

AN ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICAN LOYALTY
ON ADMINISTRATION PROGRAMS DURING THE
HOOVER PRESIDENCY, 1929-1933

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INTRODUCTION

America's most severe economic depression left a disappointed and somewhat disillusioned ex-President in its wake. Herbert Hoover took office on March 4, 1929, during a period of unparalleled prosperity. It was the era in which people commonly held the view that poverty was a thing of the past. True, the farmers did not share this view and there were warnings from economists and the Federal Reserve Board that the American economic house was not in order, but these warnings were lost in the din and the clamor for the better life promised by the glittering 20's.

Hoover was barely settled in office when he was confronted with the stock market collapse in 1929. From that point the country faced an economic depression that grew in severity until it produced greater hardships and more widespread unemployment than Americans had ever known.

During the 1928 campaign for the Presidency, Hoover had made prosperity a central theme in his strategy. He worked diligently to establish a relationship between Republican leadership and the general affluence of the 1920's. As Secretary of Commerce under Presidents Harding and Coolidge, Hoover had been an integral part of that leadership and was therefore given credit for the existing prosperity. Simple justice seemed to demand that Hoover be equally gracious in accepting responsibility for the

depression. The relationship that had so diligently been established between Republican leadership and economic opulence became a two-edged sword after 1929.

Hoover, however, was not necessarily responsible for the boom, as his defenders claim, nor for the depression, as his detractors charge. The issue of what Hoover did during the depression, however, is more readily determined.

It is generally agreed that Hoover deviated from the course followed by preceding Presidents in the face of economic crisis. The traditional policy was for the government to let the panic run its course, deflate the artificial values, and reward the conservative and prudent investor. The idea was that the economy must purge itself of speculative overdevelopment before full recovery could take place. Government interference would simply prolong the agony and delay ultimate recovery. Hoover abandoned this traditional policy for one of government intervention to generate economic recovery. He contended that he "undertook new measures" during the depression to "cushion its effects" and to "restore the constructive forces in our economic life."¹

Eugene Lyons, a Hoover biographer, also contends that Hoover took unprecedented action due to the changes in America's economy. It was no longer possible in a complex, industrialized, and

¹Herbert C. Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Great Depression, 1929-1941. (New York: MacMillan, 1952), p. 38.

interdependent economy to let the depression follow its course without measures to avert panic and provide relief. Furthermore, this action by Hoover was contrary to the advice offered by Andrew Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury and chief Administration advisor in economic affairs.²

The purpose of this paper is to examine the actions taken by President Hoover and determine the relative support Hoover received from the Republican Party in Congress. There are essentially two problems to be resolved. First it is necessary to select the policies advocated by Hoover and to establish clearly his position on substantive issues. Second a criteria must be established to measure the degree of Republican support. The most effective and objective way to do this is through an analysis of roll-call votes in the Congressional Record.

Hoover's depression programs will be considered in chronological order from 1929 to 1932. However, since some programs extend through more than one session, they will be examined to their completion from the time the proposals were initially made. A systematic analysis of the congressional votes on the President's legislative program to arrest the deterioration of the economy will permit a precise measure of congressional Republican support or opposition for the Hoover Administration.

²Eugene Lyons, The Herbert Hoover Story, (New York: Dick O'Hare, Printing, 1959) pp. 258-259.

To put Republican support of Hoover's depression policies in perspective, it is necessary to consider some major non-depression issues in the 71st and 72nd Congresses, and examine Republican and Democratic voting profiles in the Senate and House of Representatives. Non-depression issues will be analyzed in the same fashion as the depression policies. Hoover's position on a particular issue will be indicated, followed by a partisan breakdown of roll-call votes on that issue. The pattern of these issues can be delineated and compared to congressional voting profiles on depression issues.

In order to clearly establish the issues in question, as well as Hoover's position on those issues, a narrative history of congressional relations with the Hoover Administration was compiled, followed by a quantitative analysis of congressional roll-call votes. This provides an indication of whether the President's program was consistent with the Republican Party's position as reflected by the party's congressional voting record. Was Hoover's success dependent upon a broad base of consistent support from his own party, or did his party provide only minimal support for the President's program to bring about economic recovery in the United States?

I

TARIFF

During the 1928 presidential campaign, Hoover had associated "twenties" prosperity with a high tariff.¹ He pledged, however, that if elected he would ask for limited changes in the tariff. The 71st Congress was called into special session and Hoover requested that it amend the tariff law whereby a Tariff Commission could adjust rates as conditions warranted.² This action was in line with Hoover's view that a scientific tariff subject to continual adjustments would equalize the cost of domestic and foreign goods and create a competitive American market rather than simply provide a shelter for certain domestic producers. Furthermore, Hoover believed that a Commission controlled tariff was the only way to prevent special interest groups in Congress from log-rolling protective rates into tariff legislation.³ The groups which Hoover felt needed more protection than they would receive from his tariff bill were farmers and workers. They were threatened by the cheap labor and low standard of living which enabled foreign producers

¹Harris Gaylord Warren, Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 47.

²William Star Myers and Walter H. Newton, The Hoover Administration: A Documented Narrative (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), pp. 379-380.

³Warren, p. 85-89.

to market low priced goods.⁴

General Tariff Revision

Although Hoover expressed concern for both farmers and workers, his primary concern was for the former. Hoover was opposed to general revision of tariff rates by Congress, and proposed only to revise the agricultural schedule. Any other necessary revisions could be made by the proposed Tariff Commission.⁵ His tariff proposal met its first defeat in the Senate on June 17, 1929, when a resolution to restrict tariff revision to the agricultural schedule was defeated 38 (13 Republicans, 25 Democrats) to 39 (32 Republicans, 7 Democrats).⁶ Hoover lost this battle only because a large share of his own party voted for general tariff revision. The resolution never came to a vote in the House.

Although it was obvious that a comprehensive revision of tariff rates was in the offing, Hoover would not take a position on specific duties. He believed that only time would solve the existing inequities. With the absence of strong executive leadership, the tariff revision "was in the charge of two fervent protectionists, Senator Reed Smoot of Utah and Congressman Willis

⁴Arthur Mastick Hyde and Ray Lyman Wilber, The Hoover Policies. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), p. 182.

⁵New York Times, June 18, 1929, p. 1.

⁶U. S., Congressional Record, 71st Congress, 1st Session, 1929, LXXI, Part 3, p. 2975, (hereafter cited as Cong. Record).

G. Hawley of Oregon."⁷

While the question of general revision was still being resolved in the Senate, the House had already proceeded toward general revision. The Republican controlled House Ways and Means Committee reported a bill which was "satisfactory to the administration," but a conference of House Republicans refused to accept the measure until the Committee agreed to let 91 amendments for rate increases be presented on the floor of the House.⁸

All during consideration of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, the congressional Republicans adopted a curiously inconsistent course of action. A majority consistently deferred to the President's wishes and voted for flexible rate provisions under the control of a commission, yet at the same time they also voted for increases in existing duties contrary to Hoover's wishes. The apparent explanation was that the votes on rate increases followed regional lines, due to local pressures, rather than partisan lines. The representatives of the industrial states supported rate increases while opposition centered in the Middle Western farm states.⁹ Congressional Republicans found it possible to vote for an

⁷ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1956), p. 164.

⁸ Arthur W. Macmahon, "First Session of the Seventy-first Congress," American Political Science Review, XXIV, No. 1 (February, 1930), p. 48.

⁹ New York Times, June 14, 1930, p. 2.

equitable, competitive tariff controlled by a commission, but could not resist the log-rolling effect of special interests when it came to voting on rates for specific goods.

After the House Ways and Means Committee agreed to sponsor the amendments insisted upon in the Republican conference, the House voted to accept only those amendments offered by the Ways and Means Committee by 234 (229 Republicans, 5 Democrats) to 138 (12 Republicans, 125 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).¹⁰ It is apparent that the changes in the bill on the House floor were Republican initiated and executed.

The much amended tariff bill that emerged was unsatisfactory to Hoover.¹¹ It passed the House, however, on May 28, 1929, by a margin of 264 (244 Republicans, 20 Democrats) to 147 (12 Republicans, 134 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).¹² The next day, the New York Times reported that although the administration feared the rates might be too high on necessities, it would not oppose the bill.¹³ Hoover's reaction to the House measure was not one of unrestrained enthusiasm. The Republican House majority had not been amenable to the President.

¹⁰Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 1929, LXXI, Part 2, p. 1877.

¹¹Hyde and Wilbur, p. 183.

¹²Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 1929, LXXI, Part 2, p. 2106.

¹³New York Times, May 29, 1929, p.1.

Flexible Provisions

The Senate was dealing with a tariff provision much closer to Hoover's ambitions. This was the flexible provision which Hoover "strongly insisted upon."¹⁴ On October 2, 1929, Democrat Senator Furnifold M. Simmons (N.C.) offered an amendment to delete the flexible provisions from the bill. His principal allies were three important Republican Senators, George W. Norris (Neb.), Hiram W. Johnson (Calif.), and William E. Borah (Idaho).¹⁵ The amendment carried 47 (13 Republicans, 34 Democrats) to 42 (38 Republicans, 4 Democrats).¹⁶ Senate refusal to include the flexible provision Hoover requested was primarily the work of Democrats and some Republican dissidents.

The tariff controversy carried over into the first regular session of the 71st Congress. In a significant vote, the Senate drastically revised the House version. The Senate reduced the House rates primarily because Democrats voted consistently against rate increases while the majority of Republicans favored many rate increases.¹⁷ The result was a Senate bill with a rate structure

¹⁴ Ibid., October 3, 1929, p. 1.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 1929, LXXI, Part 4, p. 4149.

¹⁷ Arthur W. Macmahon, "Second Session of the Seventy-first Congress, December 2, 1929, to July 3, 1930; Special Session of the Senate, July 7-21, 1930," American Political Science Review, XXIV, No. 4 (November, 1930), pp. 921-923.

lower than the House version, but higher than the prevailing duties. The Senate vote on March 24, 1930, on the tariff bill was 53 (46 Republicans, 7 Democrats) to 31 (5 Republicans, 26 Democrats).¹⁸ The Senate had passed a measure with higher rates than Hoover preferred and had also deleted the flexible provision.

The crucial question for the House was whether to accept the Senate bill without the flexible provision.¹⁹ The House refused to accept the amended bill and voted on April 2, 1930, 241 (227 Republicans, 14 Democrats) to 153 (19 Republicans, 133 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to send it to a conference committee.²⁰ The Republican House members stood strongly behind Hoover on the more important issue of flexible provisions, but rebuffed him on tariff rates.

Efforts to compromise on flexible provisions were unfruitful, until the Senate relented and voted on May 19, 1930, to release the Senate conferees from their pledge to stand on the Senate version of the bill. The vote was actually a tie with Vice-President Charles Curtis voting to release the Senate conferees.²¹ The vote was 42 (37 Republicans, 5 Democrats) to release the

¹⁸ Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1930, LXXII, Part 6, p. 6015.

¹⁹ Macmahon, American Political Science Review, XXIV, No. 4, p. 925.

²⁰ Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1930, LXXII, Part 6, p. 6394.

²¹ New York Times, May 20, 1930, p. 1.

conferees and 42 (12 Republicans, 29 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) against retracting their stand.²² Barely enough Republicans had aligned themselves behind the President to adopt the motion.

After the other differences had been ironed out by the conference committee, the Senate accepted its report on June 13, 1930, by the vote of 44 (39 Republicans, 5 Democrats) to 42 (11 Republicans, 30 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).²³ The House passed the measure on the following day 222 (208 Republicans, 14 Democrats) to 153 (20 Republicans, 132 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).²⁴

Hoover was not completely satisfied with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, but he signed it on June 17, 1930, because he thought the flexible provisions could be invoked against any unjustified rate increases.²⁵ When the most crucial issue, flexible provisions, was at stake, a large majority of Republicans in both houses lined up with the President, while the Democrats strongly opposed Hoover's recommendations. The reverse was true on the lesser issue, rate structure, with the Democrats supporting the President with greater consistency than the members of his own party.

²²Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1930, LXXII, Part 9, p. 9138.

²³Ibid., Part 10, p. 10635.

²⁴Ibid., p. 10697.

²⁵New York Times, June 16, 1930, p. 1.

After the President's near stalemate over the tariff in the 71st Congress, the issue emerged again in the 72nd Congress. An increase in Democrat strength from the 1930 elections resulted in a small Democrat majority in the House of Representatives during the first session (which they lost in the second session through by-elections), and reduced the Republican majority in the Senate to the narrowest of margins, (48 Republicans, 47 Democrats, and one Farmer-Labor member who generally aligned himself with the Democrats).

In the first session, a Democratic sponsored tariff bill called for reciprocal tariffs and the elimination of the Chief Executive's authority over flexible rates. The latter was the chief issue.²⁶ Hoover's position on flexibility was clear. He had fought hard for the inclusion of the flexible provisions in the 71st Congress. It was also his opinion that reciprocal tariffs would lead to greater international economic instability and demoralize the nation's farmers.²⁷ Put simply, Hoover was displeased with all aspects of the Democratic bill.

The House first voted on the bill. On January 8, 1932, there was a test vote on a special rule to bring the bill to the floor without delay and to limit debate.²⁸ The special rule

²⁶"Tariff, Congressional Digest, XI, No. 2 (Feb. 1932), p. 60.

²⁷ Hyde and Wilbur, pp. 186-187.

²⁸New York Times, January 9, 1932, p. 5.

passed 214 (8 Republicans, 205 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 174 (174 Republicans).²⁹ Republican efforts to delay the bill were unsuccessful.

The next day the House voted on the tariff bill and the vote breakdown was almost the same as the test vote. It was passed 214 (12 Republicans, 201 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 182 (182 Republicans).³⁰

The bill then went to the Senate, where extensive changes were made in the bill but the controversial provision revoking Hoover's power to adjust the tariff schedule was retained. The Senate gave the Tariff Commission authority to raise or lower rates, subject to congressional veto within sixty days.³¹ The bill, with these revisions, passed the Senate by a vote of 42 (6 Republicans, 36 Democrats) to 30 (30 Republicans).³² The House reconsidered the bill and accepted the Senate amendments on April 28, 1932, by 202 (13 Republicans, 188 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 171 (167 Republicans, 4 Democrats).³³

²⁹Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 2, p. 1512.

³⁰Ibid., p. 1635.

³¹New York Times, April 1, 1932, p. 1.

³²Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 7, p. 7291.

³³Ibid., Part 8, p. 9155.

Hoover vetoed the measure, as expected, and criticized both the reciprocal provisions and elimination of the flexible provisions.³⁴ The House vote to override the veto fell far short of the two-thirds vote necessary. The vote was 178 (12 Republicans, 165 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 166 (164 Republicans, 2 Democrats).³⁵

Again Hoover's wishes on the tariff prevailed. On every House roll-call vote on the tariff an overwhelming majority of the Republicans supported the administration. In the Senate, on the one record vote of consequence, only 17 per cent of the Republican senators deserted the Administration. Hoover had succeeded on the tariff due to solid Republican support. The tariff came up only once during the second session of the 72nd Congress. Hoover asked for a readjustment of the tariff schedule due to the depreciation in the value of foreign currency. A measure was submitted to the House Ways and Means Committee for their consideration. President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted the measure kept in the committee, and a caucus of the House Democrats voted 161-4 to support his wishes.³⁶ There was a House vote on February 13, 1933, over the question of whether the Ways and Means Committee should be

³⁴New York Times, May 12, 1932, p. 1.

³⁵Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 9, p. 10039.

³⁶E. Pendleton Herring, "Second Session of the Seventy-second Congress, December 5, 1932, to March 4, 1933", American Political Science Review, XXVII, No. 3 (June, 1933), pp. 418-419.

discharged from consideration of the bill. This was a test between Hoover, who wanted the bill to be discharged so that it could be enacted into law, and Roosevelt, who wanted it killed in committee. The motion to discharge the bill was defeated 174 (171 Republicans, 3 Democrats) to 212 (16 Republicans, 195 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).³⁷ This was the only tariff battle that Hoover lost, and it was not from his party's lack of support; a solid majority of Republicans had stood with their President through most of the tariff battles between 1929 and 1933. They had strongly supported his flexible tariff in the 71st Congress, and also withstood Democratic attempts to revise the flexible provisions in the 72nd Congress.

³⁷ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXVI, Part 4, p. 3967.

II

FARM RELIEF

The tariff was a major issue in the Hoover administration but he had also pledged, during the 1928 presidential campaign, to confront the problems of America's farmers. When the special session of Congress convened in April, 1929, Hoover proposed the establishment of a Federal Farm Board to assist farmers in the cooperative marketing of farm commodities. Hoover further proposed that the Farm Board would not buy and sell commodities to fix prices, but would simply assist the farmers set up their own marketing organizations.¹ The Farm Board would make loans to farmer-controlled marketing associations for marketing and processing certain agricultural products. The marketing associations would be responsible for educating the farmers on the advantage of cooperative marketing. The marketing associations would buy from the farmer and then sell the commodities at the most advantageous price at a later date.²

Federal Farm Board

An agricultural bill consistent with Hoover's ideas was introduced in the House. It received quick approval on April 25, 1929, by a large majority, 366 (245 Republicans, 121 Democrats)

¹Myers and Newton, p. 380.

²Albert U. Romasco, The Poverty of Abundance, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 106-112.

to 35 (2 Republicans, 33 Democrats).³ Not only did the Republicans vote for it, but also the overwhelming majority of House Democrats.

Senate action on the bill somewhat complicated matters. At first, the Senate included an export debenture plan in the bill, which it eventually eliminated. However, the Senate also voted on the Farm Board proposal in essentially the same form as the House bill. Excluding the export debenture, which will be considered separately from the basic Farm Board bill, the Senate version was consistent with Hoover's recommendations with one small exception. This exception permitted stabilization corporations to purchase commodities on the open market in emergencies to support prices, a measure the farm lobby had requested.⁴ Although Hoover had not recommended this provision, he chose not to make an issue of it because "it was felt that the Board that would be appointed could control the situation."⁵

The final Senate vote on passage of the Farm Board bill was: for passage 74 (47 Republicans, 27 Democrats), and against passage 8 (3 Republicans, 5 Democrats).⁶ The bill had bipartisan support

³Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 1929, LXXI, Part 1, p. 572.

⁴Romasco, p. 112.

⁵Myers and Newton, p. 393.

⁶Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 1929, LXXI, Part 3, p. 2886.

in the Senate as well as in the House. Hoover was pleased with the passage of the bill, and requested that Congress at once appropriate \$150,000,000 of the \$500,000,000 authorized to enable the Farm Board to begin operations as soon as possible.

Export Debentures

Although the Farm Board received widespread bipartisan support, the eliminated export debenture plan sponsored by the National Grange was a source of considerable controversy and heated debate. The plan called for the government to issue debentures on exported farm commodities. The debentures could then be presented in lieu of import duties on other goods coming into the country. The hoped for effect from this plan would be a rise in the domestic price of farm goods above the world price.⁷ Hoover quickly expressed his adamant opposition to the plan as ill advised, unethical, and unworkable.⁸

The Hoover version of the Federal Farm Board bill was amended in the Senate to include the export debenture plan. The amendment was proposed by Norris (Neb.) and supported by the same coalition of Democrats and unreliable liberal Republicans that had opposed Hoover on the flexible tariff. Borah and Johnson both favored the amendment as a way to balance agricultural and

⁷Myers and Newton, p. 382.

⁸Ibid., pp, 382-383.

manufacturing interests.⁹ The Senate voted on May 8, 1929, on a motion to eliminate the debentures provision from the farm bill. With solid opposition from the farm bloc, the motion failed to pass 44 (42 Republicans, 2 Democrats) to 47 (13 Republicans, 34 Democrats) and the Senate thereby ignored Hoover's request.¹⁰

The Senate then passed the farm bill on May 14, 1929, by a vote of 54 (21 Republicans, 33 Democrats) to 33 (31 Republicans, 2 Democrats).¹¹ It was not, however, a direct vote on the debentures question and is, therefore, less significant in measuring the extent of Senate support for Hoover's proposal.

After the House refused to accept the Senate version of the farm bill with the debenture provision, a Conference Committee attempted to work out a compromise bill. The Committee rejected the Senate bill, eliminated the debenture plan, and returned the measure to the Senate for a vote. The Senate voted on June 11, 1929, to reject the conference report because it lacked the debenture plan. The vote was 43 (39 Republicans, 4 Democrats) to accept the report and 46 (13 Republicans, 32 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) against the conference report.¹²

⁹New York Times, May 9, 1929, p. 1.

¹⁰Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 1929, LXXI, Part 1, p. 997.

¹¹Ibid., Part 2, p. 1269.

¹²Ibid., Part 3, p. 2261.

In the face of this Senate opposition, Hoover rebuked the Senate and called on the House to stand fast and to force the Senate to accept the farm bill without export debentures.¹³ In accordance with Hoover's wishes, the House voted on June 13, 1929, to instruct the House conferees not to yield to the Senate on the debentures question. This was the only House roll-call vote directly related to the debentures proposal, and the House supported Hoover's position on debentures by a vote of 250 (217 Republicans, 33 Democrats) to 113 (13 Republicans, 100 Democrats).¹⁴

In the end, the Senate accepted the House version of the farm bill without the export debenture plan, and voted 74-8, as previously reported, for the Federal Farm Board bill on final passage. The bipartisan vote was not on the key issue, debentures. It simply reflected the wide support for the Farm Board. When the Senate did vote directly on the debentures proposal, it passed due to near unanimous Democratic and minority Republican approval. The President prevailed, however, with strong Republican House support.

Although once defeated, the debentures issue was revived in the Senate late in the first session of the 71st Congress.

¹³New York Times, June 12, 1929, p. 1.

¹⁴Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 1929, LXXI, Part 3, p. 2788.

Senate proponents of debentures attached their proposal to the tariff bill. On October 19, 1929, the debentures amendment passed by a vote of 42 (14 Republicans, 28 Democrats) to 34 (31 Republicans, 3 Democrats).¹⁵ The party vote "breakdown" was essentially what it had been on previous votes.

Action on the tariff bill was not concluded during the first session. The House rejected the Senate tariff because it omitted flexible tariff provisions and included the export debenture plan. This debenture proposal followed the course of its predecessor to a Senate-House Conference Committee. When the Conference Committee report was returned with the debenture plan, the House voted on May 3, 1930, to reject the debenture amendment. A motion to accept the amendment was repulsed by a vote of 161 (48 Republicans, 112 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 231 (194 Republicans, 37 Democrats).¹⁶ Hoover's Republican support slipped from its previous level, but three-fourths of the House Republicans still voted for the administration.

As before, the conference report then went to the Senate. On May 19, 1930, the Senate voted to release their conferees from their pledge to support the debentures plan by a vote of 43

¹⁵ Ibid., Part 5, p. 4694.

¹⁶ Ibid., 2nd Sess., 1930, LXXII, Part 8, p. 8294.

(37 Republicans, 6 Democrats) to 41 (12 Republicans, 28 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).¹⁷ Again some Republicans defected from Hoover, but the solid majority supported him. The defections came consistently from the group of liberal Republicans led by Senators Borah, Johnson and Norris. That was the final defeat for the export debentures proposal. Hoover had been successful in blocking its passage, and he had done it with substantial party support against Democratic opposition.

Drought Relief and the Dole

Although the creation of the Federal Farm Board and the export debentures plan were voted upon before the 1929 depression became widespread, the measures were to provide relief for the farm community which had been economically depressed since the early 1920's. As the depression spread, the nation's farmers became virtually destitute. The farmers were faced both by an acute economic depression and a severe drought. The agricultural community really understood the meaning of the "dirty thirty's" when part of the Midwest turned into a dust bowl.

The drought was most severe in the Midwest, Northwest, and lower Mississippi Valley. Hoover felt some responsibility to help relieve the situation and he secured an agreement with the railroads to haul feed into the drought areas at a fifty

¹⁷Ibid., Part 9, p. 9137.

percent reduction in rates.¹⁸ He proposed to Congress, in his annual message on December 2, 1930, that money should be appropriated to provide feed and seed loans to farmers who were drought victims. He thought that the Red Cross could take care of the cases of individual farmers in severe distress.¹⁹ The amount of the appropriation that Hoover favored was reported to be \$25 million.²⁰

The Senate approved the proposal, but increased the appropriation to \$60 million without a roll-call vote and sent it to the House. The increased funds were to provide free food to persons in addition to the feed and seed loan provisions of the original bill. Hoover vigorously opposed the addition because of his fear that the dole would destroy the initiative of Americans and their will to fend for themselves.²¹

Initial House action on the bill came on December 15, 1930. Hoover's allies in the House offered a motion to suspend the rules when the drought relief bill came up for debate to expedite passage of the bill. The Administration position was defended by Representative Gilbert H. Haugen (R-Iowa), Chairman of the House

¹⁸ Myers and Newton, p. 42.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 58.

²⁰ Arthur W. Macmahon, "Third Session of the Seventy-first Congress, December 1, 1930, to March 4, 1931," American Political Science Review, XXV, No. 4 (November, 1931), p. 939.

²¹ New York Times, December 16, 1930, p. 1.

Agricultural Committee, and Fred S. Purnell (R-Ind.). They were able to maintain party solidarity, losing only Republican support from drought stricken states, and prevented any amendments to the Republican House version of the bill which Hoover supported.²² The vote to suspend the rules was 205 (204 Republicans, 1 Democrat) for and 159 against the motion (16 Republicans, 142 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).²³ Although the motion had a clear majority, it lacked the two-thirds majority necessary for passage. Hoover forces in the House had failed, though not from lack of Republican support.

The rules vote was important, but the crucial test came three days later when the House voted to amend the Senate version. There were two vital issues: the amount of the appropriation and whether to make food available to persons without cost. The House amendment set the appropriation at \$30 million and permitted the Secretary of Agriculture to make loans for "purposes incident to food production."²⁴ The latter provision would have kept control of food for humans in the hands of Hoover's administration. This measure passed the House by 226 (220 Republicans, 6 Democrats) to 146 (16 Republicans, 129 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) with solid

²²Ibid.

²³Cong. Record, 71st Sess., 3rd Sess., 1930, LXXIV, Part 1, p. 766.

²⁴New York Times, December 19, 1930, p. 1.

Republican support. ²⁵

On the following day, the House and Senate conferees agreed to a \$45 million appropriation. The House refused open distribution of food for human consumption, but accepted the "face saving in-direction" of letting the Secretary of Agriculture use his discretion on food distribution, although the House would have preferred no provision on this matter in the bill.²⁶ The measure was passed by both Houses the following day.

The battle was rejoined, however, over appropriations to finance the feed and seed loan bill for drought relief. The House passed a routine resolution authorizing \$45 million to fund the bill, to which the Senate added \$15 million. The House Speaker, Nicholas Longworth (R-Ohio), simply disregarded the measure when it was returned to the House. Finally, the House members passed a special rule to remove it from the Speaker's desk, refuse to accept the Senate amendments, and seek a conference with the Senate.

The test came on a motion . . . to have the House conferees instructed to concur in the Senate amendment as it stood."²⁷ The motion failed to pass and Hoover's recommendation prevailed 135 (15 Republicans, 119 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 215 (202

²⁵ Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 3rd Sess., 1930, LXXIV, Part 1, p. 1062.

²⁶ Macmahon, American Political Science Review, XXV, No. 4 (November, 1931), pp. 939-940.

²⁷ New York Times, January 14, 1931, p. 1.

Republicans, 13 Democrats).²⁸

The Senate yielded to the House and some senators began to regard the Interior Department Supply bill as a means of providing additional relief funds. A \$25 million appropriation to be used by the Red Cross for relief of drought sufferers and the money employed was attached to the supply bill in the Senate on January 19, 1931. The vote was 56 (20 Republicans, 35 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 27 (27 Republicans).²⁹ The Republican senators split over the amendment while the Democrats voted unanimously against Hoover's recommendations. Hoover wanted direct relief work to be carried out by the Red Cross through private donations, not with public funds.

Hoover's allies in the Senate, led by David A. Reed (R-Pa.), made a last attempt to fulfill the President's recommendations on relief. They wanted the Senate to delay action on the appropriation so as to give the Red Cross an opportunity to demonstrate that they could handle relief needs without government subsidy. A motion in the Senate to wait until February 9, 1931, to ascertain whether the Red Cross could raise \$10 million of the needed sum was defeated 30 (29 Republicans, 1 Democrat) 53 (18 Republicans,

²⁸ Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 3rd Sess., 1931, LXXIV, Part 2, p. 2087.

²⁹ Ibid., Part 3, p. 2563.

Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).³⁰ The partisan breakdown was essentially the same on both votes relating to the \$25 million relief fund. These "decisive votes" were "regarded as forecasting the acceptance" of the \$25 million relief fund for the Red Cross from the federal government.³¹

In spite of the New York Times prediction, the House rejected every effort to have the federal government provide a dollar for human relief. In several teller votes, it rejected the Senate proposals to provide aid through the Red Cross, national welfare organizations on a matching basis, or to distribute aid through the War Department. There were two House roll-call votes on relief. The first was to permit the Administration distribute the \$25 million through agencies other than the Red Cross. It lost 149 (21 Republicans, 127 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 212 (207 Republicans, 5 Democrats).³² A similar proposal to authorize Hoover to distribute the funds in any fashion he chose lost by the vote of 151 (21 Republicans, 129 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 217 (211 Republicans, 6 Democrats).³³ This House action surpassed the highest hopes of the Administration and the

³⁰Ibid.

³¹New York Times, January 20, 1931, p. 1.

³²Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 3rd Sess., 1931, LXXIV, Part 4, p. 3659.

³³Ibid., p. 3658.

Republican leaders, who had earlier doubted that relief legislation could be prevented.³⁴

In the face of this adamant House action, the Senate stalled for a few days and then on February 14, 1931, accepted the Interior Department supply bill without the \$25 million relief fund by a vote of 67 (36 Republicans, 31 Democrats) to 15 (8 Republicans, 6 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).³⁵ This vote was anti-climatic because the Senate had already clearly demonstrated its partisan views on the drought relief amendment. The final vote simply reflected the need to pass the Interior Department supply bill to fund its normal activities. Hoover prevailed due to strong Republican support in the House but his party had split in the Senate over the question of direct federal relief to drought victims.

Other sporadic efforts at agricultural relief were made but usually involved proposals of limited consequence or were not the subject of roll-call votes. There was one recorded vote on a proposal for relief of cotton producers through the purchase of surpluses by the federal government. Hoover let it be known that he opposed the measure and that he would veto the bill if it

³⁴New York Times, January 31, 1931, p. 1.

³⁵Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 3rd Sess., 1931, LXXIV, Part 5, p. 4900.

passed the Congress.³⁶ This threat notwithstanding, the Democrats generated enough support to pass the bill in the House 188 (25 Republicans, 163 Democrats) to 183 (151 Republicans, 32 Democrats).³⁷ The Senate passed the bill without a roll-call vote, and it was vetoed as Hoover promised. The drought relief measure had gone through Congress in much the same form as Hoover had proposed it, primarily due to Republican support. It was observed at the time that "sharp party alignments appear in connection with the measures where a conflict between Congress and The President occurred" with the Democrats voting for farm relief proposals and the Republicans supporting President Hoover.³⁸

Another major Hoover proposal for farm relief failed to evoke any congressional action. He proposed to raise farm prices by retiring marginal, arable land from production. The government would lease acreage on a low bid basis and thereby retire the least productive land first. Hoover believed it was the most effective way to cut agricultural production.³⁹ Hoover's recommendation to strengthen the Federal Land Bank, which will be considered in the chapter on banking, was adopted by Congress with widespread bipartisan support.

³⁶ New York Times, March 1, 1933, p. 25.

³⁷ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXVI, Part 5, p. 5274.

³⁸ Herring, American Political Science Review, XXVII, No. 3, p. 418.

³⁹ Hoover, p. 156.

On all the major farm relief issues, Hoover received solid Republican congressional support, especially in the House Representatives. It was especially impressive on the two major farm proposals of export debentures and the distribution of drought relief as a dole. The Senate Republicans were less united in their support of the President, but Hoover had support from most of them.

III

RELIEF

Both the tariff and farm relief had been issues before 1929; they became more critical issues with the depression. Unanticipated issues also arose from the depression. When the second session of the 71st Congress convened on December 2, 1929, the economic panic was still in an early stage. Nevertheless, one of the first questions to arise was whether to extend relief to the unemployed through federally financed public works.

Public Works

Hoover consistently opposed any large government expenditures to employ the jobless on public works. The President's basis varied on particular issues, but Hoover generally opposed extensive federal works programs which would funnel money into useless, non-productive activities, increase taxes, remove funds from the private sector of the economy, contribute to graft and waste, and usurp local government's responsibility for relief. Hoover believed that the federal government should not adopt direct relief measures unless state and local governments exhausted their resources.¹

President Hoover's opinion was that the most fruitful relief policy was through voluntary cooperation between all

¹Myers and Newton, pp. 208-211.

ivate segments of the economy, with the government's role that promoting an atmosphere of voluntary cooperation. Hoover believed that if employers made no wage cuts, spread the available work among as many employees as possible, made capital improvements, and if organized labor did not strike, then local charity could meet any relief needs.²

Hoover proposed a modest expansion of the public works program to help relieve the unemployment problem early in the second session of the 71st Congress. It was actually an acceleration of "useful" projects already planned. Congress approved Hoover's recommendation, and authorized river and harbor improvements, increased construction of public buildings and roads, and the start of construction on the Colorado River Dam.³ These were controversial proposals and were carried without roll-call votes.

When the depression worsened in 1930, Hoover determined that it would be desirable to accelerate these previously authorized programs. He therefore requested a \$150 million appropriation for immediate use on the public works project. The proposal also stipulated that the President and his cabinet could allocate the funds among the different projects to respond to changing needs in

²"Emergency Aid for Employment", Congressional Digest, X, No. 1 (January, 1931), p. 2.

³Myers and Newton, p. 40.

the local labor markets.⁴

The key issue, according to the New York Times, was whether the executive branch should be allowed to exercise discretionary powers over the reallocation of the funds among departments as it saw fit.⁵ There was only one roll-call vote directly on this use of executive powers. The Hoover forces won that Senate vote 42 (35 Republicans, 7 Democrats) to 39 (11 Republicans, 27 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).⁶ The discretionary executive power remained in the bill with strong Republican support. Both houses accepted the entire bill two days later and it became law.

When the first session of the 72nd Congress opened on December 7, 1931, there was a flood of proposals to provide unemployment relief through expanded public works programs. The President was still firm in his conviction that additional federal programs were unwise. In late February of 1932, Hoover contended that no further public work of a useful nature was needed, that "made work" had no greater economic value than direct relief, and that it was as morally debasing as the dole.⁷

⁴Macmahon, American Political Science Review, XXV, No. 4, p. 943.

⁵New York Times, December 12, 1930, p. 4.

⁶Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 3rd Sess., LXXIV, Part 1, p.1029.

⁷Myers and Newton, p. 177.

Senator Robert M. La Follette (R-Wis.) contended that current relief programs were inadequate, and introduced a bill to spend more than \$2 billion on unemployment relief work.⁸ On February 15, 1932, the Democrat senators sponsored an amendment to the bill to increase the expenditures.⁹ It was defeated 31 (1 Republican, 30 Democrats) to 48 (39 Republicans, 8 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).¹⁰ The day after the Democratic amendment failed, the Senate voted on the La Follette bill, which critics called the "dole" bill. This was the first clear vote in the Congress for direct relief by the federal government. The La Follette bill received its most vigorous support from the same Democratic senators, Joseph T. Robinson (Ark.), Thomas J. Walsh (Mont.), Robert J. Bulkley (Ohio), and Hugo L. Black (Ala.), that had attempted to increase the appropriation on the previous day.¹¹ It failed to pass in a 35 (15 Republicans, 19 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 48 (27 Republicans, 21 Democrats) vote that split party lines.¹² This important vote indicated "the determination

⁸E. Pendleton Herring, "First Session of the Seventy-second Congress, December 7, 1931, to July 16, 1932," American Political Science Review, XXVI, No. 5 (October, 1932), p. 868.

⁹New York Times, February 16, 1932, p. 5.

¹⁰Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 4, p. 3939.

¹¹New York Times, February 17, 1932, p. 1.

¹²Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 4, p. 4052.

the Senate to dispose conclusively of this pending legislation."¹³

When the public works bill came to the Senate for final passage, it was in a form "satisfactory in its basic purposes to the administration," and passed with broad bipartisan support.¹⁴ The vote was 72 (35 Republicans, 37 Democrats) to 8 (7 Republicans, 1 Democrat).¹⁵ The bill passed the House without a roll-call vote and was signed into law. The President had experienced more objections from the Senate Republicans than he had been accustomed to and only considerable Democratic support saved him from defeat on some of the controversial amendments.

Although there were no House roll-call votes on this bill, there were House rollcalls on a more controversial relief measure which appeared later in the session. Texas Democrat John Nance Garner, Speaker of the House, sponsored a \$1 billion relief proposal. The funds were to be allocated by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which had been created earlier in the session to bolster the nation's credit, as direct federal grants for public construction projects. In addition, Garner proposed that \$100 million be made available to President Hoover to use as he saw

¹³New York Times, February 17, 1932, p. 3.

¹⁴Ibid., June 11, 1932, p. 1.

¹⁵Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 1, p. 12549.

for relief in special cases.¹⁶ Hoover's reaction was quite clear. He called it "the most gigantic pork barrel ever proposed to the American Congress. It is an unexampled raid on the public treasury."¹⁷

The first significant House vote on the bill was on a special rule to permit amendments only from the originating committee, which had a Democratic majority, to prevent any delaying amendments after the bill reached the House floor.¹⁸ The special rule passed by a vote of 205 (12 Republicans, 192 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 109 (181 Republicans, 8 Democrats).¹⁹ The passage of this special rule determined the fate of the bill. The Democrats had pushed a measure through the House that was clearly inconsistent with the President's wishes. In an anti-climatic vote the House passed the bill 216 (21 Republicans, 194 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 182 (172 Republicans, 10 Democrats) on the same day.²⁰

The Garner bill then went to the Senate where it was amended slightly. The only roll-call vote of consequence was the provision to finance \$500,000,000 of the proposed public works through bond sales. This passed in spite of steady Administration

¹⁶Herring, American Political Science Review, XXVI, No. 5, p. 869.

¹⁷Hyde and Wilbur, p. 459.

¹⁸New York Times, June 8, 1932, p. 1.

¹⁹Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 11, p. 12198.

²⁰Ibid., p. 12244.

position.²¹ The motion to delete the bond measure was defeated (17 Republicans, 2 Democrats) to 57 (23 Republicans, 33 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).²² The Senate then passed the bill without roll-call vote.

After the conference committee had resolved the differences between the Senate and House versions of the bill, it was returned to both houses. The House passed the bill 202 (35 Republicans, 155 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 157 (155 Republicans, 2 Democrats) on July 7, 1932.²³ Two days later the Senate passed the bill by a vote of 43 (14 Republicans, 29 Democrats) to 31 (25 Republicans, 5 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).²⁴

President Hoover defended his veto of the bill on the grounds that it "violates every sound principle of public finance and of government. Never before has so dangerous a suggestion been seriously made to our country."²⁵

There was general congressional agreement that an unemployment relief measure was needed, but it was also apparent that

²¹New York Times, June 23, 1932, p. 1.

²²Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 12, 13671.

²³Ibid., Part 13, p. 14820.

²⁴Ibid., Part 14, p. 14957.

²⁵Myers and Newton, p. 229.

There were insufficient votes to override Hoover's veto. To expedite matters the House accepted a motion by voice vote to refer the President's veto and message to the Ways and Means Committee, "thus forestalling a vote on the question of overriding and upholding the veto," which cleared the way for action on a substitute relief bill before Congress adjourned.²⁶

The substitute relief bill was sponsored by Senator Robert F. Wagner (D-N.Y.). It provided for \$2,122,000,000 to be loaned to states and other public agencies for self-liquidating projects to relieve unemployment.²⁷ The bill passed the House on July 13, 1932, by the decisive margin of 296 (170 Republicans, 125 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 46 (11 Republicans, 35 Democrats).²⁸

The Senate passed the substitute relief measure without a roll-call vote. The relief bill was "mainly in the form insisted upon by the President."²⁹ In the end, Hoover had successfully frustrated his program into law. He kept the Garner Relief Bill from becoming law with his veto and, with the bipartisan support, obtained a substitute measure.

²⁶ New York Times, July 12, 1932, p. 1.

²⁷ Ibid., July 17, 1932, p. 1.

²⁸ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 14, p. 15232.

²⁹ Myers and Newton, p. 232.

The issue of direct federal subsidies to public institutions came up only once during the second session of the 72nd Congress. An attempt was made in the Senate to substitute direct government grants in place of loans from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, but it failed in a bipartisan vote with 44 (18 Republicans, 26 Democrats) voting for loans and 28 (15 Republicans, 12 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) voting for direct grants.³⁰

The general clamor for massive public works programs was unsatisfied, but it anticipated a better reception with the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the initiation of the New Deal. Hoover had tried his program of limited public works programs, supplemented by voluntary cooperation from the private sector of the economy, to provide work relief. The programs passed by Congress were essentially of the nature and scope that Hoover requested. His closest ally had been the Republicans of the House of Representatives; they supported the President and some shared his fate in the 1932 elections for their loyalty. The Senate Republicans had been less cooperative. Many Administration proposals were enacted in the Senate with as much Democratic as Republican support. The President was not supported

³⁰ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXIV, Part 4, p. 4502.

his party on public work relief as strongly as he had been on the tariff and the farm questions.

Employment Agency

Although public works projects received the most congressional attention, there were other measures designed to alleviate the problems of the jobless millions. One such proposal was to establish a Federal Employment Service. The Department of Labor had previously established a service to work on a limited scale with the employment agencies operating in many of the states. Hoover favored an improved employment service, and requested that Congress pass legislation to provide for more coordination between the state and federal employment service.³¹

The bill was changed drastically in the Senate, primarily through the efforts of Robert F. Wagner (D-N.Y.). After his provisions were incorporated into the Hoover bill, it appropriated \$10 million to fund a survey of labor needs, grants for the operation of state employment agencies, and provisions to restrict the transportation of surplus labor from state to state.³² The Senate passed the measure 34 (12 Republicans, 21 Democrats, 1 Farmer-labor) to 27 (23 Republicans, 4 Democrats).³³ Hoover charged that

³¹Hoover, p. 47.

³²New York Times, May 13, 1930, p. 1.

³³Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1930, LXXII, Part 4, p. 8749.

proposal had been "ditched by the opposition."³⁴ The Wagner bill then passed the House without a roll-call vote. The President vetoed the bill with the charge that the Wagner bill would "not help [this] emergency but will do great damage."³⁵ Hoover presented the bill, but he had to contend with considerable Senate Republican opposition.

Immigration

Another issue related to the relief of unemployment was the immigration policy of the United States. Hoover's belief that restricting immigration would bolster employment was well known. Immigration laws already barred anyone who was likely to become a public charge. Hoover concluded that all immigrants were public charges either directly or indirectly because they went on relief or forced someone else to go on relief. Accordingly, the Hoover Administration restricted the number of immigrants allowed into the country.³⁶

Changes in the national origins clause of the Immigration Act of 1924 were proposed during the first session of the 71st Congress, but the only roll-call vote on which immigration policy was clearly related to unemployment was in the second session of the 71st Congress. This was on what had been a principal source

³⁴ Hoover, p. 47.

³⁵ Hyde and Wilbur, p. 136.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 144-145

irritation, the immigration of cheap labor from Mexico. The Senate passed a bill on May 13, 1930, to reduce immigration into the United States and to bring Mexico under the quota system by 16 (13 Republicans, 2 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).³⁷ A House committee favored the bill, but it was never voted upon by the House.³⁸

Hoover's views on immigration were further clarified by his statements on deportation. He asked for stricter laws on deportation and increased funds for enforcement as a means of reducing unemployment.³⁹ The law was not changed, but appropriations for enforcement of the existing laws were increased without a roll-call vote, and the "Secretary of Labor was thus aided in pursuing his favorite contribution to the solution of the perplexities of the business cycle."⁴⁰

³⁷ Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1930, LXXII, Part I, p. 8843.

³⁸ Macmahon, American Political Science Review, XXIV, No. 4, p. 930.

³⁹ Ibid., XXV, No. 4, p. 944.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

IV

R. F. C.

Direct relief through public works projects had not been greatly expanded by the Hoover Administration even though the depression continued to create pressure for federal action to relieve suffering. A constant clamor for action from the public urged the Hoover Administration to act more forcefully than had been its original intention.

In view of the serious credit shortage caused by the depression, Hoover proposed in early October, 1931, to establish a National Credit Association composed of the nation's bankers. It was to be underwritten by the bankers themselves with a capital of \$100 million to be used to rediscount bank assets ineligible for Federal Reserve rediscount to stabilize banks and prevent runs by depositors. The Association would also use the fund to grant loans against the assets of closed banks in order that their depositor's funds might circulate and bolster the economy. Hoover wanted the bankers know that if this effort failed he would introduce a legislative program to protect the public.¹

The National Credit Association, as outlined by Hoover, was established exactly one day after the President made his

¹Myers and Newton, pp. 127-128.

proposal. It was apparent in less than two months, however, that the National Credit Association was going to be unable to stem the tide as domestic and foreign credit structure continued to crumble.

Critics charged that the National Credit Corporation was established primarily for psychological effect to reassure the public and that it did not have the necessary funds for such a severe crisis. In addition, the sound banks were not inclined to support their struggling sister institutions, but were primarily concerned with protecting their own interests. As they maintained a liquid position, the effect was to depress all forms of collateral, further undermining the stability of the banks in difficulty.²

In view of the failure of the National Credit Corporation, Hoover proceeded with his legislative program as he had earlier pledged. His recommendations to Congress in the first session of the 72nd Congress included a proposal to establish the Reconstruction Finance Corporation with \$500 million capital and the authority to issue up to \$3 billion in tax-free bonds to finance its operation. Hoover further proposed that the Corporation have the power to extend credit against security to commercial banks, savings banks, trust companies, building and loan associations, insurance companies, mortgage loan companies, credit unions, established

²Romasco, pp. 91-97.

industries, and railroads that could not otherwise secure credit.³

The President later added the request that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation be able to make loans to agricultural credit banks and to state and local governments for reproductive public works, which would pay for themselves.⁴

Congress acted on the Reconstruction Finance Corporation proposal with reasonable promptness. On January 16, 1932, the House passed the bill as Hoover had recommended it except for minor changes.⁵ In a 335 (181 Republicans, 154 Democrats) to 56 (11 Republicans, 45 Democrats) vote, both parties endorsed the bill.⁶

The Senate had several minor roll-call votes on the Reconstruction Finance Corporation proposal, mostly on technicalities. The only amendment of concern to the Administration would have permitted the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to make loans to large cities for relief purposes. This was contrary to Hoover's recommendation that loans be made only for reproductive public works. The motion to accept the amendment failed 28 (7 Republicans, 21 Democrats) to 45 (30 Republicans, 15 Democrats).⁷ Hoover's

³Hyde and Wilbur, p. 427.

⁴Myers and Newton, p. 152.

⁵New York Times, January 15, 1932, p. 1.

⁶Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 1, p. 2081.

⁷Ibid., p. 1686.

quest had been honored. The bill then passed the Senate with only token opposition by a vote of 63 (34 Republicans, 29 Democrats) and 18 (3 Republicans, 5 Democrats).⁸

A conference committee quickly resolved the differences between the Senate and House versions of the bill. The only real difference between them was whether bonds issued by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation should be eligible for rediscount by the Federal Reserve Banks, as Hoover had requested. The Senate version, which permitted the bonds to be purchased by the United States Treasury but not by the Federal Reserve Banks, prevailed in the conference committee and the bill was returned to both Houses.

Although there was no roll-call vote, each House accepted the bill in a bipartisan fashion.⁹ The bill was not exactly what Hoover had requested, but he was reported to be pleased with the outcome and expressed his approval of the bill.¹⁰

Not long after the bill's passage, the House Democrats sponsored a relief measure to provide loans from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to the states for emergency highway construction. Hoover had not expected the Corporation to finance this type of

⁸ Ibid., p. 1705.

⁹ New York Times, January 23, 1932, p. 1.

¹⁰ "Action by Congress Since the Holiday Recess," Congressional Digest, XI, No. 2, February, 1932, p. 52.

ject, and he made his opposition clear.¹¹ In the face of presidential opposition, the House passed the bill 205 (53 Republicans, 12 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 109 (97 Republicans, 12 Democrats).¹²

Loan Recipient Disclosure

This relief proposal was ultimately supplanted by the Garner Relief Bill, which has been previously analyzed. It was a relief proposal which also called for significant changes in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Hoover's veto message on the Garner Bill included his objections to these changes. Specifically, he objected to the provisions which allowed the Reconstruction Finance Corporation loans to be made to individuals or corporations as too liberal, and also to the provision which permitted public disclosure of the recipients of the loans.¹³

The House proponents of the Garner bill did not have enough votes to override Hoover's veto, but they were successful in incorporating the requirement providing for the disclosure of loan recipients into the substitute bill. This amendment was a product of the Democratic Speaker, John N. Garner, and as a result of his insistence was included in the bill.¹⁴ By an extremely narrow

¹¹New York Times, February 28, 1932, p. 22.

¹²Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 5, p. 4892.

¹³Myers and Newton, p. 225.

¹⁴New York Times, July 16, 1932, p. 1.

origin, the House included the disclosure provision 170 (10 Republicans, 160 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 169 (167 Republicans, 2 Democrats).¹⁵

The substitute relief bill had passed the Senate two days earlier without the disclosure provision by a vote of 43 (14 Republicans, 29 Democrats) to 31 (25 Republicans, 5 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).¹⁶ There was a clash in the conference committee over the disclosure of loan recipients. Garner insisted on retaining the measure and the House again supported his stand. On July 14, 1932, it voted to instruct the House conferees to insist on the disclosure provision by 172 (12 Republicans, 159 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 40 (150 Republicans).¹⁷

In face of the House stand, a compromise was worked out by the committee. The provision was to be interpreted to mean that the disclosure would be made in confidence to the House and Senate, an understanding cemented by a "gentleman's agreement."¹⁸ Having made their point, the House members then voted to accept the conference report 286 (162 Republicans, 123 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 48 (14 Republicans, 34 Democrats).¹⁹

¹⁵ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 14, p. 15231.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 14957.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 15391.

¹⁸ New York Times, July 16, 1932, p. 1.

¹⁹ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 14, p. 15491.

This final action was taken near the end of the session after the crucial questions had been resolved and the bill, "mainly in the form insisted upon by the President," was then passed without a roll-call vote.²⁰ Speaker Garner subsequently forced a resolution through the House which commanded that all loans be made public. The "gentleman's agreement" on public disclosure was thereby modified, and the list of loan recipients were published in January, 1933.²¹

There was little further legislation related to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. On the only issue which produced a roll-call vote, the Senate voted 54 (22 Republicans, 32 Democrats) to 16 (11 Republicans, 5 Democrats) to liberalize eligibility for Reconstruction Finance Corporation loans beyond that which Hoover had originally requested.²²

The Reconstruction Finance Corporation lacked the controversy of earlier issues. It received broad bipartisan support in both Houses when it was established. The House Republicans stood with Hoover on both the appropriations for roads and the disclosure issue. Senators generally supported Hoover's position on the

²⁰Myers and Newton, p. 232.

²¹Ibid., p. 325.

²²Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXVI, Part 4, p. 4503.

disclosure question regardless of party. The President's program had been established with consistent Republican support while the Democrats had opposed his efforts on some of the particulars. It is ironic that Hoover received his support on a policy that ran contrary to his basic desire to keep government uninvolved in what had been traditionally regarded as a private business activity. The pressing needs of the times had forced him to compromise.

V

VETERANS' PENSIONS

Perhaps the relief measure which caused the most controversy during the Hoover Presidency was the clamor over pensions for the veterans of America's wars. The pension requests were advanced both by the veterans themselves and also by the relief advocates who saw this as a means of creating the purchasing power that America's economy so badly needed. These two groups combined to produce the most severe setback that Hoover experienced during his four years in office.

Spanish-American War Pensions

The first congressional pension bill in the 71st Congress increased benefit payments to Spanish-American War veterans by \$11 million annually.¹ Shortly after passage, Hoover vetoed the bill. Although he favored a general liberalizing of the Spanish-American War pension program, he objected to three provisions: the reduction of the traditional ninety day service requirement for pension eligibility to seventy days, pensions for those veterans whose health was destroyed by "vicious habits," and no distinction in eligibility between those veterans in financial need and those with substantial incomes.²

¹New York Times, June 3, 1930, p. 1.

²Hyde and Wilbur, p. 196.

Senator Tom Connally (D-Tex.) led the effort to override Hoover's veto, but he had major assistance from the other side of the aisle, especially from Senators Norris and Borah.³ The Senate voted June 2, 1930, with 61 (28 Republicans, 32 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) senators voting to override the veto and 18 (18 Republicans) to sustain the veto.⁴ A majority of the Republican Senators joined with a unanimous bloc of Democratic Senators to deal President Hoover his first defeat of consequence in the Senate.

The House also voted to override the veto on the same day. The vote probably occurred when it did because the Republican leadership was absent from the Capitol. A surprised press corp, who had expected the House to sustain the veto, offered this as a possible reason for the unexpected vote.⁵ The vital vote was on a motion to delay the vote to override the veto, which, had it passed, would have enabled the Republican leaders time to return to the city and solidify their forces. This motion failed to pass by the margin of 65 (65 Republicans) to 234 (123 Republicans, 110 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).⁶ The vote showed that there were more than enough votes to override the veto, and therefore even more

³New York Times, June 3, 1930, p. 1.

⁴Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1930, LXXII, Part 9, p. 9876.

⁵New York Times, June 3, 1930, p. 1.

⁶Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1930, LXXII, Part 9, p. 9912.

Republicans deserted their party leader to help override the veto 299 (184 Republicans, 114 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 14 (14 Republicans).⁷ The Senate Republicans had rebuffed Hoover before, but this was the first time the House Republicans failed to support the President on a key issue; their defection presented Hoover with his first major defeat in Congress.

World War I Pensions

In the same session, there was a more intense battle over the pensions for World War I veterans. In this confrontation, Hoover fared better.

The World War I veterans' bill was amended drastically on the floor of the House as a result of the efforts of John E. Rankin (D-Miss.). When it came up for a final vote on April 24, 1930, Royal Johnson (R-S.D.), who had sponsored the original bill, felt compelled to try to block passage because the liberalized qualifications for benefits to veterans could add a possible \$1 billion in benefits. The "real test came . . . when Johnson . . . moved to recommit" the veterans' bill to his House Committee.⁸ His effort failed with 145 (143 Republicans, 2 Democrats) voting for recommitment against 230 (91 Republicans, 138 Democrats, 1 Farmer-

⁷ Ibid., p. 9914.

⁸ New York Times, April 25, 1930, p. 1.

...or) in favor of immediate House action.⁹ The bill was then immediately passed by the House, 324 (189 Republicans, 134 Democrats, Farmer-Labor) to 49 (47 Republicans, 2 Democrats).¹⁰

The Senate passed the bill without a record vote. Hoover made his views known in his veto message of May 26, 1930. He thought that the bill made eligibility for benefits too lax, made a distinction between rich and poor veterans, allowed compensation for misconduct disabilities, and was too costly for the government at that time. "This veterans' bill is just bad legislation," he concluded.¹¹

On June 25, 1930, the House voted on a motion to sustain the President's veto. The effort to override fell far short of success, although 188 (185 Republicans, 3 Democrats) voted to sustain and 182 (45 Republicans, 136 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) voted to override the veto.¹² The Republicans supported the President more solidly on this vote than they had on the previous pension vote.

When this veterans' bill failed to pass, a substitute

⁹Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1930, LXXII, Part 7, p. 7673.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Hyde and Wilbur, pp. 197-198.

¹²Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1930, LXXII, Part 11, p. 11828.

measure was offered by the Republican leadership. Expecting veto of the original bill, Speaker Nicholas Longworth, Majority Leader William Tilton, and the original sponsor, Representative Johnson, had prepared a substitute which had the Administration's approval. The substitute then passed the House with strong bipartisan support because the House Democrats assumed that the bill would be amended in the Senate.¹³

There were no Senate roll-call votes on the veterans' bill until the substitute version came from the House of Representatives.

On July 1, 1930, the Senate passed two amendments which Hoover opposed. The first amendment, which was regarded as the test vote, was offered by Senator David I. Walsh (D-Mass.) and provided for an increase in the maximum benefits from \$40 to \$60 per month. The second amendment was offered by Senator Norris (R-Neb.) and provided benefits for those veterans whose disability resulted from willful misconduct.¹⁴ The first amendment passed by 37 (9 Republicans, 27 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 26 (26 Republicans).¹⁵ The second amendment passed by 36 (10 Republicans, 25 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 27 (25 Republicans, 2 Democrats).¹⁶ The entire

¹³New York Times, June 27, 1930, p. 1.

¹⁴Ibid., July 2, 1930, p. 1.

¹⁵Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1930, LXXII, Part 11, p. 12194.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 12196.

asure was then passed by 56 (28 Republicans, 27 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 11 (11 Republicans),¹⁷ A significant majority of Republican Senators had supported the President on the key votes, but to no avail.

The House Democrats had been correct in their assumption that the Senate would amend the bill, but their hopes proved to be futile as the full House rebuffed any attempts to liberalize the veterans' bill. On July 2, 1930, the House voted 194 (191 Republicans, 3 Democrats) to 117 (7 Republicans, 109 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to refuse to even consider the Senate amendments to the bill.¹⁸ There were four provisions to which Hoover and a majority of the House Republicans objected: these were the two Senate amendments above and two other amendments that had been passed without a roll-call vote, one lowered the percent of disability to be eligible for benefits from 25 percent to 10 percent, and the other eliminated the income tax payment as the criteria to determine eligibility based on need.¹⁹

The Administration forces, led by Senator David A. Reed (R-Pa.) won a decisive victory in the conference committee the

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 12198.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 12350.

¹⁹ New York Times, July 3, 1930, p. 4.

Following day. "The conference report on the Veterans' bill . . . eliminated all of the Senate amendments opposed by the President . . . [and] followed implicitly the desires of the President."²⁰ The bill then passed the Senate by a vote of 48 (32 Republicans, 16 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 14 (6 Republicans, 8 Democrats).²¹ It passed the House on the same day without a roll-call vote.

President Hoover lost on the Spanish-American War pension issue, but he won the contest over the much more important question of increased benefits for World War I veterans. On the crucial votes, he had unusually solid support from the House Republicans as well as significant support from the Senate Republicans.

Bonus Certificates

Benefits to veterans of World War I was again an issue in the third session of the 71st Congress. These veterans had been granted bonus certificates for their war service that were to mature in 25 years. There was a movement to make immediate payment of 50 percent of the certificate's face value as a relief measure and to generate more purchasing power for the faltering economy.²² The President responded with a message to Republican senators and

²⁰ Ibid., July 4, 1930, p. 1.

²¹ Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1930, LXXII, Part 11, p. 12418.

²² Hyde and Wilbur, p. 199.

representatives on the congressional committees in charge of the legislation for veterans' benefits that he would veto the proposal if it passed.²³

The President's opposition notwithstanding, Congress passed the bonus bill. It passed the House on February 16, 1931, by 363 (212 Republicans, 150 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 39 (39 Republicans).²⁴ The New York Times, reported that many Republicans bolted due to rumors that Hoover would not veto this bill, but would sign it to forestall a bill that would be proposed to pay 100 percent of the face value of the certificates.²⁵

The Senate passed the bill three days after the House by a vote of 72 (34 Republicans, 37 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 12 (12 Republicans).²⁶ Republican Senate leaders said that the House vote had undermined their efforts to block the bill.²⁷

The explanations of the Republican leaders were small consolation to the President as his party deserted him en masse. In addition, the rumors which had unsettled the House Republicans

²³ Myers and Newton, p. 65.

²⁴ Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 3rd Sess., 1931, LXXIV, Part 5, p. 5082.

²⁵ New York Times, February 17, 1931, p. 1.

²⁶ Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 3rd Sess., 1931, LXXIV, Part 5, p. 5386.

²⁷ New York Times, February 20, 1931, p. 1.

ved false, as Hoover held to his word and vetoed the bill. His message explained that the huge sum required to fund the proposal would overtax the budget, and that a majority of the veterans receiving the bonus were not in need of relief assistance.²⁸

The Republican House leaders were rather embarrassed with their shortsighted explanation for the original passage of the bill when the House voted to override Hoover's veto. Republican Majority Leader Tilson was unable to rally the forces to get one-third plus one of the total House votes necessary to sustain the veto, which was overridden 328 (179 Republicans, 148 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 79 (79 Republicans).²⁹ On the next day, February 17, 1931, the Senate also voted to override Hoover's veto by 76 (46 Republicans, 39 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 17 (16 Republicans, 1 Democrat).³⁰ Hoover had experienced perhaps his most severe setback from his party during the 71st Congress.

Although Republican leadership in the House was contradicted by the vote to override the veto, the rumor they had based their predictions on did prove to be partially correct. In the first session of the 72nd Congress there was an effort to pay 100 percent

²⁸ Hyde and Wilbur, pp. 199-200.

²⁹ Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 3rd Sess., 1931, LXXIV, Part 6, p. 6171.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 6230.

the face value of the bonus certificates to World War I veterans.³¹ Young Democratic Representative from Texas, Wright Patman, was the chief advocate of the 100 percent bonus.³² The first major vote on the Patman Bonus Bill in the House of Representatives was on June 14, 1932. The House Rules Committee, in accordance with Hoover's wishes, had not reported the bill to the House, but a motion to discharge the bill from the Rules Committee passed 226 (60 Republicans, 153 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 175 (133 Republicans, 42 Democrats).³³ This was the test vote.³⁴

After the bill was discharged, the House then passed the measure 211 (57 Republicans, 153 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 176 (126 Republicans, 50 Democrats).³⁵ Hoover's views on the bonus question had not changed, and a veto was assured if the measure should also pass the Senate.³⁶ The threatened veto proved to be unnecessary when the Senate refused to pass the proposed bonus bill. The vote was 18 (7 Republicans, 10 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) for

³¹ Hyde and Wilbur, p. 201.

³² New York Times, June 14, 1932, p. 1.

³³ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 12, p. 12854.

³⁴ New York Times, June 14, 1932, p. 1.

³⁵ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 12, p. 13053.

³⁶ New York Times, June 14, 1932, p. 1.

62 (35 Republicans, 27 Democrats) against passage.³⁷ This required
 the courage on the part of the Senate, as the bonus marchers were
 creating a tense situation in the Capital at the time.³⁸

There was limited action on veterans' benefits in the second
 session of the 72nd Congress. The only roll-call vote on veterans'
 benefits was on an amendment to attach \$1 billion for veterans' bene-
 fits to the Independent Agencies appropriation bill.³⁹ The amend-
 ment carried by 51 (23 Republicans, 27 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to
 47 (14 Republicans, 10 Democrats).⁴⁰ Hoover expressed his disapproval
 with a pocket veto after Congress adjourned on March 4, 1933.⁴¹

Republican support for Hoover was sporadic on veterans'
 benefits. It was unusual for the President to experience defeat
 regardless of the partisan voting pattern. It was even more
 unusual for him to experience his reverses at the hands of his own
 party members. The Republicans in the House failed to support
 Hoover both on Spanish-American War pensions and the bonus certifi-
 cate issue. But their support was unusually strong on the contest

³⁷ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 12,
 p. 13274.

³⁸ New York Times, June 19, 1932, p. 1.

³⁹ Herring, American Political Science Review, XXVII, No. 3,
 p. 412.

⁴⁰ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXVI, Part 3,
 p. 3171.

⁴¹ Herring, American Political Science Review, XXVII, No. 3,
 p. 413.

World War I pensions. Hoover had experienced limited support from Senate Republicans before, but the lack of solid support in the House was something new for the President.

TAXATION

Another problem that confronted the Hoover Administration was balancing the budget. The President had consistently stressed the need for fiscal stability throughout his public career, and the pressures of the depression did not change Hoover's views on the virtue and necessity of a balanced budget. The budget could be balanced either by increasing taxes to finance relief programs or by reducing normal governmental expenditures. In the end, the Administration used both policies in an attempt to minimize the effects of the depression on the budget.

The revision of the tax structure originated during the second session of the 71st Congress when Republican Representative Willis C. Hawley (Oreg.) introduced a resolution to reduce corporate and personal income taxes and all other federal taxes by one percent. This was not a depression measure, as it originated before the depression struck and was acted on before the extent of the economic collapse was fully realized. Tax reduction opponents, led by Democratic Representative John E. Rankin (Miss.), held that taxes should not be reduced with government revenue falling from the slack in business activity and the increased expenditures required for certain public works programs.¹

¹New York Times, December 6, 1929, p. 1.

The income tax resolution passed the House without a roll-call vote. On December 14, 1929, it passed the Senate 63 (39 Republicans, 24 Democrats) to 14 (11 Republicans, 3 Democrats).² The final measure was consistent with Hoover's recommendations as amendments at variance with the Administration's wishes had been voted down overwhelmingly.³ In his first confrontation with Congress over taxes, Hoover had received strong support from both parties.

Manufacturers' Sales Tax

Unfortunately, opponents to the tax cut appeared to have better foresight than the Administration forces. By 1932, Hoover found it necessary to urge the 72nd Congress to increase taxes by \$3 billion to ensure a balanced budget. He originally requested an increase in income taxes, corporate and personal, and estate taxes and the restoration of the cut that had been made in other federal taxes two years earlier. Later, Hoover also proposed a manufacturers' sales tax on everything except food and cheap clothing as a temporary measure to increase federal revenues.⁴

The House Ways and Means Committee approved Hoover's recommendations and reported a bill which included a manufacturers' sales tax, with near unanimous bipartisan support. Contrary to the

²Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1929 LXXII, Part 1, p. 670.

³New York Times, December 15, 1929, p. 1.

⁴Hoover, pp. 135-137.

customary practice, the Democratic House leaders chose to permit general debate on the bill with no time limit, a decision the Republicans opposed. The Hoover forces, Republicans who were now a minority party, charged that permitting general debate resulted in the elimination from the bill of the manufacturers' sales tax, which was expected to produce approximately one-half of the increased revenue that Hoover insisted upon.⁵ The American Political Science Review reported that a group of "allied progressives" allied "under the leadership of La Guardia," the dissident New York Republican, to eliminate the manufacturers' sales tax in a closer vote on March 24, 1932.⁶

It was restored by the House committee, but was again eliminated when the bill came to the House floor for final action. An amendment offered by Democratic Representative Robert L. Doughton (N.C.) to strike out the manufacturers' sales tax passed 160 (81 Republicans, 154 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 110 (50 Republicans, 50 Democrats).⁷

On the same day an effort was made to increase the maximum rates in the income tax bill. Hoover originally proposed a 40 percent rate for all incomes over \$100,000. Representative Phillip

⁵Myers and Newton, pp. 185-186.

⁶Herring, American Political Science Review, XXVI, No. 5, p. 866.

⁷Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 7, p. 7324.

Swing (R-Pa.) introduced an amendment to increase the maximum rates to 65 percent.⁸ This amendment, anathema to Hoover, failed 178 (62 Republicans, 115 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 211 (125 Republicans, 86 Democrats).⁹ There was disagreement over the amount of revenue the House measure would produce, but all estimates were short of the amount necessary to balance the budget.¹⁰

Hoover's sentiments on the necessity of a balanced budget were clearly expressed when he said, "it is generally agreed that the balancing of the federal budget and unimpaired national credit is indispensable to the restoration of confidence and to the very start of economic recovery."¹¹ Hoover, therefore, regarded the measure as inadequate because it failed to raise adequate revenue to balance the budget, and it failed to produce adequate revenue because the manufacturers' sales tax had been rejected. The defeat stemmed primarily from Democratic opposition while a strong majority of the House Republicans had supported Hoover. The President did prevail on the income tax rate issue, however, with Republican support.

⁸New York Times, April 2, 1932, p. 1.

⁹Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 7, p. 732 5.

¹⁰New York Times, April 2, 1932, p. 1.

¹¹Myers and Newton, p. 211.

There were efforts to amend certain aspects of the bill in the Senate. Republican Senator James Couzens (Mich.) offered an amendment to increase the maximum income tax rates to 65 percent. His most ardent support came from Senator Huey P. Long, Louisiana Democrat, who filibustered for three hours in support of higher tax rates.¹² In spite of his effort, the amendment failed 31 (15 Republicans, 15 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 49 (24 Republicans, 25 Democrats).¹³ An effort to restore the manufacturers' sales tax also failed 27 (20 Republicans, 7 Democrats) to 53 (20 Republicans, 33 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).¹⁴ On May 31, 1932, the Senate passed the bill with some added revenue provisions by a vote of 72 (41 Republicans, 31 Democrats) to 11 (2 Republicans, 8 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).¹⁵ As usual, Hoover received less support from his party in the Senate than he had in the House. This was again reflected in the vote on the conference report, which was approved 43 (30 Republicans, 16 Democrats) to 35 (11 Republicans, 23 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).¹⁶

¹²New York Times, May 17, 1932, p. 1.

¹³Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 9, p. 10276.

¹⁴Ibid., Part 10, p. 11664.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 11666.

¹⁶Ibid., Part 11, p. 12071.

No one was entirely happy with the bill as passed, certainly Hoover.¹⁷ The main issue had been the manufacturers' sales tax which Hoover had endorsed.¹⁸ If the bill had included the manufacturers' sales tax, it could have raised sufficient revenue to balance the budget and presumably would therefore have received Hoover's assent. The failure of Congress to enact the higher taxes is probably accounted for in the fact that their choice was between lower taxes and increased relief spending. If the budget was to be reasonably balanced, the nation could not have both. The advocates of increased relief were less influential politically than the people who paid taxes. The people who carried the principal share of the tax burden were also the same people who had enough resources to be politically effective.¹⁹

There was also activity on the tax issue in the second session of the 72nd Congress. In a continued effort to balance the budget in the face of emergency relief expenditures, Hoover again recommended that a manufacturers' sales tax be applied to all goods, except food and cheap clothing, at a uniform rate of two percent.²⁰ The recommendation was to no avail as Democratic congressional

¹⁷Myers and Newton, p. 219.

¹⁸Herring, American Political Science Review, XXVI, No. 5, p. 867,

¹⁹"Action by Congress Since the Holiday Recess", Congressional Digest, XI, No. 2 (February, 1932), p. 53.

²⁰Myers and Newton, pp. 305-306.

leaders decided to defer action on a general revenue bill until the special first session of the 73rd Congress convened. This would permit them to have the most recent income tax returns as a basis for future action.²¹

Income Tax Refunds

Although general revenue measures were not the subject of any record votes, one taxation issue did generate controversy. The practice was for tax refunds in excess of \$75,000 to be authorized by Congress while the Bureau of Internal Revenue authorized lesser amounts. Senator Kenneth McKellar (D-Tenn.) proposed that the figure be reduced to \$5,000. His strategy was to attach this to an important deficiency appropriations bill to prevent a Hoover veto.²² It was first necessary to suspend the rules in order to attach new legislation to the appropriations bill. This required a two-thirds vote, which it barely received on January 12, 1933, by a vote of 52 (17 Republicans, 35 Democrats) to 26 (24 Republicans, 2 Democrats).²³ After the special rule passed, the rider was attached by a vote of 51 (15 Republicans, 36 Democrats) to 26 (25 Republicans, 1 Democrat).²⁴

²¹"Taxes", Congressional Digest, XII, No. 2 (February, 1933), p. 61.

²²New York Times, January 13, 1933, p. 2.

²³Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXVI, Part 2, p. 1644.

²⁴Ibid., p. 1645.

The House version of the deficiency bill did not include the tax refund amendment, which made a conference committee necessary. Conference committee members finally compromised the level of income tax refund that would require congressional approval at \$20,000 and above. The House vote to accept this compromise amendment in the conference report was regarded as a clear reflection of the House members' reaction to the issue.²⁵ The amendment as compromised was accepted on January 17, 1933, by a vote of 224 (28 Republicans, 196 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 143 (142 Republicans, 1 Democrat).²⁶ The House Republicans, despite considerable cohesion, could not keep the tax refund amendment out of the bill, and the conference report was accepted.

Hoover's repugnance of the amendment was made clear when he chose to veto the much needed deficiency appropriations bill rather than accept the income tax refund clause, which he regarded as unconstitutional.²⁷ An unsuccessful effort to override Hoover's veto in the House ended the matter. A roll-call vote on passage received 193 (14 Republicans, 178 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) votes to override and 158 (156 Republicans, 2 Democrats) votes to sustain

²⁵ New York Times, January 18, 1933, p. 5.

²⁶ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXVI, Part 2, p. 1964.

²⁷ New York Times, January 25, 1933, p. 1.

to veto.²⁸ With the defeat of this proposal, a substitute deficiency bill was then acted upon by Congress.

Most of Hoover's tax proposals came during the 72nd Congress when the House was controlled by the Democrats and the Senate was nearly equally divided between Republicans and Democrats. As a result, the President's tax programs did not receive as much support in Congress as many of his other proposals. When Hoover's tax proposals were enacted into law, it was primarily because of House Republican support at crucial times. This support was equally important in blocking action on tax proposals that the President opposed. The Senate Republicans continued to follow a more independent course.

²⁸ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXVI, Part 2, 2449.

VII

REDUCING EXPENDITURES

The other side of the coin in President Hoover's efforts to balance the budget involved the reduction of federal expenditures. Reductions in government spending was necessary, even with Hoover's proposed tax increases, to balance the budget because of the declining federal revenue caused by the depression. This was to be achieved by drastic economy in ordinary governmental spending. The cuts needed to be large enough to offset the increased relief cost if the result was to be a net reduction in the total budget. One means to achieve this economy in normal governmental activities was the reorganization and consolidation of executive agencies to eliminate needless spending. A major portion of government expenditures was for employee salaries; therefore, salary cuts could drastically reduce government expenditures. Another means to achieve significant savings was a simple across the board reduction in normal government spending without regard to where the cuts would be made.

Hoover had urged the Congress to be frugal in their appropriations in order to maintain a balanced budget. Executive pressure to reduce government expenses had been applied throughout the entire 71st Congress. Hoover consistently vetoed programs as unnecessary raids on the public treasury and also called

his executive assistants not to spend unnecessary funds that had already been appropriated.¹ The drive for greater government economy in the 71st Congress related primarily to special demands for relief and resulting counter pressure for reduced spending. These issues included measures already considered such as veterans' benefits, public works, and other programs.

Salary Cuts

The only effort toward generally reducing government costs in the 71st Congress was to cut the salaries of government employees. Accordingly, the House of Representatives passed the Interior Department appropriations bill with salary limitations as recommended by President Hoover. The original salary levels were then restored by the Senate in Committee of the Whole. When the bill returned to the House, it voted to reject this specific salary amendment.² The House vote was 171 (114 Republicans, 56 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 114 (71 Republicans, 43 Democrats) and Hoover's recommendation was upheld.³

When the Interior Department supply bill came from the conference committee, the salary measure was in the form approved by

¹Hyde and Wilbur, pp. 451-453.

²New York Times, December 13, 1930, p. 1.

³Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 3rd Sess., 1930, LXXIV, Part 1,

House. The Senate voted to reject the conference report by a vote of 24 (21 Republicans, 3 Democrats) to 43 (16 Republicans, 26 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).⁴ The issue was finally resolved in favor of the House without any further record votes. Hoover's recommendation had again become policy because of strong House Republican support.

Flat Budget Cuts

By 1931, the severity of the depression demanded even more drastic action and Hoover responded with a more comprehensive economy program. When the first session of the 72nd Congress convened, the President's annual message laid out an economy program that would decrease ordinary government expenses \$369,000,000 for the next fiscal year.⁵ The recommendations also made it clear that the Administration was opposed to an indiscriminate economy drive that cut an arbitrary percentage from departmental appropriations without consideration of specific needs.⁶

The Senate expressed itself on the subject on January 15, 1932, when it passed a rather vague resolution which called for the Appropriations Committee to make all cuts possible "without impairing the necessary power of the government to perform its

⁴Ibid., Part 2, p. 1249.

⁵Myers and Newton, p. 152.

⁶Ibid., pp. 190-197.

in meeting the present financial crisis."⁷ This resolution, mainly in general agreement with Hoover's sentiments, was passed (30 Republicans, 20 Democrats) to 9 (1 Republican, 8 Democrats).⁸

The first vote of consequence on an economy measure came in the Senate on March 17, 1932. It involved a supply bill to provide funds for the Interior Department which was in the Senate Appropriations Committee. A resolution was offered by Senator Kenneth McKellar (D-Tenn.) to instruct the committee to reduce the appropriation by a flat ten percent.⁹ The resolution passed 40 (20 Republicans, 24 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 25 (20 Republicans, 5 Democrats).¹⁰ The committee reduced the appropriation for the Interior Department in accordance with the resolution and then the full Senate approved the reduced appropriation without a roll-call vote.

The House had already passed the supply bill without the proposed reductions, but with Speaker Garner (D-Tex.) as one of the chief proponents of the ten percent reduction, the House voted to accept the Senate amendment by 268 (105 Republicans, 163 Democrats) to

⁷ New York Times, January 16, 1932, p. 2.

⁸ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 2, p. 2034.

⁹ New York Times, March 18, 1932, p. 1.

¹⁰ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 6, p. 6323.

(39 Republicans, 3 Democrats).¹¹ This was the only recorded
vote that indicated its willingness to make arbitrary, flat
cuts in appropriations bills.

Another effort to reduce government expenses in this manner
occurred in the Senate on the omnibus appropriations bill for the
Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and Labor. On March 22,
1932, the Senate considered another motion by Senator McKellar
to recommit this bill to the Appropriations Committee with
instructions to cut ten percent of the funds from the bill. The
opposition of the administration was reflected by Senator Arthur
Vandenberg (R-Mich.), who opposed the "haphazard" approach
of reducing expenditures.¹² The ten percent cut was passed 50
(36 Republicans, 33 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 29 (23 Republicans,
6 Democrats).¹³

The Senate took the same action when the Department of the
Treasury and the Post Office appropriations bill came to the floor.¹⁴
It was recommitted for a flat ten percent cut by a vote of 37 (11
Republicans, 25 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 31 (23 Republicans,

¹¹ Ibid., Part 8, p. 8433.

¹² New York Times, March 23, 1932, p. 1.

¹³ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 6,
p. 6648.

¹⁴ New York Times, April 19, 1932, p. 1.

Democrats).¹⁵ Although Hoover wanted normal governmental costs reduced, he regarded flat cuts from departmental budgets as impractical.

The Senate was quite frugal on the previous measures, but reversed itself when it came to appropriations for the Veterans' Bureau. The House had increased appropriations for the Bureau \$19,000,000 above the President's recommendations. When the conference committee retained this increase, the Senate voted to accept the conference report on June 7, 1932.¹⁶ The motion to accept the increase carried 63 (28 Republicans, 34 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 14 (11 Republicans, 3 Democrats).¹⁷ This was a major feature of the bill, but it does reflect to some extent the power of the veterans as a pressure group.

The last session of the 72nd Congress was inactive as it awaited the inauguration of President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt and his recommendations. This was demonstrated when Democratic Senator Joseph T. Robinson, Minority Leader from Arkansas, moved to defer action on the proposed \$19,000,000 appropriation to subsidize domestic air mail until the 73rd Congress, and the House approved. The New York Times reported this as a sign that all

¹⁵ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 8, p. 6648.

¹⁶ New York Times, June 8, 1932, p. 10.

¹⁷ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 11, p. 12173.

tion on appropriations measures involving policy would be postponed until Roosevelt took office.¹⁸ The motion, a test vote on a question of whether Congress would deal further with budgetary policy, was carried in a strongly partisan vote of 39 (8 Republicans, 30 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 35 (30 Republicans, 5 Democrats).¹⁹

Another late vote indicated that the Senate intended to defer any policy decisions on economizing to the 73rd Congress. This vote related to appropriations to subsidize ocean mail, a part of the Treasury and Post Office Departments supply bill. A motion was made to reduce by one-half as an economy measure the \$35,500,000 appropriation for the ocean mail contract subsidy.²⁰ The motion was defeated 32 (7 Republicans, 24 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 44 (29 Republicans, 7 Democrats).²¹

While it appeared that the Senate was going to defer further efforts at reducing government expenses to the 73rd Congress, it reversed itself on February 7, 1933, when it voted to minimize federal spending. Senator Sam G. Bratton (D-N. Mex.) offered an amendment to the Treasury Department and Post Office appropriations bill to require all Department heads to reduce

¹⁸ New York Times, February 2, 1933, p. 2.

¹⁹ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXVI, Part 3, p. 3076.

²⁰ New York Times, February 5, 1933, p. 5.

²¹ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXVI, Part 3, p. 3366.

spending a flat five percent from the appropriations made earlier in the fiscal year.²² The Senate passed the amendment 50 (24 Republicans, 32 Democrats) to 33 (24 Republicans, 8 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).²³ This was the kind of flat cut that Hoover might have thought impractical, but it did correspond to his objective of government economy. If Hoover's reaction was mixed, so was that of the Republican senators. Government economy was not a congressional achievement in the second session, but it is difficult to determine party position and responsibility with the limited number of contradictory roll-call votes.

There had been proposals to achieve government economy other than flat cuts in appropriations. Another economy measure introduced in the House of Representatives authorized the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to shift up to 15 percent of one agency's funds to another government unit. This flexibility to meet unforeseen government needs was approved by Hoover.²⁴ The provision was in the appropriations bill when it came to the House floor for final passage, but a motion to eliminate the flexible clause passed 183 (157 Republicans, 168 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 109 (40 Republicans, 168 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 183 (157

²²New York Times, February 8, 1933, p. 1.

²³Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXVI, Part 4, p. 3510.

²⁴New York Times, May 4, 1932, p. 14.

Republicans, 26 Democrats).²⁵ Although this was not a major issue, House members, especially the Democrats, refused to indulge the Administration.

Furlough Plan

Although most of the budget savings President Hoover recommended to Congress in the first session of the 72nd Congress were in his initial message, he found it necessary to return to the Congress with additional proposals. Besides the original \$396 million reduction on normal governmental expenditures, Hoover called for additional reductions on April 4, 1932. Rather than pursue the policy of indiscriminate, flat cuts in Department appropriations, the Democratic majority in the House and near majority in the Senate insisted that the President make specific recommendations where and how the funds could be reduced. After a series of meetings which included the President, his advisors and congressional leaders, Hoover made some specific proposals which were introduced as an omnibus economy bill with an additional reduction of \$250 million beyond the original \$396 million reduction Hoover recommended.²⁶

The chief idea of the omnibus economy bill was to reduce the federal payroll without creating additional unemployment and

²⁵ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 1, p. 9514.

²⁶ Myers and Newton, pp. 190-196.

ship. Hoover had devised a furlough plan, whereby nearly every diem government employee would no longer work on Saturday morning, which would mean these employees would have a twenty-six day furlough without pay. Government personnel employed on an annual basis would be required to take a furlough of one calendar month without pay. The plan also eliminated all paid holidays. The principal exceptions to this were those federal employees whose annual income was below \$1,200 and all enlisted military personnel.²⁷ The plan was expected to reduce the government payroll eight and one-third percent. This was the heart of the Hoover program and it was essentially the proposal that the special Economy Committee of the House presented to the House membership late in April, 1932.

Perhaps the most crucial vote on the economy program was for a special rule on the omnibus economy bill. The special Economy Committee had been created by the House as part of the effort to economize in government. This committee's bills received privileged status on the House calendar, and were therefore acted upon immediately. Furthermore, a rule had been adopted which limited floor amendments to a total of four on the omnibus bill. Democratic Representative Edward W. Pou (N.C.), Chairman of the House Rules Committee, joined with Republican House Leader Bertrand H. Snell (N.Y.) in supporting this rule as necessary if an economy

²⁷New York Times, April 10, 1932.

bill was to be enacted in the face of the many competing, special interests reflected by the House membership.²⁸ Despite their efforts, the special rules was voted down on April 27, 1932, by 219 (100 Republicans, 119 Democrats) to 164 (75 Republicans, 88 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).²⁹ As the bill progressed through the legislative process, it became evident that opening the bill to amendments from the floor did impair the effectiveness of the economy program. The fears of Representative Snell and Pou proved to be well founded, and this vote proved to be disastrous to Hoover's determination to reduce federal spending.

The House committee reported the bill in essentially the form proposed by Hoover, except that an 11 percent employee pay cut had been substituted for the furlough plan.³⁰ Hoover continued to express his preference for the furlough plan throughout the controversy.³¹

When the omnibus economy bill came to the House floor for action, a barrage of amendments awaited the proposal. The first vote was on an amendment to increase the maximum pay level exempted from the 11 percent pay reduction from \$1,200 to \$2,500. It passed

²⁸Ibid., April 28, 1932, p. 1.

²⁹Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 8, p. 9057.

³⁰Herring, American Political Science Review, XXVII, No. 5, p. 864.

³¹Myers and Newton, p. 194.

(135 Republicans, 103 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 154 (64 Republicans, 90 Democrats).³² Despite President Hoover's recommendation of a maximum level of only \$1,200, the House Republicans were primarily responsible for the increase in the income exemption level.

The next vote was to restore the half-day holiday on Saturday recommended by the President which the House committee had eliminated. A proposal to incorporate the holiday plan in the bill was rejected 267 (148 Republicans, 118 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 132 (52 Republicans, 80 Democrats).³³ The holiday feature was not included in the bill, again because the House Republicans failed to support the President's recommendation.

Perhaps the most important vote to determine the actual content and source of support for Hoover's proposal came on a motion to recommit the bill. Representative C. William Ramseyer (R-Iowa), offered the recommittal motion which also carried instructions to the committee to restore the furlough plan and all other features of the bill as proposed by Hoover.³⁴ The motion failed by a vote of 146 (129 Republicans, 17 Democrats) to 250 (68 Republicans, 181

³² Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 9, p. 9512.

³³ Ibid., p. 9513.

³⁴ New York Times, May 4, 1932, p. 14.

ocrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).³⁵ Hoover had considerably more Republican support on this vote than he had on the two previous amendments.

Hoover had originally proposed a \$250,000,000 reduction in government expenditures in his supplemental economy measure. The committee bill presented to the House would have reportedly saved only \$135,000,000. After the House amended the bill, only \$90,000,000 remained of the original \$250,000,000 proposed savings.³⁶ This obviously was not what Hoover had hoped for or expected. Despite the meager savings, the bill passed the House on May 3, 1932, by a comfortable margin. It was passed in a bipartisan vote of 316 (160 Republicans, 156 Democrats) to 67 (30 Republicans, 36 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).³⁷ It was then delivered to the Senate for action.

The Senate held several contradictory votes on different phases of the proposal to reduce employment costs. On June 4, 1932, the omnibus economy bill was the subject of several roll-call votes on minor technical matters. There were two votes of consequence as Senator George H. Moses (N.H.) led his fellow Republican loyalists

³⁵ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 9, p. 9519.

³⁶ Hyde and Wilbur, pp. 455-456.

³⁷ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 9, p. 9519.

an effort to preserve Hoover's original economy plan.³⁸ The first vote was on a motion to exempt from pay reductions only those employees below \$1,000 annual income. Hoover had proposed approximately the same level of maximum salary to be exempted from a pay cut, and the motion passed 35 (16 Republicans, 18 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 29 (15 Republicans, 14 Democrats) with bipartisan support.³⁹ The second Senate vote was on a motion to cut pay ten percent. Although this was contrary to Hoover's furlough plan, a majority of both parties approved the motion 38 (17 Republicans, 21 Democrats) to 27 (13 Republicans, 13 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).⁴⁰

The Senate held another direct vote on the furlough plan three days later. Senator Moses offered an amendment to substitute the furlough plan for the percentage pay cut.⁴¹ This part of Hoover's program was defeated 36 (25 Republicans, 10 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 41 (13 Republicans, 28 Democrats).⁴² The Administration lost on this vote, but it had greater Republican support than it had in the past.

³⁸ New York Times, June 5, 1932, p. 1.

³⁹ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 11, p. 11984.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 11985

⁴¹ New York Times, June 8, 1932, p. 10.

⁴² Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 11, p. 12145.

On the following day, the Senate had second thoughts on the matter. First, the Senate voted to reconsider the amendment to restore the furlough plan, and then it approved the House amendment as a substitute for the ten percent pay cut. When the furlough plan was approved, senator James P. Byrne (D-N.C.), author of the ten percent pay cut proposal, bitterly denounced Hoover for wrecking his bill.⁴³ The vote to reconsider was a key to sentiment for the furlough plan. When it passed 36 (25 Republicans, 10 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 33 (9 Republicans, 24 Democrats), it was apparent that the furlough plan would be restored.⁴⁴ Then Hoover's plan to reduce pay passed 38 (20 Republicans, 9 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 35 (9 Republicans, 26 Democrats).⁴⁵ Hoover's plan had finally been accepted, and it was due primarily to the increasing Republican support in the Senate. This was further demonstrated on a motion to recommit the bill in an effort to kill the furlough plan.⁴⁶ The motion failed by a vote of 23 (1 Republican, 22 Democrats) to 43 (33 Republicans, 9 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).⁴⁷

⁴³ New York Times, June 9, 1932, p. 1.

⁴⁴ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXIV, Part 11, p. 12331.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 12341.

⁴⁶ New York Times, June 9, 1932, p. 1.

⁴⁷ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXIV, Part 11, p. 12348.

The furlough plan was the chief issue throughout the deliberation of the omnibus economy bill.⁴⁸ Once that issue was resolved, it was unnecessary to have further roll-call votes, and the Senate passed the bill without further delay. The bill went to the Senate-Senate conference committee which preserved the essence of the Senate version, including the furlough plan which reduced total pay for most federal employees by eight and one-third percent.⁴⁹

On June 20, 1932, the House voted on the conference report. There was a final effort to reject Hoover's plan when a motion was made to substitute a flat ten percent cut for incomes up to \$12,000, with a graduated percentage for higher incomes, but it was to no avail as the House heeded the urging of Republican Floor Leader Bertrand H. Snell (N.Y.) and defeated the amendment.⁵⁰ The motion polled 127 (17 Republicans, 110 Democrats) to 243 (166 Republicans, 77 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).⁵¹ The House then accepted the Senate amendment and Hoover's furlough plan by a vote of 326 (175 Republicans, 151 Democrats) to 45 (5 Republicans, 39 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).⁵² The principal issue resolved, the bill passed the House

⁴⁸Herring, American Political Science Review, XXVI, No. 5, p. 864.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰New York Times, June 21, 1932, p. 1.

⁵¹Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 12, p. 13535.

⁵²Ibid., p. 13538.

Senate and President Hoover then signed it into law.

The President had received strong support from the Senate Republicans at critical points, and his program had been enacted as a result of their support. The House Republicans had been less cooperative, but a comfortable majority had supported the furlough program when it was clearly the issue being voted upon.

Hoover's drive to reduce government expenditures continued through the second session of the 72nd Congress, but it was much less effective because of his defeat in the 1932 election. Congressional opposition to Hoover's economy program was negligible. Again, the principal savings in the Administration program would have come from reduced pay for federal employees through the furlough arrangement. The elimination of Saturday morning work had reduced total pay for government workers approximately eight and one-third percent. Hoover now proposed to decrease their pay another one and two-thirds percent to bring the total pay reduction to 10 percent.⁵³ His proposal was voted on and defeated in both the House and the Senate.

The Senate refused to reduce pay to ten percent on February 22, 1933, when 39 (19 Republicans, 20 Democrats) Senators voted for the ten percent cut and 44 (23 Republicans, 20 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) voted to retain the eight and one-third percent pay

⁵³ New York Times, February 22, 1933, p. 2.

reduction.⁵⁴ The proposal lost in the House by an even wider margin on a teller vote, 204-11.⁵⁵

These were the only direct votes on Hoover's pay reductions during the second session. According to Hoover, the Democratic Party members in Congress refused to cooperate when President-elect Roosevelt issued instructions to wait until the 73rd Congress for further action.⁵⁶ Although Hoover's explanation for lack of inaction may be valid, it is also apparent from the votes taken that his own party members failed to fully support his program. If action had been taken in the second session on pay reductions, it is difficult to believe that it would have been in line with Hoover's proposals.

Executive Reorganization

Although federal payroll reduction was the principal Hoover proposal to cut government expenses, reorganization of the executive branch for greater efficiency, without a decrease in services, was another feature of the omnibus economy bill. Under the plan, various government bureaus and agencies which were duplicating each other's activities were to be consolidated and the President

⁵⁴Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXVI, Part 4, p. 3511.

⁵⁵Ibid., Part 5, p. 4610.

⁵⁶Hoover, p. 193.

to have authority to make further consolidations by executive order, subject to congressional review within sixty days.⁵⁷ Hoover also proposed a specific economy that could be realized immediately, the elimination of the Army, Navy, and Panama Canal Transportation services.

The Senate originated action on the proposal to bring about savings through reorganization of the executive departments. On March 10, 1932, an effort to amend the Interior Department supply bill to provide the President with broad authority to consolidate any of the independent agencies generated debate and a vote on whether the amendment was germane to the bill. The vote was interpreted to actually be a vote on the merger issue.⁵⁹ A 32 (25 Republicans, 7 Democrats) to 34 (8 Republicans, 25 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) defeat ended this attempt to provide Hoover with reorganization powers.⁶⁰

Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (R-Mich.) made an effort to amend the Interior Department appropriations bill to give the President power to consolidate agencies within the Department of Interior.⁶¹ In a direct vote on executive reorganization powers,

⁵⁷ Myers and Newton, pp. 175-176.

⁵⁸ New York Times, April 10, 1932, p. 22.

⁵⁹ Ibid., March 11, 1932, p. 1.

⁶⁰ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 5, p. 5754.

⁶¹ New York Times, March 18, 1932, p. 17.

Hoover forces lost 28 (19 Republicans, 8 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 35 (14 Republicans, 21 Democrats).⁶² Hoover did not have the necessary support from Republican Party members in the Senate to obtain the executive reorganization powers he sought.

The next votes on schemes to increase administrative efficiency were those on the omnibus economy bill. Hoover had specifically called for the elimination of the Army, Navy, and Panama Canal Transportation Services to curb expenditures. This proposal was included in the economy bill. On May 3, 1932, the House struck this provision from the bill 297 (150 Republicans, 146 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 98 (48 Republicans, 50 Democrats).⁶³ Although this was not a major issue, Hoover was severely rebuffed on the particular recommendation. It was equally rare for more Democrats than Republicans to vote for Hoover's proposal.

Another proposal to reduce administrative expenditures, which was not among Hoover's recommendations, was to consolidate the Army and Navy. This proposal was made by Representative Joseph W. Byrns (D-Tenn.) with the support of Speaker John N. Garner. Hoover was clearly opposed to the merger.⁶⁴ This

⁶²Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 6, p. 6324.

⁶³Ibid., Part 9, p. 9515.

⁶⁴New York Times, April 19, 1932, p. 1.

proposal had been included in the omnibus economy bill, but a motion to strike out the Army-Navy merger was passed 210 (150 Republicans, 60 Democrats) to 187 (49 Republicans, 137 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).⁶⁵ When the President had clearly expressed himself on this issue, the House Republicans strongly supported him.

The House did not record a vote on the general question of executive reorganization. It was included in the omnibus economy bill which the House passed 316-67 in a vote previously analyzed. Neither did the Senate record any votes directly on executive reorganization but passed it as part of the omnibus economy bill.

The most important vote to curtail expenditures through executive reorganization was in the second session of the 72nd Congress. After President Hoover had the power to consolidate government bureaus, he pursued the cause with zeal. In one executive order he consolidated 58 different government bureaus into a few divisions.⁶⁶ The executive order was submitted to Congress for review as required by law. A decision to reject the order was made in the Democratic caucus. When the issue came to the floor, the heated debate was led by the respective party leaders, Democratic Representative Henry T. Rainey (D-Ill.)

⁶⁵ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 9, p. 9515.

⁶⁶ Hyde and Wilbur, pp. 572-574.

Representative Bertrand H. Snell (R-N.Y.)⁶⁷ The House then proceeded to reject the mergers Hoover had ordered by 176 (176 Republicans) to 202 (3 Republicans, 198 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).⁶⁸

President's effort to consolidate executive agencies was unsuccessful due to the solid opposition of the Democrat Party, not Republican defections.

Hoover was further rebuffed when the House chose to increase President's powers to reorganize the executive branch for the benefit of President-elect Roosevelt near the end of the second session. On February 21, 1933, the House "approved a grant of broad and sweeping powers" to the Chief Executive to consolidate and reorganize executive agencies with a two-thirds vote in Congress required to block the Presidential reorganization.⁶⁹ The vote came on a motion to delete the grant of power section from a proposed law, and it failed to pass by a vote of 145 (136 Republicans, 8 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 227 (42 Republicans, 185 Democrats) and the reorganization powers remained to be used by Roosevelt when he assumed the office of President.⁷⁰ There

⁶⁷ New York Times, January 20, 1933, p. 1.

⁶⁸ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXVI, Part 2, p. 2125.

⁶⁹ New York Times, February 22, 1933, p. 2.

⁷⁰ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXVI, Part 3, p. 4613.

no roll-call vote in the Senate.

Hoover's experience with administrative reorganization had been most unfortunate, especially in view of the work that the Hoover Commission did for later administrations. He had received only limited backing from Republican senators, and the solid support of the House Republicans had been to no avail.

BANKING AND FINANCE

Hoover's efforts to quell the economic effects of the depression through reduced expenditures in the 72nd Congress were viewed as a temporary expedient by the Administration. When recovery occurred, taxation and the federal budget would be viewed in a different light. Hoover made more basic proposals to bring about lasting reforms in the United States banking and financial structure, as well as relief from the immediate effects of the economic collapse.

Federal Land Bank

One of his initial proposals to the 72nd Congress involved revision of the Federal Land Bank system, which was established to provide direct credit for farmers with their agricultural properties to serve as collateral. Hoover proposed that the capital fund of the Land Banks to be expanded by \$125,000,000 to halt foreclosures on the nation's farms. The federal government would provide the additional funds until the Land Banks could sell bonds to finance the credit expansion. Furthermore, the banks would extend credit to "worthy borrowers" who were victims of the distressed economic situation.¹

There was a limited number of roll-call votes on the proposal. The first vote in the House of Representatives was on a

¹Myers and Newton, pp. 129-130.

to recommit the bill with instructions to amend the bill so that by bank directors would "for the period of one year . . . suspend in whole or in part any installment or installments upon any mortgage that may be unpaid."² The original bill called for such suspensions deemed reasonable by the Land Bank's Board of Directors, which was in line with Hoover's request that credit be extended to "worthy borrowers." The move to liberalize the loan requirements failed when the motion to recommit was defeated 165 (16 Republicans, 148 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 192 (146 Republicans, 46 Democrats).³ The President's proposal had strong Republican support.

The same proposal came up in the Senate during consideration of the World War I Debts Moratorium and was soundly defeated. An amendment was offered to the moratorium resolution which would suspend all Land Bank collections for one year if the borrower requested. The vote on the proposed moratorium on Land Bank collections was somewhat inconclusive because there was question as to the relevance of a Land Bank moratorium to the World War I Debts Moratorium.⁴ However, the motion lost 15 (8 Republicans, 7 Democrats)

²Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1931, LXXV, Part 1, p. 966.

³Ibid.

⁴New York Times, December 23, 1931, p. 1.

0 (30 Republicans, 30 Democrats) in a bipartisan vote.⁵ Both House and the Senate had deferred to Hoover.

The only other roll-call vote on the Land Bank measure in the Senate. Hoover's original recommendation called for \$25,000,000 appropriation. The Senate committee reported a bill which appropriated only \$100,000,000. An amendment from the floor to restore the appropriation to the original request passed 49 (14 Republicans, 35 Democrats) to 28 (26 Republicans, 2 Democrats) despite Republican opposition to the President.⁶ The bill passed both Houses without a roll-call vote, and was signed into law by President Hoover on February 26, 1932, in essentially the form he had requested.⁷

Home Loan Banks

The second principal Hoover reform proposal was to establish a system of Home Loan Discount Banks. Originally Hoover envisioned an extensive mortgage discount system, but preliminary opposition led him to make a more modest proposal.⁸ The President's message to Congress called for the establishment of eight to twelve

⁵ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 1, p. 1125.

⁶ Ibid., Part 2, pp. 1867-1879.

⁷ Myers and Newton, p. 179.

⁸ Hoover, p. 111.

ional banks to rediscount mortgages for real estate lenders in the same fashion as the Federal Reserve System served commercial banks. The banks would be funded by the federal treasury until they could issue bonds to the public; also member institutions would be required to purchase the original government stocks, thus eventually eliminating direct government participation in the Home Loan Banks.⁹ The purpose was to stimulate construction activity to relieve unemployment, and stop foreclosures on America's distressed homeowners. The banks were intended to become a permanent feature of the real estate mortgage market.¹⁰

The bill passed the House easily by voice vote, but encountered formidable opposition in the Senate. On July 6, 1932, two amendments were offered to the bill. The first was by Senator James H. Doolittle who "violently opposed" the bill. The Michigan Republican wanted to make the mortgage discount banks a part of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation rather than an independent system. Hoover adamantly opposed this, and wanted the banks to retain their independent status.¹¹ The Senate passed the amendment 34 (8 Republicans, 26 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 32 (24 Republicans, 8 Democrats).¹²

⁹Myers and Newton, p. 143.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 161.

¹¹New York Times, July 17, 1932, p. 12.

¹²Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 13, p. 14677.

On the same day, another amendment was presented by Republican Senator Frederic C. Walcott (Conn.) to limit the loans of the mortgage discount banks to five years, and require the banks to liquidate their operations in an additional ten years. This was in direct opposition to Hoover's intentions to make the Home Loan Banks a permanent institution rather than part of a temporary relief program.¹³ His proposal also passed the Senate 36 (16 Republicans, 19 Democrats, Farmer-Labor) to 33 (18 Republicans, 15 Democrats) despite Hoover's opposition.¹⁴ Senate Republican Leader James E. Watson (Ind.) who was the sponsor of the bill, promised the Senate that both issues would be revived in an attempt to restore Hoover's proposals.¹⁵

Senator Watson resumed the struggle on July 12, 1932, and the real test came when the Senate, 47-23, agreed to reconsider a vote whereby it recently adopted an amendment . . . that completely altered the basic features of the bill" by making the mortgage discount system a division of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.¹⁶ The vote to reconsider passed the Senate 47 (30 Republicans, 17 Democrats) to 23 (10 Republicans, 13 Democrats).¹⁷

¹³ New York Times, July 7, 1932, p. 12.

¹⁴ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 13, p. 14658.

¹⁵ New York Times, July 7, 1932, p. 12.

¹⁶ Ibid., July 13, 1932, p. 2.

¹⁷ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 14, p. 15091.

For the successful test vote the Senate proceeded to restore the original features of the bill. In a voice vote the Senate again made it an independent system, removed the liquidation amendment, and passed the bill without a roll-call vote.¹⁸ Support in the Senate for Hoover's mortgage discount bank system had been mixed, but he had enjoyed majority Republican support in every instance.

The House of Representatives had no roll-call votes directly related to the Home Loan Bank proposal. The House voted on the conference report on the bill and rejected it, but this was due to a currency expansion rider that had been added to the bill in the Senate. Hoover had only praise for the mortgage discount features of the Home Loan Bank bill when he signed it into law.¹⁹

Currency Expansion

The currency expansion rider which eventually complicated the passage of the Home Loan Bank bill was not an Administration proposal. The first effort to expand the currency in circulation occurred in the House. On May 2, 1932, the House passed a resolution sponsored by Representative T. Alan Goldsborough (D-Md.) to have the Federal Reserve Board use its control over credit to create sufficient inflation to restore 1920 commodity price levels. Representative Louis T. McFadden directed the fire of the opposition

¹⁸ New York Times, July 13, 1932, p. 2.

¹⁹ Ibid., July 23, 1932, p. 1.

against this inflationary resolution. The Pennsylvania Republican called it an attempt to raise prices through "financial juggling."²⁰ It was necessary to suspend the House rules before a vote could be taken on the bill. Rules suspension required a two-thirds vote, and therefore provided a clear indication of sentiment on the Goldsborough bill. There was strong bipartisan support to suspend the rules, 289 (123 Republicans, 165 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 100 (57 Republicans, 3 Democrats); after which the bill passed by a voice vote.²¹

The Senate disregarded the Goldsborough proposal and attached a currency expansion rider introduced by Senator Carter Glass (D-Va.) to the Home Loan Bank bill. The proposal authorized the issuance of \$1 billion in national bank notes, but with many conditions and restrictions which limited the inflationary effect. It was an obvious attempt to head off any fiat bills such as the Goldsborough bill.²² The amendment passed 53 (23 Republicans, 29 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 18 (14 Republicans, 4 Democrats).²³ In spite of the restrictive clauses, Senator David Reed (R-Pa.) and other Administration stalwarts considered the Glass amendment

²⁰ Ibid., May 3, 1932, p. 1.

²¹ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 9, p. 9432.

²² Myers and Newton, p. 217.

²³ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 14, p. 15009.

and opposed it in the name of the Administration.²⁴

When the Home Loan Bank bill was sent to the House, it was rejected because it included the Glass currency expansion clause.²⁵

When the House voted to recede and concur in the Senate amendment, it lost 126 (33 Republicans, 92 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 217 (151 Republicans, 66 Democrats).²⁶ Hoover's opposition was sustained by a strong

majority of the House Republicans.

The resulting conference committee's retention of the currency expansion amendment produced an unusual contest of will between the Senate and House during the final hours of the first session of the 72nd Congress. Three roll-call votes were necessary in both the Senate and House on the currency expansion amendment before the issue was finally resolved.²⁷

The first vote was taken in the Senate. By a vote of 44 (35 Republicans, 28 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 20 (19 Republicans, 1 Democrat), the Senate insisted that the Glass amendment be retained in the bill.²⁸ When presented to the House, an overwhelming

²⁴New York Times, July 12, 1932, p. 1.

²⁵Ibid., July 16, 1932, p. 1.

²⁶Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 14, p. 15480.

²⁷New York Times, July 17, 1932, p. 1.

²⁸Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 14, p. 15604.

Majority defeated a motion to accept the conference report with the currency expansion clause; the vote was 89 (44 Republicans, 45 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 222 (125 Republicans, 97 Democrats).²⁹ When it was returned to the Senate, a motion to accept the House version of the bill without the Glass amendment was defeated 29 (24 Republicans, 5 Democrats) to 35 (11 Republicans, 23 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).³⁰ The margin also narrowed in the House of Representatives as the conference report was returned for the second round in the test of will. However, the conference report was again rejected 102 (43 Republicans, 58 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 152 (91 Republicans, 61 Democrats).³¹ The conference report was returned to the Senate a third time where it was again adopted with the Glass amendment by 37 (13 Republicans, 24 Democrats) to 26 (23 Republicans, 3 Democrats).³² On the third vote the margin for the amendment increased over the second vote, despite a strong nucleus of Republican senators who stood with President Hoover to delete the currency expansion rider.

Faced with the adamant Senate stand, the House of Representatives relented on their third vote, and accepted the conference

²⁹ Ibid., p. 15734.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 15641.

³¹ Ibid., p. 15746.

³² Ibid., p. 15664.

...t with the offending amendment by the narrow margin of 120
Republicans, 60 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 114 (72 Republicans,
Democrats).³³ The Republican House leaders chose to give in
...r than see the very important Home Loan Bank bill die on the
...d day of the session.³⁴ This encouraged enough Republicans
...support the conference report to permit its passage. In spite
...the urgency, however, a majority of the House Republicans con-
...ed to support President Hoover's stand on the currency expan-
...n question.

Hoover signed the Home Loan Bank bill into law although it
...cluded the objectional Glass amendment. Upon signing it, he
...ued a statement that the Home Loan Bank features were too badly
...ded to veto the bill, and that Treasury officials had informed
... that in "practical working" the currency expansion clause would
... be inflationary.³⁵

Credit Expansion

Although Hoover did not favor the drastic currency expan-
...ion proposals offered by Democratic members of Congress, he did
...commend changes in the Federal Reserve System in order to expand

³³ Ibid., p. 15752.

³⁴ New York Times, July 17, 1932, p. 1.

³⁵ Myers and Newton, p. 234.

It. He proposed that Congress pass legislation to "temporarily
 enlarge the eligibility of securities for loans" from Federal
 Reserve Banks to their member banks and also to make government
 bonds eligible as backing for Federal Reserve notes. The second
 part of the proposal would free gold tied up as backing for the
 Federal Reserve notes. The government bonds would fill the void
 caused by the absence of sufficient commercial paper which had
 formerly backed up sixty percent of the value of the notes in
 circulation.³⁶

The credit expansion proposal was incorporated into a bank-
 ing reform bill generally referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act of
 1932. Senator Glass was regarded as the banking expert of the
 Senate. Democratic Representative Henry B. Steagall (Ala.) served
 as Chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee of the House
 during the 72nd Congress.³⁷ The measure passed the House with only
 minimal opposition on February 15, 1932, by a vote of 350 (167
 Republicans, 182 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 15 (8 Republicans,
 7 Democrats).³⁸ Republicans and Democrats alike supported this
 emergency measure to protect the gold standard and to expand

³⁶ Hoover, p. 115.

³⁷ Herring, American Political Science Review, XXVI, No. 5,
 p. 860.

³⁸ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 4,
 p. 4003.

ral Reserve credit.

There was only one roll-call vote of consequence in the vote on the measure. The emergency proposal relaxed Federal Reserve rediscount eligibility standards and the backing of the Federal Reserve notes with government bonds for a period of one year. An amendment was offered to extend the time to two years.

Although Hoover's attitude was not apparent, presumably he endorsed the idea because the Republican sponsors of the emergency legislation supported the amendment.³⁹ The amendment passed easily (46 Republicans, 19 Democrats) to 18 (6 Republicans, 12 Democrats).⁴⁰

Bank Reform

President Hoover made other more fundamental proposals for bank reform that were intended to become permanent features of the financial structure. He proposed, during the first session of the 72nd Congress, that all banks be compelled to join the Federal Reserve System and be inspected by federal officials, that savings banks and commercial banks be separated, and that state-wide branch banking by national banks be permitted when inadequate banking facilities existed in local areas.⁴¹ Action on these proposals was deferred to the second session of the 72nd Congress.

³⁹New York Times, February 20, 1932, p. 1.

⁴⁰Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 4, p. 4333.

⁴¹Myers and Newton, p. 166.

During the second session, the banking reform proposals were brought to the floor of the Senate for consideration. The bill reported by the committee did not include provisions to permit branch banking which Hoover had requested, but on January 21, 1933, an amendment was presented by Senator Sam G. Bratton (D-N.Mex.) to permit national banks to engage in branch banking.⁴² The amendment passed comfortably, 52 (18 Republicans, 33 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 17 (15 Republicans, 2 Democrats) with limited Republican support.⁴³ Four days later a motion by Democratic Senator Hugo L. Black of Alabama to strike out the branch banking amendment was defeated 17 (9 Republicans, 8 Democrats) to 33 (21 Republicans, 24 Democrats).⁴⁴ Republican support for Hoover's proposal increased on the second vote.

Another amendment to the banking reform bill, which was not part of the Hoover recommendations, provided for the remonetization of silver. This was the type of currency inflation measure that Hoover had opposed as irresponsible and unsound. Democratic Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana offered the amendment as a

⁴² New York Times, January 22, 1933, p. 1.

⁴³ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXVI, Part 2, p. 2208.

⁴⁴ Ibid., Part 3, p. 2512.

ns of restoring purchasing power.⁴⁵ Only 18 (6 Republicans, 12 Democrats) senators voted for remonitization with 56 (32 Republicans, Democrats) opposed.⁴⁶

The banking reform bill was finally passed by the Senate January 25, 1933, after it had been held up for eight days by Democratic senators. Elmer Thomas of Oklahoma and Huey Long of Louisiana resorted to a filibuster to hold up action on the bill.⁴⁷ When the bill came to a vote, it passed by a wide margin (28 Republicans, 26 Democrats) to 9 (4 Republicans, 4 Democrats, Farmer-Labor).⁴⁸ This bill contained the essential features that Hoover had proposed. According to Hoover, the House refused to act on the measure because President-elect Roosevelt failed to endorse the proposal.⁴⁹ President Hoover failed to achieve the permanent bank reforms he had sought. Analysis of a limited number of roll-call votes suggest that his failure was not due to Democratic opposition in Congress, but lack of Republican support.

⁴⁵New York Times, January 25, 1933, p. 1.

⁴⁶Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXVI, Part 3, p. 2393.

⁴⁷New York Times, January 26, 1933, p. 1.

⁴⁸Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXVI, Part 3, p. 2517.

⁴⁹Hoover, p. 125.

Bankruptcy

The last series of proposals that Hoover made concerning finances and credit reform were related to bankruptcy practices. On February 29, 1932, Hoover proposed that the bankruptcy laws be amended to permit voluntary readjustments of debts with supervision of the federal courts. This avoided a legal declaration of bankruptcy which carried a certain stigma as well as being too complex in view of the pressing needs.⁵⁰ For the debtor who could not meet his obligations in the economic crisis, the readjustment of his debts under proper court supervision would correspond to the realities of the situation. Hoover felt that this readjustment of debts was necessary before recovery from the depression could occur.⁵¹

Action on the bankruptcy bill was deferred until the second session of the 72nd Congress. It passed the House without a roll-call vote. The only significant issue in the Senate was whether a clause should be included to permit the reorganization or consolidation of railroad companies that were faced with bankruptcy.⁵² Hoover wanted this clause included to permit reorganization of the railroads after review by the Interstate Commerce Commission.⁵³

⁵⁰Myers and Newton, pp. 180-181.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 321.

⁵²New York Times, February 28, 1933, p. 9.

⁵³Myers and Newton, p. 323.

The Senate had mixed feelings on the subject. It had taken from the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to approve road mergers during the 71st congress by a vote of 46 (23 Republicans, 22 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 27 (20 Republicans, 6 Democrats).⁵⁴ The Senate then reversed its action during the 72nd congress and included the clause permitting reorganization of railroad companies in the bankruptcy bill if, as Hoover had requested, reorganization was approved by the courts and the Interstate Commerce Commission.⁵⁵ The vote was 42 (21 Republicans, 21 Democrats) to 15 (5 Republicans, 10 Democrats).⁵⁶

After this issue was resolved, the bankruptcy bill was quickly passed by 44 (22 Republicans, 22 Democrats) to 8 (1 Republican, 7 Democrats).⁵⁷ As in the bank reform, the bankruptcy measures were long delayed in passage, but responsibility is not evident from a study of the few roll-call votes. Both parties had strongly supported the proposals.

Hoover had realized practically all he had set out to achieve in the area of banking and financial reform during the 72nd

⁵⁴ Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1930, LXXIII, Part 9, p. 9293.

⁵⁵ New York Times, February 28, 1933, p. 9.

⁵⁶ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXVI, Part 5, p. 5134.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 5136.

gress. The Federal Land Bank and Federal Home Loan Bank bills
passed just as he had requested. He regarded the currency
expansion measure which was passed as acceptable. The Federal
Reserve System was liberalized at his request. Bank reform was
the only legislative recommendation that failed to pass both
houses of Congress. Generally, the President had experienced
solid Republican support, and in many cases strong bipartisan
support for his proposals.

IX

DEBT MORATORIUM

The final depression issue of import that Hoover proposed during about recovery was related to the problem of intergovernmental debts. Germany had reached the brink of financial collapse in mid-1931 as a result of the general depression and the additional burden of reparations payments. A collapse of the German financial system would send shock waves through the entire North Atlantic economic community with disastrous consequences. Furthermore, if Germany was forced to default on reparations payments, it appeared likely that America's World War I allies would refuse to pay their war debts to the United States.

This was the situation that confronted President Hoover in June, 1931. German President von Hindenberg directed a plea to Hoover to use his influence to intervene and prevent the collapse of the German political-economic structure.¹ Immediate action was imperative to avoid disaster, but Hoover could not act independently of Congress. The United States Congress was not in session at the time, and would not reconvene until December, six months later.

Faced with an emergency, Hoover consulted congressional leaders of both parties to secure their approval for his con-

¹Myers and Newton, pp. 90-91.

ulated course of action, and when he was certain he had enough
as, he issued a statement on the debt moratorium. Hoover urged
all the creditor nations suspend all intergovernmental debts,
contributions, and relief payments for one year. This did not in-
clude obligations of governments held by private parties. Under
circumstances did Hoover propose cancellation of the debts. His
objective was to let the debtor nations recover national prosperity
this was the only way it would be possible for them to repay
their debts.² This proposal was then accepted by all the nations
involved and implemented, pending congressional approval of the
United States participation.

When Congress convened in December, 1931, President Hoover
presented the moratorium agreement with a recommendation that the
World War Foreign Debts Commission be recreated to make temporary
adjustments in intergovernmental debts "pending recovery of their
economic life."³ Hoover continued to assert that it was not his
intention to cancel the debt.

Congress acted quickly on the moratorium. The House was
the first to take action on the bill. The House Ways and Means
Committee amended the moratorium resolution, and added a clause
declaring it was the policy of Congress to oppose the cancellation

²Hoover, p. 69.

³Myers and Newton, pp. 152-153.

reduction of foreign debts in any manner. This measure did not affect the moratorium itself in any way, but it was opposed to Hoover's recommendation on the readjustment of debts through an international commission.

The readjustment clause was never directly voted on, but was included in the moratorium resolution that passed the House on December 18, 1931. Approval of the moratorium was virtually obligatory as President Hoover had already committed the United States to that course of action six months earlier. While the outcome of the vote was not subject to much question, debate was heated. Representative Louis T. McFadden (R-Pa.) charged that Hoover had sold out the United States when he agreed to the moratorium. Hoover's principal defender was a family friend and former Stanford classmate, Arthur M. Free (R-Cal.).⁴ The resolution had a massive margin with 317 (196 Republicans, 120 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) affirmative votes and only 100 (5 Republicans, 95 Democrats) negative votes.⁵

The moratorium was approved by the Senate four days later. The only amendments offered in the Senate related to modifications of the Versailles Treaty, upon which the President had no

⁴New York Times, December 19, 1931, p. 1.

⁵Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1931, LXXV, Part 1, p. 867.

tion. There was no record vote on the debt readjustment clause which Hoover opposed. Senator Hiram Johnson led a small band of presidents who delayed action on the bill in spite of the fact that they knew they would be overwhelmed in the end. The California Republican denounced the moratorium as an effort of the international bankers to save themselves.⁶ The moratorium passed despite these charges 69 (36 Republicans, 33 Democrats) to 12 (6 Republicans, 6 Democrats) in the same form that it had passed the House.⁷

Hoover's proposal for a moratorium on intergovernmental debts had been accepted by Congress in bipartisan fashion in both the House and the Senate. Unfortunately, a year's grace period was insufficient to prevent the collapse of the German economy.

The essence of President Hoover's program was approved by Congress just as most of his other proposals to combat the depression had been supported in Congress. In those instances when the President's views had been overruled by the House it was generally a result of solid Democratic opposition combined with sufficient Republican defections to reverse the President's policies. The President's record with Senate Republicans had been much less successful. His overall success with Congress had often been

⁶ New York Times, December 23, 1932, p. 1.

⁷ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1931, LXXV, Part 1, p. 1126.

pendent upon the adamant support President Hoover received from
House Republicans.

X

NON-DEPRESSION POLICIES

In view of the seriousness of the situation, most of the Administration's attention was directed toward ending the immediate hardships caused by the depression as well as stimulating the ultimate recovery of America's economic health. At the same time, there were other issues that required the attention of the President and Congress. While these issues were important on their own merits, they were generally overshadowed by the need to cope with the more pressing problems caused by the depression.

Reapportionment

The first major non-depression issue in Hoover's Presidency came before the stock market crash in the special first session of the 71st Congress. The session was called primarily to consider farm relief and tariff revision. The President, however, considered reapportionment of the membership of the House of Representatives among the several states to accommodate the changes in population to be of sufficient importance to ask for congressional action during the special session.¹

Reapportionment was the principal feature of a general bill which provided for a decennial census. Reapportionment had been neglected since 1911, and this bill provided for an automatic

¹Myers and Newton, p. 380.

apportionment each ten years based on the most recent decennial census. There was considerable opposition to reapportionment and had been deadlocked in the Congress for several years.²

The crucial Senate vote on the bill came May 24, 1929, on a motion by Hugo L. Black (D-Ala.) to strike out the reapportionment provision.³ The motion lost 38 (9 Republicans, 29 Democrats) to 45 (40 Republicans, 5 Democrats).⁴ The bill passed the Senate five days later 57 (41 Republicans, 16 Democrats) to 26 (8 Republicans, 18 Democrats).⁵

Rural opposition in the House was formidable, but the skillful leadership of Majority Leader John Q. Tilson (R-Conn.) moved the bill through the House successfully.⁶ The bill providing for the decennial census and the reapportionment of the House of Representatives passed on June 6, 1929, by 271 (193 Republicans, 79 Democrats) to 104 (43 Republicans, 61 Democrats).⁷ After other features of the bill had been compromised by the conference committee, its report was accepted by the Senate 48 (40 Republicans, 8 Democrats) to 37 (9 Republicans, 28 Democrats).⁸

² New York Times, June 7, 1929, p. 1.

³ Macmahon, American Political Science Review, XXIV, No. 1, p. 56.

⁴ Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 1929, LXVI, Part 2, p. 1861.

⁵ Ibid., p. 2159.

⁶ Macmahon, American Political Science Review, XXIV, No. 1, p. 56.

⁷ Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 1929, LXVI, Part 3, p. 2458.

⁸ Ibid., p. 2773.

House then accepted the conference report without a roll-call and Hoover signed the bill into law. His request for legislation for reapportionment of the House had been fulfilled with solid Republican support in both the Senate and the House of Representatives.

London Naval Treaty

A second measure advanced by President Hoover during the 71st Congress unrelated to the depression was the 1930 London Naval Limitations Treaty. The agreement was submitted to the United States Senate for ratification on May 1, 1930. It failed to act on the treaty before adjourning the second session of the 71st Congress. Hoover, therefore, called the Senate into special session on July 7, 1930, and strongly urged passage of the treaty. The President concluded that United States military policy should be determined solely by the concern for national security with no consideration of aggressive expansion. He believed the treaty provided this security, and that the only other alternative was competitive building of the world's navies with no increase in the national security of any nation. He concluded that if the treaty was not ratified "now the world will be again plunged backward from its progress toward peace."⁹

Of the seventy senators present to consider the treaty, 12 were opposed to ratification, and 58 favored the treaty. The treaty was easily approved by a vote of 58 (40 Republicans, 18

⁹Hyde and Wilbur, pp. 593-597.

ocrats) to 9 (7 Republicans, 2 Democrats) with the three opposi-
sion senators paired against the bill.¹⁰

By voice vote, the Senate adopted a qualifying amendment to
validate any "secret understandings" that the Administration might
have arrived at and not included in the information presented to
the Senate. Otherwise, not one word of the treaty was altered.¹¹
Hoover's efforts toward world peace through the limitation of naval
armaments received bipartisan support far beyond the two-thirds
majority necessary for approval.

Philippines

Another foreign policy issue that arose early in the Hoover
Administration concerned Philippine independence. American
acquisition of the Islands after the Spanish-American War had been
an extremely controversial issue, and agitation for their inde-
pendence had continued through the years.

Philippine independence came up in the first session of
the 71st Congress during consideration of the tariff bill. An
amendment was offered by Democratic Senator William H. King of Utah
to grant independence to the Philippines. Many senators voting
against the amendment reported "that [the] vote should not be
interpreted as affecting in any way the issue of Philippine

¹⁰ Cong. Record, Special Senate Session, 1930, LXXIII,
Part 1, p. 378.

¹¹ New York Times, July 22, 1930, p. 1.

pendence," but was defeated to avoid delay in enactment of a tariff law.¹² Regardless of the cause, the amendment was defeated (7 Republicans, 29 Democrats) to 45 (40 Republicans, 5 Democrats).¹³

President Hoover did not express himself on the issue until received more serious consideration later in the 72nd Congress. His opinion was that the Philippines were unprepared for independence and indicated that he opposed the earlier amendment voted on in the Senate.¹⁴

The movement for Philippine independence was resumed in the House of Representatives during the first session of the 72nd Congress. On April 4, 1932, the House passed a bill sponsored by Representative Butler B. Hare (D-S.C.) to grant independence to the Islands eight years after the final passage of the bill. A "dramatic appeal to defeat the bill" by Charles Underhill (R-Mass.) was to no avail.¹⁵ The bill passed the House easily by a vote of 306 (119 Republicans, 186 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 47 (47 Republicans).¹⁶ Soon after the bill was passed, Hoover indicated

¹² Ibid., October 10, 1929, p. 1.

¹³ Cong. Record, 71st Cong. 1st Sess., 1929, LXXI, Part 4, p. 4399.

¹⁴ Hyde and Wilbur, p. 610.

¹⁵ New York Times, April 5, 1932, p. 1.

¹⁶ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 7, p. 7411.

that he favored independence for the Philippines only when the Islands had the economic stability needed for political independence. He did not "believe that economic stability had yet been assured."¹⁷

Hoover's opinion had not changed when the Senate again took up the question of Philippine independence. The date for Philippine separation from the United States was the issue under consideration, with Senator King (D-Utah) among those pressing for early independence. The Senate had originally favored a twelve year preparation period before independence was granted, but it also considered the House amendment proposing an eight year preparatory period and another amendment to reduce the period of five years.¹⁸ The latter amendment lost narrowly by 37 (20 Republicans, 16 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 38 (17 Republicans, 21 Democrats).¹⁹ The Senate then accepted the eight year preparatory period 40 (25 Republicans, 19 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 38 (13 Republicans, 20 Democrats).²⁰

The interim period necessary to prepare the Philippines for independence was again the subject of Senate debate the following day. The Senate first voted to reconsider their action of the previous day, then rejected that action and restored the twelve year time period.²¹ The vote to reconsider the action of the previous

¹⁷ Hyde and Wilbur, pp. 610-611.

¹⁸ New York Times, December 15, 1932, p. 1.

¹⁹ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1932, LXXVI, Part 1, p. 437.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ New York Times, December 17, 1932, p. 10.

passed 42 (21 Republicans, 21 Democrats) to 34 (18 Republicans, Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).²² Then the amendment to grant the Philippine independence in eight years was defeated 31 (16 Republicans Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 45 (24 Republicans, 21 Democrats).²³ The Senate had restored the twelve years period, but Hoover still considered 15 to 20 years as the minimum time necessary to adequately prepare the Islands for independence.²⁴

Another controversy about Philippine independence centered on a proposed plebiscite of the Philippine people on the question of independence. Hoover strongly advocated such a plebiscite, which was included in the bill before the Senate.²⁵ An amendment to eliminate the plebiscite was defeated 33 (13 Republicans, 19 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 35 (22 Republicans, 13 Democrats).²⁶

The opponents of the plebiscite were, however, strong enough to force a compromise the following day. Senator James F. Byrnes (D-S.C.) offered an amendment to require a constitutional convention with the resulting constitution submitted to a popular vote. The vote would be the evidence of the popular will on the

²² Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1932, LXXVI, Part 1, p. 538.

²³ Ibid., p. 540.

²⁴ Hyde and Wilbur, p. 612.

²⁵ New York Times, December 17, 1932, p. 10.

²⁶ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1932, LXXVI, Part 1, p.555.

tion of independence.²⁷ The compromise still failed to provide a clear cut vote by the Philippine people on the question of independence after a trial period as insisted upon by Hoover. In spite of this, the compromise amendment on a plebiscite passed 44 (16 Republicans, 27 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 29 (21 Republicans, 8 Democrats).²⁸

The final Senate vote was on a motion to recommit the bill, which "would be tantamount to killing it for the session."²⁹ The motion lost decisively, 19 (19 Republicans) to 54 (17 Republicans, 37 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).³⁰

The conference report, which allowed independence in ten years and only required ratification of the Constitution by the Philippine legislature, was accepted by both Houses without a roll-call.³¹ Hoover vetoed the bill, asserting the Philippines was not ready for independence under those terms. He contended that the bill would hazard the liberty and freedom of the Philippine people.³²

²⁷New York Times, December 18, 1932, p. 1.

²⁸Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1932, LXXVI, Part 1, p. 616.

²⁹New York Times, December 18, 1932, p. 1.

³⁰Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1932, LXXVI, Part 1, p. 624.

³¹"Philippines", Congressional Digest, XXI, No. 2 (February, 1933), p. 60.

³²Hyde and Wilbur, p. 613.

Representative Hare (D-S.C.), a persistent advocate of Philippine independence, led the attempt to override the veto in the House.³³ On January 13, 1933, the House voted 274 (82 Republicans, 191 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 94 (93 Republicans, 1 Democrat) to override the veto.³⁴ Soon afterward, the Senate also voted to override Hoover's veto by 66 (20 Republicans, 45 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 26 (25 Republicans, 1 Democrat).³⁵ Hoover's opposition to the measure, if not its objectives, had been consistent and clear. Although the principal support for early independence came from Democrats, the Republicans had provided important votes on crucial issues. The Republican members in both the Senate and House were split over the President's position on Philippine independence.

Motor Bus Regulation

Regulation of motor bus transportation had been carried on by State governments until the Supreme Court ruled that bus companies carrying passengers in interstate transportation were beyond the scope of state regulation. Interstate Commerce Commission

³³New York Times, January 14, 1933, p. 1.

³⁴Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXVI, Part 2, p. 1768.

³⁵ibid., p. 1924.

before recommended, with Hoover's approval, that these bus companies be brought under federal regulation.³⁶

The House first acted on a bill authorizing the Interstate Commerce Commission to control rates, scheduling, and certification of approved motor bus companies. Opponents of the bill in the 71st Congress tried to recommit it for further committee action, but their attempts failed and the bill was passed by the House.³⁷ The recommitment was defeated 104 (13 Republicans, 63 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 237 (193 Republicans, 39 Democrats).³⁸ The House then passed the bill 221 (130 Republicans, 41 Democrats) to 115 (30 Republicans, 84 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor), with strong Republican support.³⁹

The Senate was less prompt. It was late in the session when the Senate finally voted to displace the bill as unfinished business and carry it over to the third session of the 71st Congress.⁴⁰ The vote was not a direct gauge of support for the bill, but passed by 30 (12 Republicans, 18 Democrats) to 27 (19 Republicans, 7 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).⁴¹

³⁶ Hyde and Wilbur, p. 329.

³⁷ New York Times, March 25, 1930, p. 52.

³⁸ Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1930, LXXII, Part 6, p. 6028.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Macmahon, American Political Science Review, XXV, NO. 4, p. 927.

⁴¹ Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1930, LXXII, Part 11, p. 1167.

The Senate concluded action on the bill early in the next session. A motion to recommit the bill to the Senate committee for further consideration, in reality killing it, was passed 51 (26 Republicans, 26 Democrats) to 29 (20 Republicans, 8 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor), as a Republican majority rebuffed Hoover.⁴² No other action was taken on interstate control of motor bus transportation during Hoover's Administration.

Muscle Shoals

Another non-depression issue was the establishment of fertilizer and power facilities at Muscle Shoals, Alabama. It was proposed that hydro-electric facilities and a manufacturing plant for the production of nitrate fertilizer be constructed in this underdeveloped region. Nearly everyone favored this, and the main question was whether the facilities should be operated by a public corporation or private interests. Senator George Norris (R-Neb.) kept this the central issue as he pushed for public ownership of the facility.⁴³

President Hoover's position on the matter was explicit. He accepted the need for the federal government to construct dams and reservoirs where flood control, navigation, reclamation, and the stream control had dominant importance, and when the project

⁴² Ibid., 3rd Sess., 1930, LXXIV, Part 1, p. 194.

⁴³ Macmahon, American Political Science Review, XXIV, No. 4, p. 940.

beyond the capacity of private interests and local government to construct. Hoover, however, regarded Muscle Shoals as a project where electric power and the nitrate plant were the major purposes, and the nitrate plant was a by-product of other overriding considerations. He was firmly opposed to a government corporation operating Muscle Shoals in competition with private industry. The proper role of the government, according to Hoover, was the regulation of interstate power companies, not government ownership of such companies. The President did not modify his views throughout the controversy.⁴⁴

Initial action on Muscle Shoals came in the Senate during the second session of the 71st Congress, when it passed Norris' proposal for a government corporation to operate Muscle Shoals.⁴⁵ The bill passed by 45 (18 Republicans, 26 Democrats, 1 Farmer-labor) to 23 (21 Republicans, 2 Democrats).⁴⁶

When the bill came to the House, Hoover's supporters successfully eliminated the public ownership provision. A House substitute was presented in an amendment which provided for leasing the facility to one or more private concerns for fifty years with a rate of return fixed by the government on nitrate

⁴⁴Hyde and Wilbur, pp. 317-318.

⁴⁵New York Times, April 5, 1930, p. 3.

⁴⁶Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1930, LXXII, Part 6, p. 6511.

manufactured as well as surplus electric power sold.⁴⁷ The substitute amendment passed the House 186 (155 Republicans, 31 Democrats) to 135 (43 Republicans, 91 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) with strong Republican support.⁴⁸ After the provision for the private operation of Muscle Shoals was adopted, the House passed the bill 177 (156 Republicans, 41 Democrats) to 114 (35 Republicans, 78 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).⁴⁹

No further action was taken during the second session, and in the third session the Senate-House conferees finally reached agreement on a compromise proposal which provided for a government corporation to operate the power plant. The compromise also provided that if the nitrate plant was not leased to private interests within one year, it would also be operated by the government corporation.⁵⁰ The conference report, basically the bill the Senate had originally passed, was accepted by the House by a vote of 216 (88 Republicans, 127 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 153 (150 Republicans, 3 Democrats).⁵¹ The House reversal resulted from a shift by some Republicans, but primarily from solid Democratic support.

⁴⁷New York Times, May 29, 1930, p. 6.

⁴⁸Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1930, LXXII, Part 9, p. 9766.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 9767.

⁵⁰New York Times, February 21, 1931, p. 1.

⁵¹Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 3rd Sess., 1931, LXXIV, Part 6, p. 5570.

The Senate quickly followed the House action and accepted conference report 55 (20 Republicans, 35 Democrats) to 28 (26 Republicans, 2 Democrats).⁵² As expected, President Hoover vetoed the bill because it violated his principle that government must not compete with private industry.⁵³ When the session was nearly over, a strong Senate majority voted to override the veto; 49 (16 Republicans, 33 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) voting to override the veto and 34 (31 Republicans, 3 Democrats) to sustain, but the attempt failed by six votes to get the necessary two-thirds.⁵⁴ Hoover had received consistently firm Republican support in the House, and Senate Republicans had provided adequate support on the crucial vote.

The issue was revived in the 72nd Congress. A bill was presented in the first session to lease Muscle Shoals to private firms if a proper leasee could be found within one year, but a government corporation would operate the complex if a proper leasee could not be found. When the bill came to the House floor, a motion was made to recommit the bill with instructions to strike out the provision for government operation if private interests failed to lease the facility in one year.⁵⁵ The motion failed 150 (129

⁵² Ibid., p. 5716.

⁵³ Hyde and Wilbur, p. 317.

⁵⁴ Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 3rd Sess., 1931, LXXIV, Part 7, p. 7098.

⁵⁵ New York Times, May 6, 1932, p. 9.

Republicans, 21 Democrats) to 200 (41 Republicans, 158 Democrats, Farmer-Labor) and the public ownership clause remained in the
l. 56

There was no further congressional action on Muscle Shoals during Hoover's term of office. The President successfully prevented the intrusion of government ownership in a domain he believed should be maintained for private industry. The Senate Republicans were divided over Muscle Shoals, while the House Republicans had been unified behind the President.

Prohibition

The final non-depression issue was the controversy over repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. Prohibition had caused perplexing problems since its inception. Efforts to control effectively the traffic in alcoholic beverages had fallen far short of success. Both "wets" and "drys" clamored for change in the prohibition laws. These antithetical forces became more active during Hoover's Administration.

President Hoover regarded the Eighteenth Amendment as less than perfect. He described prohibition as an experiment, noble in motive, that should be given a fair and honest trial. Hoover did not directly express himself on repeal until late in his Administration. Until then, Hoover restricted himself to recommendations

⁵⁶ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 9, p. 9669.

effective control of the traffic in alcohol. His personal belief that people would be "better off" without alcoholic beverages suggests that he was following the expedient course on the

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The prohibition issue was indirectly raised early in Hoover's term. Both the "wets" and the "drys" were polarized in their positions; therefore any proposal that vaguely suggested liberalization in the liquor laws became a contest over prohibition itself.

This was demonstrated in the Senate controversy over a proposal to eliminate wood alcohol as an adulterant to alcohol used for industrial purposes. The "wets" defended the bill on the contention that wood alcohol was poisonous and therefore potentially hazardous to human beings. The prohibitionists thought the bill was a ploy to attack prohibition in general.⁵⁸ The proposal lost 16 (10 Republicans, 6 Democrats) to 45 (29 Republicans, 16 Democrats) and wood alcohol continued to be used as an adulterant.⁵⁹ The identical proposal was also decisively defeated a second time 19 (10 Republicans, 9 Democrats) to 54 (34 Republicans, 20 Democrats).⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Hyde and Wilbur, pp. 552-554.

⁵⁸ New York Times, June 7, 1930, p. 1.

⁵⁹ Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1930, LXXII, Part 9, p. 10171.

⁶⁰ Ibid., Part 8, p. 8919.

Only the emotional intensity generated over the prohibition gave these votes any significance. On the surface, the particular question was unimportant. President Hoover expressed no opinion on the wood alcohol bill, but he could not escape the polarization that forced people into one camp or the other on the prohibition question. Presumably, Hoover, a "dry" at heart committed to a fair trial for the experiment, would logically lean toward the camp which opposed the bill.

There was one explicit roll-call vote in the second session on an Administration proposal for more effective enforcement of the prohibition laws. The federal courts were overflowing with alleged offenders. Hoover proposed that United States Commissioners be permitted to preside over the trials of petty offenders in prohibition cases to relieve the excess case load on the Federal District Courts. The bill was sponsored by Charles A. Christopherson (R-S.D.) in the House of Representatives. Opponents contended that this proposal constituted a serious departure from accepted judicial practice. Polarization between the "wets" and "drys" was again demonstrated when it was suggested prior to the vote that if the measure was defeated it would appear that Congress had gone "wet" because it would make prohibition more difficult to enforce.⁶¹ The proposal with strong Republican support easily passed the House

⁶¹New York Times, June 5, 1930, p. 1.

(162 Republicans, 56 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 117 (44 Republicans, 73 Democrats).⁶²

During the third session of the 71st Congress the Senate had three roll-call votes on a liquor reform package based upon recommendations from the Wickersham Commission. Hoover had appointed the Commission to investigate prohibition and had subsequently endorsed its report except for the Commission's recommended revision of the Eighteenth Amendment. Among other recommendations, the Commission had opposed "legislation allowing more latitude for federal searches and seizures." Hoover transmitted this recommendation to Congress for action.⁶³ Senate "drys" however, proposed a bill with severe search and seizure provisions for more strict enforcement of prohibition in the District of Columbia. "Wets" attempted to remove the "radical search and seizure provisions" by recommitting the bill to committee.⁶⁴ The "drys" prevailed when the motion lost 28 (16 Republicans, 11 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 45 (23 Republicans, 22 Democrats).⁶⁵

The two other roll-call votes were on an amendment to the District of Columbia prohibition enforcement bill to remove

⁶² Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1930, LXXII, Part 9, p. 10071.

⁶³ New York Times, January 21, 1931, p. 1.

⁶⁴ Ibid., January 27, 1931, p. 1.

⁶⁵ Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 3rd Sess., 1931, LXXIV, Part 3, p. 3157.

restrictions on prescriptions for alcohol issued by medical doctors. Wickersham report had recommended that these restrictions be removed.⁶⁶ The "drys" opposed the amendment because they feared it would enable the general public to obtain prodigious quantities of alcohol.⁶⁷ The amendment lost 25 (16 Republicans, 3 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 45 (24 Republicans, 21 Democrats).⁶⁷ The "drys" again prevailed when they defeated a motion to reconsider 29 (16 Republicans, 12 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 39 (25 Republicans, 14 Democrats).⁶⁹

The roll-call votes during the 71st Congress were oblique. Without the intensity of feeling over the liquor issue these votes would not have been interpreted as a contest between the "wets" and the "drys." The "drys" won handily on these votes in every instance. The votes were paradoxical in that Hoover was presumably "dry," but his recommended modifications in prohibition laws were backed by Senate "wets" and defeated by "drys."

The preceding issues were on the fringe of the prohibition question, but subsequent votes were more directly related to the issue of legalized alcohol. Proposals were made to legalize the

⁶⁶New York Times, January 21, 1931, p. 1.

⁶⁷Ibid., February 3, 1931, p. 20.

⁶⁸Cong. Record, 71st Cong., 3rd Sess., 1931, LXXIV, Part 4, p. 3764.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 3767.

manufacture and sale of beer to raise revenue to relieve the federal government's growing budget deficit. The Wickersham Commission proposed legalizing beer while the Eighteenth Amendment was in the constitution.⁷⁰ This was in agreement with Hoover's desire to give the prohibition a fair trial. Although Hoover was desperate to increase federal revenue, authoritative sources reported that he had no intention to legalize beer.⁷¹

A proposal to legalize beer was introduced in the Senate during the first session of the 72nd Congress to make beer containing 2.75 percent alcohol legal, and to provide the basis for a tax. Before it could be voted on, an amendment was offered by one of the most persistent "wets," Senator Hiram Bingham (R-Conn.) to raise the legal alcohol content to 4.00 percent. Senate "drys" soundly defeated the bill and the amendment.⁷² The latter was defeated 23 (12 Republicans, 11 Democrats) to 60 (32 Republicans, 28 Democrats).⁷³ The bill lost 24 (12 Republicans, 12 Democrats) to 61 (32 Republicans, 29 Democrats).⁷⁴ The Senate voted at a later date on another Bingham proposal to legalize 2.75 beer. Again

⁷⁰ Myers and Newton, p. 467.

⁷¹ New York Times, September 16, 1931, p. 1.

⁷² Ibid., May 19, 1932, p. 1.

⁷³ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 10, p. 10518.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 10519.

proposal, offered as a revenue measure, was decisively defeated.⁷⁵

There were 26 (15 Republicans, 11 Democrats) senators voting to legalize beer and 55 (27 Republicans, 28 Democrats) voting to preserve the intent of the prohibition amendment.⁷⁶

Final Senate action on the beer bill came on July 11, 1932, when a motion to recommit the bill was passed 59 (26 Republicans, 33 Democrats) to 25 (14 Republicans, 11 Democrats) killing the issue for the session.⁷⁷ Decisive Senate majorities in both parties had repulsed every effort to legalize beer.

The House had one roll-call vote during the first session of the 72nd Congress on legalizing the manufacture and sale of beer. A bill to legalize beer was "pigeonholed" in committee. The House "wets" moved to discharge the beer bill from committee and bring it to the House floor for action. The vote reflected House sentiment on legalized beer.⁷⁸ House "wets" showed more power than their Senate colleagues, but they still lost 169 (82 Republicans, 86 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 228 (116 Republicans, 112 Democrats).⁷⁹ President Hoover received sufficient bipartisan support

⁷⁵ New York Times, May 26, 1932, p. 1.

⁷⁶ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 10, p. 11126.

⁷⁷ Ibid., Part 14, p. 15024.

⁷⁸ New York Times, May 24, 1932, p. 1.

⁷⁹ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 10, p. 10956.

see his recommendations prevail.

On the final roll-call vote on beer, early in the second session of the 72nd Congress, the House legalized the manufacture and sale of 3.2 percent beer.⁸⁰ The bill passed 230 (96 Republicans, 134 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 165 (101 Republicans, 64 Democrats).⁸¹ Hoover still opposed legalizing beer on the grounds that it would nullify the intent of the Eighteenth Amendment. The amendment would have to be altered through proper constitutional procedures before Hoover would agree to legalized beer. The President was reported to have "indicated unmistakably to his friends" his disapproval of the beer bill.⁸² House Republicans strongly supported the bill.

Congress also confronted the liquor issue directly during the first session of the 72nd Congress when resolutions were offered to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment. President Hoover had expressed himself on the question when he transmitted the Wickersham report to Congress: he took "serious objection to, and therefore must not be understood as recommending the commission's proposed revision of the Eighteenth Amendment."⁸³

⁸⁰ New York Times, December 22, 1932, p. 1.

⁸¹ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1932, LXXVI, Part 1, p. 867.

⁸² New York Times, November 20, 1932, p. 1.

⁸³ Ibid., January 21, 1931, p. 1.

The Senate's first direct vote on prohibition during the 12

experiment was on a resolution by Senator Bingham for the states
 to have referendums on the liquor question.⁸⁴ The resolution was
 defeated 15 (8 Republicans, 7 Democrats) to 55 (26 Republicans, 28
 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).⁸⁵ The House held its first "clear cut,
 arranged vote on the general question of prohibition" when a
 motion to bring a repeal resolution to the House floor was defeated.
 In the course of the debate, Maryland Representative J. Charles
 Anthony, leader of the Democratic "wets" in the House, was moved
 to declare that the House could "pass this resolution and depression
 will fade away like the mists before the noon day sun."⁸⁶ In spite
 of this plea, the motion to discharge the bill lost 187 (97 Repub-
 licans, 90 Democrats) to 227 (112 Republicans, 114 Democrats, 1
 Farmer-Labor).⁸⁷ Congress again supported Hoover. Republicans
 were divided on the question, but a majority supported the President.

President Hoover reversed his stand on repeal of the
 Eighteenth Amendment prior to the second session of the 72nd Con-
 gress. Hoover's intimates do not know exactly when the President
 decided that the prohibition experiment was a failure and that

⁸⁴ Ibid., January 22, 1932, p. 1.

⁸⁵ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 3,
 p. 2418.

⁸⁶ New York Times, March 15, 1932, p. 1.

⁸⁷ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 6
 p. 6003.

peal was the most practical course of action. Hoover made the public declaration of his reversal on August 11, 1932, during the presidential campaign. He attached two specific reservations to the repeal, that there be "absolute guarantees in the constitution to protect each state from interference and invasion by its neighbors, and that in no part of the United States shall there be a return to the saloon system with its inevitable political and social corruption. . . ." ⁸⁸

The House acted quickly. On the first day of the session, Speaker John N. Garner offered a repeal resolution which failed by six votes of the two-thirds majority necessary on a constitutional amendment. ⁸⁹ A total of 272 (103 Republicans, 168 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) representatives voted for repeal and 144 (100 Republicans, 44 Democrats) to preserve the Eighteenth Amendment. ⁹⁰

Whether the vote supported Hoover's position is moot. Although he favored submitting the question to the states, this resolution did not contain a clause for federal protection of dry states. ⁹¹

Action on repeal then moved to the Senate for a test vote on February 15, 1933. The "dry" forces had filibustered to

⁸⁸ Hyde and Wiltbur, pp. 555-556.

⁸⁹ New York Times, December 6, 1932, p. 1.

⁹⁰ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1932, LXXVI, Part 1, p. 12.

⁹¹ New York Times, February 16, 1933, p. 1.

went consideration of a repeal resolution, but finally agreed to a test vote on a motion by Senator John J. Blaine (R-Wis.) to consider the repeal resolution.⁹² The motion passed 58 (28 Republicans, 29 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 23 (13 Republicans, 10 Democrats).⁹³

The successful motion was then followed by two important votes on the anti-saloon clause of the repeal resolution. First an amendment to delete the clause was passed. Later, on an amendment to restore the anti-saloon clause, "the test finally came [to] . . . outlaw the saloon." On both votes, the Senate disregarded the admonishment of Senator William E. Borah (R-Idaho) that dire consequences would result with the return of "that old hellish institution," the saloon.⁹⁴ The Senate also rebuffed Hoover when it deleted the anti-saloon clause 33 (12 Republicans, 21 Democrats) to 32 (17 Republicans, 14 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).⁹⁵ The effort to restore it lost 38 (24 Republicans, 14 Democrats) to 46 (17 Republicans, 28 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor).⁹⁶ These direct votes on Hoover's proposal lacked a sufficiently large Republican majority in favor of the President's position to counterbalance Democrat opposition.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXVI, Part 4, p. 4138.

⁹⁴ New York Times, February 17, 1933, p. 1.

⁹⁵ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXVI, Part 4, p. 4179.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 4230.

The repeal resolution then passed the Senate without the moon ban, although it did provide federal protection of dry states.⁹⁷ The repeal resolution sponsored by Senator Blaine received the two-thirds majority necessary for passage 63 (29 Republicans, 33 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 23 (14 Republicans, 9 Democrats).⁹⁸ Four days later, the House reversed their earlier action and passed the repeal resolution 289 (109 Republicans, 179 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor) to 121 (89 Republicans, 32 Democrats).⁹⁹ The issue was then resolved so far as the federal government was concerned. It was now a matter for the states. It had been an issue that transcended party lines. Hoover's position had been sustained in most instances. The support necessary for this successful legislative record usually included a majority of Republicans, although often a small majority. The prohibition issue had been resolved.

⁹⁷ New York Times, February 17, 1933, p. 1.

⁹⁸ Cong. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXVI, Part 4, p. 4231.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 4516.

XI

ANALYSIS OF OVERALL
PARTISAN SUPPORT

Most of Hoover's depression measures were favorably received by Congress until the lame duck session of the 72nd Congress. The objective of this study has been to determine the source and degree of the support for the President's recommendations. A tabulation of the House and Senate votes is necessary for a more complete view of the congressional support for Hoover's programs. The tabulation of each issue clarifies the partisan support for depression and non-depression programs sponsored by Hoover and provides an overall picture of Hoover's legislative record. Both Republican and Democratic votes will be included to enable a comparison of their support for Hoover's recommendations.

The tabulation will include both House and Senate votes, which will indicate any differences in their voting patterns. The source of partisan support in the House and Senate will be expressed as percentages of Republicans and Democrats who voted in favor of Hoover's recommendations.

The votes for each party in the House and Senate are also identified as being opposed to or consistent with Hoover's legislative program. Only House and Senate members present and voting are included; pairs are excluded from the tabulation. A percentage

party support for the President on each issue was computed to provide a simple and fast technique to compare party voting patterns during the 71st and 72nd Congresses.

The votes are also broken down into two categories. The first category includes those votes on issues of major significance where President Hoover had clearly expressed his position. These votes are of greater importance and will provide the primary basis for evaluating the source of Hoover's political support. This category is designated as "Major Votes" in the tabulation. The second category will include those votes of minor consequence and/or the votes where the issue in question was complicated by the inclusion of other considerations such as a particular roll-call vote. This category is designated as "Minor Votes" in the tabulation.

This tabulation will permit a ready review of the relationship between Congress and the President. Although looking at isolated issues provides some indication of party support for the President, an overall analysis provides a clearer picture of the degree of congressional support or opposition to the Republican and Democrat Party to the administration's program.

TABLE I

TABULATION OF REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRAT CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR
PRESIDENT HOOVER'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON MAJOR VOTES
DURING THE 71ST AND 72ND CONGRESSES

Issue	Text page	Republican Votes		Democratic Votes		Percent Repub. with Hoover	Percent Demo. with Hoover
		Number with Hoover	Number against Hoover	Number with Hoover	Number against Hoover		
<u>Tariff-Senate</u>							
71st Congress							
General revision.....	6	13	32	25	7	29%	78%
Flexible provisions.....	9	38	13	4	34	75%	11%
Rates.....	10	5	46	26	7	10%	79%
Flexible provisions.....	10	37	12	5	29	75%	15%
Flexible provisions.....	11	39	11	5	30	78%	14%
Senate average.....						53%	39%
72nd Congress							
Flexible provisions.....	13	30	6	0	36	83%	0%
<u>Tariff-House</u>							
71st Congress							
Rates.....	8	12	244	134	20	5%	87%
Flexible provisions.....	10	227	19	14	133	93%	10%
Flexible provisions.....	11	208	20	14	132	88%	10%
House average.....						62%	36%
72nd Congress							
Flexible provisions.....	13	174	8	0	205	96%	0%
Flexible provisions.....	13	182	12	0	201	94%	0%
Flexible provisions.....	13	167	13	4	188	93%	2%
Flexible provisions.....	14	164	12	2	165	93%	1%
Rates.....	15	171	16	3	195	91%	2%
House average.....						93%	1%
<u>Farm Relief-Senate</u>							
71st Congress							
Cooperative marketing....	17	47	3	27	5	94%	84%
Export debentures.....	19	42	13	2	34	76%	6%
Export debentures.....	19	39	13	4	32	75%	11%
Export debentures.....	21	31	14	3	28	69%	10%
Export debentures.....	22	37	12	6	28	75%	18%
Human food dole.....	26	27	20	0	35	57%	0%
Senate average.....						74%	22%
<u>Farm Relief-House</u>							
71st Congress							
Cooperative marketing....	16	245	2	121	32	99%	79%
Export debentures.....	20	217	13	33	100	94%	33%
Export debentures.....	21	194	48	37	112	80%	25%
Human food dole.....	24	204	16	1	142	93%	1%
Human food dole.....	24	220	16	6	129	93%	4%
Human food dole.....	25	202	15	13	119	93%	10%
House average.....						92%	25%
72nd Congress							
Cotton subsidy.....	29	151	25	32	163	86%	17%

TABLE I - Continued

Issue	Text page	Republican Votes		Democratic Votes		Percent with Hoover	Percent with Hoover
		Number with Hoover	Number against Hoover	Number with Hoover	Number against Hoover		
<u>Relief-Senate</u>							
61st Congress							
Reallocation of funds...	33	35	11	7	27	76%	21%
Employment agency.....	40	23	12		21	66%	16%
Restrict Immigration....	42	24	13	27	2	65%	93%
Senate average.....						69%	43%
62nd Congress							
Relief work.....	34	39	1	8	30	98%	21%
Relief work.....	34	27	15	21	19	64%	53%
Relief work.....	35	35	7	37	1	83%	92%
Relief work.....	37	25	14	5	29	64%	15%
Federal grants.....	39	18	15	26	12	55%	68%
Senate average.....						73%	51%
<u>Relief-House</u>							
72nd Congress							
Relief work.....	36	172	21	10	194	89%	5%
Relief work.....	37	155	35	2	166	82%	1%
Relief work.....	38	170	11	125	35	94%	78%
House average.....						88%	28%
<u>R.F.C.-Senate</u>							
72nd Congress							
R.F.C. loans-public work	45	30	7	15	21	81%	42%
Establish R.F.C.	46	34	3	29	5	92%	85%
Senate average.....						87%	64%
<u>R.F.C.-House</u>							
72nd Congress							
Establish R.F.C.	45	181	11	154	45	94%	77%
R.F.C. funds for relief.	47	97	53	12	151	66%	7%
Loan disclosure.....	48	167	10	2	159	94%	1%
Loan disclosure.....	48	150	12	0	159	93%	0%
House average.....						87%	21%
<u>Veterans Pensions-Senate</u>							
71st Congress							
Sp.-Amer. War pensions..	52	18	28	0	32	39%	0%
W.W. I pensions.....	55	26	9	0	27	74%	0%
W.W. I pensions.....	55	25	10	2	25	71%	7%
W.W. I pensions.....	57	32	6	15	8	84%	65%
Bonus certificate-50%...	58	12	34	0	37	26%	0%
Bonus certificate-50%...	59	16	36	1	39	31%	3%
Senate average.....						54%	13%
72nd Congress							
Bonus certificate-100%..	60	35	7	27	10	83%	73%
W.W. I pensions.....	61	14	23	10	27	38%	27%
Senate average.....						61%	50%

TABLE I - Continued

Issue	Text page	Republican Votes		Democratic Votes		Percent with Hoover	Percent with Hoover
		Number with Hoover	Number against Hoover	Number with Hoover	Number against Hoover		
<u>Veterans Pensions-House</u>							
61st Congress							
Sp.-Amer. War pensions...	52	65	123	0	110	35%	0%
Sp.-Amer. War pensions...	53	14	184	0	114	7%	0%
W.W. I pensions.....	53	143	91	2	138	61%	1%
W.W. I pensions.....	54	185	45	3	136	80%	2%
W.W. I pensions.....	56	191	7	3	109	96%	3%
Bonus certificate-50%....	58	39	212	0	150	16%	0%
Bonus certificate-50%....	59	79	179	0	148	31%	0%
House average.....						46%	1%
72nd Congress							
Bonus certificate-100%...	60	133	60	42	165	69%	20%
Bonus certificate.100%...	60	126	57	50	153	69%	25%
House average.....						69%	23%
<u>Taxation-Senate</u>							
71st Congress							
Income tax cut.....	64	39	11	24	3	78%	89%
72nd Congress							
Income tax increase.....	67	24	15	25	15	62%	63%
Manufacturers sales tax..	67	20	20	7	32	50%	18%
Income tax refunds.....	69	24	17	2	35	59%	5%
Income tax refunds.....	69	25	15	1	36	63%	3%
Senate average.....						59%	22%
<u>Taxation-House</u>							
72nd Congress							
Manufacturers Sales tax..	65	110	81	50	154	58%	25%
Income tax increase.....	66	125	62	86	115	67%	43%
Income tax refunds.....	70	142	28	1	195	84%	1%
Income tax refunds.....	70	156	14	2	178	92%	1%
House average.....						75%	18%
<u>Reducing Expenditures-Senate</u>							
71st Congress							
Salary limitation.....	74	21	16	3	26	57%	10%
72nd Congress							
Flat budget cut-10%.....	75	20	15	5	24	57%	17%
Flat budget cut-10%.....	76	23	16	6	33	59%	15%
Flat budget cut-10%.....	76	23	11	8	25	68%	24%
Defer economy program....	78	30	8	5	30	79%	14%
Current spending cut-5%..	79	24	18	8	32	57%	20%
Pay cut.....	85	16	15	18	14	52%	56%
Furlough plan.....	85	13	17	13	21	43%	38%
Furlough plan.....	85	25	13	10	28	66%	26%
Furlough plan.....	86	25	9	10	24	74%	29%
Furlough plan.....	86	28	9	9	26	76%	26%
Furlough plan.....	86	33	1	9	22	97%	29%

TABLE I - Continued

Issue	Text page	Republican Votes		Democratic Votes		Percent with Hoover	Percent with Hoover
		Number with Hoover	Number against Hoover	Number with Hoover	Number against Hoover		
<u>Reducing Expenditures-Senate</u>							
71st and 72nd Congress - continued							
Pay cut.....	88	19	23	20	20	45%	50%
Executive reorganization.	91	19	14	8	21	56%	28%
Senate average.....						64%	29%
<u>Reducing Expenditures-House</u>							
71st Congress							
Salary limitation.....	73	114	71	56	43	62%	57%
72nd Congress							
Flat budget cut-10%.....	75	39	105	3	163	27%	2%
Pay cut exemption.....	83	64	135	90	103	32%	47%
Furlough plan.....	83	52	148	80	118	26%	40%
Furlough plan.....	83	129	68	17	181	65%	9%
Furlough plan.....	87	166	17	76	110	90%	41%
Furlough plan.....	87	175	5	151	39	97%	79%
Army-Navy merger.....	92	150	49	60	137	75%	30%
Executive reorganization.	93	176	3	0	198	98%	0%
House average.....						64%	31%
<u>Banking and Finance- Senate</u>							
71st Congress							
Railroad bankruptcy.....	110	20	23	7	22	47%	24%
72nd Congress							
Land Bank.....	97	14	26	35	2	35%	95%
Merge Land Bank-R.F.C. ..	98	24	8	8	25	75%	24%
Home Loan Bank.....	99	18	16	15	19	53%	44%
Home Loan Bank.....	99	30	10	17	13	73%	57%
Currency expansion.....	101	14	23	4	29	38%	12%
Currency expansion.....	102	19	15	1	28	56%	3%
Currency expansion.....	103	24	11	5	23	69%	18%
Currency expansion.....	103	23	13	3	24	64%	11%
Branch banking.....	107	18	15	33	2	55%	94%
Branch banking.....	107	21	9	24	8	70%	75%
Currency expansion.....	108	32	6	34	12	84%	74%
Banking reform.....	108	28	4	26	4	88%	87%
Railroad bankruptcy.....	110	21	5	21	10	81%	68%
Bankruptcy reform.....	110	22	1	22	7	96%	76%
Senate average.....						67%	53%
<u>Banking and Finance-House</u>							
72nd Congress							
Land Bank.....	96	146	16	46	148	90%	24%
Currency inflation.....	101	57	123	3	165	32%	2%
Currency expansion.....	102	151	33	66	92	82%	42%
Currency expansion.....	103	125	44	97	44	74%	69%
Currency expansion.....	103	91	43	61	58	68%	51%
Currency expansion.....	104	72	59	42	60	55%	41%
Federal Reserve rediscou.	105	167	8	182	7	95%	96%
House average.....						71%	46%

TABLE I - Continued

Issues	Text page	Republican Votes		Democratic Votes		Percent Repub. with Hoover	Percent Demo. with Hoover
		Number with Hoover	Number against Hoover	Number with Hoover	Number against Hoover		
<u>Reapportionment-Senate</u>							
61st Congress							
Reapportionment motion.....	118	40	9	5	29	82%	15%
Census plan.....	118	41	8	16	18	84%	47%
Census plan.....	118	40	9	8	28	82%	22%
Senate average.....						83%	28%
<u>Reapportionment-House</u>							
61st Congress							
Census plan.....	118	193	43	79	61	82%	56%
<u>London Naval Treaty-Senate</u>							
71st Congress							
Ratification.....	119	40	7	18	2	85%	90%
<u>Philippines-Senate</u>							
72nd Congress							
Time of independence.....	122	17	20	21	16	46%	57%
Time of independence.....	122	18	20	20	19	47%	51%
Time of independence.....	123	18	21	15	21	46%	42%
Time of independence.....	123	24	16	21	14	60%	60%
Approval by plebiscite....	123	22	13	13	19	63%	41%
Independence.....	124	19	17	0	36	53%	0%
Independence.....	125	25	20	1	45	56%	2%
Senate average.....						53%	36%
<u>Philippines-House</u>							
72nd Congress							
Time of Independence.....	121	47	119	0	186	28%	0%
Independence.....	125	93	82	1	191	53%	1%
House average.....						41%	1%
<u>Motor Bus-Senate</u>							
71st Congress							
Federal control.....	127	20	25	8	26	44%	24%
<u>Motor Bus-House</u>							
71st Congress							
Federal control.....	126	198	18	39	85	92%	31%
Federal control.....	126	180	30	41	84	86%	33%
House average.....						89%	32%

TABLE I -Continued

Issue	Text page	Republican Votes		Democratic Votes		Percent with Hoover	Percent with Hoover
		Number with Hoover	Number against Hoover	Number with Hoover	Number against Hoover		
<u>Muscle Shoals-Senate</u>							
71st Congress							
Public ownership.....	128	21	18	2	26	54%	7%
Public ownership.....	130	26	20	2	35	57%	5%
Public ownership.....	130	31	16	3	32	66%	9%
Senate average.....						59%	7%
<u>Muscle Shoals-House</u>							
71st Congress							
Public ownership.....	129	155	43	31	91	78%	25%
Public ownership.....	129	156	35	41	78	82%	34%
Public ownership.....	129	150	88	3	127	63%	2%
House average.....						74%	20%
72nd Congress							
Public ownership.....	130	129	41	21	158	76%	12%
<u>Prohibition-Senate</u>							
72nd Congress							
Legalized beer.....	136	32	12	28	11	73%	72%
Legalized beer.....	136	32	12	29	12	73%	71%
Legalized beer.....	137	27	15	28	11	64%	72%
Legalized beer.....	137	26	14	24	11	65%	69%
Repeal.....	139	26	8	28	7	76%	80%
Repeal.....	141	28	13	29	10	68%	79%
Anti-saloon clause.....	141	17	12	14	21	59%	40%
Anti-saloon clause.....	141	24	17	14	28	59%	33%
Repeal.....	142	14	29	9	33	33%	21%
Senate average.....						63%	60%
<u>Prohibition-House</u>							
71st Congress							
Trial-petty offenders....	134	162	44	56	73	79%	43%
72nd Congress							
Legalized beer.....	137	116	82	116	86	59%	57%
Legalized beer.....	138	101	96	64	133	51%	32%
Repeal.....	139	112	97	114	90	54%	56%
Repeal.....	142	89	109	32	179	45%	15%
House average.....						52%	40%

TABLE II

TABULATION OF REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRAT CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR
PRESIDENT HOOVER'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON MINOR VOTES
DURING THE 71ST AND 72ND CONGRESSES

Issue	Text page	Republican Votes		Democratic Votes		Percent Repub. with Hoover	Percent Demo. with Hoover
		Number with Hoover	Number against Hoover	Number with Hoover	Number against Hoover		
<u>Tariff-House</u>							
71st Congress							
Rates.....	8	12	229	125	5	5%	96%
<u>Farm Relief-Senate</u>							
71st Congress							
Export debentures.....	19	31	21	2	33	60%	6%
Human relief dole.....	26	29	18	1	34	62%	3%
Drought relief.....	28	36	8	31	6	82%	84%
Senate average.....						68%	31%
<u>Farm Relief-House</u>							
71st Congress							
Human relief dole.....	27	207	21	5	127	91%	4%
Human relief dole.....	27	211	21	6	129	91%	4%
House average.....						91%	4%
<u>Relief-Senate</u>							
72nd Congress							
Funding by bond issue....	37	17	23	2	33	43%	6%
<u>Relief-House</u>							
72nd Congress							
General relief.....	36	181	12	8	192	94%	4%
<u>R.F.C.-Senate</u>							
72nd Congress							
Loan standards.....	49	11	22	5	32	33%	14%
<u>R.F.C.-House</u>							
72nd Congress							
Loan disclosure.....	48	162	14	123	34	92%	78%
<u>Veterans Pensions-Senate</u>							
71st Congress							
W.W. I pensions.....	56	11	28	0	27	28%	0%
<u>Veterans Pensions-House</u>							
71st Congress							
W.W. I pensions.....	54	47	189	2	134	20%	1%
<u>Taxation-Senate</u>							
72nd Congress							
Manufacturers sales tax..	67	2	41	8	31	5%	21%
Manufacturers sales tax..	67	11	30	23	16	27%	59%
Senate average.....						16%	40%

TABLE II - Continued

Issue	Text page	Republican Votes		Democratic Votes		Percent Repub. with Hoover	Percent Demo. with Hoover
		Number with Hoover	Number against Hoover	Number with Hoover	Number against Hoover		
<u>Reducing Expenditures-Senate</u>							
72nd Congress							
Budget reduction.....	75	30	1	20	8	97%	71%
Budget increase.....	77	11	28	3	34	28%	8%
Budget reduction.....	78	7	29	24	7	19%	77%
Executive reorganization.	90	25	8	7	25	76%	22%
Senate average						55%	45%
<u>Reducing Expenditures-House</u>							
72nd Congress							
Reallocating funds.....	79	157	40	26	168	80%	13%
Omnibus economy bill.....	82	75	100	88	119	43%	43%
Omnibus economy bill.....	84	160	30	156	36	84%	81%
Executive reorganization.	91	48	150	50	146	24%	26%
Executive reorganization.	93	136	42	8	185	76%	4%
House average						61%	33%
<u>Banking and Finance-Senate</u>							
72nd Congress							
Land Bank moratorium.....	96	30	8	30	7	79%	81%
Fed. Reserve rediscount..	106	27	6	19	12	82%	61%
Senate average.....						81%	71%
<u>Debt Moratorium-Senate</u>							
72nd Congress							
Debt readjustment.....	115	36	6	33	6	86%	85%
<u>Debt Moratorium-House</u>							
72nd Congress							
Debt readjustment.....	114	196	5	120	95	98%	56%
<u>Philippines-Senate</u>							
71st Congress							
Independence.....	121	40	7	5	29	85%	15%
72nd Congress							
Independence plebiscite..	124	21	16	8	27	57%	23%
<u>Motor Bus-Senate</u>							
71st Congress							
Federal regulation.....	126	12	19	18	7	39%	72%

TABLE II - Continued

Issue	Text page	Republican Votes		Democratic Votes		Percent Repub. with Hoover	Percent Demo. with Hoover
		Number with Hoover	Number against Hoover	Number with Hoover	Number against Hoover		
<u>Prohibition-Senate</u>							
1st Congress							
Wood alcohol adulterant..	132	34	10	20	9	77%	69%
Wood alcohol adulterant..	132	29	10	16	6	74%	73%
Search and seizure clause	134	16	23	11	22	41%	33%
Prescriptions by M.D. ...	135	16	24	8	21	40%	28%
Prescriptions by M.D. ...	135	16	25	12	14	39%	46%
Senate average.....						54%	50%
<u>Prohibition-House</u>							
2nd Congress							
Repeal	140	100	103	44	168	49%	21%

An analysis of the preceding statistics is useful to amplify their full meaning. For the purpose of this analysis, it is necessary to establish a standard for measuring the extent to which the Republican party would need to vote for Hoover's policies to be considered an adequate level of partisan support.

The nature of American political parties encourages lack of cohesion. A highly ideological multi-party system solidifies political groups, and would be expected to produce a high degree of correlation between the party leader and the party's legislative members. The American two-party system often forces each party to organize along strategic lines, rather than ideological lines, in order to win elections. The necessity of attracting the voter in the middle of the political spectrum forces the Republican and Democratic party to adopt highly flexible and often ambiguous positions. The result is diverse elements within political parties. The differences within an American political party, therefore, may sometimes be greater than the differences between the two major parties.

There are also great differences within American political parties related to the varied geographic interests. The Republican from the industrial East is usually thought of as having little in common politically with the Midwestern Republican representing agrarian interests. This is also demonstrated in the Democrat party, whose strength depends upon the conservative Southerner and the more liberal, urban, labor unionist politician for

ness at the national level. The party's congressional delegation will certainly reflect this divergency.

The governmental structure also contributes to the lack of cohesion in the American political parties. The United States Constitution created a separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. A system of checks and balances encourages each branch to pursue a relatively independent course of action. A parliamentary system with its fusion of powers tends to create strict party discipline. America's governmental structure simply does not encourage the same degree of party unity. Many members of Congress have a power base in their state and district which enables them to be almost entirely divorced from the national party. They can act as independently of the Chief Executive as they choose.

With these factors in mind, the standards by which President Hoover's partisan support in Congress is to be measured should not reasonably be expected to be too high. Although a quantitative measurement is perforce arbitrary, it seems reasonable that two-thirds support is the minimum level at which a congressional party should be expected to support their leader. Three-fourths of the congressional Republicans supporting Hoover should be regarded as a satisfactory level of support and congressional support in excess of 85 percent would be excellent. These are the standards by which Hoover's partisan success will be measured on the major roll-call votes during his Administration.

Tariff

The two relevant tariff issues centered around the establishment of rates and the inclusion of flexible provisions in the tariff bill to permit readjustment of rates by executive decree. Republican support for Hoover on the question of rates was limited. The key issue, however, was the flexible provision. With this provision included, Hoover was satisfied that rates could be revised downward. Republican support for Hoover was substantial on this critical issue. Senate Republican support for Hoover ranged from 75 to 83 percent, and House Republicans overwhelmingly supported him, between 93 and 94 percent, on flexible rates. On the most important tariff issue, President Hoover and the Republican Party found a common ground.

Farm Relief

Party support for the President on his farm bill was extremely strong, 94 percent of the Republican senators, and 99 percent of the House Republicans. Republican support was satisfactory on the export debentures issue as Senate Republican support ranged from 69 to 76 percent and House Republican support averaged 86 percent. Senate support for the President was more limited on relief for drought victims. Hoover was adamantly opposed to direct federal relief. A slim majority of 57 percent of the Republican senators agreed with him. The House Republicans were solidly behind Hoover, averaging 93 percent in favor of his position. On the farm question in general, Hoover and the Republican party demonstrated very close harmony.

Public Works

The public works issue centered on the question of how much responsibility the federal government should assume for relief work opposed to state and local governments, and whether federal programs would provide loans only for self-liquidating projects as opposed to direct federal relief. Senate Republican support for Hoover varied considerably, but averaged 73 percent. Republican support in the House, which averaged 88 percent, was again strong. A solid majority of congressional Republicans supported Hoover's views on public works.

Republican support for Hoover was a minimal 66 percent in the Senate on restricting immigration and on establishing a federal employment service. These issues were of limited consequence in the overall depression program and the House held no roll-call votes.

Reconstruction Finance Corporation

Perhaps Hoover's most far reaching proposal was the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Establishing the corporation was solidly supported by 92 percent of the Republicans in the Senate, and 94 percent in the House. The only controversial aspect of the R. F. C. was over disclosure of loan recipients. There were no Senate roll-calls, but House votes show 93 percent of the House Republicans voting for the President's position. Republicans were less solid in backing Hoover on who should be recipients of R.F.C. loans and for what purpose, but it was never below a minimal level. Again the Republican party and the President found a common ground.

Veterans' Benefits

One of Hoover's principal legislative setbacks came on veterans' benefits. The principal issue was whether benefits could be increased and whether eligibility should be liberalized. In addition, there was controversy over whether benefits were a reasonable method of distributing funds to boost the economy. Hoover opposed these proposed changes, but was severely rebuffed as two vetoes were overridden. In the 71st Congress, Senate Republicans averaged only 54 percent in support of the President, and House Republicans were even lower at 46 percent. In the next Congress Republican support increased to 61 percent in the Senate and 69 percent in the House. Hoover and the congressional Republicans failed to reach substantial agreement on this issue.

Taxation

The most controversial tax issue, the manufacturer's sales tax, was the principal feature of Hoover's revenue program. Only one-half of the Senate Republicans accepted Hoover's proposal on a direct vote. Slightly more House Republicans, 53 percent, supported the President. Without this important tax provision, the Republicans accepted the revenue bill by wide margins, 73 percent in the Senate and 86 percent in the House. There was greater Republican support for Hoover's income tax increase proposal, 62 percent in the Senate and 67 percent in the House. The only other controversy, over tax refunds, was less important but Hoover enjoyed more Republican

support, 61 percent of the Senate Republicans, and 88 percent of the House Republicans. Congressional Republicans failed to support Hoover solidly on the principal issue, the manufacturer's sales tax, but Hoover consistently had the support of a limited majority of Congressional Republicans.

Reduced Expenditures

Controversy over reducing government costs revolved around flat cuts in the budget, reduction in the pay of federal employees, and administrative reorganization. The first two were emergency measures to meet the crisis. On the question of flat budget cuts Republican support for Hoover was limited. From 57 to 79 percent of the Senate Republicans backed Hoover, while on the one vote recorded only 27 percent of the House Republicans backed the President. On the furlough plan, Senate Republican support ranged from 43 to 97 percent and House Republicans between 65 and 97 percent. During the 72nd Congress, the critical period for the economy program, the overall Republican average was only 64 percent in both the House and the Senate. Party support was mixed, but it was generally less than the minimal support for a President's legislative program. There was only one key vote on the issue of executive reorganization. Hoover's reorganization proposal was rejected in the second session of the 72nd Congress despite 98 percent of the House Republicans supporting the President's plan. Other votes on executive reorganization usually demonstrated satisfactory levels of support for Hoover's proposals.

Banking and Finance

There were many varied proposals related to banking and finance. Republican support on the Federal Land Bank ranged from 35 percent in the Senate to 90 percent in the House. Senate Republicans backed Hoover's recommendations on the Home Loan Bank by 68 percent. The principal banking and finance issue centered on currency expansion. Both Senate and House Republican support for the President's position averaged 62 percent. On banking reforms, 95 percent of the House Republicans and 71 percent of the Senate Republicans voted for Hoover's proposal. Senate Republicans supported Hoover's bankruptcy proposals more strongly with an 89 percent average. Overall, the Senate Republicans averaged 64 percent on banking and finance issues and House Republicans averaged 71 percent. Their support was minimal on most banking and finance proposals.

Debts Moratorium

Republican support of the President was very strong on this issue, 86 percent in the Senate and 98 percent in the House. The President and congressional Republicans had no real disagreement over granting the moratorium.

Non-Depression Policies

Republican support for Hoover's non-depression policies was generally more than adequate. On reapportionment, it averaged approximately 83 percent in both the House and the Senate. Republican support in the Senate for the London Naval Treaty was equally

strong. On Interstate Commerce Commission control of motor buses, House Republicans backed Hoover by 89 percent, while less than a majority of Senate Republicans supported the President. Hoover lost overall Republican support on the question of Philippine independence when only 43 percent of the House and 53 percent of the Senate Republicans responded to Hoover's recommendations. The President fared somewhat better with the Republican party on the Muscle Shoals controversy. Hoover strongly opposed public ownership of the facility. In the Senate, 59 percent of the Republicans agreed with him and 74 percent of the House Republicans supported his stand. The final non-depression issue, prohibition, was extremely controversial. There were two closely related questions, legalizing beer and the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. On these questions, 63 percent of the Senate Republicans supported Hoover's stand while only 53 percent of the House Republicans supported his position on prohibition. The President had only limited agreement with the congressional Republicans on this issue.

On depression issues, Hoover enjoyed solid Republican support on the tariff, farm relief, public works, R.F.C., and the War Debts Moratorium. He received adequate Republican support on banking and finance, but Republican support barely reached a minimal level on the reduction of government expenditures. It was less than adequate on taxation and veterans' benefits. Republican support on non-depression issues was essentially the same for Hoover's proposals as it

on the depression program. Congressional support was very strong on reapportionment, the London Naval Treaty, and the Motor Bus bill. Republican support was reasonably good on Muscle Shoals. It was mixed on the question of Philippine independence and prohibition, as both issues cut across partisan lines. It was not unusual to find as many Democrats as Republicans supporting Hoover's views on these two controversial issues.

On both depression and non-depression policies, Hoover experienced solid Republican support on a majority of the issues, satisfactory support on approximately one-quarter of the other issues, and inadequate support on the remaining one-quarter.

Further indication of President Hoover's partisan backing can be determined by looking at a compilation of all the votes taken on the preceding issues during his term of office. On the following chart, all votes have been included to provide an overall look at the partisan breakdown on Hoover's legislative program.

TABLE III

COMPREHENSIVE TABULATION OF MAJOR ISSUES DURING
THE 71ST AND 72ND CONGRESSES

Type of Issue	71st Congress							
	House				Senate			
	Repub.		Demo.		Repub.		Demo.	
Depression issues.....	17	66%	17	19%	24	64%	24	28%
Non-depression issues....	7	80%	7	32%	8	69%	8	27%
All issues.....	24	70%	24	23%	32	64%	32	28%
	Number of Votes	Percent voting with Hoover	Number of Votes	Percent voting with Hoover	Number of Votes	Percent voting with Hoover	Number of Votes	Percent voting with Hoover

Type of Issue	72nd Congress							
	House				Senate			
	Repub.		Demo.		Repub.		Demo.	
Depression issues.....	34	77%	34	26%	41	67%	41	41%
Non-depression issues....	7	52%	7	25%	15	58%	15	48%
All issues.....	41	73%	41	26%	56	65%	56	43%
	Number of Votes	Percent voting with Hoover	Number of Votes	Percent voting with Hoover	Number of Votes	Percent voting with Hoover	Number of Votes	Percent voting with Hoover

TABLE IV

COMPREHENSIVE TABULATION OF MAJOR AND MINOR VOTES WITH
THE 71ST AND 72ND CONGRESSES COMBINED

Type of Issue	Major Votes - Both Congresses							
	House				Senate			
	Repub.		Demo.		Repub.		Demo.	
Depression issues.....	51	73%	51	24%	65	65%	65	36%
Non-depression issues....	14	67%	14	29%	23	62%	23	41%
All issues.....	65	72%	65	25%	88	64%	88	38%
	Number of Votes	Percent voting with Hoover	Number of Votes	Percent voting with Hoover	Number of Votes	Percent voting with Hoover	Number of Votes	Percent voting with Hoover

Type of Issue	Minor Votes - Both Congresses							
	House				Senate			
	Repub.		Demo.		Repub.		Demo.	
Depression issues.....	13	62%	13	33%	15	69%	15	40%
Non-depression issues....	1	49%	1	21%	8	56%	8	45%
All issues.....	14	61%	14	32%	23	65%	23	42%
	Number of Votes	Percent voting with Hoover	Number of Votes	Percent voting with Hoover	Number of Votes	Percent voting with Hoover	Number of Votes	Percent voting with Hoover

The major votes provide the significant totals. These are the congressional roll-calls that were directly related to an important policy question on which President Hoover had made his position known. Republican House support for the President on all votes during the 71st Congress was only 70 percent, lower than the level regarded as satisfactory. When just the depression votes are considered, House Republicans back the President's policies at a minimal 66 percent level. The situation in the Senate during the 71st Congress was similar. Senate Republicans supported Hoover more consistently on non-depression policies than they did on his depression programs. They voted for 64 percent of all his proposals, which included the non-depression votes, but for only 62 percent of his depression programs. In either case, Senate Republicans in the 71st Congress showed little reluctance to vote against Administration programs.

There was an improvement in the level of support for the President during the 72nd Congress. House Republicans backed his programs at a 73 percent level on all votes. The support index was higher when the non-depression votes are excluded, being 77 percent on the depression votes. The level of support from Senate Republicans during the 72nd Congress showed an increase from the 71st Congress, but it was still lower than the level of support in the House. Senate Republicans had a 65 percent support index on all votes, 67 percent on depression votes.

Combining both sessions of Congress, the House Republicans backed the President's legislative program at 72 percent on all votes, less than a satisfactory level of support. The presidential support index of Senate Republicans was lower at 65 percent. Neither figure was high enough to be the basis for a sense of close kinship between President Hoover and the Congressional Republicans during the 71st and 72nd Congresses.

The level of Republican support that Hoover experienced was relatively low during the 71st and 72nd Congresses, although it varied considerably from one issue to another. Contemporary reviews of the Hoover Administration made frequent reference to factions within the party. The "Progressive" Republicans were normally differentiated from the "Regular" Republicans. This division within the party combined with Democratic opposition made it doubly difficult for Hoover to get his legislative program through Congress. In spite of this, Hoover was very successful. The only significant controversy that Hoover lost in the 71st Congress was over veterans' benefits.¹ Hoover also received essentially everything he wanted from the 72nd Congress despite a Democratic House and a Senate with a Republican majority of one.² The only time the President had real difficulty was in the second session of the 72nd Congress. As a lame duck President, Hoover was in no

¹Romasco, p. 214.

²Ibid., p. 221.

position to exert pressure. The lame duck session also had 158 members in Congress who had been defeated in the November election, and the result was a stalemate of inaction.³

Hoover's success with Congress came in spite of opposition from his own party. This opposition could have stemmed from a variety of causes. The New York Times suggested that the insurgency could have been caused by Hoover's dogmatism, his lack of active leadership, his refusal to share patronage with congressional Republicans, but finally concluded that the real reason was that hard times encouraged Republicans to revolt without fear of the political consequences.⁴ Others found Hoover's problems with the Republican congressional delegation the result of his political ineptitude and his inability to provide effective leadership.⁵ Another source of Senate Republican antagonism was attributed to the fact that Hoover created enemies during the 1928 Republican presidential nomination contest among senators who had presidential ambitions of their own.⁶ Regardless of the cause of the Republican opposition, President Hoover was successful in getting his programs through Congress in spite of a relatively low level of Republican support.

³Herring, American Political Science Review, XXVII, No. 3, p. 404.

⁴New York Times, June 8, 1930, sec. III, p. 1.

⁵Romasco, p. 210.

⁶George H. Mayer, The Republican Party, 1854-1966, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 403-405.

XII

ANALYSIS OF GEOGRAPHIC
REPUBLICAN SUPPORT

With loyal Republicans in firm control of the House, President Hoover could successfully withstand most of the Republican opposition in the 71st Congress. The situation in the 72nd Congress was quite different. Two of Hoover's close associates during his administration, William S. Myers and Walter H. Newton, the latter of whom served as Secretary to the President, established the following partisan alignment as accurately reflecting the membership of Congress. At the opening of the 71st Congress there were 268 Republicans, 166 Democrats, and one Farmer-Labor, a comfortable Republican margin. The Senate had 55 Republicans, 39 Democrats, and one Farmer-Labor member. Only 42 Republican senators were identified as "Regulars" who supported the President's program.¹ The 72nd Congress had, when it convened on December 7, 1931, 214 Republicans, 219 Democrats, and one Farmer-Labor member in the House, and 48 Republicans, 47 Democrats, and one Farmer-Labor member in the Senate. Of the 48 Republican senators, 12 were identified as progressives who formed a coalition with the Democrats to control the senate. There were 15 House Republicans

¹Myers and Newton, p. 32.

identified as progressives who aligned themselves with the Democratic majority.²

This partisan view of Congress suggests that support for the President's legislative program was favorably received by the bulk of the "regular" Republicans in Congress and that opposition consistently came from a limited number of insurgents. The previous vote tabulations provide no indication of the source of support for Hoover within the Republican party. An examination of individual Republican voting patterns during the Hoover Administration will determine internal party support. It will indicate if Hoover's legislative program had a high index of support among the broad base of Republicans in Congress with the opposition limited to a core of dissidents.

The following tables will present the congressional Republican voting record on selected issues that were of major consequence in Hoover's program to meet the economic crisis. The votes selected are ones on which the Administration's position was explicit and the issue in question was being voted on directly. In the event of repetitious votes, the final vote was used as the one most indicative of loyalty to the Administration. This was the vote on which the issue was finally resolved and the one subject to the greatest pressure from all sources. These votes will be used to illustrate

²Ibid., p. 146.

the internal Republican support for Hoover's proposals.

These tables include all members present and voting as well as those who were listed in the Congressional Record as being paired for or against the bill being voted on. Those members whose position on a bill was announced in the Congressional Record, but was not included among those paired in the Record, are also included in the tabulation as being paired for or against the bill. The general pairs, which are not established as a result of a specific request do not identify voting position, and are simply listed as "not voting". A blank space in the tabulation indicates that member of Congress was not serving at the time the particular vote was taken. The table is arranged on the basis of state delegations to permit a study of the geographical basis of Republican support as well as the percentage of support for the President from each individual member.

To be included in the tabulation totals for a state, it was necessary for a legislator to be recorded on 30 percent of the selected votes. The state totals are then compiled on a regional and national basis to provide some indication of where Hoover experienced his most consistent backing. The regional and national averages are compiled from individual support totals to allow for the variation in the number of representatives in each state's congressional delegation.

VOTING RECORD OF SENATE REPUBLICANS ON SELECTED ISSUES
ON HOOVER'S RECOMMENDATIONS DURING THE
71ST AND 72ND CONGRESSES

Senators	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	
	71st Cong., 1st Sess.,	71st Cong., 1st Sess.,	71st Cong., 2nd Sess.,	71st Cong., Special Sess.,	71st Cong., 3rd Sess.,	71st Cong., 3rd Sess.,	71st Cong., 3rd Sess.,	72nd Cong., 1st Sess.,	72nd Cong., 1st Sess.,	72nd Cong., 1st Sess.,	72nd Cong., 1st Sess.,	72nd Cong., 1st Sess.,	72nd Cong., 1st Sess.,	72nd Cong., 1st Sess.,	72nd Cong., 1st Sess.,	72nd Cong., 1st Sess.,	72nd Cong., 1st Sess.,	72nd Cong., 2nd Sess.,	72nd Cong., 2nd Sess.,	72nd Cong., 2nd Sess.,	72nd Cong., 2nd Sess.,	Average	
	Reapportionment	Export Debenture	Flexible Tariff	London Naval Treaty	Human Relief Dole	Veterans' Bonus - 50%	Muscle Shoals	Regon. Fin. Corp.	Executive Reorganization	Income Tax Cut	72nd Cong., 1st Sess.,	Manufacturers Sales Tax	72nd Cong., 1st Sess.,	Employee Furlough	72nd Cong., 1st Sess.,	Beer Bill	72nd Cong., 1st Sess.,	Home Loan Bank	72nd Cong., 1st Sess.,	72nd Cong., 1st Sess.,	Home Loan Bank	72nd Cong., 1st Sess.,	Prohibition
California	Johnson.....	Shertridge..																					
Colorado	Phipps.....	Schlyer.....	Waterman....																				
Connecticut	Bingham.....	Walcott.....																					

California	Johnson.....	Shertridge..																					
Colorado	Phipps.....	Schlyer.....	Waterman....																				
Connecticut	Bingham.....	Walcott.....																					

Key: + = voted in line with Hoover
 O = voted against Hoover
 P+ = paired in line with Hoover
 PO = paired against Hoover

NV = did not and/or announce a pair
 (blank space) = was not a member at that time
 * = members votes not included in state, regional, or national averages due to inadequate sample

TABLE V - Continued

Senators	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	
Delaware																							
Hastings.....	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	95%
Townsend.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	P+	+	NV	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	100%
Idaho																							
Borah.....	NV	0	0	+	0	0	0	NV	NV	0	PO	0	+	0	+	0	0	0	0	0	NV	0	18%
Thomas.....	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	P+	0	0	P+	NV	P+	+	0	0	0	0	PO	+	PO	65%
Illinois																							
Densen.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	NV	+	+	+	+	100%
Glenn.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	P+	NV	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	94%
Indiana																							
Robinson.....	+	P+	+	0	0	P+	+	0	+	NV	0	0	0	0	+	+	+	+	0	0	0	+	53%
Watson.....	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	NV	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	95%
Iowa																							
Brookhart.....	0	0	0	+	0	+	PO	0	0	PO	PO	+	0	0	P+	+	0	PO	PO	PO	+	+	28%
Dickinson.....								P+	0	+	+	0	P+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	86%
Kansas																							
Allen.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	0	0	0	+	*
Capper.....	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	0	0	0	+	66%
Kentucky																							
Robison.....			+	+	+																		*
Sackett.....	+	+																					*
Maine																							
Gould.....	NV	P+	P+	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	*
Hale.....	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	86%
White.....								+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	NV	+	+	NV	+	100%
Maryland																							
Goldsborough...	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	100%
Massachusetts																							
Gillett.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	100%

TABLE V - Continued

Senators	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
Michigan																						
Couzens.....	+	0	+	+	0	+	P+	P+	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	0	0	0	+	+	0	62%
Vandenberg.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	81%
Minnesota																						
Schall.....	+	0	0	+	0	+	NV	NV	0	0	PO	P+	0	0	NV	+	+	0	+	0	NV	41%
Missouri																						
Patterson.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	NV	P+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	90%
Nebraska																						
Howell.....	0	0	0	+	0	+	0	+	+	0	0	0	+	0	+	0	0	0	0	+	P+	38%
Norris.....	+	0	0	+	0	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	+	0	+	0	0	0	0	PO	+	29%
Nevada																						
Oddie.....	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	PO	P+	P+	NV	+	0	+	0	70%
New Hampshire																						
Keyes.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	P+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	+	+	95%
Moses.....	NV	+	P+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	85%
New Jersey																						
Baird.....			+	P+				+	NV	+	+	+	+	0	0	+	+	+	P+	0	0	*
Barbour.....																				+	+	77%
Edge.....	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	P+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	NV	+	+	0	*
Kean.....	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	85%
Morrow.....					+	0	+															*
New Mexico																						
Cutting.....	+	+	PO	P+	0	+	0	P+	NV	0	0	+	PO	NV	NV	NV	NV	0	0	NV	0	40%
North Dakota																						
Frazier.....	0	0	0	P+	0	+	0	+	0	0	0	+	0	0	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	25%
Nye.....	0	0	0	P+	0	+	0	P+	0	0	0	+	PO	0	+	0	0	0	0	0	+	29%
Ohio																						
Burton.....	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	0	NV	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	P+	*
Fess.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	90%
McCulloch.....			+	+																		*
Oklahoma																						
Pine.....	+	0	+	0	0	+	NV															*

TABLE VI

VOTING RECORD OF HOUSE REPUBLICANS ON SELECTED MAJOR ISSUES
ON HOOVER'S RECOMMENDATIONS DURING THE
71ST AND 72ND CONGRESSES

Representatives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
	1st Cong., 1st Sess., Reapportionment	1st Cong., 1st Sess., Export Debentures	1st Cong., 2nd Sess., Flexible Tariff	1st Cong., 2nd Sess., Muscle Shoals	1st Cong., 2nd Sess., Veterans' Pension	1st Cong., 3rd Sess., Human Relief Dole	1st Cong., 3rd Sess., Veterans Bonus, 50%	2nd Cong., 1st Sess., Racon. Fin. Corp.	2nd Cong., 1st Sess., Manufacturers Sales Tax	2nd Cong., 1st Sess., Income Tax Cut	2nd Cong., 1st Sess., Veterans' Bonus, 100%	2nd Cong., 1st Sess., Employee Furlough	2nd Cong., 1st Sess., Garner Relief Bill	2nd Cong., 1st Sess., R.F.C. Loan Disclosure	2nd Cong., 1st Sess., Currency Expansion	2nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Executive Reorganization	2nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Income Tax Refund	2nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Beer Bill	2nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Philippines Independence	Average support for Hoover

California

Barbour.....	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	NV	+	+	0	0	66%
Carter.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	0	82%
Crail.....	+	P+	+	0	0	P+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	PO	66%
Curry.....	NV	NV	NV	P+	PO	NV	NV	+	0	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	66%
Englebright....	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	0	58%
Evans.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	0	89%
Free.....	+	+	+	+	P+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	PO	0	89%
Kahn.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	79%
Swing.....	+	+	+	0	0	+	0	+	0	0	0	+	0	+	0	NV	+	+	0	47%
Weich.....	NV	NV	+	0	0	+	0	+	0	0	0	+	0	+	NV	+	+	0	0	44%

Key: + = voted in line with Hoover
 0 = voted against Hoover
 P+ = paired in line with Hoover
 PO = paired against Hoover
 NV = did not vote and/or announce pair
 (blank space) = was not a member then
 * = members votes not included in averages due to inadequate sample

TABLE VI - Continued

Representatives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Colorado																					
Eaton.....	+	+	+	+	+	P+	0	NV	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	94%	
Hardy.....	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	89%	
Timberlake.....	+	P+	+	NV	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	89%	
Connecticut																					
Fenn.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	NV	NV	+	NV	P+	P+	NV	P+	NV	PO	+	100%	
Freeman.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	P+	P+	NV	P+	PO	+	+	92%	
Glynn.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	*	
Goss.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	93%	
Merritt.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	100%	
Tilson.....	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	NV	P+	+	P+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	100%	
Delaware																					
Houston.....	+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	+	94%	
Idaho																					
French.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	79%	
Smith.....	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	NV	72%	
Illinois																					
Adkins.....	0	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	0	+	0	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	0	58%	
Allen.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	+	NV	94%	
Britten.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	P+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	+	+	89%	
Buckbee.....	P+	P+	+	+	+	+	0	NV	+	PO	NV	+	+	+	+	P+	0	PO	+	76%	
Chindblom.....	+	+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	95%	
Chiperfield.....	+	+	+	+	+	P+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	P+	NV	+	+	+	+	92%	
Denison.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	NV	NV	NV	P+	NV	+	NV	+	+	0	0	0	86%	
De Priest.....	NV	+	+	+	PO	+	0	NV	NV	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	69%	
Granata.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	NV	+	0	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	*	
Hall.....	0	+	+	0	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	0	68%	
Holaday.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	0	+	+	0	P+	+	+	+	0	68%	
Hull, Moron D..	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	+	+	NV	NV	NV	+	+	NV	100%	
Hull, Wm. E....	NV	P+	+	+	0	+	0	NV	NV	NV	NV	+	+	NV	+	+	+	+	+	77%	

TABLE VI - Continued

Representatives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Illinois - cont.																				
Irwin.....	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+												71%
Johnson.....	+	+	P+	P+	PO	+	0	+	NV	NV	0	NV	P+	P+	NV	NV	NV	P+	P+	77%
McCormick.....	+	+	P+	P+	+	+	0													86%
Michaelson.....	+	NV	P+	0	NV	P+	0													*
Ramey.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0													86%
Reid.....	NV	NV	+	P+	0	P+	0	+	NV	NV	PO	NV	P+	NV	PO	NV	NV	+	0	55%
Sproul.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+													100%
Yates.....	+	+	P+	NV	+	+	0	NV	0	0	0	+	+	+	NV	P+	NV	+	NV	71%
Indiana																				
Dunbar.....	+	+	+	NV	0	+														*
Elliot.....	0	+	+	P+	+	+	+													86%
Hall.....	0	P+	+	+	+	+	0													71%
Hickey.....	+	+	+	+	+	P+	0													86%
Hogg.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	0	0	+	+	+	0	P+	+	P+	0	68%
Johnson.....	0	+	P+	P+	+	+	0													71%
Purnell.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	+	94%
Rowbottom.....	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+												83%
Vestal.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+												100%
Wood.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	P+	NV	+	P+	+	P+	94%
Iowa																				
Campell.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	+	0	0	0	+	0	PO	0	+	0	+	0	21%
Cole.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	+	100%
Dickinson.....	0	+	P+	NV	+	+	+													83%
Dowell.....	0	+	+	NV	0	+	0	+	0	0	0	+	0	+	0	+	0	+	0	56%
Gilchrist.....																				33%
Haugen.....	+	+	+	0	0	+	0	+	0	0	0	+	+	PO	0	+	+	+	+	61%
Kopp.....	0	+	+	NV	0	+	0	+	0	0	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	56%
Letts.....	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+												86%
Ramsey.....	PO	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	89%
Robinson.....	0	+	+	NV	0	+	0	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	61%
Swanson.....	0	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	0	72%
Thurston.....	0	+	+	+	0	+	0	NV	0	0	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	56%

TABLE VI - Continued

Representatives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Massachusetts-cont																				
Gifford.....	+	+	+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	P+	NV	+	+	0	0	88%
Holmes.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	P+	+	0	+	83%
Luce.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	95%
Martin.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	+	94%
Rogers.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	95%
Stobbs.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	100%
Tinkham.....	+	+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	94%
Treadway.....	+	+	+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	+	94%
Underhill.....	+	+	+	P+	NV	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	P+	P+	NV	+	P+	+	+	100%
Wigglesworth...	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	95%
Michigan																				
Bohn.....	NV	NV	+	+	P+	+	0	+	+	+	+	NV	P+	P+	NV	+	+	PO	NV	86%
Clancy.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	P+	+	+	+	0	+	89%
Gramton.....	+	P+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	86%
Hooper.....	+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	94%
Hudson.....	+	+	+	P+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	0	0	P+	NV	0	0	100%
James.....	+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	37%
Ketchman.....	+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	P+	+	NV	+	+	+	0	82%
McLaughlin.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	P+	+	0	NV	86%
McLeod.....	+	P+	+	+	+	P+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	88%
Mapes.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	95%
Michner.....	+	P+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	84%
Person.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	0	0	0	+	+	0	+	58%
Vincent.....	+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	83%
Wolcott.....	NV	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	NV	+	+	0	0	73%
Woodruff.....	+	+	+	PO	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	72%
Minnesota																				
Andreson.....	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	68%
Christgau.....	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	PO	+	+	0	0	+	0	+	0	21%
Clague.....	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	0	0	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	66%
Goodwin.....	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	+	P+	NV	NV	NV	P+	NV	80%
Knutson.....	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	0	P+	NV	+	+	0	+	76%

TABLE VI - Continued

Representatives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Minnesota - cont.																				
Maas.....	+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	+	0	NV	0	+	0	0	0	+	+	0	0	53%
Nolan.....	+	+	+	PO	+	+	0	+	0	0	P+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	+	69%
Pittenger.....	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	0	0	68%
Selvig.....	+	0	0	0	+	+	0	+	0	0	0	+	+	+	NV	P+	NV	+	0	47%
Missouri																				
Dyer.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	0	83%
Ellis.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	100%
Halsey.....	0	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	P+	0	+	57%
Hopkins.....	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	74%
Johnson.....	+	+	+	0	P+	+	NV	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	83%
Kiefner.....	+	+	+	0	P+	+	NV	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	83%
Manlove.....	0	+	+	NV	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	P+	P+	+	0	83%
Niedringhaus...	+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	+	88%
Palmer.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	86%
Short.....	+	+	+	P+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	86%
Montana																				
Leavitt.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	NV	NV	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	76%
Nebraska																				
Baldrige.....	0	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	P+	0	+	P+	0	PO	75%
Johnson.....	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	0	57%
Sears.....	NV	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	0	0	+	0	+	+	0	P+	NV	0	NV	66%
Simmons.....	0	+	0	0	+	+	0	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	0	53%
Sloan.....	0	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	57%
Nevada																				
Arentz.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	NV	+	P+	NV	+	+	0	+	82%
New Hampshire																				
Hale.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	100%
Wason.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	95%

TABLE VI - Continued

Representatives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
New Jersey																				
Ackerman.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	P+	0	+	NV	+	+	0	+	100%
Bacharach.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	P+	0	+	83%
Cavicchia.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	91%
Eaton.....	+	+	+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	P+	95%
Fort.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	100%
Hartley.....	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	0	+	0	+	0	+	NV	+	+	0	NV	65%
Hoffman.....	+	+	+	+	+	P+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	86%
Lehbach.....	+	+	+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	95%
Perkins.....	+	NV	+	P+	+	P+	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	NV	+	P+	0	0	+	76%
Seger.....	+	+	+	+	NV	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	72%
Wolverton.....	NV	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	0	+	+	0	+	0	P+	+	0	0	50%
New Mexico																				
Simms.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	86%
New York																				
Andrews.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	83%
Bacon.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	95%
Clarke.....	+	+	+	+	+	P+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	P+	+	+	89%
Cooke.....	+	+	+	NV	P+	+	0	NV	+	NV	+	+	+	+	+	P+	0	0	P+	88%
Crowther.....	+	NV	+	+	+	+	0	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	94%
Culkin.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	P+	+	0	84%
Davenport.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	P+	89%
Dempsey.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	100%
Fish.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	0	83%
Hancock.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	0	0	0	+	88%
La Guardia.....	+	+	+	0	+	P+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	37%
Millard.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	92%
Parker.....	+	+	+	+	+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	89%
Pratt, Harcourt	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	NV	+	P+	+	+	+	0	+	89%
Pratt, Ruth....	NV	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	P+	+	+	+	+	P+	+	0	+	94%
Reed.....	+	+	+	+	+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	95%
Sanders.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	NV	NV	NV	P+	+	+	P+	+	+	NV	+	+	93%
Snell.....	+	P+	+	+	+	+	0	+	NV	NV	P+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	88%
Stalker.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	100%
Taber.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	89%

TABLE VI - Continued


Representatives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Oregon																					
Butler.....	+	+	+	+	0	0	0	+	0	0	0	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	NV	47%	
Hawley.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	100%	
Korell.....	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	100%	
Pennsylvania																					
Beck.....	P+	+	+	P+	P+	+	+	P+	P+	P+	P+	NV	P+	P+	NV	P+	P+	0	+	94%	
Beers.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	NV	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	100%	
Biddle.....	+	+	+	P+	0	0	0	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	*	
Brumm.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	74%	
Campbell.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	0	74%	
Chase.....	+	+	NV	NV	+	P+	0	+	0	+	+	P+	P+	NV	+	NV	NV	0	+	64%	
Cochran.....	+	+	+	P+	+	0	0	NV	NV	NV	+	P+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	94%	
Connelly.....	P+	NV	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	76%	
Coyle.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	P+	0	+	95%	
Darrow.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	89%	
Davis.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	43%	
Doutrich.....	+	NV	+	+	0	P+	0	+	+	+	P+	+	+	PO	NV	+	+	PO	NV	76%	
Erk.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	64%	
Estep.....	NV	+	+	+	+	+	0	NV	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	81%	
Esterley.....	+	+	+	P+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	P+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	71%	
Golder.....	NV	+	+	P+	P+	+	+	+	0	0	0	NV	P+	P+	NV	P+	P+	0	P+	73%	
Graham.....	+	+	+	P+	+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	100%	
Kelly.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	0	0	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	0	63%	
Kendall.....	+	+	+	+	0	P+	0	NV	NV	NV	0	+	+	P+	NV	+	+	+	+	64%	
Kinzer.....	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	82%	
Kiess.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	*	
Kurtz.....	+	+	PO	P+	0	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	68%	
Leech.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	88%	
McFadden.....	NV	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	NV	NV	0	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	+	69%	
Magrady.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	NV	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	88%	
Menges.....	NV	NV	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	*	
Porter.....	+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	*	
Ransley.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	89%	
Rich.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	PO	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	93%	
Shreve.....	+	P+	P+	+	0	+	0	NV	+	+	+	P+	+	P+	NV	+	+	0	+	82%	

TABLE VI—Continued

Representatives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Pennsylvania-cont.																				
Stokes.....	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	NV	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	83%
Strong.....	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	NV	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	82%
Stull.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	100%
Sullivan.....	+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	NV	0	P+	NV	+	NV	0	NV	71%
Swick.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	+	+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	94%
Temple.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	100%
Turpin.....	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	0	+	0	NV	+	P+	NV	+	+	0	0	63%
Watres.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	100%
Watson.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	+	94%
Welsh.....	+	+	+	+	PO	+	0	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	+	56%
Wolfenden.....	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	P+	85%
Wyant.....	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	NV	+	NV	+	+	0	P+	76%
Rhode Island																				
Aldrich.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	P+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	+	94%
Burdick.....	NV	+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	NV	0	+	94%
South Dakota																				
Christopherson.	0	PO	0	0	+	+	0	+	0	0	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	53%
Johnson.....	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	P+	NV	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	83%
Williamson.....	NV	0	+	0	+	+	0	+	0	NV	+	+	+	P+	0	+	+	+	0	65%
Tennessee																				
Lovette.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	0	+	+	P+	NV	+	NV	+	0	60%
Reece.....	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	NV	+	NV	+	0	100%
Taylor.....	0	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	0	0	0	0	0	NV	NV	+	NV	+	0	44%
Texas																				
Wurzbach.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	*
Utah																				
Colton.....	+	NV	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	0	82%
Loofburrow.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	0	0	85%
Vermont																				
Brigham.....	0	NV	+	+	+	P+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	P+	66%
Gibson.....	0	NV	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	0	P+	82%
Weeks.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	+	+	P+	NV	+	+	+	+	100%

TABLE VI - Continued

Representatives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Virginia																					
Garber.....	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	+	+	+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	71%
Lankford.....	0	+	+	+	+	0	0	+	0	0	PO	+	0	+	P+	+	PO	+	+	+	79%
Shaffer.....	0	+	+	+	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	57%
Washington																					
Hadley.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	84%
Horr.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	PO	+	0	+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	45%
Johnson.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	95%
Miller.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	86%
Summers.....	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	+	0	72%
West Virginia																					
Bachman.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	P+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	84%
Bowman.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	NV	+	+	+	+	+	83%
Hogg.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	0	+	NV	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	62%
Hughes.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	*
Shott.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	84%
Wolverton.....	NV	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	83%
Wisconsin																					
Amie.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	0	0	0	+	NV	0	0	+	0	PO	0	0	18%
Boileau.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	0	0	+	0	0	+	+	0	0	0	0	25%
Browne.....	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	+	0	0	0	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14%
Cooper.....	+	+	0	0	NV	0	0	+	0	0	0	+	0	0	0	+	+	+	+	0	33%
Frear.....	+	PO	0	0	0	+	0	+	0	0	0	+	PO	NV	NV	+	+	+	+	0	41%
Hull.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	+	0	0	0	+	0	0	0	+	0	0	0	0	0%
Kading.....	+	+	0	0	NV	0	0	0	0	0	0	+	0	0	NV	+	+	+	+	0	24%
Lempert.....	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	+	0	0	0	+	+	+	+	0	*
Nelson.....	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	+	NV	NV	P+	+	+	+	+	NV	30%
Peavey.....	+	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	+	NV	NV	NV	0	0	PO	0	0	0%
Schafer.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	0	0	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	50%
Schneider.....	+	0	0	0	0	0	NV	0	0	0	0	+	0	0	0	+	0	0	0	0	17%
Stafford.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	79%
Withrow.....	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	0	0	0	+	0	0	0	+	0	0	0	0	17%
Wyoming																					
Carter.....	+	+	+	NV	+	P+	0	+	0	0	0	+	0	P+	0	P+	P+	0	0	NV	59%




Regional averages

Pacific Coast.....	64%
Rocky Mountain.....	68%
Southwest.....	40%
Midwest.....	45%
Mid-east.....	70%
Border States.....	93%
Northeast.....	86%

National average...70%

MAP I

MAP SHOWING THE PERCENTAGE OF SUPPORT FOR HOOVER'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON
 SELECTED VOTES BY STATE, REGION, AND NATION IN THE SENATE
 DURING THE 71ST AND 72ND CONGRESSES



Regional averages

Pacific Coast.....	73%
Rocky Mountain.....	81%
Southwest.....	74%
Midwest.....	66%
Mideast.....	73%
Border & South.....	69%
Northeast.....	86%

National average...76%

MAP II

MAP SHOWING THE PERCENTAGE OF SUPPORT FOR HOOVER'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON
 SELECTED VOTES BY STATE, REGION, AND NATION IN THE HOUSE
 DURING THE 71ST AND 72ND CONGRESSES

The percentage of Republican support Hoover received on the selected votes in Congress provides an opportunity for a better internal analysis of the President's relationship to his congressional party. The level of Administration support in the Senate from the nation shows an increase of 5 percent on the selected votes over the 65 percent Senate average on the comprehensive voting record. The 70 percent figure is nearer a satisfactory level of support for Hoover's program on these key votes.

On a geographical basis, the highest level of Senate support for the President was generally from the eastern seaboard. Support declined progressively toward the west, reached a low in the Midwest, and then increasing somewhat nearer the Pacific coast. The regions with the highest and lowest levels of support, the Border states and the Southwest, both include small samples. The most relevant totals are the Midwest and the Northeast. The Northeast backed Hoover on 86 percent of the key votes, a very respectable level of partisan support. The Midwestern states, to the consternation of the Hoover loyalists, backed their party leader on less than half of the votes. The average of the Mideast states was also relatively low, but this is primarily due to the inclusion of Wisconsin. This state had the distinction of supporting the President on only 27 percent of the selected votes, the least of any of the 48 states.

It is reasonable to expect an Administration to face some opposition within its party, but hardly to the extent it experienced from Wisconsin and the Midwestern states. A historian of the Republican party, George H. Mayer, observed that most of the Senate Republican insurgents came from the Great Plains and the Rocky Mountains.³ The voting records bear out his observation about the plains states much more than for the states in the Rocky Mountains.

Administration loyalists were strongest in upper New England, Illinois, Ohio, Maryland, and Delaware. Five senators from these states backed the President at every opportunity. Senator Phillip Goldsborough of Maryland heads the list of Hoover loyalists, voting for Hoover's programs on all of the 21 selected roll-calls. Senator John G. Townsend Jr. of Delaware was equally loyal, except for one vote on which his position was not recorded. The Senate Republican Conference leader, James Watson of Indiana, voted for the President's programs 95 percent of the time. A total of 12 senators of the 52 in the sample voted with the President at least 90 percent of the time. Only two of them, Reed Smoot of Utah and Roscoe C. Patterson of Missouri, came from west of the Mississippi River.

Hoover's Republican opposition in the Senate was equally localized. There were 13 individuals in the Senate who had a support index below 50 percent. Only two of them, Wisconsin Senators John J. Blaine and Robert M. La Follette Jr., were located east of

³Mayer, p. 414.

the Mississippi. In his memoirs, President Hoover identified his chief Republican critic in the Senate as Senator William E. Borah of Idaho.⁴ Borah's voting record certainly bears this out. His was the lowest percentage of any Senate Republican, 18 percent. Most of Hoover's Senate Republican opposition was located in the farm belt states. North Dakotans Lynn J. Frazier and Gerald P. Nye, South Dakotans Peter Norbeck and William H. McMaster, Nebraskans George W. Norris and Robert B. Howell, Smith W. Brookhart of Iowa and Thomas Schall of Minnesota voted against Hoover on a majority of the selected roll-call votes.

These Midwest states, normally regarded as bastions of Republican orthodoxy by the average citizen, had felt the effects of the depression early in the 1920's, and had been pressing for more vigorous federal action to relieve their distress. Hoover's failure to satisfy the farm bloc's demand for relief was the principal factor in his loss of support within the Republican Party. Eliminating the seven farm bloc states of North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Nebraska, Iowa, and Kansas from the national average increases the President's support index from 70 percent to 79 percent, on the selected votes. Without this core of opposition, the support for the President from his Senate party reached a fairly respectable level.

⁴Hoover, pp. 101-102.

Examination of the key votes among House Republicans produce similar results. Members were included in the state, regional, and national averages on the same basis as the Senate Republicans. Only those whose position was recorded on 30 percent of the selected roll-calls were included in the averages. There were 294 Republicans who served in Congress during the time the roll calls were taken, and 14 of them were excluded from the state averages for lack of a sufficient number of votes to constitute a representative sample.

While the House general index of support was higher than the Senate, the geographical patterns of support for the Administration was essentially the same as in the Senate. The House also showed an increase in the national level of support on the selected votes over the comprehensive tabulation. Seventy-six percent of the House Republicans voted with the Administration on these key votes, while only 73 percent of them supported the President on the comprehensive vote tabulation.

As in the Senate, House Republican backing for Hoover was strongest in the New England States, above 90 percent, and on the eastern seaboard. Support then declined east to west, reaching the lowest ebb in the Midwest, and then increased somewhat in the western states. Northeastern states backed Hoover's programs at an 86 percent level in both the House and the Senate, a very impressive level of support. It would have been higher except the large Pennsylvania Republican delegation pulled the regional

average down somewhat. The Rocky Mountain region was the only other region in the House that supported the President at a level above the national average.

The Midwest was again the region with the lowest support index for the President. The House Midwest average of 66 percent, however, was well above the Senate average of 45 percent. The Pacific coast and Mideast backed the President at a 73 percent level in the House, both above their level of Senate support. The Mideast would have again been higher without Wisconsin. As in the Senate, the Republican House delegation from Wisconsin voted against Hoover with greater frequency than any other state delegation. It was far below any of the other states with a 27 percent index, the only state below 50 percent.

While the state by state comparisons of the House and Senate delegations show the House producing more overall support for the President, the relative support from each state within each particular house is essentially the same. The twelve states with the lowest level of support for Hoover in both the Senate and the House included eight duplications. The lower ranks included the farm bloc states; Wisconsin, North Dakota, Nebraska, South Dakota, Minnesota, Kansas, and Iowa, plus California from the West coast. Hard times for the nation's farmers were reflected in the voting pattern of their congressional representatives in both houses of Congress.

The states which had the high support indexes were not as

consistent, but Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Maine, Delaware, Ohio, and Utah were among the state Republican delegations who were consistently loyal to the Administration.

The most remarkably consistent Republican delegation in the House were the Representatives from Wisconsin. Only one of them, William H. Stafford, voted for the President's recommendations more than half the time. Wisconsin had two Republican Representatives, Hubert H. Peavey and Merlin Hull, who failed to vote for a single recommendation made by the President among the key votes. Five other Republican Congressmen from Wisconsin voted with Hoover on less than 25 percent of the selected votes. The only other Republican House members who fell below 25 percent in both sessions of Congress were Victor Christgau of Minnesota and Ed H. Campbell of Iowa. In his memoirs, President Hoover singled out two Republican House members for their lack of support, Fiorello H. LaGuardia of New York and Louis T. McFadden of Pennsylvania.⁵ LaGuardia had a low support index, 37 percent, but McFadden voted for 69 percent of Hoover's proposals on the selected roll-call votes. There were many voting records far less loyal to the Administration.

There were also several Republican Congressmen who consistently voted with the President's recommendations. There were a total of 29 who backed Hoover on 100 percent of the key votes in

⁵Hoover, p. 101.

the 71st Congress, and 14 in the 72nd Congress. Representatives Henry W. Temple of Pennsylvania, Francis Seiberling of Ohio, Gale H. Stalker of New York, Cyrenus Cole of Iowa, Willis C. Hawley of Oregon, and Charles L. Underhill of Massachusetts, were among those who served in Congress during the entire Hoover Administration and voted with the President on all of the key votes. The Republican leadership in the House also supported Hoover's position consistently. John G. Tilson, Republican Floor Leader in the 71st Congress, voted with the Administration 100 percent of the time on his selected votes. Representative Bertrand H. Snell of New York, Republican Leader of the 72nd Congress, supported the President on 88 percent of the key votes during the 71st and 72nd Congresses.

The national index for Administration support in the House, with the averages of the seven farm bloc states deleted, increased considerably, just as it did in the Senate. The national average increased from 76 percent to 82 percent when the votes of Minnesota, Wisconsin, North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, Nebraska, and Iowa are excluded from the national average. The 82 percent index of support places the House in a more favorable light for Hoover partisans. The farm bloc, with its combined index of 53 percent, constituted the chief opposition to the President's program in the House as well as in the Senate.

Conclusion

Generally, congressional Republican support for the Administration's legislative program during the depression years was low,

but as the issues became more explicit, and as Hoover's position was more clearly defined, the index of support increases to a reasonably satisfactory level, especially in the House of Representatives. The overall Republican support index on minor votes in both Congresses, where issues were ill defined, was only 61 percent for House Republicans. The index increased to 72 percent on major votes. On the selected key votes, support again increased to 76 percent. By the standards used to measure partisan congressional support, this is a satisfactory level. In the Senate, the Republican index of support is only 55 percent on minor votes. This increased to 65 percent on major votes, and finally to 70 percent on the selected votes. The lower level of Senate Republican support for Hoover was reflected throughout his Administration. When the source of support for the President within the Party is analyzed, however, there is great similarity in the voting patterns of House and Senate Republicans.

The center of opposition to the President in Congress was located in the Midwestern farming states, where the depression's effects were felt years before they were in the rest of the nation. Their distress was reflected in a demand for aggressive federal action to relieve that distress. Hoover's relatively modest legislative program failed to produce an enthusiastic response from these congressional Republicans. It seems reasonable to assume that the general turmoil caused by the depression invited

Republican senators and representatives in other areas of the nation to desert the Administration's legislative program. The level of party support for the President might have been higher under different circumstances. As it was, the conclusion that congressional Republican support for President Hoover's legislative program during the depression was relatively modest seems apparent.

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