

ANGLO-PORTUGUESE RELATIONS 1914-1916

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
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
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Chapter 1

ANGLO-PORTUGUESE RELATIONS 1914-1916

On March 9, 1916, Germany declared war on Portugal. This action by Germany was the result of Portugal's seizure (at England's ardent request) of seventy or so German ships that had sought refuge in Portugal's harbors at the outbreak of hostilities. Nineteen months earlier, at the onset of the war, Portugal had offered unconditional support to England under the bilateral alliance between England and Portugal which was Europe's oldest alliance, dating back to the medieval days of John of Gaunt. In mid-August of 1914 the English Foreign Office was given notice by the Admiralty that Portugal's active participation in the war was most desirable, and on October 10, 1914, England invited Portugal to enter the war under the terms of the alliance. Why then did it take until March 9, 1916, for Portugal to enter the war? To answer this question is the chief concern of this thesis. The answer can be seen only after a close examination of the diplomatic correspondence between the two powers. However, before this correspondence itself can become intelligible some attention must be given to prewar Portugal and her diplomatic relations with fellow imperialistic powers.

Portugal's problems in international relations revolved largely around her colonial empire. Portugal's once vast empire had been greatly diminished over the centuries. Yet in 1914 her holdings were still considerable, some twenty-three times the area of Portugal proper. In Africa she held the large colonies of Angola and Mozambique;

scattered in other parts of the globe were the remnants of larger holdings. Her flag still waved over small sections of India, China, and Indonesia. In both the North and South Atlantic she still possessed islands of great strategic importance.

These colonies led England into a paradoxical position in regard to Portugal. On the one hand she continued to reaffirm her ancient treaty of alliance with Portugal. The treaties were those of 1642 and 1661, which called for:

"Each of them to favour the other and to use one another with friendly offices and true affection, and that neither of the said renowned kings, their heirs and successors, by himself or by any other, shall do or attempt anything against each other or their kingdom, by land or by sea, nor shall consent nor adhere unto any war, counsel or treaty in prejudice of the other."¹

Further, England would "defend and protect all conquests or colonies belonging to the Crown of Portugal against all his enemies as well future as present."² A secret treaty along these lines was signed at Windsor in October, 1899. In reality, however, the reaffirmation of the old treaty meant little, because the year before England had negotiated with Germany for the partition of Portugal's colonial empire. In 1898, an agreement was proposed whereby loans sought by Portugal would be guaranteed with customs revenue from Mozambique. The understanding between the governments was essentially that, if Portugal defaulted in payment of the loan, England and Germany would divide Mozambique between them, taking over collection of custom duties and thence eventually establishing outright control. Portugal was able to raise the needed loan in France, so that scheme went for naught.

¹H. V. Livermore, A New History of Portugal (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1936), p. 312.

²Ibid., pp. 312-313.

Again the year before the outbreak of World War One, Germany and England were seeking, at German instigation, to come to another agreement between the two powers over the partition of Portuguese Africa. The agreement, negotiated in May of 1913 was not signed because of the desire of Sir Edward Grey that both the agreement between Portugal and England signed in 1899 and the new treaty between Germany and England be made public. The Germans at first demurred and finally agreed to publishing the treaties; however, the war prevented their publication.

While Portugal's colonial problems did affect her relations with England during the war, her internal difficulties had an even more direct bearing on the long delay before her entry into the war. On October 5, 1910, the Kingdom of Portugal became the Republic of Portugal. The revolution which brought about the exile of the last Braganza monarch ushered in an era of extreme political instability. This political instability of Republican Portugal was caused by a number of factors, chief of which was the political immaturity of the Republican leadership. Before the revolution the Republican party had been quite small; the successful revolution brought into power a vast number of inexperienced politicians.

Upon accomplishment of the revolution, the Republican party soon broke into a number of splinter parties, adding to the instability of government. Many of the leaders of these groups were petty politicians who wanted to hold office but did not know who to rule. But the evolution of events in Portugal brought into the limelight two men who knew how to hold power and how to use it: Affonso Costa and Dr. Bernadino Machado. Both men played an important part in bringing Portugal into the war.

One of the two, Affonso Costa, "lawyer, demagogue and fanatical anti-cleric,"³ was the strongest political figure in Portugal. Costa was the leader of the Democratic party, which usually controlled the lower house in Congress. Costa held a number of governmental posts, and even when not in office he was active behind the scenes. Costa maintained his power with the help of the revolutionary secret organization the "Carbonario," a sort of vigilante society which sought to uphold the revolution. The "Carbonario" was made up of "heroes" of the revolution and served as the shock troops of the Democratic party.

The other important political figure was Dr. Machado. Machado was the leader of the interventionist party during the war, and served the Republic in a number of capacities--Minister for Foreign Affairs, Premier, and eventually President. Machado was able to hold office because of the tremendous amount of prestige that he enjoyed. His popularity with the people enabled him to maintain power while other political figures held office for a short time and then faded away. When Portugal entered the war Machado was the President and Costa the Premier.

Whoever ruled Portugal was faced with problems other than the constant political instability. Perhaps the gravest problem of Portugal was the almost impossible economic plight of the nation. For many decades before the revolution, the Monarchy had been unable to stem the yearly deficits that threatened to bankrupt the country. The revolution did not better the economic situation. In particular, the legalization of strikes compounded the problems, since the workers of Lisbon, newly

³Livermore, A New History of Portugal, p. 325.

armed with the power to strike legally, did so with abandon. With the constant changing of governments, Republican Portugal had difficulty grappling with the economic problems of the nation; with a new government in power every few weeks or months no clear-cut economic policy could be carried out or even formulated.

Another major problem that faced pre-war Portugal was the series of incursions (almost yearly) from Spain of Royalists bent on restoring the house of Braganza. These attempts at counter-revolution were ill-timed and ill-led (the "Carbonario" with their extraordinary intelligence network played a major role in defeating them); none-the-less, the disruptions contributed to the instability of the period. They forced the mobilization of the army and, of course, did not help the already weak economic position of the Republic.

Of course the incursions of Royalists from Spain did nothing to encourage friendly relations between Spain and Portugal. Nor were relations between these nations helped by the anti-clerical attitude of the revolutionaries in Portugal. And the fact that the new Portugal was a republic caused the Spanish to view the Portuguese with fear, fear that liberal ideas might spread across the border into Spain. As will be seen later the tension between Portugal and Spain caused difficulty for both Portugal and England as the war developed.

Some leaders looked upon the war as a curative for some of the internal ills of Portugal. In the thinking of men such as Dr. Machado the war offered a means by which the countries diverse political parties might unite to meet the common enemy. With Portugal as an active ally of England some security against Spain was foreseen; and the war might give Portugal means by which she could raise loans in England to help her economy.

Whatever her motivation as German troops marched into Belgium, Portugal affirmed her willingness to stand by her ancient ally, to do whatever England wished her to do.

Chapter 2

ENGLAND'S POLICY OF IBERIAN BELLIGERENCY

With the invasion of Belgium, England declared war on Germany. The news of England's declaration of war on August 4, evoked a wave of enthusiasm in Portugal. The American Charge d'Affaires described: ". . . excitable demonstrations on the part of the masses in favor of England and France against Germany . . . about 400 German citizens . . . were hissed and jeered and frequently pelted with stones by an excited, unruly Portuguese mob."¹ The mood was so pro-Allied that the German Minister called on the Charge d'Affaires to request that the United States legation handle German affairs in the event Portugal declared war on Germany.²

Even before the English declaration of war, Portugal had notified England that she stood ready to give any aid requested by her ancient ally. England's reply to the Portuguese offer was to ask the Portuguese Government ". . . to defer for the present issuing any declaration of neutrality."³ This request was apparently instigated by Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty. Churchill, in a letter

¹T. Bailey to W. J. Bryan, August 10, 1914. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1914, Supplement (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1928), p. 76.

²Ibid., p. 76.

³Eyre Crowe to Teixeira Gomes, August 3, 1914, Portugal No Conflito Europeu (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1920), Document No. 5 (hereafter referred to as P. D.).

to Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey, outlined what he thought the policy of England toward Portugal should be. Essentially he felt that an alliance with Spain was of far more importance than an alliance with Portugal, and he thought that Spain could be won as an active ally of England and France. Churchill thought it highly likely that Spain would take the opportunity of the general war in Europe to annex Portugal, and that Portugal fearing this, would seek to become an ally of England in order to gain the latter's support if she were attacked by Spain.

Churchill thought that England should remain cool toward Portugal so that if she were attacked by Spain ". . . we should be in a position to avail ourselves of the co-operation of Spain, in case it is available, and . . . any facilities we may require, not only in the islands belonging to Spain, but also in those which now belong to Portugal."⁴

Churchill felt that in the meantime England should guarantee the integrity of Portugal's islands and colonies so that they could not be used by Germany.⁵

Grey accepted Churchill's recommendations and acted to implement them. In a telegram to Lisbon Grey explained to his minister, Lancelot D. Carnegie, that England wanted Portugal to refrain from declaring neutrality⁶ and that England pledged to defend the possessions of Portugal from German attack.⁷ In instructions to Madrid, Grey asked His

⁴Winston Churchill to Edward Grey, August 5, 1914, Great Britain, Public Record Office, Foreign Office, Spain & Portugal 371/2103 (hereafter F.O. 371/2103).

⁵Ibid.

⁶Grey to Carnegie, August 4, 1914, Great Britain, Public Record Office, Foreign Office, Confidential Print, 438/document no. 186 (hereafter F.O. 438/186).

⁷Grey to Carnegie, August 4, 1914, F.O. 438/187.

Majesty's Ambassador, Sir Arthur Hardinge, to request, as judiciously as possible, the Spanish government to inform Portugal that Spain was not planning any hostile action against Portugal.⁸ To this point at least, Grey was following the advice of Churchill in remaining rather cool toward Portugal. The offer to defend Portugal's colonies was delivered not for the benefit of Portugal but to deny Germany any use of Portugal's possessions.

Yet even though England may have been cool toward Portugal, Portugal's desire to assist England remained quite hot. The Portuguese congress met in extraordinary session and granted full emergency powers to the government by unanimous vote. Machado, the Premier, made an impassioned speech in support of England which was received with great enthusiasm. Following the session of congress, popular demonstrations were held in favor of England and France in both Lisbon and Oporto.⁹

The demonstrations in Portugal of popular sympathy for England and France may have led the British Foreign Office to seek further clarification of the Admiralty's opinion as to the course England should follow in dealing with Portugal and Spain. In a letter to the Admiralty the Foreign Office stated their belief that Portugal would declare her allegiance to England, if such a declaration was requested, and noted that Sir Edward Grey had high hopes that Spain and Portugal would willingly co-operate in assisting the allies.¹⁰

⁸Grey to Arthur Hardinge, August 5, 1914, F.O. 438/234.

⁹Carnegie to Grey, August 8, 1914, F.O. 438/308.

¹⁰Foreign Office to Admiralty, August 8, 1914, F.O. 438/317.

If Grey really thought that Spain and Portugal were willing to act in concert, he was sadly mistaken. As will be seen, bad feeling between the two peninsular powers precluded any co-operation. Portugal was ready to enter the war, while in Spain the situation was entirely different. In the latter nation both the church and the army favored Germany; although these pro-German elements were in the minority, they were still strong enough to prevent Spain's active participation in the war. England found herself in a difficult position. If Portugal entered the war, there would be a danger of Spain's making trouble in Portugal. This eventuality would mean that England would either have to divert troops to fight Spain or let Portugal be overrun. In the eyes of the world it would appear strange that the defender of Belgium's neutrality would not defend her own ancient ally.

The Admiralty responded to the Foreign Office with a statement which outlined the advantages of having Portugal as an active partner in the war. Briefly the Admiralty felt that the addition of Portuguese Islands would be of great help as bases and coaling stations. The naval liabilities would not be increased by the addition of Portugal in the war, and the belligerency of Spain would also help the war effort. In short the Admiralty felt that the assistance of both Spain and Portugal should be sought.¹¹ It would appear that in this statement that the Admiralty had changed its opinion and encouraged the Foreign Office to seek Portuguese belligerency; however it should be noted that while the Admiralty did comment favorably on advantages of Portuguese belligerency it still hoped that both nations could become involved.

¹¹Admiralty to Foreign Office, August 12, 1914, F.O. 438/415.

The question might be asked why, in the light of the desire of both the Foreign Office and the Admiralty for Portugal to be encouraged to enter the war, was such an invitation not immediately forthcoming. The problem was that the Foreign Office and the Admiralty hoped to draw both Spain and Portugal into the war, a remote possibility considering the relations between the two nations. Portugal honestly feared an attack from Spain. The Portuguese Premier, Dr. Machado, in a discussion with Carnegie, told Carnegie that, while on the surface relations with Spain were excellent, he had apprehensions that Spain might attack Portugal; he wanted to know if England was ready to defend not only her possessions but the integrity of Portugal as well.¹²

Grey, taking cognizance of Portugal's fears of Spain, requested Hardinge to influence the Spanish Government to be as friendly to Portugal as possible.¹³ Hardinge replied that according to his information Spain had no designs on Portugal, and that if she did contemplate any action against Portugal in the future, she would exchange views with England. Hardinge noted, however, that the Spanish Foreign Minister was not happy with Portugal. Spain resented the fact that Portugal made public her distrust of Spain, and wished to see England put pressure on her ally to sign a Spanish-Portuguese commercial treaty and to negotiate on some Spanish claims against Portugal.¹⁴

The Foreign Office might have realized that the traditional hard feeling between Portugal and Spain would destroy their attempt to bring

¹²Carnegie to Grey, August 9, 1914, F.O. 438/336.

¹³Grey to A. Hardinge, August 10, 1914, F.O. 438/372.

¹⁴A. Hardinge to Grey, August 12, 1914, F.O. 438/466.

both Iberian powers into the war together. Antagonism which had developed over the centuries and which had grown worse since the advent of the Republic made any co-operation between the two nations doubtful at best. The attempt by England to entice both of them to war at the same time delayed Portuguese entry.

While eager that Portugal should not enter the war ahead of Spain (lest Spanish pride prevent her following an action of her smaller neighbor),¹⁵ England, for reasons that are not clear, continued to be anxious to avoid a Portuguese declaration of neutrality. England was willing to ask for a number of actions by Portugal that undercut Portugal's status as a non-belligerent. For example, during August 1914 England asked for and received permission to move 500 troops across Mozambique to reinforce Nyasaland.¹⁶

Grey continued to work to bring both powers into the war and attempted to achieve closer relations between them. Grey asked Carnegie to assure the Portuguese that Spain had no hostile intentions toward Portugal, and to encourage the Portuguese to negotiate outstanding problems with Spain.¹⁷ In a note to Madrid, Grey asked Hardinge to thank the Spanish for their assurance of good intentions toward Portugal and to assure them that Portugal's reluctance to negotiate with them was not a sign of hard feeling, since it had taken twelve years for England to

¹⁵A. Hardinge to Grey, October 7, 1914, F.O. 438/511.

¹⁶Carnegie to Freire De Andrade, August 13, 1914, P.D. No. 25 and Andrade to Carnegie, August 14, 1914, P.D. No. 27.

¹⁷Grey to Carnegie, August 15, 1914, F.O. 438/527.

negotiate a commercial treaty with Portugal and England had been Portugal's ally for centuries.¹⁸

Meanwhile, England's hope of attracting both Spain and Portugal into the war was causing grave problems in Portugal. The Portuguese could not understand the actions of their ally. Portugal wanted to enter the war, while at this point England was more concerned with obtaining the help of Spain than of Portugal. If England accepted Portugal's offer of assistance, and then Portugal was attacked by Spain, England would have to help defend her. If on the other hand, Spain attacked Portugal, and England had not beforehand accepted Portugal as an active ally, England could wait for the defeat of Portugal and then receive what she wanted of the former possessions of Portugal and the assistance of Spain in the war as well. If Spain elected not to attack Portugal then the English policy would be to help Portugal and Spain reach a detente and then hope that both powers could be attracted to the Entente cause. In either case England had to avoid closer ties with Portugal while waiting to see what Spain would do. While England was trying to remain somewhat aloof from Portugal the Portuguese were attempting to draw closer to England. Carnegie reported to Grey that Dr. Machado sought to have a conference between military experts of the two countries to discuss what preparations Portugal should make in case she became a belligerent.¹⁹

This move was prompted by Machado to forestall criticism from the Army. The Portuguese Premier's position was becoming quite difficult.

¹⁸Grey to A. Hardinge, August 15, 1914, F.O. 438/528.

¹⁹Carnegie to Grey, August 19, 1914, F.O. 438/645.

He was in power in a politically unstable nation. His people wanted to enter the war; they expected to join their ally. The Premier wanted to lead his nation into the war. Yet England only asked for them to remain an undeclared neutral. Machado was not informed of Churchill's grand design for the Iberian peninsula, which Grey seems at this point to have been following. He only knew that if England did not soon ask for Portuguese help, or at least make clear what Portugal was expected to do during the war, his days in office were numbered. The government had spent money for military preparations thinking that England would call upon them; soon his political opponents would ask what the policy of the nation was. Machado hoped that a military conference between staff officers of the two nations would help to clarify Portugal's position.²⁰ But when Machado's request for a military conference was denied he announced (in an attempt to placate the army) that two military expeditionary forces of 1,000 men each would be sent to Africa, were Portugal feared native uprisings sponsored by German agents. Much of Angola and some of Mozambique had never been completely suppressed, and control over some native groups was slight.²¹

Grey did make an attempt to clarify what His Majesty's Government wanted the Portuguese attitude to be. Grey explained to Teixeira Gomes, the Portuguese Minister to London, that England would defend with her navy the possessions of Portugal but that she could not assume the responsibility for the defense of the land frontiers of either Portugal or her colonies. Grey suggested that the best course for Portugal's

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Carnegie to Grey, August 18, 1914, F.O. 438/733.

armed forces to follow would be to concentrate their power in defense of Portugal. Grey did not feel that there would be any useful purpose in a conference of military experts.²² Evidently the advice of Winston Churchill was still being followed at this point. Despite the assurances that Spain would not attack Portugal, England's policy was still centered around the assumption that Spain planned some aggression. In any case the message that Grey delivered to Gomes was not what Machado wanted to hear.

On the day after the note was delivered to Portugal, Machado once again offered assistance to England, this time in Africa. Portugal informed the British that their troops stood ready to assist England in Nyasaland.²³ Grey replied on September 2, 1914. He thanked the Portuguese for their offer of help, but wished at the present to decline. Grey did not feel, he said, that the situation in Nyasaland was such ". . . as to justify His Majesty's Government in taking advantage of the friendly attitude of the Portuguese Government in this matter, although His Majesty's Government was none the less grateful for your communication and for the sentiments expressed therein."²⁴

Undaunted, Machado attempted again to get some sort of closer relationship with England established. The Portuguese Premier still hoped to have a conference between military experts from the two nations. Machado went to Carnegie to express his concern over the difficulties some sections of the public were causing his government.

²²Grey to T. Gomes, August 27, 1914, P.D. No. 47.

²³T. Gomes to Grey, August 28, 1914, P.D. No. 52.

²⁴Grey to T. Gomes, Sept. 2, 1914, P.D. 57.

The people, according to Machado, needed some clarification of what Portugal's position was in relation to the war. It was Machado's opinion that a military conference would help alleviate some of the pressure on the government.²⁵

Carnegie also informed Grey of a conversation he had held with the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Freire De Andrade. There was a serious disagreement between the Premier and his Foreign Minister. The problem stemmed from a memorandum that Andrade had drawn up and had showed to the Premier which was highly critical of the military capabilities of the Portuguese Army. Andrade felt that if Portugal were to enter the war her military weakness would embarrass instead of help England.²⁶ At this time and for some time afterward the cabinet meetings in Portugal were stormy. The principal problem was that Andrade was a proponent of the theory that Portugal should only do what was asked of her by England. He felt that the best policy for Portugal to follow was neutrality. Machado, on the other hand, was for intervention as quickly as possible. Andrade, as an objective observer of the condition of the army, knew that the army was too weak to be of assistance to anybody--an opinion, needless to say, that was not shared with the Premier or the Minister for War. Grey's response to all this was to inform Carnegie that he wanted him to impress upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs that England hoped that the Portuguese government would not be weakened by a Cabinet crisis.²⁷ Carnegie carried out Grey's

²⁵Carnegie to Grey, Sept. 14, 1914, F.O. 438/188.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Grey to Carnegie, Sept. 14, 1914, F.O. 438/191.

instructions and reported to his superior that he had achieved some success in convincing Andrade to avoid causing a disruption. Meanwhile, the Portuguese Premier again expressed his hope that England would reconsider the matter of a conference between staff officers.²⁸

England finally acceded to Machado's request and on the eighteenth of September, 1914, Grey cabled Carnegie: "You should invite Portuguese Government to send two officers to confer with War Office."²⁹ With the sending of the two military experts to London the tempo of negotiations changed radically. In a matter of weeks England would invite Portugal to enter the war. The next chapter will explain how this apparent change in England's foreign policy came about.

²⁸Carnegie to Grey, Sept. 17, 1914, F.O. 438/219.

²⁹Grey to Carnegie, Sept. 18, 1914, F.O. 438/244.

Chapter 3

GUNS AND MEN

As the war neared the end of its second month the incredible realities of modern warfare became evident to the civilized man of the twentieth century. The death toll was staggering, unfortunately only a prelude to the horrors that were yet to come. England had lost already in the neighborhood of 30,000 men, the French many times that number. One of the gravest problems they faced on the western front was the inferiority of the allied artillery. The German heavy artillery with its high explosive shells could not be matched in quantity or quality by the French and English. It was this lack of guns which forced the French to attempt to purchase some modern field artillery from the Portuguese. But the Portuguese when approached refused because of their mistrust of the French. Then the French asked if they could borrow the guns. The Portuguese made a counter proposal: they would lend the guns to England and France with the provision that some Portuguese troops accompany the guns to the front. Apparently at this point the French requested the English to assist them with their negotiations with the Portuguese.

Carnegie, along with his French counterpart, negotiated in Lisbon for the rapid shipment of the needed artillery to France. But the hope of convincing the Portuguese to ship the guns without delay was dampened when the Allied ministers discovered that the Portuguese

Minister for War was determined to have a division of 18,000 men accompany the artillery to France.¹

The two Allied ministers attempted to persuade the Portuguese Premier that the guns were needed on the front at once and that the shipment of men with the guns would cause a delay that would harm the war effort. To this pleading the Premier

. . . begged us [Carnegie and the French Minister] to assure our Governments that Portuguese Government were not endeavoring to evade their promise by making difficulties, but pointed out that much ill-feeling would be aroused in the army were only one branch of it were called for service abroad.²

Machado went on to say that he would ". . . favourably consider the possibility of sending most of the guns first if division followed later."³

The Minister for War was reluctant to give the guns to the Allies because he feared the intentions of Spain.⁴ Again we see that Portugal was hoping to gain from the Allies protection from any threat that might develop; she had some justification for her fears. Since the days of the Revolution the Spanish had harboured Portuguese Royalists and had not prevented Royalist attacks against Republican Portugal, attacks originating from the Spanish border. If Germany appeared to be winning the war, the anti-Portuguese factions of Spain, army and Church, might have been able to force Spain into an attempt to annex Portugal.

Andrade told Carnegie that the delay over shipping the guns to France was not due to a cooling off of the Portuguese loyalty to Great

¹Carnegie to Grey, Sept. 24, 1914, F.O. 438/316.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

Britain but due to the unpopularity of France in Portugal.⁵ If the guns were to be used by England, he said, he could see no reason why the guns would not be sent with haste to the front.⁶

Grey wanted the guns to be given to the French but if possible without a direct request from England. He telegraphed to Carnegie: ". . . It is most important that this assistance be given to France, and as our troops are in line with the French we shall regard it as given to us."⁷ In another cable to Carnegie that same day Grey stated: "Part of the guns asked for by the French will be allocated to the British force in the fighting line. This will make it clear to Portuguese Government that the assistance is given to us as well as to France."⁸

After the effort that Grey had expended in attempting to obtain the guns for France he must have been appalled when he received the following message from Carnegie: "French Minister tells me that guns would be of little use, as their mechanism and ammunition appear to be obsolete. He requests me not to press the matter on Portuguese Government until he has a definite reply from his Government."⁹

⁵Carnegie to Grey, Sept. 25, 1914, F.O. 438/337. Andrade's reference to the unpopularity of France does not ring true. The two Republican nations had many ties, and demonstrations at the opening of the war had shown popular support for France as well as England. It was some months later that Carnegie learned through unofficial channels that Andrade's comments were based on his own personal mistrust of France. Private letter from Carnegie to E. Crowe, April 22, 1915 F.O. 371/2470.

⁶Private letter from Carnegie to Crowe, April, 22, 1915 F.O. 371/2470.

⁷Grey to Carnegie, Sept. 27, 1914, F.O. 438/358.

⁸Grey to Carnegie, Sept. 27, 1914, F.O. 438/359.

⁹Carnegie to Grey, Sept. 27, 1914, F.O. 438/363. In view of this message, it would appear that Andrade may have been correct in his mistrust of the French for guns. The French had been willing originally to buy the guns; it seems odd that the French would attempt to buy obsolete guns.

At this point Grey urgently wanted to learn what the French attitude really was and he requested the English Ambassador to France, Sir F. Bertie, to find out. From Grey's instructions to Bertie it is evident that England was contemplating changing her policy toward Portugal and inviting her to enter the war if this would get the guns for France. Bertie was told that he must find out if France really wanted the guns, for if they did not ". . . it is most undesirable that we should urge Portugal to become a belligerent, and thereby ourselves incur the obligation of defending her and her colonies from the consequences."¹⁰

One point in this message to Bertie deserves special comment. What possible consequences would follow from Portugal's belligerency that would adversely affect England? None as far as the Germans were concerned. Vice Admiral Maximilian Van Spee's squadron of cruisers was being hounded all over the Pacific, and his was the only German naval force of any consequence not locked in the North Sea. The Admiralty had already expressed its opinion that from a naval point of view the belligerency of Portugal would be an asset instead of a detriment. In Africa, the only area where German troops could harm Portugal, the Portuguese troops would have needed little help and most likely would have been of some help to the British forces. The only possibility of any obligation incurred by the British would be if Portugal were attacked by Spain. Evidently England was still following the advice of Winston Churchill.

¹⁰Gray to Bertie, Sept. 23, 1914, F.O. 438/365.

Bertie followed Grey's instructions and reported that the French Foreign Minister thought that the Portuguese guns were outdated; however, the French Minister would discuss the matter with the French Minister of War. Bertie added that in any case the French did not need Portuguese troops in France!¹¹

France did not seem to want the guns, England had not yet expressed a desire for them. England did not want Portugal in the war, and neither France nor England wanted Portuguese troops in France. Yet strange as it may seem the negotiations for the guns did not stop. Why did Grey continue to negotiate for the guns when to obtain them would almost certainly force the belligerency of Portugal, a step which ran counter to England's foreign policy? A plausible answer is found in Grey's memoirs. Grey in commenting on the belligerency of Portugal notes that Lord Kitchener wanted the guns for use on the French front.¹² It would appear likely, then, that the Foreign Office was forced to persevere by the military who, in desperate need of the artillery, were little concerned with the diplomatic repercussions.

While Grey struggled to find a way of obtaining the guns while still following his policy of not allowing Portugal to become a belligerent at England's request the Portuguese were formulating new conditions. Andrade informed Carnegie that the guns could be sent only if England would formally request military help. Andrade explained that the Portuguese Minister of War was irrevocably opposed to the shipment of guns without troops going with them. Further, Portugal would need

¹¹Bertie to Grey, Sept. 29, 1914, F.O. 438/373.

¹²Sir Edward Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916 (London: Frederick A. Stocks Co., 1925), Vol II, p. 233.

some sort of loan or financial help before it could send troops to France. The only good news contained in this dispatch from Carnegie was that the guns, despite what the French had said, were quite modern and in good condition.¹³

The Portuguese price was increasing. They insisted on a formal invitation from England to enter the war; on top of that they needed a loan to send troops that nobody wanted to France. Grey was not ready to accede to the Portuguese demand for an invitation to enter the war. While he was trying to decide what action to take, the Portuguese put more pressure on him to make some sort of decision. The Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs gave to Carnegie a statement from the Portuguese government, a statement that plainly stated what the Portuguese wanted and what they would be willing to do. Carnegie's summary of this statement follows:

The Portuguese Government have decided to give Great Britain all possible assistance in present war, and to send Portuguese troops to fight beside the British troops as soon as His Majesty's Government express a desire to that effect.

With this object a complete division will be immediately organized, which will be at the disposal of the commander of the British forces in France, but the Government, taking into consideration my remarks on the subject, will first dispatch the artillery. Two infantry regiments could be ready to accompany the artillery if His Majesty's Government desired, and the rest of the division can follow. The artillery is composed of forty-eight cannons with limbers and caissons, together with another forty-eight as a reserve, without caissons.¹⁴

Two days later Carnegie sent another telegram to Grey; in it he explained that Portugal would not send the guns to the French, even if requested to do so by the English. The only means by which the guns

¹³Carnegie to Grey, Oct. 2, 1914, F.O. 438/404.

¹⁴Carnegie to Grey, Oct. 2, 1914, F.O. 438/405.

could be obtained would be in response to an English request for military aid, in other words, an invitation to become a belligerent under the terms of the alliance.¹⁵ Portugal's hesitancy to give the guns to France was probably the result of the following astute thinking by the Portuguese. If the guns were given to France and Portugal consequently entered the war, then England would not be obligated to defend her. If, on the other hand, Portugal entered the war on the request of the English, then the English, because of the alliance, would have to defend her if she were attacked by Spain.

Grey, possibly still being pressured by Kitchner, wanted to obtain the guns but he was not ready to pay the price that Portugal wanted. Apparently still hoping to hold to his policy of not becoming obligated to Portugal, he attempted once again to get the Portuguese to give the guns to France. He instructed Carnegie on October 5, 1914, to tell the Portuguese that while some of the guns would be used by the British the French would want to use them too and because they were ". . . fighting in the same line as the French there must be no distinction between giving to one or the other."¹⁶

This line of reasoning, which had been tried twice before, met with no better success than previously. Portugal had decided to give up their artillery only if they received what was in effect a guarantee of English support if Portugal was attacked by Spain. Carnegie attempted to implement the instructions of Grey. He met with no

¹⁵Carnegie to Grey, Oct. 4, 1914, F.O. 438/428.

¹⁶Grey to Carnegie, Oct. 5, 1914, F.O. 438/439.

response and then suggested to the Foreign Office that they should formally ask the Portuguese for military aid.¹⁷

It took Grey four days to come to a decision. On the tenth of October, he invited the Portuguese to enter the war. In a letter to the Portuguese Minister to London he invoked the ancient alliance between Portugal and England and formally invited the Portuguese to depart from neutrality and become an active belligerent.¹⁸

Portugal had now received the invitation that she had requested. This communication should have concluded the negotiations preceding Portugal's entrance into the war. However, this was not the case. It was a year and a half after this invitation before Portugal became a belligerent. As will be seen the instability of the political life in Portugal, the inability of the Portuguese army to train the men they had promised, and most importantly England's discouragement lead to the lengthy delay.

¹⁷Carnegie to Grey, Oct. 6, 1914, F.O. 438/453.

¹⁸Grey to Carnegie, Oct. 10, 1914, F.O. 438/491.

Chapter 4

THE MOUSE THAT COULD NOT ROAR

The invitation to Portugal to enter the war did not really indicate a change in England's policy toward Portugal. Grey delivered the invitation under duress, and in the two months that followed he attempted to prevent or delay the Portuguese from acting on the invitation, while still trying to have the Portuguese guns delivered to the front as rapidly as possible. In case he was unable to prevent the belligerency of Portugal Grey hoped to establish closer relations between Portugal and Spain. From mid-October to mid-December England's relations with Portugal revolved around getting the guns to France without Portuguese troops, and establishing closer ties between Portugal and Spain. To prevent confusion these topics will be dealt with separately.

The Portuguese government planned to act upon England's request of October 10 by calling a special session of Congress. At this session the government would strive to receive a confirmation and extension of its full powers. Grey's memorandum would be read and the government was strongly considering requesting a declaration of war.¹ Grey responded to this information by requesting Carnegie to press the Portuguese not to have congress meet until the guns had been delivered to France. Carnegie was also instructed by Grey to ask the Portuguese not to make a formal announcement of her intention to enter the war.²

¹Carnegie to Grey, Oct. 14, 1914, F.O. 438/538.

²Grey to Carnegie, Oct. 15, 1914, F.O. 438/544.

Machado acceded to England's request and postponed indefinitely the meeting of congress which had been scheduled for the twenty-first of October. Machado wanted from England a statement that could be read to congress which expressed His Majesty's Government appreciation of Portugal's attitude and the high value to England of Portugal's military co-operation. When discussing the above with Carnegie, Machado reported that the Minister for War still wanted some troops to accompany the artillery. Carnegie reminded the Premier that he had already promised to send the guns as soon as possible with the troops to follow later.³

Grey amplified his desire that Portugal should not declare war on Germany when he wired Carnegie "Portugal should on no account declare war or commit herself to its declaration. To do so would involve all the disadvantages of departing from neutrality, without securing any of the advantages."⁴ Grey hoped to have the guns delivered without any Portuguese troops; if this could be accomplished then Germany might not declare war on Portugal. If his plan was to have any hope of success Portugal must be prevented from declaring war, and the guns would have to be delivered before troops could be trained and equipped to accompany them. If Grey was successful the beneficial neutrality of Portugal would be maintained. At worst, the onus of Portugal's belligerency would be shifted from England to Germany, as the latter would be the one to declare war.

While Grey was attempting to delay or prevent any declaration of war on the part of Portugal, the Portuguese political powder keg

³Carnegie to Grey, Oct. 17, 1914, F.O. 438/559.

⁴Grey to Carnegie, Oct. 17, 1914, F.O. 438/564.

sputtered and almost exploded on the night of the nineteenth of October. Dissident elements in Portugal rose against the government and cut telegraph and telephone lines around Lisbon and halted traffic on one of the main rail lines to the north by blowing several bridges. The premature revolt was soon suppressed and Andrade blamed the Monarchists for the disturbances. Carnegie placed the blame on German agents.⁵

The revolt, even though unsuccessful, pointed out the unstable political condition of the Republic. England and Spain had to be cautious in their dealings with Portugal for at any time the violence of October nineteenth could recur, upsetting any arrangements that they might make with Portugal.

Grey's reaction to the situation in Portugal was to press the Portuguese to dispatch the guns as quickly as possible.⁶ If the government of Machado were to fall, Grey at least wanted the artillery before the change took place. While Grey was trying to get the guns shipped, Gomes, in London, was attempting to raise a loan; the troops Portugal had forced upon England could only be equipped and trained with a loan from England.⁷ England could thus delay the unwanted troops from arriving in France by refusing the requested loan.

While Carnegie was attempting to carry out Grey's instructions, his problems were compounded by a division of opinion in his own legation. George Young,⁸ Carnegie's First Secretary wrote a memorandum that

⁵Carnegie to Grey, Oct. 20, 1914, F.O. 438/597.

⁶Grey to Carnegie, Oct. 21, 1914, F.O. 438/604.

⁷Ibid.

⁸George Young latter wrote Portugal Old and Young, which was written to explain Portugal's entrance into the war. Soon after his rift with Carnegie Young left the Foreign Service and returned to London.

challenged the views of Carnegie. In his memorandum Young criticized the request for Portuguese assistance. The most important part of this document was Young's argument that if Portugal entered the war England would be forced to support any Portuguese demands for German territory in Africa after the war. This seems to have been the first expression of this idea which was soon to become a grave concern of the Foreign Office, and later was thereafter considered as a negative factor in any discussion of Portugal entering the war. Several of Young's other ideas later found expression in the thinking of some of the Foreign Office staff. In the main they were the military weakness of the Portuguese troops and the moral problem of having Portugal involved in a "Crusade for Civilization."⁹

The next move in Anglo-Portuguese relations was made by Machado who informed Carnegie that the Portuguese people were anxious that congress be called; Machado added that pressure was mounting for him to make some sort of report to the people concerning Portugal's position in the war. Carnegie was able to delay the call of congress by suggesting that a communique be issued that congress would be called at the conclusion of the staff meetings going on in London. Carnegie again warned the Portuguese Premier that no declaration of war should be made.¹⁰

England continued to play a waiting game, hoping to obtain the guns without Portuguese troops accompanying them. Machado in the meantime found himself in a most difficult position. He had forced England into asking Portugal to enter the war, yet he could not accomplish his

⁹George Young, Memorandum to the Foreign Office, Oct. 9, 1914, F.O. 371/2105.

¹⁰Carnegie to Grey, Oct. 23, 1914, F.O. 438/640.

his goal; the troops could not be trained and equipped fast enough to accompany the artillery. He faced pressure from several quarters to call the congress into session. Yet if congress met Machado feared that his political opponents would find out that he had forced England into issuing the invitation to war; if they did learn of this his days in office would be numbered. His problems had been compounded by the short-lived revolt and a severe shortage of money. The financial situation severely limited his ability to equip and train a division for France.

Carnegie saw a possible partial solution to Machado's problems when, while conferring with Andrade, he learned that the Portuguese Minister of War feared that troops would have to be sent to Angola. Carnegie asked Andrade that if troops had to be sent to Angola it would mean that no troops could be sent to France; Andrade replied affirmatively. Carnegie then suggested to the Foreign Office that Portugal be told that her help would be more appreciated in Africa than in France. This proposal, Carnegie felt, would satisfy everyone in Portugal.¹¹ The Foreign Office did not act on Carnegie's suggestion. Their lack of response may have been due to the fear that as a consequence of Portuguese action in Africa the Portuguese would have an excuse for requesting German territory after the war. Also Portuguese action in Angola might have resulted in a German declaration of war, which would have run counter to Grey's desire that Portugal remain out of the conflict.

While Carnegie was suggesting where Portuguese troops should be sent, the staff officers were meeting in London, and it was discovered

¹¹Carnegie to Grey, Oct. 24, 1914, F.O. 438/644.

that Portuguese troops could not be sent to France before December 15, 1914. Carnegie was appraised of this information and Grey impressed again upon his minister that the Portuguese should not do anything until they were ready to send the troops and that if congress had to meet it should not be for a declaration of war.¹² At the time that the staff conferences were being conducted, England began negotiations with Portugal about obtaining some 20,000 rifles with ammunition for South Africa. This new development presented Machado with an opportunity to push for the convoking of congress. Machado explained to Carnegie that the dispatch of rifles would be a breach of neutrality. He felt that congress would have to be called to deal with any situation that might develop over the shipment of arms to a belligerent.¹³ When congress did meet Machado wanted to be able to read to that body a statement from His Majesty's Government that would cover his forcing of the British invitation. He had made this request once before and now he suggested a statement to the effect that "At the beginning of the war Portugal spontaneously declared she was quite prepared as the ally of Great Britain to give every assistance. The British Government . . . have gladly invited Portuguese Government to carry this assistance into effect."¹⁴

Machado's position became more difficult when, on November fifth, he was informed that transport had been arranged for the shipment of the artillery to France. Thus, Machado was forced to deliver the guns before any troops could be readied to accompany them. When Carnegie

¹²Grey to Carnegie, Oct. 24, 1914, F.O. 438/646.

¹³Carnegie to Grey, Oct. 31, 1914, F.O. 371/2105.

¹⁴Carnegie to Grey, Oct. 31, 1914, F.O. 438/740.

informed Machado of this he did give him a statement that he could read to congress. Its language was very similar to the statement Machado had suggested. He was warned though that he should not read the statement until the guns were ready for delivery.¹⁵ The statement given to Machado did not invite Portugal to declare war on Germany. It only asked for assistance; it did not mention troops. This statement could have been put into effect by the Portuguese government without declaring war. If war were to be declared it would be by Germany, and Germany did not yet seem willing to go to war with Portugal.

Machado, blocked from declaring war with the shipment of guns to France, sought to use problems in Angola as a means to bring his nation into the war. There had been several border clashes between German and Portuguese troops in West Africa. Machado explained to Carnegie that when news of the German action was learned by the congress it might provoke that body to force an open break with Germany.¹⁶

When news reached Portugal that two Portuguese officers had been killed in Angola, Machado informed Carnegie that Portugal should now declare war on Germany. At this time Carnegie strongly urged the Premier not to do so. Carnegie even asked Machado not to make any representations to the German government, fearing that Germany might take the opportunity to declare war. Machado hoped to make a declaration of war on Germany more palatable to England by asking Carnegie what procedure should be followed in regard to the German ships in Portuguese ports if a break with Germany did develop.¹⁷

¹⁵Grey to Carnegie, Nov. 5, 1914, F.O. 438/67.

¹⁶Carnegie to Grey, Nov. 17, 1914, F.O. 371/2105.

¹⁷Carnegie to Grey, Nov. 17, 1914, F.O. 371/2105.

Portuguese blood had been spilled in Africa, yet England would not let her ally enter the conflict. Even the thinly veiled offer of seventy German ships did not move England to accept a Portuguese declaration of war on Germany. Machado was casting about for any method that would enable Portugal to enter the war, yet the one thing that would bring Portugal into the war he was unable to accomplish. If he could have delivered the troops he had forced on England then his plans would have been accomplished. However, for Portugal to ship 18,000 men to France was a remote possibility, especially when England would not grant a loan that would have helped make it possible. A Lieutenant Beck, an English military expert in Lisbon, reporting on the condition of the Portuguese army in early December, noted that ". . . the officers are bad, know nothing of war, and would be unreliable military leaders in battle . . . it would . . . be months before a division can be equipped as material of every kind is lacking . . . The Portuguese Army as a whole is totally untrained."¹⁸

The congress finally met on November twenty-third. Both houses of congress unanimously voted to grant the government full emergency power to intervene in the war. A declaration of war was not voted on. This unanimity was only on the surface and Carnegie reported that the Unionist leader was opposed to any change in Portugal's neutral position, although he favored the building up of the army as a precaution.¹⁹ Carnegie reported that he expected to see further evidence of divisions in congress when it met again on December second. Machado had informed

¹⁸Carnegie's summary of a conversation with Lt. Beck, Dec. 3, 1914, F.O. 371/2105.

¹⁹Carnegie to Grey, Nov. 25, 1914, F.O. 438/37.

him that he would resign if a motion hostile to the government were even proposed.²⁰

Machado's government did fall on the fifth of December. The issue over which the government fell was a mobilization bill. It was unacceptable to the government. The congress also was displeased with Machado when it reviewed his domestic and foreign policies since the outbreak of the war.²¹ Andrade was replaced as Minister for Foreign Affairs by Augusto Soares who had been the assistant Procurator-General. The new Foreign Minister pledged to follow the policy of his predecessor and Carnegie seems to have been pleased by the new minister.²² The new government was not expected to last long and predictions of its early demise were proven correct when in only a few days after its ascent to power it found itself in difficulty. The fall of Machado left a power vacuum that would not be filled until January when General Pimento Castro became dictator of the Republic. Affonso Costa was the only politician who could have ruled after the fall of Machado but at this time he seems to have suffered from a temporary loss of prestige.

While the Portuguese political merry-go-round was picking up speed, Grey sought from Carnegie information about the military situation in Portugal. Carnegie told him that no preparations were evident for the training and equipping of troops for France. Carnegie added that the army authorities had been relieved when the artillery had been shipped without any men.²³

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Carnegie to Grey, Dec. 5, 1914, F.O. 438/449.

²²Carnegie to Grey, Dec. 12, 1914, F.O. 438/417.

²³Carnegie to Grey, Dec. 11, 1914, F.O. 371/105.

Machado's fall from power ended for a time any serious threat of Portuguese intervention in the war. Some time would pass before the Portuguese interventionists would return to power and seek to lead Portugal into the conflict.

While the policy of England in reference to preventing Portugal's entrance into the war was carried out successfully, England was also playing the role of peacemaker between the Iberian powers. What follows is a brief account of these negotiations which bear on relations between England and Portugal; should Portugal become a belligerent, England did not want any problems to develop between Spain and Portugal.

English diplomats were active in three capitals, attempting to bring closer relations between Spain and Portugal. Hardinge in Madrid held several conversations with both the Spanish Foreign Minister and the Portuguese Ambassador to Spain. In Lisbon Carnegie spoke with both the Spanish and Portuguese representatives.

There were two main problems that served as irritants in the relations between Portugal and Spain. The most severe was called the "Chapel Case." When Portugal had declared herself a Republic, several anti-church laws were passed. The one law which served to harm Spanish-Portuguese relations the most prohibited non-Portuguese priests from practicing religion in Portugal. This law, which prevented the Spanish diplomatic mission in Lisbon from celebrating mass with a Spanish priest, was enforced only on the Spanish Legation. The other irritant was the case of a Spaniard who was imprisoned in Portugal on a charge of inflaming the Portuguese against the government. Both cases were of such an emotional nature that they could hardly be solved by reason. Two other problems served to affect adversely relations between the

two nations. One was a widely circulated rumor that if Portugal entered the war and the allies were victorious a small section of Spain would be granted to Portugal as a reward for its services; the other was the Spanish unwillingness to suppress the Portuguese Monarchists who threatened the Republic from the Spanish border.

With these problems in mind, the English diplomats sought some means by which closer ties could be established between the two powers. What concerned Grey the most was what Spain's reaction would be to the belligerency of Portugal. Hardinge reported that he foresaw a slight pro-German shift in public opinion, and that the Spanish government might draw closer to Germany if Portugal did indeed enter the war.²⁴ As a result of England's peace-keeping diplomacy, Portugal and Spain did establish some degree of harmony. In the fall and winter of 1914, although there were a number of unresolved differences, it would seem that had Portugal been able to enter the war, she really would have had nothing to fear from Spain.

As 1914 drew to a close, Portugal was still unable to enter the war. Machado was prevented from bringing his country into the war by two factors. The most important was England's constant lack of encouragement; second was the Portuguese inability to raise a division of troops. Portugal under the leadership of Machado was a mouse that could not roar. The bellicose Machado was not able to rally his people to a war psychosis which might have carried Portugal into the war. Relations between England and Portugal ended the year on a successful note as far as England was concerned. Grey had been able to obtain from Portugal

²⁴Hardinge to Grey, Oct. 7, 1914, F.O. 438/511 and A. Hardinge to Grey, Oct. 20, 1914, F.O. 438/693.

some badly needed artillery as well as 20,000 rifles for South Africa. Closer relations had been established between Spain and Portugal, and Portugal seemed further from belligerency than she had been at any time since the outbreak of the war.

Chapter 5

UNDER THE LION'S PAW

The political struggle that ensued after the fall of Machado, came to an abrupt halt on January twenty-third. On the evening of the twenty-third, the President of the Republic gave full governmental power to General Pimento de Castro. During the dictatorship of Castro the diplomatic activity between England and Portugal slowed significantly. Castro's desire that Portugal remain neutral met with the general approbation of the Foreign Office in England. In May of 1915, however, Castro was deposed by a Democratic revolt; the interventionists were back in power. Unfortunately for them they were led at this time by weak men.

It took the interventionists a month to straighten out the internal affairs of Portugal to the point to where they could concern themselves with finding a means by which they could enter the war. Their first attempt was to offer to place Portuguese ports ". . . unreservedly at the disposal of His Majesty's Government."¹ Not surprisingly this offer did not meet with an enthusiastic response in the Foreign Office; Lord Eustance Percy commented that it was ". . . the first flourish of Costa's trumpets."² Percy was in charge of the western department of the Foreign Office and he routinely handled the

¹Précis of a telegram from Carnegie to Grey, June 15, 1915, F.O. 371/2471.

²Minute by Lord E. Percy, June 15, 1915, F.O. 371/2471.

Portuguese correspondence. Percy had, as did many people in England, a low opinion of Costa, who was generally looked upon as a leader of the rabble and a suppressor of civil liberties. He was not at this time in an official position in Portugal but he had considerable power behind the scenes. It was Percy's opinion that England already had as much use as she really needed of Portugal's ports and in addition she had a base in the Cape Verde Islands. Percy suggested that this offer ". . . must be regarded as a showy attempt to 'acquire merit' and that we hope that advantage will only be taken of it where there is solid advantage to be obtained."³ The Foreign Office postponed any decision of accepting this offer from Portugal, although the Admiralty did bring the matter up later.

Because of the return of the interventionists to power England attempted to release herself of any obligation to Portugal. Carnegie was asked if in his opinion Portugal would be willing to receive payment of the munitions England had received from Portugal. Carnegie strongly suggested that because of the nature of the Portuguese, their ". . . boundless conceit, their sensibility and sentimentality . . . any offer, direct or otherwise, to refund the value of munitions would be refused and resented."⁴ Carnegie reminded the Foreign Office of other obligations that England had incurred such as the transfer of a destroyer, made in Italy, to the Royal Navy, permission to build a wireless station in Madeira, and a host of other breaches of neutrality, all of which had

³Ibid.

⁴Carnegie to Grey, June 19, 1915, F.O. 371/2470.

been protested by the German minister to Lisbon.⁵ Carnegie also offered his views on other subjects. He pointed out that Portugal would soon need financial help and that if Portugal should become a belligerent she would expect additions of territory in both eastern and western Africa. Carnegie pointed out that Dr. Costa had already in a recent speech mentioned what territorial gains he expected in case of an allied victory. Carnegie added that Costa's Democrats had recently expressed their desire to "regularize" their position by openly declaring on the side of the allies.⁶

The Foreign Office had asked Carnegie's advice and were not very pleased with what they received. Percy said of Carnegie's report: "This is not very encouraging."⁷ Percy felt that some other method of payment for munitions would have to be attempted to erase the debt that England owed Portugal.⁸ Arthur Nicolson the Permanent Undersecretary of the Foreign Office reacted by stating: "I trust that Portugal will not come out as a belligerent--she would be of little value and might be a cause of embarrassment--I doubt if public opinion here would be disposed to place more colonies under the rule of Portugal."⁹ At this juncture the Foreign Office seemed unable to take the initiative in relations with Portugal; they knew that they did not want Portugal to enter the war, nor gain territory in Africa, but they seemed at a loss as to how they

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Minute by Lord E. Percy, June 30, 1915, F.O. 371/2470.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Minute by Arthur Nicolson, July 1, 1915, F.O. 371/2470.

could effectively implement their policy. Some hard decisions had to be made but England was not willing to make them at this point. Grey did make a gesture at restraining the Portuguese; he wired Carnegie to ". . . urge upon Portuguese Government to abstain from issuing a declaration of war, and say that it would, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, be wiser to leave the initiative to Germany."¹⁰ Germany had not as yet made any initiative toward war with Portugal. If Portugal were to wait for Germany to declare war, Portugal would not in the foreseeable future be able to enter the war.

The Portuguese interventionists sent for their minister to London to help in planning strategy. His help was needed, for the interventionists in Lisbon were weakened by a temporary lack of leadership. The Democratic Party, which led in the overthrow of Castro, suffered twin blows that left them for a time without men strong enough to lead them to war. Affonso Costa was injured in an accident and as a result was so ill that his doctors severely restricted his movements. It would be several months before he could lead an active political life. The Portuguese minister to Paris, Joao Chagas, had been recalled to take over the government. He was reportedly a strong supporter of Portugal's intervention in the war but before he could reach Lisbon he was severely wounded in an assassination attempt. With Costa ill and Chagas incapacitated, the leadership of the interventionists fell to Dr. Machado. Dr. Machado had once before attempted to lead Portugal into the war and had failed. However, he did not let his first failure keep him from trying again. Jose' de Castro had been named as Premier

¹⁰Grey to Carnegie, July 7, 1915, F.O. 438/36.

as a substitute for Costa and in his first speech to congress he had stated that Portugal must "rectify the situation," or straighten out its relationship with England and redress the loss of prestige suffered at the hands of the Germans in Angola.¹¹

Carnegie sought to find out what Portugal's intentions were in regard to the war. Augusto Soares, again the Foreign Minister, explained to Carnegie that Portugal wished to break relations with Germany but would not act without preliminary discussion with England.¹²

Before the latest news that Portugal wanted to break relations with Germany reached England, the Foreign Office had had matters complicated by the Admiralty, which had asked if ". . . it will be admissible on political grounds to make full use of the Portuguese Government's offer to place their ports at the disposal of H.M. Ships as bases for operation against enemy submarines."¹³ The matter was taken up by the cabinet. The Foreign Office objected to the use of Portuguese ports. The basis for their arguments had been presented by Carnegie. Chiefly the Foreign Office felt that the use of Portuguese ports would lead to a German declaration of war. This eventuality would please Portugal for she would be able to claim a portion of German territory in Africa, a situation which ". . . would be very inconvenient to His Majesty's Government, and . . . has, already excited the apprehensions of the Government of the Union of South Africa."¹⁴ The Foreign Office sought

¹¹Carnegie to Grey, July 3, 1915, F.O. 438/70.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Admiralty to Foreign Office, June 28, 1915, F.O. 371/2471.

¹⁴Memo by the Foreign Office for use in the Cabinet, July 12, 1915, F.O. 371/2471.

to placate the Admiralty and avoid Portuguese belligerency by suggesting that an arrangement be made with Portugal that would allow British ships to patrol Portuguese territorial waters but not use Portuguese ports. The Foreign Office succeeded in convincing the Admiralty that Portugal's participation in the war was not in the best interest of England. The Foreign Office had turned back Portugal's first attempt in 1915 to enter the war.

Carnegie's dispatch discussing the Portuguese Premier's desire to rectify the position of Portugal and Soares' statement that Portugal wanted to break relations with Germany forced the Foreign Office to discuss seriously what steps should be taken to avoid Portugal's entrance into the war. Lord Percy's view of the problem was that a firm hand should be taken with Portugal. "We have for a long time been rather dealing with the Portuguese Govt. with gloves, and I am not sure we can hold them unless we speak rather more plainly, . . ." he wrote. He felt that Portugal held ". . . all the cards and Sir E. Grey's letter of October 10 is the trump card which they can always play if they want to declare war against our will."¹⁵ Percy felt that the invitation of October tenth should be withdrawn, coupled with an offer to renegotiate the treaty of Windsor, to avoid any suspicions that Portugal might have that England was not being friendly. Percy further suggested that Portugal be told that she would receive no help from England in any attempt to obtain further colonial acquisitions in Africa. Percy also suggested that Portugal be offered a loan for peaceful purposes, making it clear that no financial aid would be given if she went to war.¹⁶

¹⁵Minute by Lord E. Percy, July 13, 1915, F.O. 371/2472.

¹⁶Ibid.

Eyre Crowe, the assistant undersecretary, by and large agreed with Percy and felt that the October tenth invitation should be withdrawn but also that Portugal should be assured that if conditions warranted it would be renewed. He expressed his view that Portugal be told that her continued neutrality was in the best interest of both countries.¹⁷ Arthur Nicolson agreed with Crowe but suggested that Carnegie's opinion be solicited before the October tenth invitation was withdrawn.¹⁸

Grey reviewed the suggestions of his subordinates and wired Carnegie that he should tell the Portuguese that he no longer considered his invitation of October tenth as being in effect and remind the Portuguese that His Majesty's Government felt that "Portugal and the alliance would best be served by Portugal remaining at peace unless forced by Germany to depart from it."¹⁹ Grey also stated that he hoped that Portugal would not depart from their present peaceful attitude without previous consultation with England.²⁰

The new hard line was gradually unfolded to Portugal. In this instance her trump card was negated and she was told exactly what England wanted her position to be. However, Portugal was not to be put off so easily; she had already moved to protect her flank before making further overtures to England. Portugal proposed to Spain that the two nations work out a joint defense treaty with a provision that any

¹⁷Minute by Eyre Crowe, July 10, 1915, F.O. 371/2472.

¹⁸Minute by Arthur Nicolson, July 16, 1915, F.O. 371/2472.

¹⁹Grey to Carnegie, July 17, 1915, F.O. 438/119.

²⁰Ibid.

difficulties that might arise between them should be settled by arbitration. Portugal further suggested that a commercial treaty be negotiated.²¹ When Carnegie asked the Portuguese foreign minister what effect the possible Portuguese belligerency would have on relations with Spain, Soares replied that he could foresee no difficulty with Spain if Portugal went to war.²² Carnegie may have been playing on the traditional antipathy between Portugal and Spain, the implied threat being that Portugal would receive no help from England if Spain caused problems as a result of Portuguese intervention in the war.

With the threat of Portugal's unsolicited entrance into the war the Foreign Office drew up a long memo for cabinet use, detailing the advantages and disadvantages of Portugal's entrance into the war. The memo was prefaced with a recent dispatch from Carnegie containing an account of a conversation he had held with the Portuguese foreign minister. Soares had asked Carnegie flatly why England was opposed to Portugal's active participation in the war. Soares was given the stock answer that Sir Edward Grey felt that it would not be to Portugal's advantage to be dragged into a war from which she had nothing to gain, and that England was quite satisfied with the assistance she had gained from Portugal in the latter's role as a neutral. Soares outlined for Carnegie the advantages that Portugal would receive by entering the war. Soares felt the war could end in three ways, with a patched-up peace, a German victory or an allied victory. If either of the first two happened Portugal stood to gain nothing, but if there were an allied

²¹A. Hardinge to Grey, July 14, 1915, F.O. 438/110.

²²Carnegie to Grey, July 20, 1915, F.O. 438/135.

victory, Portugal would like to have her voice heard in the peace settlement, something which she could not do if she remained neutral. Soares saw several benefits that would accrue to her if she entered the war. For one she would have the use of the German ships that were rusting in Portuguese harbors. Added to this would be German industries that Portugal could nationalize. Another advantage would be the political stability that would result in the nation uniting to go to war. A further benefit, added by Carnegie, was that the large debt owed to Germany could be repudiated if Portugal were a belligerent. Soares had concluded his conversation with Carnegie by informing him that his government was contemplating breaking off relations with Germany but that Portugal would consult with England before taking such a step.²³

The cabinet memo was made up of comments attached to the above dispatch of Carnegie's. Lord Percy outlined what were in his opinion the advantages and disadvantages of Portuguese belligerency. Percy felt that the chief advantage would be the forty-four German ships of acceptable value in Portuguese ports. Other positive aspects of Portuguese intervention would be the increased efficiency of the antisubmarine patrol gained by the unrestricted use of Portuguese ports, as well as the help that would be gained in blockading German East Africa. The major disadvantages in Percy's view would be the loss of freedom of action in the settlement of Africa after the war as well as being saddled with the obligation to defend Portuguese colonies for all time. This was coupled with the loss of munitions that Portugal was obtaining for England in Denmark and Brazil, and the possibility of having to

²³Carnegie to Grey, July 15, 1915, F.O. 371/2472.

intervene if Portugal were attacked by Spain. And yet a further negative aspect would be the furnishing of financial aid to Portugal. Percy felt that the participation of Portugal would be of some help from a military point of view but not from a political point of view. He suggested two possible courses of action. One would be to entice Spain into the war by using Portugal. Settle differences between Spain and Portugal, he recommended, then offer Spain a trade of Gibraltar for Ceuta (a port in Morocco opposite Gibraltar), with compensation given to Portugal in Africa. The second suggestion was to give Portugal some explanation of what was expected of her by England, a coherent explanation of that could be given to the public.²⁴

Eyre Crowe added his opinion, not at all in accord with Percy. Crowe felt that Percy had greatly overstated the disadvantages of Portuguese belligerency. It was his opinion that Portugal only desired a small section of German territory in East Africa called the Kioga to which Portugal had an historic claim. Crowe reminded the cabinet that England was already obligated to defend the Portuguese colonies. Also Portugal had already stated that she would no longer buy munitions under the table for England. Any financial aid that Portugal would be given would be offset by aid that Portugal could give in blockading German East Africa. According to Crowe, England ". . . should endeavor to settle the question according to military and naval needs in prosecuting the war and in future wars."²⁵ Crowe also felt that if there was a military advantage to be gained from the trade of Gibraltar and Ceuta

²⁴Minute by Lord E. Percy, July 21, 1915, F.O. 371/2472.

²⁵Minute by Eyre Crowe, July 22, 1915, F.O. 371/2472.

a moral and political edge would also be gained. Arthur Nicolson expressed no real opinion on the matter of Portuguese belligerency but he did feel that the proposed exchange of territory with Spain was an excellent card to play if England hoped to win Spanish help in the war.²⁶

With the views of these men in mind it is apparent that there was a great deal of divergent thinking among the subordinates of Grey concerning policy towards Portugal. This of course meant that Grey had to make his decision by choosing the ideas of one or more of his staff, or, as was often the case, using parts of each man's thinking.

The question of whether England wanted Portugal alone in the war was delayed as England again attempted to bring Portugal and Spain closer, with the hope of involving both in the war. This had been attempted before, but now it appeared that Portugal was eager to patch up her differences with Spain, and England hoped this time she would be successful. At first it appeared that some success would come from England's role as an unofficial mediator, when Carnegie reported that some progress was being made by Portugal in seeking an accord with Spain. The Portuguese minister to Spain had already received a verbal guarantee that if Portugal became involved in the war, that Spain would not consider such an action with alarm. However, no written guarantee had yet been given.²⁷ Carnegie also noted that Portugal desired a tripartite agreement which would include England and Spain. Portugal wanted to send a proposed agreement to London for England's perusal and comment.²⁸

²⁶Minute by Arthur Nicolson, July 22, 1915, F.O. 371/2472.

²⁷Carnegie to Grey, July 27, 1915, F.O. 438/183.

²⁸Ibid.

Grey reacted to Portugal's request for English participation in any agreement between Spain and Portugal by telling Portugal that England would carefully consider such a proposal and by telling Carnegie that England wanted nothing to do with such an agreement. Grey did encourage both of his ministers in Lisbon and Madrid to exert their influence to achieve some agreement between Portugal and Spain.²⁹

Just as it appeared that Portugal and Spain were drawing closer together, the situation exploded. Portugal appeared to suffer a sudden spasm of fear, fear that Spain, in league with German agents, was about to annex Portugal. This fantastic news was given to Carnegie by Soares on August 1, 1915. He told Carnegie that his government had proof that German agents were training in Barcelona and were planning an excursion into Portugal with monarchists and other dissident elements. These attacks would be made on August sixth, the day of Portugal's presidential elections. Soares told Carnegie that he distrusted Spain, even though Spain had been negotiating with Portugal. His distrust was based on information which reported that Spain had purchased a large amount of munitions in the United States. The disturbing aspect of this information, as far as England was concerned, was Soares' warning that the government might be forced to make widespread arrests of Germans and break off relations with Germany, which would likely bring a declaration of war from Germany.³⁰

That Portugal's fears of Spain was merely a smokescreen to enable Portugal to enter the war is seen from the dialogue that followed

²⁹Grey to Carnegie, July 30, 1915, F.O. 438/215a, and Grey to A. Hardinge, July 30, 1915, F.O. 438/215b.

³⁰Carnegie to Grey, July 27, 1915, F.O. 438/183.

after Soares gave Carnegie the information about the planned aggression from Spain. Carnegie had suggested that in view of the above it would be best if Portugal would accelerate conclusion of a treaty with Spain. Soares replied that if Portugal entered the war, Spain would hesitate to act against Portugal out of fear of what the English reaction would be. Soares then gave Carnegie another reason why it might be necessary for Portugal to declare war. Portuguese soldiers who had been captured by Germans in Angola were due to return home and their return might touch off popular demonstrations that could cause a break with Germany.³¹ Carnegie reported from his conversation with Soares that it was his opinion that Portugal was soon going to force a break with Germany so that she could enter the war.³²

Grey was not caught completely off-guard by this renewed desire of Portugal to enter the war. In London Crowe had received word from the Portuguese minister that the situation in Portugal was becoming unbearable. According to Gomes, the people were discontented because of the equivocal attitude of the government toward the war; this was causing severe political repercussions. Added to this was the unrest that was being caused by the German minister. The German minister's life had been threatened and Gomes feared that he would be assassinated. Yet another problem was the severe debt that was a terrible burden on the people. Gomes suggested that England grant Portugal a free hand to declare war on Germany if it appeared that such action was in the best interest of Portugal.³³

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

³³Eyre Crowe's report of a conversation with Teixeira Gomes, July 29, 1915, F.O. 371/2472.

The Portuguese government was casting about for any possible excuse to enter the war. They were hoping to show England how desperate the situation was, that they needed carte blanche from England so that they could deal with any eventuality. The imaginative means they used knew no bounds: they conjured up hords of German agents crossing the border as a prelude to a Spanish invasion; at any moment, they told London, the German minister might be assassinated or popular demonstrations might break out that would force Portugal to declare war.

Grey, attempting to sort out this barrage from Portugal and to gain time, instructed Carnegie to tell the Portuguese that ". . . pending consideration of all the issues involved . . . it is essential to avoid complication with Spain . . ." and ". . . if a break between Portugal and Germany occurs on the initiation of Portuguese Government, it should be on a clear issue, making Germany's provocation evident, and not a pretext sought by Portuguese Government."³⁴ Grey added that Portugal should take no precipitous step until England could express an opinion from a political as well as a strategic point of view.³⁵ Grey was moving toward the advice of Lord Percy; he was becoming firmer with Portugal. The cabinet had not yet settled the question and Grey apparently wanted to prevent any sudden Portuguese move that would hinder England's freedom of action.

Grey's telegram had some effect on the Portuguese, for when Soares next talked with Carnegie he was less bellicose. He assured Carnegie that his government was following the policy established by

³⁴Grey to Carnegie, Aug. 3, 1915, F.O. 438/261.

³⁵Ibid.

England and that the Portuguese attempt to come to an agreement with Spain was proof of their sincerity. Soares was quick to add that the public did not understand Portugal's foreign policy and that demonstrations that might force a break with Germany could become inevitable.³⁶ It should be noted here that the Democratic government in power by and large controlled the Lisbon mob and, at any time the government wished, it could unleash "spontaneous" demonstrations to force a break with Germany. Perhaps thinking of this Carnegie warned Soares that Portugal should not take any action without prior consultation with England. To this Soares agreed, but Carnegie in his report to Grey stated his opinion that Portugal would soon enter the war. He based his opinion on the pressure building up in congress for the government to take some decisive action against Germany.³⁷

In a cabinet meeting on August fifth, a decision was made to get tough with Portugal. Portugal was told that if a break did come with Germany it must be the result of a clear issue, in the interest of Portugal, and ". . . not forced on Germany as an obligation on the part of Portugal towards England."³⁸ England would defend with her navy the coast of Portugal and her colonies, but she would not provide munitions or financial aid, except to purchase German ships.³⁹ In another message Portugal was informed that England could not defend her from complications that might arise with Spain.⁴⁰

³⁶Carnegie to Grey, Aug. 4, 1915, F.O. 438/266.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸E. Crowe to T. Gomes, Aug. 5, 1915, P.D. No. 222.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Grey to Carnegie, Aug. 5, 1915, F.O. 438/280.

Portugal was given a free hand to do as she pleased but there was little she could do without England's support. She was not financially able to enter the war without English help, and without the support in a peace conference she would receive nothing in Africa. Her war-making potential was limited by the amount of help she received from England. In fact, Portugal found herself with free helpless hands.

About all that Portugal could do in reaction to the new hard line of England was to express her "regret and surprise."⁴¹ Soares asked if England would defend Portugal from an unprovoked attack by Spain. Portugal wanted to know if the alliance was void. He was told that England could not spare any troops for use in Portugal. In an attempt to learn the full intent of England's policy Soares mentioned the unneutral acts his nation had committed which could lead to war, whichever country declared it. He was informed ". . . that if Portugal goes to war it must be on her own responsibility, and that she must not assert that she does so in consequence of obligations under the alliance."⁴²

Grey did make some attempt to sooth Portugal's feelings by assuring Portugal that England could defend her coasts, though not her interior, and expressed thanks for the friendship Portugal had shown during the war.⁴³ This gesture, of course, in no way moderated the impact of England's policy toward Portugal. Portugal had found out that being a client state severely limited her options in international relations. She was indeed under the Lion's paw.

⁴¹Carnegie to Grey, Aug. 8, 1915, F.O. 438/305.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Grey to Carnegie, Aug. 9, 1915, F.O. 438/313.

The effect of England's policy was to dampen the martial fervor of the interventionists. Soares informed Carnegie that Portugal ". . . will acquiesce recognising that she must not by any action of hers, however noble and devoted, prejudice the great cause of liberty and the destiny of the Great powers now struggling in war."⁴⁴

This pacific attitude of Portugal lasted until Dr. Machado became President of the Republic October 25, 1915. Almost immediately Machado informed Carnegie that he wanted to break relations with Germany and send the division of troops to France that he had promised a year before. Machado had to be reminded that the invitation had been withdrawn.⁴⁵ Machado sent his acting foreign secretary to see Carnegie the next day and Carnegie hashed over the same ground that he had with the President. Carnegie did learn two important things in this conversation. The acting foreign secretary mentioned that Portugal had no real desire to add to her territory and that General Castro had left the army in such bad shape that it would be many months before it could help the allies.⁴⁶ At the threat of a new diplomatic offensive by Portugal aimed at entering the war, England responded by repeating the message she had given Portugal in August. If she entered the war it was her own responsibility.

This reaffirmation of the hard line toward Portugal closed another chapter in the relations between Portugal and England. In a very short time England would issue a new line, one which would invite

⁴⁴Augusto Soares to Carnegie, Sept. 16, 1915, F.O. 438/20 encloser 2.

⁴⁵Carnegie to Grey, Oct. 25, 1915, F.O. 438/303.

⁴⁶Carnegie to Grey, Oct. 27, 1915, F.O. 438/304.

Portugal to enter the war. The hard policy toward Portugal would be regretted, for Portugal's pride had been wounded and England was to find her much less pliable in future relations.

Chapter 6

THE SEIZURE

As the year 1915 drew to a close relations between England and Portugal, outwardly cordial, were really quite cool. England's rebuff of Portugal in the summer of that year had severely wounded the pride of her ancient ally, and by the end of 1915 England had cause to regret her harsh treatment of Portugal.

England found herself in a most difficult position; in late 1915 blood and treasure were being expended at fantastic rates in the trench warfare of the western front. Churchill had hoped to end the standoff in the West by breaking through the Dardanelles and knocking Turkey out of the war in the East; a side benefit of the Dardanelles operation would be the release of shipping in the Black Sea for use by the Allies. Unfortunately, the failure of the Dardanelles operation in December of 1915 forced them to seek Portuguese help in procuring desperately needed tonnage in the form of the German ships that had sought refuge in Portuguese ports.

Actually a War Office and Admiralty interdepartmental committee had first discussed the possibility of obtaining the German ships in Portuguese ports in May of 1915. The question had been tabled because of the hoped-for success of the Dardanelles operation and also because General Castro, then in power, would have opposed the seizure of the German ships; but in December the question was again taken up. The cabinet examined the situation and the question was framed by the

Foreign Office in the following manner: "The point for consideration is, then, whether, in order to secure the German tonnage, His Majesty's Government would be justified in urging the Portuguese Government to undertake the various responsibilities which such action would entail."¹ The authors of the memo felt that it might be possible for Portugal to requisition the German ships without Germany declaring war on Portugal; however England would have to be prepared for the eventuality of a German declaration of war.²

The memo had been prefaced with a general review of Anglo-Portuguese relations from May through November, 1915. The review had noted that the Revolution had brought to power a government more friendly to England than Castro's, and it also noted the Portuguese reluctance to follow England's lead concerning the war.³ However, the review neglected to take into account the hurt that Portugal had suffered as the result of the English rebuff of August, 1915. This negligence to ascertain properly the Portuguese attitude caused England to miscalculate seriously the willingness of the Portuguese government to continue to accede to her wishes.

There was one other aspect of the Portuguese government that England neglected to take into account, that was the return of Affonso Costa to power. Machado was respected in Portugal but lacked the ability of Costa, a man whom England would find much less pliable than

¹Cabinet Memo, "German Ships in Portuguese Ports," Dec. 17, 1915, F.O. 371/2472.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

Machado. Carnegie learned that Costa would be difficult to deal with when he had his first interview with the new Portuguese Premier.

Costa was very displeased with the rebuff of August sixth. He explained to Carnegie that at the end of the war Portugal would have to publish the diplomatic correspondence concerning the war. The public, Costa warned, would be very upset when it learned of the August sixth note and future relations between the two nations might be harmed. Carnegie attempted to soft-peddle the importance of that communication but reported to London that Costa left the meeting unconvinced and with the impression that England would abandon Portugal if it suited England's purpose. Carnegie recommended that the August sixth message be rescinded and replaced.⁴

England's great need for tonnage, caused by the German submarine sinkings, spurred the Foreign Office to action; two messages were drafted by Arthur Nicolson, approved, and sent to Carnegie.⁵ The first was an attempt to sooth the open wound left by the now notorious message of August sixth. It explained with tortured logic that the message was evidence of England's support of the alliance, and that they had requested Portugal to consult with England before taking the initiative in any declaration of war on Germany because of the alliance. The message concluded by noting that: "If the Portuguese Government gathered a different impression from Mr. Carnegie's communication of August 6th they were quite mistaken."⁶ Of course, if the Portuguese had gotten the

⁴Carnegie to the Foreign Office, Dec. 25, 1915, 371/2472.

⁵Draft of a telegram to Carnegie by Arthur Nicolson, Dec. 27, 1915, F.O. 371/2472.

⁶Carnegie to Government of Portugal, Dec. 30, 1915, P.D. No. 321.

impression suggested in this latest message, England would have not gained the desired effect of forcing Portugal to back down from her plans to declare war on Germany. This shallow attempt to heal the wounded Portuguese pride did not have the effect that the Foreign Office had hoped for. The Foreign Office learned how seriously they had miscalculated the Portuguese attitude when Carnegie delivered the second message to the Portuguese government.

Carnegie had been directed to enquire of the Portuguese if they would consider the possibility of requisitioning the German ships in their ports. Portugal was told that Portuguese companies would charter the ships for England's use. The Foreign Office suggested that Portugal follow the example of Italy and requisition the ships without declaring war.⁷ Even though England was prepared to accept the risk that the seizure might lead to a German declaration of war on Portugal, she hoped that the ships could be obtained without Portugal entering the war. By asking Portugal to follow the precedent of Italy, she could at least preclude a Portuguese declaration of war.

The request by England that Portugal requisition the German ships did not meet with an enthusiastic response on the part of Dr. Costa. Before the official presentation of the request on December 30, 1915, Carnegie had mentioned the question of the ships on December twenty-fifth. Costa had replied to Carnegie that the subject of the German ships would take a considerable amount of study.⁸ Clearly, Costa was in no hurry to accede to England's request for the German ships. In

⁷Carnegie to Government of Portugal, Dec. 30, 1915, P.D. No. 323.

⁸Carnegie to Grey, Dec. 35, 1915, F.O. 371/2759.

her request England had not offered to Portugal anything in return for the risk she would be forced to take by seizing the German ships.

Portugal had not been requested to seize the German ships by a direct appeal based on the alliance. Portugal could not be assured of gaining anything by her action and she would be risking a great deal.

The situation became somewhat confused when Dr. Costa requested a loan. Costa was seeking £2,000,000 for internal improvements.⁹ Costa had the reputation of being a financial magician and it was his hope that with the loan he could make some sort of order out of the economic chaos that faced his country. Costa sent to London to negotiate for the loan a Mr. Bleck, who was the president of the British chamber of commerce in Lisbon. Carnegie strongly urged the Foreign Office to use its influence in seeing that the loan was granted. Carnegie felt that if Portugal was not granted the loan that Costa would become ". . . less well disposed towards us";¹⁰ he foresaw endless difficulty developing in commercial and trade relations between the two nations if the loan were not granted. Carnegie also added that Costa desperately needed the loan and that if he could not obtain it in London he would seek the money from German sources.¹¹

Costa's reluctance to requisition the German ships and his request for a loan placed the Foreign Office in a quandary. As the new year dawned the Foreign Office showed uncertainty as to what action should be taken to obtain the German ships. Lord Percy had learned from

⁹Carnegie to Grey, Dec. 28, 1915, F.O. 371/2759.

¹⁰Carnegie to Erye Crowe, Dec. 28, 1915, F.O. 371/2759.

¹¹Ibid.

Mr. Bleck, on the latter's arrival in London, that Costa opposed the seizure of the ships, because in Costa's opinion it would be a breach of international law. Percy did get the impression from Mr. Bleck that Portugal might be planning to requisition the ships for its own use. Some sort of transport was badly needed by the Portuguese for they were in desperate need of wheat which they could obtain from South America. It was Percy's belief that if Portugal did requisition the German ships that they would use them for a short time and then quietly transfer the ships to England. And he clung to the hope that such action on the part of Portugal would not lead to a German declaration of war.¹²

At this point the question of how the Portuguese might be encouraged to seize the ships was being considered throughout the Foreign Office. A legal expert from the Treaty Department noted that the method of seizure suggested to the Portuguese was illegal under international law. Portugal could not follow the precedent of Italy in requisitioning the German ships. It was pointed out that when Italy had requisitioned the German ships in her ports she had been at war--not with Germany, but she had been a belligerent. Portugal was still acting under the guise of a neutral and she could not legally act as had Italy. A greater concern to the Treaty Department was the precedent such action on the part of Portugal would set. If Portugal requisitioned the German ships in their ports, then the United States could do the same; in that case the German ships in American ports would become American rather than British. The legal expert concurred with Percy that Portugal could requisition the ships with the excuse that they were needed for

¹²Minute by Lord E. Percy, Jan. 7, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

emergency purposes, then at a later date turn them over to the British. One other suggestion was furnished by the Treaty Department and that was that the Portuguese force the German ships to leave the Portuguese ports where they could then be seized by the Royal Navy.¹³

Arthur Nicolson felt that the best procedure for the Foreign Office to follow was to hand the decision of how to obtain the ships over to higher authority.¹⁴ On reviewing the situation Grey decided, although time was of the essence, to defer a decision until Portugal made a more specific reply to the English request. As yet Costa had said only that the question would necessitate careful consideration and Mr. Bleck had said only that Costa seemed opposed to the idea. The Foreign Office had grappled with the question and as yet had not found a feasible solution to the problem. So far no one had suggested an appeal to the alliance, since the Foreign Office remained opposed to Portugal's entering the war.

Meanwhile, however, Grey accepted Nicolson's suggestion and the matter was given to the cabinet for their opinion. One group within the cabinet sought to tie the Portuguese request for a loan with the seizure of the German vessels. This ploy might have been originated by Reginold McKenna, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Walter Runciman, a Labor M.P.¹⁵ Runciman had scribbled on a minute by Percy: "My interest in the loan has gone if it is not connected with the requisition of the German ships which is a most urgent necessity."¹⁶ This form of

¹³Minute by the Treaty Department, Jan. 7, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

¹⁴Minute by Arthur Nicolson, Jan. 11, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

¹⁵Minute by Reginold McKenna, and Walter Runciman, Jan. 13, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

blackmail might have been possible, except that Costa very likely could have received the needed loan from German bankers in Lisbon. Percy reacted strongly in opposition to the suggested conditioning of the loan on the requisition of the ships. He noted that for one thing it was illegal for Portugal to seize the ships following the Italian manner, and, secondly, that it was morally wrong to force Portugal by blackmail into another unneutral act. Percy urged that the loan be granted, with no restrictions, and Mr. Bleck be given authority by the Foreign Office to handle negotiations for the sale of the ships.¹⁷ Percy won the argument and the suggestion to grant the loan on the condition that Portugal seize the German ships was defeated. The loan would be granted, in hopes that Costa would be placed in a more favorable mood to requisition the German ships.

The Foreign Office renewed its efforts to obtain the ships on January 13, 1916. Carnegie was instructed to propose to Costa several ways by which the German ships could be seized. The first suggestion, favored by the Foreign Office, was for Portugal to requisition the ships, giving to Germany the excuse that the ships were desperately needed to transport wheat to Portugal; Portugal would pay for the ships after the war. The second proposal was similar but differed in that payment would be made in Portuguese treasury bills that would not be negotiable until the end of the war. A third suggestion was that a Portuguese company buy the ships, but in this case the payment would go to the German owners in a negotiable form. This proposal was the least favored by the Foreign Office.¹⁸

¹⁷Minute by Lord E. Percy, Jan. 11, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

¹⁸Foreign Office to Carnegie, Jan. 13, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

None of the alternatives suggested to Costa met with his approval. Costa felt that the first two suggestions would be acceptable if Portugal were to take only six ships or so, but that by no stretch of the imagination would she require sixty or seventy vessels. To requisition all of the German ships would, in Costa's view, be undignified, and would most likely draw some sort of ultimatum from Germany.¹⁹ Carnegie reported his fears that Portugal would buy a few German ships for her own urgent needs, without any risk from Germany and with no benefit going to England.²⁰

When Costa's continued reluctance to seize the German ships became known in London, Percy suggested that official negotiations would not make any further progress at that time and urged that Mr. Bleck be empowered to attempt some sort of arrangement with Costa. There was a further suggestion made that the £2,000,000 loan be granted with a further £1,000,000 offered against the security of the German ships.²¹

There was one group within the Foreign Office that believed that a tougher line needed to be used on Portugal. This segment of the Foreign Office suggested that if Portugal bought a few of the German ships for their own use she be informed that England would seize the ships using Article 56 of the Treaty of London.²² However, this plan was defeated for the time being; wiser heads counseling that a more

¹⁹Carnegie to Grey, Jan. 16, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Minute by Lord E. Percy, Jan. 17, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

²²Draft of a cancelled dispatch for Carnegie, Jan. 20, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

delicate approach was needed. As of yet Portugal had shown none of the great desire to enter the war she had evidenced a few months earlier.

Costa was of course quite cognizant of the war situation which was, in January of 1916, not at all favorable to England and her allies. England's merchant marine was shrinking, and the German High Seas Fleet was still a grave threat to the Grand Fleet. On the Western front neither side had made any appreciable progress at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives. In the East the Russian steam roller had shown its inability to win a decisive victory, while the Austro-Hungarian empire was demonstrating far more cohesiveness than either side had dreamed possible, and Turkey, the sick man of Europe, was surprisingly healthy. In January of 1916 Costa would have needed second sight to ascertain which side would be the eventual winner. England's recent defeat at Gallipoli and her inability to conquer German East Africa must have given him a desire to be very cautious in his dealings with London. He could afford to wait for the price of entering the war to become more attractive.

Sometime prior to January twenty-fourth, the suggestion must have risen in the Foreign Office²³ that England should appeal to the alliance to obtain the ships for on this date Percy mentioned that the possibility was being discussed and wanted to inform Carnegie that a call to the alliance was possible.²⁴ However, before such a step was to be taken the Foreign Office wanted to try again to acquire the German ships by a less drastic means and sent Mr. Bleck to

²³Minute by Lord E. Percy, Jan. 24, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

²⁴Proposed telegram to Carnegie from Percy, Jan. 24, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

Lisbon to negotiate with Costa. Bleck had been instructed to press Costa to requisition the German ships and he was ". . . authorized to foreshadow to Costa a further £1,000,000 on security of the ships."²⁵

By late January of 1916 England was seriously contemplating an appeal to the alliance as a means of obtaining the ships. It would appear that the thought of Portugal becoming an active ally had lost some of its earlier onus. Several factors were involved in this thinking. Portuguese troops would be of some assistance in hastening the defeat in German East Africa of General Paul Von Lettow-Verbeck, whose continued ability to escape defeat was diverting badly needed forces from the Western front. Portugal also had showed less interest than before in seeking large areas of German Africa. A far greater incentive for England to change its policy was of course the badly needed German ships. One other possible influence deserves mention. The Asquith government was in trouble and the announcement of a new ally might have been thought of as being helpful in easing some of the pressure being applied to the government by Loyd George and the opposition led by Bonar Law.

By January twenty-sixth Costa made known his feelings to the latest request of the British for the German ships. His Foreign Minister, Soares, explained to Carnegie that Dr. Costa was opposed to the requisition of the German ships because of the difficulty of justifying it. Costa favored requisitioning a few of the German ships for Portugal's own needs. Soares did inform Carnegie that if England were to appeal formally to the alliance, then it would be an entirely

²⁵Ibid.

different matter. However, Soares warned, such action, (seizure of the ships as a result of an appeal to the alliance) would most likely cause Germany to declare war.²⁶

The refusal of Costa to requisition the ships practically convinced Arthur Nicolson that England should appeal to the alliance. If England did not appeal to the alliance, then he counseled that Mr. Bleck be strongly supported in an attempt to purchase the ships. Nicolson held little hope for the success of this later course for he assumed that Germany would not allow the sale of the ships. Nicolson strongly urged that the whole question of obtaining the ships and the prospect of requesting Portugal to actively become an ally in the war be presented to the war committee.²⁷

The Foreign Office had done what it could to obtain the ships without Portugal's being invited to seize them as a request from the alliance, and after a month's effort had been forced to admit failure. The question was presented to the cabinet and war committee on January 29, 1916; the discussion centered around the minute drawn up by Nicolson. However, no decision was made.²⁸ The English government was not as yet ready to ask Portugal to become an active ally. Again the Foreign Office was given the opportunity to devise some other means of obtaining the German ships.

Grey was in a very difficult and delicate position. There was little he could do to put pressure on Costa. He had to keep in mind

²⁶Carnegie to Grey, Jan. 26, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

²⁷Minute by Arthur Nicolson, Jan. 27, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

²⁸Cabinet Memo, "German Ships in Portuguese Ports," Jan. 29, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

that any pressure that was applied would likely backfire, owing to the fierce pride of the Portuguese. Costa was far shrewder than Machado, and Portugal held something of great worth to the British. England had only a few bargaining points; money was one, but then Costa could receive money from his German friends. England could, of course, prevent the Portuguese from operating the German ships, but then world opinion would be marshalled against England if Portugal made a strong plea that the few ships she purchased were to be used solely to transfer wheat to Portugal from South America.

While Grey deliberated on what means he could use to obtain the German ships, the Portuguese deliberated on a bill that would enable the Portuguese government to requisition war material and transport. The bill was explained to Carnegie by Costa, who made it clear to the British minister that if the German ships were requisitioned it would be for the use of the Portuguese government.²⁹ Percy found this intelligence encouraging; he felt that such a bill if passed would encourage the Germans to sell their ships and Percy recommended that Mr. Bleck and Carnegie continue negotiations for the purchase of the ships.³⁰ Arthur Nicolson in viewing the situation in Portugal suggested that the Foreign Office wait for the pending cabinet decision before further action was taken.³¹

Edward Grey did not heed Nicolson's advice but opted for applying greater pressure on the Portuguese government to requisition the

²⁹Précis of a telegram from Carnegie to Grey, Jan. 29, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

³⁰Minute by Lord E. Percy, Jan. 30, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

³¹Minute by Arthur Nicolson, Jan. 31, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

ships. The form of this pressure was a severe threat; he told the Portuguese that English ships could no longer be used in trade with Portugal and that it was possible that England would withdraw the use of English port facilities by Portuguese ships. Grey further pointed out that Spain and other neutral countries were considering the requisitioning of German ships.³² Here indeed was a grave threat. Portugal depended greatly on English shipping; even more, since the bulk of Portuguese trade was with England, the denial of access to British ports would have meant serious damage to the Portuguese economy. The reference to Spain was to goad the Portuguese into action; if Spain requisitioned the German ships in her ports and entered the war, it would be a severe blow to Portuguese pride.

Grey's threat did not force the Portuguese to respond in the manner Grey had hoped for. Soares replied to the threat by telling Carnegie that Portugal was willing to requisition the German ships but only if England appealed to the alliance. He explained that an official appeal to the alliance was needed to guard against both internal and external problems that could result from such action. Soares also further stipulated that if the ships were seized they would have to carry the Portuguese flag and the company which controlled the ships would have to be based in Lisbon.³³ A further Portuguese reaction to the threat was to request a repeal of the message. Costa was hurt that England would address such a message to an ally. Carnegie suggested to Grey that the message should be explained away.³⁴

³²Carnegie to government of Portugal, Feb. 2, 1916, P.D. No. 328.

³³Carnegie to Foreign Office, Feb. 7, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

³⁴Ibid.

All that Grey's threat really accomplished was to harden Portugal's resolve to requisition the German ships only upon a formal request from England based upon an appeal to the alliance. Twice within a few months England had dealt harshly with Portugal and in both cases Grey had misjudged Portugal's reaction. In this case Portugal did not knuckle under; she maintained her position. She would no longer do England's bidding unless she became a full partner, a recognized ally of England.

The English cabinet meet the day after Costa's reply was forwarded to London. The decision was finally made to invite Portugal to seize the ships as an obligation of the alliance. However, instead of Grey issuing an official appeal to Portugal to seize the ships as an action taken by an ally, he asked Carnegie to make an oral statement to the effect that England wished Portugal ". . . in the interest of the alliance . . ." ³⁵ to seize the German ships. England pledged to defend the Portuguese dominions to the best of her ability. Grey also asked Soares not to lay the question before the congress; ³⁶ he did not want the German crews warned of the impending seizure, nor did he want a repeat of the political debate of the fall of 1914.

The Portuguese government responded a few days later and requested a formal written invitation. Soares explained that if Portugal did not have such a formal request severe internal and external problems might develop. If the government were given a formal request Soares was sure that political support would be universal. Soares told

³⁵Grey to Carnegie, Feb. 10, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

³⁶Ibid.

Carnegie that fears of a political debate over the question was unfounded for the government already had the necessary power to seize the ships, as well as plans for the seizure. Soares further informed Carnegie that the government would explain the seizure using the Italian precedent. He then gave to Carnegie the wording that Portugal wished the appeal to contain.³⁷

Just two days later Carnegie received from London the formal request to seize the ships in almost the same language suggested by the Portuguese.³⁸ However, Portugal did not act upon the request, but delayed. The same day the request was delivered Soares indicated to Carnegie that he feared that the Germans were aware of the plans to seize the ships and suggested to Carnegie that Portugal open negotiations with the German owners for the purchase of the ships; this move according to Soares would be a diversion that would cause the Germans to relax their security. No real negotiations would follow and Portugal would seize the ships at the proper moment.³⁹ Carnegie urged Soares that Portugal seize the ships with haste; any delay, he told Soares, would allow the Germans time to complete their plans for the destruction of the ships.⁴⁰

Still Portugal delayed, and on February twenty-first Carnegie, fearing that Portugal planned to buy only a few ships for their own use, informed Soares that if Portugal bought just a few ships for their own

³⁷Carnegie to Grey, Feb. 14, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

³⁸Grey to Carnegie, Feb. 16, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

³⁹Carnegie to Grey, Feb. 16, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

⁴⁰Ibid.

use they would not be allowed to use them. England would cite Article 56 of the Declaration of London and seize them as German ships. Carnegie also warned that any negotiations to buy the ships might drag on for months.⁴¹

This warning from Carnegie seems to have spurred the Portuguese to action for on the twenty-third of February, to the complete surprise of Carnegie and the Germans, the ships were seized in Lisbon and in other Portuguese ports.⁴² The German response to the seizure of their ships was to issue an ultimatum that demanded the requisition order be rescinded within five days. The Portuguese did not meet the requirements of the ultimatum and Germany declared war on March 9, 1916. The Portuguese congress met the next day and the government resigned to allow the President to form a national government. Leaders from all the parties pledged to support the government.⁴³

Portugal was now a belligerent. She now had the dubious privilege of sending her men to die along side of those of France and England. The long and confusing negotiations were ended, but it remains to be seen what conclusions can be drawn from this diplomatic sparring between Lisbon and London.

⁴¹Carnegie to Soares, Feb. 21, 1916, P.D. No. 331.

⁴²Carnegie to Grey, Feb. 23, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

⁴³Carnegie to Grey, March 11, 1916, F.O. 371/2759.

Chapter 7

CONCLUSION

What has preceded has been largely a description of Anglo-Portuguese relations during the early years of the First World War. While the main outline of events is clear, a number of points still need to be clarified and several amplified.

Although it may not seem so on the surface, the English Foreign Office, headed by Sir Edward Grey, remained quite constant in its unwillingness to see Portugal become a belligerent. This conclusion would be questioned in light of England's invitation to Portugal on October 10, 1914, to enter the war, if it were not for the evidence that clearly shows that that invitation was issued by Grey under duress. When that request was issued, Lord Kitchner was perhaps the single most important figure in English governmental circles. Kitchner had expressed a desire for the Portuguese artillery, and Grey could hardly ignore his request to obtain the guns. For Grey to obtain the guns it became necessary as a last resort to invite Portugal to furnish the guns, with troops as an ally. Despite this invitation, however, as was explained in Chapter 4, Grey was able to prevent the belligerency of Portugal in the fall of 1914.

The call of Portugal to the alliance in February of 1916, did not really indicate a change in the Foreign Office's policy of keeping Portugal out of the war. That call was a desperate gamble, made solely to obtain the sorely needed German ships in Portuguese ports. It was

hoped even as the invitation was issued that Germany would not declare war on Portugal. Portugal in February of 1916 was not invited to declare war on Germany, only to seize the German ships.

It well might be asked at this point, why England, when she went to great lengths to attract other allies, so ardently discouraged her oldest ally from entering the war? Summery reasons for England's seemingly strange action follow.

In the early days of the war, Portugal was discouraged from taking an active part in the war, because of the action of Winston Churchill. Churchill then the First Lord of the Admiralty, viewed the Iberian peninsula with Machiavellian eyes. Churchill argued, and apparently convinced Grey, that Spain would most likely take the opportunity of the general European conflict to attack and annex Portugal. With this eventuality in mind Churchill suggested that England refrain from becoming closely tied with Portugal, so that England might realize the benefit of the unified peninsula becoming an ally. A bonus, if his dire prediction were to become true, would be the Portuguese colonies that would come under English control. However, Churchill's belief in the aggressiveness of the Spanish was not realized, and Portugal was left confused as to England's plans for her.

Besides Churchill's reasons for discouraging Portugal to enter the war, several other factors were at work. By late in 1914, England began to fear that Portuguese belligerency would result in a Portuguese demand for a share of the German colonies in Africa. Early in the war England appreciated the opportunities of expanding her dominion in the dark continent as a reward of her victory. If Portugal became a belligerent, however, she could with historical justification demand some

remuneration in the form of German territory for her part in the war effort. England and the Union of South Africa viewed with grave concern any extension of Portuguese territory in Africa. It should be remembered that before the war England had negotiated with Germany for a division of the Portuguese possessions in Africa. It is possible that the thought in the minds of some English colonial expansionists was that if Portugal did not take part in the war England might obtain both German and Portuguese possessions in Africa.

Of course another reason for England's lack of enthusiasm to have Portugal as an active ally was the weakness of the Portuguese army. Military experts in Europe thought of the Portuguese army as the weakest in Europe. England's leaders feared that Portuguese troops employed on the Western front would be a liability instead of an asset. They were quite aware of the military attaches' reports of 1913 which noted that the Portuguese army was made up of slightly over 20,000 men. The report also mentioned that because of the Revolution and the departure of the Royalists that the value of the officers had greatly declined.¹ And, finally, the English feared the Portuguese army's affinity for the Prussian army.

The result of England's foreign policy toward Portugal was to cause that nation to live in a more unstable situation than was normal even for Portugal. Portugal could not clearly divine the reasons for England's disinclination to invite her into the war. It soon became clear to the Portuguese that England did not want her to enter the conflict, but England would not give a clear explanation for her actions.

¹v. De Braganca-Cunha, Revolutionary Portugal, (1910-1936) (London: James Clark & Co., 1936), p. 199.

Thus the Portuguese were left in the dark as to what the war meant to them. England, of course, could not explain why Portugal was not invited to join in the war effort. Grey could not inform the Portuguese government that he did not want to divide the German territory in Africa with them. Nor could he explain that England was waiting for Portugal to be swallowed by Spain. And Portuguese pride would not have been able to stand the idea that her army was so weak that she would be of no help in the war.

When Portuguese Foreign Minister Soares inquired of Carnegie why England opposed Portuguese co-operation, he was given the unsatisfactory response that, in Grey's opinion, Portugal was helping England by remaining neutral. While this explanation was accepted by some of the neutralist leaders in Portugal it was disappointing to large numbers of the Portuguese leaders and people.

If one puts himself in the position of the Portuguese, some feeling of sympathy for them must result from the experience. Portugal, a small and weak nation, but a nation with fierce pride, was told by her old friend and benefactor that she was not needed. She found herself in a most difficult position, for her friend asked her to remain neutral, but at the same time asked her to commit unneutral acts, such as allowing troops to cross her possessions, buying contraband, and transferring a destroyer to the hands of the Royal Navy. Yet she was not asked to send men into war, as a legitimate ally. If an analogy is permitted it would be similar to a baseball game in which the big boys play and the little brother is requested to chase the foul balls; however, when the little brother asks to play, even in right field, he is ignored and even insulted, and threatened with reprisals if he tries to play in the game uninvited.

Of course, in World War I England was not playing a ball game but fighting for her survival. She had to look to her own self-interest. But should it not be asked if England, in regard to her policy toward Portugal, really pursued a course in line with her own self-interest? A definite answer cannot be supplied to this question; also it is unfair with the advantage of hind-sight to be overly critical of those who were working with an unprecedented crisis, without the advantage or opportunity to do it all over again. Yet several weaknesses are apparent in the wisdom and actions of leaders both in England and in Portugal.

Grey's gravest mistake was made early in the war when he followed the advice of Winston Churchill. It was naïve at best to believe that Spain would annex Portugal and England would be able to stay aloof from the fray. England was obligated to defend Portugal and Portugal would have been able to muster world opinion on her behalf that would have forced England to intercede. Also it is quite apparent that the mere threat of English reprisals would have made Spanish aggression against Portugal unthinkable. Only if England were on the verge of a complete collapse is it likely that Spain might have taken the step of annexing Portugal. But in that case obviously no advantage would have been gained by England. It was also naïve to think that England could be able to influence Portugal and Spain into co-operating to the point that both nations would become allied with England.

The English Foreign Office also miscalculated the extent to which the Portuguese could be manipulated. In the closing weeks of 1915 the Foreign Office was completely unaware of the severe strain it had placed on its relations with Portugal by its crude rebuff of the

Portuguese in August of 1915. The impression is gained that England felt that the Portuguese would requisition the German ships the moment that England requested such action. As had been noted, the Portuguese mood was far from cooperative in the winter of 1915-1916. By-and-large the record of England's dealings with Portugal during the early years of the war shows her a clumsy, heavy-handed great power that was unable to fulfill her goal of keeping Portugal out of the war. Portugal was able to circumvent the aim of England's foreign policy and enter the conflict.

While England's policy shows weaknesses both in conception and execution, Portugal's record is not much better. Portugal's attitude toward the war is difficult to describe, let alone explain. Early in the war, indeed at the outset of the hostilities, the people of Portugal expressed great sympathy for the French and English. It would seem that if the government had called for a declaration of war against the Germans in August of 1914 it would have met with near universal approval on the part of the Portuguese people as well as the diverse political parties. As the war progressed this great outpouring of sympathy for the allies seemed to dissipate somewhat; the evidence that suggests this is the fact that Machado was unable to gain sufficient strength to lead his people into the war in the fall of 1914, after the English invitation. This is not to say, however, that if England had encouraged the Portuguese to participate in the war any government in power would have had much difficulty in rallying support to join in the conflict.

The neutralist faction in Portugal rose and waned in strength. The dictator Castro was a neutralist and he was able to remain in power for five months, which is somewhere near the average length of term of

power in early revolutionary Portugal. The strongest supporter of intervening in the war was Dr. Machado. He led a very powerful faction that was, whenever in power, dedicated to the proposition that Portugal should join in the battle for the benefits that would accrue to the victor--glory, territory in Africa, political unity, and financial reward.

While the position of Machado and the other interventionists was quite transparent, Costa's was cloaked in obscurity. Before the war he was quite friendly with Germans in Lisbon, but soon after the war began he closed ranks with Machado. Yet in the winter of 1915-1916 he seems to have acted independently of Machado and seemed willing to buck English pressure to seize the German ships, at least for a time. While he waxed and waned outwardly in enthusiasm to enter the war, in all probability he was in favor of Portuguese intervention, but only on his terms.

In summing up this chronicle of Anglo-Portuguese relations it would seem that England made a mistake in not accepting Portuguese aid at the beginning of the war. England had much to gain and really little to lose. The Portuguese would have been most helpful in Africa where their troops had valuable experience. The German forces in German East Africa might have been defeated before the end of the war. The German ships that were so important in 1916 could have seen almost two years of service for the allies. Also, early participation of Portugal would have closed off a major source of German intelligence in Lisbon.

Of course, if Portugal had joined in the war in August of 1914, England might well have had to give Portugal a larger share of German Africa; that would have been, it would seem, a small price to pay for the lives that might have been saved.

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