to the Arab journalists conference in 1965, Al-Fatah clarified this notion when it said, "Blazing our armed revolution inside the occupied territory 'Israel,' is a healing medicine for all our people's diseases."⁷¹

In its strategy, the Al-Fatah Movement places its ultimate confidence on the Arab masses. They are, in its view, "latent volcanoes," and the main "instrument" of the

⁶⁹Nasser Aruri (ed.), The Palestinian Resistance to Israeli Occupation (Wilmett, Illinois: The Medina University Press International, 1970), p. 8.

⁷⁰Al-Fatah, Revolution and Violence, p. 27.

⁷¹Al-Fatah, From the Starting Points of Fedayeen Action, p. 58.

Palestinian armed struggle.⁷² Al-Fatah determines that this manpower capacity should be activated. The destiny of the Palestinian armed struggle, in the Al-Fatah doctrine, will be, to a great extent, determined by the cooperation between the Palestinian guerrillas movement (the Vanguard) and the Arab masses.⁷³

Accordingly, the formation of a supporting Arab front should be established in all Arab countries.⁷⁴ The task of this front is to safeguard rear bases for the Palestinian resistance forces and to be used as a means of putting pressure on the Arab governments. Before 1967's war, as indicated earlier, the Arab governments had treated Al-Fatah's commandos as criminals. After the war, the popularity of the Palestinian commandos has forced these governments to come to terms with them.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, the old hostility remained the same. The Arab regimes were and still conceive the guerrilla movement to be a serious threat to the status quo which these regimes have been trying to maintain. In the light of these facts, one could understand why Al-Fatah has been advocating the "supporting Arab front" idea.

⁷²Abu Omar (From Al-Fatah leadership) "Discussion Around the Thought of the Palestinian Revolution," Palestine Affairs (Beirut: No. 5, The Palestine Research Center, November 1971), p. 107.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Al-Fatah, How Will the People's Armed Revolution Explode, p. 22.

⁷⁵Edward Hughes, "A Brotherhood of Terror," Time, March 29, 1968, p. 29.

Guerrilla warfare strategy which exploits the Arab's numerical superiority and which at the same time overcomes their technological weaknesses has been the Al-Fatah substitution for conventional war. It was, as Al-Fatah advocates, the weapon used successfully by the weaker people (Vietnam and Algeria) against the superiority of the imperialists forces.⁷⁶

In the final analysis, Al-Fatah declared that by forcing the Israeli forces to distribute themselves in every town and village in Israel and along the Arab borders, by using the guerrilla tactics of attacking the weak points of the enemy and quickly withdrawing and by avoiding direct clashes, the Palestinian command's forces will be able to shake the confidence of the Israeli forces.⁷⁷ By then, and only then, the balance of power, Al-Fatah confidently points out, will begin to shift slowly at first but accelerating with time, in favor of the Palestinians.⁷⁸

⁷⁶Rostgaard (ed.), Palestine: Crisis and Liberation (Havana, Cuba: Instituto del Libro, April 1970), p. 155.

⁷⁷Leila S. Kadi (ed.), Basic Political Documents of the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement (Beirut: Palestine Research Center, 1969), p. 152.

⁷⁸The Al-Fatah is aware of the fact that the struggle will be a very long one. In Arafat's (the top leader of Al-Fatah) appearances before the "Young Lions of the Revolution," the children (6-12 years old) brought up with Russian "Kalashnikov" in refugee camps, he has the habit of referring to them as the generation that might attain victory. But he also frequently tends to talk about a war that will last generations and generations. Ehud Yaari, Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah (New York: American-Israeli Publishing Co., Ltd., 1970), p. 387.

Al-Fatah and the International
Theories of Guerrilla Warfare

The theories of guerrilla warfare have been developed in the twentieth century several times over. They have been popularized and romanticized to the extent of becoming almost part of this generation's culture, especially in the underdeveloped countries.⁷⁹ No wonder then, the Al-Fatah Movement studied and analyzed various revolutionary theories and tried to apply some of their elements to the Palestinian case. It would be unreasonable to expect Al-Fatah's approach to guerrilla warfare to be original. The successes of guerrilla warfare in China, Algeria, Cuba and Vietnam were viewed by Al-Fatah as precedents guaranteeing the Palestinian guerrilla warfare success.⁸⁰ The feeling of kinship of sorts in a family of successful revolutionaries and guerrilla fighters inspires both optimism and pride in Palestinians.

Al-Fatah makes no bones about its indebtedness to the exponents of guerrilla warfare. Its spokesmen are fond of explaining that, although they have learned from others, they rely only on their own specific experience.⁸¹ They used to mention that the singularity of the Palestinian case limits,

⁷⁹Carleton Beals, Great Guerrilla Warriors (New York: A Tower Book, January 1971), p. 9; Y. Harkabi, Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy, p.17.

⁸⁰Herbert Mason (ed.), Reflections on the Middle East Crisis, p. 112.

⁸¹From Al-Fatah unpublished material, Why Do I Belong to Al-Fatah, No. 1, pp. 2-7.

to a great extent, the possibility of benefiting from lessons from elsewhere. In its "Revolutionary Lessons and Trials" series, Al-Fatah published pamphlets bearing the titles: "The Chinese Experience,"⁸² "The Vietnames Experience,"⁸³ and "The Cuban Experience,"⁸⁴ Though Algeria, as an Arab case, should have served as the main source of inspiration for Al-Fatah, it seems that the greatest influence was exerted by Cuban experience.

The reasons for Al-Fatah's seeing Cuba as the main source of inspiration for its guerrilla warfare seems obvious. Mao Tse-tung has stressed that guerrilla warfare can succeed only in a large country like China where the guerrilla can establish a base out of the reach of enemy forces.⁸⁵ He has specified that guerrilla warfare cannot succeed in a country of a small size. Mao's theory, thus, does not support Al-Fatah's guerrilla warfare strategy in a country of small area such as Palestine, whereas Cuba's experience proved the contrary.

When Che-Guevara met Yasser Arafat in Algeria, in 1965,⁸⁶ he whole-heartedly urged the Palestinians to launch

⁸²Al-Fatah, Revolutionary Lessons and Trials, The Chinese Experience (Beirut: New Reprint, August 1967).

⁸³Al-Fatah, Revolutionary Lessons and Trials, The Vietnames Experience (Beirut: New Reprint, August 1967).

⁸⁴Al-Fatah, Revolutionary Lessons and Trials, The Cuban Experience (Beirut: New Reprint, August 1967).

⁸⁵Carleton Beals, Great Guerrilla Warriors, p. 188.

⁸⁶Rostgaard (ed.), Palestine: Crisis and Liberation, p. 156.

their armed struggle regardless of circumstances. It is noteworthy, therefore, to indicate that the first sentence of the Al-Fatah pamphlet on the Cuban experience reads:

The Cuban experience has proved the error of those who see a need for waiting until the maturing of the objective and the subjective circumstances for the revolution, instead of the continuous effort to accelerate the formation of these circumstances.⁸⁷

In China and Vietnam, the leaders of the guerrilla warfare were the Communist Parties. Al-Fatah disapproves of the need to be established as a party. In Cuba, Al-Fatah argues, it all started from the wanderings of the first twelve people in the "Sierra Maestra."⁸⁸ Thus, the Cuban model suits Al-Fatah, precisely because Al-Fatah was not, in its beginning, a popular movement.

As a result of its belief in the Third World's solidarity, the Al-Fatah Movement has established good relations with China, Vietnam (VietCong) and Cuba and has given both help and advice.⁸⁹ Some of Al-Fatah's leaders and hundreds of its cadres, accordingly, were sent to China and Cuba for training.⁹⁰

⁸⁷The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Al-Fatah, Series of "Revolutionary Lessons and Trials," No. 6, The Cuban Experience (Beirut: New Reprint, August 1967), p. 3.

⁸⁸Colletion/Analysis, Palestine: Crisis and Liberation (Havana, Cuba: Press "Mario Reguera Gomez," April 1970), p. 155.

⁸⁹Randa Khalidi, "Palestine Liberation Movement," The Arab World (New York: May 1969), p. 23.

⁹⁰John K. Cooley, "China and the Palestinians," Journal of Palestine Studies (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies), I, No. 2 (Winter 1972), 29.

Al-Fatah's Social Ideology

When the founding group of Al-Fatah started to develop and formulate the basic principles of their doctrine, in 1958, the singularity of the Palestinian case deprived them of the luxury of choice between the various political ideologies. The fact was that the main concern of the Palestinians in the refugee camps was neither "Marxist" nor "Capitalist" theories, but "the return" to Palestine.⁹¹ The Ideologies of the West had no relevance to the dweller of the refugee camps. Accordingly, the founding group has demanded the members of Al-Fatah, from the very beginning, dissociate themselves from their former ideologies and party affiliations and believe only in liberation of Palestine through violence and armed struggle.⁹² The conviction of Al-Fatah leadership has been that armed struggle will purify the soul of the Palestinians, wipe out their ideological sensitivities, and political ideology can only grow within the armed struggle "as the Palestinian revolution grows and comes of age."⁹³

Al-Fatah, on the other hand, intentionally avoids declaring a specific social ideology and its leaders.

⁹¹Dialogue With Fatah (This dialogue took place in April 1969 between Abu-Eyad, a member of Al-Fatah's Central Committee, and Loutfi Al-Khouli, the Editor of the Egyptian leftist journal Al-Talia (The Vanguard). The dialogue translated into English and published by Al-Fatah, (Beirut: 1970), p. 56.

⁹²Edmund Ghareeb, "An Interview With Abu Ammar," The Arab World (New York: May 1969), p. 27.

⁹³Hisham Sharabi, Palestine and Israel, the Lethal Dilemma, p. 200.

repeatedly declare that the current phase is the phase of national liberation during which the Palestinians must concentrate upon the military activities and avoid any social controversies.⁹⁴ Arafat, the top leader of Al-Fatah, once admitted, "We took arms and began to fight without thinking about our activities in relation to an ideology."⁹⁵

Marxism was rejected by the Al-Fatah Movement.⁹⁶ It was rejected on the basis that while Al-Fatah's main concern, as indicated earlier, was guaranteeing the Palestinian national unity, Marxism, by its emphasis on the class struggle, would destroy the chances of that unity. On this basis, Al-Fatah has accused the Palestinian Marxist's guerrilla

⁹⁴Al-Fatah unpublished material, The Palestinian Revolution: The New Dimensions, p. 3.

⁹⁵Edmund Ghareeb, "An Interview with Abu Amar", The Arab World, p. 27.

An important debate about Al-Fatah's refusal to draw up a social platform took place between Arafat and a correspondent of the Lebanese weekly "El Siad". Arafat offered practical reasons for Al-Fatah's stand when he said:

I am a refugee. We are a people of refugees. Do you know what it means to be a refugee? I am a poor and helpless man. I have nothing, for I was banished and dispossessed of my homeland. What meaning do the left or the right have in the struggle for the liberation of my homeland?

Must I publish a public statement to proclaim my belief in Marxism? Is this what I am required to do at this stage? Everybody asks what our social views are. Aren't we still in the phase of national liberation?

Yaari, Strike Terror, p. 194.

⁹⁶Al-Fatah, The Palestinian Revolution: The New Dimensions, p. 3.

organizations PFLP⁹⁷ and PDFLP⁹⁸ of "adventurism."⁹⁹ It declared that these organizations have introduced the factor of the class struggle into the Palestinian struggle, thus, dividing Palestinians among themselves instead of uniting them against the same enemy.

When Al-Fatah was accused by these Marxist organizations of bourgeois tendencies, because it does not limit the Palestinian struggle to the workers and peasant class,¹⁰⁰ Al-Fatah's reply was:

Those who make such accusations overlook the fact that Al-Fatah does represent a particular class, but a wider one. The class of uprooted, displaced and oppressed Palestinians.¹⁰¹

⁹⁷The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Established in 1967 as an amalgamation of several small groups under the leadership of Dr. George Habash (Christian). Neo-Marxist, the main opposition to Al-Fatah's hegemony. It is the organization which specialized in the hijacking operations.

⁹⁸The Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Small Marxist guerrilla organization, headed by Naif Hawatmeh, who broke away from the Popular Front in May, 1968 over ideological differences with Habash.

⁹⁹Al-Fatah, The Palestinian Revolution: The New Dimensions, p. 7.

¹⁰⁰Gassan Kanafany, "Discussions Around the Thought of the Palestinian Revolution," Palestine Affaris, No. 5, pp. 110-111.

¹⁰¹Gerard Chaliand, The Palestinian Resistance, p. 71. According to Al-Fatah statistics, its members are constituted of:

- 40% - high school graduates
- 25% - workers and peasants
- 20% - academic students
- 15% - clerks and public utility workers

Al-Fatah unpublished material, Why Do I Belong to Al-Fatah?

Al-Fatah's anti-ideological stand remained until after the Six Day War. Towards the Middle of 1969, there were internal pressures among Al-Fatah cadres for adoption of a social ideology that would crown Al-Fatah with the character of "Arab socialism."¹⁰²

Nevertheless, regarding the social question, the farthest that Al-Fatah was willing to go was to declare that, "The land will belong to the hands that liberate it."¹⁰³ In its elaboration of this stand, Al-Fatah stated that it is not easy to put forward a "specific" social ideology at a time when the struggle is against the "occupying power."¹⁰⁴ In the Palestinian situation, the struggle should be a national one, in the sense that all the classes which are against Zionism and imperialism should form an alliance to destroy the "Zionist-imperialist occupation of Palestine."¹⁰⁵ Thus, to put forward a social concept would have, in Al-Fatah's analysis, a direct effect on the alliance by sowing dissension among its members. Al-Fatah cleared this point when it stated that:

¹⁰² Hisham Sharabi, Palestine Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness (Washington: The center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1970), p. 31.

¹⁰³ Al-Fatah, From the Starting Points of Fedayeen Action, p. 59.

¹⁰⁴ Leila S. Kadi (ed.), Basic Political Documents of the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement, p. 104.

¹⁰⁵ Hisham Sharabi, Palestine Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness, p. 56.

The bloody battle with Zionist occupation is one of survival and not over a social ideology, it is a struggle of life and death, of being or not being. In such a struggle ideological differences ought to disappear and the people ought to join together in a broad revolutionary front to dismantle the political, social and economic structure of the oppressor state and uproot Zionism from our noble soil.¹⁰⁶

The leaders of Al-Fatah, in their insistence that the essential thing for the Palestinians is the armed struggle and not the development of a "program" or some political line, obviously have in mind the Algerian experience. The Algerian F.L.N. is a perfect example of a movement that did not originate as a political party and never fought in the sense of ideological spirit. Against all expectations, the F.L.N. was able to awaken and to develop the aspirations of an entire people after a century of assimilation. It took up arms against a big colonial power and created in Algerian blood and bones the sense of an Algerian nation. The struggle--an eight-year struggle--imposed the "fact of Algeria" on the French and converted the "terrorists" of 1954 into "authentic representatives of the Algerian people."¹⁰⁷ The Palestinian people, Al-Fatah declared, will become again a genuine people only through a similar test.¹⁰⁸

That has been a brief examination of the main elements of the doctrine of the Al-Fatah Movement. One basic element

¹⁰⁶ Al-Fatah, From the Starting Points of Fedayeen Action, p. 64.

¹⁰⁷ Jean Larteguy, The Walls of Israel. (New York: M. Evans and Company, Inc., 1968), p. 228.

¹⁰⁸ Al-Fatah, Revolution and Violence: The Road to Victory, p. 27.

in Al-Fatah's doctrine is still unexamined; it is the solution of Al-Fatah to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

What is the ultimate goal of the Al-Fatah's armed struggle? How does Al-Fatah perceive the final solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?

The answer to these questions constitute a significant element in Al-Fatah's doctrine. Examining that element will be the task of the next chapter.

Chapter V

AL-FATAH'S SOLUTION

"A DEMOCRATIC NON-SECTARIAN STATE IN PALESTINE"

"If God, as some now say, is dead, He no doubt died of trying to find an equitable solution to the Arab-Jewish problem."¹

The above statement illustrates, to a great extent, the complicated situation to which the Arab-Israeli conflict has reached. To find a solution, therefore, which will satisfy both sides seems, to many observers, next to impossible. The bulk of the Jews and the Israelis draw from their suffering in Europe (especially Germany) the conviction that, in this world, when threatened one must be prepared to kill or to be killed.² The Palestinians draw from the Algerian struggle the conviction that liberation was made possible only by resorting to the gun and force. Everyone of the Israelis and Palestinians feels deeply aggrieved at an enemy from whom he cannot escape, whom he suspects, and fears, and with whom he sees virtually no hope for peace. All are

¹Walter Laqueur (ed), The Israel-Arab Reader, 2d ed. (New York: B. L. Mazel, Inc., 1970), p. 310.

²Arthur Hertzberg, "The Evolution of Jewish Identity," (a monthly Jewish Review published by the Theodor Herzl Foundation, Inc., New York), Midstream, XVII, No. 7 (August, September, 1971), 31.

caught in a web of self-justification, bitterness and hatred.³ Each side feels that force is the only language the other side will understand. In this they agree, and this sets them on a collision course. For the Jews believe justice requires the recognition of the State of Israel as a fact. For the Palestinians, to recognize the fact is to acquiesce in the wrong done them by the conquest of Palestine.

Having this complicated situation in mind, the Palestine National Liberation Movement, Al-Fatah, declared to Jews and Palestinians in particular, and the world at large, that there is still hope and a possibility of peaceful living in Palestine for Jews, Christians and Muslims alike.

The Palestine of Tomorrow

On January 28, 1969, the delegation of the Al-Fatah Movement to the "Second International Conference in Support of the Arab Peoples," in Cairo, declared officially and for the first time, the ultimate goal of Al-Fatah struggle. The declaration stated:

We are fighting, today, to create the new Palestine of tomorrow; a progressive, democratic and non-sectarian Palestine in which Christian, Muslim and Jew will worship, work, live peacefully and enjoy equal rights.

The statement further added:

. . . Our Palestine revolution still stretches its welcoming hand to all human beings who want to fight for,

³Uri Aunery, Israel Without Zionists: A Plea For Peace in the Middle East (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969), p. 192.

and live in, a democratic, tolerant Palestine, irrespective of race, color or religion.⁴

The declaration was repeated, explained and amplified by the Al-Fatah representatives in every international gathering attended by Al-Fatah delegations.⁵ The top leader of Al-Fatah, Yasser Arafat (Abu Ammar) clarified the idea when he was interviewed by a journalist from Cuba in 1970, when he said:

We have not taken up arms to force two million Jews into the sea (as Israel claims) or to wage a religious or racial war. The Jews lived alongside the Arabs, including the Palestinians, for many years, and we have never proposed to expel the Jews from Palestine. We are carrying the war forward to expel from our country a military occupation force set-up by international imperialism and international Zionism--which served as the instrument for carrying out imperialist policy in the creation of Israel.⁶

Abu Iyad, a member of Al-Fatah's Central Committee, stated, in a long interview with the editor of Al-Taleea (the Egyptian Monthly Journal), in June 1969, that the Palestinian revolution condemns persecution of human beings and discrimination based on any form or shape, and that the Al-Fatah Movement would help Jews anywhere, if they faced persecution at the hands of racists. Abu Iyad said that he would be

⁴The Address of Al-Fatah Delegation to the Second International Conference in Support of the Arab Peoples, held in Cairo, January 28, 1969 (Beirut: published by the Al-Fatah Movement, 1970), p. 1.

⁵The Al-Fatah 1969 Year Book (in Arabic), (Beirut: 1969), pp. 110, 116, 121, 158, 160 and 162.

⁶Palestine: Crisis and Liberation, Collection/Analysis (Havana: Institute del Libro, 1970), pp. 166-167.

willing to give these Jews arms and fight with them.⁷

In explaining how the Al-Fatah movement arrived at the democratic non-sectarian state idea, Dr. Nabil Shaath, one of the Al-Fatah ideologists, states that through the struggle between 1965-1969, Al-Fatah leadership developed the general lines of this idea and they realized, out of their experience, that a people's war cannot be motivated and sustained by revenge alone.⁸ The Al-Fatah leadership, therefore, engaged in a serious study and discussion of the idea. "Relearning old truths emerged" Al-Fatah elaborates:

. . . Jews suffered persecution at the hands of racist criminals under Nazism; so did we (Palestinians) under Zionism. Several revealing parallels were discovered. How could we hate the Jews quo Jews? How could we fall in the same racist trap?⁹

Such was Al-Fatah's re-examination of the conflict.

A new attitude, therefore, was being formed toward the people of Israel. Distinction between Jew and Zionist started to have meaning.¹⁰ Yasser Arafat (Abu Ammar) stated

⁷Dialogue With Fatah, (the interview of Al-Taleea translated into English by Al-Fatah), (Beirut: 1969), p. 104.

⁸The full text of a lecture delivered by Dr. Nabil Saath on the "Palestine-of-Tomorrow" at the Second International Symposium on Palestine held in Kuwait, February 13-17, 1971, p. 1.

⁹Dr. Mohammed Rasheed, Towards A Democratic State in Palestine (Beirut: Palestine Research Center, November, 1970), p. 16.

¹⁰When several Jewish students from Europe came to spend part of their summer in Al-Fatah camps and bases in Jordan, in 1969, they were treated as brothers. Mohammed Rasheed, Towards A Democratic State in Palestine, p. 17.

sometime earlier:

We are not against the Jews. On the contrary, we are all Semites, and we have been living with each other in peace and fraternity, Muslims, Jews and Christians, for many centuries It is one of the aims of our movement to liberate the Jews, themselves, from the domination of Zionism.¹¹

The ultimate goal of the Palestinian struggle, Al-Fatah elaborates, is the destruction of the Zionist structure in Palestine represented by the Israeli State Institutions, such as the army, the bureaucracy and the political organizations.¹² Al-Fatah goes on to explain that:

The maintenance of a technological advanced military machine through a continuous Western capital flow and exchange of population, led the expansionist Zionist machinery to perpetuate one aggression after another.¹³

Therefore, Al-Fatah insists that the liquidation of such a state is an irreplaceable condition for the creation of the new Palestine. On the other hand, liquidation of the "structure" of the State of Israel does not mean, Al-Fatah points out, liquidation of the people of Israel. "When the machinery of the Nazi State was liquidated," Al-Fatah draws an analogy, "the German people were liberated together with other nations that were oppressed by Nazi-Germany. The Germans were not liquidated."¹⁴

¹¹Dan Adams Schmidt, The New York Times, December 3, 1968, p. 6.

¹²Naseer Aruri (ed), The Palestinian Resistance To Israeli Occupation (Wilmette, Illinois: The Medina University Press International, 1970), p. 7.

¹³Mohammed Rasheed, Towards A Democratic State in Palestine, p. 39.

¹⁴Ibid.

PROFILE OF THE PALESTINE OF TOMORROW

Having accomplished this goal, the liquidation of the "State" of Israel, what will the new country, the democratic, progressive and non-sectarian state look like? In spite of the fact that the idea, so far, remains more a vision than a detailed political program, the general features of the Palestine of Tomorrow could be drawn as follows.

The Country

Pre-1948 Palestine, is the territory to be liberated and where the democratic, progressive State of Palestine is to be created.¹⁵ The liberated Palestine will be part of the Arab homeland, and will not be "another alien state" within it.¹⁶ The new Palestine, Al-Fatah declared repeatedly, will be anti-imperialist, and will join the ranks of progressive revolutionary countries of the Third World.¹⁷

The Constituents

All the Jews, Muslims and Christians in Palestine, or forcibly exiled from it, will have, as Al-Fatah explains, the right to Palestinian citizenship.¹⁸ This guarantees the

¹⁵Interview with Abu Iyad, (member of Al-Fatah's Central Committee), Free Palestine, a monthly paper published by the Friends of Free Palestine (Washington, D.C.: III, No. 7, (November 1971), 7.

¹⁶Al-Fatah 1969 Year Book, p. 160.

¹⁷Edmund Ghareeb, "An Interview With Abu-Ammar", The Arab World (New York: May 1969), p. 27.

¹⁸Leila S. Kadi (ed.), Basic Political Documents of the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement (Beirut, 1969), p.75.

right of all exiled Palestinians to return to "their" land whether they have been born in Palestine or in exile.

Equally, this means, in the Al-Fatah vision, that all Jewish Palestinians--at present time Israelis--have the same right, on the condition that they reject "Zionist racist chauvinism" and fully agree to live as Palestinians in the New Palestine.¹⁹ In his long interview with Al-Taleea (the Egyptian Monthly Journal) Abu Iyad, a member of the Al-Fatah Central Committee, reasserted that not only progressive anti-Zionist Jews, but even present Zionists, who will be willing to abandon their "racist" ideology, will be welcome as Palestinian citizens.²⁰ Yasser Arafat (Abu Ammar) reiterated several times that the President of liberated Palestine could be a Jew, a Muslim or a Christian, not because of his religion or sect, but on the basis of his merit as an outstanding Palestinian.²¹

It is the belief of the Al-Fatah Movement that, in the long run, the majority of the present Israeli Jews will change their attitudes and will subscribe, contribute and enrich this vision, especially after the State machinery,

¹⁹Dialogue With Fatah, p. 66.

²⁰Ibid., p. 104.

²¹Dr. Mohammed Rasheed, Towards A Democratic State In Palestine, p. 38.

economy and military establishment of Israel is destroyed.²²

The Ideology

As was indicated in the preceding chapter, Al-Fatah's anti-ideology stand (this is the phase of the liberation struggle not of ideological controversies) still prevails. In regard to the ideology of the "Palestine of Tomorrow," Al-Fatah states that in the process of, and at the time of liberation, the Palestinians (Jews, Christians and Muslims) will decide on the system of government, and on the political-economic-social organization of their liberated country.²³

However, it is self-evident, Al-Fatah explains, that a democratic and progressive Palestine "rejects, by elimination, a theocratic, a feudalist, an aristocratic and authoritarian or a racist-chauvinistic form of government."²⁴ It will be a country, Al-Fatah elaborates, that does not allow oppression or exploitation of any group of people by any other group or individual; a state that provides equal opportunities for its people in work, worship, education with Hebrew as well as Arabic the official languages, political

²²"Al-Fatah Movement looks forward to the day when several thousands Jews will join its fighting ranks for the liberation of Palestine" From the speech of Al-Fatah representative to the 2nd World Conference on Palestine held in Amman, September 26, 1970.

AL-FATAH (weekly paper), Beirut: September 10, 1970, p. 3.

²³Al-Fatah 1969 Year Book, p. 121.

²⁴Mohammed Rasheed, Towards A Democratic State in Palestine, p. 36.

decision-making, cultural and artistic expression.²⁵

In the final analysis, the solution of a democratic non-sectarian state, Al-Fatah advocates, is superior to the other three solutions²⁶ which were offered to the Jewish question. Superior in that it offers, Al-Fatah explains, the Jews in Palestine equality and freedom from persecution, discrimination and anxiety and yet retains his option to remain a Jew, to practice his religion and speak his language and share:

. . . co-equally in the building of a challenging and visionary new country, a country where he is no more oppressor, and no more oppressed; no victim and no aggressor with no exclusive superior rights, nor a second-class status; possessor of a universal, pluralist vision, not a sufferer from ethnocentric claustrophobia.²⁷

²⁵Clovis Maksoud, "New Palestine: Grievance Redressed, Justice For Arab and Jew," Mid East (monthly periodical), (Washington, D.C.: June, 1970), XI, No. 3, 9.

- ²⁶1. The Western liberal solution: indicating assimilation and absorption into western societies.
2. The socialist solution: asserting that the end of exploitation through a proletarian revolution would render the problem null and void.
3. The Zionist solution: springing from an indictment of the human nature, that minorities will forever be oppressed by majorities and that the only way out for oppressed minorities is to try to establish themselves as a majority in some country. But as it turns out in Palestine, creating such a country by invasion, and uprooting its population, succeeds only in creating a glorified ghetto instead of the myriad small ones, a ghetto that is in the long-run less safe and secure than the older and smaller ones."

Dr. Nabil Shaath, "Palestine of Tomorrow," AL-FATAH, weekly newspaper (Beirut: March 23, 1971), III, No. 1, 8.

²⁷Ibid.

Is The "Palestine of Tomorrow" Viable?

To determine whether the Al'Fatah vision of "Palestine of Tomorrow" is viable, it is necessary to identify the position of the other side of the conflict (the Israeli side) from that proposal. But the problem here is that the Israeli side has never, officially, mentioned or discussed this proposal. The Israeli's policy in this regard is based primarily on dismissing the whole idea.²⁸ If they mention it (rarely), they mention it as a propaganda from the Al-Fatah side in order to gain world public opinion.²⁹

Nevertheless, the Al-Fatah solution of a democratic non-sectarian state in Palestine as a just and final solution for the Palestinian-Israeli confrontation still lacks, in fact, full clarity and elaboration. But, on the other hand, this is, as an Arab ideologist concluded, the best that can be done by Al-Fatah and the Palestinians, especially at this stage of liberation struggle.³⁰ To discuss, modify, contribute and enrich the idea is the initiative which should come from the Israeli side.³¹

On the other hand, in a relatively short time, through their armed struggle, the Palestinians, as many

²⁸Russell Stetler, Palestine: The Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 218.

²⁹Y. Harkabi, Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy, p. 11.

³⁰Dr. Clovis Maksud, Democratic Alternative to Israel, (Synopsis of a statement to the Young Democrats National Convention held on November 18, 1970 at Hot Springs, Arkansas), p. 4.

³¹Ibid.

observers have noticed, have outgrown, to a certain extent, their bitterness and prejudice towards the Jews.³² The distinction between the Jew and the Zionist has become a cornerstone in the Al-Fatah doctrine. It is noteworthy to indicate that a few years ago discussing a proposal in the Arab world, such as Al-Fatah's proposal, would have been considered as a complete sell-out or high treason to the Palestinian problem. Even today, some chauvinist Arabs still find it very difficult to accept the proposed goal.

In the final analysis, if a democratic and progressive new Palestine is, as an Israeli official once said, Utopia,³³ the Al-Fatah Movement, on the other hand, has declared that the "Palestinian guerrillas and camp dwellers are starting to practice it."³⁴

³²Palestine: Crisis and Liberation, p. 154.

³³"Interview with Uri Avnery," II, No. 7 (November 1970), 4.

³⁴Dr. Mohammed Rasheed, Towards A Democratic State in Palestine, p. 37.

Chapter VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

SUMMARY

It was the purpose of this study to examine the development and doctrine of the Al-Fatah Movement and to examine its place as an important factor in the conflict in the Middle East. In order to understand the atmosphere in which the Al-Fatah was dealing, it was necessary to outline the origins of the "Palestine Problem" and the general character of the thought which was dominating the Arab World in regard to that problem.

It was indicated how the whole problem started when, in 1896, Theodor Herzl of Austria wrote his pamphlet, The Jewish State calling for the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. In 1917 Britain issued the Balfour Declaration, viewing with favor the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine with a contradictory proviso, supposedly to protect the Palestinian rights. In 1922 the League of Nations assigned to Britain a Mandate over Palestine in order to fulfill the terms of the British Balfour Declaration.

In 1947 the United Nations partitioned Palestine which led to the creation of the Jewish State of Israel and

the displacement of the Palestinian people. The Palestinians did not consent to any of these declarations and promises to the Jews, nor did they consent to the partition of Palestine. Nevertheless, in 1948, the state of Israel became a fact in the Middle East, but the Arabs in general, and the Palestinians in particular, have never recognized that fact.

In the wake of the creation of the State of Israel, the Palestinian people scattered in refugee camps around the boundaries of Palestine (Israel after 1948) filled with hatred, frustrations, and hopes. They hoped that something would be done by the United Nations, Arab States and big powers to restore "their" rights in Palestine. They waited and waited, but their wait was fruitless and their dispersion was aggravated. The Palestinians, then, were convinced that unless they took their problem into their own hands, others would do nothing for them.

In 1959 a secret monthly magazine of limited circulation, under the name of "Our Palestine" began publication in Beirut, Lebanon. "Our Palestine" called for the Palestinianization of the Palestine problem. This meant that the Arab regimes should end their guardianship over the Palestinians and give them a free hand to work for the liberation of their land. Later on, it became known that the sponsors of "Our Palestine" were the Al-Fatah founding group. This group came into existence out of the discussions of Palestinian students in Cairo University. From the very beginning Yasser Arafat (his code name is Abu Ammar) was the leader of

the founding group. His career, in a way, mirrors the history and thrust of the Al-Fatah Movement.

In the early 1950's, Arafat began his studies in the school of engineering in Cairo University. The University offered him an ideal atmosphere to begin spreading the idea of the necessity of creating an independent Palestinian underground organization. As chairman of the "Palestinian Student Federation in Egypt,"--1952-1956--Arafat helped to lay the basic foundation for the Al-Fatah organization. In 1957 after a brief period as an engineer in Egypt, Arafat left Egypt to go to Kuwait, where he obtained an engineering job. Meanwhile, he traveled among the scattered Palestinians to recruit members for the proposed organization. In 1958 the organization was formed under the name of Al-Fatah. Soon cells were formed in Kuwait, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Egypt and West Germany. The initial development of Al-Fatah was slow and went against the trends of the period. This could be linked to the belief which was dominating the Arab world, that Arab unity was the only road to the liberation of Palestine, and any claims to unity boosted this belief. Thus slogans and aspirations to unite under the leadership of President Nasser made themselves felt strongly during the years 1957-1958, culminating in union between Syria and Egypt.

Between 1957 and 1967, talk about Arab unity reached its climax, but at the same time, rivalry between the various Arab regimes became even more acute. In this context, the

Palestinian national question was not a simple one because through the idea of Arab unity, the existence of Israel made it possible for many Arab regimes to redirect popular aspirations toward external objectives and an outside enemy. Accordingly, when the militants of the Al-Fatah Movement declared their rejection and their rebellion against the Arab regimes' strategies and their way of thinking, they were accused of being agents of CENTO, and even agents of Israel. The United Arab Republic (President Nasser) was of the opinion that Al-Fatah was trying to involve it in a war with Israel at a time when Arab unity had not yet been achieved. Thus, the strictly clandestine character of the Al-Fatah Movement, until 1967, was less due to Israel than to the attitude of Arab regimes where the commandos were often put under house arrest, thrown in jail or even worse.

With the failure of the Syro-Egyptian union in 1961, the concept of Arab unity as the only road to the liberation of Palestine collapsed. Many Palestinians, then, realized that the attainment of Arab unity was an almost impossible task, and that they could not afford to wait until all the Arab world was united. Al-Fatah, as an independent Palestinian entity, started to expand and recruited hundreds of Palestinians throughout the Arab world and Western Europe. The triumph of the Algerian revolution in 1962 came to give more weight to the Al-Fatah principle of an independent Palestinian activity. On the New Year's Eve of 1955, after six years of preparations, Al-Fatah decided to launch the

"Palestinian Struggle for the Liberation of Palestine."

Up to 1965 and through "Our Palestine," Al-Fatah was the sole political movement in the entire Arab world which called for the adoption of the principle of Palestinian armed struggle as the only means for the liberation of Palestine. It believed that the Palestinians should start armed struggle regardless of the meager resources, and irrespective of the reaction or plans of the Arab armies.

In the early stages Al-Fatah ideas and military operations against Israel were not clearly described in the Arab world for the reason that the Arab regimes and their mass media were tacitly opposed to the Al-Fatah principle of Palestinian guerrilla warfare. The Palestinian people remained passive awaiting the Arab regimes, especially the United Arab Republic, to bring a favorable end to their problem. Al-Fatah was an isolated movement trying to prove that Palestinians could escape the control of the various Arab States.

The overwhelming defeat of the Arab regimes in the 1967 War took the Arab masses by surprise. The acceptance of the cease-fire in 1967 by regimes which had announced their determination to "go all the way" helped clarify their true ideological position. For an entire Arab generation, this was indicative of the failure of the prevailing ideologies, Baathism and Nasserism. The defeat proved, in fact, to the Palestinian what the Al-Fatah Movement had been trying to prove that dependence on the Arab governments for the

liberation of Palestine would lead nowhere. The 1967 defeat proved to the Palestinians and the Arabs, alike, another principle of the Al-Fatah Movement, that the idea of Arab unity, which was considered to be the road to Palestine, was far-fetched under existing conditions. The Arab masses, Al-Fatah explains, were isolated and could not play their proper role in the war because the existing Arab regimes feared their own people, in case they were armed and trained, more than the enemy. Thus, the role of the Arab masses, as Al-Fatah advocates, was limited to observing the defeat of their armies and the occupation of the whole of Palestine, Sinai and the Golan Heights. Al-Fatah took it upon itself to act, continue the struggle against Israel, rally the Arab masses to its side, and make them play their proper role in "retrieving" Palestine, Sinai and the Golden Heights from Israeli "occupation."

With the collapse of Arab military strength in 1967, Al-Fatah's doctrine of the guerrilla warfare gained momentum and strength very quickly. Al-Fatah armed itself with great rapidity and in only eighteen months, after the Arabs' defeat in 1967, it was able to train thousands of combatants while, before the defeat, it had taken almost seven years (1958-1965) to complete the structure of its first politico-military nucleus. Soon Al-Fatah came to control the mass of the Palestinian population, especially in the refugee camps. With the "Battle of Al-Karamah," on March 21, 1968, Al-Fatah emerged as undisputed leader of the Palestinian people and as

a new factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Political education was intensified by Al-Fatah among the refugees with the aim of rediscovering their "Palestinian identity."

In terms of instrumental doctrine, Al-Fatah Movement committed itself to the following fundamental principles:

1. "The liberation of Palestine is the road to the Arab unity" principle was the Al-Fatah's substitute to the accepted concept in the Arab world, "The Arab unity is the road to liberation of Palestine;"

2. "Guerrilla warfare" strategy substituting the "conventional war" strategy;

3. "The Palestinian armed struggle is the only alternative to combat the State of Israel;"

4. "Palestinian leadership" instead of the "Arab guardianship" and

5. "Creating a democratic non-sectarian state in Palestine," where Jews, Christians and Muslims could work, worship and live peacefully together while enjoying equal rights and obligations, as an alternative to the Arab chauvinist slogan, "driving the Jews into the sea."

With its commitment to these fundamental principles, there is no doubt that the Al-Fatah Movement has marked a distinct break with the Arab thought of the previous two decades.

It was in the adoption of violence as its strategic centerpiece that the Al-Fatah Movement showed its radical character. The Maoist dictum that "power grows out of the

barrel of a gun," occupied the center in the Al-Fatah ideology. The Third World concept of people's liberation war, formerly only marginal in the political thought of the Arab world, became the keystone of Al-Fatah's doctrine. Al-Fatah leaders read Marx, Mao, Giap, Debray and Guevara, not necessarily out of agreement with their social goals, but for their practical expertise. Al-Fatah, in this respect rejected the Marxist theory as a ready-made social theory for the Palestinian revolution. The furthest that Al-Fatah was willing to go, in regard to the social question, was to declare that "land will belong to the hands that liberate it."

Al-Fatah, however, placed a higher priority on indoctrination. It advocated that indoctrination and education must be carried out systematically among the Palestinians, the other Arabs, and the Israelis. The Palestinians, Al-Fatah explains, must be politicized--imbued with a "new mentality" that abjures self-pity and despair, so that they could participate in the common struggle. The other Arab masses must be persuaded and mobilized to support and participate in the Palestinian armed struggle. And the Israeli population--particularly the disadvantaged Arab Palestinians and Arab Jews--must be offered a preferable alternative to its present life in the "Zionist state." Al-Fatah's activism stressed the development of individual and community capabilities as opposed to the attitude of fatalism prevalent in the traditional sectors of Palestinian and Arab society. Among the activist traits, which Al-Fatah instilled in its

commandos and in the refugee camps' population, were the modern virtues of achievement, self-reliance, and leadership initiative. The guerrilla image that dramatically won the support of the Arab people was that of an individual who has taken his future into his own hands, who sacrifices personal advantages and who works as part of a team for a noble purpose.

CONCLUSIONS

The primary conclusions which can be drawn from this study may be listed as follows:

1. Stripped of propaganda and sentiment, the Palestine problem is, simply, the struggle of two different peoples for the same strip of land. For the Jews, the establishment of Israel was a "Return", with all the mystical significance the capital "R" implies. For the Arabs, it was another "invasion." The confrontation, therefore, is one in which the stakes are as high as national life itself. As the history of the last two decades, and as things stand today in the Middle East, the melancholy conclusion is that only continued belligerent confrontation lies ahead.

2. For the first time since 1948, the Palestinians have assumed the primary responsibility for their own cause, exhibiting an unprecedented degree of dedication and self-reliance. Indeed, the emergence of a growing independent "Palestinian entity," owing allegiance to no Arab government, immune to external diplomatic pressure, and dedicated to a

doctrine of armed struggle, constitutes a new explosive dimension in the lingering Arab-Israeli conflict.

3. The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Al-Fatah, is neither a party nor a front. A party has to have a constant social ideology. A front is composed, usually, of revolutionary organizations based on a specific work program. Al-Fatah, therefore, is a movement because it believes in the necessity of subjecting its thought to practice and experience. Through practice and experience it can enrich the necessary contents of its thought. Al-Fatah does not believe in the logic of static theory. It is a movement which has specific aims and acts in accordance with basic principles. It has incontestable principles, yet the contents of its ideology cannot be determined except through actual practice. In this sense Al-Fatah is a movement which is continuously subjecting the totality of its concepts and policies to practice. It will continue to change these concepts and policies in order to build the final structure of its thought or ideology.

4. In Al-Fatah's commando the Arabs see the birth of the "new Arab man" redeemed from all past dishonor and humiliation. The Arab nationalists have transferred to the Al-Fatah Movement the hopes that they had earlier placed in Nasserism and Baathism. Identification with Al-Fatah, therefore, has become the measure and symbol of patriotism.

5. Until 1967, the Palestinian problem had been viewed as an Arab-Israeli problem with the Palestinian

refugees composing merely a negative quantity in the conflict. Now with the rise of the Al-Fatah Movement, the problem of the refugees was transformed. The Palestinians now not only set forth their own demands, but refused to acknowledge any settlement to which they were not a party. It was now almost impossible to speak and to act--as Israel and Arab regimes had done for over twenty years--as if the Palestinians did not exist. Now a solution to be binding, had to take full account of their (Palestinian) existence. Any calculation which does not estimate this basic change is necessarily incomplete and misleading.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. ENGLISH LANGUAGE

BOOKS

- Abdel Malek, Anour. Egypt: Military Society. New York: Vintage Books, 1968.
- Abu-Lughod, Ibrahim (ed.). The Transformation of Palestine: Essays On the Origin and Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971.
- Apter, David (ed.). Ideology and Discontent. New York: Free Press, 1964.
- Aruri, Naseer (ed.). The Palestinian Resistance to Israeli Occupation. Wilmette, Illinois: The Medina University Press International, 1970.
- Avineri, Shlomo (ed.). Israel and the Palestinians. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971.
- Avnery, Uri. Israel Without Zionists: A Plea For Peace in the Middle East. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968.
- Beals, Carleton. Great Guerrilla Warriors. New York: A Tower Book, 1971.
- Ben Gurion, David. Rebirth and Destiny of Israel. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954.
- Ben-Jacob, Jeremiah. The Rise of Israel. New York: Judicial Printing Company, Inc., 1949.
- Binder, Leonard. The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964.
- Bodeheimer, M. I. Prelude to Israel. New York: A. S. Barnes and Company, Inc., 1963.
- Bolitho, Hector (ed.). Twelve Jews. New York: Books for Libraries Press, Inc., 1967.
- Chaliand, Gerard. The Palestinian Resistance. Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, Inc., 1972.

- Christenson, Reo M., and others. Ideologies and Modern Politics. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, Inc., 1971.
- Churba, Joseph. Fedayeen and the Middle East Crisis. Alabama: Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, May 1969.
- Cohen, Israel. A Short History of Zionism. London: Frederick Muller, Ltd., 1951.
- Curtis, Michael (ed.). People and Politics in the Middle East. Newark: Transaction Books, Inc., 1971.
- Davis, John H. The Evasive Peace: A Study of the Zionist-Arab Problem. London: Cox and Wyman, Ltd., 1969.
- Fisher, Eugene M. and M. Cherif Bassiouni. Storm Over Arab World: A People in Revolution. Chicago: Follett Publishing Company, 1972.
- Forest, A. C. The Unholy Land. Toronto, Canada: MacClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1971.
- Gendzier, Irenel (ed.). A Middle East Reader. New York: Western Publishing Company, Inc., 1969.
- Haddad, George M. Revolution and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States. New York: Robert Speller and Sons, Publishers, Inc., 1971.
- Halpern, Ben. The Idea of the Jewish State. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969.
- Harkabi, Y. Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy. London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970.
- Herzl, Theodor. The Jewish State. London: Zionist Organization, 1934.
- Hilberg, Paul. The Destruction of the European Jews. Chicago: Quadrangle Book, Inc., 1961.
- Hinschman, Ira. Red Star Over Bethlehem: Russia Drives for the Middle East. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971.
- Horowitz, David. State in the Making. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953.
- Howard, Michael and Robert Hunter. Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of 1967. London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967.

- John, Robert St. They Came From Everywhere: Twelve Who Helped Mold Modern Israel. New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1962.
- Kadi, Leila S. (ed.). Basic Political Documents of the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement. Beirut: Palestine Research Center, 1970.
- Karaoglen, Aid (ed.). The Struggle Goes On. Beirut: The Palestine Research Center, 1969.
- Karpat, Kemal H. (ed.). Political and Social Thought In The Contemporary Middle East. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970.
- Kerr, Malcolm H. The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abdel Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.
- _____. The Middle East Conflict. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 1968.
- Khadduri, Majdia D. (ed.). The Arab-Israeli Impasse: Expressions of Moderate Viewpoints on the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Washington, D.C.: Robert B. Luce, Inc., 1968.
- Khouri, Fred J. The Arab-Israeli Dilemma. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1968.
- Kimche, David and Jon. A Clash of Destinies: The Arab-Jewish War and the Founding of the State of Israel. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1960.
- Koestler, Arthur. Promise and Fulfillment: Palestine 1917-1949. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949.
- Laqueur, Walter. The Israeli-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict. 2d ed. New York: B. L. Mazel, Inc., 1970.
- Lerner, Daniel. The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing of the Middle East. New York: The Free Press, 1968.
- Lilienthal, Alfred M. What Price Israel? Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953.
- Larteguy, Jean. The Walls of Israel. New York: M. Evans and Company, Inc., 1968.
- Mardor, Munya. Haganah. New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1964.
- Mason, Herbert (ed.). Reflections on the Middle East Crisis. New York: Mouton and Co., 1970.

- Menuhin, Moshe. The Decadence of Judaism in Our Time. Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969.
- Monroe, Elizabeth. Britain's Moment in the Middle East 1914-1956. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963.
- _____, and others. Time Bomb in the Middle East. New York: Friendship Press, 1969.
- Nevakivi, Jukka. Britain, France and the Arab Middle East 1914-1920. London: University of London, the Athlone Press, 1969.
- Nutting, Anthony. The Arabs. New York: The New American Library, 1964.
- Peretz, Don. The Middle East Today. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971.
- Plamenatz, John. Ideology. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970.
- Rasheed, Mohamed. Towards A Democratic State in Palestine. Beirut: Palestine Research Center, 1970.
- Ravravai, Yaakou (ed.). To Make War or Make Peace: Symposium On The Middle East. Tel Aviv: Publishers New Outlook, 1969.
- Rejai, M. (ed.). Decline of Ideology. New York: Aldin, Atherton, Inc., 1971.
- Rodinon, Maxime. Israel and the Arabs. New York: Pantheon Books, A Division of Random House, 1968.
- Rostgaard (ed.). Palestine: Crisis and Liberation (Collection Analysis). Havana: Instituto del Libro, 1970.
- Safron, Nadar. From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation 1948-1967. New York: Western Publishing Co., 1969.
- Schechtman, Joseph B. The Arab Refugee Problem. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1952.
- Sharabi, Hisham. Palestine and Israel: The Lethal Dilemma. New York: Western Publishing Company, Inc., 1969.
- _____. Palestine Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Their Effectiveness. Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1970.
- Stein, Leonard. The Balfour Declaration. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961.

- Stetler, Russell (ed.). Palestine: The Arab-Israeli Conflict. San Francisco: Ramparts Press, Inc., 1972.
- Stewart, Desmond. The Middle East: Temple of Janus. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1971.
- Taylor, Alen R. Prelude to Israel. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959.
- Taylor, Alen R. and Richard N. Tetlie. Palestine: A Search for Truth. Approaches to the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1970.
- Toynbee, Arnold. A Study of History. London: Oxford University Press, Vol. VIII, 1963.
- Trabulsi, Fawwaz. Palestine From the New Left Review. Washington, D.C.: Free Palestine Press, 1968.
- Vatikiotis, P. J. Conflict In The Middle East. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1971.
- Waines, David. The Unholy War: Israel and Palestine 1897-1971. Wilmette, Illinois: Medina University Press International, 1971.
- Weizmann, Chaim. Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1949.
- Winer, Gershon. The Founding Fathers of Israel. New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1971.
- Yaari, Ehud. Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah. New York: American-Israeli Publishing Co., Ltd., 1970.

PAMPHLETS

- Al-Khuli, Lutfi. Dialogue With Fatah. Beirut: The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Al-Fatah, 1970.
- Maksoud, Clovis. Democratic Alternative to Israel. Synopsis of Statement to the Young Democratic National Convention held on November 18, 1971 at Hot Springs, Arkansas, U.S.A.
- The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Al-Fatah. The Freedom Fighters. Beirut: 1968.
- _____. Political and Armed Struggle. Beirut: 1969.
- _____. Revolution Until Victory. Beirut: 1969.

_____. A Strategy For the Liberation of Palestine. Amman: Information Department, 1969.

PERIODICALS

- Abu-Lutf, "Al-Fatah and the Left," AL-FATAH, (Beirut), I, No. 4 (October 1, 1969), 3.
- "At Al-Karameh: Al-Fatah Knowingly Broke Guerrilla Rules," AL-FATAH, (Beirut), III, No. 1 (March 23, 1971), 12.
- Carroll, Raymond, "Middle East: That Is The War That Is," Newsweek, January 13, 1969, p. 40.
- Cooley, John K., "Afternoons We Learn To Shoot," The Christian Science Monitor, June 21, 1969, p. 9.
- _____, "Arab Guerrillas Undeterred," The Christian Science Monitor, March 27, 1968, p. 1.
- _____, "China and the Palestinians," Journal of Palestine Studies, (Beirut), I, No. 2 (Winter 1972), 29.
- Crossman, Richard, "An Open Letter to the Israeli Foreign Minister," Midstream (New York), XVI, No. 8 (October 1970), 9.
- "Dangerous Deadline for the Middle East," Time, November 9, 1970, p. 20.
- Dayan, Moshe, "Jewish-Arab Coexistence," Midstream, XV, No. 6 (June 1969), 27.
- "Deadly Stalemate," Newsweek, March 29, 1968, p. 40.
- Fellowes, Peregrine, "Can Peace Be Guaranteed? The Ultimate Enigma," New Middle East (London), No. 30, March 1971, p. 12.
- "Foray into Jordan," Time, March 29, 1968, p. 30.
- Gareeb, Edmund, "An Interview With Abu-Ammar," The Arab World (New York), XV, No. 5 (May 1969), 27.
- "Golda Meir Speaks Her Mind," The Middle East Newsletter (Beirut), III, No. 5 and 6 (September 1969), 3.
- Heykal, Mohammed Hassanein, "War and Peace in the Middle East," Journal of Palestine Studies, I, No. 1 (Autumn 1971), 11.

- Hertzberg, Arthur, "The Evolution of Jewish Identity," Midstream, XVIII, No. 7 (August-September 1971), 31.
- "How Israel Feels About War and Peace," Time, April 12, 1971, p. 32.
- Hudson, Michael C., "Developments and Setbacks in the Palestinian Resistance Movement 1967-1971," Journal of Palestine Studies (Beirut), I, No. 3 (Spring 1972), 80.
- Hughes, Edward, "A Brotherhood of Terror," Time, March 29, 1968, p. 29.
- "Interview with Abu Iyad," Free Palestine (Washington), III, No. 7 (November 1971), 7.
- "Interview With Uri Avnery," Free Palestine (Washington), II, No. 7 (November 1970), 4.
- Khalidi, Randa, "Palestine Liberation Movement," The Arab World, May 1969, p. 23.
- Kuroda, Yosumasa, "Young Palestinian Commandos in Political Socialization Perspective," The Middle East Journal (Washington), XXVI, No. 3 (Summer 1972), 265.
- Law, John, "Why War Threatens Again in the Middle East," U. S. News and World Report, September 30, 1968, p. 73.
- Maksoud, Clovis, "New Palestine: Grievance Redressed, Justice for Arab and Jew," Mid East (Washington), XI, No. 3 (June 1970), 9.
- "The Mideast: Is Compromise Possible? New Elements in an Explosive Situation: Soviet Power and the Palestinian Terrorists," Newsweek, February 17, 1969, p. 38.
- Mullins, Willard A., "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science," The American Political Science Review, June 1972, p. 498.
- "Palestine Is My Country," Newsweek, February 17, 1969, p. 38.
- "The Price of Security," Newsweek, August 19, 1968, p. 44.
- Schleifer, Abdullah, "Palestine Liberation Movement," The Arab World, May 1969, p. 19.
- Schmidt, Dan Adams, "Al-Fatah Leader Stresses Militancy," The New York Times, December 3, 1968, p. 6.

Shaath, Nabeel, "High Level Palestinian Manpower," Journal of Palestine Studies (Beirut), I, No. 2 (Winter 1972), 89.

_____. "Palestine of Tomorrow," AL-FATAH, III, No. 1 (March 23, 1971), 8.

Stone, I. F., "Where Was Nixon When Sadat Gave the Russians the Boot," The New York Times Review of Books, XIX, No. 3 (August 31, 1972), 11.

Syrkin, Marie, "Who Are the Palestinians?", Midstream (New York), XVI, No. 1 (January 1970), 11.

Yazid, Mohammed, "Algeria and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," Journal of Palestine Studies, I, No. 2 (Winter 1972), 6.

UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS AND REPORTS

The Address of Al-Fatah Delegation to the Second International Conference in Support of the Arab Peoples, held in Cairo, January 28, 1969. Beirut: 1970.

Embassy of Israel, Washington, D.C., The Lesson of Munich, September 14, 1972, p. 2.

B. ARABIC LANGUAGE

BOOKS

Al-Fatah 1969 Year Book. Beirut: 1969.

PAMPHLETS

Al-Fatah Pamphlets: Series of "Revolutionary Lessons and Trials," The Chinese Experience. Beirut: New Reprint, August, 1967.

_____. The Cuban Experience. Beirut: New Reprint, August, 1967

_____. From the Starting Points of Fedayeen Action. Beirut: New Reprint, August, 1967.

_____. How Will the People's Armed Revolution Explode? Beirut: New Reprint, August, 1967.

_____. The Liberation of the Occupied Lands and The Method of Struggle Against Direct Colonialism. Beirut: New Reprint, September, 1967.

_____. Revolution and Violence: The Road to Victory. Beirut: New Reprint, August, 1967.

_____. Revolutionary Stands. Beirut: New Reprint, May, 1968.

_____. The Vietnamese Experience. Beirut: New Reprint, August, 1967.

Al-Fatah Pamphlets: The Armed Palestinian Revolution And Its Developments. Beirut: No. 106, 1967.

_____. Palestine Problem: The Core of Arab Revolution. Beirut: No. 107, 1967.

_____. This Is Our Revolution. Beirut: October 1968.

PERIODICALS

"Discussion Around the Thought of the Palestinian Revolution," Palestine Affairs (Beirut), No. 5, November, 1971, p. 107.

el-Hassan, Hani, "Al-Fatah: In Theory and Practice," Palestine Affaris, No. 7, March 1972, pp. 17-18.

Mousa, Shatah, "The General Union of Palestinian Students Experiment," Palestine Affaris (Beirut), No. 4, 1971, p. 181.

UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS AND REPORTS

From Al-Fatah Unpublished Materials: Why Do I Belong To Al-Fatah? (no place of publishing is mentioned), No. 1, 1967.

_____. The Palestinian Revolution: The New Dimensions. (no place of publishing is mentioned), 1968.