

A BURKEIAN ANALYSIS OF HARRY S. TRUMAN'S  
ACCEPTANCE SPEECH TO THE 1948  
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL  
CONVENTION

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## CHAPTER I

### THE PROBLEM

Chapter one will be divided into four sections:

(1) an introduction and statement of the problem; (2) justification of the problem; (3) previous research; and (4) a preview of succeeding chapters.

#### I. INTRODUCTION

The decade of the 40's has long been regarded as one of the most dramatic periods in American history. The United States suffered through the most devastating war in the history of the world. The end of this war introduced the beginnings of the nuclear age and the Cold War. America's President died while still in office and Harry S. Truman was forced into the role of directing a major industrial and international power through the transition from war to peace. He was thrust into the necessity of establishing a foreign policy which could contend with a new threatening international menace. The job required finding a means to contain rampant

internal inflation. He had to generate jobs and provide housing for thousands of those returning from the war effort. The problems of Truman's first term as President were compounded by the election of a Republican Congress in 1946 and an increasing split in his own Democratic Party. The electorate seemed to lose its faith in Truman and at the time of the 1948 Democratic National Convention the polls showed Dewey the overwhelming choice. Truman had been dubbed a "gone goose" President. Truman's biographer indicated that: "His tenure . . . was the least tranquil, the most bedeviled by partisan strife, of any President since Andrew Johnson."<sup>1</sup> Harry S. Truman was the thirty-third President of the United States. He would become famous for his decisions to use the atomic bomb in World War II, the Truman Doctrine, and his personality. He is also known for leading the biggest political upset in American history. Truman was not considered an accomplished speaker though his rhetoric probably contributed much to his political successes. One of his most important rhetorical efforts

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<sup>1</sup>Cobell Phillips, The Truman Presidency (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), p. xi.

was his acceptance speech for the Presidential nomination at the 1948 Democratic National Convention.

The speech was unusual for two reasons. He was addressing a convention that had resigned itself to the fact that its candidate could not or probably would not win. Second, he announced that he was going to call a special session of Congress so the Republicans could enact their national platform into law. Irwin Ross indicated that Truman:

. . . skillfully exploited an initiative which every President possesses but most would probably regard as inappropriate for so blatantly political a purpose. It was also unprecedented. Not since 1856, the press was quick to point out, had an emergency session of Congress been called during a Presidential election year. And never, as far as anyone could remember, had a President announced a special session in a speech to a party convention.<sup>2</sup>

The boldness of the speech created possibilities for an interesting and valuable study. It shall be the purpose of this study to describe the rhetorical situation of Harry S. Truman's 1948 acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention.

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<sup>2</sup>Irwin Ross, The Loneliest Campaign: The Truman Victory of 1948 (New York: The New American Library, Incorporated, 1968), p. 128.



## II. JUSTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM

The rhetorical situation of the 1948 acceptance speech is appropriate for study for three distinct reasons: (1) the unusualness of the speech; (2) Truman's reputation as a speaker; and (3) the importance of the election. Each shall be discussed separately. This section shall also justify the method of analysis to be used.

### The Speech

The acceptance speech involved three unusual circumstances. Two have been previously mentioned. The first was that Truman presented the speech to an audience that did not want him as their nominee but they could find no willing alternative. Most of the Democratic delegates did not believe that Truman was a powerful enough leader to win the election.

The second unusual circumstance was that Truman announced the special session of Congress in the speech. No previous incumbent had had nerve to use such a blatant yet readily available tactic. The action was a totally obvious political move yet it did not seem to offend the American

public. As shall be seen, many observers called it a brilliant maneuver.

The third unusual circumstance was a reaction to the first two. Although Truman had seemingly insurmountable barriers to overcome to be effective with his audience and though he used such an overt and unfair political tool as the special session he seemed to be effective.<sup>3</sup> A superficial look at the speech and the times would tend to support the opposite.

#### Truman the Speaker

The examination of the 1948 acceptance speech is extremely important to the study of Truman's rhetoric because he was not known as an accomplished public speaker. His dynamic and earthy personality did not show in most of his formal speaking efforts. This analysis could be justified solely on the basis of discovering why an unacclaimed speaker like Truman could be successful in such a formidable situation as the 1948 Democratic Convention.

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<sup>3</sup>Time (July 26, 1948), 14.

## The Election

The 1948 Presidential election was important because of its heralded upset. On election night Dewey was predicted the winner with little doubt; but Truman won. Truman's announcement to call the special session had to play an important role in the election outcome. The action was Truman's most strategic maneuver of the campaign.<sup>4</sup>

## Methodology

This study shall use Kenneth Burke's dramatic theory as its method of analysis. Burke's theory is appropriate for two reasons: (1) it provides a clear and easy method for assuring that a thorough study will be made; and (2) it provides an appropriate means to analyze the strategies Truman used in the speech.

Thorough Study. Burke's theory emphasizes that a critic must consider all sources that can affect the rhetorical situation. His pentad is designed to serve as the

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<sup>4</sup>Wilfred E. Binkley, President and Congress (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), p. 347.

guidelines for finding all the influential sources. The pentadic guidelines are separated into the Act (naming what took place in thought and deed), the Scene (the background of the act, the situation in which the act occurred), the Agent (the kind of person that performed the act), the Agency (what means or instruments were used), and the Purpose (the cause for which the action was taken).<sup>5</sup> The critic cannot be sure he has isolated the important factors which determined the nature of a rhetorical situation unless all the possibilities have been pursued. L. Virginia Holland summarized Burke's contention when she wrote:

From Burke's point of view we can never arrive at a valid, realistic description of naming the nature or substance of the speech until we consider it from all of these interrelated aspects.<sup>6</sup>

Burke's pentadic theory provides definitive starting points for discovering the possibilities by insisting that the critic view each of the five general aspects of the

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<sup>5</sup>Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1969), p. xv.

<sup>6</sup>L. Virginia Holland, "Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Approach in Speech Criticism," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLI (December, 1955), 353.

rhetorical situation through its relationship to the other four.

A thorough analysis is necessary for a criticism of Truman's speech. The unusual nature of the speech and Truman's effectiveness imply an extremely complex rhetorical problem. By using the interrelationships of Burke's pentadic terms the writer can clearly and cohesively delineate the singular factors which affected each other to create the ultimate nature of the overall situation.

Strategies within the Speech. Basic to Burke's theory is his contention that all persuasion is designed to further social cohesion. All men are different from each other and as a consequence must constantly remind each other of their similarities for socialization to be possible. Consequently, Burke's rhetorical theory revolves around the contention that the speaker tries to identify the similarities between himself and his audience. Such identification serves as the basis of persuasion.

Truman's speech definitely demonstrated Burke's theory to be viable. The speech attempted to gain support for Truman from the Democratic delegates and the voting

public. The speech clearly attempted to gain such support by establishing a definite association between himself and his listeners. Burke's theory of identification will serve as a valuable tool in the description of how the speech attempted to gain political support for Truman.

### III. PREVIOUS RESEARCH

An investigation of Auer's "Doctoral Dissertations, Work in Progress" and University Microfilms Incorporated, Dissertation Abstracts revealed nineteen previous studies of Truman as a speaker and no works in progress. None of the prior studies dealt specifically with the 1948 convention speech. Ten of the studies analyzed a specific aspect of Truman's speaking. Five were comparative studies with other speakers. Three were surveys of a series of speeches and one was an analysis of a speech in 1952.

Only an M. A. Thesis by George Austin on the "Rhetoric of Containment: A Rhetorical Analysis of the Truman Doctrine" at the University of Oregon used Burke's theories as its basis of evaluation. The work did not limit itself to one persuasive act and it did not provide any new insight into the 1948 acceptance speech.

#### IV. SUCCEEDING ORGANIZATION

The purpose of this section is to prognosticate the contents of the succeeding chapters.

##### Chapter II

Chapter II will provide an indepth discussion of the methodology used to analyze Truman's speech. The discussion will be divided into three sections. Section one shall discuss Burke's rationale for his theory. Section two will introduce and explain the pentad and its relationship to Burke's concept of action and motives. Section three will discuss how the pentadic ratios will be used to reveal the important motives which determined the nature of Truman's rhetorical situation.

##### Chapter III

Chapter III reports the results of the analysis of the 1948 acceptance speech. The discussion will be divided into four sections. Section one will isolate the pentadic ratios that were most important in the determination of Truman's rhetorical situation. Sections two, three and four will discuss the important ratios and describe the

nature of Truman's situation.

#### Chapter IV

Chapter IV will be divided into two sections.

Section one will summarize the important findings of the study and draw the final conclusions. Section two will discuss the possibilities for additional research.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>A copy of the speech shall be appended to the end of the study.



## CHAPTER II

### THE DRAMATISTIC THEORY AS

#### A METHOD FOR CRITICISM

This chapter will present an overview of Kenneth Burke's dramatistic theory of human communication as the method for analyzing Harry S. Truman's 1948 acceptance speech. Most of the materials consulted for chapter two were the primary works by Kenneth Burke: A Grammar of Motives and A Rhetoric of Motives. Other helpful works included Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, edited by William H. Rueckert, Burke's Permanence and Change, Perspectives by Incongruity, and Language as Symbolic Action.

The delineation of Burke's theory and its subsequent method fall within three major divisions: (1) Burke's definition of man and the importance of language; (2) the pentad; and (3) the pentadic interrelationships.

#### I. DEFINITION OF MAN

A clear basis for Burke's dramatistic theory was provided by his explanation of man's unique characteristics.

This section explains those characteristics which are important to the analysis of Truman's speech. Subsequent sections will describe the dramatistic theory in which Burke focused upon man's unique abilities. Burke attributed four characteristics to man which make him unique from other animals: Man is (1) the symbol-using animal; (2) inventor of the negative; (3) separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making; and (4) goaded by the spirit of hierarchy.<sup>1</sup> An understanding of the first and fourth characteristic is helpful for the analysis of the Truman speech. The second and third characteristics are important only for an in depth discussion of Burke's theory.

### The Symbol-Using Animal

Burke rejected the "classic definition of man (the 'rational animal')"<sup>2</sup> as not being a totally unique characteristic. Animals behave rationally in a given situation

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<sup>1</sup>Kenneth Burke, "Definition of Man," Perspectives by Incongruity, Stanley Edgar Hyman and Barbara Karmiller, editors (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press 1964), p. 199.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

but they cannot symbolically abstract their experience to communicate it. Danial Fogarty explained Burke's position when he indicated that abstraction:

. . . is the characteristically human ability that makes a rational man specifically rational. Not only is this abstracting power, which Burke calls 'generalization', the specific element of his essence as a man, but it lifts his nature, in kind as well as in degree, above that of other animals. . . .<sup>3</sup>

Burke's emphasis upon man's ability to symbolize abstractions is basic to his theory of rhetorical criticism.

Holland verified the importance of symbolic abstraction when she wrote:

Since man is specifically a symbol-using animal who expresses himself symbolically primarily through linguistic structures the main way he acts is verbally, or through the medium of language.<sup>4</sup>

Burke contended that man acts via his unique use of abstract language, consequently, further understanding of man requires study of his verbalizations.

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<sup>3</sup>Danial Fogarty, "Kenneth Burke's Theory," Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, William H. Rueckert, editor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), p. 329.

<sup>4</sup>Holland, op. cit., 353.

### Goaded by the Spirit of Hierarchy

This section explains what Burke meant by hierarchy and why hierarchy is important to the study of rhetoric. Hierarchy, according to Burke, is a characteristic motive of man because he lives within societies. Within a society men constantly attempt to maintain patterns of order or to establish new patterns of order so the society can function as an entity. The consequence is that men develop stratified order. Burke indicated both that hierarchies are inevitable and that many can operate within the same society when he stated:

The hierarchic principle itself is inevitable in systematic thought. It is embodied in the mere process of growth, which is synonymous with the class divisions of youth and age, stronger and weaker, male and female, or the stages of learning from apprentice to journeyman to master.<sup>5</sup>

The hierarchial motive then is man's desire to better himself within his perspective of the operating hierarchy or his wish to establish new hierarchies to provide for personal betterment.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives and A Rhetoric of Motives (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1962), p. 665.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp. 199-200.

The study of man's preoccupation with order must also be a study of man's rhetoric because the use of rhetoric is for the maintenance of an old or the establishment of a new system of order. Fogarty explained:

According to Burke, man pours all his energies into establishing and maintaining his personal world of hierarchic order. His survival depends on it. And rhetoric is his specific means of seeking or keeping that order. . . . it is also the means of accomplishing order, because for Burke, entreaty, overture, politeness, and diplomacy are all forms of a rhetoric of courtship that promotes union for the sake of order. . . .<sup>7</sup>

Rhetoric is a device by which the individual can further his own personal hierarchic order. The analysis of Truman's speech will involve a discovery of Truman's hierarchical motives and those of his audience.

### Summary

Burke defined man as the only animal capable of verbalizing abstract thought in the form of a symbolic language. Man is universally motivated by patterns of social stratification which he attempts to preserve or change with the use of rhetoric. Remaining conscious of Burke's

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<sup>7</sup>Fogarty, op. cit., pp. 322-323.

explanation that man has unique abilities involving the use of language, it is now appropriate to discuss his theory which is centered around man's linguistic ability.

## II. THE PENTAD

At the center of Burke's theory is his dramatic pentad. His philosophy concerning the investigation and evaluation of rhetoric emanates from the use of his pentad. This section introduces the pentadic terms and provides an explanation of action and motives. In the Grammar five terms designate the "generating principle" for investigation. They are: Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose.<sup>8</sup> Fogarty summarized the terms when he wrote:

For any action (human, symbol-using act), as opposed to motion (mere animal, nonsymbol-using act), there are always five points of view: scene, the environmental point of view; act, the thing itself as represented in an idea; agent, the derivational or efficient cause aspect of the thing; agency, the 'how' and 'with what assistance' of the thing or act; and purpose, the agent's motivation.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Burke, Grammar, op. cit., p. xvii.

<sup>9</sup>Fogarty, op. cit., p. 327.

Burke contended that the pentad is a tool to classify any motive behind any rhetorical act. Since the pentad is designed to describe the motives surrounding a particular action, it is necessary to understand the terms "action" and "motives."

### Action

The objective of this thesis is to provide a means for investigating Truman's verbal actions placed in their complete context. Burke conceptualized verbal action as a strictly human enterprise and emphasized the distinction between action and motion. For Burke, motion was a type of natural movement not requiring any of man's unique characteristics. It is simply something that occurs without human purpose. Action, however, must be purposive. Burke noted:

As for 'act', any verb, no matter how specific or how general, that has connotations of consciousness or purpose falls under this category. If one happened to stumble over an obstruction, that would be not an act, but a mere motion. However, one could convert even this sheer accident into something of act if, in the course of falling, one suddenly willed his fall. . . . 'Dramatistically,' the basic unit of action would be defined as 'the human body in

conscious or purposive motion.<sup>10</sup>

A man unconsciously humming to himself while working would be simply a motion but the man consciously humming to signal a loafing friend that the boss was coming would be an action. This study shall be confined to Harry S. Truman's verbal action in the 1948 acceptance speech and the motives surrounding it.

### Motives

To study the nature of Truman's action it is necessary to determine the motives surrounding it. Burke referred to motives as the stimuli which prompt the various alternatives for action. For example, a man wished to rise at a town meeting and voice his opinion (agent motive) but he did not know whether to do so because he was seated in the back and might not be heard well (scenic motive). The proposal seriously threatened his property rights (act motive) and his vote would not let the others know how he felt (agent motive). He wanted to convince his peers that the proposal should be rejected (purpose motive). For the

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<sup>10</sup>Burke, Motives, op. cit., p. 14.



individual to take conscious and purposive action he had to weigh the factors (motives) which surrounded his two alternatives: to vote and not speak or to speak and then vote. To determine, in retrospect, the nature of the individual's action requires a discovery of the situational motives surrounding the act and a determination of how they affected the act. This study shall determine the motives which significantly impinged upon the rhetorical situation surrounding Truman's speech.

### Summary

Burke's means for analyzing man's unique linguistic abilities was through his dramatistic pentad. The design of the pentad was to facilitate a broad observation of purposive linguistic action. The pentad can serve as a means for investigating the motives for a particular action. Investigation of the motives surrounding Truman's speech will be accomplished through the use of Burke's pentadic system. That system is described in the succeeding section.

### III. INTERRELATIONSHIPS

Burke defined rhetoric as a persuasive design for

inducing action in the speaker's audience.<sup>11</sup> To determine the nature of Truman's persuasive design and its effectiveness requires a complete description of the motives involved. This section explains Burke's pentadic ratios and how they will be used in the analysis of Truman's speech.

### Ratios

Burke contended that the total situation surrounding an action cannot be described by looking through the pentad in division. The areas of the rhetorical situation covered by each term in the pentad are interrelated and must be treated as such. Burke noted:

In our introduction we noted that the areas covered by our five terms overlap upon one another. And because of this overlap, it is possible for a thinker to make his way continuously from any one of them to any one of the others. Or he may use terms in which several of the areas are merged. For any of the terms may be seen in terms of any of the others.<sup>12</sup>

In other words, the nature of any one of the pentadic terms cannot be described without being placed in the context of the other four terms. Each term within the pentad

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 127.

is a facet of the total rhetorical situation. Fogarty summed up Burke's explanation when he stated:

Burke now has five questions to ask about any topic or problem, five ways to express fullness of meaning, five ways for the receiver of the communication to test it for deeper motivational meaning behind the symbols. He can not only repeatedly begin his examination, but he can know he is asking the basic and most important and exhaustive questions each time he returns to begin again. In fact, by permutations of pairs of the five questions, he really has ten questions to ask, ten points from which to repeat a beginning: act-scene, act-agent, act-agency, act-purpose, scene-agent, scene-agency, scene-purpose, agent-agency, agent-purpose and agency-purpose.<sup>13</sup>

Burke was indicating that each member of the pentad can affect the nature of the others and each ratio provides a description of how one term does modify the other. The job of the Burkeian critic is to discern how, in a particular ratio, the situation within one term of the ratio affected or changed the situation embodied in the other term of the ratio. Each ratio such as act-scene, would involve two questions the critic can ask. "The terms of the pentad mutually define each other and as a ratio, they systematically determine the nature of the form from all of its

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<sup>13</sup>Fogarty, op. cit., p. 327.

perspectives."<sup>14</sup> By looking at all the possibilities for motives the critic can determine the elements surrounding Truman's action. To do so requires determining the nature of each element of the pentad.

### Act

This section discusses what will be examined in Truman's speech and what hypotheses will be examined to discover the nature of Truman's act.

Burke contended that an examination of an act requires analysis of its attempts at identification. Burke's theory of identification, based on his doctrine of consubstantiality, is that ". . . two persons may be identified in terms of some principle they share in common, an 'identification' that does not deny their distinctness."<sup>15</sup> Consubstantiality refers to the similarities different men have in common. Burke indicated that a speaker could

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<sup>14</sup>Jim William Chesebro, "Kenneth Burke's 'Dramatism' Applied to the Analysis of Rhetorical Strategies" (Unpublished Master's thesis, Illinois State University, 1967), p. 57.

<sup>15</sup>Burke, Motives, op. cit., p. 545.

attempt identification in two ways: the speaker can attempt to transcend the differences between himself and his audience or attempt to identify himself with them.<sup>16</sup> He contended that the critic can determine the nature of the speaker's attempts at identification by examining his appeals to the four universal motives of hierarchy, guilt, victimage, and redemption. As stated by Brock: "Burke describes man's society as a 'dramatistic' process, passing through the stages of guilt, purification, and redemption."<sup>17</sup> He argued that when a man feels uncomfortable or rejects his position in the hierarchy he develops a feeling of guilt. To shed his guilt the man finds a victim which can assume his guilt and act as a sacrifice. Through such a sacrifice the guilt is redeemed. Truman's attempts at identification will be determined in the perspective of these four motives.

To determine the nature of Truman's speech the

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<sup>16</sup>Kenneth Burke, as cited in Chesebro, loc. cit.

<sup>17</sup>Bernard Brock, "Political Speaking: A Burkeian Approach," Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, William H. Rueckart, editor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1969), p. 448.

critic must ask how did the scene, agent, agency, and purpose modify the act? This will involve a discovery of the effect on the thought content of the speech by such factors as the economic conditions of the times, the mood of the convention, the traditions of conventions, the political mood of the country, the occasion, Truman's hierarchical motives, the extemporaneous nature of the speech, and Truman's purpose.

### Scene

The scene of Truman's speech encompassed those environmental factors relevant to the rhetorical situation. The nature of the scene will be determined by asking how it was affected by the other four pentadic factors. This will involve discovering how the environmental conditions were affected by such factors as Truman's attack on the Republican Party, Truman's calling of Congress, the President's presence at the convention, his delivery, and his pleas for unity.

### Agent

It is necessary to determine the nature of Truman's

hierarchies. What kind of person was Truman? The question is answered by working through hypotheses involving the other pentadic elements. How was Truman's character modified by such factors as his parents, business and political experiences, political ambitions, his seemingly sure defeat in the Presidential race, and his small town background?

### Agency

Discovering the nature of the agencies Truman used involves a determination of the means he used to present the speech and their nature. How did factors such as the discouraged convention, Truman's convictions, the late hour of the speech, and Truman's previous extemporaneous experience affect the delivery of the speech?

### Purpose

Purpose lies at the center of an analysis of the Truman speech and involves the action Truman was trying to induce in his audience. To determine the nature of Truman's purpose the final four pentadic hypotheses need to be examined. This requires a determination of how such factors as the Southern defection, the Wallace break, Truman's image as a loser, the Democratic platform, and Truman's

stubborn attitude motivated his purpose.

#### IV. SUMMARY

The purpose of this chapter was to indicate how Kenneth Burke's dramaturgic theory of communication will be used as a method to analyze Harry S. Truman's 1948 acceptance Speech. The method shall focus around the action Truman was attempting to induce in his audience. The success or failure to induce such action will be evaluated by describing the nature of the rhetorical situation. The nature of the situation shall be examined through Burke's pentadic ratios. The result of the examination will provide a delineation of the factors most influential in the inducement or failure to induce the actions Truman desired.



## CHAPTER III

### THE SPEECH: INDUCEMENT TO ACTION?

This chapter shall provide a synthesis of the significant factors which affected the rhetorical situation involving President Truman's 1948 acceptance speech. The guidelines for this analysis were described in the previous chapter concerning Kenneth Burke's dramatistic method. Twenty analytical ratios were described as directional viewpoints which the critic might use to determine the nature of Truman's rhetorical situation.

The resultant description of Truman's situation shall be divided into four sections: (1) a discussion of those relationships found not to be influential; (2) the nature of Truman's purpose; (3) the nature of the speech; and (4) the response to the speech.

#### I. UNIMPORTANT RATIOS

This section shall exclude from the remainder of the study fifteen of the twenty mathematical ratios discussed in Chapter III. When Burke described the use of pentadic

interrelationships as avenues for discovering the nature of a rhetorical situation, he did not infer that all the possibilities would be important in all situations. His contention was that the critic follow all possible avenues of investigation to be sure that the actual nature of the situation be found. Analysis of the Truman acceptance speech found five interrelationships which were most crucial to the development of the rhetorical situation: scene-purpose, scene-act, agent-act, act-scene, and agency-scene. This study shall not contend that the other factors had no influence on the ultimate situation. Obviously President Truman's formative years determined his nature as an individual. However, the circumference of this study does not require a detailed description of the overall nature of Harry S. Truman. The single factor in Truman's character important to this study was his fighting spirit and no isolated reasons could be found for the development of such a trait.

The type person Truman was would certainly affect what objective he would establish for the speech but no evidence could be found which indicated his character was a primary determinant of the purpose of this speech.

Similar reasons could be offered for the remaining ratios being excluded. No evidence revealed any significant contribution to the eventual nature of the rhetorical situation.

## II. PURPOSE

This study set forth its objective as the analysis of Truman's rhetorical situation. The logical procedure to fulfill such an objective requires answers to three questions. What was to be accomplished? What was done? What was accomplished? This section is designed to answer the first question by describing the nature of Truman's purpose for presenting such an acceptance address. The pentadic interrelationship important to the study of Truman's purpose was the scene-purpose ratio. Truman presented the speech for dual purposes. His primary purpose was to unify the Democratic Party and his secondary purpose was to gain general acceptance from a definite segment of the American electorate. Clarity will best be served by discussing the two separately.

### Party Unification

The scenic motive which determined the nature of Truman's primary purpose was the breakdown in party unity. Near the end of the convention the Democratic Party seemed to be shambles. Truman was forced to accept the Presidential candidacy from a party which had three distinct and divisive forces. The first of these scenic factors had been facing the Democratic Party since December 29, 1947, when Henry Wallace announced he would run for the Presidency on a third-party ticket. Some political observers predicted that Wallace would poll from five million to eight million votes.<sup>1</sup> Most of the votes would have come from the New Dealer Democrats and those who opposed Truman's containment policy.<sup>2</sup>

Wallace posed a serious threat for Truman in seven of the most populous states which controlled 195 electoral

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<sup>1</sup>Arthur S. Link, American Epoch: A History of the United States Since the 1890's (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), p. 636.

<sup>2</sup>"Chances for a Wallace Party: Odds Against Success in 1948," The United States News, XXIV (January 9, 1948), 9.

votes. The seriousness of the Wallace threat was cited by U. S. News in January of 1948 when it stated:

If Mr. Wallace polls as many as 500,000 votes in these states and the race is as close as it was in 1944, the Democrats stand to lose Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio and New York. Mr. Truman's best chance of winning one of these states is in California.<sup>3</sup>

Truman was fully aware that the election would be close with Governor Dewey and he needed only to look at history to observe the usual defeat of the party from which a third-party had emanated.<sup>4</sup>

The second scenic factor which determined Truman's purpose was the defection of the Southern Democrats. As shall be seen, Truman made his appeals to Northerners and was forced to sacrifice the support from southern states as a consequence. After a long hassle the platform committee, led by Hubert Humphery, adopted a strong civil rights plank which prompted a decisive revolt by the Southern delegates. Truman was compelled to conduct his candidacy without the support of the South.

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 10.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 9.

The third and most important scenic motive was Truman's need for support from the liberal New Deal wing.

As Shannon indicated:

Those who had been enthusiastic FDR supporters found Truman extremely disappointing in his first two to three years. At the same time, division within the old New Deal coalition over foreign policy questions further reduced Truman's political base.<sup>5</sup>

By convention time the liberal Democrats were literally hunting for an alternative, "more glamorous"<sup>6</sup> candidate. They had earlier appealed to General Dwight Eisenhower to seek the nomination and the effort was continued until just before the convention began when "Ike" had given his final and definite "no."<sup>7</sup> The group then attempted to draft Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas but he quickly stopped the movement.<sup>8</sup> The prevailing sentiment

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<sup>5</sup>David A. Shannon, World War II and Since (Vol. III of Twentieth Century America, 3 vols.; Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969), p. 510.

<sup>6</sup>Frank Freidel, America in the Twentieth Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 495.

<sup>7</sup>Irwin Ross, The Loneliest Campaign: The Truman Victory of 1948 (New York: The New American Library, 1968), p. 111.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 112.

of the liberal Democrats, when forced to accept Truman, was epitomized by the Boss of Jersey City, Frank Hague, when he exasperatingly stated, "Truman, Harry Truman. Oh my God."<sup>9</sup>

The impact that the party disunity had on the convention was inevitable. The delegates entered the convention resigned to nominating a candidate that no one wanted. Newsweek magazine described the convention's attitude when it commented:

As the 1,592 delegates assembled this Monday, July 12, they acted as if they were attending a funeral. For, with the suicide of the draft-Eisenhower drive and the lingering death of the stop-Truman hopes, they were now prepared to accept the man whom Northern New Dealers, Southern white supremacists, and big-city machine bosses had united in repudiating. Barring a political earthquake, they were ready to give their Presidential nomination to Harry S. Truman by default.<sup>10</sup>

The convention carried its dismal atmosphere through the nominating and balloting. The party chasms were so deep that no motion was made to nominate Truman unanimously which was a gesture that had long been a convention custom.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>As cited by Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade and After: America, 1945-1960 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 83.

<sup>10</sup>Newsweek (July 19, 1948), 15.

<sup>11</sup>News item in the New York Times, July 15, 1948.

The President needed the help of the party machinery to be elected. He needed the support of the liberal party leaders to overcome Henry Wallace's threat in the North and the split with the Southern leadership. Truman was compelled to try to generate some kind of unity with the solid liberal core of the party by giving them some reason for supporting him. Truman spelled out his primary purpose in his Memoirs when he wrote, "I meant to give them something to cheer about and something to campaign for."<sup>12</sup> The scenic motives splitting the Democratic Party provided Truman no alternative but to attempt to unite himself with the party liberals.

### The Northern Voters

No candidate for the Presidency of the United States can give a public speech without consciously evaluating how it will be received by the immediate audience and by the voting public generally. Truman's recognition of both audiences was present and scenic motives also determined the nature of his secondary purpose. He worked for party

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<sup>12</sup>Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (Vol. II of Memoirs. 2 vols.; Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Incorporated, 1956), p. 206.



unity with the immediate audience and for acceptance by the northern worker with the secondary audience.<sup>13</sup>

The important scenic motive to be considered was Truman's need for northern city support. The Democrats had overwhelmingly lost the Congress in the 1946 elections. By far, the greatest percentage decline in Democratic support was in the cities. Shannon verbalized Truman's problem when he stated:

For Truman, then the task was to pursue domestic policies that would attract that part of the voting population in which labor and minority groups were important.<sup>14</sup>

The President had to regain the traditional metropolitan Democratic vote if he were to have a chance of winning. Most of the urban vote was blue collar workers and minority groups. Henry Wallace's third party candidacy threatened the urban vote directly and required the President to concentrate his efforts in the cities.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>"Shift in '48 Political Tactics," U. S. News--World Report, XXIV (January 16, 1948), 16.

<sup>14</sup>Shannon, op. cit., p. 513.

<sup>15</sup>"Shift in '48 Political Tactics," loc. cit.

Truman was forced to appeal to the urban blacks to offset the Southern revolt. He could not count on any Southern electoral votes so he needed to concentrate on victory in the North. U. S. News emphasized the importance of the urban Negro vote to Truman when it stated:

That vote now is big enough to swing at least 228 electoral votes in 12 states in any close election. If the election is as close as it promises to be, there are enough Negro voters in 15 Northern states to swing 277 electoral votes. It takes 266 electoral votes to win the presidency.<sup>16</sup>

The Negro had become a formidable voting block in the cities and Truman anticipated their importance in what had to be a close election if he were to win. The President, by necessity, was compelled to establish a favorable image with the urban voter.

### Summary

Truman established a primary and secondary purpose to his speech. The nature of each was mostly determined by scenic motives. Truman's primary purpose was to establish the party unity necessary to provide him the support

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<sup>16</sup>"Civil Rights Issue in Election," U. S. News--World Report, XXIV (February 20, 1948), 22.

of the liberal wing. Three scenic factors necessitated such an objective: Henry Wallace threatened Truman's northern support; the defection of southern delegates assured the loss of southern support; and the support of the party's liberal wing was necessary if Truman was to get the facilities of the party machinery.

The nature of Truman's secondary purpose was shaped by a singular scenic motive. Truman needed the support of the northern cities to win a close election and support from the cities meant he had to gain the favor of northern laborers and minority groups.

### III. THE NATURE OF THE SPEECH

The objective of this section shall be to delineate the strategies Truman used in the speech and discuss the influential factors which established the form of the speech. The analysis shall be divided into a discussion of two pentadic ratios: (1) the scenic motives which influenced Truman's strategies and (2) the influence the agent motives in Truman's character had on the strategies used.

### Scene-Act

It was noted previously that President Truman was mindful of two audiences: the delegates at the Democratic National Convention and the Northern blue-collar workers and minorities. To win a close election Truman needed the support of both groups and the strategies within the 1948 acceptance speech were distinctly geared toward both.

It should be noted that the overall nature of the act and the strategies within it were responsive to Truman's two purposes. The function of any act is to fulfill a purpose. Implicit within the succeeding discussion of Truman's strategies will be the influence of his purposes. However, the nature of Truman's act can be more explicitly described by discussing the specific influence of certain scenic motives. This section shall conclude with a summary of the overall nature of the act motivated by Truman's purposes and the scenic factors which determined the specific nature of Truman's strategies.

The Democratic Delegates. It was noted in the discussion of Truman's purpose that the Democratic party had

become a shambles by the time its nominee was to present his acceptance speech. The party had split into various factions with nearly irreconcilable differences. It seemed that the only unity was in the consensus that Truman could not win the election. Consequently, Truman had to establish a reason for the party to believe in him and he needed to provide some hope for winning the election to get the unity spelled out in his purpose.

The President attempted to establish party unity by trying to identify himself with the liberal wing of the party. The core of the party consisted of the old "New Dealers." If Truman gained their confidence he would then have had access to the party machinery and the grass roots support which he desperately needed.

Truman did not try to directly identify his audience with himself. He attempted to transcend their differences by identifying their unity of cause in scenic motives; the tradition of the Democratic party and in the Roosevelt, New Deal progressivism. Truman wasted few words before he began to identify the consubstantiality between himself and the delegates. He stated, "This convention met to express

the will and reaffirm the beliefs of the Democratic Party."<sup>17</sup> The statement established the approach the speaker would pursue. The cause for battle was a party one and so the battle must also be fought by the party. Truman emphasized the altruism of the party by calling it the "people's party" and then later referring to it as the party that makes sure "people get a fair share."<sup>18</sup> In each of his attempts at identification Truman was establishing a basis for substantiality in association and purpose.

The association was within the spirit and history of the Democratic party. Truman reviewed the accomplishments of the party since F.D.R. first took office in 1933. He referred to the foreign policy spirit of Woodrow Wilson toward the League of Nations and then immediately attempted to establish the accomplishments of the Marshall Plan and the formulation of the United Nations.<sup>19</sup> Truman's strategy was to link his own accomplishments to those of Wilson's.

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<sup>17</sup>Harry S. Truman, "For Victory and a Great Cause," Vital Speeches of the Day, XIV (August 1, 1948), 610-611.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 611.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

If the approach worked properly, the Party's admiration for, and association with, President Wilson would subtly begin to embrace Truman's policies also. If the delegates attached the same sentiments to Truman's cause they could then find reason to campaign under the guise of the Party and not have to admit to themselves a complete reversal of opinion about the man. Truman's primary attempts at identification in the opening minutes of the speech were directed toward establishing the consubstantiality of himself and the delegates within the tradition and spirit of the Democratic party.

The opening statements also established the basis for the President's most important strategy to establish identification. It assumed the form of opposition to the Eightieth Congress. The record of the Eightieth Congress was the most influential scenic motive which affected the nature of Truman's strategies.

Guilt, Victimage and Redemption. The basis for Truman's strategy had been established earlier in the spring

on his speaking tour.<sup>20</sup> His attack was on the Eightieth Congress and the Congress served as the prime factor which facilitated Truman's attempts at identification. Truman attempted to identify himself with his audiences through their association in opposition to the Eightieth Congress. Truman attempted to establish the association with his two audiences by focusing his dramatistic strategy around the Democrat's desire for vindication from their 1946 defeat and the working classes motives for a better standard of living.

The liberal core of the Democratic Party was composed primarily of Roosevelt New Dealers. Most of the New Dealers wanted a continuation of the domestic social welfare programs established during F.D.R's tenure and were the primary proponents of civil rights reform. Truman's task with the New Dealers was best forecasted by U. S. News in the spring of 1948 when it commented that:

Mr. Wallace's threat to the Democrats depends upon how many votes he can capture from Mr. Truman in

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<sup>20</sup>Richard O. Davies, Housing Reform During the Truman Administration (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1966), p. 84.



Northern states on his issues of foreign and domestic policy. The closer Mr. Truman comes to the New Deal domestic program espoused by Mr. Wallace, the narrower will be the margin of difference between the two, and the smaller will be the Wallace threat.<sup>21</sup>

Truman needed to regain the New Deal support in the party and, in doing so, he could also prevent losing the New Deal supporters in the electorate.

Truman made his appeal to the blue collar workers and minority groups in the electorate who had allowed the Republicans to assume control of the Congress in 1946. The condition of the economy had gotten worse since 1946 and the lower income groups were hardest hit. Although employment was up, inflation was reaching an all time high and the country was facing a severe housing shortage. Organized labor was facing the new Taft-Hartley Act which was passed in the Eightieth Congress and represented the first highly anti-labor legislation. Congress had also refused to extend social security benefits and raise the minimum wage. The working classes were slowly becoming aware that the change in Washington since 1946 had not provided the answer

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<sup>21</sup>"Shift in '48 Political Tactics," loc. cit.

to the country's economic problems. Freidel indicated that:

Workers and others in modest circumstances began to notice that it [inflation] was taking place under a Republican Congress whose spokesmen had asserted that laissez faire would cure the nation's ills.<sup>22</sup>

The discontent concerning the economy provided Truman ample reason to lay the blame for the country's economic ills on the doorstep of the Eightieth Congress.

Truman needed a strong stand on civil rights to help gain the support of the liberal elements of the Democratic Party and the northern minority groups. The liberal wing of the party had been the main force which secured a strong civil rights plank in the party platform and the migration generated by the war had given the blacks a decisive role in the big electoral states.<sup>23</sup> Overall social reform had become an important issue as indicated by Link when he stated:

By the postwar period practically all leaders in church, school, press, labor, law, and government had joined in a campaign to square American practices with professions. It was a crusade on many levels,

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<sup>22</sup>Freidel, op. cit., p. 492.

<sup>23</sup>"Civil Rights Issue in Election," loc. cit.

but it operated most spectacularly in the troubled area of Negro-white relations.<sup>24</sup>

All the issues surrounding labor, wages, housing, social security, and civil rights were of utmost importance to the social reformers, especially the blacks. Truman needed to keep the speech focused around domestic social and economic reform to appeal to the groups whose support he needed.

Truman's strategies were founded on his audiences' anxieties surrounding the Republican control of the Eightieth Congress. The Democratic party had allowed the Republicans to get the upper hand in Congress and the electorate was directly responsible for voting the Republicans into power. The Democrats had not solved the problems of the "common man" through the "new deal." The burden of people still in want in a land of plenty was unsolved and still on the shoulders of the liberal champions of the "common man." Conversion from a war-time economy had gone as badly when the Democrats controlled Congress as under Republican control. The historical guilt of depriving segments of society their complete membership was still assumed by all.

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<sup>24</sup>Link, op. cit., p. 604.

Truman offered the Republican Party as a sacrifice which could assume his audiences' anxieties. By allowing the Eightieth Congress to assume the blame for the country's economic and social problems, Truman's audiences could shed their portion of the blame.

The speech blamed the Republican's for the state of the economy because they offered only a token system of price controls in the Eightieth Congress. Truman vetoed the bill only because it was such a "rotten" piece of legislation. The plight of the working man and the poor was blamed on the Eightieth Congress because it had not acted on the Taft-Ellender-Wagner housing bill; it had not raised the minimum wage; and it did not pass Truman's civil rights program. The Congress had not solved the educational crisis; it had ruined the Labor Department; and it passed, over the President's veto, a tax bill which, "still helps the rich and sticks the knife into the back of the poor."<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>Truman, "For Victory and a Great Cause," loc. cit.

Truman offered the complete sacrifice of the Eightieth Congress in the final portion of the speech. The Republicans had adopted a platform nearly identical to the Democrats and Truman seized the opportunity to secure them as his scapegoat. He stated:

My duty as President requires that I use every means within my power to get the laws the people need on matters of such importance and urgency. I am therefore calling this Congress back into session on the 26th of July.

On the twenty-sixth day of July, which out in Missouri they call Turnip Day, I'm going to call that Congress back and I'm going to ask them to pass laws halting rising prices and to meet the housing crisis which they say they're for in that platform.<sup>26</sup>

The strategy was a brilliant one; not only did Truman blame the Republicans for not solving the important domestic problems, but he gave them the responsibility for solving them in the special session. Truman took the solution of the problems out of the hands of the electorate and the Democratic Party and bombastically delegated the responsibility to the Republicans.

The sacrifice of the Republicans in the special session served as the ideal means for redemption. The

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 612.

guilt was removed from the Democrats and the electorate. The Democrats did not control Congress so the Republicans had to pass the needed legislation in the special session. If the legislation was not passed, it could not be the Democrats' fault. The voters could do nothing except vote the Republicans out if they did not do their duty. After the special session no one but the Republicans could be blamed if the country's ills still persisted.

Mr. Truman overtly indicated to his audiences how they could redeem themselves. For the electorate he indicated, "The American people will not decide by listening to mere words or by reading a mere platform. They will decide on the record. The record as it has been written."<sup>27</sup> Truman was providing the means for his audience to totally absolve themselves of all blame: if the Republicans did not solve the problems in the special session, then elect the Democrats who would do the job. His appeal to the delegates was more direct. He stated:

Today in 1948 we are the defenders of the stronghold of democracy and of equal opportunity. The haven of the ordinary people of this land and not of the

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

avored classes or of the powerful few. . . . This is more than a political call to arms. Give me your help. Not to win votes alone, but to win in this new crusade and keep America secure and safe for its own people.<sup>28</sup>

The President was simply inviting the delegates to redeem themselves for their humiliating loss in 1946 by working hard to defeat the culprit responsible for the country's ills.

Summary. Truman's attempts at identification were directed toward the dual purposes of his speech. He attempted to align himself with the liberal Democrats through the tradition, principles and accomplishments of the Democratic party so party unity could be restored. He attempted to draw an association between his policies and those of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt; both of which the liberal delegates greatly supported. Truman attempted to expose his consubstantiality with the blue collar workers and the black minority by emphasizing his policies which best attempted to improve their lots. He attempted to link his social welfare policies with a less affluent

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<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

audience whose primary concerns were to improve their standards of living. The scenic motive concerning the inaction of the Eightieth Congress determined the nature of Truman's primary strategy. The President's overall strategy was to use his audiences' guilt concerning the state of the economy and the plight of lower class America. Truman used the Republican Eightieth Congress as a scapegoat to transcend the differences between himself and his audiences. If his strategy was effective his audiences would absolve themselves of their own guilt by transferring the blame to the Eightieth Congress. The final result would be the establishment of a new consubstantiality in the opposition to the Republicans.

#### The Man and the Speech

This section will discuss the agent-act ratio. The character of Harry S. Truman played an influential role in the final nature of the speech. The speech clearly reflected the most outstanding characteristics of Harry S. Truman the man. By 2:25 a.m. on July 15, when the President presented his acceptance speech, it appeared that no one believed Truman could win the election but Truman himself. The point



was made by Professor Freidel when he wrote:

Only President Truman himself did not seem to expect defeat. In accepting the nomination, he brought fire back into the discouraged and exhausted delegates by delivering a fighting speech. Choosing not to campaign against the impeccable Governor Dewey, who stood for so much the same in domestic and foreign policy, he launched his attack instead at the Republican Congress.<sup>29</sup>

Professor Freidel's use of "fighting" is a common adjective used to describe Truman's political character. During Truman's tenure in the Senate he had gained a reputation for honesty and fearlessness while serving as chairman of the Defense Investigating Committee.<sup>30</sup> Link remarked that:

. . . above all he was extraordinary in his courage--whether in defying the Ku Klux Klan in his home county, on the hustings fighting a seemingly lost battle, in dismissing a renowned general, or in leading his country in bold pursuit of peace and security.<sup>31</sup>

With such a history of courageous battles over often unpopular causes, Truman's decision to recall Congress in an

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<sup>29</sup>Freidel, op. cit., p. 495.

<sup>30</sup>Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1965), p. 33.

<sup>31</sup>Link, op. cit., p. 626.

election year should have been no surprise. With the odds stacked against him Truman was demonstrating what the New York Times of July 15, 1948, called, "another entirely different Truman trait--his fighting spirit."<sup>32</sup> The President was launching his battle from his own firm conviction that he could win.

It should be noted that the idea to recall Congress was not Truman's idea although he took credit for it in his Memoirs<sup>33</sup> and was given immediate credit for it by Time magazine.<sup>34</sup> No one has ever been given official credit for originating the idea although many scholars subscribe to the theory that White House aide Charles S. Murphy first advanced the idea in a memorandum to the President. The purpose of the action was to crystalize the issues in domestic policy which Truman had nurtured on his spring speaking tour and to clearly emphasize the failure of the Eightieth Congress. Murphy described the move as, "the

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<sup>32</sup>Editorial statement in the New York Times, July 15, 1948.

<sup>33</sup>Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, op. cit., p. 208.

<sup>34</sup>"The Nation," Time, LII (July 26, 1948), 13.

boldest and most popular step the President could possibly make," in order to, "reverse the powerful trend now running against us."<sup>35</sup> Clark Clifford was probably most influential in helping the President to decide on the use of the tactic. Clifford explained the dramatic announcement when he stated, "We've got our backs on our own 1-yard line with a minute to play, it has to be razzle-dazzle."<sup>36</sup> Even though the move was not originally Truman's, the final decision to use it remained his and he did not shy away. He made the speech a "razzle-dazzle" fight characteristic of his courage to do whatever necessarily had to be done.

The issues Truman crystalized in his speech also clearly reflected his character. He assailed the Republicans for mouthing support for social reform in civil rights, housing, minimum wage, taxation, and social security but not acting on them. The issues were consistent with Truman's character as Professor Link indicated: "He was extraordinary in his hatred of pretense, his feeling for

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<sup>35</sup>Charles S. Murphy as cited by Davies, loc. cit.

<sup>36</sup>Clark Clifford as cited by Newsweek, XXXII (July 26, 1948), 21.

the underdog, and his broad sympathy which tolerated no racial or religious distinctions."<sup>37</sup> Truman attacked the Republicans for their disguise on social reform; his programs were most beneficial for the elderly, poor, and lower working classes; and he vigorously pushed the civil rights issue even at the expense of southern support.

#### IV. REACTION TO THE SPEECH

This section will discuss how the acceptance speech was received. It shall involve a discussion of both the act-scene and the agency-scene ratios. The discussion will be divided into the reaction of the Democratic delegates and then the reception by the secondary audience, the northern electorate.

##### The Convention's Reaction

When Truman was introduced to make his acceptance no one, outside his close advisers, would have guessed the result. The speech (act) literally created a new (scene) convention. The New York Times early edition on the

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<sup>37</sup>Link, loc. cit.

morning of the fifteenth wrote that, "President Truman set the convention on fire with his acceptance speech. . . ."38

Newsweek's overall commentary on the speech was much the same when it stated:

Now, as the President opened a black notebook before him (he did not have a prepared text), it was evident that nothing short of a stroke of magic could infuse the remnants of the party with enthusiasm. But magic he had: in a speech bristling with marching words. Mr. Truman brought the convention to its highest peak of excitement by announcing the call of a special session of Congress for July 26 in a direct challenge to the Republican Party to enact its platform promises of three weeks ago into law.<sup>39</sup>

The same Newsweek report indicated that:

To his plea: "I must have your help," the convention echoed with responsive cheers; to his cry: "You must get in and push and win this election," the delegates let loose heartfelt whoops; to his electrifying announcement of a Congressional call on July 26 'which out in Missouri they call Turnip Day,' the audience rose to the last delegate in a roar of admiration for a man who dared to fight.<sup>40</sup>

The New York Times reported that the delegates "howled"

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<sup>38</sup>News item in the New York Times, July 15, 1948.

<sup>39</sup>Newsweek, XXXII (July 26, 1948), 17.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., 21.

at Truman's opening statement that the Democrats would win and make the Republicans like it and "roared" after his announcement of a special session.<sup>41</sup> Truman's strategy seemed to be successful with the delegates.

Truman's delivery (agency) played an important role in generating audience reaction. He had long been known as a boring manuscript reader until his speaking tour in the spring of 1948. His advisers convinced him to experiment with an informal, extemporaneous delivery and it had been received very well. Truman mustered much the same results with his acceptance speech. When he spoke extemporaneously in the opening and closing minutes the audience reacted most energetically. Time magazine indicated that during the extemporaneous parts of the speech, "the President's voice was strong" and "his tone was assertive." He was described as a "new militant Harry Truman."<sup>42</sup> The New York Times provided a more incisive account of the reaction to Truman's delivery when it stated:

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<sup>41</sup>Op. cit., July 15, 1948.

<sup>42</sup>Time, LII (July 26, 1948), 14.

When he was in an informal extemporaneous, accusative mood, in the first minute or so of his talk, the President had the audience with him. When, however, he went statistical on them, and started reading the record on the Republican Party, the roars died down considerably.<sup>43</sup>

Clearly, Truman's switch to an extemporaneous delivery helped him instill a fighting image with his audience. By recalling Congress in his own sincere, confident, and assertive manner, Truman was successful at reassuring the liberal Democrats that he was a forceful and confident leader.

The general reaction was that Truman had successfully fulfilled his purpose with the liberal delegates. Editorialist Ernest K. Lindley wrote that:

Truman's militant decision and acceptance speech sealed his alliance with the Roosevelt Democrats of the North and West. He did his utmost to overcome their feeling that he was not a forceful and skillful leader and could not make a good campaign. No other national convention in recent times has been so remarkably transformed in spirit by a single speech.<sup>44</sup>

The success of the speech was echoed by Time magazine when it stated that:

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<sup>43</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>44</sup>Ernest K. Lindley, "Washington Tides: The Democrats Make a Great Decision," Newsweek, XXXII (July 26, 1948), 23.

At 2:25 a.m. Harry Truman stepped back from the rostrum for his final two minutes of cheers. There was no doubt that he had lifted the delegates out of their doldrums. He had roused admiration for his political courage. Said one delegate: "You can't stay cold about a man who sticks his chin out and fights."<sup>45</sup>

Truman clearly achieved his purpose with the Roosevelt Democrats. He closely aligned his policies with their beliefs and provided them a graphic demonstration that he was going to fight in an all-out effort to win.

#### Northern Labor and Blacks

An attempt to gauge the reaction of Truman's secondary audience must necessarily be more speculative than an observation of the convention delegates. However, by placing the speech in Truman's overall campaign the importance of the speech can more easily be evaluated. Obviously, the entire campaign scheme was effective at getting Truman the votes he was campaigning for. Professor Freidel agreed with this assertion when he wrote that: "To all those groups who could be convinced they had a grievance against the Republican Congress, he appealed effectively, winning the

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<sup>45</sup>Time, loc. cit.



strong support of organized labor, disgruntled farmers, and northern Negroes."<sup>46</sup> Ultimately, Truman fulfilled the purpose of his campaign speech, which had generally been established as the overall purpose of the campaign as early as the President's "State of the Union" address in January.

The individual importance of the speech was articulated by Davies when he stated that:

This speech, in view of the subsequent campaign, was the turning point in the election. . . . The special session, although not planned long in advance, nonetheless fitted into the general strategy that Truman had followed since early in the year; his move was merely an advance phase of his attempt to focus attention upon a few issues, such as housing, which would best serve his political aims.<sup>47</sup>

The speech crystalized the issues for the electorate and successfully placed the Republicans on the defensive. The special session proved to be a retreat from its platform by the Republicans. The acceptance speech afforded Truman the opportunity to back his policies with an action that made the Republican's rhetoric appear insincere and

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<sup>46</sup>Freidel, op. cit., p. 496.

<sup>47</sup>Davies, op. cit., p. 86.

worthless. Overall Truman's campaign was effective and the acceptance speech established the means for Truman to totally seize the offensive.

### Summary

The acceptance speech was successful with both of Truman's audiences. He capably demonstrated to the Democratic delegates that he was and intended to remain a strong and fearless leader. The delegates reaction was overwhelming. Truman lifted the Democratic convention from its doldrums and gave them their first hope for the election.

The speech also forwarded Truman's overall campaign scheme with the northern voters. Its announcement of a special session clarified Truman's accusation of a "do-nothing" Congress and crystalized the issues in domestic policy where the Republicans were weakest. Overall, the speech probably succeeded in doing more than Truman hoped it would.

## V. SUMMARY

The purpose of this chapter was to report the important motives which influenced the nature of Truman's

rhetorical situation. Five of the twenty pentadic ratios revealed influential motives which helped to significantly determine the nature of the situation. They were: scene-purpose, scene-act, act-scene, agent-act, and agency-scene.

Truman's primary purpose was to regenerate party unity. The purpose was the result of three scenic motives: (1) Henry Wallace's candidacy; (2) the rebellion of the Southern leadership; and (3) the liberals lacked confidence in Truman's abilities. His secondary purpose was to gain the support of the northern urban voter. The scenic motive influential here was that the election was anticipated as being extremely close and Truman had to have the urban vote to win.

The nature of the act was importantly motivated by scenic factors. Most important was the record of inaction in the Eightieth Congress. Truman used the Congress as a scapegoat to facilitate his dramatistic strategy. Truman sought to relieve his audiences' guilt concerning the internal problems of the country and political defeat by offering the Republican Eightieth Congress as the sacrifice. Truman provided the means for redemption of both of his

audiences through active opposition to the Republicans in the campaign and election. He attempted to identify with his audiences in the opposition to the Republican Eightieth Congress.

Agent motives were also influential in determining the strategies. Truman's disposition for helping the down-trodden helped influence the choice to focus on internal issues. His fighting spirit was an influential motive which prompted the decision to recall Congress.

The act was an apparent success. It literally transformed the scene at the convention. The leadership and spirit within the speech provided the delegates a renewed hope that the election was not lost. The convention was lifted from its doldrums as the vocal response to the speech roared overwhelming encouragement to Truman.

Truman's decision to change to an extemporaneous delivery was an important agency motive which helped elicit the response to the speech. Truman's natural and sincere delivery helped convey the fighting and hopeful image he was trying to portray.

The speech should also be termed a success with Truman's secondary audience. It fit into Truman's overall

campaign scheme of focusing on internal issues which concerned the urban voters the most. The speech was considered a "turning point" in the campaign.

## CHAPTER IV

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter shall provide a summary of the preceding chapters and report the conclusions of the study. The chapter shall be divided into four sections: (1) summary of chapter one; (2) summary of chapter two; (3) summary of chapter three; and (4) possibilities for future research.

#### I. CHAPTER ONE

Chapter one established the purpose of this study to be a description of the rhetorical situation of Harry S. Truman's 1948 acceptance address to the Democratic National Convention. The study was justified with three rationals. The first rational was that the speech was enveloped with three unusual circumstances: (1) it was presented to a distraught group of delegates who were convinced that their nominee had no chance of winning; (2) Truman blatantly used the power of the Presidency for a purely political maneuver when he announced the recalling of Congress into special session so the Republicans could enact their platform into

law; and (3) the success of the speech, despite the two preceding circumstances. The second rational was that Truman, who was noted as a poor speaker prior to the convention, seemed to be successful in a difficult rhetorical situation. The third rational for the study was that the 1948 election resulted in a major political upset and the acceptance speech was considered to be one of the important speeches in the campaign.

Chapter one also introduced Kenneth Burke's dramatic theory as the methodology to be used in the study. Burke's theory was justified on the basis that it emphasized the importance of a thorough study and provided definite analytical guidelines for such a study. The theory was also justified on the basis that the concept of identification would be helpful in describing Truman's rhetorical strategies to gain political support.

## II. CHAPTER TWO

Chapter two involved a discussion of Kenneth Burke's theory as a method for rhetorical criticism of Truman's acceptance speech. Burke described man as unique in his

use of abstract symbols to communicate his experiences and a social animal who uses his symbol-using ability to preserve or change what he perceives to be the stratified order of social values. Burke called the orders hierarchies.

Burke asserted that to study human behavior one must study a man's actions. He described an action as a purposive gesture and verbal action as the most common. Burke argued that to study a man's actions requires a discovery of the motives which influenced the action. He offered his dramatistic pentad as the locus of all motives in any rhetorical situation. The pentad includes the terms: act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose. To use Burke's pentad as a method for analyzing Truman's speech the critic need examine each term in the pentad through its relationship with the other four terms. Such a procedure provides twenty ratios which the critic can use to discover the important motives which helped develop the nature of the overall situation surrounding the action.

Burke contended that basic to all persuasive attempts is the tendency to expose the consubstantiality of the speaker and his audience. The critic should examine the



nature of the rhetorical act by discovering the nature of the speaker's attempts at identification. The similarities can be linked directly between the speaker and his audience or can be aligned in other phenomena to transcend their differences. The nature of the attempts at identification can be discovered by examining the universal motives of hierarchy, guilt, victimage, and redemption.

### III. CHAPTER THREE

The purpose of this chapter was to describe the nature of Truman's rhetorical situation by discussing the motives which were found to be important. Five pentadic ratios were found to be the most significant: scene-purpose, scene-act, agent-act, act-scene, and agency-scene.

#### Scene-Purpose

Truman's purpose was most influenced by scenic motives. The "action" Truman was attempting to induce was political support from the Democratic delegates and a favorable vote from the northern urban workers and minorities. Three motives prompted Truman's appeal for party unity: (1) Henry Wallace's defection from the Democratic

Party threatened a split of the party's liberal element; (2) the revolt of the Southern Party leadership following approval of a strong civil rights plank in the party platform left Truman little support in the South; and (3) the liberal, "New Deal," wing of the party, which controlled the party machinery, had little confidence in Truman's ability as a leader. One basic scenic motive prompted Truman's desire for the northern urban vote. It was generally accepted that the election would be very close and Truman needed the urban vote to win. The vote of the northern cities had turned to the Republicans in the 1946 election and the Wallace candidacy threatened it even more. Truman needed the sizable minority vote to offset his loss of southern support, and the vote was sizable enough to influence a close election.

#### Scene-Act

The overall nature of the acceptance speech was a response to Truman's desire for party unity and support of the urban voter. Scenic motives were influential in determining the specific nature of the speech. Truman's efforts to establish party unity focused around two scenic

motives. The first involved identifying the consubstantiality through association in the Democratic Party and its political purpose. Truman attempted to transcend the differences between himself and the delegates by aligning both their causes in the Democratic Party. The second scenic motive which greatly influenced the nature of Truman's speech was the record of the Eightieth Congress. The acceptance speech clearly revolved its attempts at identification around the universal motives of hierarchy, guilt, victimage, and redemption.

Hierarchy. Truman appealed to what he perceived to be two hierarchical motives of the Democratic delegates: to regain control of national politics and to renew social welfare efforts to help eliminate the internal problems of the country. He perceived the hierarchical motives of the urban voters to be improvement of their economic and social status.

Guilt. Truman appealed to the delegates guilt concerning their defeat in the 1946 elections and their social guilt concerning the underprivileged and the second class

citizenship of the minorities. He appealed to the guilt in the urban voters who had swung their support to the Republicans in 1946. The Republicans had not solved the country's ills and the voters had to assume part of the blame.

Victimage. Truman "sacrificed" the Republican Eightieth Congress as the cause of the nation's ills. He dubbed it as a "do-nothing" Congress. The Republicans had endorsed a national platform at their convention which was much the same as the Democrats'. Consequently, Truman established the Congress as his scapegoat by recalling it into special session to enact the Republican platform into law. Such measures, Truman contended, would solve the social and economic needs of the country. If the measures were not passed only the Republican majority could be blamed.

Redemption. Truman offered both of his audiences vindication for their guilt in the active opposition to the Republican's re-election. He based his attempts at identification in the opposition to the Republican Eightieth Congress. He aligned his cause with the tradition and history of the democratic party. The tradition had long been

to represent the "common man" and the history had been political dominance for twenty-five years.

### Agent-Act

Truman's character was an influential factor which helped determine the issues and the tone of the speech. The most influential agent motive was Truman's fighting and courageous spirit. Such a spirit prompted Truman not to back down when faced with seemingly insurmountable political adversity and made possible the bold decision to recall Congress. Truman's compassion for the poor and the minorities also helped center the issues around social welfare and labor legislation.

### Act-Scene

The speech was apparently a success with the Democratic delegates. It transformed the discouraged convention into a jubilant group with renewed hope. The tone of the speech and the announcement to recall Congress demonstrated to the liberal delegates that Truman could be a strong and capable party leader.

The speech was termed the "turning point" for the overall campaign in Truman's pursuit of the northern

electorate. The announcement to recall Congress successfully fit into the overall campaign scheme of attacking the Eightieth Congress on its record with internal national problems.

#### Agency-Scene

Truman's use of an extemporaneous delivery helped convey his fighting spirit and sincerity. When he spoke extemporaneously the delegates reacted vigorously and when he read from his notes their reaction died down. He used the extemporaneous style at those points in the speech where he sought an audience response. The volatility of Truman's delivery and the dramatism of the text served to elicit an overwhelming reaction from the delegates.

#### IV. POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE STUDY

The analysis of Truman's acceptance speech has prompted two broad questions. Each could provide an interesting and valuable study which could create a better understanding of Truman's rhetoric or the process of speech criticism. Each of the questions extends beyond the circumference of this study.

The first question would involve discovering how much of Truman's rhetorical successes can be attributed to his advisors. The analysis of his acceptance speech revealed that Truman's advisors were highly influential in many of his most important administrative and political decisions. An interesting study could pursue an investigation to determine how many of Truman's rhetorical successes and failures were more the product of his advisors than himself.

The second question would pursue whether Kenneth Burke's theory can be applied to all types of persuasive speaking. Would Burke's theory of the dramatistic process of guilt, victimage, and redemption apply to a speech of praise? Would his theory apply in an atheistic society? Would Burke's theory only be applicable to the rhetoric of a rational person? A worthwhile study could be conducted to affirm or deny Burke's contention concerning the universality of his theory.

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**APPENDIX**

## FOR VICTORY AND A GREAT CAUSE<sup>1</sup>

I am sorry that the microphones are in your way, but they have to be where they are because I've got to be able to see what I'm doing, as I always am able to see what I am doing.

I can't tell you how very much I appreciate the honor which you've just conferred upon me. I shall continue to try to deserve it. I accept the nomination, and I want to thank this convention for its unanimous nomination of my good friend and colleague, Senator Barkley, of Kentucky.

He's a great man and a great public servant. Senator Barkley and I will win this election and make these Republicans like it, don't you forget that. We'll do that because they're wrong and we're right, and I'll prove it to you in just a few minutes.

This convention met to express the will and reaffirm the beliefs of the Democratic party. There have been differences of opinion. Those differences have been settled by a majority vote, as they should be, and now it's time for us to get together and beat the common enemy and it's up to you.

We'll be working together for victory and a great cause. Victory has become a habit of our party. It's been elected four times in succession and I'm convinced it will be elected a fifth time next November.

The reason is that the people know the Democratic party is the people's party and the Republican party is the party of special interests and it always has been and always will be.

The record of the Democratic party is written in the

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<sup>1</sup>Harry S. Truman, Vital Speeches of the Day, XIV (August 1, 1948), 610-612.

accomplishments of the last sixteen years. I don't need to repeat them. They have been very ably placed before this convention by the keynote speaker, the candidate for Vice-President, and by the permanent chairman.

Confidence and security have been brought to the American people by the Democratic party. Farm income has increased from less than \$2,500,000,000 in 1933 to more than \$18,000,000,000 in 1947. Never in the world were the farmers of any republic or any kingdom or any other country, as prosperous as the farmers of the United States, and if they don't do their duty by the Democratic party they're the most ungrateful people in the world.

The wages and salaries in this country have increased from \$29,000,000,000 in 1933 to more than \$128,000,000,000 in 1947. That's labor, and labor never had but one friend in politics, and that was the Democratic party and Franklin D. Roosevelt.

And I'll say to labor just what I've said to the farmers. They are the most ungrateful people in the world if they pass the Democratic party by this year.

The total national income has increased from less than \$40,000,000,000 in 1933 to \$203,000,000,000 in 1947, the greatest in all the history of the world. These benefits have been spread to all the people because it's the business of the Democratic party to see that the people get a fair share of these things.

### The Eightieth Congress

This last Eightieth Congress proved just the opposite for the Republicans. The record on foreign policy of the Democratic party is that the United States has been turned away permanently from isolationism, and we've converted the greatest and best of the Republicans to our viewpoint on that subject.

The United States has to accept its full responsibility for leadership in international affairs. We have

been the backers and the people who organized and started the United Nations, first started under that great Democratic President Woodrow Wilson in the League of Nations. The League was sabotaged by the Republicans in 1920, and we must see that the United Nations continues a strong and going body, so we can have everlasting peace in the world.

We've removed the trade barriers in the world, which is the best asset we can have for peace. Those trade barriers must not be put back into operation again. We have started a foreign-aid program which means the recovery of Europe and China and the Far East. We instituted the program for Greece and Turkey, and I'll say to you that all these things were done in a co-operative bi-partisan manner.

The foreign-relations committees of the Senate and the House were taken into the full confidence of the President in every one of these moves.

As I've said time and time again, foreign policy should be the policy of the whole nation, and not a policy of one party or the other. Partisanship should stop at the water's edge, and I shall continue to preach that through this whole campaign.

I'd like to say a word or two now about what I think the Republican philosophy is, and I'll speak from actions and from history and from experience. The situation in 1932 was due to the policy of the Republican party control of the government of the United States.

The Republican party favors the privileged few and not the common, every-day man. Ever since its inception, that party has been under the control of special privilege, and they concretely proved it in the eightieth Congress. They proved it by the things they did to the people and not for them. They proved it by the things they failed to do.

Now let's look at some of them, just a few. Time and time again I recommended the extension of price control before it expired on June 30, 1946. I asked for that

extension in September, 1945. In November, 1945, in a message on the State of the Union in 1946. That price control legislation didn't come to my desk until June 30, 1946, on the day on which it was supposed to expire, and it was such a rotten bill that I couldn't sign it.

Then thirty days after that they sent me one that was just as bad and I had to sign it, because they quit and went home.

It was said when O.P.A. died that prices would adjust themselves, for the benefit of the country. They've adjusted themselves all right. They've gone all the way off the chart in adjusting themselves at the expense of the consumer and for the benefit of the people who hold the goods.

I called a special session of Congress in November, 1947--November 17, 1947-- and I set out a ten-point program for the welfare and benefit of this country; among other things, stand-by price controls. I got nothing. The Congress has still done nothing.

Way back, four and a half years ago while I was in the Senate we passed the housing bill in the Senate known as the Wagner-Ellender-Taft bill. It was a bill to clear the slums in the big cities, and to help erect low-rent housing. That bill, as I said, passed the Senate four years ago, but it died in the House. That bill was reintroduced in the Eightieth Congress as the Taft-Ellender-Wagner bill--the name was slightly changed.

But it was practically the same bill and it passed the Senate, but was allowed to die in the House of Representatives. The Banking and Currency Committee sat on that bill, and it was finally forced out of the committee when the Rules Committee took charge, and it's still in the Rules Committee.

### Another Bill Passed

But desperate pleas from Philadelphia, in that convention that met here three weeks ago, didn't get that



housing bill passed. They passed a bill that's called a housing bill, which isn't worth the paper it's written on.

In the field of labor, we needed moderate legislation to promote labor-management relations. But Congress instead passed the so-called Taft-Hartley act, which has disrupted labor-management relations and will cause strife and bitterness for years to come if it's not repealed, and the Democratic platform says it's got to be repealed.

I tried to strengthen the Labor Department. The Republican platform of 1944 said if they were in power they'd build up a strong Labor Department. Do you know what they've done to the Labor Department? They've simply torn it up. There's only one bureau left that's functioning and they've cut the appropriation on that so it can hardly function.

I recommended an increase in the minimum wage. What did they do? Nothing, absolutely nothing. I suggested that the schools in this country are crowded, teachers underpaid, and that there is a shortage of teachers. One of the greatest national needs is more and better schools.

I urged the Congress to provide \$300,000,000 to aid the states in meeting the present educational crisis. The Congress did nothing about it. Time and again I have recommended improvements in the social security law, including extending protection to those not now covered, to increase the amount of the benefits, reduce the eligibility age of women from sixty-five to sixty years. Congress studied the matter for two years but couldn't find time to extend increased benefits, but it did find time to take social security benefits away from 750,000 people.

And they passed that over my veto.

I repeatedly asked the Congress to pass a health program. The nation suffers from lack of medical care. That situation can be remedied any time the Congress wants to act upon it. Everybody knows that I recommended to the Congress a civil-rights program. I did so because I believe it to be my duty under the Constitution. Some of the members

of my own party disagreed with me violently on this matter, but they stand up and do it openly. People can tell where they stand. But the Republicans all profess to be for these measures, but the Eightieth Congress didn't act and they had enough men there to do it, and they could have had cloture, and they didn't have to have a filibuster. There were enough people in that Congress to vote for cloture.

### "Rich-Man's Tax Bill"

Now everybody likes to have a little surplus. But we must reduce the national debt in times of prosperity, and when tax relief can be given without regard to those who need it most, and not go to those who need it least, as this Republican rich-man's tax bill did when they passed it over my veto, on the third try.

The first one of these tax bills they sent me was so rotten that they couldn't even stomach it themselves. They finally did send one that was somewhat improved, but it still helps the rich and sticks the knife into the back of the poor.

Now the Republicans came here a few weeks ago and they wrote up a platform. I hope you've all read that platform. They adopted a platform, and that platform had a lot of promises and statements of what the Republican party is for and what they would do if they were in power.

They promised to do in that platform a lot of things I've been asking them to do, and that they've refused to do when they had the power. The Republican platform cries about cruelly high prices. I have been trying to get them to do something about high prices ever since they met the first time.

Now listen to this one. This one is equally as bad and as cynical. The Republican platform comes out for slum clearance and low rental housing. I've been trying to get them to pass that housing bill ever since they met the first time, and it's still resting in the Rules Committee today.

The Republican platform pledges equality of educational opportunity. I've been trying to get them to do something about that ever since they came there, and that bill is at rest in the House of Representatives.

The Republican platform urges extending and increasing social security benefits. Think of that--increasing social security benefits, and yet when they had the opportunity they took 750,000 people off the social security roles.

I wonder if they think they can fool the people of the United States with such poppycock as that?

There's a long list of these promises in that Republican platform and if it weren't so late I'd tell you about all of them.

### Is Recalling Congress

I discussed a number of these failures of the Republican Eightieth Congress, and every one of them is important. Two of them are of major concern to every American family; the failure to do anything about high prices, and the failure to do anything about housing.

My duty as President requires that I use every means within my power to get the laws the people need on matters of such importance and urgency. I am therefore calling this Congress back into session on the 26th of July.

On the twenty-sixth day of July, which out in Missouri they call Turnip Day, I'm going to call that Congress back and I'm going to ask them to pass laws halting rising prices and to meet the housing crisis which they say they're for in their platform. At the same time I shall ask them to act on other vitally needed measures such as aid to education, which they say they're for; a national health program, civil-rights legislation, which they say they're for; an increase in the minimum wage--which I doubt very much they're for; an extension of social security coverage and increased benefits, which they say they're for; funds for projects needed in our program to provide public power and cheap electricity.

By indirection, this Eightieth Congress has tried to sabotage the power policy which the United States has pursued for fourteen years. That power lobby is just as bad as the real estate lobby, which is sitting on the housing bill. I shall ask for adequate and decent law for displaced persons in place of the anti-Semitic, anti-Catholic law which this Eightieth Congress passed.

Now my friends, if there is any reality behind that Republican platform, we ought to get some action out of the short session of the Eightieth Congress. They could do this job in fifteen days if they wanted to do it. They'll still have time to go out and run for office. They're going to try and dodge their responsibility, they're going to drag all the red herrings they can across this campaign. But I'm here to say to you that Senator Barkley and I are not going to let them get away with it.

Now what that worst Eightieth Congress does in its special session will be the test. The American people will not decide by listening to mere words or by reading a mere platform. They will decide on the record. The record as it has been written. And in the record is the stark truth that the battle lines for 1948 are the same as they were back in 1932 when the nation lay prostrate and helpless as the result of Republican misrule and inaction.

In 1932 we were attacking the citadel of special privilege and greed; we were fighting to drive the money changers from the temple. Today in 1948 we are the defenders of the stronghold of democracy and of equal opportunity. The haven of the ordinary people of this land and not of the favored classes or of the powerful few.

The battle cry is just the same now as it was in 1932 and I paraphrase the words of Franklin D. Roosevelt as he issued the challenge in accepting his nomination at Chicago: This is more than a political call to arms. Give me your help. Not to win votes alone, but to win in this new crusade and keep America secure and safe for its own people.

Now my friends, with the help of God, and the whole-hearted push which you can put behind this campaign, we can save this country from a continuation of the Eightieth Congress and from misrule from now on. I must have your help! You must get in and push and win this election. The country can't afford another Republican Congress.