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East-West Trade
and
Congressional Party Voting,
1947-1970

by

Peter J. Geib

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by
Peter J. Geib *

The purpose of this study is to explore the effect of partisan considerations in Congressional voting as it relates to the formulation of trade legislation with Communist countries. Two major themes are present in this work. First, the voting behavior suggests that Congressional partisanship within a generally restrictionist orientation was an important element in the formulation of policy. But it was a special kind of partisanship. Both parties were clearly restrictionist until 1969. One party was simply *more* restrictionist than the other. Second, the study shows that regionalism has been an important aspect of voting behavior. The study describes fundamental regional cleavages within the framework of each of the parties and the changes since 1947. Although this brief study does not analyze the degree of party influence over East-West trade legislation *vis-a-vis* the executive branch, it does show that the two major parties were highly involved in the formulation of trade policy.

In the examination of the voting record, four problems emerge of major importance: the degree of partisanship or bipartisanship in the East-West trade area, the relationship of party to expansionist or restrictionist voting behavior, the influence of executive action on party position, and the influence of region on party voting cleavage. The analysis of the voting record provides one way of measuring certain partisan activities. In many cases, however, it was not completely satisfactory, because some key issues were decided in party leadership circles by types of persuasion, the exercise of the expertise, and other circumstances. Moreover, these questions of leadership influence were difficult to research as no public documents and few private documents exist relating to informal party leadership action. Also, party influentials do not wish to make public the consequences of political bargaining, and therefore interviews often cannot help in discovering the pattern of leadership action. Nevertheless, it is the purpose in this study to

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For the purpose of this analysis Communist countries or "East" include the following: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mainland China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Poland, Rumania, USSR, and Yugoslavia.

answer some questions by presenting data pertinent to the voting patterns.

Certain fundamental questions arise from the four problems presented above. Regarding partisanship and bipartisanship, the study poses the following questions: How often did Congressmen vote in partisan terms concerning East-West trade policy? How often did Congressmen vote in bipartisan terms? Has there been any substantial change in the degree of bipartisanship? Regarding policy orientation and party action, this analysis answers the following questions: Which party emerged as more restrictionist between 1947 and 1970? Which party emerged as more expansionist? When the vote was bipartisan, how often was it restrictionist? Has there been any substantial change in these voting patterns? The study also explains party support for the various administrations. How often did the parties support administrations and can any important distinctions be found in this support?

In addition to answering the above questions, the study describes the importance of regionally caused cleavages. Data were analyzed in terms of five basic regions of the country: Northeast, Midwest, Mountain, Pacific, and South. (These regions will be defined below.) Region has generally been important in the United States in matters of international trade. The aim here is to determine whether this was true regarding East-West trade policy between 1947 and 1970. The following questions are answered: Were there any consistent regional concentrations of votes for or against increased trade? Were there any consistent regional splits of votes in each party? Have there been any significant changes in regional voting patterns?

In the following section, Congressional activity was examined to determine every time that members of Congress put themselves on record on roll calls relating significantly to East-West trade. This total includes practically every record vote on a bill, amendment, or resolution pertaining to East-West trade between January 1947 and January 1970. In order for selection, a roll call vote must have been related directly to the East-West trade question. For example, the data do not include a record vote on the passage of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, because the entire bill was not related to trade policy with Communist countries. The data do include any record vote on an East-West trade amendment, i.e., the Kelley amendment to the 1954 act. Thus, again for emphasis: a roll call vote must have been related directly to trade policy with Communist countries. Table I shows the distribution of these roll calls between House and Senate and in the different sessions of Congress.

Classification is essential in order to analyze roll call votes. In general, five categories of voting behavior were established. They were based on three of the four fundamental problems suggested at the beginning of this section: partisanship, policy preference, and support for the executive. At least two categories of party support were required —

TABLE 1
NUMBER OF ROLL CALLS RELATING TO
EAST-WEST TRADE

<i>Congress</i>	<i>House</i>	<i>Senate</i>	<i>Total</i>
81st (1949-1950)	2	1	3
82nd (1951-1952)	0	3	3
83rd (1953-1954)	0	0	0
84th (1955-1956)	0	0	0
85th (1957-1958)	0	2	2
86th (1959-1960)	0	1	1
87th (1961-1962)	1	8	9
88th (1963-1964)	2	5	7
89th (1965-1966)	3	0	3
90th (1967-1968)	1	2	3
91st (1969)	1	3	4
	10	25	35

“partisan” and “bipartisan.” For the purpose of this analysis, bipartisan does not necessarily mean agreement with the executive position. Bipartisanship may be more restrictionist or more expansionist than the position of a particular administration.

What constitutes a partisan vote? What percentage of each of the parties must be lined up in opposition to each other? The definition which divided a “partisan” vote from a “bipartisan” vote in this study is a straight fifty per cent line of division. If over one-half of one party lined up in opposition against more than one-half of the other party, it was a partisan vote. If the parties stood together it was a bipartisan vote.

Some subjective judgments occurred in collecting the data. Generally, paired votes and announced votes were not counted in determining the consequences of voting. This procedure was justifiable because the party action consequences were the most important consequences sought. When voting members of either party were evenly split, however, it was usually possible to decide how to count a vote by taking into consideration the paired and announced votes of other members of the party. Most votes were clearly partisan, bipartisan, or neither. In short, if a vote was close, the paired and announced votes were taken into consideration.

In addition to “partisan” and “bipartisan,” a third general classification of “administration support” was required. A congressman was credited with administration support when his recorded vote seemed to conform to that measure sought at the time by the executive authorities who were primarily concerned. In most roll call votes, the President’s position was clear.

The fourth and fifth classifications of voting behavior were chosen because they reflect individual preferences relating to the restrictionist-expansionist policy spectrum. A "restrictionist" vote was an attempt to decrease the amount of trade between the United States and Communist countries. An "expansionist" vote was an attempt to increase the amount of trade between the United States and Communist countries. Some qualification of these definitions is required. Whether a vote was restrictionist or expansionist sometimes depended upon the political context. In the debate surrounding the Battle Act, for example, a vote against the highly restrictionist Kem-Wherry amendment was an expansionist vote within the framework of that debate. A vote against the Kem-Wherry amendment, however, was in favor of the Battle Act, a "less" restrictionist measure but hardly an expansionist measure. Nevertheless, since the Battle Act contained executive discretion, it was "more" expansionist than the Kem-Wherry amendment. For the purpose of this study, the terms restrictionist vote and expansionist vote refer to relative positions in a vote, and not necessarily to the nature of the legislation as it might stand outside the political context of the period.

The problem of region as an element affecting the action of parties and voting behavior was included in the scheme of classification by virtue of the geographical origin of congressmen. In sum five categories of classification were established based on four fundamental problems regarding voting behavior:

1. "partisan" votes
2. "bipartisan" votes
3. administration support
4. "restrictionist" voting
5. "expansionist" voting

After establishing these categories, it became possible to make the following computations. First, calculations were made for the times a congressman went on record on bipartisan roll calls in the East-West trade area and what percentage he was recorded in support of that majority.¹ Second, calculations were made of the times a member went on record on partisan votes on East-West trade and what percentage he was recorded in support of his own party. Third, calculations were made concerning the times a member went on record in support of the administration and what the percentage was for this support. Fourth, calculations were made concerning the percentage of

¹ It should be said that a member of Congress had to go on record in the above cases in order to compute his support percentage. A member's failure to record himself did not really harm his support record. The only effect was to cause a slight over-weighting of the votes in the same category. This distortion is far less serious than that which would result from counting every absence as evidence of non-support.

times a member supported a restrictionist voting position. Finally, calculations were made concerning the percentage of times a member supported an expansionist voting position. In most cases, the last two calculations were made easier because a vote in favor of expansionist policies automatically decreased the support percentage for restrictionist policy in that particular Congress by an equal amount. The calculations were made separately for each Congress. Once these fundamental calculations were made, it was possible to determine which party was more restrictionist, and if there was major change.

Table 2 shows the results of this stage of the calculations. Table 2 represents three sample states from the kind of table that was compiled by the author to establish support percentages for *each member* of the House and Senate during *each Congress* as derived from record votes on East-West trade legislation. Column P shows the percentage of support that senators and representatives gave to a partisan orientation. Column B shows the percentage of support which they gave to a bipartisan vote. Column A shows the percentage of support which members of Congress gave to specific administrations. Column R shows the percentage of support that they gave to the restrictionist orientation. Finally, Column E shows the percentage of support that they gave to an expansionist policy orientation. Several subjective judgments about individual actions had to be made in addition to the problem of when to count paired and announced votes. These decisions are reflected in Table 2. If a blank space appears in the bipartisan (B) or partisan (P) columns, it means that there was no bipartisan or partisan vote. If a zero appears in any column, it represents non-support (not absence) on the part of the member voting. Finally, the letters NV represent a member's decision not to vote on a partisan or bipartisan decision. However, the initials NV do not mean that a member of Congress did not vote at all, only that he did not vote in a partisan or bipartisan roll call vote. If an individual chose not to vote at all, this action is indicated in Table 2.

The Question of Party Loyalty

In the matter of East-West trade policy, partisanship was the most frequent phenomenon in both parties between 1947 and 1970. Bipartisanship did emerge as an important political force in the middle of the 1960's. Roll call votes that were neither partisan nor bipartisan emerged in an insignificant pattern. Table 3 shows the number of partisan and bipartisan record votes in each Congress as well as the number of roll call votes that could not be classified as partisan or bipartisan in terms of this study.

The evidence shows that congressmen voted most frequently in partisan terms. Rigid partisanship was the rule in eighteen out of thirty-five roll call votes (51 per cent) between January 1947 and

TABLE 2

A SAMPLE COMPILATION OF THREE STATES FROM THE TABLES OF INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT PERCENTAGES ON TRADE POLICY WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES ESTABLISHED FOR EACH CONGRESS.

87TH CONGRESS

		<i>Washington</i>	P	B	A	R	E
Sens.	Magnuson, W. - D.		100	100	60	40	60
	Jackson, H. - D.		100	50	83	17	83
Reps.	1. Pelly, T. - R.			100	0	100	0
	2. Westland, J. - R.			100	0	100	0
	3. Hansen, J. - D.			100	0	100	0
	4. May, C. - R.			100	0	100	0
	5. Horan, W. - R.			Did not vote			
	6. Tollefson, T. - R.			100	0	100	0
	7. Magnuson - D.			Did not vote			
<i>West Virginia</i>							
Sens.	Randolph, J. - D.		100	100	57	43	57
	Byrd, R. - D.		100	100	25	75	25
Reps.	1. Moore, A. - R.			100	0	100	0
	2. Staggers, H. - D.			100	0	100	0
	3. Bailey, - D.			100	0	100	0
	4. Hechler, D. - D.			100	0	100	0
	5. Kee, E. - D.			Did not vote			
	6. Slack, - D.			100	0	100	0
<i>Wisconsin</i>							
Sens.	Proxmire, W. - D		33.3	75	15	85	15
	Wiley, J. - R.		0	100	66.7	33.3	66.7
Reps.	1. Schadeberg, H. - R.			100	0	100	0
	2. Kastenmeier, R. - D.			100	0	100	0
	3. Thomson, V. - R.			100	0	100	0
	4. Zablocki, C. - D.			100	0	100	0
	5. Reuss, H. - D.			Did not vote			
	6. Van Pelt, W. - R.			100	0	100	0

January 1970. Bipartisan voting occurred in eleven out of the thirty-five cases (31 per cent). In six cases members of Congress did not cast their votes according to either pattern. It is clear that voting by party exceeded voting by bipartisan coalitions.

TABLE 3
PARTISAN AND BIPARTISAN RECORD VOTES

Congress	<i>Partisan</i>		<i>Bipartisan</i>		<i>Other</i>	
	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate
81st (1949-1950)	1	1	1	0	0	0
82nd (1951-1952)	0	2	0	0	0	1
83rd (1953-1954)	0	0	0	0	0	0
84th (1955-1956)	0	0	0	0	0	0
85th (1957-1958)	0	0	0	2	0	0
86th (1959-1960)	0	1	0	0	0	0
87th (1961-1962)	0	3	1	4	0	1
88th (1963-1964)	2	4	0	1	0	0
89th (1965-1966)	0	0	1	0	2	0
90th (1967-1968)	1	1	0	0	0	1
91st (1969)	0	2	1	0	0	1

In addition to the evidence provided in Table 3, there is a second way to show the importance of partisan behavior. Also, this method allows us to measure the degree of importance that partisanship assumed in the separate Congresses. These partisan support means were derived only from record votes that were specifically defined as *partisan* record votes earlier. Calculations were made for the House and Senate separately in the case of each partisan record vote in order to determine the degree of strength of partisan action. Table 4 indicates that legislators in the House and Senate consistently gave strong support to their respective parties. Indeed, in sixteen out of twenty cases represented in Table 4, the individual support means for both parties averaged over seventy per cent.² The 86th Congress was the only one in which a congressional support mean for partisanship fell below fifty per cent. Table 4 shows that in terms of the relative actions of the House and Senate parties that could be recorded, there was apparently little difference in partisan support caused by the different institutional circumstances. However, this analysis later shows that the Senate parties were frequently more expansionist in their solidarity than the House parties. Finally, there did appear to be a higher degree of partisanship in the early cold war years.

What accounted for the high frequency of partisan record votes in the early "cold wars" years and the particularly high degree of partisanship during this period as measured in Tables 3 and 4? One of the

² One should recall that partisan roll call votes did not occur in each Congress between 1947 and 1970. Thus, there are gaps in the data presented in Table 4, particularly in the House.

most salient facts regarding the information in the two previous tables is the importance of partisanship between 1948 and 1952. During this

TABLE 4
SUPPORT MEANS AND PARTY LOYALTY

<i>Congress</i>	<i>Democratic Partisan Support Means by Congress</i>		<i>Republican Partisan Support Means by Congress</i>	
	<i>Senate</i>	<i>House</i>	<i>Senate</i>	<i>House</i>
81st (1949-1950)	97.1%	97.7%	84.6%	71.3%
82nd (1951-1952)	94.9%		78.8%	
85th (1957-1958)	61.0%		61.5%	
86th (1959-1960)	60.4%		44.4%	
87th (1961-1962)	76.6%		76.0%	
88th (1963-1964)	71.5%	76.5%	76.0%	96.2%
90th (1967-1968)	70.9%	74.0%	56.3%	78.6%
91st (1969)	76.7%		68.2%	
Average of all Congresses	76.1%	82.7%	68.2%	82.0%

period Table 3 shows that legislators voted along party lines (as defined in this study) four times. During this time congressmen voted in a bipartisan manner only once. At the same time Table 4 shows that the *degree* of partisanship in the House and Senate was particularly high (i.e., the 81st and 82nd Congresses). Following this period it dropped off substantially.

There is one fundamental reason why partisanship between 1947 and 1952 was deceptively strong and unique. It relates to the debate and vote in 1949 over the Export Control Act. The partisanship of 1949 was unique because the Republicans saw an opportunity to make important short term political gains at little cost. It is clear that the Republicans viewed Truman's initiative to place restrictions on exports as a legitimate target for the traditional defenders of *laissez faire* industrial policy. In short, the Republicans hoped to make substantial gains with their traditional constituency, but may have viewed their opposition as a short term political maneuver. The evidence suggests that Republican leaders used traditional Republican ideology to oppose the bill. Although Republican leader Senator Robert Taft eventually supported the bill, he stated:

I am willing rather reluctantly, to support the pending bill. I feel very strongly that the general policy of controlling exports and im-

ports is a mistake, that it interferes with foreign trade and with the initiative of men to develop American industry, as well as foreign industry.³

Republican leaders in the House voiced similar arguments. Walcott of Michigan offered several unsuccessful amendments from the floor which were based on an opposition to increased centralization of government. Furthermore, argued Representative Hinshaw of California, who, with Walcott, led the Republican opposition in the House:

. . . but what this bill means is that in negotiations under the present trade treaty acts you are going to give the President authority to agree with other countries to establish domestic export quotas. . . . That will mean a complete violation of the freedom in commerce which our country has enjoyed, except in war, since the beginning. It will give . . . free reign to the President to engage in commercial warfare through the export quota system. This is the system applied by authoritarian countries.⁴

It is clear that the Republicans believed that political gains based on widely held Republican views were in easy reach. Although leading Republicans may have held these views in 1949, evidence presented later shows that they became restrictionist.

The history of the orientation of the two parties after 1949 underlines the unique nature of partisanship in 1949. After the early 1950's, the evidence indicates that there was continuing partisanship, but that it existed within a broader framework of agreement; one party was simply more restrictionist than the other. The fact of strong partisanship within a broader framework of agreement was the principal reason for the high frequency of partisan voting between 1947 and 1970 on the East-West trade issue. As statements and events during and after 1949 showed, the partisanship of 1949 was a passing phenomenon. Shortly thereafter, both parties exhibited restrictionist orientations. Partisanship did not in fact exist in the terms presented by the Republicans in 1949 because both parties shortly thereafter began to exhibit a restrictionist orientation. It is important to realize that during this period, until the middle of the 1960's, those who desired to disrupt most completely the legislative *status quo* were interested in passing "more" restrictionist legislation. In later years the expansionists would capture the legislative initiative.

The two-party acceptance of generally restrictionist assumptions was to last until the late 1960's. Even in 1949, when there was at

³ U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Taft stating his reluctance to support export controls, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., February 8, 1949, *Congressional Record*, Vol. 95, p. 954.

⁴ U. S., Congress, House, Representative Hinshaw speaking in opposition to export controls, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., January 3, 1947, *Congressional Record*, Vol. 95, p. 1370.

least the appearance of an expansionist-restrictionist split underlying partisanship, there was evidence that the Republican leadership was tending toward restrictionist assumptions. Republican Senate leader Taft reluctantly decided to support Truman's initiative:

My principal reason for hesitating to oppose the pending bill is our situation with regard to Russia. So long as that situation exists, I do not like to oppose a bill giving power.⁵

The struggles over the Cannon amendment, the Kem Amendment, and the Battle Act in 1950 and 1951 revealed that the Republicans were in fact "more" restrictionist in partisan terms than the Democrats.

Partisanship appeared continuously after 1949 and it was based fundamentally on the degree of "restrictionism" adopted by the parties. It was particularly strong in the period from 1959 until the end of 1964. A qualitative change in the nature of partisanship did not really occur until the middle of the 1960's. An examination of the debates in Congress showed that the popularity of expansionist policy grew rapidly between 1965 and 1970 despite the Vietnam War, particularly within the ideological framework of the Democratic Party. This emerging expansionist sentiment, and its clash with old line restrictionist views, was not really reflected in roll call votes until the 1969 debate over the Export Administration Act. This newly emerging expansionist partisanship might have been reflected earlier in record votes if the Johnson administration's East-West Trade Expansion Act (1966-1967) had not been effectively blocked by opposing forces in its initial stages of consideration. Table 3 shows that there were two partisan votes in 1969. These votes reflect qualitatively different ideological views. One party had clearly become expansionist and one party had clearly remained restrictionist. The extent of these philosophical differences is discussed in the next section.

Regarding bipartisanship, Table 3 indicates that it occurred most frequently in 1961 and 1962 before the increasingly partisan roll call votes of 1963 and 1964. Indeed, six of the eighteen partisan roll call votes occurred in 1963 and 1964.

There were two basic reasons for the high frequency of bipartisan votes in 1961 and 1962. First, the period between 1961 and the end of 1964 was a time of high activity in terms of roll call voting. Sixteen of the thirty-five record votes occurred during this period. The generally large number of roll calls during this period certainly contributed to the larger absolute number of bipartisan votes, although their proportion to partisan votes remained almost the same as in the total universe of data. Second, the evidence suggests that the partisan split

⁵ U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Taft announcing his support for export controls, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., February 8, 1949, *Congressional Record*, Vol. 95, p. 955.

between the "more restrictionist" party and the "less restrictionist" party had begun to moderate in at least one respect. By 1962 Congress had developed a basic East-West trade framework that appeared to generate Congressional consensus regarding the value of the legislative *status quo*. The framework was generally restrictionist. The Keating-Kitchin amendment, which accounted for two bipartisan record votes, tended to push the framework in a somewhat more restrictionist direction. But the changes were not substantial. The renewal of the Export Control Act of 1949, which included the Keating-Kitchin amendment, accounted for a third record vote.

Those who adopted "extreme" positions during 1961 and 1962 generated little support. An examination of the three partisan votes in 1961 and 1962 showed that in all cases attempts to move the legislative framework in a more restrictionist direction failed. An examination of the East-West trade debate of 1961 and 1962, as well as the evidence of voting behavior, showed that there was no indication of an effectively large or influential leadership group in either party attempting to radically turn the legislative framework in a more expansionist direction.

The first expansionist legislation since 1947 was passed in 1969 — the Export Administration Act. The controversy surrounding this legislation was reflected in the partisan votes of 1969. As Table 3 indicates, there were two partisan votes in 1969. Both record votes were related to the Export Administration Act. In each case the Senate voted in favor of a more expansionist policy. In 1969 there was also one bipartisan record vote. In this case the House of Representatives voted in favor of expansionist export policy, although the House originally opposed the bill. It is clear that in 1969 the partisan votes reflected a qualitatively new basis for partisanship. The Democratic Party had broken the earlier framework of partisanship within a generally restrictionist orientation and become clearly expansionist. The Republican Party retained a restrictionist orientation. Nevertheless, between 1947 and 1970 party loyalty, in one form or another, was a highly important consideration in the formulation of trade policy with Communist countries.

Party Policy Preference

In addition to the question of party loyalty, the second major problem relating to partisan considerations is party orientation toward the restrictionist-expansionist policy spectrum. This section concerns three fundamental questions: Which party emerged as more restrictionist between 1947 and 1970? Has there been any substantial change in the orientation of the two parties? When the vote was bipartisan, how often was it restrictionist and how often was it expansionist? Before answering these questions, one should recall the context of party action

which the analysis of record votes cannot satisfactorily reveal. Within the framework of political absolutes presented by the Cold War, the Congressional output was generally restrictionist. Nevertheless, the following section makes it clear that within this context one party was clearly *more* restrictionist than the other. In almost every roll call vote, it was possible to determine the two principal orientations. Consequently, one can accurately plot the positions of the two parties in every Congress in which record votes occurred. Methods used to determine these positions are explained below.

Which party emerged as consistently more restrictionist between 1947 and 1970? This section uses two ways to establish the relative positions of the parties in terms of a restrictionist-expansionist dichotomy. First, the study establishes party support means for the two orientations based on the individual support percentages. Second, the study describes the degree of partisan orientation to the two positions based on an analysis of partisan record votes in each Congress.

The first set of data is summarized in Tables 5 and 6. Means are based on the individual percentages calculated for each individual who cast a vote in the relevant roll call votes. The party means represent the average score computed for the separate parties in each house for each Congress. These party means give one a reasonably accurate measure of party position in each Congress and over time.⁶

The data in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that the Democratic Party was relatively more expansionist than the Republican Party. In the Senate there was only one Congress, the 86th, in which the Democratic Party support mean shows less support for the expansionist position than the Republican Party. Moreover, the difference in support for the Republicans and the Democrats in the 86th Congress was less than two percentage points. Finally, in the Senate, it is evident that a majority in each party consistently took different ideological positions. A majority of the Democratic Party in the Senate was expansionist in terms of the context of the votes. In all cases one can determine whether a vote "tended" toward an expansionist or restrictionist policy preference.

In the House the picture is somewhat different. As in the Senate, Democrats were consistently more expansionist than Republicans. However, the Democratic support mean for expansionist policy was not consistently over fifty per cent. In fact, it was over fifty per cent in only two of the six Congresses in which there were record votes. In brief, both parties in the House more often voted restrictionist on all record votes. Nevertheless, the Republicans were always *more* restric-

⁶ A further study of party behavior might raise the question of party cohesiveness based on a measure of standard deviation. This might include an analysis of predictors and probable causes of cohesiveness in individual record votes. For the purpose of this study, the party means give one a reasonably accurate measure of the central tendencies of the two parties in each Congress and over time.

tionist, with one exception — the 81st Congress. This exception was explained in earlier paragraphs. The House roll call vote in the 81st Congress of 1949 simply reflects the position of the House Democrats in support of the Truman administration's Export Control Act as well as the short term reaction of the House Republicans. Table 6 shows that the House Republicans quickly reversed themselves in later Congresses and became "more" restrictionist than the Democrats. The House Democrats voted less support for the expansionist orientation than did the House Republicans in only two cases. One of these votes related to the 1949 Export Control Act. The other case related to one of the House votes on the 1969 Export Administration Act, in which the few Democrats who voted gave their support to the Nixon administration's desire for a simple extension of the old law. The House originally supported a simple extension of the old law. It agreed later to the Senate's

TABLE 5
PARTY MEANS OF INDIVIDUAL SENATE SUPPORT
PERCENTAGES FOR THE RESTRICTIONIST
AND EXPANSIONIST POSITIONS

<i>Congress</i>			<i>Restrictionist Percentage</i>	<i>Expansionist Percentage</i>
81st	Dem.	Support Mean	6.1%	93.9%
(1949-1950)	Rep.	Support Mean	81.5%	18.5%
82nd	Dem.	Support Mean	34.6%	65.4%
(1951-1952)	Rep.	Support Mean	70.1%	29.9%
85th	Dem.	Support Mean	27.9%	72.1%
(1957-1958)	Rep.	Support Mean	55.8%	44.2%
86th	Dem.	Support Mean	44.6%	55.4%
(1959-1960)	Rep.	Support Mean	46.9%	53.1%
87th	Dem.	Support Mean	51.3%	48.8%
(1961-1962)	Rep.	Support Mean	72.9%	27.1%
88th	Dem.	Support Mean	26.4%	73.6%
(1963-1964)	Rep.	Support Mean	69.5%	30.5%
90th	Dem.	Support Mean	46.4%	53.6%
(1967-1968)	Rep.	Support Mean	64.1%	35.9%
91st	Dem.	Support Mean	26.1%	73.9%
(1969)	Rep.	Support Mean	82.8%	17.2%
Dem. All Congress Expansionist Mean			66.8%	
Rep. All Congress Expansionist Mean			32.0%	
Dem. All Congress Restrictionist Mean			33.0%	
Rep. All Congress Restrictionist Mean			68.0%	

TABLE 6

PARTY MEANS OF INDIVIDUAL HOUSE SUPPORT
PERCENTAGES FOR THE RESTRICTIONIST
AND EXPANSIONIST POSITIONS

<i>Congress</i>			Restrictionist <i>Percentage</i>	Expansionist <i>Percentage</i>
81st	Dem.	Support Mean	96.5%	3.5%
(1949-1950)	Rep.	Support Mean	54.4%	45.6%
87th	Dem.	Support Mean	100.0%	0.0%
(1961-1962)	Rep.	Support Mean	100.0%	0.0%
88th	Dem.	Support Mean	25.0%	75.0%
(1963-1964)	Rep.	Support Mean	93.2%	6.8%
89th	Dem.	Support Mean	56.0%	44.0%
(1965-1966)	Rep.	Support Mean	85.0%	15.0%
90th	Dem.	Support Mean	19.1%	80.9%
(1967-1968)	Rep.	Support Mean	83.5%	16.5%
91st	Dem.	Support Mean	99.4%	.6%
(1969)	Rep.	Support Mean	96.6%	3.4%
Dem. All Congress Restrictionist Mean			66.0%	
Rep. All Congress Restrictionist Mean			85.5%	
Dem. All Congress Expansionist Mean			34.0%	
Rep. All Congress Expansionist Mean			14.6%	

expansionist initiative. The Democratic Party mean for the House only reflects the original position.

What reasons can be given to explain the degree of difference in the Democratic Party position in the House and Senate? First, in the Senate as well as in the House, the Democratic Party was relatively more expansionist than the Republican Party. But in the Senate the Democratic Party's support mean for the expansionist position was consistently over fifty per cent, as Table 5 shows. The principal reason for this difference reflects the reality that the East-West trade policy was usually viewed as a tool of foreign policy. As such, it was subjected to the same political phenomena as other foreign policy problems. Scholars have repeatedly found that the larger a policy-maker's political constituency, the more "liberal" he tends to be on trade and aid problems. This reflects the idea that there is less opportunity for local economic (or political) questions to interfere with "broader" considerations of national interest if one's political constituency is relatively large. Thus, in the consideration of the East-West trade issue, the study explains that the political branch with the broadest constituency (i.e., the executive branch) usually took a more expansionist position than

the legislative branch. According to the same principle, Tables 5 and 6 show that the Senate Democrats and Republicans tend to be slightly more expansionist than their counterparts in the House.

It is interesting to review certain figures that are not represented in Tables 5 and 6. These figures relate to the degree of party orientation to the two principal policy positions — relative restrictionism or expansionism. They are not presented in detail here. In many cases, the individual support percentages for each Congress provide evidence that the Democrats gave “very strong” support to the expansionist position while the Republicans gave “very strong” support to the restrictionist position. This was generally true in almost all cases in the Senate and the House with the exception of the House vote on the Export Control Act of 1949. The reasons for this short term position were explained in earlier paragraphs. In the Senate in the 81st Congress (1949-1950), thirty of a total of thirty-three individual Democratic support percentages representing expansionist support were one hundred per cent in support of that position. In the Senate in the 81st Congress, twenty-two out of a total of twenty-five individual Republican support percentages represented restrictionist support of that position. Indeed, as the data show, this pattern often occurred in later years in both House and Senate. Complete data showing this particular pattern are not given here, however, because in most cases, particularly in the House, there was only a small number of votes from which to calculate the range of support percentages. Consequently, an individual support percentage which was calculated from two or three votes might give a misleading impression, particularly in terms of the range of individual scores or in terms of presenting the model scores for Democrats or Republicans in each Congress.

In addition to the data relating to individual and group support percentages, there is a second set of data that help to clarify the degree of party orientation to the restrictionist and expansionist positions. These data are based on the percentage of each party that voted restrictionist and expansionist on partisan roll call votes. In order to focus more clearly on the record votes in which party clearly made a difference, the analysis was limited to partisan roll call votes. Table 7 shows the percentages of each party that voted restrictionist and expansionist in the Senate and the House. The evidence is based only on the action of party members who voted.

There are several important facts underlined by this information. First, Table 7 emphasizes the conclusion drawn from the analysis of party support means which shows that the Democratic Party was consistently less restrictionist than the Republican Party. Second, the information in Table 7 carries the analysis further to show the degree of partisanship. Both parties were “highly” oriented to their respective positions and this created important and relatively consistent partisan cleavage. This fact held true in all cases, with the exception of one

TABLE 7
PARTISAN VOTES AND THE DEGREE OF PARTISAN
ORIENTATION TO THE RESTRICTIONIST-
EXPANSIONIST SPECTRUM

<i>Congress and Vote</i>	<i>Restrictionist Percentage Senate</i>	<i>Expansionist Percentage House</i>	<i>Restrictionist Percentage Senate</i>	<i>Expansionist Percentage House</i>
81st (1949-1950)				
<i>Cannon Amend.</i>				
Dem.	8.3%		91.7%	
Rep.	80.6%		19.4%	
<i>Walcott Amends.</i>				
Dem.		99.1%		.9%
Rep.		27.2%		72.8%
82nd (1951-1952)				
<i>Kem-Wherry Amend.</i> (vote 1)				
Dem.	2.7%		97.3%	
Rep.	79.4%		20.6%	
<i>Kem-Wherry Amend.</i> (vote 2)				
Dem.	8.1%		91.9%	
Rep.	75.8%		24.2%	
85th (1957-1958)				
<i>Knowland Amend.</i>				
Dem.	36.6%		63.4%	
Rep.	61.9%		38.1%	
86th (1959-1960)				
<i>Kennedy-Aiken Bill</i>				
Dem.	39.9%		60.7%	
Rep.	53.1%		46.9%	
87th (1961-1962)				
<i>Miller Amend.</i>				
Dem.	18.2%		81.8%	
Rep.	68.0%		32.0%	
<i>Cotton Amend.</i> (To Mut. Sec. Act of '61, vote 1)				
Dem.	32.4%		68.6%	
Rep.	82.8%		17.2%	
<i>Cotton Amend.</i> (vote 2)				
Dem.	26.4%		73.6%	
Rep.	83.3%		16.7%	

<i>Congress and Vote</i>	<i>Restrictionist Percentage Senate</i>	<i>Expansionist Percentage House</i>	<i>Restrictionist Percentage Senate</i>	<i>Expansionist Percentage House</i>
88th (1963-1964)				
<i>Mundt Amend.</i> (To Ex-Im. Bank Act of '64, vote 1)				
Dem.	39.3%		60.7%	
Rep.	80.0%		20.0%	
<i>Mundt Amend.</i> (vote 2)				
Dem.	26.7%		73.3%	
Rep.	66.7%		33.3%	
<i>Tower Amend.</i> (To Ex-Im. Bank Act for '64)				
Dem.	23.7%		76.3%	
Rep.	75.9%		24.1%	
<i>Ex-Im. Bank Provision For '64</i>				
Dem.	21.1%		78.9%	
Rep.	72.7%		27.3%	
<i>Ex-Im. Bank Provision For '64 (vote 1)</i>				
Dem.		28.4%		71.5%
Rep.		96.2%		3.8%
<i>Ex-Im. Bank Provision For '64 (vote 2)</i>				
Dem.		15.9%		84.1%
Rep.		96.6%		3.4%
90th (1967-1968)				
<i>Dirkson Amend.</i> (To Ex-Im Bank Act of '68)				
Dem.	33.9%		66.1%	
Rep.	59.4%		40.6%	
<i>Amend To bon MFC for Poland</i>				
Dem.		27.6%		72.4%
Rep.		78.4%		21.6%

Congress and Vote	Restrictionist Percentage		Expansionist Percentage	
	Senate	House	Senate	House
91st (1969)				
Ex. Ad. Act of '69 (vote 1)				
Dem.	14.6%		85.4%	
Rep.	63.6%		36.4%	
Ex. Ad. Act of '69 (vote 2)				
Dem.	22.2%		77.8%	
Rep.	72.7%		27.3%	

vote on the Walcott amendments which were directly related to the Export Control Act of 1949. Table 7 adds further proof to the evidence that this situation was short-lived. Table 3 noted that fifty-five per cent of the total number of record votes in the East-West trade area were partisan votes. The degree of partisan cleavage on these partisan votes was surprising. In all cases in the Senate, the members of the Democratic Party who voted in partisan votes gave over sixty per cent of their support to the expansionist position. Moreover, in fifty-three per cent of the partisan votes in the Senate, the Democratic Party gave more than three-fourths of its voting support to the expansionist position. With the exception of one case in the Senate, the members of the Republican Party who voted on partisan record votes gave over fifty-nine per cent of their support to the restrictionist position. Finally, in forty-seven per cent of the partisan votes in the Senate, the Republican Party members cast more than three-fourths of their votes for the restrictionist position.

In the House it was more difficult to draw lasting conclusions about partisan cleavage, because there was a substantially smaller number of roll call votes. Within this smaller universe of data, however, the picture is similar to that which emerged from Senate votes. The one exception to the rule that the Republican Party was more restrictionist than the Democratic Party involved the Walcott amendments. Table 7 shows the percentage explaining this exception. In the three other record votes the Democrats were highly restrictionist. Table 7 shows that the Democrats gave more than seventy per cent of their votes to the expansionist position in three out of four of the partisan votes. At the same time the Republicans gave over seventy per cent of their votes to the restrictionist position in the same three record votes. It is clear that both parties strongly supported their respective positions in almost all the roll call votes of a partisan nature.

Has there been any substantial change in the policy preferences of the parties? The party support means were used to plot change. The following charts are graphs of the information presented in Tables




Chart 1 – Partisan Support for Policy Preference in Senate

Democratic Support for Expansionist Position ----

Republican Support for Restrictionist Position - - - -

4 and 5. Chart I shows the consistency with which Senate Democrats supported the expansionist position in all record votes. This support, as mentioned in a preceding paragraph, dropped below fifty per cent in terms of the party support means only once. In this case, it did not decrease to any great extent. Chart I also shows the consistency

with which the Senate Republicans supported the restrictionist position. Republican support for this position in terms of party means fell below fifty per cent only once. Both parties offered strong support for their respective orientations in the Senate.

Why is the Democratic support of Truman's restrictionist Export Control Act not reflected in Chart 1? It should be remembered from the explanation of Table 5 that the Senate position in the 81st Congress was not in a roll call vote. The Senate Democrats did support the administration in this case. They also supported the administration in later months in the 81st Congress in the vote on the Cannon amendment. By this time, however, the Republicans had established a substantially "more" restrictionist orientation than the Democrats. This position usually involved rigid limitations on executive action. In sum, the votes on the Cannon amendment and other bills are represented in Chart 1, but there was no vote on the Export Control Act in the Senate. Chart 2 shows the consequences for the parties of a record vote on the Export Control Act in the House. The reasons for the Democratic and Republican positions in 1949 are explained at the beginning of this study.

Chart 2 indicates essentially that both parties were more inconsistent in their support means in the House than they were in the Senate. The Democratic support for the expansionist position was low in the 81st, 87th, and the 91st Congresses. But it was high in the 88th, the 89th, and the 90th. Similarly, the Republican support for the restrictionist position was low in the 81st, 87th, and the 91st. At the same time, it was exceptionally high in the 88th, 89th, and 90th Congresses. Although the parties in the House may have been less consistent than in the Senate, Chart 2 overemphasizes this inconsistency. In the case of the 81st Congress, the Democratic and Republican Party means in the House only reflect the votes on the Export Control Act of 1949 and the Walcott amendments to that act. It has been pointed out several times that this minimal support for expansionist policy by the House Democrats was restricted to the case of the Export Control Act of 1949. If there had been other roll calls later in the 81st Congress, more support for the expansionist position would be reflected in Chart 2. In the 87th Congress, there was only one record vote in the House. This vote was a final roll call on the Keating-Kitchin amendment, a successful restrictionist amendment, which the House had thoroughly debated before bringing to a final vote. Although it does distort the graph because it was the only roll call in the House during the 87th Congress, it does reflect the increased restrictionist sentiment to emerge in that 1961-1962 Congress. The restrictionist salience was exceedingly high during that period, probably reflecting international tension over the complex of problems surrounding Cuba.

In the case of the 91st Congress, there are also clearcut explanations for the greatly reduced support of the expansionist orientation in the House. First, this low support mean in the House manifests the




Chart 2 – Partisan Support for Policy Preference in House

Democratic Support for Expansionist Position ----

Republican Support for Restrictionist Position - - - -

originally strong support received by the Nixon administration for its attempt to simply renew the old Export Control Act in 1969. The House eventually supported the new Export Administration Act of 1969 after it received strong Senate backing. The low support mean for expansionism reflects only the earlier position. Second, an examination of the roll call vote in the House showed that one hundred and fifty-one

members did not vote. Fifty-three per cent of those who did not vote were Democrats who may have substantially increased the Democratic support mean for the expansionist position.

When the vote was bipartisan, how often was it restrictionist and how often was it expansionist? The evidence shows that there were five bipartisan votes in the Senate and four in the House between 1949 and January 1970. In contrast there were fourteen partisan votes in the Senate and four in the House. Thus, although the two parties agreed often enough to support a generally restrictionist orientation, there was significant partisanship within this framework relating to more specific goals and policy procedure. It is interesting to review the bipartisan restrictionist votes, which include the following:

1. Cannon amendment of 1950 regarding limits on aid to nations trading with Communist countries (House).
2. Keating-Kitchin amendment of 1962 restricting executive action in relation to export policy (House).
3. Lausche-Proxmire amendment of 1962 suspending most-favored-nation to Communist countries (Senate).
4. Continuation of Export Control Act in 1962 (Senate).
5. Keating-Kitchin amendment of 1962 restricting executive action in relation to export policy (Senate).
6. Mansfield-Dirkson amendment of 1962 restricting assistance to countries trading with Communist countries (Senate).
7. Findley amendment of 1966 restricting aid to countries trading with North Vietnam (House).
8. Byrd amendment of 1967 restricting credit to countries trading with North Vietnam (Senate).
9. Bennett Bill of 1969 for simple renewal of old Export Control Act (House).

The expansionist votes include a 1963 vote on the Lausche-Proxmire amendment in the Senate and a 1957 vote on the Knowland amendment relating to the continuation of a restrictionist export policy.

This evidence shows that the restrictionist orientation of bipartisan votes prevailed. Moreover, the list indicates that these votes were evenly distributed during the decade of the 1960's with one bipartisan restrictionist vote occurring in 1950. Thus, this information reinforces the conclusion that Congress, as represented by the political parties, maintained a generally restrictionist position until the end of the last decade.

The Question of Administration Support

The purpose of this section is to present information about the effect of administration action on party position. The evidence pre-

sented regarding parties, particularly when it is viewed against the background of the executive-legislative conflict, indicates that both Congressional parties were more restrictionist than the executive until the struggle over the Export Administration Act of 1969. At the same time, this study shows that within the framework of Congress the Republicans were consistently more restrictionist than the Democrats. Since the party ideological positions were fairly consistent, particularly in the Senate, and the White House in the post-war years was in the hands of Republicans as well as Democrats, the facts suggest that the party affiliation of the administration *was not particularly important* in determining party positions. There were, of course, some exceptions, such as the Export Control Act of 1949.

In Congress an examination of the individual administration support percentages of the members of each party showed that a vote for the expansionist position was in fact a vote in the direction of the position that the executive encouraged. In short, more Congressional Democrats than Republicans were consistently closer to the administration position, and this was true for both Republican and Democratic administrations. In this study there was no attempt to establish the position of the executive and the parties for each vote on a detailed restrictionist-expansionist continuum. One could seldom determine in any valid manner the degree to which an administration was more expansionist than the Congressional Democrats. Since there always remained the overarching conflict between the restrictionist tendency of the two parties in Congress and the expansionism (or at least the desire for flexibility) of the executive, one could deduce from the general administration position on East-West trade whether an administration encouraged or discouraged a particular party position.

The data provide evidence that party support percentages for the administration were consistent regardless of the party which held the White House. The relative positions of the Congressional parties and the executive were so consistent until 1969 (with the exception of 1949) that one could virtually equate support for the expansionist position on a roll call vote with the position of the executive on that vote. It should be emphasized again that the executive always desired stronger expansionist legislation than any expansionist vote on legislation allowed. This was because Congress continually maintained a restrictionist political consensus regarding trade with Communist countries and would not allow expansionist legislation to be formulated until 1969.

The party support means relating to the executive positions are not reviewed here. An examination of the individual support percentages for the Democrats between 1947 and 1970 revealed that they gave approximately the same degree of support to the administration when a Republican was President as when a Democrat held that office. Furthermore, an analysis of the individual support percentages for the Republicans between 1947 and 1970 revealed that they gave approximately

the same degree of support to the administration regardless of whether a Democrat or Republican was President.

The Question of Regionalism

It was decided to compare regional voting records within each party according to five basic regions of the country. This method was based on the initial assumption that regional conflicts within the parties were of special importance in the East-West trade area. The evidence suggests that this assumption was valid. The following questions are important in this examination: Were there any regions which consistently produced party members who differed substantially from members of other regions? If there were regional splits of votes in each party, how did they differ from the general party line in ideological terms? Have there been any significant changes in regional voting patterns?

The first problem was to identify for analysis the five basic regions of the country: Northeast, Midwest, South, Mountain, and Pacific. They were established using state boundary lines, in order to keep state delegations together, and to allow consistent treatment of the Senate and House. The problem of border states was solved in a somewhat arbitrary manner, with especial attention to keeping the deep South together as a voting bloc. Until recently, scattered Republican votes could indicate little in the South. Missouri and Kentucky were assigned to the Midwest. Maryland and Delaware were assigned to the Northeast.

The following list represents the regions into which each state was placed for the purpose of this study:

Northeast: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Maryland, and Connecticut.

Midwest: Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, and Nebraska.

South: West Virginia, Virginia, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, and Oklahoma.

Mountain: New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, Utah, Nevada, Wyoming, Idaho, and Montana.

Pacific: Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, and Hawaii.

Finally, separate calculations were made for the House and Senate in order to expose any differences that might be related to institutional setting. Tables A. 1 through A. 11 show the support percentages in each Congress for each party according to the region of the country. Table A. 11 indicates the average support mean in each of the four categories over the period from the 81st Congress to the 91st Congress. These tables are found in the statistical *appendix* to the study.

Democratic Cleavage

Were there any regions which consistently produced Democratic party members who differed substantially from Democrats in other regions? It should be recalled that Table 4 gives the partisan support means for each Congress as well as an all-Congress average. This information helps establish a norm regarding coherence to the "party line."

The first important insight relating to partisan support means and regionalism was the degree to which the South differed from the other four regions. Table A. 11 shows that the South stood virtually alone in terms of an all-Congress average, with a support level for partisan votes substantially below the other regions. In the Senate the Southern Democrats were thirty percentage points below the second lowest support level. In the House the Southern Democrats were almost twenty percentage points below the second lowest support level. In contrast, the other regions maintained a high degree of solidarity, significantly above the Southern support levels. The regional tables provide a statistical breakdown of regional support levels for each Congress.

The second salient fact regarding Democratic cleavage and support for partisanship was the solidarity of the Midwestern and Northeastern Democrats. In the Senate the Northeastern Democrats compiled an all-Congress average support percentage of eight-five for partisan votes. In the House the Northern Democrats compiled an 87.7 per cent ten-Congress support average. By comparison, the Midwestern Democrats compiled an 82.9 per cent average in the Senate and 93.3 per cent average in the House. The solidarity of the Midwestern and Northeastern Democrats is not as surprising as one might first assume. A later section shows that the Northeastern Democrats gave a surprisingly small degree of support to the expansionist position, second only to the Southern Democrats. Thus, it is not surprising that the Northeastern Democrats gave lower than expected support to the expansionist party line.

The third significant fact concerning partisan support means is that the Pacific Democrats compiled the highest support percentage for partisan record votes. This author could not discover any particular variable or set of variables relating to the cause of this phenomenon except, of course, that an all-Congress breakdown of the figures (i.e., Table A. 5) shows that the Pacific Democrats *consistently* gave a high percentage of support to the Democratic party line. Speculation suggests at least one important cause of this strong support for Democratic partisanship. The Democrats were consistently less restrictionist than the Republicans. Thus, partisan support for the Democratic line was almost always an expression of sentiment for a "liberal" East-West trade policy. Moreover, California, with its large number of representatives, clearly dominates the Pacific region as it is defined by this study. It is also clear that the Pacific states, and California in particular, have an

important and sophisticated tradition of overseas commerce and communication. Since the Democrats have had a more expansionist orientation than the Republicans, one can hypothesize that this position received strong support from a commercial community which has seen its standard of living benefit considerably from international trade. Finally, as a later section shows, the figures regarding philosophical orientation tend to reinforce this hypothesis.

If there were regional splits in the Democratic Party, how did the regions differ from one another ideologically? Before examining the figures, it is helpful to take note of the party support average based on all the Congresses in which roll call votes were recorded. Again this gives one insight into the nature of the party position. Table 5 shows that in the Senate the Democratic support average for the restrictionist orientation in all Congresses was 33.0 per cent. In the House the Democratic support percentage for the restrictionist position was 66.0 per cent. In the Senate the Democrats compiled an average of 66.8 per cent support for the expansionist position. Finally, the Democrats compiled an expansionist support percentage of 34.0 per cent in the House, according to Table 6.

The first salient fact concerning Democratic regional policy orientation was the expected cleavage between the South and the other four regions. Southern Democrats gave the weakest support to expansionist policy and the strongest relative support to restrictionist policy in the Senate as well as the House. In the Senate the support percentage for expansionist policy was 56.2 per cent, 8.9 percentage points lower than the next lowest regional support percentage. In the House, Southern Democrats compiled a support percentage of 18.6 per cent in favor of expansionist policy, 14.2 per cent lower than the next lowest regional support percentage. Tables A. 1 through A. 5 show individual figures relating to each Congress.

The second main fact regarding Democratic cleavage and policy orientation is that despite a substantial difference, the Northeastern region Democrats were closer to the Southern Democrats than the Midwestern, Mountain, or Pacific Democrats. This was unexpected. Nevertheless, Table A. 11 shows that in terms of an all-Congress average, the Northeastern region Democrats remained closer to the other regions than to the Southern Democrats. Tables A. 1 through A. 5 give a statistical breakdown according to each Congress.

The third important fact derived from the tables regarding region and policy preference from 1947 to 1970 is that the Pacific Democrats gave the strongest support among the five regions to the expansionist position. Table A. 11 shows that in terms of the all-Congress average this was particularly true in the Senate where Democrats compiled an 81.1 per cent percentage in support of expansionist policy. The Mountain Democrats were the next closest with a 77.3 per cent support average. In the House the Pacific Democrats gave the expansionist

position a 43.8 per cent support average. In the House, however, the Mountain and Northeast Democrats almost matched the Pacific Democrats with scores of 43.6 per cent and 42.3 per cent respectively.

The evidence relating to region and policy preference reinforces the idea advanced earlier that the Pacific Democrats gave expansionist policy the strongest support because of their tradition of international trade. One should not, however, make too much of this finding, because it is only one variable in the formula. For example, Northeastern Democrats who also represent an important international commercial tradition did not score significantly higher than other regions in support of expansionist policy.

Were there any important changes in regional voting patterns in the Democratic Party between 1947 and 1970? In terms of partisan support percentages, the various Democratic regions were remarkably consistent with one major exception. This exception occurred in the 81st and 82nd Congresses when the Democratic regions compiled extremely high partisan support percentages. The reasons for this are explained in an earlier section. It should be recalled that this short-term partisanship was not related to long-term principles and resulted from an attempt to accumulate large political capital at no real cost.

Finally, before looking at the problems of regional change, it is important to define consistency. For the purpose of this analysis, consistency really has two dimensions. Consistency of range refers to the ability of a region to prevent wide fluctuations in its Congressional support percentages. Consistency of relative position refers to the maintenance of a constant percentage position relative to other regions. The following text makes the necessary distinctions.

In terms of support for partisanship, consistency really began in each region after the 82nd Congress. As for consistency of range, Tables A. 1 through A. 5 show that there was relatively little fluctuation in the support levels among the regions over the designated period of time. In fact this was true of the 81st and 82nd Congresses as well as others. In all regions but one the Congressional support percentage remained within a thirty-five point range. Moreover, with only a few Congressional exceptions, the range of fluctuation in the Senate and House was no more than twenty points for all regions. The primary regional exception was the South. After the 82nd Congress, however, Table A. 3 shows that there was strong consistency of range among Southern Democrats in the House and Senate.

In terms of consistency of relative position as it related to partisan support, the regional tables show that the Pacific Democrats consistently possessed the highest Congress-by-Congress support percentages in the House and Senate. Moreover, these tables indicate that after the 82nd Congress, the Southern Democrats always possessed the lowest Congress-by-Congress partisan support mean in the Senate and the House. The

Mountain Democrats regularly compiled the second highest support mean, followed by the Northeastern and Midwestern Democrats.

In terms of the restrictionist-expansionist policy spectrum, consistency of range in each region was generally the rule in the Senate. Large fluctuations in the scores of the House Democrats from all regions occurred from the relatively small number of record votes in the House during each Congress. Congress-by-Congress support percentages generally fluctuated within a twenty-five point range in the House and the Senate after the 82nd Congress. There were only twelve support means which fell outside of this range among the expansionist support scores for all Congresses among the five regions. Moreover, most of the Congressional support mean represented House action.

No deviation was the rule after the 82nd Congress in terms of the consistency of relative position. The Pacific Democrats regularly gave the expansionist position the strongest support among the five regions, never compiling a Congressional support percentage of less than 67.0 per cent in the Senate. In the House the Pacific Democrats were not as consistent, but they usually maintained a Congress-by-Congress expansionist support percentage above that of other regions.

The Southern Democrats usually compiled the lowest Congress-by-Congress percentage support for the expansionist position in the House as well as the Senate. Except for the 81st Congress, the Southern Democratic support percentage fluctuated between 26.4 per cent and 62.8 per cent, considerably lower than the highs reached by other regions represented in the Senate. Considering the small number of roll call votes in the House, the Southern Democratic support level did not fluctuate as greatly as did the support percentages of other regions. Table A. 3 shows that it never reached beyond 50.0 per cent.

In addition to the extreme Democratic positions represented by the Southern and Pacific regions, the evidence shows that the other three regions also maintained their separate consistencies, particularly in the Senate. Tables A. 1, A. 2 and A. 4 show that in most Congresses the Mountain Democrats compiled the second highest support percentages for the expansionist position in the Senate and the House followed by the Northeastern and Midwestern Democrats.

In conclusion it is apparent that except for the unique situation that developed primarily in relation to the Export Control Act of 1949, there was little change in regional voting patterns in the Democratic Party between 1947 and 1970.

Before turning to the question of regional cleavage in the Republican Party, a few words should be said regarding regional bipartisanship. This section of the study purposely emphasizes regional partisanship, because it was clearly more important than bipartisanship between 1947 and 1970, if understood within the proper context. Table A. 11 gives the important data concerning bipartisan support means for each

region within each party. Perhaps the most striking fact regarding the Democratic Party was the solidarity among the five regions. The regions were not more than thirteen points apart in terms of their averages. Moreover, the averages are presented in Table A. 11 and are surprisingly high. The other regional tables indicate that the support levels for bipartisanship over the years were consistently high and consistent in their relative regional solidarity.

It was suggested at an earlier point that during the period of the greatest number of bipartisan votes, it appeared that Congress had reached a kind of consensus. Both parties supported the legislative *status quo* on a relatively restrictionist basis. Congress refused to accept any legislation that was substantially more or less restrictionist than the *status quo*. Finally, one must underline that the number of bipartisan votes on which the calculations in the regional tables are based is far fewer than the number of partisan record votes, as an earlier section points out. This emphasizes the importance of partisanship relative to bipartisanship over the years.

Republican Cleavage

Were there any regions which consistently produced Republican Party members who differed substantially from Republicans in other regions? Table 4 gives us the partisan support means for each Congress as well as an all-Congress average. These figures are useful in that they help us establish a norm regarding the party line. Table 4 shows that the average Republican Party support percentage between 1947 and 1970 was 68.2 per cent in the Senate and 82.0 per cent in the House.

The most important regional Republican difference was Northeast against South. Table A. 11 shows that the Northeastern partisan support average for the Republicans between 1947 and 1970 was 50.9 per cent in the Senate and 73.0 per cent in the House. In contrast, the Southern Senate Republican support average was 100. per cent in the Senate and 96.3 per cent in the House. Tables A. 6 and A. 8 provide a breakdown of these averages according to each Congress. As in the case of the Democrats, the study shows that the degree of support for partisan record votes was a direct reflection of sentiments regarding restrictionist-expansionist policy preference.

The second prominent fact concerning Republican cleavage and support for partisan roll call votes was the solidarity of the Midwestern, Mountain, and Pacific Republicans. In terms of their all-Congress averages between 1947 and 1970, these three regions varied by no more than sixteen percentage points in the Senate and ten percentage points in the House. Moreover, these regions fell squarely in between the Northeast and the South in regard to relative levels of support for partisan record votes. Tables A. 7, A. 9 and A. 10 give a statistical breakdown of regional support means for partisan action in terms of each Congress.

If there were regional splits in the Republican Party, how did the regions differ from one another regarding policy preference? It is helpful again to keep in mind the party support average based on all the Congresses in which votes were recorded. Tables 5 and 6 show that the Republican support average for the restrictionist position between 1947 and 1970 was 67.2 per cent in the Senate and 85.4 per cent in the House. The averages for the expansionist position were 32.8 per cent in the Senate and 14.6 per cent in the House.

The first salient fact regarding Republican regional policy orientation was the cleavage between the South and the Northeastern region. Until 1970 the Southern Republicans were clearly the most restrictionist Republicans in the country with an average support percentage of 93.8 per cent in the Senate and 90.6 per cent in the House. In contrast the Northeastern Republicans were the least restrictionist with an all Congress average of 50.8 per cent in the Senate and 81.1 per cent in the House. The regional tables give a statistical breakdown of Republican support for the restrictionist breakdown in each Congress.

The second important fact about the Republican support percentages is the solidarity of the Midwestern, Mountain, and Pacific Republicans in between the extreme positions of the Northeastern and Southern Republicans. Table A. 11 indicates the average of the Congressional support percentages for each region. These regions represented the mainstream of Republican thinking concerning East-West trade between 1947 and 1970.

The third notable fact is that in terms of the Midwest, Pacific, and Mountain regions, the Pacific Republicans compiled the lowest support percentage for the restrictionist position, reinforcing the idea that a tradition of international commerce influenced East-West trade preferences. The regional tables provide support percentages relating to each Congress for the House and the Senate.

Were there any important changes in regional voting patterns in the Republican Party between 1947 and 1970? Consistency is defined here as it was in the discussion of Democratic cleavage — in terms of consistency of range and consistency of relative position.

Regarding consistency of range, the Republicans in each region maintained a relatively constant level of support between 1947 and 1970. Although the regional tables indicate fluctuations in the support levels for each region, one can establish a range of thirty percentage points or somewhat less within which one finds almost all House and Senate support percentages. The average, of course, may be high or low. In sum, each region displayed only a medium degree of fluctuation in support means overtime, and no trends appeared during the established time period as to partisan support.

There was also a high degree of consistency concerning relative position in reference to support for partisan votes. A comparison of

the regional Republican tables showed that the Northeastern Republicans regularly gave the lowest support means to partisan votes. This was probably related to the generally expansionist orientation of the Northeast's "liberal" Republicans. In contrast, Table A. 8 shows that the Southern Republicans regularly gave the strongest support to partisan action (i.e., regular 100. per cent support). Although no region gave as consistently strong support to the Republican line as the Southern Republicans, the other regional tables show that Pacific, Mountain, and Midwest Republicans regularly maintained their middle positions relative to the Northeastern and Southern Republicans.

Consistency was also important in Republican voting on restrictionist-expansionist policy preference. Republicans from the five regions maintained a consistency of range and relative position that was similar to their actions concerning partisanship. In terms of range, almost all individual Congressional support means for the restrictionist position in each region fall within a twenty-five point range on the support spectrum. Only fifteen individual Congressional support means (for all the regions) fall outside of this twenty-five point range established for each region. In short, there was not a great degree of fluctuation in support levels in each region over the designated time period.

In terms of support for the restrictionist position, the regional Republicans maintained consistent relative positions between 1947 and 1970. A comparison of the regional tables showed that the Northeastern Republicans regularly maintained the lowest support level in the Senate and the House. Indeed in the Senate, Northeastern Republican support means were below 50.0 per cent support for restrictionist votes in five out of the six Congresses in which there were restrictionist-expansionist roll call options. Second, a comparison of the regional tables showed that the Southern Republicans gave the strongest support to the restrictionist position in the Senate and the House. No region can remotely compare to Southern Republican support. Table A. 8 shows that in the Senate the South gave 100. per cent support in three of the four Congresses in which there were restrictionist roll call options. Table A. 8 shows that in the House the support mean fell below 90.0 per cent support for restrictionist policy in only one out of six Congresses. The Midwestern Republicans regularly established the second strongest support level for the restrictionist position. The Mountain and Pacific Republicans regularly compiled the third and fourth strongest level of support for the restrictionist position in the Senate and House. The regional tables give the statistical breakdown according to each Congress. In conclusion, Republicans in the five regions maintained their relative positions regarding support levels between 1947 and 1970. There were no observable trends apart from these consistencies and the only real statistical distortions in relative positions occurred in the 81st and 82nd Congresses. These distortions were short-lived.

It is important to briefly review the question of bipartisanship as it relates to regionalism in the Republican Party. As was the case

with the Democrats, this section purposely emphasizes partisanship because it was the most important phenomenon. Table A. 8 and the Congress-by-Congress regional tables provide the relevant evidence concerning bipartisanship. In contrast to the Democrats, there was not the same degree of solidarity regarding bipartisanship among the Republicans. Table A. 8 points out that the Southern Republicans in the House and the Senate gave substantially less support to bipartisan votes than the other regions. An examination of these votes showed that Southern Republicans demanded more restrictionist legislation than the bipartisan coalition would usually support. Thus, the Southern support which was at a high level. The other regional Republicans were relatively solid in their support which was at a high level. Finally, the individual regional tables show that the regions were consistent in their level of support for bipartisanship and in terms of their relative positions.

Conclusion

This study explores the effect of partisan considerations in Congressional voting, as it relates to the formulation of trade policy toward Communist countries. Four problems were of major importance: the degree of partisanship (and bipartisanship) in relationship to trade policy toward Communist countries, the relationship of party to expansionist or restrictionist voting behavior, party support and administration action, and the importance of region to party cleavage.

Concerning party loyalty, the evidence shows that between 1947 and 1970 partisanship was the most frequent phenomenon in both parties. Table 3 shows that partisanship was the rule in eighteen out of thirty-five record votes in the House and Senate between January 1947 and January 1970. Furthermore, Table 4 gives us some indication of the degree of importance of partisanship based on the calculation of individual support percentages in each Congress. Bipartisanship emerged as an important force only in the middle of the 1960's. During one occasion in 1968-1969, it became instrumental in the formulation of the new expansionist leadership coalition in the Senate.

The evidence further suggests that partisanship was important within a special ideological framework. Democrats and Republicans alike agreed on basic assumptions regarding trade with Communist nations at least until the late 1960's when these assumptions began to break down. Importantly, both parties had a generally restrictionist orientation until 1968-1969. However, the Democrats were consistently *less* restrictionist than the Republicans.

The second major issue is the problem of party orientation toward the restrictionist-expansionist policy spectrum. First, the evidence indicates that in relative terms the Democratic Party was consistently less restrictionist than the Republican Party. Table 5 shows that according to party support means (based on individual party support percentages

relating to record votes), Senate Democrats gave more support for the expansionist position than the Republicans. Table 6 shows that in the House, Democrats were also less restrictionist than the Republicans. But Senate Democrats were clearly less restrictionist relative to Senate Republicans than House Democrats were to House Republicans. The study attributes this to the well-documented observation that the Senate tends to be relatively "more liberal" than the House on foreign policy issues due to the nature of their respective constituencies and terms of office. The study reviews these reasons in the appropriate section.

The data on party orientation provide insight into the degree of partisan orientation to the restrictionist-expansionist policy spectrum. This information is presented in Table 7. Rather than using individual support percentages, these data are simply based on the percentage of each party that voted restrictionist or expansionist on partisan record votes. Table 7 underlines the conclusion drawn from the examination of party support means: the Democratic Party was consistently less restrictionist than the Republican Party. Second, the information presented in Table 7 shows the degree of partisanship in partisan votes. Table 7 indicates a consistently "wide" partisan cleavage.

Finally, there is the issue of change in the policy preferences of the parties. Chart 1 shows in terms of support levels the consistency with which Senate Democrats supported the expansionist position over time. This support dropped below fifty per cent only once. Chart I also shows the consistency with which Senate Republicans supported the restrictionist position. Chart 2 indicates that change in the support level in the House was more frequent than in the Senate.

The third major issue of importance in this study is the question of administration support. During the period between 1947 and 1970, the executive usually took a more "expansionist" position than the controlling consensus in Congress. The evidence suggests that the party affiliation of the administration was of little importance in determining the administration's position or the party position in Congress, particularly in comparison to the importance of the executive-legislative conflict. An examination of the evidence showed that the executive position, when it could be precisely determined, always conformed to the expansionist voting option on record votes. The executive's ideal position was more often than not considerably more expansionist than any politically effective Congressional leadership coalition until the emergence of the current expansionist leadership coalition. Thus, at least until 1968, the executive-legislative conflict always put the executive in support of the most expansionist (but ineffective) Congressional elements.

The fourth major concern is regionalism. It was examined within the framework of the two major parties. In terms of the relationship of regionalism to partisan support cleavage, the evidence shows that the most important difference in the Democratic Party was between the Northeastern region and the South.

The second important fact relating to Democratic partisan support cleavage was the high degree of solidarity between the Midwestern and Northeastern Democrats. This was not as surprising as one might first expect. Evidence regarding regionalism and ideology shows that the Northeastern Democrats were somewhat more restrictionist regarding policy toward Communist countries than traditional political wisdom might suggest. Finally, concerning Democratic partisan support cleavage, it is clear that the Pacific Democrats gave the strongest support to the Democratic Party line. Other evidence confirms a suggested conclusion that the Pacific Democrats gave the strongest support to the expansionist position.

The ideological orientation of the regions was the second major question. There was initially the expected difference between the South and the other four regions. Southern Democrats gave substantially less support to the expansionist orientation than did the Democrats of the other four regions. This was true in the House as well as the Senate. A second fact, which was somewhat unexpected, is that the Northeastern Democrats were closer to the Southern Democrats than the Midwestern, Mountain, or Pacific Democrats. This should be qualified to a degree by saying that the Northeastern Democrats still remained closer in percentage terms to the other regions than to the Southern Democrats. The evidence also underlines that the Pacific Democrats gave the strongest support to the expansionist position. Finally, this study indicates that there was a high degree of consistency over time regarding these relative regional positions.

Many of the same regional cleavages appeared in the Republican Party. In terms of regional support for partisanship, the evidence shows that the most important difference was again between the Northeastern region and the South. Second, the evidence indicates the high degree of solidarity among the Midwestern, Mountain, and Pacific Republicans. Table A. 11 shows that these regions varied by no more than sixteen percentage points in the Senate and ten percentage points in the House.

Regarding Republican regionalism and the restrictionist-expansionist policy spectrum, the major cleavage was again between the South and the Northeast. The Northeast Republicans were the least restrictionist while the Southern Republicans were the most restrictionist. As in the case of Republican Regional support levels for partisanship, there was a high degree of solidarity among the Midwestern, Mountain, and Pacific Republicans on the basis of policy preference. These regions again fell squarely in between the Northeastern and Southern Republicans. Finally, Table A. 11 shows that the Pacific Republicans compiled the lowest support percentage for the restrictionist position, reinforcing the idea of the influence of a tradition of international commerce on East-West trade preferences. The various regions consistently maintained their relative positions within the Republican Party between 1947 and 1970.

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APPENDIX
REGIONAL AND PARTY SUPPORT PERCENTAGES

TABLE A. 1
NORTHEAST DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT MEANS

Congress	Partisan Support Means		Bipartisan Support Means		Restrictionist Support Means		Expansionist Support Means	
	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House
81st (1949-1950)	100.0%	66.7%	NV*	90.0%	20.0%	97.1%	80.0%	2.9%
82nd (1951-1952)	83.3%	NV	NV	NV	44.2%	NV	55.8%	NV
85th (1957-1958)	100.00%	NV	100.0%	NV	0.0%	NV	100.0%	NV
86th (1959-1960)	66.7%	NV	NV	NV	33.3%	NV	66.7%	NV
87th (1961-1962)	85.7%	NV	77.8%	100.0%	39.1%	100.0%	60.9%	0.0%
88th (1963-1964)	77.7%	98.2%	NV	NV	17.0%	7.0%	83.0%	93.0%
89th (1965-1966)	NV	NV	NV	72.3%	NV	37.7%	NV	62.3%
90th (1967-1968)	81.8%	98.2%	50.0%	NV	25.0%	3.4%	75.0%	96.0%
91st (1969)	NV	NV	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%

*No Votes

TABLE A. 2
MIDWEST DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT MEANS

Congress	Partisan Support Means		Bipartisan Support Means		Restrictionist Support Means		Expansionist Support Means	
	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House
81st (1949-1950)	100.0%	100.0%	NV*	98.2%	0.0%	97.5%	100.0%	2.5%
82nd (1951-1952)	100.0%	NV	NV	NV	24.9%	NV	75.1%	0.0%
85th (1957-1958)	66.7%	NV	80.0%	NV	33.3%	NV	66.7%	NV
86th (1959-1960)	71.4%	NV	NV	NV	28.6%	NV	71.4%	NV
87th (1961-1962)	80.6%	NV	81.8%	100.0%	42.8%	100.0%	57.2%	0.0%
88th (1963-1964)	70.9%	95.5%	60.0%	NV	42.6%	6.8%	67.4%	93.2%
89th (1965-1966)	NV	NV	NV	60.0%	NV	50.7%	NV	49.3%
90th (1967-1968)	73.3%	84.4%	69.2%	NV	45.1%	15.6%	54.9%	84.4%
91st (1969)	100.0%	NV	NV	97.0%	12.5%	100.0%	87.5%	0.0%

*No Votes

TABLE A. 3
SOUTHERN DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT MEANS

Congress	Partisan Support Means		Bipartisan Support Means		Restrictionist Support Means		Expansionist Support Means	
	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House
81st (1949-1950)	94.7%	100.0%	NV*	89.4%	5.3%	91.9%	94.7%	8.1%
82nd (1951-1952)	95.0%	NV	NV	NV	37.2%	NV	62.8%	NV
85th (1957-1958)	40.0%	NV	88.2%	NV	37.5%	NV	62.5%	NV
86th (1959-1960)	38.0%	NV	NV	NV	56.0%	NV	44.0%	NV
87th (1961-1962)	61.3%	NV	80.4%	100.0%	61.4%	100.0%	48.6%	0.0%
88th (1963-1964)	44.1%	52.6%	52.9%	NV	37.2%	50.0%	62.8%	50.0%
89th (1965-1966)	NV	NV	NV	97.3%	NV	77.4%	NV	22.6%
90th (1967-1968)	47.3%	41.0%	94.4%	NV	73.6%	60.3%	26.4%	30.7%
91st (1969)	43.4%	NV	NV	100.0%	52.1%	100.0%	47.9%	0.0%

*No Votes

TABLE A. 4
MOUNTAIN DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT MEANS

Congress	Partisan Support Means		Bipartisan Support Means		Restrictionist Support Means		Expansionist Support Means	
	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House
81st (1949-1950)	100.0%	87.5%	NV*	90.0%	0.0%	90.0%	100.0%	10.0%
82nd (1951-1952)	100.0%	NV	NV	NV	24.8%	NV	75.2%	NV
85th (1957-1958)	71.4%	NV	100.0%	NV	31.2%	NV	68.8%	NV
86th (1959-1960)	77.8%	NV	NV	NV	22.2%	NV	77.8%	NV
87th (1961-1962)	95.5%	NV	84.2%	100.0%	46.7%	100.0%	53.3%	0.0%
88th (1963-1964)	94.4%	75.0%	85.7%	NV	2.8%	25.0%	97.2%	75.0%
89th (1965-1966)	NV	NV	NV	100.0%	NV	94.4%	NV	5.6%
90th (1967-1968)	80.0%	87.5%	60.0%	NV	40.0%	12.5%	60.0%	87.5%
91st (1969)	100.0%	NV	NV	100.0%	14.3%	16.7%	85.7%	83.3%

*No Votes

TABLE A. 5
PACIFIC DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT MEANS

Congress	Partisan Support Means		Bipartisan Support Means		Restrictionist Support Means		Expansionist Support Means	
	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House
81st (1949-1950)	NV*	100.0%	NV	87.5%	NV	90.9%	NV	9.1%
82nd (1951-1952)	100.0%	NV	NV	NV	33.0%	NV	67.0%	NV
85th (1957-1958)	100.0%	NV	100.0%	NV	0.0%	NV	100.0%	NV
86th (1959-1960)	71.4%	NV	NV	NV	28.6%	NV	71.4%	NV
87th (1961-1962)	100.0%	NV	NV	100.0%	40.1%	100.0%	79.7%	0.0%
88th (1963-1964)	67.9%	98.1%	85.7%	NV	25.0%	1.9%	75.0%	98.1%
89th (1965-1966)	NV	NV	NV	53.8%	NV	44.4%	NV	55.6%
90th (1967-1968)	100.0%	92.6%	40.0%	NV	25.0%	0.0%	75.0%	100.0%
91st (1969)	100.0%	NV	NV	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%

*No Votes

TABLE A. 6
NORTHEAST REPUBLICAN SUPPORT MEANS

Congress	Partisan Support Means		Bipartisan Support Means		Restrictionist Support Means		Expansionist Support Means	
	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House
81st (1949-1950)	73.3%	76.4%	NV*	87.8%	83.3%	54.8%	16.7%	45.2%
82nd (1951-1952)	45.0%	NV	NV	NV	48.1%	NV	61.9%	NV
85th (1957-1958)	53.3%	NV	57.1%	NV	46.9%	NV	53.1%	NV
86th (1959-1960)	42.9%	NV	NV	NV	42.9%	NV	67.1%	NV
87th (1961-1962)	72.3%	NV	79.2%	100.0%	75.7%	100.0%	24.3%	0.0%
88th (1963-1964)	56.4%	89.4%	50.0%	NV	51.3%	87.2%	49.0%	12.8%
89th (1965-1966)	NV	NV	NV	96.9%	NV	86.8%	NV	13.2%
90th (1967-1968)	22.2%	53.3%	62.5%	NV	27.8%	57.8%	72.2%	42.2%
91st (1969)	41.7%	NV	NV	100.0%	30.5%	100.0%	69.5%	0.0%

*No Votes

TABLE A. 7
MIDWEST REPUBLICAN SUPPORT MEANS

Congress	Partisan Support Means		Bipartisan Support Means		Restrictionist Support Means		Expansionist Support Means	
	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House
81st (1949-1950)	86.7%	75.0%	NV*	88.5%	80.0%	54.8%	20.0%	45.2%
82nd (1951-1952)	88.5%	NV	NV	NV	73.3%	NV	26.7%	NV
85th (1957-1958)	56.3%	NV	64.7%	NV	41.7%	NV	58.3%	NV
86th (1959-1960)	57.1%	NV	NV	NV	57.1%	NV	42.9%	NV
87th (1961-1962)	80.6%	NV	84.8%	100.0%	81.2%	100.0%	18.8%	0.0%
88th (1963-1964)	81.8%	100.0%	45.5%	NV	73.4%	100.0%	26.6%	0.0%
89th (1965-1966)	NV	NV	NV	96.1%	NV	98.2%	NV	1.8%
90th (1967-1968)	45.5%	86.7%	83.3%	NV	88.0%	89.3%	12.0%	10.7%
91st (1969)	80.0%	NV	NV	84.4%	83.4%	86.4%	16.6%	13.6%

*No Votes

TABLE A. 8
SOUTHERN REPUBLICAN SUPPORT MEANS

Congress	Partisan Support Means		Bipartisan Support Means		Restrictionist Support Means		Expansionist Support Means	
	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House
81st (1949-1950)	NV*	NV	NV	50.0%	NV	50.0%	NV	50.0%
85th (1957-1958)	100.0%	NV	0.0%	NV	100.0%	NV	0.0%	NV
87th (1961-1962)	NV	NV	NV	100.0%	NV	100.0%	NV	100.0%
88th (1963-1964)	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	NV	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
89th (1965-1966)	NV	NV	NV	93.3%	NV	93.3%	NV	6.7%
90th (1967-1968)	100.0%	92.6%	75.0%	NV	75.0%	100.0%	25.0%	0.0%
91st (1969)	100.0%	NV	NV	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%

*No Votes

TABLE A. 9
MOUNTAIN REPUBLICAN SUPPORT MEANS

Congress	Partisan Support Means		Bipartisan Support Means		Restrictionist Support Means		Expansionist Support Means	
	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House
81st (1949-1950)	100.0%	66.7%	NV*	100.0%	100.0%	66.7%	0.0%	33.3%
82nd (1951-1952)	100.0%	NV	NV	NV	78.0%	NV	22.0%	NV
85th (1957-1958)	80.0%	NV	0.0%	NV	83.3%	NV	16.7%	NV
86th (1959-1960)	66.6%	NV	NV	NV	66.6%	NV	33.4%	NV
87th (1961-1962)	75.0%	NV	62.5%	100.0%	83.5%	100.0%	16.5%	0.0%
88th (1963-1964)	100.0%	100.0%	33.3%	NV	93.6%	100.0%	6.4%	0.0%
89th (1965-1966)	NV	NV	NV	100.0%	NV	100.0%	NV	100.0%
90th (1967-1968)	100.0%	88.9%	100.0%	NV	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
91st (1969)	100.0%	NV	NV	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%

*No Votes

TABLE A. 10
PACIFIC REPUBLICAN SUPPORT MEANS

Congress	Partisan Support Means		Bipartisan Support Means		Restrictionist Support Means		Expansionist Support Means	
	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House
81st (1949-1950)	66.7%	55.6%	NV*	100.0%	66.7%	55.0%	33.3%	45.0%
82nd (1951-1952)	100.0%	NV	NV	NV	83.3%	NV	16.7%	NV
85th (1957-1958)	100.0%	NV	0.0%	NV	100.0%	NV	0.0%	NV
86th (1959-1960)	0.0%	NV	NV	NV	0.0%	NV	100.0%	NV
87th (1961-1962)	83.5%	NV	75.0%	100.0%	83.5%	100.0%	16.5%	0.0%
88th (1963-1964)	66.5%	100.0%	100.0%	NV	52.5%	95.5%	48.5%	4.5%
89th (1965-1966)	NV	NV	NV	100.0%	NV	92.7%	NV	8.3%
90th (1967-1968)	66.7%	76.5%	66.7%	NV	66.7%	82.4%	33.3%	17.6%
91st (1969)	50.0%	NV	NV	100.0%	44.3%	100.0%	55.7%	0.0%

*No Votes

TABLE A. 11
REGIONAL AVERAGE SUPPORT MEAN FOR TEN
CONGRESSES UNDER EACH CATEGORY

Congress	Partisan Support Means		Bipartisan Support Means		Restrictionist Support Means		Expansionist Support Means	
	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House
Northeast Dems.	85.0%	87.7%	82.1%	90.6%	34.8%	57.5%	65.1%	42.3%
Midwest Dems.	82.9%	93.3%	72.8%	88.8%	28.7%	61.8%	72.5%	32.8%
Southern Dems.	52.2%	64.5%	79.0%	96.7%	45.0%	79.9%	56.2%	18.6%
Mountain Dems.	89.9%	83.3%	82.5%	97.5%	22.8%	56.4%	77.3%	43.6%
Pacific Dems.	91.3%	97.0%	75.2%	85.3%	21.7%	56.2%	81.1%	43.8%
Northeast Reps.	50.9%	73.0%	62.2%	96.2%	50.8%	81.1%	51.7%	18.9%
Midwest Reps.	72.1%	87.2%	69.6%	92.3%	72.3%	88.1%	27.7%	11.9%
Southern Reps.	100.0%	96.3%	25.0%	85.8%	93.8%	90.6%	6.3%	26.1%
Mountain Reps.	77.7%	85.2%	49.0%	100.0%	88.1%	94.5%	11.9%	22.2%
Pacific Reps.	66.7%	77.4%	60.4%	100.0%	71.0%	87.6%	38.0%	12.6%