

THE BRITISH VICTORY AT QUEBEC 1759:  
A STUDY BASED ON THE INFLUENCE  
OF BRITISH SEA POWER

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Much has been written regarding the British naval and military victory over the French at Quebec in 1759.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Christopher Hibbert, Wolfe at Quebec (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1959). Hibbert describes the capture of Quebec in 1759 as the most fateful, dramatic and important event in the history of the eighteenth century. "At four o'clock (September 18, 1759) the Bourbon flag was lowered from its mast on the citadel and Union Jack was hoisted in its place." p. 167. Thus Wolfe had helped to win an empire at Quebec. p. 184; Duncan Grinnell-Milne, Mad is He? The Character and Achievement of James Wolfe (London: The Bodley Head, 1963). Duncan calls the victory at Quebec "one of the most notable events in the annals of war," and adds that "Without the victory at Quebec, France might well be ruling yet over the St. Lawrence Valley and the territories west of the Alleghenies, the seaboard colonies might still be dependent upon England for support." p. 288. For a complete detail of Wolfe's activities in Quebec, see this source pages 220-57; George M. Wrong, The Conquest of New France (New Haven and London: Yale University Press and Oxford University Press, 1921). The author remarked that the battle of the Plains of Abraham was perhaps the only incident in history of a decisive battle of world import followed by the death of both leaders, each made immortal by the tragedy of their common fate, p. 222. Also see pages 198-224 for contrast of strategies of Montcalm and William Pitt at Quebec; Captain John Knox, An Historical Journal of the Campaigns in North America, 1757-1760. 3 Vols. (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1914-1916). This is the most valuable record of the North American campaigns. Captain Knox, an eye witness officer, recorded that the thirteenth of September 1759 should be known as the day of errors. Wolfe owed his qualified success to the fact that Montcalm made many mistakes as did his adversary. Vol. II, pp. 493, 105, Vol. III, p. 336; Francis Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, 2 Vols. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1900), Vol. II. Parkman claims that Quebec was a natural fortress and added that "Not four thousand men, but four times four thousand,

A great number of these works deal in the main with the military campaign in North America as a part of a three-pronged attack which William Pitt, later the Earl of Chatham, planned with Quebec as his objective. With this objective in mind, Pitt put a great deal of emphasis on the use of superior sea power. It is the major purpose of this thesis to examine the influence of sea power upon the British victory at Quebec.

In examining the influence of sea power at this period, a brief history of Europe and America is necessary before the story of the main chapters is brought into display. There is little doubt that the British use of sea power against France in Europe and North American combined operations, as a preparation for the campaign against Quebec, has demonstrated that sea power was a necessary weapon for victory.

Throughout this victory one must ascertain the significance of the problem. The major thesis of this work is that sea power was the influencing factor in the defeat of France both in the European theater and North America. However, in Europe the war involved the major European powers. It is interesting to see how the use

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stood in its defences; and their chiefs, (Canadians), wisely resolved not to throw away the advantages of their position. p. 209. He described Wolfe's alternative as "Victory or ruin." pp. 288-9.

of sea power prevented a large number of French army troops from being used against Britain's allies in Europe.

In an effort to present this topic in all its ramifications, it shall be necessary to establish as a frame of reference just what British policy has been toward the French. The writer will trace the struggle in both the European scene and the combined operations in North America. Then, the effectiveness of British sea power will be discussed to show how it destroyed the French economy, successfully blockaded the French ports, thus eliminating the enemy's use of communications and supply lines, and how this sea effort was used to win the confidence of the colonists and Indian allies in those years.

It must be noted that this struggle falls into two major divisions. The period from 1754 to 1757 marks the French victories, and is sometimes referred to as the dismal years, while the period from 1758 to 1760 marks the victorious years. During this period Pitt's combined operations began to bear fruit. General Wolfe managed to ascend the St. Lawrence river. France was forced to realize the strength of sea power as Great Britain managed to bring the colonial struggle into New France.

But France was not convinced of her naval weakness and ultimate defeat until the British began to pierce the

heart of New France. It was fantastic how the British navy and army cooperated in forcing the French citadel at Quebec to surrender. However, as expected when a colonial port falls, it was to be desired that it should also afford immediate protection against recapture from the land side. The French planned to recapture Quebec in 1760, but the attempt failed.

This paper will conclude with the final attempt of the British to hold Quebec. The British forces held against a desperate French siege, but reinforcements from the two mother countries were to determine the fate of the spring campaign. British sea power successfully denied the French forces the chance of receiving supplies and reinforcements from France. By so doing sea power played its final role and brought the long war to a successful conclusion.

The importance of this topic is indicated by its long range potential. The British victory at Quebec marks the end of French rule in North America. The fall of Canada has been interpreted by some historians to be a cause of the war for American independence. For the removal of the fear of French motives and encroachments from the minds of the American colonists, and the taxes which were levied in the colonies to help pay for the costs of war, precipitated the American Revolution and

the birth of the United States. A few years after the end of the war in Canada the first shots of the Revolutionary War were fired at Lexington, and the Americans were on the road to their destiny. It was, although Wolfe and Saunders would not perhaps have thought so, a happy ending.

## CHAPTER II

### THE ANGLO-FRENCH STRUGGLE BEFORE THE CONQUEST OF CANADA

#### I. THE EUROPEAN SCENE

##### The Diplomacy

Treaties of peace so often contain the seeds of war. The Treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle was no exception.<sup>1</sup> It contained two, both of which began almost at once to germinate and were destined to burst forth within eight years.

These were, first, the confirmation of Prussia in the possession of Silesia, at the expense of Austria;<sup>2</sup> and second, the delegation to a boundary commission of the disputed frontier in North America, between Great Britain and France. Silesia was a clear-cut issue, obvious to the world, and Austria wasted little time in starting diplomatic exchanges which she hoped would lead

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<sup>1</sup>D. B. Horn and Mary Ransome, eds., English Historical Documents, 12 Vols. (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1957), Vol. X, pp. 922-930. In summary the Treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle restored the conquests made during the war of Austrian Succession and thus left unsettled most of the causes for which the war had been fought.

<sup>2</sup>For the diplomacy of the Austrian Succession, see David Jayne Hill, A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe, 3 Vols. (London: Bombay and Calcutta: Longmans, Green and Company, 1914), Vol. III, pp. 439-476.

to the encirclement and downfall of Prussia, even at the risk of war.<sup>3</sup>

Under the old system an alliance between France and Prussia stood against a rival alliance between England and Austria. But whatever community of interests those four nations might have had with their respective particulars in the past, circumstances had changed. Their interests now diverged and the old system was not only old but obsolescent.

France and England were no longer fighting in the Austrian Netherlands; their rivalry lay over the seas, in America and India. Prussia and Austria, on the other hand, were struggling for Silesia in the heart of Europe. Because of these alliances Austria was expected to forward England's colonial claims, and England was obliged to support Austria's claim to Silesia.

It was inevitable that there should be an awakening and a fresh alignment of forces.<sup>4</sup> Wenzel Anton Kaunitz

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 539-540; Thomas B. Macaulay, Life of Frederick The Great (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company), p. 154. Macaulay says the purpose of Austria was to regain Silesia.

<sup>4</sup>Owen A. Sherrand, Lord Chatham: Pitt and the Seven Years' War (London: The Garden City Press Limited, 1955), p. 44; Diplomatic revolution, therefore, was not a result of an accident, but due to general causes which had been long at work. See Arthur Hassal, Periods of European History: The Balance of Power (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1907), pp. 206-207.

of Austria was the first diplomat to grasp realities and evolve new ideas. It was his object to slip Austria out of the English alliance and win France to a scheme for the overthrow and partition of Prussia. He hoped that Elizabeth of Russia might be induced to join Austria.<sup>5</sup>

If the parties concerned joined the scheme, there were advantages for all. The scheme held out to Maria Theresa (not only) the hope--the desperately cherished hope of recovering Silesia. Maintaining peace alone, it was hoped, could not restore Silesia to its lawful ruler.<sup>6</sup>

For the better part of a century the Bourbon house of France and the Hapsburgs of Austria had nursed a hostility based on diverse dynastic and territorial interests. French expansionism from the time of Louis XIV had periodically threatened the Rhenish principalities and the Austrian Netherlands.<sup>7</sup> Not only were

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<sup>5</sup>Hill, A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe, p. 543; for Kaunitz's Austrian future foreign policy, see Andrews, Eighteenth Century Europe (London: Longmans, Green and Company Limited, 1965), p. 186.

<sup>6</sup>Charles Grant Robertson, Chatham and the British Empire (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1946), p. 54.

<sup>7</sup>Pennsylvania Gazette, September 2, 1756. The Queen of Austrian Netherlands made a Treaty with France, it was learned in London by June 15, 1756, in which France would pay her eight million livre.



England and France chronically at war: France and Austria had come to be traditional enemies as well.<sup>8</sup>

Finally the equation of European Powers was balanced. All the great powers were involved. The Austrian Empire, Russia, France, Sweden, and, later, Spain, against Prussia, England, Hanover, and later Portugal.<sup>9</sup>

It is not, however, the object of this work to trace in any detail the causes of the conflict, or to assess its consequences; the political events affecting hostilities are mentioned only in so far as they influenced the fighting. The war in its wider aspects, even in Europe, will be dealt with only as the setting for the campaigns fought by England and Hanover as allies of Prussia.

France and Austria were to draw Sweden, then a respectable military power, into their coalition as well as Russia. Only by virtue of great military genius was Frederick the Great able, with the help only of allied

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<sup>8</sup>E. B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz, eds., Sea Power: A Naval History (Englewood Cliff: New Jersey, 1960), p. 47.

<sup>9</sup>Hill, A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe, pp. 519, 523; William F. Reddaway, A History of Europe: 1714-1814, 8 Vols. (London: Methuen and Company Limited, 1936), Vol. VIII, p. 225. (1,800,000 pounds went to Ferdinand of Brunswick for the support of the continental war.)

minor German states and British subsidy, to survive and keep his nation intact through seven years of war.

England was dragged into the continental war because Hanover belonged to her King, and could not stand seeing her humiliated by the existing enemies. For this matter, the Newcastle Ministry stood with the King of England for her defense. However, in 1756 Newcastle was dropped out of office, and William Pitt, later the Earl of Chatham, filled that position. Pitt was opposed to the use of English soldiers to defend Hanover. But, he was forced out of that office in the same year.

In the next eleven months England had a triumvirate sort of government which consisted of Newcastle, as first Lord of Treasury; William Pitt, as Secretary of State with full control of the war and foreign affairs; and Chesterfield, acting as go between.

But war seemed inevitable, although at earlier stages it might have been avoided without difficulty. There began a general search for alliances which soon developed into a complete reversal of former arrangements.

Maria Theresa, Queen of Austria, thirsting for revenge, sought under the inspiration of Kaunitz, a strict union with France and Russia. The tongue of Frederick, biting, uncontrolled, and especially in dealing with the frailty of woman, did perhaps more than the Austrian

diplomacy to facilitate these arrangements, for the Empress Elizabeth and Madame Pompadour were both stung to unremitting animosity by Frederick's reckless ribaldy.

Frederick the Great, however, took the first step himself.

While France was secretly carrying on negotiations with England, which continued to the end of 1755, and neglecting to renew her previous treaty with Prussia which expired in May 1756, Frederick signed with Great Britain in January 1756 the Treaty of Westminster<sup>10</sup> in which both parties guaranteed each other's possessions and bound themselves to take up arms against any power which should invade Germany.

This defensive plan should be considered as one of the causes of the two wars, separate in their origin and objectives, of France with Great Britain and Prussia with Austria, to merge into a single worldwide struggle which would decide the future of European State System as well as that of the British Empire.<sup>11</sup>

The news of this treaty was received at Versailles with consternation and wrath. The French court replied

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<sup>10</sup>Lord Rosebery, Chatham: His Early Life and Connections (London: Arthur L. Humpreys, 1910), pp. 400-401; For details of Westminster Treaty, see Horn, English Historical Documents, pp. 934-936.

<sup>11</sup>Robertson, Chatham and the British Empire, p. 65; For a good account of diplomatic revolution, see Andrews, Eighteenth Century Europe, pp. 185-192.

to it by the Treaty of Versailles (May 1, 1756), hurriedly concluded with Austria and extremely one-sided.<sup>12</sup> However, both parties agreed to guarantee each other's dominions, and a secret article, aimed at Prussia, made the compact more stringent. In August France diplomatically defeated her former ally (Prussia) by a treaty signed in August when Austria was once more to regain possession of Silesia and Glazt.<sup>13</sup>

It was hoped that this counter-balancing treaty to that of Westminster insured the peace of the continent. But the world did not know Frederick. It should be clear that Frederick was preparing for an attack. Two circumstances impelled him. He had become aware through a corrupt Saxony Clerk of Correspondence of a secret plan between Austria and Saxony "concerting a vast confederacy against him." The second was "that with Russia had been originally concluded a treaty with a view to operations against Frederick himself, and to that purpose the Empress Elizabeth was determined that it should be confined.

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<sup>12</sup>By this treaty France agreed to respect the Austrian Netherlands, from which she might have hoped for some compensation in case of success; Pennsylvania Gazette, November 11, 1756.

<sup>13</sup>Rosebery, Chatham: His Life and Connections, p. 401; Francis Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, 2 Vols. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1900), Vol. I, p. 354.

Lord Rosebery made it clear. "By personal declaration and by two resolutions of the Russian senate"<sup>14</sup> it was made clear that hostility to Frederick alone inspired the Russian share of the treaty.<sup>15</sup>

What Frederick saw and though was obvious. He saw the circle closing around him. Three outraged women were directing their forces of three armies against him.<sup>16</sup> His reliance was based on Britain and Prussia itself. Frederick had little time to plan how to carry the battle. Cognizant of the plot against him, Frederick determined to have the advantage of attack. Before the Saxons had well realized that war was impending, Frederick seized the Capital, the army and the compromising papers which he had hoped would justify his actions.<sup>17</sup> This was the beginning of the world-wide struggle known as the seven years' war.

Much has been written for and against the action of Frederick. Frederick defended himself according to

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<sup>14</sup>Rosebery, Chatham: His Early Life and Connections, p. 402.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>These outraged women were Maria Theresa (Queen of Austria), Elizabeth (Queen of Russia) and Madame Pompadour from France; Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol. I, p. 353.

<sup>17</sup>Rosebery, Chatham: His Early Life and Connections, p. 402.

the declaration in which he had stated, "in the inevitable war with Austria," that he possessed proofs of the complicity of Saxony in a conspiracy against Prussia.<sup>18</sup>

From a purely military point of view his action may have been a stroke of genius. But conceived, as it was, in a state of mental exaltation produced by the tension of an anxious situation, placed him in an unenviable light in the eyes of his contemporaries. Frederick captured Saxon Archives at Dresden which would prove that Saxony had joined a coalition for the destruction of Prussia. This meant that Saxony would be a guilty partner.<sup>19</sup> But the captured documents did not justify Frederick's actions.<sup>20</sup> Besides Frederick had demanded a treaty from Austria by requesting, "Peace or War" to Maria Theresa.<sup>21</sup> Frederick did not give his friends enough time to discuss the problem. Instead he declared war against Saxony after three days. However, this writer feels that Frederick's immediate purpose in the sudden invasion of Saxony remains a subject for discussion.

Frederick was not in error regarding the unfriendly attitude of Austria and Russia. Maria Theresa had never

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<sup>18</sup>Hill, A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe, p. 537.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 539.

forgiven him for robbing her of Silesia; and Kaunitz was planning, with the aid of Russia, the recovery of the lost province.<sup>22</sup> This was all that was necessary for the historical setting, a mere glimpse of the intrigues and rancors which were lashing all Europe into storm, perhaps the parliamentary arena would better put these destinies in both legal and illegal manner.

King George II's speech contained the following paragraph, which strikes the reader as something less than candid:

With sincere desire to preserve my people from calamities of war, as well as to prevent, in the midst of these troubles, a general war from being lighted up in Europe, I have always been ready to accept reasonable and honorable terms of accommodation; . . . from various appearances and preparations; . . .<sup>23</sup> formed against my kingdoms and dominions.

In the event of war numbers were expected to count a great deal. The population of Prussia was so small

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid., pp. 539-540, 543. Hill claims that the system of Kaunitz's diplomacy just before the invasion of Saxony had been to restrain Russia and stimulate France so that the three monarchies might be united against Prussia at a favorable moment.

<sup>23</sup>Rosebery, Chatham: His Early Life and Connections, pp. 403-404. For one interested in diplomacy of this period, see also James Harvey Robinson and Charles A. Beard, The Development of Modern Europe (Boston, New York, and London: Ginn and Company, 1907), and Reginald J. White, Europe in the Eighteenth Century (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), pp. 148-154.

as compared with that of a combined Russia, Austria, and France.<sup>24</sup> The possibility of tackling successfully this kind of a war was a job beyond Pitt's power. He was a genius of war strategy, but genius, up to the certain limit, can make good an inferiority in manpower, but even within that limit genius requires troops of the same quality as itself. Napoleon in 1814 and Lee in 1864 were to exemplify what Frederick's war revealed by 1760. Diminishing quality and numbers as against increasing quality and numbers can only end one way. And the same plain moral truth stands out in the basin of the St. Lawrence in 1759 and 1760, where the English had better leaders and superiority in numbers: for Nelson's axiom "that numbers alone can annihilate" is true of the land as of the sea.<sup>25</sup>

Pitt saw that if Prussia succumbed, Hanover would be lost, for a proclamation of neutrality by the electorate would be laughed at by the victorious Confederacy.

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<sup>24</sup>Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol. II, pp. 38-39; Robertson, Chatham and the British Empire, pp. 84-85.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 93; See also Albert Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1915), pp. 532-533, "If two maritime powers are at strike, the one that has the fewest ships must always avoid doubtful engagements." (Ibid., p. 289.)



In July 1757 the situation was depressing for Britain and her allies for the failures at Rochefort and Louisburg and the loss of Fort William Henry; a drawn battle against the Russians at Gross-Jagersdorf and Cumberland's capitulation at Hastenbeck, had made both the British and Frederick's situation very serious, but it was saved in November by the two classic victories in the West and East at Rosbach and Leuthen.<sup>26</sup>

The position of Russia during the diplomatic revaluation was of utmost importance.<sup>27</sup> It was the pivot of George II's foreign policy on the continent as articulated in the Anglo-Russian Subsidy Treaty proposal. An intensive study of the state of the military at that time would require a knowledge and understanding of fields that lie outside the scope of the present study. However, the calculation of Russia's enormous military potential was the key to Maria Theresa's understanding of her role in European policies which was being threatened by the Anglo-French struggle. This conflict

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<sup>26</sup>Reginald A. Savory, His Britannic Majesty's Army in Germany During the Seven Years' War (London: at the Clarendon Press, 1966), pp. 47, 52, 57.

<sup>27</sup>Herbert H. Kaplan, Russia and the Outbreak of The Seven Years' War (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 3-14, et. Passim.

indirectly provided Russia with a patiently awaited opportunity to carry out her designs.<sup>28</sup>

Frederick feared most an invasion from the east by the Russians under British pay. It was partly because of that conviction that Frederick concluded the Convention of Westminster in 1756.<sup>29</sup> But diplomatic talks between Russia and England did not fare well. Elizabeth was dismayed by the British refusal to accept her interpretation of the Anglo-Subsidy Treaty. She was outraged by the Convention, but these disappointments could not dampen her aggressive spirit. She plunged ahead with her military mobilization. A letter to Newcastle clearly shows why England changed her position.

I quite agree with your grace that no better use could be made of the Russian treaty in the present circumstances. I say in the present circumstances because . . . the moment we cannot make

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<sup>28</sup>Kaplan, Russia and the Outbreak of the Seven Years' War, p. 125. It should be noted that Russia was the key to containment of Prussia. In case of war, Russia could invade and occupy east Prussia. Britain could also employ 60,000 Russian troops to attack Prussia in case an alliance with Russia was concluded.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., pp. 36-46. The Convention of Westminster blew up any chances of Britain's employment of Russian troops; unless Frederick broke the convention. It was through this convention that France was able to gain Russia as her ally.

up our matters with Vienna, the only thing left is to keep terms with Russia.<sup>30</sup>

Great Britain had at her disposal some fifty-five thousand Russian mercenaries who were ready to strike a death blow at Prussia.<sup>31</sup>

If military mobilization is to be construed as a precipitant of war, then Russia, not Austria or Prussia, whose mobilization followed Russia's by months, is culpable. The provocation once made had to be dealt with, and Frederick again reacted to Russia's foreign policy; but this time he contracted for war by invading Saxony. Elizabeth welcomed the act as if Prussia had attacked Russia itself. Elizabeth, however, was successful on the diplomatic front with both France and Austria. France accepted Russia as a profitable ally for France had everything to gain by opening up substantial commercial relations with Russia. A report regarding maritime trade shows:

It is apparent . . . that of the 1,500 ships which frequent the ports of the Baltic every year, one sees hardly five or six (ships) that are French.

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<sup>30</sup>Holderness to Newcastle, August 3, 1755, Quoted in Kaplan, Russia and the Outbreak of the Seven Years' War, p. 57.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., pp. 20-21. The provision of fifty-five thousand troops was a part of a short lived treaty signed in August 9, 1755. Britain was obliged to pay one hundred thousand pounds plus four hundred thousand pounds if Russians went outside Russia.

And conversely, only three Russian ships out of 50,000 vessels had entered French ports during the years 1755-1757.<sup>32</sup>

In August 1756 the culmination of nearly a year's secret diplomacy between France and Russia was already achieved. It may be said that the secret of France was its stubborn refusal to throw over all policies and to unite boldly and wholly with the rising power of the Russian Empire in 1756. It only remains to be said that France could have saved the peace of Europe and its own fortunes had she long before allied herself directly with Russia to preserve the peace.<sup>33</sup>

#### The Blockade System

Not until 1756 was war officially declared.<sup>34</sup> But depredations by English privateers and naval units, and the public announcements of the secretly negotiated treaty between England and Prussia made an overt

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<sup>32</sup>Lawrence J. Oliva, Misalliance: A Study of French Policy in Russia During the Seven Years' War (New York: New York University Press, 1964), p. 78.

<sup>33</sup>Hill, A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe, Vol. III, pp. 514-531 et. Passim, pp. 588-590.

<sup>34</sup>Virginia Gazette, August 27, 1756.

declaration of war and a spreading of hostilities inevitable.<sup>35</sup> In the past when England allied with Austria, France could by striking at the Austrian Netherlands (now Belgium) secure a foothold (quid pro quo) to exchange for any colonies she might lose to superior British sea power.<sup>36</sup>

The new alliance system made this impossible. France could strike Hanover, to be sure, but England's alliance with Frederick made this strategy less certain. The obvious remaining alternative was a cross-channel invasion of England herself, a blow struck before England could fully marshall her naval resources or prepare adequate land defenses.<sup>37</sup> In the context of more recent history it seems quixotic to plan a sea-borne invasion without effective naval supremacy (for which the French had no real prospect or plan). But in 1755 an invasion

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<sup>35</sup>Robertson, Chatham and the British Empire, pp. 91-92. The whole law of privateering easily degenerated into purely piracy in the 18th century. Powerful British trading interests pressed Pitt to let open all seas.

<sup>36</sup>Potter, Sea Power, p. 47. In an attempt to define sea power Potter claimed, "(sea power) is clearly more inclusive than naval power. It comprises not only combat craft and weapons but also auxiliary craft, commercial shipping, bases and trained personnel. It is measured in terms of ability to use the sea in defiance of rivals and competitors." (Ibid., p. 19).

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., Pennsylvania Gazette, July 1, 1756.

by evading the British navy was still thought possible.<sup>38</sup> It is against this background that the Minorca operation must be examined.

Through diplomatic channels and intelligence reports, the British cabinet and the British people were apprised of these preparations and of the invasion scheme. With England's tiny professional army widely scattered, and a large part of her navy dispersed on foreign stations, there was something very like a panic in London.<sup>39</sup> To the Duke of Newcastle, then Chief Minister, and his advisers, it seemed self-evident that no effort should be spared to strengthen military defenses at home and most particularly to enlarge the channel fleet at the expense of all other prospective theaters of war whatever.

It was soon evident that the French government and the French navy backed the aggressive spirit of Belle Isle, Minister for War, and lacked material means as well. If England was not ready to defend against

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<sup>38</sup>As recently as 1745 such diversion had been particularly successful. As will be seen, fears of an invasion from France would on an occasion dominate British strategic thinking, particularly during the wars of the French Revolution and Empire (1793-1815).

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., October 7, 1756. The French claimed that the British naval forces had not kept full vigilance and as such ten thousand French soldiers were sent to Canada.

an invasion, France was not ready to mount it, and when the French commanders reached the point of translating the bold plan into an effective operational blueprint, they shielded away. But in throwing into confusion the defensive strategy of Britain, the French gained the priceless advantage of surprise in the Mediterranean theater of operation. One hundred and fifty transports carrying fifteen thousand troops under the Duc de Richelieu and twelve ships of the line under the Marquis de la Galissoniere were assembled at Toulon. The diversion against Minorca had now become the main operation.<sup>40</sup>

The French landings were made on Minorca in mid-April 1756, and planted a strong three thousand man garrison at St. Philip which covered the main city, Port of Mahon.

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<sup>40</sup>For a detailed information of the failure of Minorca, see Horn, ed., "Captain Augustus Harvey's account of the Failure to Relieve Minorca, May 1756," The English Historical Documents, 1714-1783, Vol. X, pp. 855-861. It should be realized that the French were building vessels in a rapid manner. "In a few weeks at the end of 1756 five new warships and one frigate were launched in Toulon alone," see Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser, March 24, 1757. It should be realized that the invasion of Great Britain has been a difficult assignment for invaders. Sea-barrier and difficulties of sea transports make England safe from invasion. For details of this geographic nature, see Alfred L. Rowse. The Spirit of English History (London: Jonathan Cape), p. 12.

The British naval strength was weak in the Mediterranean. The action to encounter the French was taken belatedly.<sup>41</sup> John Byng was sent to the Mediterranean with ten ships of the line. But after an attempt to engage Marquis Galissoniere, Byng headed for Gibraltar. The British general in Minorca, Blakeney, held his position before he surrendered.<sup>42</sup> Byng had not, in a tactical sense, lost the battle. But he had done worse: "he had failed to win one when a victory was psychologically necessary." A victory was so essential that Byng was charged with cowardice in the face of the enemy, and found guilty. Finally Byng was tried for failure to "do his utmost" to defeat the enemy.<sup>43</sup> For this offense Byng was accordingly shot. By his death Byng accomplished more for his service than by his living deeds.<sup>44</sup>

The unrelieved British disasters of 1756, seen in the perspective of history, were a blessing in disguise.

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<sup>41</sup>Potter, Sea Power, p. 48.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 51; Pennsylvania Gazette, October 28, 1756; Michael Lewis, The History of British Navy (Fairlawn: New Jersey, 1959), p. 128.

<sup>43</sup>Potter, Sea Power, p. 51.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., "The discussion, and difference of opinions on this sentence is incredible," see Katherine A. Esdaile, ed., Walpole and Chatham, 1714-1760 (London: G. Bell and Company Limited, 1912), p. 97.



They forced a cabinet shuffle by the incompetent Duke of Newcastle and his government. The elder William Pitt, darling of the House of Commons and of the English people, anathema to King George and rival to Newcastle, was invited to join the government.<sup>45</sup> Such was the desperation of Newcastle and his party that they were obliged to accept Pitt on his own hard terms that he be principal Secretary of State for War, with virtually dictatorial power over troop and ship movements. Such were Pitt's energies and strategic genius that he became in effect the creator of the greatest chain of victories in all British history.

Since England was allied with Frederick, and since the protection of Hanover was a major objective of the war, it was obvious that any British government could easily find itself expending the bulk of its military forces on the continental war. There was in fact what might be termed a "continental school" of strategy within the British government, of which King George II himself was the ranking member.

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<sup>45</sup>In political fighting against Lord John Carteret (later the Earl of Granville) in Parliament, Pitt had excoriated Lord John's Hanoverian sympathies, and thereby had mortally offended George II's German patriotism.

Pitt strongly opposed aiding Frederick with a subsidy to support the Hanoverians with token forces and he also opposed the presence of a prince of the blood, which would relieve Frederick by drawing French forces from the coastlines by hit-and-run raids--these actions Pitt could approve as subserving his main plan. But the great prizes were overseas--North America, the Sugar Islands of the Caribbean and India. To Pitt the securing of these, permanently and irrevocably, was the great end of the war. Pitt was by temperament first and last an empire-builder.<sup>46</sup> His reasoning was simple:

England thrive on trade. The Empire nourished trade. Trade made for wealth. Wealth enhanced military strength.<sup>47</sup>

At that very time Frederick was in effect fighting England's battles by virtue of the chests of specie England was sending to pay his troops. Furthermore, on the battlefields of Europe, England's outnumbered little army could scarcely hope to be more than a pawn. In overseas war

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<sup>46</sup>Robertson, Chatham and the British Empire. Robertson says that Pitt was not the founder of the first Empire, but unquestionably he saved it in the great ministry (1757-1761), p. xi; For a good discussion of this war minister, see Owen A. Sherrard, Lord Chatham: A War Minister in the Making (London: The Garden City Press Ltd., 1952).

<sup>47</sup>Potter, Sea Power, p. 52; A similar statement has been supplied, see Klaus E. Knorr, British Colonial Theories (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1944), pp. 100, 81-95 et. Passim.

her naval preponderance could be utilized to best advantage. In terms of field strategy her navy must first cork up the French ports by blockade, keeping the French fleet segmented. Then any naval margin could be employed to convoy overseas expeditions and support amphibious operations in the four corners of the earth. And the British navy would of course cut off support from France to her colonies.<sup>48</sup>

The military successes of Prussia early in the war simply stimulated greater efforts by the French and the Austrians, who together had an overwhelmingly greater force. Frederick naturally demanded of his British allies more material assistance than the subsidy and the dubious support of a small English force under the Duke of Cumberland. A part of England's answer was the "conjunct operations"--amphibious raids against French ports. These campaigns were aimed incidentally for cleaning out nests of troublesome privateers that preyed on English coastal shipping, but their primary object was, by attracting concentrations of French troops from the eastern battle front, to relieve the pressure on Frederick in middle Europe.

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<sup>48</sup>The effects of this will be viewed through Chapters 3, 4, 5 of this work. As it will be seen later, France lost Quebec and with it the whole of Canada because she failed to reinforce her forces in America.

The first "conjunct operation" was directed against Rochefort<sup>49</sup> in the fall of 1757. In spite of the investing and subsequent capture of the island of Aix, lying just offshore, this expedition was correctly counted as a failure because Rochefort was not captured. That was due mainly to a lack of adequate planning which led the commanders to conclude that a landing was impossible. The undertaking, however, offered a negative object to Lieutenant Colonel James Wolfe, who was serving as chief of staff. Apropos of the ill-starred Rochefort campaign, Pitt remarked in a letter:

I have found out an Admiral should (endeavor) to run into an enemies' port immediately . . . ; that previous directions should be given in respect to landing the troops, and a proper disposition made for the boats of all sorts, . . . that pushing on smartly is the road to success . . . ; that nothing is to be reckoned an obstacle to your understanding . . .<sup>50</sup>

As Wolfe was to demonstrate at Louisburg and Quebec, the lesson was not on him.

The British scored a somewhat larger measure of success at St. Malo, on the Bay of St. Michel between

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<sup>49</sup>G. J. Marcus, A Naval History of England: The Formative Centuries (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), Vol. I, p. 288. The expedition ended in Fiasco. The British officers withdrew without giving a fight.

<sup>50</sup>Robert Wright, The Life of Major General J. Wolfe (London, 1864), pp. 396-397, Quoted by Potter, Sea Power, p. 53.

the Breton and the Norman Peninsula. St. Malo was home port for many small crafts whose owners in wartime turned naturally from fishing and the coasting trade to privateering. Here in June 1758 some thirteen thousand British troops landed and spent a week ashore, burning more than a hundred privateers. The following August the British took temporary possession of Cherbourg and destroyed fortifications and shipping. A renewed attack on the St. Malo area achieved limited success, but a speedy French concentration drove the expedition back to its ships and destroyed the British rear guard ashore.

These were all relatively small-scale coastal raids, with no design to hold the territory captured. Even though these raids contributed to the strategic ends noted above, their importance was mainly psychological. They encouraged Frederick to believe in the reality of British military assistance. The effect on the outcome of the war on land was no more decisive than the guerre de course at sea. The completeness of England's supremacy at sea under Pitt's energetic ministry was beginning to create that feeling of universal jealousy in Europe which proved of so great a use to Napoleon in his attempts at continental federation against the island power. There is very interesting memoir by Choiseul, which shows that he at least realized how

great was the advance made by the power of Great Britain. By attempting to persuade the court of Stockholm to join the proposed descent on the Scottish coast Choiseul claims:

"I will end," he writes, "by saying that we in France have no other means of ending successfully a war that is becoming very dangerous to the equilibrium of Europe. We must not deceive ourselves. The true equilibrium depends in reality on commerce and on America. The German war, even if it be conducted more effectively than at present, will not prevent the evils that are threatened by the English on the sea . . ." <sup>51</sup>

Choiseul's whole plan was based on the fact that the English navy was so scattered that it might be possible for at least one of the expeditions to elude the vigilance of English admirals. <sup>52</sup> His scheme would have been an ambitious one if France had obtained the "Command of the Sea," however, under the conditions existing, it was little better than ridiculous. <sup>53</sup>

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<sup>51</sup>Walford Davis Green, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham and the Growth and Division of the British Empire, 1708-1778 (New York: London: The Knickerbocker Press, 1901), pp. 146-147.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 158; for Choiseul's plan, see Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, pp. 297-298.

<sup>53</sup>The best official definition of this concept, the test determining whether the command of the sea has been gained, is that it shall be possible to transport across the waters commanded a large military expedition without risk of serious loss. Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905 (Hamden: Connecticut, 1964), p. 65. See also H. J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1902), pp. 309-310.

Once Pitt had perfected his strategic dispositions and strengthened the channel fleet and both the Brest and Toulon blockading squadrons, he was prepared to push his empire-building plans overseas. He did not feel it necessary to wait for the total destruction of France's divided, land-blocked fleet. So in 1757, in 1758, and in 1759 were mounted important British expeditions, whose fortunes will be developed presently. To maintain geographic unity, however, it is here convenient to describe two fleet actions in European waters which in 1759 destroyed France's last naval hopes.

Undoubtedly the annoyance of the British "conjunct operations" helped to stimulate the French government to revive the discredited scheme of invasion of England considered earlier in the war. The bold and able Duc de Choiseul became the War Minister for Louis XIV. He openly planned to put a French army ashore across the channel. As in 1756, the prerequisite for success was to secure at least temporary naval supremacy in the "Narrow Seas" by concentrating there the entire French fleet.<sup>54</sup> This would involve bringing the Toulon squadron to Brest.

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<sup>54</sup>Potter, Sea Power, p. 54. It was of utmost importance that Choiseul should have given this topic a much better consideration. Crossing of this channel

When, in the late summer of 1759, Admiral Edward Boscawen temporarily abandoned the close blockade of the French Mediterranean ports to recondition at Gibraltar, the French Admiral De la Clue with ten of the line took this opportunity to attempt to escape to the Atlantic.<sup>55</sup> Though De la Clue weathered the Straights of Gibraltar, Boscawen was alerted by his watch-frigates and gave chase with his more heavily-gunned fleet of thirteen of the line and many frigates. De la Clue conceived it his proper mission to action and fled precipitately. Boscawen cracked on all sail, and by accident of wind and weather brought the French to the bay of the Portuguese coast.<sup>56</sup> Since the French would not stand and fight, there was no question of formalist line of tactics here.<sup>57</sup> It was a general chase. By sheer hard fighting the British fleet defeated the French squadron, and drove the survivors into Lagos Bay, which gives the battle its name.<sup>58</sup> There

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<sup>54</sup>(continued) was not equivalent to a river crossing. The Spanish Armada, 1588, and later an attempt by Germany operation, "Sea Lion" turned out to be great destructions.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid.

<sup>56</sup>Lawrence Henry Gipson, The Great War for the Empire: The Culmination, 1760-1763. 8 Vols. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), pp. 11-12.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>58</sup>Potter, Sea Power, p. 54, Gipson, Great War for the Empire, Vol. VIII, p. 14.



De la Clue grounded his flagship and Boscawen, in violation of Portuguese territorial waters, captured three French two-deckers. Another French seventy-four gun ship was burned. The sortie of the Toulon fleet thus ended in utter disaster on August 18, 1759.<sup>59</sup>

In the fall of 1759, Admiral Comte de Conflans, commanding in Brest, seized an opportunity to dodge Hawke's persistent blockade. When a northwest gale made the Breton coast a lee shore, the British blockading squadron clawed back into their own channel ports. Conflans knew that the wind was his means of survival. But he hoped to defeat a small British squadron operating in the vicinity of Belle Isle, and then by dodging the channel fleet, possibly to support a landing in Scotland. But Hawke was too shrewd to be deceived. As he came down close-hauled from Torquay and Plymouth on the Westerly wind, his frigates reported the sortie of the French fleet from Brest. The English admiral guessed that Conflans must have entered the bay of Biscay. He sighted the French fleet off the Quiberon Peninsula, and swooped down like a falcon on his prey.

Like De la Clue, Conflans had no intention of standing and fighting even a slightly superior British

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<sup>59</sup>Ibid., pp. 17-24 et. Passim; Lewis, The History of the British Navy, p. 134.

force. Relying on a rising gale and approaching darkness, he led a retirement into Quiberon,<sup>60</sup> a reef-strewn difficult anchorage into which he could not believe the British would dare to follow. Hawke, saw his quarry in full flight and like Boscawen in Lagos Bay, felt free to fire a general chase signal. As the pursuit became protracted, the resultant formation was a straggling line with ships arrayed according to their sailing qualities.

The British followed in the French wake, their van engaged the French rear. Both fleets skirted the breakers on the rocks lining the bay entrance, firing when a target was presented. Hawke finally anchored when nightfall made chase suicidal. Two British vessels were lost, one by gunfire and one capsized. During the night seven of the French ships jettisoned their guns and, thus lightened, escaped over the bar into the shallow Vallaine river. Seven others slipped their cables and under cover of darkness made their way to Rochefort. The following morning the remaining of the French ships

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<sup>60</sup>See "Admiral Hawke's dispatch to the Admiralty on the battle of Quiberon Bay, November 24, 1759," Horn, ed., English Historical Documents, Vol. X, pp. 878-881. Hawke pursued Conflans and defeated him on November 20.

beached to avoid capture.<sup>61</sup> Thus was destroyed or scattered the last substantial French naval forces. Not again in the war would there be a French invasion threat to England nor could there be a substantial challenge to British naval supremacy.

Lagos and Quiberon Bay may be thought of as "twin actions" in that each was a decisive British victory, and in that end was by melee. Since the melee did not affect Pitt's major strategy, they were not of great strategic significance. They did, however, materially reduce the burden of the blockades of Brest and Toulon for the British fleet, and they have an obvious significance in the history of tactics.

The British squadrons were able to insult the coast of France at will. As a consequence France's sea trade was no longer merely disrupted, it was annihilated.<sup>62</sup> To cite only one case: in mid-December 1758 eight warships and several frigates were moored in the roadstead at

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<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 22. It should be noted that England with a population of eight million against France with a population of twenty million used sea power to put the island immune of invasion, See David Hannay, The Navy and Sea Power (London: Williams and Norgate, 1909), p. 247.

<sup>62</sup>Guy Fregault, Canada: The War of the Conquest (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 233; Philip Guedalla, The Partition of Europe, 1715-1815 (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1914), p. 57.

Brest unable to sail for want of crews.<sup>63</sup> Since France failed to defend her ports at home, it should be interesting to study the struggle in America.

## II. THE COMBINED OPERATIONS IN NORTH AMERICA

While Europe was busy with the diplomatic preparation of the Seven Years' War, men overseas were occupied with a more active prelude to its colonial struggle.

The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle had produced no solution to the problem that involved the Anglo-French expansion. The treaty even left undecided the Anglo-Spanish differences which had been occasion of the colonial war. But it was not between Spain and England or in the region of South America that the conflict was to be renewed. This time a direct trial of strength between Great Britain and France was to decide finally the control of North America.

The boundary between Canada and New England had not been fixed, and it presented a constant cause of trouble and border warfare. The country of the Iroquois

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<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 58; Fregault, Canada: The War of the Conquest, p. 233; It should be realized that the invasion of Great Britain has been a difficult assignment for invaders. Sea-barrier and difficulties of sea transports make England safe from invasion. For details of this geographic nature, see Alfred L. Rowse, The Spirit of English History (London: Johnathan Cape, 1943), p. 12.

or Five Nations and Algonquins lay between the frontiers of the English and the French settlements. The presence of the Redmen presented the area with warlike allies.<sup>64</sup> The Algonquins were always allies of the French, and the Iroquis were generally allies of the English.

The only means of communication was by its waterways and trails. Quebec and Montreal were the only towns in the interior. Since Quebec was the capital, any invasion of Canada must have Quebec for its main objective.<sup>65</sup> And, as there were no roads, any invasion must confine itself mainly to waterfronts. The most important of the waterways was the St. Lawrence, by which ships could ascend right to Montreal, if not stopped by hostile fleets or the cannon of Quebec. There were other minor rivers which also provided some communications.

The other two water routes by which Montreal and Quebec and the heart of Canada could be approached from the south were: first, the route by way of Lake Ontario and down the St. Lawrence; and the second, the route

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<sup>64</sup>The original five nations were the Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondages, Cayugas, and the Senecas.

<sup>65</sup>Since the objective of the British was Quebec, this paper has been tailored to provide Chapters III and IV to center at Quebec.

across Lake Huron and Georgian Bay. There were rapids above Montreal which provided a serious obstacle.<sup>66</sup>

The start of the war was no different from the other wars. George Washington must be regarded as an officer who opened up the French Indian War at Fort Le Boeuf in 1753, and his surrender at the Great Meadows in 1754.<sup>67</sup> This was followed by General Braddock's expedition in 1755. This was as well defeated and its force of 1,373 was cut to pieces and routed.<sup>68</sup> Although most of the earlier expeditions had turned against Great Britain, they may be ignored so that a real study of the combined operations may be carried on.<sup>69</sup>

The year 1758 opened up British victories and French losses in North America. The Great Pitt was made Premier of England and his execution of the war was to be by combined operations. So in 1758 and in 1759 were mounted important British expeditions, whose fortunes will be developed presently.

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<sup>66</sup>Mathew Forney Steele, American Campaigns, 2 Vols. (Washington: Byron S. Adams, 1909), Vol. I, pp. 4-5.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., pp. 6-7.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., p. 7. Braddock was over-confident. As a result sixty-three out of eighty-six of his officers were killed as compared to sixteen Frenchmen killed.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., pp. 10-11.

## Louisburg

Pitt's first move in America, in 1758 was to fit out a fleet and an army to capture Louisburg, with Quebec as the ultimate objective. Before the end of May the fleet and the army of eleven thousand British regulars were at Halifax. The army was placed under the command of General Jefferey Amherst and his most active officer proved to be James Wolfe. In a well planned amphibious assault, the fleet's boat took the troops to the rocky open coast despite French fire. The fleet managed to land many English on the shore and thus outnumbered the French, forcing them to the city where they would wait their destiny.

Boscawen's fleet cruised outside the French fort thus cutting off French reinforcements and supplies.<sup>70</sup> It was because of this protection that the British army was able to capture the French fortress to surrender on July 27, 1758.<sup>71</sup> The fall of Louisburg opened the way to Quebec.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>70</sup>Potter, Sea Power, p. 55; John Knox, An Historical Journal of the Campaigns in North America for the Years 1757, 1758, 1759 and 1760, 3 Vols., (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1914-1916), Vol. I, p. 41.

<sup>71</sup>Steel, American Campaigns, pp. 11-12.

<sup>72</sup>Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, p. 294.

## The Ohio Valley

For the French the Ohio was the necessary link between their two widely separated colonies. If France could manage to link Louisiana with Canada, then their defense would follow by establishment of a series of forts along the Ohio river.

The British also desired the possession of the Ohio. Its occupation would make England the future owner of the great West. There is little doubt, in view of the British and French claims that both nations were determined to win the Ohio Valley.<sup>73</sup>

The French constructed Fort Duquesne on the Ohio as a means of shutting up the English along the Atlantic seaboard and the mountains.<sup>74</sup> Great Britain had two alternatives; first, they would accept the idea of being shut up which is highly doubtful. And second, they could reduce the Fort. William Johnson, who had been imprisoned by the Indians, and brought the news that Fort Duquesne was guarded by forty to fifty enlisted

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<sup>73</sup>The Ohio remained as the cause of Anglo-French struggle in North America. Since neither side would consider a compromise, "The sword was to be the final arbiter." George M. Wrong, The Conquest of New France: A Chronicle of the Colonial Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921), p. 151.

<sup>74</sup>Rowse, The Spirit of the English History, p. 88.



soldiers.<sup>75</sup> This seems to agree with what Williamson wrote that Montcalm was faced with defense of all points at the same time and therefore had to recall the garrison from Duquesne to Canada. "Thus the Ohio was at length conquered without bloodshed and Fort Duquesne renamed Pittsburgh."<sup>76</sup>

Brigadier John Forbes spent a year clearing a road through the forests from Cumberland, Maryland, but was surprised to find the fort abandoned. The loss of Fort Frontenac to the British forced the abandonment of Fort Duquesne. The military advantage rendered by this event was that the French lost their Indian allies. By the capture of Fort Duquesne and Louisburg, Canada was contained and Pitt was able to plan for the kill.

### The Great Lakes Region

A close examination of the situation on the New York frontier reveals the truth. The year before, General Londoun failed to get four thousand men from the colonies. In 1758 Pitt requested twenty thousand men. In June 1758

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<sup>75</sup>Samuel Hazard, ed., Pennsylvania Archives, 1756-1760. First Series, 12 Vols. (Philadelphia: Printed by Joseph Severns and Company, 1853), Vol. III, p. 13.

<sup>76</sup>James A. Williamson, British Empire and the Commonwealth (New York and London: MacMillan and Company Limited, 1960), p. 160.

Abercromby had an army of fifteen thousand men, over six thousand of whom were British regulars encamped at Fort William Henry, at the head of Lake George. Though Abercromby was in command, Steele says the "soul of the army" was young Lord Howe. General Wolfe called Howe "the best soldier in the British Army."<sup>77</sup> De Montcalm was at Ticonderoga with only thirty-six hundred soldiers to defend it. This force should not be underestimated for it placed its batteries behind good defensive lines which had been secured since 1757. By noon on July 6, 1758 the British army landed on the north end of Lake George and was on the way through forests. Lord Howe was shot dead by hidden French guardsmen. The attack was made on July 8th, but it failed.<sup>78</sup> With this loss, Abercromby gave Pitt his sole loss for 1758.

On another quarter Colonel John Bradstreet scored a surprising victory over the French by capturing Fort

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<sup>77</sup>Steele, American Campaigns, p. 12; Much about the French war, see Francis W. Halsey, ed., Great Epochs in American History, 10 Vols. The French War and Revolution, 1745-1782 (New York and London: Funk and Wagnalls Company, 1912).

<sup>78</sup>Williamson, British Empire and the Commonwealth, p. 160; Robert Rogers, Journals of Major Robert Rogers (London: J. Millan, Printer, 1765), p. 11.

Frontenac on August 25, 1758.<sup>79</sup> This victory is regarded as next to Louisburg in importance. It ended the French command of Lake Ontario. New France was cut in two and it also opened up a good opportunity for the reduction of the interior. If Bradstreet's victory had been followed by another body of men, to reoccupy and rebuild Oswego, thus recovering a harbor on Lake Ontario, all the captured French vessels could have been brought thither and the command of this inland sea assured to Britain. Fort Duquesne was deprived of the supplies on which it depended and therefore was not expected to offer a good resistance to its advancing enemy.

### III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BRITISH SEA POWER

Military calculations balanced the equation that involved wins and losses for 1758. Abercromby's failure largely neutralized Amherst's success. But the story remained to be told that the year 1758 witnessed the tide's turn. Four military points were clearly visible.

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<sup>79</sup>Steele, American Campaigns, p. 12; For brief historical summary and site of the Great Lakes region, see Warwick Stevens Carpenter, The Summer Paradise in History (Albany: The Delaware and Hudson Company, 1914). This booklet gives a brief historical description of Lake George and Lake Champlain.

The St. Lawrence route was uncovered, the French were dislodged from the Ohio Valley and their communications with the west had been threatened.<sup>80</sup> The French trade was destroyed by the use of British sea power.<sup>81</sup> The British parliament acted to knock off French trade. Severe measures were enforced to see that trade with France was never to be encouraged.<sup>82</sup> Hubert Hall called this type of trade a "clandestine exchange" and added that it was reducing efforts to blockade.<sup>83</sup> The French colonies were deprived of their fleet protection and were in urgent need of supplies for which they were only too willing to trade.<sup>84</sup>

The major attack was to be made on French colonies and their commerce. To accomplish this it was essential that England should maintain her supremacy at sea. It became vital to prevent a concentration of the French

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<sup>80</sup>Knox, Journal, Vol. I, p. 270.

<sup>81</sup>Mahan, Influence of Sea Power Upon History, p. 311.

<sup>82</sup>Pennsylvania Gazette, July 21, 1757.

<sup>83</sup>Hubert Hall, "Chatham's Colonial Policy," American Historical Review, (1899-1900), p. 667.

<sup>84</sup>Basil Williams, The Whig Supremacy: 1714-1760 (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 320; For special studies of the details of Colonial Policy, see George L. Beer, British Colonial Policy, 1754-1765 (New York, 1907).

Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets, and in order to do so Pitt instituted a system of close blockade of the chief French naval bases--Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon. Once these were locked in French ports the effects were clear:

The effect of the blockade in this and after wars was to keep, and it did, the French in a state of constant inferiority in the practical handling of their ships, however, fair showing their outward appearance or equal numerical force.<sup>85</sup>

It was upon this record of British experience that Mahan built his sea power interpretation of history and his strategical doctrine of command of the sea.<sup>86</sup>

If the war had an objective, it was to take America. It would be a waste of time and trouble to try to achieve that objective in Europe. Richard Pares in the English Historical Review stressed the issues of the common man that "the public opinion required of the politicians that they make straight for their goals."<sup>87</sup>

Having now established that France was as weak in the presence of the naval power of Great Britain as her colonists were in the face of the British rivals in America, the remainder of this work will concern

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<sup>85</sup>Mahan, Influence of Sea Power Upon History, p. 297.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., p. 283.

<sup>87</sup>Richard Pares, "American Versus Continental Warfare, 1739-1763," English Historical Review, 51, (1936), p. 449f.

itself with the influence of sea power upon the Anglo-French struggle in Quebec and Montreal.

## CHAPTER III

### GENERAL WOLFE ON THE ST. LAWRENCE

The rejoicing in Canada was brief. Before the end of the year 1758, the British were victorious at both the eastern and western ends of the long battle-line. Louisburg fell in July and Fort Duquesne in November. Fort Frontenac, which held the command of Lake Ontario, surrendered and with it the West surrendered to Bradstreet in August just after Montcalm's victory at Ticonderoga. The Ohio was gone. The great fortress guarding the gateway to the Gulf was also gone. The next English attack would fall on Quebec.<sup>1</sup>

When the Prime Minister, William Pitt (later the Earl of Chatham), set to work in 1758, it was clear to him that General Amherst should remain constantly on the Continent. It was equally clear to him that General Wolfe would command the expedition up the Saint Lawrence

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<sup>1</sup>For a complete description of the activities in Quebec, see Christopher Lloyd, The Capture of Quebec (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1959); Christopher Hibbert, Wolfe at Quebec (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1959); Duncan Grinnell-Milne, Mad, Is He? The Character and Achievement of James Wolfe (London: The Bodley Head, 1963), and Francis Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1900), Vol. II, Chapters XX, XXVII-XXX.

against Quebec.<sup>2</sup> Pitt was convinced that Wolfe was a tough soldier when the British captured Louisburg.

After the fall of Louisburg, General Amherst ordered Wolfe to sail to the mouth of St. Lawrence in a squadron under the command of Admiral Hardy. The mission was to destroy the French settlement on the lower course of the river and the gulf, hence alarming the Canadian authorities of their coming danger.<sup>3</sup> At the conclusion of this expedition Wolfe returned to England, where Pitt promoted him and gave him instructions for the reduction of Quebec.

On January 1759, Wolfe received the temporary rank of Major General. As assistants Pitt awarded the following positions to these young officers: Colonel Robert Monckton, Colonel James Murray, and Colonel George Townshend--the brother of the more famous Charles Townshend. Colonel Guy Carleton was added to the top three, but General Wolfe showed some signs of disapproval. Major Isaac Barre took the position of adjutant general

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<sup>2</sup>Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution: The Great War for the Empire: 1758-1760 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), Vol. VII, p. 371.

<sup>3</sup>The feat added no glory to the British arms, but the defeat of the fishermen deprived Canadian resources and this was a military purpose.



and Major Patrick Mackellar the post of chief engineer. No doubt, this was a "boy's" campaign for General Wolfe and Colonel Townshend were the only officers over thirty.<sup>4</sup>

All the requirements for the army were satisfied, but a good sea force was required to transport the necessary troops and supplies. As the enterprise was expected to be an amphibious operation, Lord Anson selected Rear Admiral Sir Charles Saunders<sup>5</sup> to take the responsibility of the fleet. Saunders like Wolfe was raised to the position of Vice-Admiral for this service alone. Second to the naval command was Philip Durell.

On February 5, 1759 Pitt ordered Wolfe to America. According to the timetable Wolfe was supposed to leave Louisburg for the St. Lawrence on May 7. Pitt stressed

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<sup>4</sup>Gipson, British Empire, VII, 374-75; J. A. Williamson, The British Empire and the Commonwealth (New York and London: MacMillan and Company, Limited, 1960), p. 160; Howard H. Peckham, The Colonial Wars (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 169-70. It should be noted that King George II was not in agreement with this type of administration and had demanded leadership to be given according to due order of seniority irrespective of military genius.

<sup>5</sup>Saunders brought Wolfe's army to the threshold of Quebec. E. B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz, eds., Sea Power: A Naval History (Englewood Cliffs, 1960), p. 56.

the importance of a good understanding between the land and the sea forces.<sup>6</sup>

Philip Durell's assignment was to cut off any French aid to Quebec. He would sail to Bic island for further orders from Admiral Saunders. It is to be noted here that the first sea force order was not carried out. The French managed to elude Durell and transported supplies and troops to Quebec.<sup>7</sup> Durell must be accused for this crucial mistake. If he could have mastered the waterway as he was supposed to, then the French should have not received the transports and no doubt their days would have been numbered. Durell, therefore, must have prolonged the siege at that particular incidence.

But while Durell was receiving his charge, both Wolfe and Saunders were also getting their own charges. Their fleet was expected to arrive at Louisburg in April, but it did not get there until June 4. Contemporaries have called their fleet, "the finest squadron of His Majesty's ships that had ever yet appeared in North

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<sup>6</sup>It should be noted that both land and sea forces worked as a unity for this was a combined operation.

<sup>7</sup>Officers sent to Saunders at Bic declared that three frigates and ten transports had escaped Durell for Quebec (Captain John Knox, Journal, Vol. I, p. 281).

America."<sup>8</sup> Wolfe's army was composed of at least nine thousand men. Many of them had already seen service in America and the rest were rangers who had come to win laurels.<sup>9</sup> Fregault put the total forces employed in combat at about thirty-seven thousand men.<sup>10</sup>

The fleet from Louisburg under Saunders consisted of 9 ships of the line, 13 frigates, sloops, and other ships of war including 113 troop transports and supply vessels. On June 11, 1759, the headlands of Gaspé loomed up on the port side of Gaspé and on June 15, the squadron appeared on the Gulf of the St. Lawrence. Even though the vessels arrived late, it was clear that the highlands on the north and south shores were still covered with snow, which disappeared on June 16. Two days later, the fleet anchored on the neighborhood of the island of Bic and St. Barnabe in the Lower St. Lawrence. On May 22, Durell left with almost all of his squadron so

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<sup>8</sup>England was attacking Quebec not so much with an Army as with a powerful War fleet. A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1915), p. 294.

<sup>9</sup>Pennsylvania Gazette, May 10, 1759.

<sup>10</sup>The prevailing toast among the officers of Louisburg was: "British (colors) on every French Fort, Post, and Garrison in America" (Captain John Knox, Journal, Vol. I, p. 279); Guy Fregault, Canada: The War of Conquest (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 235-6.

as to move up to the strategic Ile-Aux-Coudres, near the rapids and close to Quebec. It was by no means a good military enterprise. On May 28, the Colonel managed to land a detachment of Carleton's troops. Durell demonstrated that the navigation of the St. Lawrence was not so difficult as the French had told.

Meanwhile the main fleet proceeded from Bic slowly up the river. On June 23, the ships came close to Ile-Aux-Coudres. The Canadian inhabitants along the shore directed a heavy but ineffective fire at the ships before they were forced out of their positions. However, they managed to delay the British ships. Captain Knox has pointed out that "these natives paid dear for this behavior"<sup>11</sup> in the subsequent burning of their habitations. On June 25, these ships cruised past the Traverse, called "a place of the greatest difficulty and danger between the St. Lawrence and Quebec,"<sup>12</sup> and there upon joined Durell's detachment at the south side of Ile d'Orleans.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Captain Knox, Journal, Vol. I, pp. 288-9.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 290.

<sup>13</sup>It is to be noted that out of a total of two hundred ships, there was no single loss. The British navy under Saunders deserved credit.

In the early Spring 1759, the defense plan for Canada seemed extremely vulnerable.<sup>14</sup> All able men, including young boys, who could fire a gun were subject to military duty. At seeing the British advance, Vaudreuil declared that whatever progress the British might make, he was resolved to yield them nothing, but hold his ground even to annihilation. However, his promise to do his best to keep on good terms with Montcalm was nothing but a mere statement to cover his mistakes. In August 1758 Hugues Pean, the town major of Quebec and one of a little circle that enjoyed the largess which Bigot dispensed, was ordered to France under the orders of Governor Vaudreuil<sup>15</sup> and in November Bougainville was able to leave before the ice blocked the entry of the St. Lawrence.<sup>16</sup> Also another friend and admirer of Montcalm went in the person of Doreil, Commissary

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<sup>14</sup>Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol. II, p. 195; Grinell-Milne, Mad, Is He? The Character and Achievement of James Wolfe, p. 37.

<sup>15</sup>Gipson, British Empire, VII, 380.

<sup>16</sup>M. de Montcalm to M. de Cremille, August 21, 1758. E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, Printers, 1858), Vol. X, p. 856.

at War.<sup>17</sup> During this mission in France Major Pean stressed the need for provisions, ammunition, and more soldiers, which according to the situation in Canada, should be sent by April, 1759.<sup>18</sup>

But there were so many internal conflicts in Canada that the healing could not be expected to happen without effects in New France. Even when Nicolas Rene Berryer, Minister of Marine, listened to the demands from Canada, he failed to see the tragic need for these supplies. "It is useless," he says, "to try to rival Britain on the sea, and the wise thing to do is to save money by not spending it on ships."<sup>19</sup> The old Duc de Belle-Isle, the Minister of War, presented a similar view, though he held an objective. He outlined his

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<sup>17</sup>While the governor wrote flattering letters of introduction to the Minister of Marine and the Minister of War respecting both Bougainville and Doreil, in another letter to Berryer, he states: ". . . they do not understand the Colony, and to warn you that they are creatures of Montcalm," The Minister of the Marine, November 3, 1758, Quoted by Vaudreuil to Parkman: Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol. II, p. 172.

<sup>18</sup>Memoir of M. Pean on the Condition of Canada, O'Callaghan, ed., New York Colonial Documents, Vol. X, pp. 897-900.

<sup>19</sup>George M. Wrong, The Conquest of New France: A Chronicle of the Colonial Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, London: Oxford University Press, 1921), pp. 200-1.

position in a letter to Montcalm. George Wrong provides a sample of the letter:

"France had to concentrate her strength in Europe. The British fleet," he added, "paralyzed efforts overseas. There was no certainty, or even probability, that troops and supplies sent from France would even reach Canada."<sup>20</sup>

The central idea in both Berryer's and Belle-Isle's positions was that British sea power was beginning to be felt in France. It was doubtful whether the top French leaders in Canada were in a position to get this message.

The news that a British invasion was expected in Quebec alarmed the whole colony of Canada.<sup>21</sup> Five battalions from France, nearly all of the colony troops, and the militia from every part of Canada poured into Quebec, along with a thousand or more Indians. The Indians came to lend their scalping-knives to the defense.

The effect of the differences led to the evacuation of Isle-Aux-Coudres and Isle d' Orleans.<sup>22</sup> Montcalm planned to encamp his army on the plains of Abraham,

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<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 201; Green, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, pp. 140-1.

<sup>21</sup>Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol. II, p. 198. Montcalm reports that all the forces of Canada, except the detachments of Bourlamaque and La Corne, were ordered to Quebec.

<sup>22</sup>Isle d' Orleans was Wolfe's first landing.

but later with concurrence with Vaudrevil, agreed to change his plan. He resolved to post his whole force on the St. Lawrence below the city, with his right resting on the St. Charles and his left on the Montmorency Rivers.<sup>23</sup> Between Montmorency and St. Charles was a little river called Beauport. A short distance from St. Lawrence along this river Montcalm erected his camp, the Beauport.

The mouth of St. Charles was blocked with a boom of logs which were chained together. In addition to this kind of defense, Montcalm sank two hulks and mounted some cannons on them. Between the St. Charles river and Montmorency was an extensive earthworks. On the side of Quebec, the St. Charles was entrenched. This insured safety and defense for Quebec in case Beauport fell.

In the city all gates were closed and barricaded and 106 cannon were mounted on the city walls.<sup>24</sup> The river defenses were composed of a floating battery of twelve heavy pieces, a number of gunboats, eight fire-ships, and several fire rafts. The frigates sailed up

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<sup>23</sup>Montmorency was heavily guarded. It should be noted that an attempt to attack Montcalm through this position cost Wolfe over four hundred killed and wounded. See Gipson, British Empire, VII, 399.

<sup>24</sup>This number was found after the siege. Knox, Journal, Vol. II, p. 151.



river beyond the Richelieu River, but later one thousand sailors returned to man the batteries and the gunboats. The decision to use sailors to man the batteries must be viewed as a dangerous operation. It would involve a breakdown in case of an attack from Montreal. However, Quebec was the capital of New France and its defense was of vital importance. The total number of the French troops, including Indians, at Quebec amounted to sixteen thousand men.<sup>25</sup> Against this huge force Wolfe brought about nine thousand men.<sup>26</sup>

Montcalm had outlined all the steps for the defense of Quebec before the arrival of the British fleet. One of the methods used to stop the British ships from entering through the traverse was the sinking of ten of the largest ships across the water way. A floating battery was also used to fire on the approaching vessels. One must wonder why the French defenses did not count on naval engagements. The French knew well that naval engagement against the British navy would not get them anywhere.<sup>27</sup> On June 26,

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<sup>25</sup>Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol. II, See Appendix H, pp. 436-438.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>The Minister of Marine, Berryer, failed to see the use of building ships. See George M. Wrong, The Conquest of New France, pp. 200-1.

the British fleet was seen off the Island of Bic and news was conveyed to Governor Vaudreuil. The news caused flight among the people of Quebec.<sup>28</sup>

The inhabitants of Ile-Auz-Coudres and Ile d' Orleans were evacuated to Quebec. When Durell landed on these islands, he found deserted homes. The French had counted on burning Durell's ships, but a powerful wind from the Northeast set in and held back the French fireships. The wind helped Durell's ships in sailing up the Traverse and to the southeast shore of Ile d' Orleans.<sup>29</sup> But, the French did not withdraw the idea of setting the British ships on fire. Finally the French sent in their burning fireships and firerafts on the ebb tide to destroy the anchored British men-of-war, but the ever-watchful Saunders had boats patrolling nightly up river, and these had little trouble in grappling these burning infernos to shore.<sup>30</sup> The French secret plan failed, but Montcalm was content to hold a tactical defensive.

On June 21, the British ships were established at the Isle d' Orleans. Part of their success was due

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<sup>28</sup>Gipson, British Empire, VII, 391.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 392.

<sup>30</sup>Potter, Sea Power, p. 56; Peckham, Colonial Wars, p. 187.

to the guidance which a captured Canadian had offered to the British sailors. One of Durell's ships hoisted a French flag and with this the French were fooled. They never attacked Durell's ships. In fact, the Canadian pilots came out to the ships and they were made prisoners. After a safe landing and capture of the Canadian pilots, Durell replaced the French flag with a red flag.

Towards the end of June the main fleet was near the mountain of Cape Tourmente. The passage called Traverse lay between the Cape and the lower end of Orleans and was expected to be the most dangerous part of the St. Lawrence. But with the guidance of the captured pilots, the passage was successful.<sup>31</sup> It is not clear why the French had not strengthened the defenses at Point Levis and Isle d' Orleans.

Governor Vaudrevil was blamed for his negligence to plant cannons at a certain plateau on the side of the mountain of Cape Tourmente, where the gunners would have proved inaccessible. They could batter down every ship that sought passage. Since the French failed to erect these necessary defenses, the British fleet was able to sail safely.

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<sup>31</sup>Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol. II, pp. 204-5.

On June 26, the British ships anchored off the south shore of the island of Orleans, a few miles from Quebec. Captain John Knox wrote:

"here we are entertained with a most agreeable prospect of a delightful country on every side; wind mills, water mills, churches . . . all built with stone, and covered, some with woods, and others with straw." Knox adds, "while we are under sail we had a transient view of a stupendous natural curiosity called the waterfall of Montmorenci."<sup>32</sup>

During the night Lieutenant Meech with forty New England rangers landed. They managed to beat off a group of armed inhabitants and forced them to escape across the north Channel. From Orleans Wolfe could see the display of the fine military works<sup>33</sup> at Quebec. Wolfe also viewed Montcalm's long extended defenses. These defenses stretched from the St. Charles to Cataract of the Montmorency. From the cataract to the river Beauport, the river front was covered by earthworks. The defenses between Beauport and the St. Charles consisted of broad flats of mud, intrenchments and a floating battery. Cape Diamond hid the view of the upper city. Had Wolfe

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<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 207.

<sup>33</sup>Batteries frowned everywhere; the Chateau battery, the clergy battery, the hospital battery, the Royal, Dolphin's and Queen's batteries. For a good disposition of these guns, see Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol. II, p. 208.

looked beyond Cape Diamond, he would have beheld disheartening prospects.

From Orleans, for mile after mile, the St. Lawrence was walled by a range of steep cliffs which were often inaccessible. A few men on top of the cliff could hold an army in check. Quebec, no doubt, was a natural fortress. Bougainville remarked that,

"by the help of intrenchments, easily and quickly made, and defended by three or four thousand men, I think the city would be safe." Bougainville added, "I do not believe that the English will make any attempt against it; but they may have the madness to do so, and it is well to be prepared against surprise."<sup>34</sup>

Wolfe came to attack Quebec. He had the madness to do it.

Wolfe and Saunders drew most of their advantages from the wide differences between Montcalm and Vaudreuil in their use of power in Canada.<sup>35</sup> Vaudreuil believed in the attack of the invaders, but Montcalm relied on a strict defensive plan. As to the respective merits of the two contrasting strategic conceptions, the student of military science today cannot quite easily come to a decision. Each has its undoubted merits. If the French government was in a position to push up the St.

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<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 209.

<sup>35</sup>O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, Vol. X, pp. 868-77; Wrong, Conquests of New France, pp. 198-9; Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol. II, pp. 202-3.

Lawrence a good number of transports so as to double the actual military strength of Canada, no doubt Montcalm should not have hesitated to give up strategic command posts as Niagara, Ticonderoga and Crown point.

Lawrence Gipson wonders whether the mere number of troops, mere resources, on either side necessarily determine the outcome.<sup>36</sup> It must be reckoned that the British military preponderance had been decisive in the case of Cape Breton Island and might be so in the case of the forks of the Ohio. But there were the brilliant victories at Oswego in 1756, at Fort William Henry in 1757 and at Fort Ticonderoga, the leadership of high quality, troops of high spirit and powerful Indian support more than overbalanced these advantages.<sup>37</sup> One wonders why some parts of New France should be surrendered without some sort of defense.

Against this line of reasoning could be advanced certain logical strategic concepts that brushed aside all sentimental factors. Montcalm felt that there were reasonable grounds for confidence in the survival of New France if he were free to limit the range of his military activities to a very restricted area and within

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<sup>36</sup>Gipson, British Empire, VII, 383.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid.

it be able to utilize to the maximum his armed strength. It is of interest that his views were later fully supported by France's greatest living soldier, the venerable Merschal de Belle-Isle, Minister of War.<sup>38</sup>

When the differences appeared before the council of the state in the form of letters from Vaudreuil, Montcalm and Bigot, the Ministers came to the conclusion that this divergence in military policy between the two leaders was so serious a matter that it must be placed before the King in person with the recommendation that:

it appears necessary that he should be pleased to grant the Marquis de Montcalm his recall, which he has demanded in the letter also annexed hereto, as his health and the debts that he contracted do not permit him to continue his service.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>38</sup>Writing to Montcalm on February 19, 1759, Belle-Isle declared: "As it is expected that the entire efforts of the English will be directed against Canada, and that they will attack you at different points at once, it will be necessary that you confine your plan of defense to those parts that are most essential and most connected, in order that being concentrated on a smaller extent of country, you may be always enabled mutually to help one another to communicate with and support each other." (O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, Vol. X, p. 907).

<sup>39</sup>On July 12, 1758 after the Victory at Ticonderoga, Montcalm had written to Belle-Isle asking him to procure his recall: "My health suffers, my purse is exhausted. At the end of the year I shall owe the Treasurer of the colony ten thousand ecurs! And more than all . . . the impossibility in which I am placed of doing good and preventing evil." (Ibid., Vol. X, p. 733); But after the fall of Frontenac Montcalm changed his view, feeling that "since the affairs of the colony are getting bad, it is my duty to endeavor to repair them or to retard their ruin to the greatest extent of my power." (Ibid., Vol. X, p. 832).

It seemed best to replace Montcalm with the Chevalier de Levis. The latter came to Canada with Montcalm and was already in line to replace him in case of accident. De Levis could work more easily with the governor-general and was generally "beloved and esteemed by all the troops and militia of the colony."<sup>40</sup>

It was doubtful if Montcalm would be recalled to France. The Ministers reversed themselves, as recorded in one of their minutes which shows that they had come to place a new valuation on the man they had previously determined to recall.

On mature reflection, this arrangement (the plan to recall) cannot take place, as M de Montcalm is necessary in the present conjuncture.<sup>41</sup>

A provision was made that Montcalm meet his financial obligations and that in case of death of Vaudrevil that Montcalm should take over the administration of New France.<sup>42</sup> It was most likely that Montcalm was happy when he learned that Vaudrevil was to consult him on all operations in the course of the coming

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<sup>40</sup>"Abstract of, and Ministerial Minutes on, the Dispatches from Canada," Ibid., Vol. X, p. 907.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Bougainville to Marquis de Montcalm, December 22, 1758, Ibid., Vol. X, pp. 939-40.



campaign.<sup>43</sup> Besides, the Governor General and the Intendant were informed to seek the field commander's advice on all matters of administration that related to the defense and preservation of the Colony.<sup>44</sup> It was also decided that Vaudrevil should not appear in the campaign unless it involved the marching of all the militia for the general defense of the Colony. Belle-Isle told the King that he was responsible for Montcalm's action.<sup>45</sup> All the notes signed by the Intendant had to be countersigned by Vaudrevil.<sup>46</sup> But this advice brought little relief.

France was faced with a lot of difficulties, especially tremendous financial demands to maintain the army in Germany and the destruction of so much of her sea-borne commerce. She could, therefore, not afford to give Canada any financial relief. The supplies and soldiers at home were abundant, but France lacked the ability to send any large convoys across the Atlantic with safety in the face of the British naval predominance.

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<sup>43</sup>Berryer to Montcalm, February 3, 1759, Canadian Archives Report (1905), Vol. I, Part VI, p. 291, Quoted by Gipson, British Empire, VII, 385.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid.

<sup>45</sup>Belle-Isle to Montcalm, February 19, 1759, New York Colonial Documents, Vol. X, p. 944.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., Vol. X, pp. 937-9.

In view of this, Montcalm was warned that the defense of Canada rested upon his "wisdom and courage, and the bravery of the troops (already there)." <sup>47</sup>

It was supposed that few vessels left France for Canada. However, an authoritative source indicates that not all of this slender supply got through, it is clear. <sup>48</sup> Had they all succeeded in eluding the British war ships, it would still have been small in comparison with the vast flotilla of British transports ultimately brought up the river by Saunders and sent from the British Isles and the North American colonies, loaded not only with troops but with an abundance of everything needed to sustain them in the campaign.

Vaudreuil's plan for the defense of Canada was geared to render the conquest of the colony a work of very great difficulty. But this could be viewed as a dangerous type of strategy. It was in opposition to Montcalm's views. Vaudreuil failed to inform Montcalm

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<sup>47</sup>Ibid., Vol. X, p. 944.

<sup>48</sup>Montcalm to Belle-Isle, May 24, 1759. Ibid., Vol. X, p. 972.

(the Commander-in-Chief) of his defensive<sup>49</sup> procedure and doubtless, Montcalm should have been informed of the plan.<sup>50</sup> Nevertheless, it was not clear how useful an attempt at collaboration on the part of these two high spirited men would have been in light of the fact that their views were so far apart and also that the final responsibility for the safety of the colony rested squarely on the shoulders of Vaudreuil rather than Montcalm. With this state of affairs, General Wolfe wedged his strategy.

But Wolfe underestimated the military acumen of the French command. For he had laid plans to throw his army upon the north shore to the west of the St. Charles river and to establish strong posts between that river and Beauport. He thought that this plan would cut the city from any communications with the lower river. Wolfe also thought of establishing secondary posts on the south shore of the St. Lawrence from point Levy

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<sup>49</sup>For "summary of the plan of General Operations for the Campaign of 1759," see New York Colonial Documents, Vol. X, pp. 952-6; Lloyd, The Capture of Quebec, pp. 43-4. Lloyd explains that there was lack of unity in operation. There is no word about deferring, or collaborating with Montcalm in joint task of defending the citadel of Canada.

<sup>50</sup>Montcalm to Belle-Isle, April 12, 1759, New York Colonial Documents, Vol. X, pp. 960-2.

west to the Chaudiere.<sup>51</sup> But Wolfe was forced to limit his immediate action to sending Monckton with four battalions to occupy unfortified point Levy. This would provide a military advantage. Admiral Saunders occupied the area where he could anchor his ships. On June 30, the troops occupied the area and heavy guns were installed at point de Peres, directly opposite Quebec, for the purpose of bombarding the city.<sup>52</sup>

The movement of Monckton's brigade to the South shore gave Wolfe the opportunity of issuing a manifesto to the people of Canada, which was posted on the door of the church at Beaumont, a village to the south of Point Levy. General Wolfe promised freedom to the people of Beaumont, but warned them to keep out of arms.<sup>53</sup> There was so much to be done before Quebec could be attacked.

The plan to establish batteries at the western end of d' Orleans was successful under Brigadier Townshend.

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<sup>51</sup>It should be noted that Wolfe failed to realize the strength of the St. Lawrence defenses until June 20, 1759 when he learned that the Northern shore was closed to him and only the Southern shore was open. (Potter, Sea Power, p. 57).

<sup>52</sup>"Monckton dug in twenty-nine Cannon to be used for pounding Quebec," Peckham, Colonial Wars, pp. 187-8.

<sup>53</sup>Gipson, British Empire, VII, 394; For Wolfe's proclamation see Knox, Journals, Vol. I, pp. 303-304.

The next move was to place a strong division on the northern shore of the Montmorency river and its falls. The fleet gave its unquestionable offense. The frigates bombarded the French lines on the heights above the falls of the Montmorency river. This was good enough to enable three thousand British soldiers to land below the falls where they entrenched.

This activity brought the British face to face with the French troops. The river banks were steep and forbidding. It was true, however, that below the falls there was a fordable place, as was also true three miles up the river. The French had prepared defenses to block any British advance across the fordable areas. The possibility of getting to the French side would be attained by defeating the French on the lower fold.

On July 12, 1759, the British began the bombardment of Quebec. This shelling caused a lot of commotions within the city and no doubt the strategy was quite effective.<sup>54</sup> The shelling of the city forced the French to try to dislodge the British camp at Point Levis. The plan was well executed, but darkness caused a tragedy to the French force. The French detachments, upon separation into two bodies, mistook one another for an enemy

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<sup>54</sup>Knox, Journals, Vol. I, p. 333.

force. They then fired on each other, and in panic soon after recrossed the St. Lawrence. In the British camp the picture was different.

General Wolfe was anxious to move toward the French at the Montmorency encampments. He decided to separate the French force and if possible make them leave their entrenchments and come out to fight in the open ground. Once again, it was the duty of the ships to open the way for further advance like they had done at Orleans. Captain Rouse used two of Saunder's men of war, with two heavily armed sloops and two transports with troops and provisions and succeeded in passing the Quebec batteries and gained the upper river. The batteries at Point Levy supported the movement by delivering an incessant fire on the city. This was a strategic plan.

The shelling of Quebec from Point Levy permitted more effective reconnoitring of the area above Quebec. The mission found no unguarded places. Unfortunately, at Sillery higher up, a battery caused damage to Rouse's command ship and forced him to cruise further north to settle at Pointe Aux Trembles which was about thirty miles from Quebec. Thus, Wolfe so far achieved very little.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>55</sup>Knox, Journals, Vol. I, pp. 337, 342.

Nevertheless, the movement about the river was of great significance. It brought a state of uneasiness in Quebec.<sup>56</sup>

Montcalm did not seriously consider the possibility of an attack on the upstream side of the city. He had failed to suppose that troops could be passed up in boats. When General Wolfe and Saunders managed to pass upstream, they did not only succeed, but surprised the French. Montcalm realized the danger in the possibility of a British landing in the northern shore of the St. Lawrence.<sup>57</sup> He saw this as a threat to the communications of food and munition supplies for the city. This citadel needed careful military reconnoitering that would ensure a weak spot that the English might force a safe landing. General Wolfe knew at this time that Quebec was perhaps one of the best, if not the best, defended areas in the eighteenth century. The British, however, relied on the use of superior naval force to subdue the French.

The fleet began to shift artillery and display feints all along the St. Lawrence waterway. The moves and the counter moves of the British fleet and the French army reminded Montcalm of a game of chess, in which

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<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 344.

<sup>57</sup>Grinnell-Milne, Mad, Is He? The Character and Achievement of James Wolfe, p. 77.

Wolfe had greater facility of moving the pawns in an attempt to produce a checkmate than he himself possessed.<sup>58</sup> But, the movements and the feints along the waterway should be considered of little military value unless the time<sup>59</sup> factor was considered in the military calculations.

General Wolfe was playing his game with little time left before the winter season began. He was aware that the objective must be achieved. One thing had not been tried: a frontal assault which General Wolfe decided as a necessary idea. Orders for concentration of troops to the east of Montmorency and the west point of the Ile d' Orleans constituted part of the strategy. The attempt to pass the ford at the Montmorency was carried out on July 31, 1759.<sup>60</sup> It was a large operation. It

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<sup>58</sup>Gipson, British Empire, VII, 397; Knox, Journals, Vol. II, p. 64, and J. Hollan Rose, Newton and Benians, eds., The Cambridge History of the British Empire, 7 Vols. (New York and Cambridge: The MacMillan Company and At the University Press, 1929-1940), Vol. VI, pp. 108-9.

<sup>59</sup>Wrong, The Conquest of Canada, p. 217. If the French held a strong defensive position, they would have forced Wolfe and Saunders to leave for England during the winter.

<sup>60</sup>For a detailed account of Wolfe's Operations at Beauport and the Montmorency, See Grinnell-Milne, Mad, Is He? The Character and Achievement of James Wolfe, pp. 31-46; Potter, ed., Sea Power, p. 57. Potter stresses the necessity of sea power as he declares: "Effective fire could not have been utilized without the use of frigates."



consisted of Monckton's brigade at Point Levy, the brigades under Townshend and Murray which were at this time stationed along the east of Montmorency river. In addition to these forces, the fleet gave several gun ships in support of the operation. It was, therefore, a combined operation.<sup>61</sup>

The objective here was to force de Levis' camp so that the troops might take a redoubt that the enemy established close to the ford. It was hoped that if the ford were held then the army would storm the entrenchments on the heights. A beachhead was secured at five o'clock on July 31, after many feints and movements to deceive the enemy. The troops (grenadiers, two companies of Royal Americans) landed on a muddy beach and took the enemy redoubt close to it. They were ordered to wait until Townshend's troops crossed the ford before they could make further attempts. But, the grenadiers "impatient to acquire glory," in the words of Knox, would not be held back. They moved ahead, met a devastating enemy fire and retreat became their only safety.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>61</sup>It should be noted that both land and sea efforts were to work as one unit. This cooperation played its task in the Battle of Quebec. Both General Wolfe and Admiral Saunders worked with harmony and cooperation.

<sup>62</sup>Knox, Journals, Vol. I, pp. 354-8. A similar account of the attack may be found under "Narrative of the Siege of Quebec, Published by the French," New York Colonial Documents, Vol. X, pp. 1000,1001.

The fleet ships under Monckton carried out the retreating of forces without further loss of life. Lawrence Gipson, who has written extensively in this period, claims that the French weapon was a "defensive plan."<sup>63</sup> The French remained in their secure entrenchments on the heights and beat off their enemy force.

Even though the British enjoyed the advantage gathered from the feud between Vaudreuil and Montcalm, the French enjoyed the possession of a strategic command of Quebec and possession of the ground in a colony whose civilian population was her ally.<sup>64</sup>

Military scholars have blamed the Montmorency attack as badly conceived and a misuse of the mobility of sea power, but the shoals that prevented the fleet from sending its big ships in close quarters to land

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<sup>63</sup>Gipson, British Empire, VII, 399; General Wolfe supported this defensive strength in his letter to his Mother of which a sample is provided: "The enemy puts nothing to risk and . . . has shut himself up in an accessible entrenchments so that I can't get at him without spilling a torrent of blood," see (J. Holland Rose, Newton and Benians, eds., The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. VI, p. 108); Horn, ed., "General Wolfe describes the difficulties of the expedition against Quebec, September 9, 1759," The English Historical Documents, pp. 873-5.

<sup>64</sup>Potter, Sea Power, p. 56-7. Potter says that the strategic position of Quebec was made impregnable due to Montcalm's fourteen thousand men with three hundred guns and Indian war parties.

effective fire support must be viewed as one of the crucial factors of Wolfe's failure.<sup>65</sup> For only when seaborne artillery can lay down a crushing barrage just ahead of the infantry as it lands, will a frontal assault on a defended beach have much chance of success. If risks were weighed against the probability of success, the balance was clearly for not making the effort at Montmorency river. The number of the British losses<sup>66</sup> no doubt confirmed that a frontal attack was unnecessary.

However, the movement was fairly well planned,<sup>67</sup> but poorly executed because of the delay of Townshend's contingents and the failure of the grenadiers to wait for the rest of the troops so that they could attack as a unit.

If the British attempt succeeded, thus forcing the French to the West of St. Charles river, there would have remained that formidable obstacle lying between the British and the city of Quebec, with its precipitous

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<sup>65</sup>Potter, Sea Power, p. 57.

<sup>66</sup>The English forces suffered 210 killed and 230 wounded against 60 French casualties, see Peckham, Colonial Wars, p. 188.

<sup>67</sup>Knox, Journals, Vol. II, pp. 64, 66. Knox confirms that Wolfe had a calculated assistance from Point Levy (Monckton's aid) and the Montmorency Camp (Townshend's aid).

bank without bridges, as these would undoubtedly have been destroyed.

General Wolfe was faced with defeat. There was a possibility of the collapse of the campaign while so near to, and yet so far from, his objective. This incident marked Wolfe's despondence.<sup>68</sup> But, Wolfe was determined to capture Quebec and his return for further battle must at this time be viewed most likely.

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<sup>68</sup>Gipson, British Empire, VII, 399.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE PIERCING OF THE HEART OF NEW FRANCE

The defenses of Montcalm at the Montmorency forced General Wolfe to revise his military plans. This became the basis for the evacuation from the encampment, and the new plan to attack Quebec from the upper river.<sup>1</sup>

In early September the troops were withdrawn from Montmorency to Ile d' Orleans, and then landed later on Point Levis. About thirty-five hundred men were crowded in ships for the journey upstream.<sup>2</sup> General Wolfe was eager to try the new line of attack. While Saunders feinted at the old beachhead, he would try a surprise attack at the Anse du Foulon, a little boat landing a bare mile and a half upriver from the city walls, but this movement would prove a supreme test in September 12.

Saunders played his role to perfection, bombarding the ruined lower town and the Beauport beach with every gun that could be brought to bear, ostentatiously loading

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<sup>1</sup>The defeat at Montmorency led to the British withdrawal from Montmorency area and subsequently led to the many plans for the attack of Quebec of which the brigadier's plan was adopted. (an attack from the upper river). For this plan, see Knox, Journals, Vol. II, pp. 33-4.

<sup>2</sup>Peckham, Colonial Wars, p. 189.

the ships' boats with marines and seamen as if a new landing were imminent. Meanwhile a strong infantry force in flat-bottomed boats, supported by frigates and sloops-of-war, worked upriver with the tide as if to effect a lodgement far above the city. It was a fine moonlit night.

The French leaders (Montcalm and Vaudreuil) observed the British movement, but they could not reach an agreeable interpretation of the nature behind the feints.<sup>3</sup> However, defenses were strengthened. De Le'vis was assigned to stop any activities that Amherst might try in Montreal. He would also check any British advance from Quebec to Montreal. The French decided that Galops island would provide Le'vis with the best headquarters possible. Another base of defense was centered at Bougainville's force. Bougainville with his four thousand stout troops was to protect the whole north bank of the river above Quebec by moving his troops to any threatened point.

But on September 7, the tide turned, the British boat force began rowing furiously down river. Aided by the tidal current it quickly outdistanced Bougainville's exhausted foot soldiers. At the same time Bougainville

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<sup>3</sup>Potter, Sea Power, p. 58.

was forced to shift his position because Holme's vessels seemed to anchor near Cap Rouge.<sup>4</sup> This was the turning point. Winter was not too far off and both Vaudreuil and Montcalm thought that the movements up and down the river meant that the English were making ready to sail away. Montcalm still held the position that the English would attack below the city.<sup>5</sup> That was the reason why he remained at Beauport, and with this calculation kept the bulk of his force there.

On September 9, Wolfe took view of the Anse Du Foulon from the south shore of Etchemin river and on September 10, all the British officers took a view of the Foulon. Even though the officers spent much time examining the place, it was not clear whether all the forces would have attacked at the same spot. Evidently, there was some misunderstanding between General Wolfe and his brigadiers. The following is an excerpt of their letter:

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<sup>4</sup>Gipson, British Empire, VII, 409; Knox, Journals, Vol. II, p. 58. It should be realized that if the French did not send their frigates down the river, they could easily destroy the British ships one by one as they came upstream. This idea is also shared by Grinnell, Mad, Is He? The Character and Achievements of Wolfe, pp. 61-69, et. passim.

<sup>5</sup>Lloyd, The Capture of Quebec, pp. 43-44.

As we do not think ourselves sufficiently informed of the several parts which may fall to our share in the execution of the Descent . . . tomorrow, we must beg leave to request from you . . . the nature of the thing will admit of, particularly to the place or places we are to attack. . .<sup>6</sup>

The letter was a perfectly proper one in view of the fact that none of the generals had received such orders. Wolfe in reply, given on the evening of the 12th and directed to Monckton, stated something that was quite true, but it carried with it an implied rebuke to his brigadiers:

It is not a usual thing to point out in the public orders the direct spot of our attack, nor for any inferior officer not charged with a particular duty to ask instructions upon that point. I have the honor to inform you today that it is my duty to attack the French army. To the best of my knowledge and abilities I have fixed upon that spot where we can act with the most force and are likely to succeed.<sup>7</sup>

In reading between the lines of this letter and the one in which this letter serves as a reply, one cannot fail to see the nature of a military collapse. The brigadiers were quite fresh from defeat inflicted at Montmorency. The arguments regarding the river plan in which the brigadiers disapproved Wolfe's plan must be viewed as the beginning of the military problems.

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<sup>6</sup>Major Moncrief's Journal: ed., A. G. Doughty, The Siege of Quebec, Vol. VI, p. 59, quoted by Gipson, British Empire, VII, 411.

<sup>7</sup>Knox, Journals, Vol. II, pp. 66-67.



From the civilian point of view, it should be pointed out that since the operation was to be carried at night, it represented the most hazardous and difficult task that officers could follow, bearing in mind that Quebec was one of the most heavily guarded spots in the eighteenth century. But, militarily the operation might surprise the enemy. But Wolfe was determined to attack at the Foulon post and immediately, he gave the necessary duties.

The landing was scheduled to begin on the night of September 12. On the same day Saunders began the bombardment of the Foulon post. At four o'clock thirty boats with Wolfe, Monckton and Murray came to the shore below Sillery and other boats landed at Cape Diamond. Wolfe's plan to reach the Foulon unseen depended on the naval cooperation. However, the whole river plan depended on the knowledge which Admiral Saunders received from a deserter, Captain Jervis.<sup>8</sup>

A sentry would have ruined the British plan had he not been silenced in "French" not to make noise as

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<sup>8</sup>Grinnell, Mad, Is He? The Character and Achievement of James Wolfe, p. 77. The deserter's message confirmed that Montcalm was expecting an attack at the Beauport lines. It should not be taken for granted that the river plan was simple, for this plan was not based upon a spin of the wheel. In the end the only thing left wholly to chance was the unforeseeable accident of weather (Ibid., pp. 77-93, et. passim).

supply boats were stealing past the enemy to reach Quebec.<sup>9</sup> The first group to mount the Foulon pass was under Colonel William Howe (brother of Late Lord Howe). When Wolfe and Murray gained the heights, Wolfe heard some shots and quickly compelled his aide-de-Camp, adjutant General Isaac Barre not to permit further landing of troops. But, fortunately Barre disregarded the orders and let in the troops at landing.<sup>10</sup> It is most likely Wolfe doubted the success of the enterprise. One may say that the memories of the retreat at Montmorency were fresh in his mind.

Warning signals soon appeared at Quebec, but Montcalm and his staff ignored them. It should be believed that Montcalm, at this time, was strengthening the Beauport lines. The operation of Saunders' fleet gave him the impression that an attack at Beauport was most likely. Sea power was able to secure a surprise for the army. What Saunders managed to secure for the empire no doubt

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<sup>9</sup>The posts were not warned, so "when our sentries saw the enemy's barges advancing, they took them for ours, and satisfied with the word "France" which was returned to the challenge, allowed those barges to pass without giving themselves the trouble to reconnoitre them" ("Operations of the Army under M'de Montcalm before Quebec," New York Colonial Documents, Vol. X, p. 1038); Knox, Journal, Vol. II, p. 67; Peckham, Colonial Wars, p. 189.

<sup>10</sup>Gipson, British Empire, VII, 415.

was very clear. Had the fleet not given enough disturbing feints,<sup>11</sup> Montcalm stood a good chance of hearing the first signal from Quebec.

It took a while before Montcalm was convinced of the British landing. Even when he was fully aware of what had happened, he acted unreluctantly. Here was an opportunity that could have gone either way. His delay gave the British force a golden opportunity.

A British detachment under Townshend from the ships and other forces from Ile d' Orleans and from point Levy managed under the delay to ascend the Foulon. Montcalm was therefore to fight against nearly four thousand British troops.<sup>12</sup>

But when Montcalm got to the heights of Abraham, he could not wait for Bougainville's force at the rear of the British Army.<sup>13</sup> From there on it was strategy against strategy. The battle took fifteen minutes and reached its decisive conclusion. As Montreuil views the situation:

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<sup>11</sup>Peckham, The Colonial Wars, pp. 190-191. Peckham claims that the feints kept Montcalm's attention diversified and therefore he was unable to hear the signals from Quebec.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 190. Peckham gives credit for the success at Foulon to the navy other than the army. The attack at the Foulon, according to him, turned out to be a workable naval tactic.

<sup>13</sup>Knox, Journals, Vol. II, pp. 68-69.

Had the Marquis de Montcalm postponed one instance marching against the enemy, they could not have been attacked in consequence of the favorable position they were going to take up, having even begun some entrenchments in their rear.<sup>14</sup>

Vaudreuil saw Montcalm as "carried away by his zeal and great vivacity," and added that Montcalm attacked prematurely before gathering all the available French forces. As Vaudreuil wrote to M. Berryer that on hearing that Montcalm had:

dispatched the Pickets of the different regiments, a part of the battalions and Canadians, and advanced himself without communicating his arrangements to me . . . I feared the action would be brought on before the junction of the corps under the command of M'de Bougainville, composed of the . . . I ordered the remainder of our forces (about Quebec), with the exception of the posts of the line of Beauport and set out immediately to place myself at the head of the army.<sup>15</sup>

Vaudreuil appeared at the scene of the battle too late. The day was lost in no more than fifteen minutes.

The superiority in open-field action on classical lines of an army made up of highly disciplined regulars over one composed of half trained militia and backwoodsmen

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<sup>14</sup>Montreuil to Belle-Isle, September 22, 1759, O'Callagan, ed., New York Colonial Document, Vol. X, pp. 1013-1014; Francis W. Halsey, ed., Great Epochs of American History, 10 Vols. (New York and London: Funk and Wagnalls Company, 1912) Vol. III., pp. 59-60.

<sup>15</sup>Vaudreuil to Berryer, September 23, 1759, New York Colonial Document, pp. 1010-1011.

was fully demonstrated on September 13. The French battalions by the fall of 1759 had embodied so many Canadians, who excelled only in bush fighting and had not adapted to perform the duty that Montcalm assigned to them. They advanced to the enemy in cries and delivered their first fire from a far distance. The British troops reserved their fire until the enemy line approached within forty yards and then the muskets blazed along the line.<sup>16</sup> The British were too much for their enemy.

The French pattern of forces was falling like cards. First the French colonials on Montcalm's right retreated in order to seek the protection of the woods. Then when the whole right flank gave way, the center and left promptly followed.

The British charged with eagerness. Soon the French were in panic and wild flight. The British pursued with bayonets in the most terrifying execution. Authoritative documents gave the Canadians on the British left some credit because they checked their onrush, hence giving the French security time to slow the British chase.<sup>17</sup> Both Generals Wolfe and Montcalm fell dead.

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<sup>16</sup>Knox, Journals, Vol. II, pp. 66-71, 77-79. In these pages is a detailed account of the battle on the Plains of Abraham.

<sup>17</sup>Bigot to Belle-Isle, October 25, 1759, O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, Vol. X, p. 1052.

During his last minutes, Wolfe declared happily, "I will die in peace."<sup>18</sup>

The losses were almost the same if the loss of Wolfe equalled the loss of Montcalm, and the loss of 664 British equalled 650 French.<sup>19</sup> In the numbers engaged the combat was a minor affair, but in its results, it was one of the world's greatest battles. It gave Canada to England.

In a critical evaluation of this military engagement, it must be stated that Wolfe took great chances. If he had been defeated, he would have been cut off and captured or destroyed. He had no line of retreat, nor way of escape, albeit his British regulars were better soldiers than the Canadians composing the bulk of Montcalm's forces.<sup>20</sup> If Montcalm's army had gone into the fight in better shape, and the detachment from Cap Rouge, two thousand men, had got up sooner, it is hard to see how the British could have been victorious.

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<sup>18</sup>Knox, Journal, Vol. II, p. 79. Captain Knox heard many versions of Wolfe's words. But he seems to be well assured that these were Wolfe's last words.

<sup>19</sup>Mathew Forney Steele, American Campaigns, 2 Vols. (Washington: Byron S. Adams, 1909), Vol. I, p. 18.

<sup>20</sup>Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol. II, pp. 288-289. Parkman says, "Wolfe's alternative was victory or ruin; for if he would be overwhelmed by a combined attack, retreat would be hopeless."

Montcalm ought to have waited for the detachment from Cap Rouge before assaulting. Moreover, there were other troops at Beauport, and in the city, that he ought to have had at his disposal. Those who hold credit and dignity for the man can blame the governor who withheld the troops.<sup>21</sup> Montcalm also made the mistake of attacking with all his troops, instead of holding some troops in reserve. A strong reserve, put into the fight at the right moment and place, might have saved the day. But fortune appears to have been on the side of the British in this engagement. In the first place, the French commander at Cap Rouge had given orders that night for some transports to slip down to Quebec, keeping close to the shore. The sentinels all along the shore had been cautioned not to fire on them, and not to attract the British ships to them. The transports were cancelled, but the sentinels were not notified of it.<sup>22</sup> This circumstance enabled the British boats to go along the shore without being fired upon, or causing the French corps to be alarmed.

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<sup>21</sup>Steele, American Campaigns, Vol. I, p. 19.

<sup>22</sup>Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol. II, pp. 283-286. The most important moment at the chances was the fact that Vergor commanded the post at Anse du Foulon, but he had allowed all his men to go home.

The death of Montcalm left Vaudreuil in full military, as well as civil authority in Canada. He had his routed army collected at Beauport. Instead of uniting it with the troops from Cap Rouge, and attacking the small British force besieging Quebec, he fled with his command, and did not halt till he had reached Jacques Cartier, thirty miles up the river.<sup>23</sup>

The death of General Wolfe and Monckton helped put George Townshend to the command of the British army. He held his position on the battle of the plains of Abraham in such a manner that when Bougainville saw his lines parallel to receive the fire, he retreated. The new British leader held his best position rather than pursue Bougainville, and it is believed that Townshend did not want to run the risk of sacrificing the victory.<sup>24</sup>

The surrender of Quebec was inevitable. The city turned into a fugitive town after September 13. The efforts of Chevalier de Montreuil to gather the remnants of the army at St. Charles bridge to join them with Vaudreuil's contingent of Canadians proved unfruitful. It was doubtful whether Vaudreuil was convinced to give

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<sup>23</sup>Vaudreuil's flight has been described as abominable flight and full of disorder and confusion (Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol. II, p. 307.)

<sup>24</sup>Gipson, British Empire, VII, 422.



the British a second battle. The Canadians refused to take chances and that brought to an end any hopes of dislodging the British from Quebec. The French forces were gathered at Beauport where it should be considered the surrender originated.

The future was unpredictable. There were great fears that the British forces might even attack the Beauport camp. Vaudreuil was quickly forced to call a council of war in order to make decisions regarding the future of Quebec. It was determined, in view of the lack of provisions, that the battalions should retreat to Jacques Cartier, where the army arrived on September 15.<sup>25</sup>

Thus Quebec was left to its fate. Indeed, under the conviction that the city should not hold out, Vaudreuil, before departing with the army, drew up terms for its surrender.<sup>26</sup> The city was faced with many problems which could not be solved except by surrender. The food situation was horrible. The troops were put on

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<sup>25</sup>"An Impartial Opinion on Military Operations of the Campaign in Canada, 1759," New York Colonial Documents, Vol. X, p. 1062.

<sup>26</sup>For the terms of surrender, see "M. de Vaudreuil's Instructions to M. de Ramezay," New York Colonial Documents, Vol. X, pp. 1004-1007.

short rations and, in spite of their protests, had to eat horse flesh.<sup>27</sup>

The council of war<sup>28</sup> which met on September 15, gave the hint to Ramezay that he should surrender the city before risking it to heavy bombardment by the British troops.<sup>29</sup> On the evening of September 15, de Ramezay called the final Council of War to settle the fate of of Quebec before September 17. It was decided that Ramezay should avail himself of the capitulation.<sup>30</sup> No matter how the officers carried the decision, the British had the answers.

Admiral Saunders forced the issue by sending six of his men-of-war to the lower town with orders to begin bombardment. As a result of this maneuver, a white flag was flown from the walls. Major de Joannes left

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<sup>27</sup>Wrong, The Conquests of New France, p. 208.

<sup>28</sup>The Minutes of the Council of War, September 15, 1759, and M. Bernier to the Duke de Belle-Isle, September 19, 1759; and M. Daine to Marshall de Belle Isle, October 9, 1759, New York Colonial Documents, Vol. X, pp. 1007, 1010, and 1015.

<sup>29</sup>M. de Vaudreuil's Instructions to M. de Ramezay, Ibid., p. 1004.

<sup>30</sup>All the fifteen officers signed for capitulation, except the military engineer Captain de Fiedmont. The engineer's position was "to reduce the ration and to push the defense of the place to the last extremity," (Ibid., p. 1008).

Quebec and headed to Townshend's office to present the terms of Capitulation.<sup>31</sup>

Vaudreuil's terms for the capitulation were more for the safeguarding of the French interests than a mere surrender to the British combined operation.<sup>32</sup> But he showed a willingness to make terms more agreeable with respect to the surrender of the garrison. The British headquarters issued an ultimatum demanding the surrender of the garrison and warned further, that if Quebec was not given up by eleven o'clock, Townshend would take it by storm.<sup>33</sup> Before eight o'clock in the morning September 18, 1759, Ramezay signed the final papers for capitulation.<sup>34</sup>

The terms of surrender were much more liberal than those granted to the French at Louisburg. The French soldiers were to be accorded the honors of war, and to be allowed to return to France. The inhabitants were to have protection in person and property, and

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<sup>31</sup>Gipson, The Great War for the Empire, Vol. VII, p. 424.

<sup>32</sup>O'Callagan, ed., New York Colonial Documents, Vol. X, pp. 1004-1006.

<sup>33</sup>Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol. II, pp. 315-316.

<sup>34</sup>Gipson, British Empire, VII, 425.

free exercise of religion.<sup>35</sup> On September 22, the French garrison of about twenty-five hundred men was placed on transports and sent to France. The Canadians were disarmed and permitted to remain in the country under the terms of capitulation.<sup>36</sup>

This great victory was attributed to the quality of leadership provided by both Wolfe and Saunders and their lieutenants, to the quality of the weapons, both heavy artillery and muskets, and finally, to the harmonious cooperation between the two branches of the service through the entire operation. The foe that they faced for months and that was only finally vanquished on the heights of Abraham was both superbly commanded and determined.

The French cooperated with more unity with respect to defensive measures than most historians have recognized in their tendency to overemphasize the effects of the rivalry between Vaudreuil and Montcalm. It was only at the final critical moment when the British appeared

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<sup>35</sup>The final terms were included in the letter of M. de Vaudreuil to M. Berryer, September 21, 1759 (New York Colonial Documents, Vol. X, pp. 1011-1013).

<sup>36</sup>Gipson, British Empire, VII, 426. There were those who spoke for the restoration of Canada in 1759. For this see Verne W. Crane, ed., Benjamin Franklin's Letters to the Press, 1758-1775 (Chapelle Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1950), pp. 13-16.

on the heights of Abraham that two factors were chiefly responsible for the French defeat: the inferior quality not only of their muskets, but also of the lack of discipline of the Canadians. These Canadians failed to break through the weakest of the British lines. If Montcalm had at his disposal the same number of men, all highly disciplined veterans, of the quality that later under Napoleon swept like a torrent over Europe, who can say with confidence what might have been the outcome of that decisive engagement on September 13, 1759.

## CHAPTER V

### THE BRITISH FINAL ATTEMPT TO HOLD QUEBEC

After the fall of Quebec, the state of affairs in Canada were a disgrace. The inhabitants in the neighborhood of Quebec were complaining of the devastation of their property by the British army.<sup>1</sup> Those inhabitants who retreated into the Montreal area were being viewed as army prospects for the spring offensive. There was immediate need of British defenses. A fort was under construction on the Jacques Cartier and at the same time Bougainville was taking a post at Pointe Aux Trembles. From here a team was sent to Rivere du cap Rouge, a cannon range distance from Quebec in order to harass the British forces in Quebec.<sup>2</sup> While the officers were engaged in military preparation, Vaudreuil remained at Montreal with the responsibility of feeding supplies to Bourlamaque at the Isle-Aux-Noix on to de la Corne who was stationed at Galop's Island near La Presentation and at Fort La Galette on the Upper St. Lawrence.

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<sup>1</sup>O'Callaghan, ed., "An Imperfect Description of the Misery of Canada," New York Colonial Documents, Vol. X, pp. 1057-9.

<sup>2</sup>Knox, Journals, Vol. II, pp. 177-78, 203-4, 217.

At Quebec the British were engaged in constructing some of the buildings which they had knocked down during the seige of the city in 1759. It was hoped that a garrison of seven thousand men would defend the city against any French attempt to recapture the city.<sup>3</sup> Monckton appointed James Murray as Governor of Quebec, and Colonel Burton as Lieutenant Governor.<sup>4</sup> Other members of General Wolfe's staff were ordered to England or to join their regiments posted elsewhere.

On October 18, 1759 Admiral Saunders left Quebec with most of the ships of the line and a number of transports and on October 26, Monckton departed for England. News that the French would lay seige to the city forced Governor Murray to order the construction of twelve floating batteries for the defense of the city.<sup>5</sup> Murray's further action came as an answer to Vaudreuil's threat to nearby inhabitants that they would be harassed by Indians in case they failed to contribute for war. Murray assured the Canadians that the British would free them from severe despotism.<sup>6</sup> However, these Canadians

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 181.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 177.

<sup>5</sup>Potter, Sea Power, p. 19. Potter says that when the warships left Quebec, Murray was denied the sea communications which were needed to execute the war.

<sup>6</sup>Knox, Journal, Vol. II, pp. 185-6.

were required to carry lanterns after nightfall. Lights were supposed to be off by ten o'clock. By late November the parish of St. Joseph in the region of Point Aux Toembles revolted from the oath of fidelity that they had given to the British authorities. In an answer to this revolt, Murray sent a strong detachment to lay waste the country. In addition to this he warned the parishes of further severe measures if they did not stop their disturbances.<sup>7</sup>

To keep the French out of reach of Quebec a chain of blockhouses from Cape Diamond to the suburbs of St. Jean was constructed. An authoritative newspaper of the time claims that by the end of February, 1760, the blockhouses were assuming shape.<sup>8</sup> Later in the year traverses were also built to support the blockhouses. Before the severe winter closed in, the troops had gathered adequate supplies of firewood.

There was a mounting fear in Quebec due to the rumors of a French fleet which was expected near Point Levy.<sup>9</sup> During this time of threatening fear the parish

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 209-10.

<sup>8</sup>"Calender of Events at Quebec from October 27, 1759 to May 8, 1760," Pennsylvania Gazette, June 12, 1760.

<sup>9</sup>Knox, Journals, Vol. II, pp. 251-3.



of St. Michael revolted against the oath of fidelity. As a result every house in that parish was reduced to a complete ruin.<sup>10</sup> But these stern measures to the parishes had their effects.

In the beginning of March, Quebec was combating new enemies. Sickness in the British garrison reduced the original strength of the army from seventy-three hundred effectives to forty-eight hundred. The number of sick and weak men who were considered unfit for duty was so great that the matter became of urgent concern to Governor Murray. Fresh provisions, this time in the British garrison, were required. It was estimated that at the end of April one thousand men had died and two thousand men were totally unfit to do any work.<sup>11</sup>

It was quite clear that the French had planned to attack Quebec. Reliable sources indicated serious training was being given to the French soldiers in Montreal for perfecting themselves in the art of moving up tall ladders over a wall; however, many accidents took place in the course of these exercises and this was quite enough to convince the Canadians that the guerrilla

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 265.

<sup>11</sup>Gipson, British Empire, VII, 434.

tactic was impracticable.<sup>12</sup> News from the French camp showed that both Vaudreuil and de Levis, like Murray, could not afford to furnish the soldiers with supplies before spring. But the supplies from France were the only hope of the resistance of New France. Nevertheless, Vaudreuil was determined to save Canada. In November, Vaudreuil ordered eight or ten merchant ships held in security on the upper river to drop down to Sillery where they would have a favorable opportunity to run the batteries at Quebec in order for them to sail to France. The French ships managed to run the Quebec batteries and on November 24, they headed for France under Captain Kanon.<sup>13</sup>

The struggle for Quebec was far from finished. A complete understanding of Le Mercier's recommendations to the Ministry of War signed in Versailles on January 7 should prove this point.<sup>14</sup> His decision was based on whose fleet would reach the St. Lawrence first. His strategy to fortify the key points all along St. Lawrence was an imitation of General Wolfe's strategy.

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<sup>12</sup>Knox, Journals, Vol. II, pp. 270-2.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 115.

<sup>14</sup>O'Callaghan, "Memoir of Chev. Le Mercier on Canada," New York Colonial Documents, Vol. II, pp. 1065-8.

In face of these appeals, Belle-Isle wrote reassuringly to de Levis on February 8, that Berryer, Minister of the Marine,

Orders to be dispatched to you, relief of every description in provisions, munitions of war, recruits, by means whereof, despite the advantages the English possess in the occupation of the town of Quebec, . . . and perhaps to some advantage over them, sufficient to arrest their progress.<sup>15</sup>

The French failed to fulfill Le Mercier's plan and time of delivery of supplies to Canada. Instead of supplies leaving France in February, the French fleet of twenty to thirty ships left Bordeaux on April 14, only to be scattered by two British war ships. However, on May 17, three French ships managed to reach the St. Lawrence at last, but, to their captain's dismay, found complete British mastery of the river.<sup>16</sup> Thus, it was the fate of New France to be sealed by the relentless exertion of a superior sea power. But, the French soldiers in Canada continued to fight for the recapture of Quebec.

De Levis went ahead with his preparation for a spring assault upon Canada. He hoped to gather both from Montreal and Trois Rivieres some sixty-seven hundred regulars. Bougainville moved to Isle-Aux-Noix and

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<sup>15</sup> Marshal de Belle Isle to Chevalier de Levis, February 9, 1760, Ibid., pp. 1068-9.

<sup>16</sup> "Advices from Halifax," Pennsylvania Gazette, June 26, 1760, Knox, Journals, Vol. II, pp. 429-30.

Bourlamaque was to accompany de Levis to Quebec. On April 20, the Army of Montreal began the descent of the St. Lawrence and on April 24, it reached Pointe Aux Trembles. Here de Levis decided to surprise the British troops at Sillery. The French plan failed to last long because Murray managed to secure the information about the enemy and strict precaution of his position.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, there was no surprise when de Levis' forces moved over the Cape Range River and by the evening of April 27, the army appeared at St. Foy which was not far from Quebec.

Governor Murray had a choice of measures. He could meet the enemy in the open field with inferior numbers or he could attempt to seal himself firmly within Quebec and stand a siege. The decision came on April 28. Murray decided like Montcalm to face the enemy offensively rather than stand defensively. The ensuing battle was fought in the same general area where Wolfe and Montcalm had contested for the supremacy in September. This time however, de Levis occupied the Foulon and the ground to the north of it. At the beginning of the battle Murray posted himself to the west of the line of blockhouses

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<sup>17</sup>A French artillery man fell into the St. Lawrence, floated on ice and was rescued at Quebec. He revealed that de Levis was near Quebec. (Knox, Journals, Vol. II, p. 442.)

and entrenchments from Cape Diamond to St. Jean that his men had built during the winter.

The battle consisted primarily of flank movements, each side making an effort to envelope the wings of the opposing army. The British had the advantage of high ground. But the whole army moved forward into low ground where the soldiers fought knee-deep in melted snow and consequently lost their advantage. The French attacked Murray's right wing as well as the left and forced them into disorder. The demoralization of both wings of the army led to a general withdrawal.<sup>18</sup> In the ensuing retreat Murray's forces made it back to Quebec without panic. A strong rear-guard protected the little army from de Levis' troops. The artillery that was dragged into the low country was pulled along after the guns were spiked. The loss of men, including killed, wounded, and prisoners, amounted to eleven hundred.<sup>19</sup>

The battle of Sillery is a testimony to the superiority of de Levis as a strategist and tactician over his opponent. Right from the start of the battle Murray had the possession of high ground. In deserting the

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<sup>18</sup>Peckham, Colonial Wars, p. 197.

<sup>19</sup>Knox, Journals, Vol. II, pp. 292-5; "Journal of the Battle of Sillery and Siege of Quebec," O'Callaghan, ed., New York Colonial Documents, Vol. X, pp. 1077-89.

elevation, which he never should have done, and in moving toward the enemy, he violated one of the fundamental canons of military science with respect to surrender of the advantages of terrain and artillery support on the part of a force faced by one of great numerical superiority. Consequently, there was a retreat of the flanks in the face of sure annihilation or surrender unless a withdrawal took place.<sup>20</sup> This defeat can be viewed in many ways. Here was a British army with strategic position against the French army. There was no employment of naval tactics. The British army was defeated. One may conclude that sea power was essential for British victories. No doubt the British army needed a naval umbrella during the struggle.

From April 28 to May 17, Quebec was besieged. The British entrenched themselves and between May 8 and May 13 four batteries were established to the west of Murray's chain of blockhouses of the French artillery of twenty-one guns. Only one of the cannon was in the twenty-four pounder class. The rest were eighteens and twelves and were erected too far a distance to batter the walls. The French supply of power was not sufficient. Against these batteries some one hundred and fifty guns,

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<sup>20</sup>Knox, Journals, Vol. II, p. 225.

some large calibre, were shifted from the river defenses and most of them ultimately went into action.<sup>21</sup>

Murray made a stout defense and kept de Levis at bay, until a British fleet appeared in the river. De Levis' position in respect to seige and recapturing of Quebec was excellent, but it was doubtful whether France was in a position to break through the British blockade system in Europe. If the French fleet appeared in the St. Lawrence before the British fleet, there would be little doubt that France would recapture Quebec.

On May 6, signals appeared below Quebec that seemed to indicate the presence of a fleet. Was it British or French?<sup>22</sup> The news received through deserters from the de Levis camp revealed the state of distress in the French army for lack of adequate food supplies.<sup>23</sup> This restored the British morale, but the presence of the ascending fleet compelled the British and French to keep a state of round the clock alertness.

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 306-13.

<sup>22</sup>Robert Rogers, Journals of Major Robert Rogers (London: J. Millan, Printer, 1765), p. 170. Rogers says, "The ships had up different colors and the people at Quebec could not tell whether they were French or British."

<sup>23</sup>Knox, Journals, Vol. II, pp. 301-7.

On May 15, the British fleet arrived at Quebec. All the possibilities of the recapture of Quebec were forgotten. British sea power had opened up its responsibility for the empire. A captured French courtier from the lower St. Lawrence told of scattered ships in the river and another British fleet in the entry of the Gulf.<sup>24</sup> On May 18, Lord Colville's fleet anchored before Quebec. The British therefore regained their complete mastery of the St. Lawrence waterway. The British warships forced the French sailors to destroy or sink their supply ships. Two French frigates were also destroyed. However, the French refused to lower the French flag.<sup>25</sup> These ships contained naval stores and food supplies. It was a great blow to de Levis.

The French army did very good job by forcing the British army to the walls of Quebec, but the absence of a French navy made the difference. Since no French vessels were available, de Levis sought retreat. Before the retreating French army could gather its artillery, the British warship, the Vanguard, began firing at the French position with a heavy enfilading fire. This

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<sup>24</sup>Ibid., pp. 317-18.

<sup>25</sup>Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol. II, pp. 356-7.



forced de Levis to destroy some of the war materials including the guns captured from Murray at Sillery woods.

On May 17, de Levis arrived at Cape Rouge only to spend a day salvaging what he could from the sunken vessels. On May 18, he arrived at Jacques Cartier. He appointed Major Dumas with eighteen hundred men to take the defense of Pointe Aux Trembles, the fort at the Jacques Cartier and the Church at Dechambeault.<sup>26</sup> The rest of the troops were ordered to Montreal and Trois Riviere. On May 21, the Canadians were fed up and quit the military. With the British war ships on the waterways, the chances of French survival were very slim. The defeat of France was necessary according to William Pitt. Pitt saw the need for troops and once more turned to the colonies for the supply of men.<sup>27</sup> Pay and provisions for the colonial troops were given attention. If the colonies provided the necessary troops, it was hoped that General Amherst would proceed and reduce Montreal for Pitt had rated it as the objective for the 1760 campaign.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 361.

<sup>27</sup>Pennsylvania Gazette, April 26, 1759.

<sup>28</sup>Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol. II, p. 361.

The colonial support in 1760 was of great significance both in manpower as well as other supplies. The Northern Colonies took the lead in mobilization for the spring campaign. On January 24, Massachusetts agreed to furnish Pitt with five thousand men in addition to twenty-five hundred in the service. The state of Connecticut voted to furnish Great Britain with five thousand men and has been credited with this number on the official records.<sup>29</sup> There were unnecessary delays in raising the troops which were due to the rumors of predicted approaching peace. The New Hampshire Assembly agreed to raise eight hundred men and Rhode Island eight hundred.<sup>30</sup> Pennsylvania, Virginia and North Carolina raised less than four thousand men.

However, these provinces were not ready for action until late in May. Once more it must be realized that

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<sup>29</sup>Connecticut Colonial Records, Vol. X, pp. 349-50, quoted in Gipson, British Empire, VII, 446.

<sup>30</sup>Rhode Island Colonial Records, Vol. VI, pp. 243-5, quoted Ibid.

William Pitt played a great role in winning colonial support.<sup>31</sup>

In 1760, General Amherst, Commander in Chief of the British forces in America, planned a combined movement of three columns for the capture of Montreal, and the completion of the conquest of Canada. Murray was to move up from Quebec; Haviland, with a column from Crown Point, was to advance by way of the Richelieu River; and Amherst himself, with a column, was to march down the St. Lawrence.

From the military point of view, this operation was a hazardous combination for it gave the French forces, watching these three armies, the opportunities to unite and fall upon each of the columns separately. At any rate the French failed to take advantage of the opportunity, and opposed little real resistance to the advance of any one of the three British columns.<sup>32</sup> In connection with the plans formulated, it should be noted that Amherst was obliged to make a diversion of several troops. He

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<sup>31</sup>Pennsylvania Gazette, April 26, 1759, A letter from William Denny, the Lieutenant Governor and Commander in Chief of the Province of Pennsylvania, shows how Pitt's Ministry had gone about providing pay and provisions to the rangers. Every able man enlisting received six pounds and six pounds advance money for clothing. The officers who enlisted these men received twenty shillings for every volunteer enlisted.

<sup>32</sup>Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol. II, pp. 360-1.

had to check the Cherokee hostilities and strengthen his position in the valley of the Ohio. He put Brigadier Monckton in direct charge of Southern Operations.

There were still fresh memories in Amherst's experience. However, he was determined that he would take his force up the Mohawk to Oswego, and from there he would sail by boat across Lake Ontario to the entrance of the St. Lawrence. It was clear that once he took possession of the entrance, the campaign would proceed to Montreal. The task beyond him was to drive off the French defenses at La Galette and the Rapids of St. Lawrence. Amherst figured that a small force should be used to check the French defenses at Isle-Aux-Noix. In coordination, Murray assured General Amherst of the mobility up the St. Lawrence. If all the calculations worked, the French were bound to fall at Montreal.<sup>33</sup>

Amherst's campaign for 1760 sought the services of William Johnson (the Indian superintendent) and his Six Nations. During this time the French sought to employ Indian diplomacy which Johnson discovered.

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<sup>33</sup>Canadian Archives (1912), p. 86, quoted by Gipson, The Great War for the Empire, Vol. VII, p. 447.

Johnson was successful in this field. He took six hundred Indians to Oswego.<sup>34</sup>

In the month of May Amherst decided to reduce Isle-Aux-Noix by the use of mixed groups (Highlanders and Monckton's colonial regiments from New York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Indians) which would move over Lake Champlain and down the Richelieu. The difficulties up the Mohawk by reason of the low water, caused a lot of delays. Two sloops were built on Lake Ontario to defend the great flotilla of wholeboats and bateaux in the face of two armed French vessels, but they had to be provisioned and armed. The two sloops, named the Onondaga and the Mohawk to honor Johnson's Indians, were placed under the command of Captain Loring. The task given to the sloops was to find the channel leading from Lake Ontario to St. Lawrence. On July 14 Amherst approached the entrance of the St. Lawrence and the following day his force was only three leagues from Fort La Galette.

The British forces down the St. Lawrence were to meet the Chevalier Pouchot who had left Montreal on

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<sup>34</sup>M. de Vaudreuil to M. Berryer, June 24, 1760, O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, Vol. X, p. 1093. "It would appear that the five nations are devoted to the English, inasmuch as they are unwilling to do anything without the consent of Colonel Johnson," (Ibid.).

July 17, 1759. But Pouchot selected a nearby island and began a fast construction of a fort at Fort Levis on Isle Orkointon. This fort represented the sole defense of the upper St. Lawrence. Fort La Galette proved to be naturally a poor defensive area. The mission to befriend the Indians around Fort Levis proved of little military value to the French. The English agents had completely ruined any future French-Indian alliance. To the dismay of Pouchot some Indians attending his meeting were carrying British flags. On May 17 it was approved that the deserting and treacherous Indians should be left alone.<sup>35</sup>

On August 16, Johnson with his Indian allies appeared with British soldiers at La Presentation and the mission Indians received them cordially. It was then obvious that Pouchot could rely upon one French vessel (the Ontaouaise) and the defenses at Fort Levis to block Amherst's advance. However, the Ontaouaise was captured in a gallant waterfight with five British row galleys.<sup>36</sup> With this advantage Amherst moved along the North shore, passed the Isle Royale where Fort Levis stood and took possession of the northern bank of the

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<sup>35</sup>Gipson, British Empire, VII, 451.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 452.

St. Lawrence. At the same time Colonel Haviland moved down the south shore and took the post opposite the French island fort. Then Amherst's forces erected their batteries which opened fire from their twenty-four pounders on August 23. In the process of reducing Fort Levis, Loring's two vessels were joined by the French captured and now repaired vessel. However, the three vessels were no match to the French defenses. In fact, they were disabled during the fight.<sup>37</sup>

Pouchot, nevertheless, was doomed. His original four hundred and fifty men were reduced to less than three hundred effectives and were destined to face Amherst's ten thousand troops provided with batteries of heavy guns playing at will upon the French defenses. Four hundred additional troops under de la Corne were ordered to reinforce Pouchot, but they were unable even to get into contact with him. Therefore, realizing the hopelessness of his situation, Pouchot surrendered on the afternoon of August 25.<sup>38</sup>

Pouchot failed because he was not reinforced. Amherst's batteries kept French reinforcements from reaching the French fort. It must be realized that

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<sup>37</sup>Knox, Journals, Vol. II, pp. 411-2.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 403.

the French forces were occupied with other dangers. Governor Murray was advancing up the St. Lawrence and Brigadier General Haviland was also advancing from Lake Champlain and the Richelieu.<sup>39</sup> In addition to this force it should be remembered that General Johnson's success in the Indian diplomacy had weakened Pouchot's strategy in respect to mass. Pouchot had one ship and three hundred men to stem the invasion. The French military leaders did all they could to save New France from the British imperialism. Pouchot was reduced to a minimum. Who else?

The defenses erected at Isle-Aux-Noix were entrusted to Bougainville who held four hundred and fifty men at the end of June. De Berry reinforced Bougainville and the new force stood at eleven hundred men.<sup>40</sup>

During this time General Amherst learned that the French had beseiged Quebec and blockaded Murray's up river activities. Major Robert Rogers of the Rangers was as a result ordered to create a diversion of two hundred men, move them down Lake Champlain from Crown Point and land on the west side near the entrance of the Richelieu. It was expected that Rogers would surprise

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<sup>39</sup>Gipson, British Empire, VII, 453.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 454.



St. Jean located below Isle-Aux-Noix, and destroy all vessels, boats, provisions, and whatever else would aid the enemy.<sup>41</sup>

Rogers had the misfortune of being discovered near Isle-Aux-Noix. However, had Rogers waited for some time, he could have surprised the community of Sainte Therese. On May 15, Rogers stormed the gates of the stock place, burned the houses, the magazines of storage and provisions, wagons, and killed horses and cattle before he retired. From this time on until midsummer brigadier Haviland had not taken any important move. Then on August 11, a large British expedition left Crown Point, with no problem to face, such as those which confronted General Amherst the preceeding years, with respect to the control of Lake Champlain.<sup>42</sup> This force landed on the eastern shore near Isle-Aux-Noix and soon erected batteries which were put to work on May 23. A separate body was detached and put under Captain Darby. This body later was credited with the destruction of the French river fleet with two light howitzers and six pounders.

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<sup>41</sup>Robert Rogers to Sergeant Beverley, Robert Rogers, Journals of Major Robert Rogers (London: Printed by J. Millan, 1765), pp. 178-83.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 189; Knox, Journals, Vol. II, p. 392.

The surprise worked perfectly. The party managed also to capture a rideaux and used its heavy guns to sink the rest of the French vessels before they could escape.<sup>43</sup> This success gave the British command of the Richelieu below Isle-Aux-Noix and thus opened an easy way by water to Fort St. Jean and Chambly. This was a serious blow to the French plan of defense of Montreal for these defenses alone stood between a junction of Haviland's army with that of Murray which soon would be approaching Montreal.

The defenses were badly threatened. Moreover, Isle-Aux-Noix, as a result of the loss of control of the lower Richelieu, was isolated. The question was for how long would Montreal last against the three British columns? According to this writer the French leaders should have thought deeply after the fall of Quebec in 1759 and the failure of the government of France to break the blockade in Europe which led to British supremacy of the St. Lawrence waterway. With these two channels of communication closed to France it is quite easy to say any attempt of the French forces to continue the armed struggle is no more than a half armed force fighting

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<sup>43</sup>Rogers Journal, pp. 190-2; M. Bigot to Marshal de Belle Isle, August 29, 1760, O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, Vol. X, p. 1104.

against a modern equipped force. This was too much of a handicap to the French. They took defense seriously just because they had the advantage of terrain. It is the object of this thesis; however, to show how British sea power was used to defeat such French tactics.

Bougainville had two alternatives to consider. He could hold gallantly and run the risk of capture or retreat if necessary and add his force to Montreal for the final campaign. Bougainville chose the later alternative and by August 27, he retreated with a good force. Behind him he left forty men who continued to hold the defenses of Isle-Aux-Noix until they decided to surrender on August 28.<sup>44</sup>

With the fall of Isle-Aux-Noix and the protecting fleet on the Richelieu no longer available for defenses, it was highly in doubt that the French force would stand another month of serious fighting. But military officers see military campaigns from different levels. Such was the idea presented by Bigot in his letter to Belle-Isle. He says:

Had M. de Bougainville been able to hold out the time that was hoped, Canada might have been saved

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<sup>44</sup>Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, Vol. X, p. 1104.

for this year; such were the appearances, whilst at present it is in great danger.<sup>45</sup>

Montreal was, indeed, in great danger. So much force was destined to converge there, that one may question whether or not the mere holding of the forts on the Richelieu could possibly have saved New France. After viewing these conditions, Bigot warned, "This is our last resource."<sup>46</sup> That was an honest statement.

Not only was General Amherst approaching Montreal with some ten thousand men from the west, but Governor Murray was moving relentlessly from the east closer to the city. Murray had fifty-two hundred men in Quebec by June 15, but twenty-three hundred of them were incapacitated.<sup>47</sup> However, Murray was reinforced in July, and Amherst ordered two more regiments up from Louisburg to support him. The British sea force captured the mastery of the St. Lawrence river, and this left Quebec in no danger. Murray, therefore, proceeded to move to Montreal with twenty-two hundred men from Quebec. The expedition under Murray consisted of thirty-two frigates, brigantines, and other sailing vessels, nine

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<sup>45</sup>M. Bigot to Marshal de Belle-Isle, August 28, 1760, Ibid.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

<sup>47</sup>Knox, Journals, Vol. II, p. 340-46 et. passim.

floating batteries and large numbers of barges and bateaux.<sup>48</sup> The mighty force separated upon reaching Point Aux Trembles. Captain Knox records in his Journal the effect of this array of might upon these dwellings along the banks of the St. Lawrence. He wrote:

The north and south inhabitants are all in arms, terrified, no doubt at their approaching fate; it is not probable they ever saw so numerous a fleet in this part of the country.<sup>49</sup>

The effect of the fleet was significant. The men of the parish of St. Croix surrendered to the troops who had landed, and the day following, those of this parish do well as those of the parish of Lobiniere took the oath of neutrality. The community of St. Antoine followed suit by surrendering their arms on August 23. But for those men who doubted the outcome Murray warned:

Who can carry on or support war without ships, artillery, ammunition, or provisions? At whose mercy are your habitations, and that harvest that you expect to reap this summer, together with all you are possessed of in this world? Therefore consider your own interest, and provoke us no more.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>48</sup>Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, Vol. X, p. 1104. According to the information received from two prisoners from Murray's detachment it was learned that the latter "had received twelve hundred men from Louisberg." See Bigot P. S. to Belle Isle, September, 1760.

<sup>49</sup>Knox, Journals, Vol. II, pp. 352-4.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., pp. 352-4.

Murray's naval ascent of the St. Lawrence created a lot of fears along the banks of the river, but his action in avoiding an engagement at the mouth of the Jacques Cartier, made the French garrison at Trois Rivieres from the British fleet movements. The French had the wrong idea. The truth about the fleet is in de Levis' letter to Belle Isle. De Levis admits: "We possess no means of stopping them; we are making a mere defensive demonstration to retard their march."<sup>51</sup>

In reading this letter behind the lines, one sees the position behind that the French bestowed upon the British seapower. In Chapter IV of this work both Marshal Belle Isle and M. de Berryer confessed the uselessness of the French naval competition against the British navy. The Indians felt the pressure, too, but their reactions were of great loss to the French who had no hope of manpower supplies from France. On August 17, de Levis received bad news. Two armies were then converging upon Montreal, with that from Crown Point but half a league from Isle-Aux-Noix, and the other moving down the St. Lawrence close to Fort Levis. De Levis was made aware of the force of Lord Rollo with

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<sup>51</sup>M. de Levis to Belle-Isle, August 7, 1760, O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, Vol. X, p. 1102.

the Louisburg regiments, now with Murray near the Mouth of the Richelieu.<sup>52</sup>

Lord Rollo's mission was quite successful with the Indians around the Richelieu or Sorel. He burned the homes of the Canadians who still held arms. Lord Rollo had an opportunity to exchange fire with the French under Bourlamaque who had entrenched eleven hundred men near the mouth of the Richelieu. But neither of them was willing to fight. The inhabitants including the Canadian militiamen were beginning to get the message that France could not win the war. They spread so much fear into the parishes that the communities went into a general desertion.<sup>53</sup> The situation was getting out of control. Anything could happen.

On August 28, Brigadier Haviland appeared on the Richelieu with a flotilla. The French forces at St. Jean and Sainte-Therese retired out of fear to Chambly, lower down the Richelieu.<sup>54</sup> A week later General Murray

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<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 1105. M. Bigot added, "That detachment Rollo's has ravished viole pillaged and burned houses and barns, and committed other disorders."

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., Bigot says there were four to five hundred Indians who were not stable.

<sup>54</sup>Rogers Journal, pp. 192-4.

weighed anchor up the river and on August 28, he was only four leagues short of Montreal.

But the French had some hopes. Dumas and Bourlamque moved parallel with Murray's force. However, Amherst was expected to come down the upper St. Lawrence from Isle Royale, and this was expected to force down the French to their knees. Murray took that opportunity and entrenched at Varenne.<sup>55</sup> On September 1, the people of Chambly surrendered and with this Murray took the road through Chambly to la Prairie where he reached on September 4. Two days later General Amherst landed at Lachine on the island of Montreal.

At this time the French were concentrated on the island of Montreal. Murray's fleet had spread all along the river to the south of it and Brigadier Haviland was closing to the river from Chambly and Captain Roger's rangers arrived at Longueuil, on the south bank of the St. Lawrence opposite Montreal.<sup>56</sup> The timing was perfect. At this critical junction, the last of the Canadians deserted the army and returned home. This left de Levis with scarcely more than two thousand effectives. With a ring of steel forged about the city no doubt, one

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<sup>55</sup>Knox, Journals, Vol. II, pp. 381-82.

<sup>56</sup>Rogers Journal, pp. 194-5.



should expect capitulation. During the night of September 6, Vaudreuil conferred with all the principal officers of the land troops and the marines. The intendant Bigot presented a memoir relative to the capitulation of the colony. He set forth the state of its affairs together with a definite project for surrender.

Consequently, early in the morning of September 7, Lieutenant Colonel Bougainville brought a letter in which he requested a cease fire until noon.<sup>57</sup> At this time the French governor agreed also to negotiate for surrender. After some bitter discussions regarding certain articles Vaudreuil was forced to proposals that General Amherst imposed.<sup>58</sup>

Thus, by this surrender, which included the whole of New France and its dependencies, Anglo-French hostilities on the continent of North America came to a drastic

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<sup>57</sup>Gipson, British Empire, VII, 463.

<sup>58</sup>There were fifty-five articles for the capitulation. The first twenty-two and the last five deal with the military establishments in New France. De Levis protested against obliging troops to lay down their arms. (O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, Vol. X, p. 1106. For these documents see same book, pp. 1107-20.) Also see Rogers Journal, p. 195; Virginia Gazette, January 16, 1761. Amherst forwarded the capitulation of Montreal to William Pitt.

end. The Treaty of Paris<sup>59</sup> which was signed on February 10, 1763 confirmed the conquests of Great Britain. By the same treaty France restored Minorca, her sole trophy of the war.<sup>60</sup> In concluding this chapter with the surrender of Canada, it is however, important to make quite clear that the conflict which terminated at the gates of Montreal on September 7, 1760 was but a phase of further struggle.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>59</sup>For a Complete Summary of the Treaty of Paris, See Horn, "The Treaty of Paris, 10 February, 1763," English Historical Documents, Vol. X, pp. 936-42; Pennsylvania Journal, February 17, 1763 and May 12, 1763.

<sup>60</sup>Williamson, British Empire and Commonwealth, p. 163; see also Sinclair R. Atkins, From Utrecht to Waterloo (London: Methuen and Company, 1965), p. 132.

<sup>61</sup>The colonists, notably the rangers, were inclined to despise the regulars and greatly to underestimate their services. The American War of Independence claims part of its causes from this conquest. Compare this work with W. L. Labaree, ed., "The Canadian Pamphlet," The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 14 Vols. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963), Vol. VIII, p. 53; W. L. Grant, "Canada Versus Guadeloupe. An Episode of Seven Years' War," American Historical Review, 17 (1912), pp. 735-42.

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUMMARY

It has been the purpose of this thesis to trace and analyze the influence of British sea power upon the British victory at Quebec. Since this victory was inflicted from the sea to the land, military campaigns are essential. In an effort to ascertain the influence of British sea power, it has been necessary in retrospect to view the Anglo-French struggle before the conquest of Quebec from the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle until the French surrender at Montreal.

Due to the vast scope of this project of examining the Anglo-French struggle, it has been necessary to divide this material into two chapters. The hope is that after the reader has digested this panorama of history, he will arrive at an understanding of the nature of the Anglo-French struggle. Then the reader may better understand the influence of the British sea power upon the conflict.

The major concept to be grasped from studying the Anglo-French struggle is that it was a struggle between a sea power and a land power. Their problems were both in diplomacy and colonial rivalry. These problems, it is clear, could not be solved otherwise, but in the battlefield.

During the period under discussion we see a great change in European diplomacy. Maria Theresa of Austria is portrayed as one who promoted this diplomacy in the hope of trying to recover Silesia from Frederick the Great of Prussia. Her allies united in the hope of dismembering Prussia. Since Austria was allied with France and Russia, Maria Theresa, it is to be noted, became proud of her position at the head of a population of one hundred million people. This huge force was to face quite small numbers of populations from Britain and Prussia.

The French had a plan actually to expand their territories in North America. It should be recalled that the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was a good cause of this struggle.

From the policy of intervention came an error in foreign policy. Both Britain and France erred in their foreign policy calculations toward Russia, and further compounded their problem when France allied with Austria and Britain allied with Prussia. Both Maria Theresa and Elizabeth hated Frederick of Prussia and with the news of the convention of Westminster it should be no surprise that they were easily won to the French alliance. In this diplomatic war Frederick sees France, Austria, and Russia as surrounding him

with the hope of an attack to dismember his kingdom. All that Frederick could do was to surprise these nations one by one before they could unite their armies. Frederick did this by invading Saxony. Thus Frederick started the war (not actually causing it) and according to the defensive alliance of Westminster, it was upon Great Britain to support him or subsidize him. The distinctive strategic feature of the struggle, from the author's point of view, is Pitt's plan--a strategy toward which Britain had been groping since the Anglo-Dutch wars.

Pitt's strategy, like all strategies that achieve true concentration, has both a holding and a hitting aspect. Throughout the armed struggle, this policy played one of the most prominent roles in the blockade system as far as the naval and military campaigns are concerned.

The holding aspect consists of: 1) the efforts of the Royal Navy in first blockading and then destroying the French fleets; 2) the efforts of Britain's allies, chiefly Frederick the Great of Prussia, in minimizing French wealth, and 3) containing the French manpower that might otherwise be used to build up the French Navy to break the British blockade and succor France's overseas possessions.

Within the European theatre, Pitt's plan has both a hitting and a holding aspect. In Europe Frederick's army has been viewed as the principal hitting element, while the British "conjunct expedition" along the coast of France is viewed as intended in part to make the French sufficiently fearful of an invasion to hold back the troops that might otherwise be sent against Frederick.

France's counter-strategy against Britain consisted of: 1) raids on British maritime commerce; 2) attempts to defend French colonies; and, 3) attempts to invade the British Isles. This writer has tried to show how the British naval preponderance succeeded in rendering all these efforts futile. Thus Belle Isle's scheme for invading the British Isles by eluding the channel fleet was forced to die in the planning stage. However, French Mediterranean diversion resulted in the repulse of Byng's fleet and the capture of Minorca. This victory seemed to have encouraged the French navy for we see later on some similar invasion plans, requiring the combining of the Toulon and Brest fleets in the English Channel. These French hopes were nullified. Bascarmen was assigned to destroy the Toulon fleet, which he defeated and destroyed at the battle of Lagos Bay (1759). General Hawke destroyed the Brest fleet in the battle of Quiberon Bay (1759). It is hoped that the reader will be in a

position to see how these victories affected the British victories in Canada.

The main British offensive, the hitting aspect, is carried beyond the seas--using England's naval preponderance to support attacks on the colonies of France. It is essential to understand the importance of the capture of these colonies. It was necessary for the expansion of the empire, promotion of trade and consequently for production of wealth. It should be recalled that a part of this increased wealth went to subsidize Britain's allies for keeping the large French army occupied in continental war, thus giving the English fleet mastery of the seas. The command of the sea means more than the protection of trade. Behind this command lay a job for the army whose duty is emphasized all along the North American campaigns.

In an attempt to bring some continuity in the story, Pitt's triple offensive has been viewed through the key campaigns of Louisburg, the Ohio Valley, and the Great Lakes. These campaigns comprised both sea and land operations in which the navy's and the army's cooperation has been stressed and assigned the topic "combined operations." The importance of these campaigns should be attributed to opening the road to Quebec which

Pitt deeply appreciated, for Quebec was his military objective.

For one who has followed closely the information provided in this work, in view of the strict blockade system along the coast of France and the North Atlantic, it should have come as no surprise when France was unable to reply by sending more vessels to Canada especially after the destruction of her fleet at Louisburg. The failure of France to reinforce and supply New France with a fleet, men, and other military needs has been studied and reasons have been given through the exploration of the correspondence between New France leaders and French Ministers of War and the Marines. The nature of the Canadian campaign depends on how these reinforcements could be supplied to Canada.

Throughout the years 1759-1760 the French forces in Canada stood one of the most desperate defensive efforts the North American continent ever saw. It must be borne in mind that every ship entering a French port had slipped in stealthily. It is no wonder why French convoys sailed at night. They had to do so, so that they could elude the vigilance of the British cruisers. We see the English fleet assaulting the coasts of France at will.

During the time when French ships were unable to come out to sea, Pitt ordered Admiral Saunders and



General Wolfe to ascend the St. Lawrence in an effort to dislodge the French from Quebec. Saunders and his assistants were able to take General Wolfe's army safely to the threshold of Quebec. All the weak defenses along the waterway, especially at Isle d' Orleans and Point Levy, were answered with such formidable fire that the defenders vacated the areas for use by the British.

However, the French defense of Canada would not be felt until Wolfe's army threatened to force its way at the Montmorency encampments. The result is a defeat. An attempt, therefore, has been made to show that without cooperation of the navy and the army nothing could be done to dislodge Montcalm from his entrenchment.

Saunders displayed an excellent example of the proper use of sea power, especially after Wolfe's defeat at the Montmorency River. The use of feints while flat-bottomed boats delivered troops at the Foulon Post should be clearly studied. So long as a part of the British fleet kept a good bombardment of the Montmorency and the North coast of Quebec, both Montcalm and Bougainville could not help defend Quebec from the rear. It is the primary object of this writer to show that without the use of the superior sea power Wolfe would have been unable to scale the cliffs at Quebec. But once Wolfe

stood at the Plains of Abraham, then the British army, it should be noted, won victory in fifteen minutes.

It was intended that the reader will see from the information provided in this summary that the failure of France to send ships to blockade the St. Lawrence all the time led to the British mastery of the waterway. The author tended to show in one way or the other that the battle was won on the St. Lawrence waterway, but brought to a conclusion on the Plains of Abraham. However, each step is essential for the achievement.

While the fleet under Saunders maintained a complete mastery of the waterway, the army failed to seal off all escape routes and as such most of the French army escaped from Quebec. This mistake by the army cost Great Britain another year to bring New France to a defeat.

Since the French could not get supplies and above all the needed reinforcements, ammunitions, the rest of 1759 to the early part of September 1760 has been examined as an unnecessary struggle and yet as an attempt by Britain to bring back their already won victory. The rest of the struggle was both naval and army in action. The fleet from Quebec ascended the St. Lawrence and two armies worked to converge at Montreal. The

attempt was a success. The surrender at Montreal meant surrender of the whole of New France.

Thus an attempt has been made to show that France, in seeking to guard its great overseas interests, was obliged to face among other things the fatal handicap of inadequate sea power. This means that too few ships could be detached to operate in North America, in view of the desperate need for them in the north Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

All wars have their object lessons for students of military science as well as for all thoughtful students. The one under our study is no exception. The following are among those most evident lessons.

McLee tactics, initiated by general chase, won smashing victories at Lagos and at Quiberon Bay.

In an amphibious war, both careful planning, unstinted interservice cooperation, boldness of leadership and perseverance are essential. In our attempt to this study, we find that these requirements were lacking in Rochefort Operations and consequently the operation failed. But General Wolfe and Admiral Saunders at Quebec showed the qualities necessary to accomplish this most difficult military task, of giving assault on land positions from the sea.

William Pitt emerged as the model of the Commander in Chief, characterized by unity of purpose, consistency, and decisiveness. He disposed his prizes so that each aided all the others. Because Pitt thought naturally in giant strategic terms, he could ensure not merely victory but a chance for England to secure all her war aims.

The pervasive and inexorable power of naval preponderance in this war is a great lesson from the British victories. The British navy at once kept the tight little island secure from invasion and made possible winning Quebec and Montreal, and with these the whole of Canada. It should appear natural that the great American naval historian, Alfred Thayer Mahan, should have turned to the history of England between 1660 and 1783 to mine object-lessons to support his sea power thesis ("The influence of sea power upon history").

In summing up the major theme into one sentence, it would be that the one nation that gained in this struggle was that which used the sea in peace to earn its wealth, and ruled it in war by the extent of its navy, by the number of its subjects who lived on the sea or by the sea, and by its numerous bases of operations scattered over the globe.

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