

THE EVOLUTION OF GERMAN GEOPOLITIK  
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
Background of the Study. . . . .	1
Importance of the Study . . . . .	6
The Problem . . . . .	7
Procedure . . . . .	7
I. HISTORICO-PHILOSOPHICAL ANTECEDENTS	
OF GEOPOLITIK . . . . .	8
Forerunners of Geopolitik (Selected) . . . . .	8
Deterministic and Evolutionary	
Philosophy . . . . .	13
Immediate Precursors: Mahan	
and Mackinder. . . . .	22
II. GEOPOLITIK FOUNDATIONS: RATZEL	
AND KJELLEN. . . . .	38
Friedrich Ratzel. . . . .	38
Kjellen: His New Geopolitical	
System . . . . .	57
III. THE RISE OF HAUSHOFERIAN GEOPOLITIK. . . . .	74
Prior to World War I . . . . .	74
The Post-War Years . . . . .	87
IV. NATIONAL SOCIALIST GEOPOLITIK. . . . .	126
V. THE NATURE OF GERMAN GEOPOLITIK COMPARED	
AND CONTRASTED TO POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY. . . . .	147

CHAPTER	PAGE
VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS. . . . .	170
Summary. . . . .	170
Conclusions. . . . .	193
Implications . . . . .	205
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	207

## INTRODUCTION

### BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The first world war became to many a war in which democracy was arrayed against a militaristic Germany bent on subjugating its neighbors. It was but a few decades since Germany had achieved unification and, dissatisfied with a narrow continental European position, had entered the realm of world politics. Germany's behavior during the war resulted in a proliferous amount of writings attempting to show that the roots of German militarism and territorial aggrandizement were to be found in that nation's philosophical history, a history that was rampant with the exaltation of might and power over right and reason. The fact that Germany had been encircled for centuries by a ring of hostile neighbors could not but have a profound effect on its philosophy. The eternal conflict left a philosophical tradition that exalted national unification, superiority, and domination.

At the outset of World War I Germany faced an allied coalition that was decidedly better equipped, resource-wise, to win a prolonged struggle. However, prior to Verdun in 1916, the intervention of the United States and

the German people, who until the last moment had been told they were winning the war, began to question--why?

Even before the peace terms were delivered from Versailles, the Germans, or at least a number of military leaders, deduced that their effort had failed because the nation lacked a social message, because her principle of national self-determination was confused and inconsistent, and because there had been, in actuality, no grand theme of political strategy. There appeared to have been no real understanding, or at least a consistent one, as to what their world political objectives were. There had been the Schlieffen Plan for the opening campaigns and numerous ad hoc schemes developed under the exigencies of war, but no Geopolitik, the "science" of strategy that apparently played such a prominent role later in guiding Nazi foreign policy and the German military effort in World War II.

In 1918 the German Empire sounded its deathnote. The next few decades saw an embittered and confused Germany, facing turmoil, insurrection, and eventually a disastrous depression. Germany tried democracy in the form of the Weimar Republic, but when that failed, radical elements under the leadership of Adolph Hitler emerged in 1933 witnessed a chain of events that elevated militarism, racism, anti-Semitism, Pan-Germanism, and the drive for Lebensraum to unparalleled heights in the German state--all component

parts of an ideology called, Geopolitik.

The rise of National Socialism closely paralleled that of German Geopolitik, the science committed to political action in the life-and-death struggle of statesorganisms for Lebensraum. Both had their inception in post-War I Munich, the center of reactionary ferment and radical innovations. Both were imbued with elements of Germany's Philosophical tradition. That Geopolitik was not a specific innovation of National Socialism is sometimes forgotten. But as a matter of fact, the bulk of Geopolitik theories and directives were written well before Hitler expounded his views on Lebensraum in Mein Kampf and certainly before he inaugurated the policy of territorial expansion.

What should be deemed the first foundations of Geopolitik were written by a German geographer (Friedrich Ratzel) shortly before the turn of the century. The first actual Geopolitik system, in this century, was itself devised prior to 1922, by a Swede (Rudolf Kjellen), and the field, as enlarged and expanded, had gained considerable momentum by the Nazi takeover in 1933. However, only under National Socialism did Geopolitik receive the pre-eminence and influence necessary to become an important factor in world politics. At that, its role in Nazi Germany was rather a short one, apparently lasting only as long as it met with Hitler's approval and presented no direct challenge

to his ideas and aims.

The general concensus of observers writing during the Nazi era was that twentieth-century Geopolitik in its German form was fraudulent, dishonest, strongly imbued with determinism, and bordering into the metaphysical. In other words, Geopolitik came to be designated as a "pseudo-Science." In some respects, however, Geopolitik possessed elements of strategic validity, and should not be relegated in its entirety to a position as a fictitious science. Perhaps the year cooling-off period since the end of the Second World War permits a more objective study of the nature and scope of Geopolitik than was possible during and immediately after the war, which was when the bulk of works on Geopolitik by English authors appeared.

Whatever the case, the knowledge that Nazi Germany achieved many of its goals and came within a hairsbreadth of world domination underscores the significance of geopolitical thinking and justifies some reconsideration of the subject.

The deterministic aspects of Geopolitik are not in themselves evidence of the departure of the movement from strictly scientific geography. However, a basic leitmotiv of the German school of Geopolitik was that geographical factors alone determined the growth and decline of states. Such a concept reckoned geographical factors as the unalterable causes of national policies. Ideas such as these led



to the conclusion that the deterministic aspects of the subject were responsible for it later bordering into the metaphysical. Whatever the case, from 1918, to 1941, the German populace was continually harangued with such geopolitical ideas as: space is power and the greatest attribute of a nation's greatness; Germany must acquire more space; Germany must win back its living space that was taken away after World War I; and fate had not granted the Germans an allotment of space under which it could instinctively follow its path through history. The geopoliticians told the Germans that they were surrounded by hostile peoples who could easily invade Germany. They were told that they lacked perspective for becoming a world power since they failed to think in terms of space-consciousness. They were fired up by such terms as Lebensraum and Autarky into envisioning a Germany transformed into an awesome continental land-power and rendered impregnable against British sea-power. In essence, the geopoliticians were agitating for national unity and encouraging patriotism on the part of the Germans, while teaching them to think in space concepts, and to accept their movement as a new, dynamic and portentuous means of answering Versailles.

After World War II, examinations of German Geopolitik by American and British scholars often failed to give a precise account of the nature and scope of the movement. A sizeable number of Americans had always regarded the subject

as intellectually deceptive. Additionally, it has been presupposed that saturation with the ideas of Nietzsche, Fichte, Hegel, Treitschke, and other philosophers had conditioned the German mind to the point where it easily accepted the tenets of Geopolitik.

## II. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

It has been several decades since any penetrating study of Geopolitik has been made, at least to the knowledge of the author. Therefore, it seems appropriate to re-examine Geopolitik as it developed in Germany and to draw attention to its component ideas. This attempt will be worthwhile, if for no other reason that it will remind us of the influence of geography upon politics.

## III. THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this study is to examine the deterministic aspects of Geopolitik, be they environmental or geographic, and to follow their incorporation into National Socialist Geopolitik. First, the evolution of Geopolitik through sequential periods will be traced in an attempt to determine what correlation existed between German philosophy and the basic tenets of Geopolitik. Second, the field in its practical application, i. e., applied geo-strategy, will be examined, especially as it assisted the Nazi cause. Third, the relationship of Geopolitik to political geography, to geography in general, and to various other science will

be examined in an effort to ascertain its status.

#### IV. PROCEDURE

Beginning with the historical antecedents of Geopolitik Thinking, the study will evolve into an investigation of the origins and evolution of the subject both in theory and practice. The implications of Geopolitik for the laymen will thus develop out of an examination of its development.

## CHAPTER I

### HISTORICO-PHILOSOPHICAL ANTECEDENTS OF GEOPOLITIK

#### I. FORERUNNERS OF GEOPOLITIK

Andrew Gyorgy, in his work entitled, Geopolitics: The New German Science, contends that twentieth-century Geopolitik contained nothing really revolutionary, but was compounded of geopolitical doctrines that were mainly clever new combinations of old ideas--revised editions--from a long line of political and philosophical thought. In this work, Gyorgy traces the heritage of twentieth-century Geopolitik all the way from Aristotle via Bodin, through Montesquieu, Buckle, Ritter, Kjellen and Mackinder down to twentieth-century German, French, and American scholars.

According to Gyorgy, the component ideas of geopolitics, furthermore, have a long history and their development can be clearly traced through the centuries.

Precisely because geopolitics, as a fusion of geographical and governmental concepts is comparatively new, its hinterlands are to be sought in history. Its component ideas, emerging at different times and under varying circumstances, have coalesced at relatively long intervals to form a succession of what are currently called environmental political theories.<sup>1</sup>

As environmental political theories the first vague

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1. Andrew Gyorgy, Geopolitics: The New German Science. (Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1944), p. 141.

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formulations were found in ancient and medieval times and associated with the names of Aristotle, Lucretius, Strabo, and later Bodin.

### Aristotle

According to Gyorgy, Aristotle's observations on the influence and importance of the natural environment on man clearly distinguish him as a precursor of geopolitical ideas.<sup>2</sup>

From a further examination of Gyorgy's discussion of Aristotle, one finds that he (Aristotle) emphatically stressed that man was affected by his geographical environment, both directly, in his own person, and indirectly, through the various institutions of his community life.<sup>3</sup> Also considered by Aristotle were topographical influences that were instrumental in affecting state evolution.

Gyorgy interprets Aristotle's theory of the state as holding some implications for twentieth-century Geopolitik. In Aristotle's opinion, the state was a product of nature, and the natural environment destined man for a state and also served as the everlasting foundation for all political phenomena.<sup>4</sup> In later nineteenth-century geographic works, many invariably start out from the premise that the state is the product of nature.

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2. Gyorgy, Geopolitics, p. 141.

3. Ibid., p. 143.

4. Ibid.

Gyorgy believes that Aristotle's most important contribution to early environmental, geopolitical doctrines comes from his realization of the close relationship of nature to political power. In Aristotle's opinion, the expansion of the state depended on an inept utilization of nature's forces.<sup>5</sup> (Ratzel and Kjellen, and even the master geopolitician, Kark Haushofer, agree on this point.) Furthermore, Gyorgy noted that Aristotle was fully aware that geographic knowledge could be used to further political domination. This was to become a basic leitmotiv of German geopolitics, and Haushofer and Hitler alike refer often to this concept.

With the death of Aristotle, Gyorgy states that geopolitical thinking went into a decline. To build a broader philosophical basis for the relationship between man and nature, was left to key thinkers of the Roman Imperial Age.

#### Lucretius and Strabo

Allegedly, the foremost Latin exponent of Epicurean philosophy, Lucretius, related the growth of political power to the desire to overcome nature's obstacles and handicaps. Lucretius elaborated on and further developed Aristotle's ideas on nature, geography, and politics.<sup>6</sup> In addition, he was of the opinion that the relation between man and nature

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5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p. 144.

is not always one of friendship, but more likely to be that of armed warfare or unfriendliness. This, Gyorgy viewed as ultimately having an important repercussion in nineteenth-century politico-geographical literature, for the German geographers of that period adopted the idea of a changing but ever unfriendly nature developing the fighting ability of peoples to a varying degree. Nature herself is seen as thus facilitating a division of peoples into stronger or weaker nations, world powers or small states.<sup>7</sup>

From this point, Gyorgy departs from antiquity to discuss imperial Rome, whose vast expanse at its height of political power facilitated the examination of topography and its influence on human history by Strabo. Strabo is reportedly the first geographer to stress the close connection between the size and geographic location of a country and the political form of its government.<sup>8</sup>

According to Gyorgy, Strabo thought that geography was one of the strongest influencing factors in political life, and environment determined the physical as well as the political needs of a people.<sup>9</sup>

Controversially, Gyorgy states that "for more than a thousand years after Strabo's death there was no comprehensive

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7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.



discussion of environmental influences in politics, for the last classic writers on geography of the period following the Augustan Age, Pomponius Mela and Pliny the Elder, were students of descriptive, historical geography and exhibited no understanding of deeper, 'geopolitical relationships or phenomena.'<sup>10</sup>

From this point in history, Gyorgy is convinced that a period of intellectual darkness set in, where there were no precursors of German Geopolitik to any degree, nor were there any until the rise and development of the modern national state, when environmental writings reappear. Apparently, in these new environmental writings philosophers found it fairly easy to draw attention to the manifold relations of the new and more concrete political phenomenon --the state--and nature.<sup>11</sup> In addition, these writings reflected "the classical inheritance and continuing influence of the earlier 'geopolitical' doctrines already noted."<sup>12</sup>

### Bodin

During the later renaissance, Jean Bodin (1530-1596) carefully examined such direct geographical factors as climate, food, and general topography, making them subjects

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10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., p. 145.

12. Ibid.

of detailed investigations in both his Method and his Republic.<sup>13</sup>

In summarizing the afore hand precursors of Geopolitik and the role of environmental theories in political geography, it appears that they formulated certain concepts basic to the subject. Gyorgy states that "by the end of the eighteenth century, key geopolitical ideas have already taken fairly clear shape."<sup>14</sup>

However, it was under the influence of organismic thinking, owing from Ratzel, that successive nineteenth-century political geographers, such as Ritter Alexander, Van Humboldt and Henry Buckle, "enlarged the scope of environmental doctrines and comprehensively examined the more intricate details of man's relationship to nature."<sup>15</sup> In addition, Ritter's space concepts held distinct implications for Geopolitik, and were not too unlike those of his successors Kjellen and Haushofer. It seemed almost inevitable that nineteenth-century geographers would reach the conclusion that the state itself was an organic body in space. From ideas such as those presented prededingly, it was only natural that the death of a state came about by a lack of space.

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13. Ibid., p.145.

14. Ibid., p. 148.

15. Ibid., p. 155.

Therefore, states had to expand or die; they had to colonize. Territorial expansion and the development of Lebensraum were closely intertwined notions to German geographers of the nineteenth century.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, both German politicians and geographers were asserting that Germany would have to fight for survival on land and sea. Therein, such geopolitical thinking led to numerous formulations of expansionist German aims in the East utilizing the slogan Drang nach Osten.<sup>16</sup> Then, too, several statesmen were advocating a Mitteleuropa for Germany, decades before Bismarck and William II dreamed of a drive to the East.

The significance of the nineteenth-century precursors of Geopolitik apparently lies in their analysis of man's geographic environment and the historic changes it produced. Man was a product of his natural environment. Therefore, geography could not be separated from politics, and nations were limited in their rise and decline by environmental, natural forces.

## II. DETERMINISTIC AND EVOLUTIONARY PHILOSOPHY

After the last world war was decided, a number of scholars in the fields of geography and political science were led to regard German Geopolitik as essentially representing

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16. Ibid.

deterministic aspects of their respective subjects. A noted geographer asserted that in the German form, geopolitics was clearly an extreme form of geographical determinism.<sup>17</sup> As such the state was considered as expanding out of necessity; the individual was relegated to an entirely subordinate position in the organistate. Material resources possessed by the military and civilian populations existed to facilitate the expansive urge of the nation. Natural resources were arrayed according to their possible utility for state growth.

History provided not only the justification for the expansive state but also a pattern for fashioning a nation's strength through careful attention to geographic factors. A political scientist, widely known in the field of international relations, concluded that "German Geopolitik surrendered only too willingly to the temptation...to fashion from the case histories of political geography a theory of geographical determinism."<sup>18</sup>

The war provided a testing ground for the deterministic aspects of Geopolitik. Such an application to warfare led one critic of the geopoliticians to remark what had already

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17. Griffith Taylor, Geography in the Twentieth Century (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951), p. 587.

18. Robert Strausz-Hupe, International Relations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), p. 41.

been known, namely, that they

...introduced a new rationalization for war, which...was that the environmental factors and geographic relationships of Germany (bestowed) upon the German nation a natural manifest destiny in Europe and the world.<sup>19</sup>

Obstensibly, pronouncements of geographic determinism stem from age-old attempts to ascertain man-land relationships. However, man's relation to his environment was not looked upon as a proper subject for geographical research prior to the eighteenth century.<sup>20</sup> Geography was largely dominated by physical descriptions and as yet, not anthropocentric. Nonetheless, certain hypotheses dealing with the influence of the environment on man were sometimes incorporated into geographic studies, a number of which have already been presented. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the study of nature and man's part in it became a proper subject for a number of historico-geographic studies in a multiplicity of fields.<sup>21</sup> For the most part these represented syntheses of environmental determinism and the evolutionary philosophy of life that characterized the time. Man was viewed as a subject of the universe. However, no precise consideration of the interaction of the state and

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19. Thorsten Kalijarvi, Modern World Politics (New York: Crowell, 1953), p. 340.

20. Alfred Meyer & John Strietelmeier, Geography in World Society (Philadelphia: Lippincott & Co., 1963), p. 9.

21. Ibid.

geography evolved from these eighteenth century studies. This task was left to various successors in the next century in such fields as geography, political science and history.

The geographers von Humboldt (1769-1850) and Ritter (1779-1859) sought more systematically to determine what unity existed between man and nature.<sup>22</sup> Ritter presupposed that the forms of the earth's surface exerted a determining influences on climate, vegetation and man. Therefore, the course of history was profoundly influenced by climate and topography.<sup>23</sup>

From such a base from whence to consider the interaction of geography and the state, Ritter went on to maintain that the "directive's of political life can be assumed by geography."<sup>24</sup> As envisioned by Ritter:

...geography can furnish the directive of political life as a whole...there will come a time when strong-minded humans by their understanding of the moral and natural aspects of the world, will be able to foresee and guide the future development of each nation on earth.<sup>25</sup>

More than half a century before a Swede, Kjellen viewed "the state as an organism," Ritter envisaged the separate continents as primary organs of the greater organism, the

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22. Alfred Meyer & John Strietelmeier, Geography in World Society, p. 9.

23. Robert Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics: The Struggle For Space and Power (New York: G. P. Putman Sons, 1942) p. 23.

24. Ritter, quoted in Robert Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics, p. 23.

25. Ibid.

"living Globe."<sup>26</sup> The earth organism thus gave rise to the state organism.

Ritter and Humboldt were but two of a number of geographers at the turn of the nineteenth century who contemplated the problem of casual relationships between the forces of the natural environment on one hand, and man's behavior on the other. Ritter was not alone in considering geography the fundamental element in determining the course of History. In the twentieth century, such an approach usually has been termed "environmentalism," "determinism," or "environmental-determinism." As such it "presupposes a necessary developmental sequence of culture in accord with physical principles, and therefore, tied to the physical environment."<sup>27</sup> Perhaps more pertinent to the development of Geopolitik is the knowledge that under determinism a given set of natural features is seen as effecting a certain result in the behavior of mankind.

The belief that human affairs were conditioned by geography led to the conclusion among some nineteenth-century thinkers that political geography was the key to human affairs. Consequently a framework for studies of a geopolitical nature emerged: a framework further reinforced by the evolutionary philosophy in vogue at that time. The appearance of Charles

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26. Ibid.

27. Meyer, *op. cit.*

Darwin's Origin of Species (1859), marks the beginning of a neo-naturalism that held important implications for geopolitical studies.<sup>28</sup> De Jean Baptise Lamarck, Auguste Comte, and Herbert Spencer, produced studies apply evolutionary theories to human society, that held implications for Geopolitik. A twentieth century German geographer summarily concluded:

...in this adoption by social science of the naturalistic-materialistic doctrines of biology lies the real root of (Friedrich) Ratzel's teaching and in general of the over-evaluation of the milieu in geography since then.<sup>29</sup>

Determinism and evolutionary philosophy were seemingly destined to play an increasing role in geographic studies of the later nineteenth century. At its end, a German geographer (Ratzel) introduced a political geography strongly influenced by both. Some of his ideas, though with peculiar adaptations, were given new impetus decades later under the label of Geopolitik. However, the ideas of Ratzel were not the sole reservoir from whence the foundations of Geopolitik were drawn. A number of historians, philosophers and other scholars besides the ones previously mentioned were contributing factors: Kant, who preached of a greater destiny for Germany; others who saw Germany as a superior nation with a will to power and dominance; ardent nationalists that summoned Germany to a "place in the sun;" philosophers that argued for

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28. Carl Troll, "Geographic Science in Germany," Annals, Association of American Geographers, XXXVI (June 1949), p. 134.

29. Ibid.



the supremacy of the state above all else; Germans long ingrained with the spirit of Prussian militarism and conquest.

Once Geopolitik had emerged as a vital force in post-world War I Germany, many of these precursors were relegated to second place: namely, to provide justification for geopolitical claims. To impart some measure of respectability to the field, advocates of Geopolitik searched into German history for such predecessors that would provide not only reinforcement of Geopolitik theories but also justification for the goals of the geopoliticians for Germany. Various precursors have thus been mentioned for the part they played in the development of Geopolitik. However, those presented are not the only precursors available for subject. As has been noted, Gyorgy presents an objective, comprehensive survey of Geopolitik precursors; however, contemporary writers on the same subject often included a set of forerunners that differentiated somewhat from his. Hans Weigert, in his Generals and Geographers credited the following with being precursors of Geopolitik: Thucydides, Hippocrate, Plato, Aristotle, Strabo, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Montesquieu, Herder, Fichte, Hegel, Grimm, von Humboldt, Ritter, Ratzel, Semple, von Treitschke, List, Kjellen, and Mackinder.<sup>30</sup> In Weigert's work, Thucydides is credited with the idea of the organic

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30. Hans Weigert, Generals and Geographers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 1+.

growth of the state, not a nineteenth-century geographers, as in Gyorgy's Geopolitics. J. G. Herder is mentioned by Weigert as one of the Germans who pondered over the new organic concept of the nation, stressing the biological aspect of it. Weigert also cites Hegel and Fichte as being pioneers in the field of geopolitics, although one source ascertains that they were not precursors of Geopolitik as much as they were justifiers for National Socialist aims, and, allegedly, they only gained prominence in geopolitical literature once the National Socialists had made Geopolitik their science.

Weigert could possibly be commended for including Hans Grimm as a precursor of Geopolitik, for his work, People Without Space, after 1926, apparently had an immense impact on the German populace and allegedly assisted in popularizing Haushofer's struggle for Lebensraum. Moreover, Andreas Dorpalen reaches a similar conclusion in his work entitled The World of General Haushofer: Geopolitics in Action.<sup>31</sup> However, it was Ratzel that apparently had the most influence on Haushofer. (The reasons why should appear obvious in the succeeding chapter.) Both Weigert and Dorpalen agree that Ratzel had the most influence on Haushofer, Gyorgy calls Ratzel the father of the Weltanschauung of German Geopolitik.

The World of General Haushofer is one of the few English sources available that doesn't contain an extensive analysis

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31. Andreas Dorpalen, The World of General Haushofer: Geopolitics In Action (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1942), p. 17.

of the precursors of Geopolitik in the first chapter. Nor is there anywhere any sizeable discussion of the forerunners of the subject. However, the influence of various precursors is felt throughout the work, upon examining selections from the works of Haushofer and other geopoliticians. For example, when Haushofer is stating that "war geopolitics points out the influence of topography, climate, flora, and settlement on strategy," one tends to remember that such a precursor as Aristotle reached similar conclusions. When Haushofer states that "Germany must emerge out of the narrowness of her present living space into the freedom of the world," one can but refer back to Ratzel, Kjellen, and a host of other precursors, for their views on the subject. When Haushofer argues for additional living space for Germany, he is not presenting dissimilar views from List, who suggested a greater Germany extending from the Black Sea and the Adriatic to the North Sea and Baltic Seas, a Germany that would include Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium. List justified this Lebensraum on such grounds as race, language, economics and strategic vitalness. Did not Haushofer justify his claims for Lebensraum on the same grounds, and did not other geopoliticians reach similar conclusions? Haushofer states that large-space concepts made small nations great; thinking in narrow spaces, on the other hand, inevitably causes decay. Ritter concluded that the death of a state came about by a lack of space; Haushofer could not

more. Some of the nineteenth-century geographers mentioned as precursors held the belief that the state itself was an organic body in space. Haushofer could but agree, and superimpose upon this knowledge his own peculiar speculations. However, if Haushofer utilized the concepts and ideas of these afore-mentioned precursors to some extent, what impact did immediate precursors such as Mahan, Mackinder, Ratzel, and Kjellen, have on the body of knowledge that was disseminated through twentieth-century Geopolitik? Perhaps the answer lies in succeeding parts of this chapter and the preceeding one.

### III. THE IMMEDIATE PRECURSORS--MAHAN AND MACKINDER

Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914). Mahan, an American historian and naval strategist, produced a number of works on the effect of sea power on nations, the most important, of course, being The Influence of Sea Power on History.<sup>32</sup> A substantial amount of literature was devoted to discussing Germany's disadvantageous geographical position in regard to sea power. Naval strategy and sea power were conditioned, according to his thinking, by certain fundamental aspects of geographic location and by government policies, such as existed, on overseas bases and navies. Control of the seas was the essence of national security, a seemingly overlooked

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32. Margaret Tuttle Sprout, "Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power," Makers of Modern Strategy, Ed. Edward M. Earle, p. 416.

factor in Mahan's time.

Six fundamental factors affected the growth and development of a nation's seapower, including: geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory, population, and national character.<sup>33</sup> Insular positions encouraged the development of large navies and less reliance on land forces. Britain's geographical position was, at least in part, responsible for the enhancement of British naval superiority. Physical configuration largely determined a country's accessibility to the sea and thence seapower. The width and breadth of a nation could be both a source of strength and of weakness, depending on such factors as the placement and size of the populations, and the length of coastline. However, an extensive network of rivers served as a detriment to the interests of a sea-faring nation. Population, though, constituted a formidable factor if a sizeable labor force was on hand to pursue maritime occupations and the nation was capable of calling up a large sector for war-time shipbuilding. Finally, a nation whose populace was convinced that their destiny lay in the pursuit of maritime trade, and who were otherwise closely tied to the sea, possessed one other vital factor.

Apparently, Mahan envisaged an eventual decline in Britain's dominant position among sea-going nations, and

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33. Ibid.

himself hastened the forces which would make it a reality. His works consequently renewed expansionist urges or further gravitated them in a number of countries.

In essence, Mahan's prime concern was in determining the influence of sea power upon the fates of a nation. After assiduously studying the historical background of great empires and the naval and military history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Mahan gained some insight into the factors that account for the rise and decline of nations. Mahan was firmly convinced that nations must expand or decline, and that they could not remain static. By analyzing the contrasts between land and naval warfare, a subsequent theory of naval tactics emerged.<sup>34</sup>

Following World War I, German naval theorists concluded that the failure of the German navy to seriously challenge that of Great Britain represented a basic shortcoming of the war effort, and in succeeding years, the theories of Mahan received new impetus under the guise of Geopolitik.

Sir Halford Mackinder (18 -19 ). Mackinder's ideas are important for the stress he placed on continental as opposed to sea powers.<sup>35</sup> A critical examination of Mahan's theories

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34. Ibid.

35. Han W. Weigert, "Critique of Mackinder," Foundations of National Power, eds. Harold and Margaret Sprout, p. 174.

on sea power revealed a number of qualifications that heretofore had been somewhat ignored. Britain's insular position alone guaranteed no naval supremacy; such a position in regard to opposing nations however did make feasible British domination of the seas.

Expounding on the shifting of power of contemporary nations, and opposing somewhat Mahan's emphasis on the primacy of sea power, Mackinder prognosticated an eventual end to the dominant position of the British Empire. Such a move would be made possible by a shift in the balance of power to continental land blocs. In the Geographical Pivot of History, the European phase of history was decadent, while a "closed political system" was in the making.<sup>36</sup> The relative strength of land and sea power was becoming modified by improvements in transportation. Power in such a closed system was mobile on land and in the air to some degree. The passing of the Victorian age of seapower meant a re-emphasis on the subordination of Europe and its political geography to Asia. In Asia existed immense opportunities for the resurrection of landpower and air power. Mackinder had previously asserted that history was always made by the pressure of the plains or steppes peoples of

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36. Ibid.

Eurasia upon the populations occupying the littorals of the Eurasian land mass. The Eurasian land mass thus represented the mainspring of the world's political structure:

As we consider the broader currents of history does not a certain persistence of geographical relationship become evident? It is not the pivot region of the world's politics that vast area of Euro-Asia which is inaccessible to ships, but in antiquity lay open to the horse-riding nomads, and is today about to be covered with a network of railways? There have been and are here the conditions of a mobility of military and economic power of a far-reaching and yet limited character present in this region. Russia replaces the Mongol Empire. Her pressure on Finland, on Scandinavia, on Poland, on Turkey, on Persia, on India, and on China, replaces the centrifugal raids of steppemen. In the world at large she occupies the central strategical position held by Germany in Europe.<sup>37</sup>

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The oversetting of the balance of power in favor of the pivot state, resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia would permit of the use of vast continental resources and the empire of the world would be in sight.<sup>38</sup>

The Eurasian land mass therefore possessed unparalleled natural and demographic resources and a vast spaciousness which represented the pivotal area of mankind. Such a "pivot area" was not vulnerable to sea power from the surrounding waters. Although Russia was referred to as the dominant power in the pivot area, Mackinder further

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37. Halford Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," Geographical Journal, XXIII (1904), p. 427.

38. Ibid.



recognized Germany's strategic location to that region.<sup>39</sup> The western and northern fringes of the pivot area constituted part of the North European Plain which continued unbroken into Germany save for the Urals. Mackinder sounded a dire warning lest a power bloc between Russia and Germany should occur and thus consolidate the pivotal region. Such a union could rule not only Europe but possibly the entire world. However, the warning aimed primarily at Great Britain, went relatively unheeded when it was made in 1904, although a move to counteract such a union was effected in the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907.<sup>40</sup>

Mackinder, recognizing that Europe had previously been invaded by the Mongol hordes from the east, nevertheless saw possibilities of the exact reverse, or a movement from the pivotal area to eastern areas.<sup>41</sup>

After World War I, Mackinder, in Democratic Ideals and Reality, reiterated the dangers of a transcontinental

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39. Russell A. Fifield, "Geopolitics at Munich," Department of State Bulletin XII (June, 1945), p. 115.

40. Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power, p. 56.

41. Fifield, op. cit., p. 155.

combination between Germany and Russia.<sup>42</sup> Additionally, the pivot area or "the Heartland" was widened to include all areas that were denied sea power. The war itself to Mackinder was a climax of the inevitable collision between land and sea power. Britain's control of the seas had made possible the blockade of Germany and the Central Powers, while at the same time mustered reinforcements from overseas to peninsular Europe. Sea power was thus victorious over land power. However, Mackinder could not take such a result as conclusive of the superiority of sea power. Consequently, he was determined to disclose that land power would have the final say in the twentieth century.<sup>43</sup>

By evaluating the implications of a possible if not inevitable clash between sea and land power, Mackinder devised the Heartland concept of Eurasia. Noting that nine-twelfths of the earth's surface was covered by water, and only three-twelfths by land, two-twelfths of the latter was marked off as the "World-Island," integrating Europe, Asia and Africa into a joint continent.<sup>44</sup> The dominant

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42. Ihor Kamenetsky, Secret Nazi Plans for Eastern Europe, (New York: Bookman Associates, 1961), p. 30.

43. Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power, op. Cit., p. 251.

44. Sir Halford Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1942), p. 62.

region of the World Island was the pivotal area or the Heartland, extending approximately from the "broad isthmus between the Baltic and Black Seas" to the eastern reaches of Siberia, including much of the Mongolian and Iranian Upland (See Map 1.)<sup>45</sup> The Heartland, the successor to the "pivot area" in its strategic relation to the geography of the World Island, possessed all the necessary elements for subjecting Eurasia, if controlled by an aggressive nation. Mackinder considered Germany the most advantageously suited, in terms of space and position, for control or domination of the Heartland.<sup>46</sup> A central location, compounded with interior lines and in a position invulnerable to sea power, collaborated to gear Germany for territorial imperialism. Therefore, once Germany acquired control of the Heartland, she could, with the assistance of sea power, proceed to conquer the world.<sup>47</sup> The reference to sea power reflected Mackinder's conception that although land power would achieve a superior role, nevertheless sea power was an indispensable attribute

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45. Ibid., p. 74.

46. Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power, op. cit., p. 58.

47. Ibid., p. 59.

of national power, but requiring broader land bases than before.<sup>48</sup> Moreover, conquest of the World Island would somehow allow Germany, as the greatest landpower, to accede to a position as the greatest sea power.<sup>49</sup>

In essence, domination of the Heartland meant probable subjection of the World Island, a supercontinent containing fourteen-sixteenths of the world population. Therefore, the power controlling the Eurasian-African land mass and its inhabitants, for all practical purposes, controlled the world. As Mackinder hypothesized:

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:  
 Who rules the Heartland commands the World-  
 Island:  
 Who rules the World-Island commands the World.<sup>50</sup>

A leading American authority on Geopolitik later visualized the Heartland for German purposes as:

...a strategic area containing all the advantages indispensable for a Germany at war against any great power or combination of powers...a gigantic citadel reaching from the Elbe to the Amur... the deep base from which Germany's military forces can strike in all directions while her vital war industries can be withdrawn to remote inner regions...with the riches of the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and the Urals--the nearest thing to the ideal state of German economic self-

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48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, p. 150.

sufficiency...it is...the mystical cradle of world conquerors.<sup>51</sup>

In retrospect, such was Mackinder's thesis that a new world order would be founded upon the reality of the firm geographic factors underlying history. Thus, the controller of the geographic spaciousness and resources of the Heartland was seemingly predestined to expand over the world.

Finally, Mackinder's attitude toward war bears striking resemblance to the theme of Wehr-geopolitik later incorporated into Nazi Germany. Accordingly, the great wars of history were the outcome of the unequal growth of states, an unequalness due inherently to the uneven distribution of "fertility and strategical opportunities upon the face of the globe."<sup>52</sup>

In considering the antecedents as sketched in this section, it appears to be a misrepresentation to assert that Geopolitik evolved directly from German and European philosophy. However, the relationship which exists between man and his geographical environment has been the subject of

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51. Charles Kruczewski, "Germany's Lebensraum," The American Political Science Review, XXXIX (1940).

52. Harold and Margaret Sprout, op. cit., p. 76.

speculation at least since the time of the Greeks. The answers to the question, what is man's relation to nature, have varied from time to time as well as the emphasis which has been attached to that relation. The Greeks and the Romans treated of this matter, and the subject was revived by Bodin in the sixteenth century. Later, Montesquieu attempted to formulate a systematic theory of the influence which environment exerted on political practices. Ritter in the early part of the nineteenth century wrote a work attempting to trace the relations between man and his geographic position.

Deterministic and evolutionary philosophies contained ideas that eventually found expression in the peculiar doctrines of twentieth-century Geopolitik, not to discount the influence of other aspects of naturalism and positivism. Moreover, such philosophy appears to have conditioned the Germans psychologically to the point that such philosophic thinking permeated easily the various fields of scholarly study. Such was the case that ostensibly from the ancient times had been handed down and enlarged an extensive body of ideas that would find its way into German geography and eventually, Geopolitik. A twentieth century geographer aptly stated that "probably the most interesting aspect

is the sensitive way in which geographical ideas at all periods have reflected contemporary trends in philosophic thinking.<sup>53</sup>

Philosophers, historians, military and political scientists, as well as geographers contributed theories that later would be widely read by the geopoliticians. Perhaps, the acceptance of many of their ideas into the mainstream of German thinking hastened the arrival of Geopolitik. Whatever the case, Germany's defeat in a number of wars brought forth philosophies of reconstruction, and Geopolitik emerged. The call to national unity envisioned by so many would result in a much stronger Germany. A number of philosophers reiterated the divine right of the German people to rule over their adversaries, who were, by and large, inferior peoples. The Germans were admonished to purge all foreign elements from their Kultur, and to glorify the Aryan race. Germany, by the very nature of her environment, therefore, was destined for the "will to power."

Geographers, among them Ritter and Humboldt, gave due consideration to the inter-relations of man and his

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53. Taylor, op. cit., p. 69.

natural surroundings. Some German philosophers exalted the superiority of the state and its German inhabitants, and thereupon superimposed a Weltanschauung. Germany thus was designed to be a conquering nation; therefore, all energies of the state were to be directed to that end. Fichte, Hegel, and Treitschke, were among those that harangued the German people with ideas of Weltanschauung and the divine right and destiny of Germans. Germany was therefore entitled by the laws of history and nature to a space more adequate to its mission in life. The essential that this needed space would have to be taken from others was seemingly irrelevant, since Germany could justifiably be shown to have rights to Lebensraum. Von Treitschke had long urged German expansion by military conquest, and he was joined by others with the same pronouncement. List, among others, concocted directions for new German expansion on the continent of Europe.

In retrospect, conceptions of Lebensraum, Drang nach Osten, Weltanschauung, Autarky, and other later Geopolitik ideas were the language of Germans long before the dawn of the twentieth century. As one geographer stated, "although Hegel, Fichte and others developed a great wealth of hypotheses which they were not in a position to prove, they provided, nevertheless, a stimulating body of ideas



for future studies in the field of political geography.<sup>54</sup>

...it remained for a pragmatic generation in the twentieth century, equally deriving culture and politics from geographic and biological factors, to utilize the work of these learned forerunners, and build on their foundations of genuine science the heavily motivated yet superficially dazzling superstructure of Geopolitik.<sup>55</sup>

Finally, it appears that the important thing here is that before Geopolitik could emerge in the twentieth century, the ideas presented beforehand would be combined with the concepts of the likes of Mahan and Mackinder, and later summated and included in the major works of Haushofer and others of the twentieth-century field. However, the importance of the concepts that appear in this chapter is directly concerned forthright with the deterministic philosophy that they purveyed, for it was this determinism as later adopted by German geographers in various forms that gave breadth to the foundations that were eventually to direct the course of German Geopolitik. In addition, it also appears that the evolutionary philosophy in vogue at the time held a precedent for the emergence of Geopolitik.

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54. Richard Hartshorne, "Recent Developments in Political Geography," American Political Science Review, Vol. 29 (October, 1935), p. 5.

55. Gyorgy, Geopolitiks, p. 155.

In essence, it meant nothing more than apply biological concepts of evolution and naturalism to cultural phenomena. This is exactly what happens at the end of the nineteenth century. A geographer, well grounded in the natural sciences, applies evolutionist and naturalist concepts to his concepts of geography, adopts deterministic thinking, and, in combination, develops a political geography that is, in essence, the groundwork for twentieth-century Geopolitik.

In addition to the deterministic and evolutionary philosophy which gave a sense of direction for Geopolitik, there were also the writings of Mahan and Mackinder to impart connotations to the subject. Mahan's writings are important for the naval theory he expounded and the primacy of sea power. Mackinder ranks as a far more important precursor of Geopolitik, and his importance apparently lies with his theories of the supremacy of land power over sea power. However, his most important contribution to the subject of Geopolitik appears to be his Heartland theory, or the theory that whoever controls the Heartland, thereby controls the world.

In the light of today's nuclear air age, does not the Heartland theory still hold implications?

Whatever the case, a basis has been laid for a discussion of the Geopolitik foundations of Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellen in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER II

### GEOPOLITIK FOUNDATIONS: RATZEL AND KJELLEN

Although Geopolitik underwent a steady growth in Germany for more than two decades after World War I, at no time was it defined in terms acceptable to all geographers and political scientists alike. Subsequent definitions on the nature and scope of the subject depend upon the particular time period under consideration. The Geopolitik foundations rendered by Ratzel at the close of the nineteenth century merit some differentiation from those of an immediate successor, Kjellen. Similarly, the latter's system is at once distinguishable from the so-called "science" that Haushofer and the German geopoliticians pursued. Concomitantly, the usurpation of Geopolitik data and methods by the National Socialists marked a milestone in the development of the medium. However, Friedrich Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellen were recognized as founders of Geopolitik, and as such, their foundations merit rather meticulous examination.

#### I. FRIEDRICH RATZEL

Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904). Ratzel was the geographer more concerned with the influence of physical phenomena on man than with the nature of the phenomena themselves.

Reportedly, Ritter's preoccupation with the notion that human adjustment to the physical landscape determined history led Ratzel to strikingly similar conclusions.<sup>1</sup> As such, he was among the first, if not the first of geographers to seriously advance geographic determinism as a factor in the inter-relation of states.<sup>2</sup> His contributions to geopolitics stem from an endeavor to set new standards for the behavior of states. In Politische Geographie (1897), Anthropogeographie (1882-1891), and an essay entitled "Lebensraum" (1901), a number of basic tenets were established not only for Geopolitik but for later National Socialist doctrines of Lebensraum.<sup>3</sup> These included: the conception that space represented the most fundamental requisite of a nation; that contentions for space followed the natural law of survival of the fittest, i.e. the stronger over the weaker; and that only racially pure peoples, strongly rooted in the soil (not only in the agricultural sense), are most likely to be victors in conquering and keeping living space.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Eugene Willard Miller, Global Geography (New York: Crowell Co., 1957), p. 443.

<sup>2</sup>Kamenetsky, op. cit., p. 28.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 29.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

In essence, Ratzel conceived of the man-land relationships as a process by which man developed as part and parcel of the earth's crust.<sup>5</sup> He distinguished the human facts on the earth and "their manifold, complex, and variable connections with the facts of the physical order . . ."<sup>6</sup>

He saw human groups and human societies developing, always within certain natural limits . . . occupying always a certain definite place on the globe, and needing always, in order to nourish themselves, to subsist, to grow, a certain space (Raum).<sup>7</sup>

In actuality, the term anthropogeographie was coined by Ratzel to designate the role of geographic factors in the life of mankind.<sup>8</sup>

. . . Man appeared upon earth as a child, capable of receiving education and of developing, and to whom education and development were necessities; the earth has brought him up, through a struggle with all her powers and beings, and into his special history is woven the general history of the world. Periods of heat and ages of ice have now extended, now limited his sphere of existence; he has seen species of plants and of animals become extinct, and new ones arise. This being so, he . . . could not possibly have remained unaltered. Thus Man of to-day is not only the product of his own development,<sup>9</sup> but also a product of the development of the world.

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<sup>5</sup> Charles E. Merriam and Harry E. Barnes, A History of Political Theories (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1942), p. 472.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Jean Brunhes, Human Geography (New York: Rand McNally and Company, 1920), p. 32.

<sup>8</sup> Franz L. Neumann, Behemoth (New York: Octagon Books, 1963), p. 138.

<sup>9</sup> Friedrich Ratzel, "Man as a Life Phenomenon on Earth," History of the World, ed., H. L. Helmut (London: W. Heinemann 1901-07), p. 61.

States as Organisms

Ratzel's publication of Politische Geographie (1897), unveiled somewhat of a peculiar concept of the states, which in essence, viewed it as an earth-rooted living organism that needed to expand to survive.<sup>10</sup> Unquestionably, he was influenced by Darwinism and the emergent theory that the state was an organism like any other biological organism. Therefore, the laws governing evolutionary processes were also applicable to the state. The same relationship between biological organism and environment held for state and habi-  
tant.<sup>11</sup> Darwin had previously stated in the Origin of Species that although isolation is of great importance in the production of new species, largeness of area is on the whole still more important for the production of long-lived species capable of spreading widely.<sup>12</sup> Darwin's observations on the value of space, coinciding with the theory of the state as an organism represented manifest implications for Ratzel's political geography. Space was regarded as Macht or power in itself, i.e., a political force. In Darwin's phrase of "survival of the fittest" could be found

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<sup>10</sup>Miller, op. cit., p. 443.

<sup>11</sup>Ratzel, op. cit., p. 65.

<sup>12</sup>Charles Darwin, Origin of Species (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959), p. 96.

justification for prompting territorial expansion in a quest for additional living space.

Ratzel described his state-organism as follows:

As races are forms of organic life, it follows that the organism of the state must appear more real to us than it did to Schaffle, who merely designated it as "relatively the best of all figurative characteristics of the state." The state can not be comprehended otherwise than as an organized being; objections to this conception arise only from a narrow interpretation of the word "organism." Every people, every state is organic, as a combination of organic units. Moreover there is something organic in the internal coherence of the groups and individuals from which a state is formed. Only in animal and plant life is the most perfect organism that in which the independence of organs is sacrificed to the whole to the greatest degree. In nations and in states the members preserve an independence which varies directly with the extent of the development. Therefore, are not peoples and states most imperfect organisms compared with plants and animals?

The superiority of the state organism . . . is based upon very different grounds. States are spiritual and moral organizations . . . spiritual coherence certainly creates many resemblances between the life functions of a people or state and those of an animal organism; thus we may speak of assimilation, circulation, and so on . . .<sup>13</sup>

In such a manner, nations and mankind were considered as organisms reacting to their environment in much the same way that an animal organism reacts to nature. Frontier areas were designated as peripheral organs functioning to facilitate interchange and to afford security.<sup>14</sup> However, although race

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<sup>13</sup>Ratzel, op. cit., p. 65-66.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid. p. 66.



and state organisms stood upon the same plane as plant or animal organisms, they were in reality, not true organisms, but aggregate organisms, and as such, constituted a higher form, organically. As such organisms, states could expand, prosper, contract, and decay, as living organisms did. Possessing a compact core area and a somewhat loosened structure in tributial areas, the organic state either could be developed within its present boundaries or be used as a base from which to expand in space.<sup>15</sup>

Man was inexorably connected with the soil, or ground. Such a connection strengthened through time, as man advanced from a loose primordial organization, occupying a relatively wide expanse, to a closely knit, densely populated nation, possessing less space, but considerably more power.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, Ratzel promulgated the law that every political unit was indestructibly tied to the soil, and increasingly so through the ages.<sup>17</sup>

Succeedingly, Ratzel depicts the accompanying results in history of peoples, which, upon reaching the stage above, no longer displace each other by conquest, but rather go through processes of assimilation and penetration. The

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 67.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

inevitable result is that state-organisms do not decay in the sense that plants and animals do, but amalgamate the conquered with the conquering peoples, into a union that promises growth.<sup>18</sup>

### Location and Space

Two factors, space (the area occupied by the state) and location played a major role in determining the fortunes of history, as exemplified by Ratzel's innumerable examples.<sup>19</sup> Any geographical phenomenon could be found reoccurring in a multiplicity of regions. Coasts similar to those of Greece were found in such locales as Istria, Spain, and Italy; therefore, the Greeks invading forces chose to land on such coasts because of the similarities in terrain. Thus it was concluded that "lands, no matter how distant from one another they may be, whenever their climates are similar, are destined to be scenes of analogous historical developments."<sup>20</sup>

Location was by far the more important factor in anthropogeography, encompassing not only the area possessed by state, but likewise the size and form of any given

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18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., p. 62.

20. Ibid., p. 64.

territory, its climatic and vegetational aspects and its relation to contiguous expanses.<sup>21</sup> Location was the means of ascertaining whether neighboring countries would be on friendly or hostile terms, and also a method of delimiting culture areas.<sup>22</sup> A relatively isolated geographical area might offer security from without but at the same time foster cultural stagnation. On the other hand, a strong country with a central position on a continent was in a favorable position to secure domination over its neighbors, whereas a weak nation in such a position invited aggressiveness from all sides.<sup>23</sup> However, although relative isolation might insure protection and security through the early stages of a nation's development, such a situation was likely at a later date to result not only in cultural stagnation but overpopulation.<sup>24</sup>

In a similar manner, Ratzel found that a nation's situation, geographically, exerted a pronounced influence upon its historical fate. Greece represented a suitable example, for "everything else (was) subordinate to the

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<sup>21</sup>Neuman, op. cit., p. 138.

<sup>22</sup>Ratzel, op. cit.

<sup>23</sup>Merriam and Barnes, op. cit., p. 474.

<sup>24</sup>Ratzel, op. cit., p. 80.

fact that Greece (stood) upon the threshold of the Orient."<sup>25</sup> The single most important factor in that country's development was the position with regard to the surrounding lands of western Asia and northern Africa.<sup>26</sup> Similarly, every segment of the earth's surface lent a peculiarity to the countries and populations occupying respective space. For example, only in Europe were geographical considerations of such a nature to allow for Germany's status as a first-class power.

Summarily, Ratzel concluded that "connection with a hemisphere . . . identity with a peninsula or archipelago, location with respect to oceans, seas, rivers, deserts, and mountains, determine the histories of countries."<sup>27</sup> Italy's mid position in the Mediterranean was enough to insure her status as a Mediterranean power. On the other hand, Germany, shackled with a hemmed-in position in the interior of Europe, could not hope to achieve the development made possible by Britain's insular situation.<sup>28</sup>

As regards a nation's location to water spaces, Ratzel was convinced that the optimum situation was for

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 81.

a country to occupy land extending from ocean to ocean, or, the whole of a continent. Perhaps the most unfavorable location was that of the continental state surrounded on all sides by nation-states, and cut off from the sea. Germany again appears to have been a prime example of such a situation.<sup>29</sup>

States, expressedly large states, were continually coveting adjacent territory.<sup>30</sup> Such a characteristic, when pursued aggressively, spelled a loss of independence for smaller states.

Space to Ratzel, was power, and an indispensable attribute of national greatness: it was a political force and not . . . merely a vehicle of political force.<sup>31</sup> Only a sufficient amount of space or spaciousness could sustain life.

Similar to the struggle for life, the basic aim of which is to gain space, the struggles of peoples are almost always struggles for the same object. In modern history the reward of victory always was--or was meant to be--a gain of territory.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 82.

<sup>30</sup>Merriam and Barnes, op. cit., p. 476.

<sup>31</sup>Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power, op. cit., p. 32.

<sup>32</sup>Friedrich Ratzel, Politische Geographie, quoted in George Kiss, "Political Geography into Geopolitics," p. 634.

Every people has to be educated up from smaller to larger space conceptions; and the process has to be repeated again and again to prevent a people from sinking back into its old, small-space conceptions. The decay of every state is the result of a declining space conception.<sup>33</sup>

Ratzel saw historic growth as being subject to a number of laws. Essentially, there had always been a trend toward giant empires or super-states, at the expense of smaller states.<sup>34</sup> Under the organic theory of state's expansion was a necessity to replenish the biological form, and more space was needed to conquer yet even more space.

In addition, space was paralleled or correlated with culture. Ratzel was convinced that the smaller the state the more intensive the culture. Moreover, culture was relatively hard put to penetrate to the center in large spaces.<sup>35</sup>

To prove hypotheses on space, Ratzel surveyed specific areas of the world for the purpose of ascertaining the distribution of national power. Europe and Australia possessed only enough space for one power to dominate, since they occupied relatively a small percentage of the earth's surface.

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<sup>33</sup>Friedrich Ratzel, Politische Geographie, quoted in Derwent Whittlesey, German Strategy of World Conquest (Toronto: Farrar, 1942), p. 93.

<sup>34</sup>Naumann, op. cit., p. 138.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

If Australia was the only power on its continent, then Germany was in the most favorable position to secure domination in Europe.<sup>36</sup> Ratzel emphasized that none but the Anglo-Celtic races possessed the urge to conquer.

Underlying such notions was always the essence that great territories, by the nature of their size, were invited to further expansion, and a nominally endless quest for Lebensraum.<sup>37</sup> Large states in time, though, disintegrated into smaller states, and in a cycle, returned to the stage of brilliance. As seen over the width and breadth of the world, this constituted what Ratzel termed the Raummotiv, the Lebensraum motive, the space motive.<sup>38</sup> As Ratzel stated, "Far-sighted domination of space possessed by the statesman, mobility and adaptability of the people, these two are needed for complete success."<sup>39</sup> He also wrote, "There is on this small planet sufficient space for only one great state."<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power, op. cit., p. 32.

<sup>37</sup> Ratzel, op. cit.

<sup>38</sup> Mattern, op. cit. Geopolitics: Doctrine of National Self-Sufficiency and Empire (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1942), p. 42.

<sup>39</sup> Ratzel, Politische Geographie, quoted in George Kiss, "Political Geography into Geopolitics," p. 635.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

Area

The area possessed by the nation was further indicative of it's political power.<sup>41</sup> Area and population, were to Ratzel, two main characteristics of a nation. Territory was closely bound to the life of the people, and wars were, almost inevitably, the result of struggles for territory.<sup>42</sup> The desire for expansion naturally followed respective rulers appreciation for the significance of large areas. The highest form of civilization was that obtainable by extending boundaries to the farthest limits.<sup>43</sup> Ratzel in Germany's situation with regard to area, concluded that "In Germany the theory of geography is well studied out, but the chapter on area is forgotten; Germany neglects to realize the value of her own territory."<sup>44</sup>

In essence, the growth of states has represented the expansion and maturation of the social organism. Large states inevitably replaced small states, and the trend continued on and on.

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<sup>41</sup>Ratzel, "Man as a Life Phenomenon on the Earth," quoted in Helmot, op. cit., p. 82.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 83.

<sup>43</sup>Merriam and Barnes, op. cit., p. 476.

<sup>44</sup>Ratzel, "Man as a Life Phenomenon on the Earth," quoted in Helmot, op. cit., p. 85.



Paralleling considerations of area were the problems connected with population, since the inhabitants of spatial areas were equally important, and a method of dividing the world into units based on demographic criteria, Ratzel depicted the general trend as follows: "Civilization and political superiority have always attended the thickly populated districts."<sup>45</sup> Historic development had characteristically shown a progression from small nomadic populations to large clusters in limited areas.<sup>46</sup> The significant feature of population is not the grossness but the "development of the division of labor and social differentiation, the process which is one of the most accurate measures of social evolution."<sup>47</sup>

In succeeding sections of "Man As a Life Phenomenon on Earth," Ratzel reiterates the contention that bodies of water have a pronounced influence upon historical progress,<sup>48</sup> and that the topography of the earth's surface determines whether an area will be culturally sterile or progressive.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 89.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

<sup>47</sup>Merriam and Barnes, op. cit., p. 477.

<sup>48</sup>Ratzel, "Man as a Life Phenomenon on the Earth," quoted in Helmut, op. cit., p. 82.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 96.

Movement

Ratzel was probably one of the earliest geographers to analyze the movement and migration of peoples within and without their historic boundaries. Historic movement was viewed always as the struggle for area, corresponding to the biological struggle for existence.<sup>50</sup> Each piece of earth with its inhabitants was separate from other areas by natural frontiers. A constant inner motion was exerted by the respective peoples into movements oriented outward.<sup>51</sup> Generally such movements are governed proportionally by the "rate of internal growth and power."<sup>52</sup> The only general law of direction was that movement was toward the richer or weaker neighbor, either the one of less resistance or the one with the most to offer.<sup>53</sup> In retrospect, such migration was usually motivated by desires for land, and penetration was possible not only by conquest or colonization, but by economic means.<sup>54</sup> Essentially, true to the organic theory, populations were considered to move in much the same way

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<sup>50</sup>Merriam and Barnes, op. cit., p. 474

<sup>51</sup>Ibid.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid.

as fluids, or as Ratzel stated, "the people like a slow liquid may move forward or backward."<sup>55</sup> Basically, such movements of people, whether by conquest or colonization, usually took place not over unoccupied areas but confronted that already settled, resulting in more assimilation than displacement.<sup>56</sup>

### The Seven Laws of Historic Growth<sup>57</sup>

In 1896, Ratzel's "Laws of the Territorial Growth of States" appeared in a leading geographic journal of the time.<sup>58</sup> However, they were little more than a summation of the expansionist trends in history and the growth of empires.

The first law stated that the space of states increases with the growth of Kultur. As later interpreted, this meant that the "enlargement of the geographical horizon, the fruit of bodily and spiritual exertions of countless generations made available ever new territories for the growth of peoples."<sup>59</sup> Only through Kultur (culture) could

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<sup>55</sup>Mattern, op. cit., p. 53.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid.

<sup>57</sup>Johannes Mattern's section of "The Historic Laws of State Growth," provided the basis for discussing the seven laws. See Johannes Mattern, Geopolitics: The Doctrine of National Self-Sufficiency, Chapter II, p. 55.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., p. 57.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 56.

such acquired possessions be brought under control. In order to dominate areas, socially and politically, the conquering power had to possess the elements of a superior culture.<sup>60</sup> Therefore, Ratzel was apparently led to see a direct ratio existing, proportionally, between the growth of populations and the amount of culture possessed.<sup>61</sup> As populations expanded, culture increased and eventually this progression necessitated more space to expand in. The conclusion was that the great states of history were determined by the amount of Kultur their peoples obtained. The greater the culture, the greater the state. According to Ratzel, the great Kulture states were all included within Europe or amongst her colonial possessions, with the exception of China.<sup>62</sup>

A second law was concerned with the growth of states by other means such as economic penetration and missionary activity. Such forms of development were not only older than the states themselves, but they each tended to expand in their own peculiar way.<sup>63</sup> Therefore, the nations that had developed such other manifestations to the highest

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p. 57.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

degree had "a portentous driving force which, in expanding outwardly, drove the state in the same directions."<sup>64</sup>

The third law was as follows:

. . . the growth of states proceeds by the amalgamation and absorption and assimilation of smaller units. This entitles not only annexation of the smaller territory, which may not be of a lasting effect, but amalgamation of the people into the populace as a whole. Thus the acquired peoples must be welded to the soil of their new state.<sup>65</sup>

Thus, mere annexation of territory alone is not enough, but must be accompanied by an assimilation of the newly acquired people.

The fourth law viewed the frontier as the peripheric organ of the state. The frontier was not an arbitrarily fixed line, a delimited zone, but a transitional area open to assimilation from either side. As such, "frontiers were dynamic, reflecting the expansive force of aggressive countries."<sup>66</sup> Boundary disputes arose over the expansive urge of one or another state, and might lead to war, if specified claims were not dealt with adequately.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Russell H. Fifield and G. Etzel Percy, Geopolitics at Munich, Department of State Bulletin, XII (June 24, 1945), p. 10.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

A fifth law recognized that states in the growth process strove for the absorption of politically valuable sections.<sup>68</sup> Such areas as strategically vital, as coasts and railways were avidly sought after by expansive states. Those areas with natural resources, as well as those containing industrial complexes were also prime locales of contention.<sup>69</sup>

The sixth law was as follows:

. . . the first impetus for territorial growth comes to primitive states from without. The great states with Kultur bring their ideas to primitive peoples who through increasing population acquire the need of expansion.<sup>70</sup>

A final law stated that "the general tendency toward territorial annexation and amalgamation transmits the trend from state to state and increases its intensity."<sup>71</sup> Thus, the urge to expand grows with each success.

The preceding "seven laws" caused geographers and political scientists in the twentieth century to remark that they laid the foundation for the appearance of Geopolitik, thus marking the dawn of German Geopolitik.

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<sup>68</sup>Ibid.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid.

In retrospect, the dynamic concepts that Ratzel contributed to political geography and subsequently, the new science of Geopolitik, included: the state as an organism; state-organisms must expand; space is power; space-conquering forces; and a number revolving around Lebensraum. A basic postulate of Ratzel's and eventually of Haushofer's Geopolitik was that the state-organism was deeply rooted in the soil, and subject to biologic laws of growth. As biologic organisms grew to survive, so a fundamental law of the state was that it must expand it's life-giving space. Space was power, a political force of untold dimensions. A loss of territory or decline in space-consciousness meant the decline of the state. Expansion followed the biological law of survival of the fittest. Only the strongest were able to gain additional space from their neighbors. Thus, expansion and growth were requisites of power. The idea of Lebensraum was logically associated with the conception of the organic state.

## II. KJELLEN: HIS NEW GEOPOLITICAL SYSTEM

Apparently, prior to 1924, much of the work carried on under the auspices of Geopolitik was based on Ratzel. However, by this time a Swedish political scientist, Pan-Germanic in aspirations, had devised a new geopolitical Science.

Rudolf Kjellen (1864-1922), a professor of government at the University of Goteborg, Sweden, and an avowed pro-German, published a number of works of consequence to the development of German Geopolitik. Staten som Lifsform (The State as a Form of Life) (1916), Grundriss zu einem System der Politik (Foundations for a System of Politics) (1920), and Great Powers in the World--all interested the Germans a great deal.<sup>72</sup> The first glorified the significance of the organic growth of space; the second presented a new geopolitical science; and the third revealed a method for German resurrection.<sup>73</sup>

Kjellen was the political scientist devoutly interested in the influence of the natural environment, a successor to Ratzel along deterministic lines. If Ratzel was the geographer led by his geographical investigations to the consideration of politics as motivated and directed by the potentialities of geography, Kjellen turned to geography for deeper insight into world politics. Borrowing Ratzel's "seven laws," though not per se, a new political science was formulated. In addition a number of Ratzel's theories were expanded and applied to contemporary problems in international politics.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>72</sup>Kalijarvi, op. cit., p. 543.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid.

<sup>74</sup>Mattern, op. cit., p. 64.



In essence, Kjellen saw in the political science of the day a conception of the state existing as an institution for and by the law, a pure legal science.<sup>75</sup> Hesitating to view the state in such a manner as something apart from society, Kjellen instead envisaged the two as being interwoven. Society was the "living, teeming, mass of people of many interests, friendly, competitive, conflicting, and even hostile."<sup>76</sup> As such, it was nothing more than a giver of law and its enforcer. Superimposed upon this was Kjellen's consideration of what ought to be the nature of the state. The state was to be regarded as an integral part of society, on the basis of man's experience with the living state(s).<sup>77</sup> Six such experiences existed to Kjellen's way of thinking, and were of paramount importance to man.

Kjellen was led to conclude from a fifth experience that the "state must be viewed, or admitted to be, more than an institution for the creation and enforcement of law, more than a mere keeper of peace and order after the old laissez-faire pattern!"<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>75</sup>Ibid.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., p. 65.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., p. 66.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid.

State and society was to be considered," . . . as two categories to be harmonized, . . . synthesized . . . the new political scientist must enlarge his sphere of thought . . . to cover the factual . . . the new political science must fill the 'legal skeleton with social flesh and blood.'"<sup>79</sup>

Similar to Ratzel, Kjellen considered the state as composing a living organism, acting both internally, and externally, in relation to other states.<sup>80</sup> Such an organic state formed the basis of Kjellen's geopolitical science. Particularly important appears to be the importance he attached to the external role of states, which followed natural law in such situations.<sup>81</sup>

A sixth experience dealt more implicitly with relations between states, or countries. Such territorial attributes as power (Macht) and position were stressed. Once again, the state was operative as an expanding organism in its relations to other states.<sup>82</sup> However, Kjellen departed somewhat from Ratzel on this aspect, and placed state and mankind on the same level, with the state

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<sup>79</sup>Ibid.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., p. 69.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid., p. 71.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., p. 69.

thence being viewed as a "superman," subject only to that law that calls for the "survival of the fittest."<sup>83</sup>

Of Kjellen's newly founded Geopolitik, one writer remarked that it was,

. . . a new geopolitical science . . . to consider the state as it is and states as they are in relation to other states, occupying the place of prominence formerly held by the legal order . . . its study is now assumed by the chief motive--that of historic reality of the state; its political purposefulness or conformity with the political objective, advantage and necessity. Here the science of the state has its unity in multiplicity . . . and its own appeal.<sup>84</sup>

In essence, the basis of the new Geopolitik science was historic reality, concerned not with a philosophical, untenable state, but with the reality of past, present, and future.<sup>85</sup> As such, the new political science would "do justice to the realities of the life of the modern state."<sup>86</sup>

Throughout much of Kjellen's writings is the emphasis placed upon war as a geopolitical method, or as he stated, war was an experimental field for geopolitics.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>83</sup>Ibid., p. 71.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid., p. 72.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., p. 73.

<sup>87</sup>Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power, op. cit., p. 42.

### A Five-Point System

In Kjellen's revised political science, emphasis was placed on the following five aspects of the state:

Geopolitik--geography and the state,  
 Demopolitik--population and the state,  
 Oekopolitik--economic resources of the state,  
 Sociopolitik--social structure of the state,  
 Kratopolitik--governmental organization.<sup>88</sup>

Obviously, the first attribute was of paramount importance. Concerned with the territory or Realm of the state, consideration was given to its relationship with regards to space, size, and shape, among other things.<sup>89</sup> These factors necessitated continual re-examinations as the power of adjacent nations was likely to increase or decrease from time to time. The shape of a country was to be examined in light of its geographical position, its situation among contiguous countries, its continental location, and its nearness to bodies of water.<sup>90</sup> The history of past geographical influences on the shaping of foreign policy of particular countries was imperative knowledge. From such considerations, Kjellen constructed

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<sup>88</sup>Edmund Walsh, "Geopolitics and International Morals," Hans Weigert and Vilhjalmur Stefansson, (eds.), Compass of the World (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944), p. 17.

<sup>89</sup>Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power, op. cit., p. 42.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid.

a geopolitical state with a body, limbs, organs, and other organismic parts. The immediate core area of the state composed the body of the state, its capital and other administrative centers. Rivers, roads, and railroads formed part of the limbs, while boundaries constituted yet other appendages.<sup>91</sup> Mankind's position within this geopolitical state-organism was a subordinate one, "since a loss of territory places the state at odds to replace it, while humans constantly replenish themselves."<sup>92</sup>

At this juncture, the term Geopolitik is introduced then for the first time, "concerned with the duty of the state to preserve the territory of the realm and its resources as analogous to man's obligation to preserve his body and health."<sup>93</sup>

Another prime concern of the first aspect was the status of frontiers. As peripheric organs of the state, boundaries were therefore closest to those external forces that threatened the security of the state.<sup>94</sup>

In retrospect, the importance of space, size, and shape centered around contemporary political situations.

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<sup>91</sup>Mattern, op. cit., p. 74.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., p. 75.

Similar to Ratzel, Kjellen saw a prerogative for great states to expand in space. As he explained: "vitaly strong states with limited space are compelled under the categorical imperative to enlarge their space by colonization, amalgamation, or conquest."<sup>95</sup> England and Germany were in such a position that necessitated further space; therefore, they possessed a natural right to additional growth. The quest for space was a logical outcome of the state's most indispensable attribute--space.<sup>96</sup> Without additional space, and continual territorial aggrandizement, it was thought that the state would lose power.

In essence, Kjellen's theories dealing with geography and the state (the first attribute) represented basically the views as those held by Ratzel on the organic nature of the state.<sup>97</sup> Only the state was a super-organismic form of life, under Kjellen, and not an organism alone.

#### Demopolitik

A second branch of Kjellen's system dealt with the populace of the state, or its Volk, and was variously labeled

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<sup>95</sup>Ibid., p. 76.

<sup>96</sup>Ibid.

<sup>97</sup>Neumann, op. cit., p. 140.

as Demopolitik or Ethnopolitik.<sup>98</sup> Ethnopolitics considered the state more or less as an ethnic personality. At this point, Kjellen effected a significant departure from Ratzel in that nationality and aspects of the territory were combined. By nationality was meant the "folk individuality" of the state, not "nation," which represented only the organic form of the state.<sup>99</sup> The two organically different components when merged provided a more adequate base to study man's relationship to the Realm.

Of prime concern under this aspect were the relations, past, and present, between the Volk and the nation.<sup>100</sup> Further broken down, the problem was to explore the interconnections of different nationalities within a state, and without, although utilizing the same time sequence and the resulting projections for the future. By such a method it was reportedly possible to survey the loyalties of different racial or ethnic-cultured groups within a state, and to ascertain the existence of conflicting loyalties if they were present.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>98</sup>Walsh, op. cit., p. 16.

<sup>99</sup>Neumann, op. cit., p. 140.

<sup>100</sup>Mattern, op. cit., p. 77.

<sup>101</sup>Ibid.

In addition, this branch of a new geopolitical science was markedly concerned with various demographic aspects of the state that were either advantageous or disadvantageous to its power structure.<sup>102</sup> Such factors as birth rate, birth control, and density were analyzed in an effort to determine their influence on the vitality of the state.<sup>103</sup> Therefore, this branch was essentially involved with the influence of Volk upon territory and vice-versa, as each affected the other's growth pattern. Kjellen placed the responsibility for insuring and instituting growth in the hands of the state. The folk concept was a method readily available for justifying expansion into new territories.<sup>104</sup> Wherever the Volk resided, then it was the state's sacred duty to follow and extend sovereignty over that area.<sup>105</sup> Without doubt, Kjellen recognized the implications of the pre-war Pan-German and Pan-Slavic movements, as well as that of the designs for some form of Mitteleuropa, and patterned his ethnopolitics as a sort of rectification of the three.<sup>106</sup>

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102 Ibid.

103 Ibid., p. 78.

104 Ibid.

105 Walsh, op. cit., p. 17.

106 Mattern, op. cit., p. 77.



A third aspect of Kjellen's system consisted of the economic resources of the state, or what was termed Oekopolitik,<sup>107</sup> and went beyond such elements as public finance and the administration of state property (mines, waterways, etc.) into declaring that the primary responsibility of the state was to direct all its activities in such a manner as to assure the Volk a living.<sup>108</sup> In the main, economic self-sufficiency, or Autarky was the ultimate goal whether it was achievable within the confines of the Realm or only securable by grasping from adjacent territory.<sup>109</sup> In such a manner, economic considerations provided one further means of justifying state expansion, not only to provide needed resources but also other vital facets, such as space to live in. If the state was confronted with inadequate housing for its population, then it was responsible for providing additional living-space, even if such an obligation meant commandeering the space from neighboring countries.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>107</sup>Walsh, op. cit., p. 16.

<sup>108</sup>Mattern, op. cit., p. 78.

<sup>109</sup>Ibid.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid.

The attainment of economic self-sufficiency was but one objective of Oekopolitik, although it was apparently the most important one. Superimposed upon Autarkyal considerations was Kjellen's conviction that a balanced economy of a simplified nature with exports balancing imports, constituted the most desirable economic form.<sup>111</sup> When such a balanced economy was not possible, the deficit was to be made up through manipulation of other sectors of finance, such as interest on capital invested abroad.<sup>112</sup> Commercial dealings represented but one of three "state households" designated by Kjellen as the bastions of a state's economic structure.<sup>113</sup> The investor and colonial types completed the picture with the former a possible outgrowth of the commercial phase and the latter distinctly concerned with agrarian production and the balancing of exported raw materials and food products against imported manufactured items.<sup>114</sup>

The ideal economy in actuality was a combination of elements from the three types, culminating in Autarky.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>111</sup>Ibid.

<sup>112</sup>Ibid.

<sup>113</sup>Ibid.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid.

<sup>115</sup>Ibid., p. 79.

Essentially, the state viewed as a "household" was primarily concerned with the flow of capital and production, with the interchange of raw and manufactured goods; with the ways and means of establishing as nearly as possible, economic-self-sufficiency; and of nullifying any setbacks should they occur.

The succeeding aspect of "socio-politics," stressed once again the mutual interdependence of state and society. If Oekopolitik was confronted with problems of supplying the populace with sufficient foodstuffs and means of securing an adequate living, then social politics was faced with ascertaining the effect of different interest groups on the progress of Autarky.<sup>117</sup> As defined,

. . . social politics (traced) the development of the modern social order from early clan society through the subsequent neighborhood or community state, the occupational . . . state, and the interest group state of today, as transitions to a new order in the offing, in which a new sense of sociality (would) serve to relieve the state of its coercive coordinating activity as part of its social politics.<sup>118</sup>

In other words, socio-politics was conceived of as a

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<sup>116</sup>Ibid., p. 81.

<sup>117</sup>Ibid.

<sup>118</sup>Ibid., p. 83.

necessary state function which would eventually lead to the disappearance of the coercive functions of the state.<sup>119</sup>

A final aspect of the new political science of Geopolitik dealt with the state as government. Statecraft was advocated that would coordinate interest groups to the utmost without simultaneously favoring any one group.<sup>120</sup> To accomplish such an end, the state allowably could resort to any and all legal methods of suppressing lawlessness. In addition, the state, if it so desired, could resort to international war "as a means of deflecting internal strife into the field of foreign politics."<sup>121</sup> Although governments were directed to act in a legal constituted manner, the overriding principle of governing was utility or "political purposefulness," largely determinable by geographical economic and historic factors.<sup>122</sup>

The aforehand five aspects in combination presented for the first time a system of Geopolitik, however crude it may have appeared. In a limited sense, though, only the first aspect was delineated as Geopolitik.

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<sup>119</sup>Ibid.

<sup>120</sup>Ibid.

<sup>121</sup>Ibid., p. 87.

<sup>122</sup>Ibid.

In summation, the foundations established for a system of Geopolitik by Ratzel and Kjellen appear at first glance to contain virtually all the principal theories of German Geopolitik. If Ratzel originated the idea of the importance of a space-conception as well as the "dynamic concepts of space," Kjellen succeeded in popularizing Ratzel's findings and clothing them within a nomenclature that was for all practical purposes the first system of Geopolitik.<sup>123</sup>

Although Ratzel's theories on space received no widespread acceptance in Germany during the years before World War I, with the onset of the war and an accompanying stimulation of popular and academic interest in political geography, a sizeable number of followers in the Ratzelian tradition arose. Not the least of these was Kjellen, the Swedish Germanophile who further exalted the importance of

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<sup>123</sup>Johannes Mattern stresses that while such geopolitical ideas represented a new ideology of socio-political thought, the basic ideas were as ancient as the landscape upon which they developed. These ideas included: "that man organized into a state that functions as a biological organism subject to the laws of nature; that state organization developed out of a need for protection and security that would guarantee a livelihood and a degree of growth that measured up to potentialities; and that national self-sufficiency was desirable along with preparations for it, even at the expense of war." See his chapter on geopolitical foundations in Geopolitik: Doctrine of National Self-Sufficiency.

the organic growth of states, although with more elaboration. The state was implemented into a position comparable to that of a human being of superior character, with organic morals and an incessant urge for growth. Therefore, the state's growth was somewhat patterned after human growth in size and weight, and there was no need for moral considerations, since territorial expansion occurred as a natural phenomenon. In such a manner, growth or expansion was indispensable to the health and vitality of the nation.

Obtensibly, the sane, scientific, political geography practiced in Germany during the pre-war years had relatively little to offer a traditionally militaristic Germany bent on subduing its neighbors. However, the theorems of Ratzel and Kjellen on the feasibility of expanding in living space coincided with German aspirations for territorial aggrandizement. The notion that the state organism expanded, contracted, lived and decayed provided justification for German expansion, since the German state was thought to lack necessary Lebensraum.

As an afterthought, the Geopolitik of Kjellen was later criticized as being "still a pedantic attempt to elevate the obvious to the rank of science--to show that

world history is determined primarily by geographical situations," i.e., geographical determinism.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>124</sup>Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power, op. cit., p. 22.

## CHAPTER III

### THE RISE OF HAUSHOFERIAN GEOPOLITIK

As previously mentioned, Ratzel's treatise on political geography and more specifically, his dynamic concepts of the state and space went relatively unheeded prior to World War I. On the other hand, Kjellen's major works were not published until the war years and not translated into German until the closing years of the war. However, by 1914, Karl Haushofer, sufficiently endowed with Ratzelian theories had formulated a score of ideas or concepts that were to become fundamental to his system of Geopolitik.

Haushofer's early manhood was substantially dominated by a military career which eventually led to a military college and subsequently the War Academy.<sup>1</sup> During this period, Haushofer was exposed to the ideas of such notable strategists as Mahan, Mackinder, and Clausewitz, to name a few.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, an increasing interest in geography led to familiarity with the ideas of Ratzel and other geographers. Whatever the case, in 1909 Haushofer embarked for Japan and the Orient, to study

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<sup>1</sup>Kalijarvi, op. cit., p. 347.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.



Japanese military techniques.<sup>3</sup> Through intensive study of Japanese and other Far East political institutions, culture, and military affairs, as well as extensive travel throughout the area, Haushofer accumulated a formative amount of information for later geopolitical source material. Of more importance, was Haushofer's subsequent development of an appreciation for Japanese "geopolitical" thinking.<sup>4</sup> The annexation of Korea by the Japanese in 1910, accompanied by overwhelming partisan support on the part of the citizenry, left a marked impression on the German officer. What was termed "rare national unity" the utter obedience of the Japanese to their emperor, and political insightedness in high positions, led Haushofer to applaud the geopolitical instincts of that country.<sup>5</sup> Apparently, the Japanese had been able to achieve such monumental goals as Korea through a workable knowledge of world affairs. Haushofer concluded that this was made possible by strict adherence to the geographical, national, racial, and religious factors, not only of Japan, but of its adversaries and other nations of the

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<sup>3</sup>Whittlesey, op. cit., p. 394.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Taylor, op. cit., p. 589.

world.<sup>6</sup> (Allegedly, Haushofer patterned the German school of Geopolitik after this fashion.)

As it was, Haushofer left Japan with admirable envy for the "space-consciousness" of the Japanese.

Upon returning to Germany, Haushofer reassumed his duties at the general staff college, more than sufficiently prepared to lecture on Japan and the Orient. In 1912 Haushofer was reportedly placed on leave due to illness, although the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 led to immediate recall. However, during the interval, two books on Japan were published: Dia Nihon: Greater Japan's Military Power, World Role, and Future; and a second work presented as a doctoral dissertation, entitled, the German Share in the Geographical Opening Up of Japan and the Sub-Japanese Earth Space, and Its Advancement Through the Influence of War and Defense Politics.<sup>7</sup> The former, published for the general public, and covering general topics briefly, only hinted at the military geography Haushofer had acquired by that time. However, the dissertation was written with the conviction that only "a firm summarizing of my frequently interrupted cultural progress in geography would

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6. Ibidl, p. 590.

7. Russell H. Fifield, "Geopolitics at Munich," The Department of State Bulletin, XII, June 24, 1945, p. 1134.

permit me to extract from my practical experience in the foreign service their full value."<sup>8</sup>

The beforehand inescapably imparted Haushofer's interest in the inter-relationship of military affairs and geography, in the application of geographic factors to military planning.<sup>9</sup> The dissertation, dedicated to Ratzel, opened with the oft-quoted statement from Heraclitus: "War is the father of all things."<sup>10</sup> Haushofer's preoccupation with militant geography is apparent from the following statement: "To a soldier who obviously comes to the scientific workfield of geography from a militaro-geographic approach, it is but a step to the wise to demonstrate the worth of Heraclitus's axiom also for this field."<sup>11</sup>

In 1914 with the war at hand, Haushofer was forced to discontinue his studies and writing and join his comrades on the battlefields of Europe. However, the geographic insights gained into the inter-connections of geography and military strategy were not lost in the ensuing war years,

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<sup>8</sup>Karl Haushofer, quoted in Derwent Whittlesey, Haushofer: the Geopoliticians, Edward Earle (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), p. 395.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Karl Haushofer, Dia Nihon . . . quoted in Derwent Whittlesey, "Haushofer: the Geopoliticians," Makers of Modern Strategy, Edward Earle, (ed.), op. cit., p. 395.

but rather strengthened in practicality. The war itself provided confirmation of many of the ideas that Haushofer had contemplated, and convinced him of his mission after the war.<sup>12</sup>

The years between 1914 and 1918 witnessed no complete void of geopolitical ideas, although as yet, there was no science of Geopolitik.<sup>13</sup> However, a sizeable number of later-day components were characteristic of the period. Lebensraum emerged as a war aim, though not in the substance of form it assumed in World War II.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, Friedrich Naumann's Mitteleuropa was widely read during the optimistic years of the war, as were other schemes dealing with German expansion into various parts of Central Europe.<sup>15</sup> In addition, Paul Rohrbach's expansion themes were resuscitated, including the role of a proposed Berlin-Bagdad

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<sup>12</sup> Fifield, "Geopolitics at Munich," op. cit., p. 15.

<sup>13</sup> According to Robert Strausz-Hupe, Lebensraum as an aim in World War I was all-inclusive. "It meant not the righting of a specific wrong or even the demand for the annexation of any specific territory. It covered an infinite variety of demands for an infinite variety of spaces. It envisioned everything, and committed Germany, in her relations with her allies, to nothing." See Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics, op. cit., p. 36.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Henry Cord Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 1815-1945 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1955), p. 172.

railroad.<sup>16</sup> However, although expansion was widely discussed there appeared no comprehensive design for world conquest, and what objectives there were, existed on the continent of Europe.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, although somewhat crude and unimagi-native maps were drawn for the purpose of elucidating German claims to contiguous territory, they received no widespread attention.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, advocates of Lebensraum to be secured outside of Europe found virtually only a small fol-lowing. In addition, Austria was generally considered a barrier to German expansion southward, although that country's ultimate absorption was necessitated as a step in creating a Mitteleuropa under German hegemony.<sup>19</sup>

World War I also saw various Pan-German societies emerge to play a leading role in support of the German effort. Such activities as those carried on by the Pan-German League served somewhat auspiciously the aims of German nationalism at home and abroad.<sup>20</sup> A basic motive of the League was to inspire Germans living outside Germany to remain loyal to the

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics, op. cit., p. 36.

<sup>18</sup>Meyer, op. cit.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Whittlesey, German Strategy of World Conquest, op. cit., p. 36.

government. Moreover, the aims of that association included: the preservation of German nationality wherever German elements existed; the continued support of German schools abroad; the nullification of impediments to German national development; and the furthering of German interests in all parts of the world.<sup>21</sup> Territorially, before World War I the League desired to incorporate all Germans living in surrounding countries, and eventually aspired to witness a time when Germans throughout the world would dominate in their respective areas.<sup>22</sup> During the war, the League specifically supported German claims adjacent to the country's western border.<sup>23</sup> Apparently, such territorial aspirations were predicated on the belief that Germany rightfully must possess a share of world power and space proportionate to the greatness of Germany's cultural, economic and militaristic strength.<sup>24</sup>

An interesting sidelight of the Pan-German movement was its emphasis on compiling information on various geographical areas. A critic in 1917, remarked on such efforts:

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 36.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid. p. 41.

The Pan-German plan is founded on a very exact knowledge of all political, ethnographical, economic, social, military, and naval problems, not only of Europe, but of the whole world. . . .<sup>25</sup>

Inspired perhaps by the continental and worldwide thinking of such organizations as the Pan-Germanists, the war years culminated in a sizeable re-evaluation of Germany's position in international affairs.<sup>26</sup> Several German scholars in various fields attempted re-orientations of their areas that would assist the war effort. Certain geographers and political scientists devised new combinations that represented subject material from their respective fields.<sup>27</sup> By some coincidence, the primary works of Kjellen were translated, and subsequently distributed widely throughout the country, concomitantly receiving immense popularity among the citizenry.<sup>28</sup> The Swede's evaluations of world politics in terms of geographic factors apparently

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 55.

<sup>26</sup>Meyer, op. cit., p. 140.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>The following works of Kjellen were published: Die Grossmächte der Gegenwart, translated by C. Koch (1914) and republished in 1916, subsequently went through 21 printings in 1919. Die politischen Probleme des Weltkrieges, translated in 1916, was followed by Staten som Lifsform, translated as Der Staatals Lebensform. See Derwent Whittlesey, German Strategy of World Conquest, p. 278.

impressed also a sizeable number of German scholars, not the least of geographers, who noted his works in passing.<sup>29</sup>

After indigenous examination of Kjellen's analysis of the effect that geographical, political, economic, and social factors wield on the power of nations, several Germans were apparently convinced of the need for instituting some form of Mitteleuropa, which with additional natural resources and space would guarantee Germany a dominant position in the politics of Europe.<sup>30</sup> The message that Kjellen conveyed, that is, that the world was dominated by a few great powers and that Germany should assume a leading role on the continent of Europe, was interpreted as warranting Germany's expansion over contiguous territory to achieve such a status.<sup>31</sup> Kjellen's insistence that a lack of geographic space compelled expansion was the first introduction many Germans had to political geography, although millions were introduced to the field through German military campaigns in Europe and elsewhere.<sup>32</sup>

For these and other reasons, the war witnessed a renewed interest in political geography and in the works of

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<sup>29</sup>Meyer, op. cit., p. 141.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics, p. 20.

<sup>32</sup>Meyer, op. cit.



Ratzel and Kjellen. Furthermore, many of Kjellen's theories reflected the age-old fears of Germans. For instance, Kjellen reiterated Germany's natural opposition to Russia and the British Empire, as well as Sweden's similar position.<sup>33</sup>

Thus, Russia's trend toward expansion for warm water outlets placed Sweden in a precarious, if not defenseless position. Sweden, characterized by a "declining space-consciousness" possessed neither the strength nor resourcefulness to oppose Russian moves.<sup>34</sup> Kjellen envisaged somewhat of a similar predicament for Germany, unless it activated space-thinking, since that country lacked at this time what was considered the three primary attributes of a great power: spaciousness, freedom of movement, and internal cohesion.<sup>35</sup> If Russia was by the nature of her situation, barred from ocean outlets and deficient in freedom of movement; and England possessed a lack of internal cohesion; then Germany was negligible in all three.<sup>36</sup> With no overseas possessions to speak of (at least prior to the latter part of the nineteenth century), a coastline that was minute in comparison

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<sup>33</sup>Strausz-Hupe, op. cit., p. 41.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 43.

to that of England, Russia, and other powers of the day; and a position on the continent amidst a host of encircling adversaries; Germany was nevertheless selected by Kjellen as the one nation destined to ward off the designs of Russia.<sup>37</sup> Further, Kjellen envisaged a profitable and expansive future for Germany, projecting an empire bounded by Dunkerque and Riga, Hamburg and Bagdad, and extending at its furthest point to Middle Africa.<sup>38</sup> Such an empire would have included some two hundred and fifty million people under German hegemony. With due sincerity, a number of Germany's political and military leaders, viewed such expansion as a dutiful objective, not at all impractical.<sup>39</sup>

The war years, witnessing a reactivation of political geography, also resulted in endeavors by a number of German geographers to elevate that branch to equal status with physical geography.<sup>40</sup> In the realm of world politics which some geographers entered, the tendency was to seek geographic explanations for German shortcomings. Alfred Hettner, for instance, a widely recognized geographer, thus saw

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<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 44.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 45.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 46.

<sup>40</sup>Meyer, op. cit., p. 246.

Germany's failures in foreign affairs as a result of insufficient geographic insights.<sup>41</sup> He consequently insisted that "basic ideas of all foreign policy must be founded on geography."<sup>42</sup> Another noted geographer of the period, Albert Penck, recognized the incessant necessity of a growing people for space and further insisted that geography would be a forceful determinant of the fate of Germany and the other Central European states in the future.<sup>43</sup> A contemporary Austrian professor, Hugo Hassinger produced during these fateful years a delimitation of a Mitteleuropa that was not far from the aspirations of post-war Geopolitikers. Such a Mitteleuropa would have characteristically included boundaries that were motile, or in a "process of . . . strong expansive movement."<sup>44</sup>

In retrospect, Ratzelian theories and Kjellen's new geopolitical science secured a firm footing in Germany during the war years, and in all probability, assisted the war effort, although to what degree remains uncertain. Nonetheless, political geography played an increasing role as

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<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid.

the fortunes of the German army seemed destined to bring ultimate victory to the German cause.

However, as was the case, the war was lost. To millions of Germans prepared for the supreme victory, defeat at the hands of the allies came as a demoralizing shock. The terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty served to further disconcert the population of Germany. The general staff was abolished, the colonies forfeited to other nations, and the army reduced to a virtual nonentity.<sup>45</sup> Germany's Drang nach Osten was abruptly halted, and the size of Germany itself reduced by the resultant severing of a number of Germanic speaking areas. France was awarded Alsace-Lorraine and permitted to occupy the Rhineland for a decade and a half. Henceforth no air force was to be permitted, no submarines allowed to operate, and the navy was to be limited to six heavy cruisers, six medium cruisers, and a similar amount of destroyers.<sup>46</sup>

Economically, it appeared that France desired to witness a Germany humbled, rendered unable to rearm, and accordingly, the French did their part in securing the harshest terms possible.

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<sup>45</sup>George Mayer and Walter Forster, The United States in the Twentieth Century (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1958), p. 30.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

Perhaps the most unwelcome terms of the treaty were those that divorced German areas in Posen and West Prussia from the homeland of Germany, and evoked the incorporation of more than a million Germans into a "corridor" designed to separate East Prussia from the rest of Germany. Such sundered territories constituted one-eighth of Germany's territory, one-seventh of her arable land, a sizeable amount of the population, and more than a small amount of her mineral resources.<sup>47</sup> (in post-war years, gaining back territory became one of the first objectives of Geopolitik under Haushofer.)

The "war-guilt" clause that the Germans were forced to admit to, leveling the responsibility for the war on Germany, was one further action that in succeeding years fueled a revengeful attitude among the proud militarists of that country.

### The Post-War Years

The war's end and Versailles, although stifling for for a time German plans for expansion, saw no accompanying destruction of the work carried on by German geographers. On the other hand, political geography, though under a

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<sup>47</sup>Ibid.

different guise, and imbued along different lines, received new direction, direction that a vindictive Germany was prepared for. Thus it was, that even before the final terms arrived from Versailles, a number of the military, political, and intellectual hierarchy were already thinking in terms of vindication and rearmament.<sup>48</sup> The defeat might have shattered immediate schemes for enlarging Germany's Lebensraum; however, by no means had the desire for territorial expansion completely waned.<sup>49</sup> Apparently, the teachings of Ratzel and Kjellen acquired expanded impetus and some new meaning in post-war years, especially their directives on the regeneration of state power.<sup>50</sup> To a Germany at a low ebb, susceptibility to such regenerative ideas as they professed was understandable. If more concern for the effect of natural factors and strict adherence to the geographic factors of state power would lead to reinstating Germany's greatness, then, no small number of geographers and political scientists accepted the challenge of such implications.<sup>51</sup> Among the more noteworthy was Karl Haushofer, recently discharged from

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<sup>48</sup>Etzel Percy and Russell H. Fifield, World Political Geography (New York: Thomas Crowell Co., 1948), p. 23.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid.

the army in 1919, and the likes of Alfred Hettner, Arthur Dix, and Alex Supan.<sup>52</sup> Apparently, the common goals of such geographers was the restoration of Germany's power, which led a number of them to abandon more scientific pursuits for the sake of a movement-in-the making that promised vindication of Germany and denunciation of the Versailles Treaty.<sup>53</sup> One writer remarked of the post-war period that witnessed a new direction for German geography:

. . . in connection with their geographical studies, the stigma of national defeat. . . the psychoses of war-guilt denial and of Versailles peace-treaty repudiation had left the German geographers in no normal state of mind. They were not really searching for the politico-geographic reasons for Germany's defeat; they were seeking a blueprint for German vindication and revival, and a strategy for eventual national victory.<sup>54</sup>

Although the political geography developed in Germany prior to this time apparently offered some basis for post-war reconstruction along modest lines, it was junked by most Germans who wanted much more, including:

. . . total vindication, total escape from war guilt, and total revival of wealth and power. To achieve these ends, they were willing to convert political geography into total geographical nonsense if need be, and eventually to risk war.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>52</sup>Ibid.

<sup>53</sup>Pearcy and Fifield, World Political Geography.  
op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid.

It was sometime during the immediate post-war period that the Germans adopted Kjellen's term Geopolitik for the name of the geopolitical "science" that offered restoration, expansion, and possibly a method of world domination.<sup>56</sup> The adoption of the term Geopolitik besides being a name for the old political and military geography of Germany, now "enabled the German geographers themselves to escape the moral censorship of their science, and to sidestep their own scientific consciences."<sup>57</sup>

Kjellen's book, The Great Powers of the World had gone to nineteen editions in Germany sometime during the war and once the war was over, he published The Great Powers and the World Crisis,<sup>58</sup> foreshadowing new opportunities for the vanquished Germans. However, the conclusion of the war released an ominous figure once again into the politico-geographic realm--Karl Haushofer.

Alllegedly, Haushofer decided to dedicate his career to a regeneration of Germany while leading defeated troops back across eastern borders into the homeland. In Grenzen (Frontiers) Haushofer observed:

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<sup>56</sup>Ibid.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

<sup>58</sup>Taylor, op. cit., p. 103.



When late in the fall of 1918, on my homeward march from the broken remnants of Germany's border provinces, I realized, in contrast to the keen frontier instinct I had observed in other peoples, the comparative lack of such instinct on the part of my own otherwise highly gifted people; when I perceived the German people's blind faith in the promises of their enemies and experienced its self-deception concerning the facts of the perpetual struggle for Lebensraum on this earth-- at that time the inner need which I felt myself and which I believed would soon be felt by my people created the impulse and the plan for this work.<sup>59</sup>

In such a manner, Haushofer lamented the lack of what he termed the "frontier instinct" on the part of the German people, for they had allowed themselves to be driven back from areas they had held for centuries because they never possessed that historical living space inwardly, "or cherished it as a spiritual treasure."<sup>60</sup> Herein, Haushofer deemed it his mission to enlighten the Germans on the attributes of space-consciousness, and the advantages of possessing additional space.

After a discharge from the army, Haushofer accepted an appointment in 1919 to the geography staff of the University of Munich.<sup>61</sup> Since the general staff apparently continued operating, although in a clandestine manner, it is

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<sup>59</sup>Karl Haushofer, Grenzen, quoted in Robert Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics: the Struggle for Space and Power, p. 47.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 49.

not at all improbable that Haushofer assisted their post-war efforts in formulating plans for reconstructing the Germany army, especially as they were related to geographic considerations.<sup>62</sup>

Whatever the case, at Munich Haushofer had innumerable opportunities to associate with geographers, political scientists, journalists, and other Germans that held similar views to his on the necessity of restoring German power and the role geographic factors would play in such an effort. The concomitant results of such associations was the launching of the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, the seminar on *Geopolitik*, and the "school" of *Geopolitik*.

Until 1922 Haushofer had the able assistance and collaboration of Kjellen, until the latter's death in that year. Thereafter, Haushofer assumed the reins as the foremost *Geopolitiker* of the post-war era.<sup>63</sup>

The actual date that saw a large scale movement by German geographers into the field initiated by Kjellen and Haushofer was not until 1924, although by that time, a sizeable number of younger geographers had quickly taken

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<sup>62</sup>Kalijarvi, op. cit., p. 347.

<sup>63</sup>Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics, op. cit., p. 50.

to Haushofer.<sup>64</sup> After 1924 the cooperation of such scholarly geographers as Otto Maull, Eric Obst, and Hugo Hassinger was enlisted, and would have seemed to guarantee a development of Geopolitik along more scientific lines than resulted.<sup>65</sup> However, perhaps the following statement has some meaning in explaining the position of such geographers:

If the tendency to follow all the aspects of a problem leads the geographer into fields unfamiliar to him, much more serious is the tendency to go beyond the study of things as they are and render judgments as to what they should be. When dealing with some problem in which his own country is concerned, the student will strive to demonstrate that things should be made as he, a loyal citizen, would like them to be.<sup>66</sup>

Between 1916 and 1928, a number of publications appeared tainted strongly with the ideas of Ratzel and Kjellen. Maull, treating of political geography aptly depicts the direction in which much of German geography was heading. Basing his Politische Geographie on Ratzel's of the same name, the determinants of "space" and "position" were once again exalted in a theory of state organization.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>64</sup>Carl Troll, "Geographic Science in Germany," Fischer, trans., Annals, Association of American Geographers, XXXVI (June, 1949), p. 129.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid.

<sup>66</sup>Richard Hartshorne, "Recent Developments in Political Geography," The American Political Science Review, XXIX (October, 1935), p. 958.

<sup>67</sup>Kiss, op. cit., p. 238.

Similarly, the state was viewed as a spatial organism, displaying a strong tendency toward environmental determinism. States were thereby distinguishable in terms of power by the nature of their physical situation, and the processes of growth, maturation and decay were ever present in the life of nations.<sup>68</sup> However, when Maull's work appeared, it had only a limited influence, and it remained for Haushofer and his associates to further mold political geography into Geopolitik.

Conceivably, the actual birthdate of German Geopolitik dates from 1924, the year Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean was published and the Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik launched, with Maull and Obst as co-founders and Kurt Vowinckel as publisher.<sup>69</sup> An alleged early objective of the journal was the revision of the peace treaties.<sup>70</sup> Whatever the case, the dynamic concepts of Ratzel, Kjellen, Mackinder, and a host of others interpreted and given new meaning by German writers, now had a means of conveyance to the general public.

The Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik, the dynamic concepts emerging, and the personage of Haushofer, combined to give

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<sup>68</sup>Ibid.

<sup>69</sup>Fiefield, "Geopolitiks at Munich," op. cit., p. 1155.

<sup>70</sup>Meyer, op. cit., p. 309.

the new German science of Geopolitik a popular appeal, offering more than the static, stable scientific geography practiced at the time.

Between 1924 and 1931, Haushofer and his associates produced a number of works basic to German Geopolitik. Haushofer's first major contribution was Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean (1924) followed by Frontiers (1927), Geopolitics of Self-Determination (1927), The Great Powers and the World War (1930), and Geopolitik of Pan-Ideas (1931). Obst published a geopolitical work in 1927 entitled England, Europe and the World, and Haushofer, Maull, Obst, and Herman Lautensach collaborated on Baustein zur Geopolitik (1927).<sup>71</sup> Besides the aforehand, there were a number of other geopolitical works published, virtually too numerous to mention.

Haushofer's first major contribution to Geopolitik containing most of his important ideas, came under the rather elongated title of Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean: Studies on the Relationship between Geography and History.<sup>72</sup> As might be expected, it exposed the history of the Pacific area according to a pattern of geographic determinants. To

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<sup>71</sup>Whittlesey, German Strategy, op. cit., p. 275.

<sup>72</sup>Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics, op. cit., p. 50.

some, this work became the early Bible of Geopolitik, inasmuch as it reflected Haushofer's general ideas of the period, although the underlying motive of its publication was to orient the Germans towards the east and Pacific areas.<sup>73</sup> Since his early jaunt to the East had been made while he was reportedly highly influenced by Ratzel's laws of space or space-growth, and especially the notion that "every people must be educated up from smaller to larger conceptions of space . . . and a declining space conception results in decay of the state," it appears that Japan served well as a laboratory for Haushofer's similar views.

Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean was further written to encourage the Germans to think conceptually in terms of large spaces, and what more forceful example was at hand than Japan's relationship to the rest of the Far East.<sup>74</sup>

For some time, Japan had aspired to and pursued a policy of expansion on the continent of Asia, thus resulting in a significant expansion of her living area. Apparently Haushofer saw in Japan's progress towards conquering the

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<sup>73</sup>Ibid.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid.

interior of China, a classic example of Ratzel's laws of territorial growth.<sup>75</sup>

Obstensibly, Haushofer viewed the situation in Asia at the time, as a struggle against the colonial powers of England, France, and the Dutch, the erstwhile adversaries of Germany.<sup>76</sup> It was Germany's responsibility to assist the Asians in their quest for self-determination. In any struggle against Great Britain and the rest, Germany and Japan were natural allies, since World War I had removed any over-lapping territorial interests.<sup>77</sup> Therefore, the predominant theme of this geopolitical work was advocacy of a close relationship between Germany and Japan, "an attempt to link the great spaces of the Pacific to the small spaces of Germany."<sup>78</sup> Haushofer was certain that the international balance of power was shifting to the Pacific, and therefore, such an alliance was advantageous to Germany at the expense of the Anglo-Saxon colonizers.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>75</sup>Hans Weigert, "Asia Through Haushofer's Glasses," Compass of the World, Weigert and Vilhjalmur Stefansson (eds.) (New York: the Macmillan Company, 1944), p. 398.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., p. 399.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid., p. 402.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid.

Another salient point deduced from Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean concerned Haushofer's preoccupation with the conviction that land powers and sea powers were bound inevitably to clash, although Germany and Japan were themselves at such odds.<sup>80</sup> In essence, the theory was that England's mastery of the seas and world trade would at some future date conflict with Germany's intention to consolidate the mainland and secure world trade for herself.<sup>81</sup>

At this juncture also, Haushofer advocated Russo-Japanese cooperation, stating "the less friction there is in relations between Japan and Russia, the less chance for the Anglo-Saxons to impose a policy of divide and conquer."<sup>82</sup>

In this same work Haushofer felt free to allot Japan living space in the Indo-Pacific area but not any in the Eurasian Heartland itself, which he supposedly reserved for Russo-German control.<sup>83</sup>

In retrospect, Haushofer was convinced that the Pacific area represented the most important geopolitical area in the world, and that forthrightly it would assume a dominant role

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<sup>80</sup>Ibid.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid.

<sup>83</sup>Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics, op. cit., p. 128.



in world politics.<sup>84</sup> In Japan's urge to expand Haushofer envisaged the "rhythmical breathing of a continuously expanding life organ."<sup>85</sup> He summed up Japan's position as follows:

I am convinced that the Empire of the Rising Sun will continue to be successful in its conquest of space as long as it observes the rules of jiu-jitsu and, as before, avoids the dangers of an unbridled expansion.<sup>86</sup>

The application of such geopolitical consciousness on the part of the Germans could turn defeat into victory, if only they adopted a similar global point of view.<sup>87</sup>

The ideas expressed in Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean, constituting Haushofer's prime objectives, were essentially the same as expressed in Grenzen (Frontiers), actually translated as The Geographical and Political Significance of Frontiers, and a collaborative work entitled, Macht und Erde (Power and Earth).<sup>88</sup> However, one other work stands out as a further representation of Haushofer's ideas;

<sup>84</sup>Fifiield, "Geopolitics at Munich," op. cit., p. 1156.

<sup>85</sup>Karl Haushofer, Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean, quoted in Fifiield, "Geopolitics at Munich," op. cit., p. 1155.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid.

<sup>88</sup>Griswold, op. cit., p. 316.

his Weltpolitik von Heute (World Politics of Today), published in 1934.

Dedicated to Rudolf Hess, "World Politics" was designed to acquaint the Germans with contemporary world politics, and as such, demanded that they place themselves "in the center of the 'folk' and cultural space,"<sup>89</sup> for "racial determinants . . . are dynamic elements within the 'static' world of international agreements."<sup>90</sup> The Germany of 1932 was a product of a Versailles Treaty based on immense geopolitical inaccuracies, and it was the purpose of geopolitics to overcome such errors, including "the division of Europe into colony-possessing powers in the West, space-possessing powers in the East, and strangled states in the center."<sup>91</sup> "World Politics" recognized Versailles responsibility also for the autonomous development of America, the disintegration of the British Empire, the renewed impetus on self-determination in the Indo-Pacific area, and a return of Russia to an eastward orientation.<sup>92</sup> Future political developments depended, therefore,

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<sup>89</sup>Neumann, op. cit., p. 142.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., p. 143.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., p. 143.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid.

upon the situations resulting from such matters, and "a clear insight into the relations between power and state."<sup>93</sup> Primal geopolitical drives were functioning in the four areas of America, the British Empire, the Indo-Pacific realm, and Russia, contending for the domination of spaces, continental and trans-continental.<sup>94</sup>

The task at hand for the Germans was to restore the lost space of the Reich, including military space; the territory of the Reich; the conglomerations of German "folk soil," inclusive of the Polish Corridor, the Sudetenland, Upper Silesia, Teschen, Austria, Alsace-Lorraine, and southern Denmark; the areas predominated by German culture elements; and the independent Dutch-Flemish spaces.<sup>95</sup>

"World Politics" was further endowed with Haushofer's theory of decadent and renovating powers, in constant opposition to each other.<sup>96</sup> The foremost opposition was between the renaissance or reviving powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and the powers of perseverance, including England and France, with various other powers designated a

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<sup>93</sup>Ibid.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid.

<sup>95</sup>Ibid.

<sup>96</sup>Ibid.

middle-of-the-road position.<sup>97</sup> The prevailing answers to such formidable oppositions lay not among normal routes or with legal organizations but followed the old German proverb that declared self-help to be the best help.<sup>98</sup>

At a later stage in the work (World Politics) Haushofer attempted to delineate the amount of space requisite for Germany's or any other state's needs. The problem was solvable by incorporating smaller spaces and by destroying Britain and France.<sup>99</sup> The limits to the British Empire had been reached, therefore, decadence would set in, and a loss of space was inevitable. Similarly, France was doomed for it had "lost the will to live," and "a country that has begun to surrender is through."<sup>100</sup>

Great powers were to be replaced by world powers, possessing the "will to power," since the amount of space occupied alone was insufficient to declare the status of a country.<sup>101</sup> Germany's dominant situation amidst the world powers provided what was considered the gist of "World Politics."

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<sup>97</sup>Ibid.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid., p. 144.

<sup>99</sup>Ibid.

<sup>100</sup>Ibid.

<sup>101</sup>Ibid.

Germany was "to work carefully, utilizing the existing antagonisms by a surprisingly decisive interference of counsel and action: for everything falls into the lap of him who waits."<sup>102</sup>

In this later work, as contrasted with Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean, Haushofer harangued his readers with the value of racism in achieving living space. Haushofer contended that master races must perpetuate purity, since racial intermingling had brought about the disintegration of many an empire.<sup>103</sup> By comparison, there was no apparent reference or preference for Aryan superiority in Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean.<sup>104</sup> Quite to the contrary, Haushofer stressed the beneficial results of crossbreeding racial strains.<sup>105</sup>

Haushofer encouraged the exploitation of racial minorities if they were being suppressed, especially German related peoples, and argued for the right of self-determination, which he saw an invaluable weapon to Germany.<sup>106</sup> Thereupon, Haushofer admonished his audience to "take

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<sup>102</sup>Ibid.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid.

<sup>104</sup>Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics, op. cit., p. 91.

<sup>105</sup>Ibid.

<sup>106</sup>Neumann, op. cit., p. 145.

advantage of every friction growing out of the minority problem. Stir up national and racial conflicts where you can. Every conflict will play into the hands of Germany."<sup>107</sup>

Haushofer considered Germany to be justifiable in seeking to gain its lost territory back, basing his claim on the immorality of Versailles and the territorial acquisitions by the allied powers.<sup>108</sup> Such acquisitions were "Robberies concealed and justified by international law. The mandates, for example were nothing other than spatial fraud."<sup>109</sup> In future attempts to conquer space, Germany would apply such new methods as exemplified by propaganda; "new military techniques including the use of aeroplanes and tanks as loosening forces against both troops and civilians;" and the blitzkrieg.<sup>110</sup>

The world mission for Germany was to dismember Britain and France, and allow only Russia, Japan, and the United States to exist as powers alongside Germany.<sup>111</sup> Thus, the renovating powers would rid the world of the decadent powers.

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<sup>107</sup>Karl Haushofer, Weltpolitik von Heute, quoted in Franz Neumann, Behemoth (Octagon Books, 1963), p. 145.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid.

<sup>109</sup>Ibid.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid.

Through Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean, World Politics of Today, and the various other Haushofer works, run the underlying themes that dominate the "science" of Geopolitik. The themes appear to be centered around the following concepts: the organic theory of state, an age-old theory modified for modern usage; Lebensraum, or living space, consisting of ideas adapted by Haushofer from the likes of Ratzel and Kjellen; Drang nach Osten and Mittel-europa, advocating expansion at the expense of Germany's neighbors and directed toward "a place in the sun;" Weltanschauung, comprising a sort of world outlook that necessitated German dominance in world affairs; Autarky, seeking an economic self-sufficiency that would render Germany a "have nation," but ultimately geared to render the German war machine unimpregnable; the Heartland, comprising most of the Eurasian land mass and presenting a foremost objective for consolidation that inevitably spelled dominance of the World Island, and the destruction of the British Empire, its monopoly of world trade and seapower.

The Organic Nature of States and Dynamic Concepts of Space

Haushofer accepted basically the findings of Ratzel and Kjellen on these subjects and came to regard the state as an organic entity, subject to biological laws.<sup>112</sup> At

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<sup>112</sup>Kamenetsky, op. cit., p. 30.

this point, he was much closer to Kjellen's state conception than to Ratzel's which was presented in metaphor. Therefore, the state was likened to a biological organism, that must expand if it is to survive, and this constituted a basic law of the growth of nations.

If the state-organism must expand, then it did so at the expense of its weaker neighbors. Space was power, a vehicle of political force, and the means for conquering yet more space. On the attributes of space as power, Haushofer remarked:

A great nation has to break out from a singularly narrow space, crowded with people, without fresh air, a vital space narrowed and mitulated for the past thousand years . . . unless either the whole earth is opened up or the free immigration of the best and most capable people or else the vital spaces still unoccupied are redistributed according to former accomplishments and the ability to create.<sup>113</sup>

Similarly, in Bausteine zur Geopolitik (1928), which Haushofer collaborated on with Obst and others, it was concluded:

Geopolitik is one of the most powerful weapons in the struggle for a more just distribution of vital spaces of the earth, a distribution based on the capacity to work and the cultural achievements of peoples rather than on settlements imposed by force.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>113</sup>Karl Haushofer, Atemweite, quoted in George Kiss, "Political Geography into Geopolitics," The Geographical Review, XXXIX, October, 1942, p. 643.

<sup>114</sup>Karl Haushofer and others, Bausteine zur Geopolitik quoted in George Kiss, op. cit., p. 642.



Perhaps the following statement of Kjellen also serves to illuminate Haushofer's views on space, and the relation of states:

Just as living organisms tend to expand, so "vital strong states" with a limited area of sovereignty are dominated by the categorical political imperative to enlarge their area by colonization, union with other states, or conquest . . . this is the case of Germany. . . . In both cases this expansion is not the raw instinct of conquest, but the natural and necessary trend toward expansion as a means of self-preservation.<sup>115</sup>

In interpreting Ratzel's soil-embedded state-organism Haushofer, literally, thought he meant a state deeply rooted agriculturally, and therefore adopted such a pursuit as the best mode of life for Germany.<sup>116</sup>

In such a manner Haushofer taught that space influenced all human activities and as such, constituted a prime concern of the field of geopolitics.<sup>117</sup> The historic development of mankind continually reflected the struggle for space. Further, the political maturation of a nation was due, not to historical factors, or political accident, but to geographic determinants, including various natural resources and raw materials and one

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<sup>115</sup>Rudolf Kjellen, Staten som Lifsforn, quoted in Derwent Whittlesey, German Strategy of World Conquest, op. cit., p. 93.

<sup>116</sup>Kamenetsky, op. cit., p. 31.

<sup>117</sup>Adolf Stone, "Geopolitics as Haushofer Taught It," The Journal of Geography, XXXXXIII, (1953), p. 167.

further aspect, opportunities for expansion.<sup>118</sup> As one writer stated:

. . . foreign policy does not determine the history of a country, but the land itself determines the foreign policy and hence the history.<sup>119</sup>

Haushofer therefore believed that all research of necessity, must start with space, which was the least changeable of factors in man's political life.<sup>120</sup> All civilization was based on space concepts: Hellenism resulted from the Aegean Sea, Islam evolved from the desert, the U.S.S.R. was conceived out of the steppes.<sup>121</sup> Rim empires such as that of the Romans circumscribing the Mediterranean Sea and that of the Turks surrounding the Black Sea, had no space basis, and therefore, no enduring quality.<sup>122</sup> The development of every nation inevitably was dependent on its share of space on the surface of the earth.<sup>123</sup> Concomitant redistributions of space shares resulted in molding the essence of history, and the basic

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<sup>118</sup>Ibid.

<sup>119</sup>H. F. Raup, "Geopolitics," Education, XXXXXXVIII, January, 1943, p. 267.

<sup>120</sup>Stone, op. cit.

<sup>121</sup>Ibid.

<sup>122</sup>Ibid.

<sup>123</sup>Ibid.

pattern followed was that "space always conquered" the conquering man.<sup>124</sup> Hence, Russia faces towards Asia, Christianity was absorbed into Europe rather than the Near East. Haushofer's classic example of space conquering man was always Napoleon's unsuccessful attempt to conquer the vast expanses of the interior of Russia, which demonstrated the superiority of such space factors as the steppe and climate over man.<sup>125</sup>

The various theories on the organismic nature of the state, coupled with such space-thinking, inevitably led Haushofer to examine Germany's spatial accomplishments, or rather, lack of space. After a painstaking diagnosis of the German state and its situation as regards its contemporary Raum, Haushofer prescribed additional living space or Lebensraum.<sup>126</sup> The organismic theory, inasmuch as it provided that a state must expand or perish, provided the justification for securing Lebensraum. Therefore Haushofer concluded that there was a natural right to additional living space, even at the expense of contiguous

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<sup>124</sup>Ibid.

<sup>125</sup>Ibid.

<sup>126</sup>Herman Rauschnig, *The Revolution of Nihilism*, (New York: Alliance Book Corporation, Longmans, Green and Company, 1939), p. 188.

nation or "against owners of great spaces who have not the capacity to develop their reserves of space."<sup>127</sup>

Essentially, the concept of Lebensraum was developed to the effect that the Germans were being crowded out of existence, and therefore, had every right to expand so far as they desired.<sup>128</sup>

Literally translated, Lebensraum . . . when interpreted by any one in Germany (was) taken to indicate all that which (was) necessary for guaranteeing the life and development of the German people--physically, politically, and economically. It (embraced) all kinds of issues based upon prestige, historical and geographical considerations.<sup>129</sup>

Mauil insisted that a people only had claim to "that space which it had earned as a cultural area by its work . . .,"

. . . and to that spatial reserve which it (needed) . . . for its growing body; but not to countries which . . . (would) not be able to settle or manage rationally for the best advantages of the natives for centuries or even millenia.<sup>130</sup>

Living space was further defined not only as a "place in the sun" for Germany, but as the conquest of an area large enough to be made self-sufficient in agriculture, raw

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<sup>127</sup>Ibid.

<sup>128</sup>Ladislav Farago (ed.), German Psychological Warfare (New York: Committee for National Morale, 1941), p. 67.

<sup>129</sup>Franz Kruczewski, "Germany's Lebensraum," The American Political Science Review, XXXIV (1940), p. 964.

<sup>130</sup>Otto Mauil, Das Wesen der Geopolitik, quoted in Robert Lochner, Geopolitik: Its Nature and Aims, p. 74.

materials and industrial goods.<sup>131</sup> The proposed living space was claimed on the basis of German cultural elements or nuclei habitating areas in continental Europe and elsewhere and the principal argument used to depict Germany as an organism in need of expansion was that of overpopulation.<sup>132</sup>

The proposed living space apparently under consideration for Lebensraum purposes was none but the age-old Drang nach Osten or "drive to the east."<sup>133</sup> Haushofer was not alone in advocating for the colonization of such areas as Poland and the Danubian lands. Germany's overpopulation allegedly necessitated such colonization, since, as Haushofer stated, "excessive pressure of populations becomes an explosive in the existing world order."<sup>134</sup> However, territorial colonization was only a temporary means to relieve population pressure, and a further solution was to be sought in a redistribution of the world.<sup>135</sup> Nations were to be given territory according to their capacity to sustain it, which

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<sup>131</sup>Farago, op. cit.

<sup>132</sup>Fifield, "Geopolitics at Munich," op. cit., p. 1157.

<sup>133</sup>Rauschnig, op. cit., p. 188.

<sup>134</sup>Ibid.

<sup>135</sup>Ibid.

implied that land would be taken from decadent nations.<sup>136</sup>

Thus, in the final analysis the heart of Geopolitik, as Haushofer saw it was the quest for living space, and Geopolitik was the science by which the material needs of each nation were surveyed and the proper space (Raum) and situation (Lage) logically determined.<sup>137</sup> Germany's task was thence to expand substantially throughout parts of Central Europe, neighboring countries and elsewhere, and eventually to retake overseas colonies lost in World War I.<sup>138</sup> Germany was further justified to encourage neighboring countries to revamp their economies to support or supplement that of the Reich, thereby insuring further benefits for the motherland.<sup>139</sup> A method of accomplishing further incorporation was described as follows:

Since the tendency to regionalism ("large-area amalgamation") (was) likely to be blocked by the small states, it (was) Germany's duty to "free" them from the small-area formations that (were) marks of dissolution and evaporation . . . (for) . . . the small states (had) no other choice than to become voluntary protectorates of big dynamic powers. Least of all (could) small states with vast colonial possessions expect to hold their

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<sup>136</sup>Ibid.

<sup>137</sup>Griswold, op. cit., p. 316.

<sup>138</sup>Ibid.

<sup>139</sup>Kalijarvi, op. cit., p. 351.

possessions while Germany (was) left to suffocate  
 "through insufficiency of space."<sup>140</sup>

Lebensraum was, in the final examination, the solution to Germany's social, economic, and political problems; expansion in space was the cure-all for Germany's post-war situation. However, the ultimate goal of such Lebensraum thinking must have been world domination, made possible by successive steps in the expansion process, and justifiable by the belief that the German people were entitled by the laws of nature to Lebensraum more in keeping with its needs and commensurate with its ideals.

In somewhat of a departure, it might be noted that Geopolitik writings were not the only avenue for expounding the need for Lebensraum. Hans Grimm's Volk ohne Raum (People Without Space) probably had a wider audience in the twenties than did Haushofer and his entourage.<sup>141</sup> Further, it presented fuel to a Germany that was awakening to the need for space; space for factories and for farms; space for "the expatriates lost to Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania;<sup>142</sup> space to compensate for that lost in Africa

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<sup>140</sup>Ibid.

<sup>141</sup>Griswold, op. cit., p. 320.

<sup>142</sup>Ibid., p. 321.

and the East Indies; space abounding in foodstuffs and raw materials for industry; space with which to prevent a two-front war.<sup>143</sup> These were the space-aspirations of the German geopoliticians in the twenties, thirties, and early forties.

### Autarky

The various economic aspects of Lebensraum as implied earlier, were closely tied to the goal of Autarky, the accomplishment of an economically self-sufficient Germany.<sup>144</sup> Such independence from the products of foreign nations would allow Germany security from economic strangulation in such a form as a blockade, while serving the cause of war-preparedness or mobilization.

If the German people could be made to strive toward autarky, their self-denial would immediately release both internal and imported supplies for some special purpose. . . . (which) turned out to be preparation for war.<sup>145</sup>

The pursuit of autarchic goals, as well as Lebensraum could but lead to war, for that was the ultimate means of instituting both to the highest degree, and the "science"

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<sup>143</sup>Ibid.

<sup>144</sup>Whittlesey, "Haushofer: the Geopoliticians,"  
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<sup>140</sup>Ibid.

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<sup>143</sup>Ibid.

<sup>144</sup>Whittlesey, "Haushofer: the Geopoliticians,"  
op. cit.

<sup>145</sup>Ibid.

of Geopolitik became inexorably tied to a fight for space. In retrospect, Autarky received much of its impetus from recognition of the importance of economic control as a vital weapon in penetrating various countries, or as one geopolitician stated, "complete economic penetration has the same effect as territorial occupation."<sup>146</sup>

### Pan-regions

The traditional demand of the Germans that people of the same origins be incorporated into Germany proper, appeared once again as a primary objective of the geopoliticians.<sup>147</sup> Thus, all peoples speaking Germanic languages were to become subject to the one central government of the Reich. However, the areas succeedingly claimed by Germany went somewhat beyond German-speaking areas, into non-Germanic areas of Holland, Belgium and the Slavic countries.<sup>148</sup> The territory designated for incorporation by the geopoliticians lay to the east of Germany, and was claimed on the basis of the clusters of Germans that settled the area in earlier times, and also on the

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<sup>146</sup>Fifield, Geopolitics, op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>147</sup>Kalijarvi, op. cit., p. 353.

<sup>148</sup>Whittlesey, "Haushofer: the Geopoliticians," op. cit., p. 400.

essence that German was used as the language for commercial purposes in such areas.<sup>149</sup>

However, the geopoliticians couldn't possibly lay claim to all of the world on such a basis, so a redistribution was forthcoming that divided it into four "Pan-regions," later three such groupings, upon dismissal of a Russian dominated sphere. Japan was allotted the dominant position in Pan-Asia, the United States a similar position in America, and Germany retained control of Eur-Africa.<sup>150</sup> Each of these units, comprising somewhat of a supercontinental union, combined middle with low latitudes, a variety of mineral resources, and a large share of the world's population, and were designed to be as close to self-sufficiency as possible.<sup>151</sup> The delimiting of such regions grew out of a "recognition that present-day rapid transportation and communication have destroyed independence of action for nearly all small states and some larger ones."<sup>152</sup> Therefore:

It is optimistically assumed that the time has come when areas larger than the largest existing

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<sup>149</sup>Ibid.

<sup>150</sup>Kalijarvi, op. cit., p. 353.

<sup>151</sup>Whittlesey, "Haushofer; the Geopoliticians," op. cit., p. 402.

<sup>152</sup>Ibid.

nations can be economically unified, . . . and therefore . . . politically unified.<sup>153</sup>

Pan-America and Pan-Asia, in actuality, were designed to be only temporary expedients until the fortunes of Germany permitted wholesale absorption of them.<sup>154</sup>

Under the plan for pan-regions, the British Empire and other countries with overseas empires cut across the proposed regions, and therefore, were to be obliterated. Therefore, attempts to set up such pan-regions left no alternative but recourse to war.<sup>155</sup>

#### The Importance of Land Power vs. Seapower

Consolidation of the political potentialities of Mackinder's "Heartland," and the destruction of British sea power constituted the prime objectives of the school of Geopolitik.<sup>156</sup> The former implied control of the Heartland in Russian hands either by mutual agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union, or by outright invasion and subjugating of the various republics of the U.S.S.R. Apparently, Haushofer presented no concise directives of how the Heartland was to be secured: there

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<sup>153</sup>Ibid.

<sup>154</sup>Ibid.

<sup>155</sup>Ibid.

<sup>156</sup>Fifield and Percy, World Political Geography, p.30.

were three distinct possibilities: colonization; voluntary amalgamation, or conquest.<sup>157</sup> If Mackinder was one who believed that the major threat of peace in Europe lay in German domination of Russia and Eurasia, then Haushofer was not one to make him a liar. Instead, he believed that German hegemony over the Heartland meant eventual control of the World Island, although apparently it would only be made possible by a complete and decisive defeat of the Russian armies and the Russian people.<sup>158</sup> However, a step of such magnitude belied the geopolitical fact of the impossibility of conquering a nation possessed of vast spaces within which to retreat.<sup>159</sup> Therefore it appears that Haushofer, at least early, favored some sort of reapproachment with the Soviet Union.<sup>160</sup> Accordingly, Russia was to be won over to collaboration in three phases. The German army was to win the confidence of the Russian military hierarchy by stationing advisers in Russia and by training segments of the Russian army in Germany. These occurrences were to be followed up by a conference among

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<sup>157</sup>Raup, op. cit., p. 270.

<sup>158</sup>Ibid., p. 271.

<sup>159</sup>Ibid.

<sup>160</sup>Whittlesey, German Strategy, op. cit., p. 162.

the political leaders of the two countries, and finally, the assistance of German technicians was to be made available to convert Russia into a more modern industrial power.<sup>161</sup>

Before Germany could aspire to control of the Heartland, the so-called "shatter belt" of Europe had to be secured, and "transformed into protectorates, or liquidated."<sup>162</sup> Thus, although aspirations for controlling the Heartland had been thwarted in 1919 by the establishment of the "belt," the situation was, now at long last, to be rectified.

However, at this juncture, it seems imperative to acknowledge that a Russo-German understanding as a means of counteracting the Versailles Treaty was enacted by the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922, long before Haushofer emerged as a political figure in Germany.<sup>163</sup>

The whole idea of cooperation with Russia was, from the start, taken to insure Germany a preponderant share of hegemony in the Eastern hemisphere, as well as to guard

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<sup>161</sup>"Who Rules Russia Rules the World," New Republic (July 7, 1941), p. 11.

<sup>162</sup>Miller, Renner, and others, op. cit., p. 448.

<sup>163</sup>Neumann, op. cit., p. 283.



against the eventuality of a two-front war.<sup>164</sup> Nonetheless, the potentialities of a Berlin-Moscow axis extending to Tokyo and possibly Peking loomed as a highly desirable objective in post-war I Germany. Immediately after the war, Haushofer declared that German and Russian interests, politically and economically, were identical and "that the two countries had been forced into the war on opposite sides by the perfidy of Great Britain."<sup>165</sup>

Underlying German aspirations toward the Heartland was the essence that it represented a strategically vital area containing the material and natural resources indispensable to the Reich in waging war.<sup>166</sup> The Heartland was described by one political scientist as follows:

It is the deep base from which Germany's military forces can strike in all directions while her vital war industries can be withdrawn to remote inner regions. It is--with the riches of the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and the Urals--the nearest thing to the ideal state of German economic self-sufficiency . . . it is . . . the mystical cradle of world conquerors.<sup>167</sup>

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<sup>164</sup>Felix Wasserman, "Geopolitics," Education, LXXII, (February, 1952), p. 364.

<sup>165</sup>Kiss, op. cit., p. 644.

<sup>166</sup>Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics, op. cit., p. 60.

<sup>167</sup>Ibid.

Further, the Heartland was a means whereby Germany could solve her alleged overpopulation problem, but essentially, it gained stature from Haushofer's insistence that the fundamental issue of international politics revolved around control of the Eurasian Heartland.<sup>168</sup> Therefore, if Germany controlled the Heartland, world domination was inevitable,<sup>169</sup> and a Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo axis making it possible would provide strategic impregnability to opposing forces.<sup>170</sup> The Heartland thus constituted the best possible base for land power--a natural fortress.

A second major objective of the Haushoferian school of Geopolitik was the destruction of the sea power of the maritime states that presented formidable opposition to German aspirations. The actual goal was the desecration of Britain's sea strength.<sup>171</sup> Haushofer was not one to underestimate sea power at any length, and recognized as Mackinder did, that the continual plight of history demonstrated an ever present opposition between land power

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<sup>168</sup>Ibid., p. 155.

<sup>169</sup>Ibid.

<sup>170</sup>Kamenetsky, op. cit., p. 31.

<sup>171</sup>Fifield and Percy, World Political Geography, op. cit., p. 31.

and sea power.<sup>172</sup> In order for Germany to destroy Britain's naval superiority, the Germans would have to combine their land power in the Eurasian Heartland with a formidable sea striking force: Therefore, to the geopoliticians world dominance could only be achieved by substantially subordinating sea power to land power.<sup>173</sup>

However, the attitude of the Geopolitikers made it possible to either ally with Great Britain or to accept her as a rival, although it appears Haushofer would have preferred the former course.<sup>174</sup> The general concensus was that the British "erred in failing to join forces with Germany before commercial rivalry had pushed them over the brink of war."<sup>175</sup> However, the British represented for Germany, the foremost sea power of the era, in antithesis to its own land power, and complete subjugation of Europe inevitably necessitated conflict between the two countries.<sup>176</sup> As long as Britain controlled the "world-ocean," it stood in opposition to German expansion overseas.

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<sup>172</sup>Ibid.

<sup>173</sup>Ibid.

<sup>174</sup>Whittlesey, German Strategy, op. cit., p. 203.

<sup>175</sup>Ibid.

<sup>176</sup>Ibid.

The Decadence of Britain and the West-European Nations

The British Empire was doomed according to Haushofer and the geopoliticians.<sup>177</sup> All nations relying almost exclusively on oceanic trade and a maritime situation were in a similar predicament. In addition, the European states of Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium were decadent and bound to disappear.<sup>178</sup>

Frontiers

To the geopoliticians, frontiers represented only a temporary halt of a nation in its quest for expansion and world domination.<sup>179</sup> As such, the Geopolitikers termed the science of the frontier the most important single discipline of general Geopolitik,<sup>180</sup> and dedicated their services to destroying the boundaries set by the Versailles treaty. Therefore, the frontier became a battlefield, since obviously Germany would have to fight to restore pre-war I boundaries.<sup>181</sup>

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<sup>177</sup>Ibid., p. 196.

<sup>178</sup>Fifield and Percy, World Political Geography op. cit., p. 31.

<sup>179</sup>Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics, p. 196.

<sup>180</sup>Ibid., p. 218.

<sup>181</sup>Ibid.

The frontier, as a line is in reality not the true frontier but a compromise arrived at more or less accidentally, sometimes as the result of an act of violence. Thus the frontier is a mere hiatus between power-political situations. Pacts which attempt to guarantee frontiers, are based on the great illusion that one can put a ceiling on the living growth of a nation.<sup>182</sup>

Further:

. . . the frontier is an organism like the state itself and lives a dynamic life of its own. It defies international law and treaties.<sup>183</sup>

The Geopolitik frontier therefore was one encouraging expansionism and only a "temporary front line held by the state during the lull between wars."<sup>184</sup> Only decadent nations sought fixed borders, not those, such as Germany, in a state of dynamic expansion.<sup>185</sup>

In summation, the years 1919-31, witnessed a theme and tempo for Geopolitik that followed a sequential pattern--the increasing importance attached to Haushofer and the "school of Geopolitik." However, the basic leitmotiv remained during those eventful years the essence that space was not only the vehicle of power--it was power. The writings of Ratzel and Kjellen prospered in the post-war

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<sup>182</sup>Otto Maull, Polisische Grenzen, quoted in Derwent Whittlesey, German Strategy of World Conquest, p. 219.

<sup>183</sup>Ibid.

<sup>184</sup>Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics, op. cit., p. 220.

<sup>185</sup>Ibid.

years and accorded Haushofer a number of basic theories on the organismic nature of the state, the necessity for Lebensraum, Autarky, and a host of others. The dynamic concepts of Geopolitik space thinking as listed precedingly secured a sizeable following by 1931, not the least of which included the National Socialists. For all practical purposes, Geopolitik found its way into that organization by way of Hitler and the Versailles revisionist movement, which is the subject of the succeeding chapter. However, in the final analysis, Haushofer was commended highly by an American author because:

He understood the dangerous potentialities resulting from the combination of the geographic factor of limitless space with the driving dynamism of a global revolutionary mission. He saw Russia's tremendous possibilities in lining up with the coming revolt of the restless masses in China, Indonesia, India, and the Islamic Near East. He emphasized that, being a semi-Asiatic country herself, she was, mentally as well as geographically, closer to the Asiatic half of mankind than were the Western colonial powers, which in consequence of the internecine strife of the war were losing their grip.<sup>186</sup>

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<sup>186</sup>Wasserman, op. cit., p. 365.

## CHAPTER IV

### NATIONAL SOCIALIST GEOPOLITIK

A prolific amount of literature has been written on the relationship between Haushofer and Adolf Hitler. Suffice it to say that documented evidence proves that Haushofer conferred with the latter at Landsberg am Lech, a sort of prison outside of Munich, and that Rudolf Hess was a pupil of Haushofer's at the University of Munich.<sup>1</sup> In addition, it appears that Hitler received a number of books from Haushofer, including Machiavelli's Prince, Clausewitz' On War, and Ratzel's Political Geography.<sup>2</sup> Any similarity between the writings of Haushofer and Hitler comes as no surprise, then, although it is refutable to expect that an intimate relationship existed between the two, and an erroneous simplification to make Haushofer the ghost-writer of "Mein Kampf" and of Nazi foreign policy.<sup>3</sup> However, the record stands for itself. Hitler, discussing the relationship of Lebensraum and a nation's power concluded:

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<sup>1</sup>Wasserman, op. cit., p. 367.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Neumann, op. cit., p. 283.

The size of a people's living area includes an essential factor for the determination of its outward security. The greater the amount of room a people has at its disposal, the greater is also its natural protection; because military victories over nations crowded in small territories have always been reached more quickly and more easily, especially more effectively and more completely, than in the cases of States which are territorially greater in size. The size of the State territory, therefore, gives a certain protection against frivolous attacks, as success may be gained only after long and severe fighting and, therefore, the risk of an impertinent surprise attack, except for quite unusual reasons, will appear too great. In the greatness of the State territory, therefore, lies a reason for the easier preservation of a nation's liberty and independence, whereas, in the reverse case, the smallness of such a formation simply invites seizure.<sup>4</sup>

Chapter fourteen of Mein Kampf also contains a number of quotations that belie Haushofer's influence, including:

We must again profess the advocacy of the supreme point of view of every foreign policy; that is: To bring the land into consonance with the population.<sup>5</sup>

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... Only a sufficiently extensive area on this globe guarantees a nation freedom of existence.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1943), p. 177.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 943.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 935.



We National Socialists, however, must go further: the right to soil and territory can become a duty if decline seems to be in store for a great nation unless it extends its territory.<sup>7</sup> . . . Germany will either be a world power, or will not be at all. To be a world power, however, it requires that size which nowadays gives its necessary importance to such a power, and which gives life to its citizens. . . . State frontiers are man-made and can be altered by man. . . . If the German people today, penned into an impossible area, face a wretched future, this is as little Fate's command as its rejection would constitute a snub to Fate.<sup>8</sup>

From other sections of Mein Kampf it appears that Hitler was not at all adverse to Anglo-German alliance.

For Germany . . . the only possibility of carrying out a sound territorial policy was to be found in the acquisition of new soil in Europe proper . . . For such a policy, however, there was only one single ally in Europe: England. . . . To gain England's favor, no sacrifice should have been too great. Then one would have had to renounce colonies and sea power, world trade, a German war fleet. Concentration of the State's entire means of power in the land army . . . European territorial policy could be carried out against Russia only with England as an ally.<sup>9</sup>

Although from the preceding quotations it is quite apparent that Hitler and Haushofer were close on many issues, on at least one, race, they appeared to be diametrically opposed. In 1924 Haushofer wrote:

There are people who are never able to observe objectively, and from such people come all party programs, including those of international Socialism.

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 950.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 180++

To these people this discussion is not directed. Neither is it directed to the race fanatics who ignore facts without the knowledge of which no keeper of bees or pigeons, no breeder of cattle or horses, could carry on his business, to say nothing of the director of a human state organization.<sup>10</sup>

In contrast, Hitler wrote in Mein Kampf:

It was not an accident that the first great civilizations were created in those regions where the Aryan met with other races and subjected them to serve his own purposes. So the road which the Aryan had to take was clearly indicated. The conquering race had to enslave inferior men.<sup>11</sup>

Although the racial issue divided Haushofer and Hitler somewhat at the time of Mein Kampf, various other passages of the book served to illuminate the similarities of the two on what German foreign policy ought to be. As the distinguished geographer, Hans Weigert stated: ". . . an understanding of Haushofer's ideas is necessary if we want to understand Hitler's foreign policy."<sup>12</sup> Apparently, Haushofer devoted such an immense effort to Geopolitik in

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<sup>10</sup>Karl Haushofer, "Geopolitische Einflüsse bei den Verkörperungsversuchen von nationalem Socialismus und Sozialer Aristokratie," Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, I (1924), quoted in Derwent Whittlesey, German Strategy of World Conquest, p. 77.

<sup>11</sup>Hitler, op. cit., p. 405.

<sup>12</sup>Hans W. Weigert, German Geopolitics," Harper's Magazine, 183, p. 587.

the hopes that it would be accepted as a guide to German foreign policy. As he stated in one of his geographical works:

This work is to furnish guidance in the study of world policy. It is based on the method of geopolitical observation. Whosoever seeks in it a scheme drawn to individual situations will be disappointed. . . . What matters in this time of vast upheavals is that each individual, each group, and each great power should know the motive forces of world political developments. Only thus can the leaders of the great powers determine the just division of the earth.<sup>13</sup>

However, Haushofer intended his system not to be a rigid, fixed plan of action; in the realm of foreign policy Geopolitik at best was to be "flexible," especially adaptable to the changing needs of Germany and basically designed to fulfill Germany's apparent void of war-time strategy. Haushofer described the role of the geopolitician in foreign affairs as follows:

The geopolitical expert labors in a field requiring untiring effort and a subtle understanding. His reward lies in his ability to serve as a guide and helper to the statesman.<sup>14</sup>

Haushofer often remarked, even in the early twenties, that his remarks were addressed to the makers of German foreign policy, and one alleged purpose of "scientific

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<sup>13</sup>Karl Haushofer, Weltpolitik von heute, quoted in Robert Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics, op. cit., p. 70.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 73.

geopolitics" was to "develop an arresting style of its own so as to hold the attention of those powerful men to whom its findings are of practical interest."<sup>15</sup>

At this juncture, it should be mentioned that for the most part, in the early twenties, the school of Geopolitik kept relatively aloof from the Nazi party,<sup>16</sup> and for that matter, the rest of the party strife that weakened the Weimar Republic.<sup>17</sup> However, in the later twenties, as one author noted, "an affinity with the moderate wing of the Nazi party became perceptible in the attitude of some of the articles."<sup>18</sup> The same source attributed such a shift to the realization that "the geopolitical tenets were naturally more in line with the traditions of conservatism and nationalism than of liberalism and socialism."<sup>19</sup>

Some two years before the advent of Hitler's Third Reich, an "Arbeitsgemeinschaft fur Geopolitik" (Work Group for Geopolitik) was founded and apparently soon

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics, p. 77.

<sup>17</sup>Wasserman, op. cit., p. 365

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

reached accord with the Nazi foreign policy program.<sup>20</sup> Apparently, the intellectuals of the Geopolitik movement were attracted by the "dynamism of the new party."<sup>21</sup> In addition the Journal of Geopolitik had apparently become the geographical organ of the Nazi party by this time.<sup>22</sup>

Since the "Work Group for Geopolitik" was distinctly national-socialist oriented, the year 1931 marks a somewhat notable shift of the field to Nazi influence. To that group, Geopolitik was not a field of knowledge but "a basic principle and an intrinsic attitude," for the utilization of material garnered from geography, history, and biology.<sup>23</sup> Carl Troll describes the functioning of this group after 1931 as follows:

. . . they drew the conclusion that teaching of history and geography should be absorbed into geopolitics. By applying the geopolitical way of thinking, which originally was only concerned with the state, to administrative units, individual settlements, and economic regions they attempted to subordinate the entire economic organization to their doctrine . . . population studies became subordinated to this doctrine. Thereby the racial

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<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Taylor, op. cit., p. 107.

<sup>23</sup>Carl Troll, "Geographic Science in Germany," Eric Risher (trans.), Annals, Association of American Geographers, XXXVI, June, 1949, p. 130.

doctrine of the party was drawn in and integrated into geopolitics whereas Haushofer had kept that completely out, if only for family reasons.<sup>24</sup>

Significantly, three of the more predominant Geopolitikers and contributors to the Journal of Geopolitik, Maull, Obst and Lautensach, discontinued their services at this time.<sup>25</sup>

In 1933, with the usurpation of state power by Hitler and the National Socialists, Geopolitik was officially taken over by the party as an instrument for its purposes.<sup>26</sup> Immediately, Hitler named Haushofer president of the German Academy, and in return, Haushofer published a pamphlet paying tribute to National Socialism, entitled "The National-Socialist Idea in the World," and indicating the compatibility of Geopolitik and the Nazi party, especially on matters of foreign policy.<sup>27</sup> In addition, funds were allotted for the alleged Institute of Geopolitics, if it ever existed.

However, although National Socialism and Geopolitik had obvious similarities, the Nazi conception of Lebensraum was not an exact replica of that of the school of Geopolitik.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Wasserman, op. cit., p. 368.

<sup>28</sup>Kamenetsky, op. cit., p. 32.

The Nazi concept of blood and soil was too strongly saturated with Germanic myth and racism to fit completely within the frame of Haushofer's Geopolitics.<sup>29</sup>

Further, Hitler and Haushofer had somewhat different methods of obtaining Lebensraum, although by this time it appears that Haushofer had acquiesced to the Nazi doctrine of racial purity.<sup>30</sup> However, when geopolitical considerations clearly conflicted with racial considerations, Haushofer and the geopoliticians were prone to accede to the former and reject racial extremism.<sup>31</sup> Another point of contention concerned Germany's relationship with the Soviet Union. If Haushofer considered the Russians to be natural allies, due to the landpower versus oceanic power thesis, and was skeptical of Germany's ability to invade and conquer them, the Nazi ideologists on the other hand, "would not agree to regard Russia as a full-fledged and permanent ally because of racial prejudices and the Germanic myth."<sup>32</sup> Haushofer was apparently convinced that if Germany assisted Russia's eastward expansion, then in return, the Russians would cede some areas in its western

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<sup>29</sup>Ibid.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

provinces to the Reich, or at least not contest a German invasion of the "corridor."<sup>33</sup> However, Nazi foreign policy in as much as it was largely dictated toward purging Jews and Jewish influence and recovering German Lebensraum in the East, was not compatible to a permanent alliance with the Russians.<sup>34</sup> The Soviet Union occupied a part of the traditional or rightful German Lebensraum and also was ruled to some degree by Jews; therefore, such cooperation was thought to be impossible. Nonetheless, an alliance with Britain was not unthinkable but quite a possibility, due to racial similarities.<sup>35</sup>

In 1935 Haushofer defended Nazi Geopolitik on the basis of "blood and soil." A year later, he found himself in the precarious position of opposing the "Work Group" on the issue of alleged changes which the group had made in the conception of geopolitics, but refused to condemn them openly.<sup>36</sup> An interesting sidelight to the controversy between the geopolitician Richard Hennig and the "Work Group," was that the latter defended their position by

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<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>36</sup>Troll, op. cit., p. 131.



labeling the earlier Geopolitik as "geographic materialism."<sup>37</sup> Whatever the case, Vowinckel could boast in 1936 that geopolitics "stood in close contact and interchange with the great ideological revolution of national socialism from the very beginning," and that "it was necessary and will in the future be necessary for us, in even more decided manner to oppose any tendencies toward interpretations of geopolitics that are incompatible with the basic ideas of national socialism."<sup>38</sup> To Troll, "the last remainder of scientific attitude was relinquished . . . and the willingness for scholarly discussion . . . denied."<sup>39</sup>

Apparently, after 1936, leadership in the Geopolitik movement was increasingly wrested from Haushofer.<sup>40</sup> However, a new dynamic force had emerged in the field by this time, under the catchword of Wehrgeopolitik (war Geopolitics). Haushofer published a book under this title in 1932, although leadership in the category of geo-strategy apparently fell to Ewald Banse.<sup>41</sup> Banse published

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<sup>37</sup>Ibid.

<sup>38</sup>Kurt Vowinckel, quoted in Carl Troll, "Geographic Science in Germany," op. cit., p. 131.

<sup>39</sup>Troll, op. cit., p. 131.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 132.

in 1933, Raum und Volk im Weltkrieg, titled Germany Prepares for War in Britain and the United States.<sup>42</sup> An outspoken representative of geopolitics, racism, and wehr-geopolitics, Banse blatantly declared that Germany should take such a country as Russia expressly for the raw materials needed to pursue a new war.<sup>43</sup> The need for imperialistic war was self-evident and to that end Banse evoked a peculiar Wehrwissenschaft (science of war) as the "systematic application of every branch of human thought and human endeavor to the end of increasing the defensive strength of our people."<sup>44</sup> Germany Prepares for War, examined or analyzed the world in its entirety, carefully scrutinizing each nation, its geographic potentialities, its "blood and character," and its political organization, as a means of determining possible German successes and setbacks abroad.<sup>45</sup> In addition, Banse accurately forecast the techniques of psychological warfare used by the Germans

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<sup>42</sup>Andrew Gyorgy, "The Geopolitics of War," Journal of Politics, V, (1943), p. 351.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Neumann, Behemoth, op. cit., p. 146.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

during World War II.<sup>46</sup> Basically, he insisted that geography and psychology were more fundamental to modern warfare than was the old military science.<sup>47</sup> The Nazi Revolution was not only anticipated but exacting directives were outlaid for the strategy and tactics to be followed in the coming Blitzkrieg. In summation, Banse's formula for German geo-strategy was as follows: propaganda was to be directed intensely at the most vulnerable spot in the "enemy's social and political organism;" discontented racial minorities were to be sought out and turned against their masters, and it was hoped the same situation would prevail for disident members of political parties, gangsters, and fanatics; and finally, any method of securing their cooperation was acceptable.<sup>48</sup>

Before a further examination of Wehrgeopolitik as the resilient core of Geopolitik, it seems feasible to briefly summarize the main authorities on the subject: Haushofer and Banse's respective works on Wehrgeopolitik.

Haushofer considered Wehrgeopolitik a special branch of Geopolitik, and his contribution as such exposed

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<sup>46</sup>Farago, op. cit., p. 105.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid.

<sup>48</sup>Kalijarvi, op. cit., p. 358.

the influence of such geographic factors as climate, topography, fauna and flora, on military strategy.<sup>49</sup> In addition the collaboration of land and sea forces was analyzed against a background of mountains, coastlines, valleys, railroads, villages and cities.<sup>50</sup> The overriding purpose of war-geopolitics, to Haushofer, was to impress upon the soldier the determining influence of earth-surface features on the art of warfare.<sup>51</sup> To the contrary of many post-war assertions, Haushofer presented no maps or directives for an attack upon the North American Continent, although he discussed at length the "strategic importance of Iceland and the Arctic approaches to the . . . Continent, and . . . the problems of warfare in the Arctic zones, the rain-forests and the tropics."<sup>52</sup> For the most part the presentation of such ideas was not new, since similar references abound in military science and geography publications. However, one author thought Haushofer's ideas on the subject went far "to explain why Hitler's military operations by land, air, and sea (were) so often favored by the right kind of weather," in

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<sup>49</sup>Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics, op. cit., p. 102.

<sup>50</sup>Weigert, "German Geopolitics," op. cit., p. 590.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid.

<sup>52</sup>Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics, op. cit., p. 103.

apparent adherence to Haushofer's recognition of the indispensable nature of meteorological and climatological studies in planning warfare.<sup>53</sup>

Summarily, Haushofer wrote war-geopolitics from the point of view that the modern German officer needed indoctrination with the spatial dynamics of warfare in the modern sense. A preliminary condition to military strategy was the acquisition of a firm geographical background.

Bense regarded war as the continuation of statesmanship by other methods. While statesmanship was the "art of regulating a state's relations with all other states in such a manner as to secure for it a maximum of security and, maybe, superiority,"<sup>54</sup> warfare was the following:

. . . the art of employing the military resources of the state . . . against the enemy in such a way that he submits to your will.<sup>55</sup>

Statesmanship gained its impetus from national, military and economic sources arrayed against other nations through a representative spokesman.<sup>56</sup> However, though a

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<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 104.

<sup>54</sup>Ewald Banse, Germany Prepares for War, op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid.

geographic base existed, statesmanship functioned, so to say, independent of such factors. Whereas statesmanship was based on the sum-total of geographic factors, warfare only utilized a part of them, and was therefore limited. Further, statescraft was a long range process, whereas warfare was a "short term expedient."<sup>57</sup> If the former bargained collectively over a long period with no resultant loss of resources, the latter quickly exploited what it possessed.<sup>58</sup>

In the final analysis, statesmanship was always the ultimate end of the state, warfare only a method of obtaining that end.<sup>59</sup> Bantse further defined war as:

. . . a geographical phenomenon . . . tied to the surface of the earth; derives its material sustenance from it, and moves purposefully over it, seeking out those positions which are favorable to one side, unfavorable to the other. It selects the best of the male population and inspires them with the fighting spirit or implants chilling fear in their bosoms, according as it favors one nation and handicaps the other; in which matter climatic and racial factors, national ideals and, finally, the aims of the government all play their part. That state which, directed by the genius of the great statesman . . . brings all its geographical potentialities . . . in a state of healthy intensification into military action against an enemy

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<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

not hopelessly superior from the beginning--such a state has a good chance of emerging victorious.<sup>60</sup>

Wehr-geopolitik thus emerged from the older geography which Banse related, "dealt neither with the land nor with the people, but remained on the far lower intellectual level of physical features and population . . . unable to discover any intimate relation."<sup>61</sup> The new war geography closely stood on both the land and the people which rendered limits to its practice. The lack of such a geography in the previous war, the lack of an intimate connection between man and land assisted in undermining the war effort.<sup>62</sup> The purpose of government in Banse's eyes, was to take careful notice of man-land relationships. For that purpose in Germany, a "science of national defense" was necessitated, with the objective of increasing Germany's military strength.<sup>63</sup> (In actuality, the "science of national defense" was war-geopolitics, only a personal differing with Haushofer produced an improvised name.) All due consideration was to be given to geography, industry, communications, and psychology,

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<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 9

by two methods: first, a general set of principles would allow evaluation of each country from the military point of view; then, this would result in Germany's enhanced chances of future wars.<sup>64</sup>

The nature and scope of this new geography for war use, as determined by physical geography, was delineated as follows:

1. Geographical position.--The geographical position of a state determines its military security or insecurity in advance. It endows it with a smaller or larger number of neighbors, gives it the protection of coasts or mountains or deserts or, alternatively, handicaps it by surrounding it with countries of vastly superior size and wealth which are always threatening to swamp it.<sup>65</sup>

Germany was thus encircled by a host of threatening neighbors, quite in contrast to Great Britain which seldom had been so threatened. Even France and Russia possessed more favorable situations from the military point of view.

Unhappily to Banse, a country's geographical position, more than any other geographic attribute (save maybe racial and national psychology) was strictly a matter of fate.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., p. 10.



Germany, however much she aspired to being a seapower, was geographically stymied. However, this was not to say that Germany did not both aspire to hegemony in Europe and throughout the world, which only a land power could achieve as a cooperative effort.<sup>67</sup>

2. Space as such. An extremely significant, and from the military point of view supremely important, feature of any region...spaciousness makes for larger areas and freer movement; it induces a feeling of greater distinction from neighboring countries and therewith of increased security...Nations with a large territory can afford to retreat indefinitely before an invader and leave distance to destroy him; a nation with a small territory has little room to retreat... it must conquer and die.<sup>68</sup>

On this point, the similarity with Haushofer's space views is readily apparent. Space was the foremost attribute in military planning. However, Banse was convinced that such large spaces as those presented by Russia could be conquered by translating space into time, i.e., "to conquer distances by rapid means of communication," including airplane as well as railroads and the usual means of military transportation.<sup>69</sup> Apparently a Blitzkrieg was thus called for.

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67. Ibid., p. 15.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid., p. 17.

3. Frontier and Coast.-- . . . Where two highly active and highly antithetical elements border upon one another, the expression of their individualities becomes intensified at the line of demarcation and takes on the character of attack and defense. The earth has two great frontiers of this kind to show us--the coast, where the land and sea contend with one another and come to terms; and the political frontier, along which two different and often hostile sets of aims and ambitions confront one another.

The first Reich was blamed for a lack of frontier instincts which caused the Danish and Belgium peoples not to desire union with Germany. Further, frontiers were the prime example of a country's self-defensive spirit, the front line of defense against neighboring entities,<sup>71</sup> and the battleground. The coast, however presented a special type of frontier problem that entailed the building of a fleet to conquer it by would-be adversaries.<sup>72</sup>

4. Land-forms.--The size of a territory does not depend wholly on its area but also on its orographical features; . . . Flat country enables armies to operate on a wide front; mountains, on the other hand, impose a narrow one. It follows that the plain is the battleground of large armies, the mountains of small ones;<sup>73</sup>

At this juncture, Banse dealt rather extensively with the strategy of warfare as it concerned mountains,

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<sup>70</sup>Ibid

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., p. 21

passes, valleys, plains, as well as the inhabitants of these various areas.<sup>74</sup>

5. Climate. The air is the element in which the soldier lives . . . and has a mysterious power of elating or depressing him in such a degree that the issue of a battle may depend on it.<sup>75</sup>

Suffice it to say that the emphasis here was placed on the psychological effects of climate in warfare.

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., p. 26.

## CHAPTER V

### THE NATURE OF GERMAN GEOPOLITIK AS COMPARED AND CONTRASTED TO POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

#### Definition and Scope of Geopolitik

The most complex aspect of the "science of Geopolitik" is its definition. Apparently, the difficulty arises in finding two or more Geopolitikers in agreement on an exacting character and limits to the field. The essence that Geopolitik went beyond the point of descriptive, explanatory studies and attempted to lay a foundation for political action, a set of operatives for directing German expansion in the world, is in itself no accurate depiction of the field. Nor do such brief definitions as "a new science of power politics," "a modern view of politico-geography," or "geographical conscience of the state," offer much more than a brief encounter with the nature of Geopolitik. Richard Hartshorne aptly summed up the situation in the following statement: "The school of Geopolitik includes some of the worst offenders, . . . as critics have frequently charged . . . of writers who have made little effort to define their field or to recognize definite limits to

the area of knowledge in which they are at home."<sup>1</sup> From such vagueness on the part of the Geopolitikers, questions arose as to whether Geopolitik was an "independent science," as most of its adherents, including Haushofer claimed; or was it a branch of geography, and if considered as such, what relation did it have to political geography?

Geopolitik, by some of its definitions might well be inferred to be synonymous with political geography. However, although practically all geographers admit that the two mediums possessed some of the same roots, and might have appeared inseparable in the first decades of the twentieth century, succeeding critics have come to regard Geopolitik only as an outgrowth, not a branch of political geography. To some it was political science, while to others it was applied political geography, and to still others a "new science in space." The following definitions serve somewhat to differentiate between the two subjects of Geopolitik and political geography.

According to Haushofer, Geopolitik was:

. . . the study of the earth relations of political occurrences . . . the character of the earth's surfaces . . . gives to Geopolitik its

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<sup>1</sup>Richard Hartshorne, "Recent Developments in Political Geography," American Political Science Review Vol. 29 (October, 1935).

frame within which the course of political events must take place if they are to have permanent success.<sup>2</sup>

Although history has obscured the source for the succeeding definition, it serves to further illuminate the character of the subject.

Geopolitik is a system for the analysis of peoples in their social, economic and political environment, and the state in its geographic position with regard to other states.<sup>3</sup>

The subject was further defined by an American as:

. . . the name applied to the study of the social, political, economic, strategic and geographic elements of a state, indicating methods which may be used in formulating and achieving its foreign policy and objectives.<sup>4</sup>

Russell Fifield alleges that the fundamental idea of Geopolitik was expressed in the following definition of the so-called "Geopolitical Institute at Munich."

Geopolitik is the doctrine of the earth relations of political developments; Geopolitik is the doctrine of the power of the state on earth; Geopolitics is the science which deals with the political organisms of space and their structure; Geopolitics is the scientific foundation of the art of political action in the life-and-death struggle of state organisms for Lebensraum.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Karl Haushofer, Erich Obst, and Lautensach, Bausteine fur Geopolitik, quoted in Richard Hartshorne, "Recent Developments in Political Geography," op. cit., p. 797.

<sup>3</sup>Kieffer, Realities of World Power, p. 10.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Fifield and Percy, Geopolitics, op. cit., p. 4.

A German radio broadcast defined the subject as follows: "the science of the relationship between space and politics which particularly attempts to show how geographical knowledge can be transformed into intellectual equipment for political leaders."<sup>6</sup>

Perhaps the most quoted definitions of Geopolitik are included in the following statements:

Geopolitik is the science dealing with the dependence of political events upon the soil. It is based upon the broad foundations of geography, especially political geography, which is the science of political organisms of space and their structure . . . Geopolitik aims to furnish the armature for political action and guidance in political life . . . Geopolitik must come to be the geographic conscience of the state. Geopolitik is the science of political forms of life in their regional relationships, both as affected by natural conditions and in terms of their historical development.<sup>7</sup>

To Haushofer and the other Geopolitikers their "science" was an integrating and evaluating one that united natural science and political appraisal for the purpose of helping the Germans to secure their rightful place in the affairs of the world. As such, the emphasis was not so much upon aspects of the landscape but on the "earth

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>7</sup>Haushofer, Obst, Maull, and Lautensach, Bausteine zur Geopolitik, quoted in Robert Lochner, "Geopolitik: Its Nature and Aim."

relations of political occurrences."<sup>8</sup> Geopolitik was the compass for guiding the statesman of the state and the basis for accomplishing political goals of the nation.<sup>9</sup>

A noted Geopolitiker in the pre-Hitler era, Max Spandau, defined the role of Geopolitik as follows:

. . . from the determination of the present relations of the state and its soil, Geopolitik . . . attempts to discover the directions of growth in order to recommend where the points of growth should take place; it gives impulse to the life of the state and shows to general politics the veins into which the blood for the best nourishment of the organisms is to be pumped.<sup>10</sup>

Another Geopolitiker before 1933 described himself and others of the "school" in similarity with:

. . . the active, instinctively acting politician, in contrast to the geographer, who like the historian, investigates after the event, with a detached, reasoning attitude . . . the Geopolitiker is able to assist the statesman by examining spaces and stages of economics as political-geographic functions, and by tracing the dependence of character development of people on their way of life and occupations, which in turn are largely dependent on landscape and stage of economic advancement.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Lochner, Geopolitik: Its Nature and Aim, p. 23.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Siegfried Passarge, "Aufgaben und Methoden der Politischen Geographie," Zeitschrift für Politik, XXX 1931-32, p. 444, quoted in Lochner, op. cit., p. 23.



Once Geopolitik had been adopted by the Nazis, such definitions as the preceding were given the party line and subsequently redefined as:

. . . political science born from the National Socialist view of the state . . . both science and politics . . . national political science. Geopolitik calculates the possibilities of occurrence from the configuration of the earth surface. By computing, it becomes a mathematical science; by using especially the areas as a basis, it becomes a geometrical science.<sup>12</sup>

The destiny of Geopolitik under National Socialism was to serve as the nucleus for crystallization of the various sciences following the party program, thus reiterating the basic Nazi concepts of "blood and soil." As one Geopolitiker stated:

Geopolitik becomes technology which is able to guide practical politics up to the necessary jumping-off point from secure earth. To trace the basic forces of blood and soil in their fate-determining effects is the task of the new science.<sup>13</sup>

Geopolitik thus became the expedient for integrating geography, history, political science and sociology, aiming for the collaboration of physical geography, biogeography

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<sup>12</sup>Karl Mehrmann, "Verinnerlichung der Geopolitik," Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, XV, 1933, quoted in Robert Lochner, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>13</sup>Haushofer, "Grundlage, Wesen und Ziele der Geopolitik," Bausteine zur Geopolitik, quoted in Lochner, op. cit., p. 25.

anthropogeography, anthropology, cultural geography, ethnology, and various other disciplines.

Under Nazi regime, Geopolitik became a science founded on a national-conservative philosophy (Weltanschauung). The transition to National-Socialist Geopolitik was apparently not accomplished with ease, at least not on Haushofer's part. The choice, however was one of deserting the Geopolitik movement altogether and rendering it completely into the hands of Hitler's hierarchy, or remaining in the group (the Work Group for Geopolitik) and possibly effecting the direction of Nazi Geopolitik.<sup>14</sup> Needless to say, Haushofer chose the latter course, which accounted for re-orienting Geopolitik along lines congruous with "blood and soil." At any case, Haushofer intended Geopolitik to adapt to eternal shifts of power.

Geopolitik, whether under Haushofer or the Nazis was a system of power politics that contained three main aspects: that connected with its alleged position as a science; that related to its service as a political weapon; and that enveloped with a world outlook, a Weltanschauung. Its only scientific aspects appeared to be the accumulation and examination of factual data, and its historic biological conception of the state as an organism, thus

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<sup>14</sup>Lochner, op. cit., p. 26.1.

implying a sharp departure from political geography considered as a branch of scientific geography.

### Political Geography and Geopolitik

When political geography was revived at the onset of World War II with a distinct focusing on the problems of international relations, a number of American geographers were apparently impressed with the alleged influence of the Haushoferian school of Geopolitik on Nazi military strategy. Many Americans apparently became confused over political geography and Geopolitic, some regarding them as one and the same, others realizing that extreme differences existed between them.<sup>15</sup> Nonetheless it became a problem of distinguishing between the two; a problem compounded by the Geopolitikers lack of any clear delineation of the nature and scope of the field.<sup>16</sup>

Haushofer once remarked that Geopolitik grew out of political geography, although it activated the latter's voluminous amount of knowledge and dynamically led Geopolitik beyond the limits of geography.<sup>17</sup> In any analysis, its "dynamics of space" emphasis loomed as an early means

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<sup>15</sup>James and Jones, op. cit., p. 172.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Fifield and Percy, Geopolitics, p. 5.

of distinguishing it from heretofore political geography. The difference was that between a static and a dynamic science. Hartshorne defined political geography as "the relations between man's political activities and organizations (including the state, but also parties, etc.) and the natural environment or earth conditions, whether stated directly or conversely, and summarily concluded that Geopolitik, as viewed conservatively, represented the application of the techniques and knowledge of political geography to international problems.<sup>18</sup> However, in a later statement, Hartshorne, in reviewing Geopolitik dynamics of state processes of growth, revealed that such "dynamicism" distinguished it from political geography.<sup>19</sup> Whatever the case, he considered Geopolitik as a part of geography and not a part of political science.<sup>20</sup> On the other hand, the political scientist, Adolf Grabowsky, thought that the dynamic nature of Geopolitik relegated it to the realm of political science, not political geography.<sup>21</sup> Lin Yu Tang, a political scientist of sorts,

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<sup>18</sup>Hartshorne, op. cit., p. 960.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 794.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.,

stated that while "political geography is primarily geography, whose functions are descriptive and analytical, geopolitics (Geopolitik) is primarily politics, the politics of world conquest or at least of world struggles . . . built on strategic concepts of geography."<sup>22</sup>

Geopolitik, possessing a guide to action, was thereby distinguishable from political geography.<sup>23</sup> Further, Geopolitik was concerned with the state not as a static concept but as a living organism, not interested in the state as a phenomenon of nature, in its situation, size, form, or boundaries as such, but in the expansive urges of the state toward growth.<sup>24</sup> As one Geopolitiker differentiated between his subject and political geography, the former described the political forms and distribution of states at any one time, in the form of a still picture, while Geopolitik, like a moving picture, described movements in politics.<sup>25</sup> "Political geography, describing the area of the state, deals with the earth surface;

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<sup>22</sup>Lin Yu-Tang, "Geopolitics: Law of the Jungle, Asia and the Americas, XXXXIII, (April, 1943), p. 199.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

<sup>25</sup>Richard Hennig and Leo Koerholz, Einguehrung in die Geopolitik, quoted in Lochner, op. cit., p. 27.

Geopolitik, examining the processes of life within the state and among states in their spatial conditioning, deals with . . . the effect of geographic factors on political happenings."<sup>26</sup> As exemplified by Haushofer, "political geography merely shows the size of the population of a state at the moment of observation; Geopolitik, however, looks at the trends of population."<sup>27</sup>

Mauß, a noted Geopolitiker for a time, contended that such dynamics of state areas as purveyed in Geopolitik were not new to the field of political geography.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, the conclusion was drawn that Geopolitik was applied political geography. Writing in 1938, Hartshorne concurred with this consensus, describing it as the most accurate description of studies published by the school of Geopolitik up to that time.<sup>29</sup> Mauß further emphasized that Geopolitik used the methods of political geography in other areas of science, such as history, political science, et cetera. Mauß distinguished between the two geographies by asserting that "the former considers the

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Karl Haushofer, Weltpolitik von Heute, quoted in Lochner, op. cit., p. 27.

<sup>28</sup>Hartshorne, op. cit., p. 960.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.

spatial requirements of a state, but political geography studies only the space conditions of the country."<sup>30</sup> One was static and descriptive, the other dynamic, a science vivifying space. Maul reiterated in a later statement that Geopolitik was a discipline that weighed and evaluated given situations and by concomitant results sought to guide practical politics.<sup>31</sup>

Some time after Maull's departure from the "Work Group" and school of Geopolitik, he criticized the movement for failing to carefully consider the nature of the problem they were dealing with, while accumulating a tremendous quantity of material that was somewhat deficient in quality because of such absence of a clearly defined field with a distinct nature, scope and methods.<sup>32</sup>

A 1924 issue of the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik contained a noteworthy differentiation between Geopolitik and Political Geography.

Geopolitik is the science of the determination and conditioning of political developments by the earth . . . It has its broad basis in geography, especially political geography, as the science of political spatial organisms and their structure. The nature of terrestrial spaces as comprehended

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<sup>30</sup>Fifield, "Geopolitics at Munich," op. cit., p. 1152.

<sup>31</sup>Hartshorne, op. cit., p. 961.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 926.

from the geographical point of view provided the frame for Geopolitik, within which political processes must proceed if they are to have permanence. No doubt the leaders of the world of politics transgress this frame, but sooner or later the constraining force of spatial relations will reassert itself . . . As thus conceived, Geopolitik will furnish the implements for political action and be a guide to political life . . . As such it becomes a technology capable of leading practical politics to the point where it can spring from a firm footing. It is only thus that the jump to action can be made from the solid ground of knowledge, not from that of ignorance, more dangerous and more remote. Geopolitik will and must become the geographical conscience of the state.<sup>33</sup>

In 1935, Hartshorne recognized Geopolitik as "the most important development in political geography in recent times, if not of any time." Apparently at this time, Hartshorne saw nothing imminently perilous about Germany continuing to develop such an outcropping of political geography, depending on what effect the changed situation in Germany may have on the development of social sciences in general.<sup>34</sup> He contended that political geography could not afford to turn away completely from the school of Geopolitik because "it enriched enormously the material of political geography."<sup>35</sup> Hartshorne added that almost the entire field of political geographers in Germany had gone

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<sup>33</sup>Kiss, op. cit., p. 641.

<sup>34</sup>Hartshorne, op. cit., p. 960.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.



over to that medium, which was significant since the greatest developments in political geography had occurred in Germany.<sup>36</sup> However, it appears that Hartshorne regarded Geopolitik as an ill-defined field in which geography in terms of political geography was utilized for particular purposes beyond the pursuit of knowledge, and therefore, science.<sup>37</sup> He apparently doubted at one time that such "sociological geography" could make important contributions to geography, due to the point of view it had developed.<sup>38</sup>

In The Nature of Geography Hartshorne defined Geopolitik as follows:

The special field of Geopolitik . . . represents a very broadly defined--or quite undefined--field in which geography, in terms of political geography, is utilized for particular purposes that lie beyond the pursuit of knowledge. It represents, therefore, the application of geography to politics and one's estimate of its value and importance will depend on the value that one assigns to the political purpose it is designed to serve. Since it is designed to serve national politics from the German point of view, its positive value from that point of view may be considered as offset by its negative value from the point of view of other countries.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>36</sup>Hartshorne, "The Nature of Geography," Annals, Association of American Geographers, Vol. 29 (1939), p. 382.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 580.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 581.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 580.

Issiah Bowman defined the work of the field in a somewhat similar manner.

. . . geographic facts are marshalled to support political claims . . . Systems of philosophy are devised which are nothing more than apologies for policies based on military necessity or the logic of "high culture requires more space" . . . Clearly this is ideology, not science.<sup>40</sup>

Returning to Hartshorne for a moment, he once remarked of Geopolitik that it was "neither geography nor political science, but at best political philosophy, at worst national politics."<sup>41</sup>

Whether this be interpreted as a partial return to the geographic materialism of the middle 19th century; or to certain teleological principles of the earth's surface to states areas, we have in either case, a throwback to "environmentalism" in a form which permits the exploitations of purely nationalistic interests of the state.<sup>42</sup>

Two additional statements rendered by Hartshorne serve to belie a basic failing of Geopolitik.

The essential problem of political geography is to determine whether the life of political societies is determined, in part, at least, by the natural form in which they develop; in what manner the soil, air, and water relate themselves to the collective action of men.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Issiah Bowman, Geography in Relation to the Social Sciences, (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1934), p. 311.

<sup>41</sup> Hartshorne, "Recent Developments," op. cit., p. 961.

<sup>42</sup> Carl Bauer, quoted in Richard Hartshorne, "Recent Developments in Political Geography," p. 961.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 797.

The proper function of the political geographer is to analyze and appraise the situation; whether a change therefore be sought is a matter for politics, and statesmen. However, force usually is the ultimate decider, or resolver of issues.<sup>44</sup>

The point that Hartshorne apparently tried to make was that the Geopolitikers assumed the prerogative to forecast change and proceeded to draw up blueprints for making such alterations as deemed necessary. In applying their talents to the territorial interests of the German state, the Geopolitikers were destined to become statesmen of war planning. As Hartshorne emphasized, "the scientist, when he becomes a propogandist or . . . his country's war effort, he ceases for the time being, the active pursuit of only science."<sup>45</sup> When the scientist departs from examining things as they are objectively, to subjectively declaring what they ought to be, the confines of science are torn asunder, and nationalistic interests emerge as the over-riding consideration.

The prevailing tendency of the Geopolitikers to overstep scientific bounds led to practices

. . . where his lack of complete training betrays him into fallicitious and exaggerated conclusions, to say nothing of gross national partisanship.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 797.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 959.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 797.

A French geographer, Albert Demangeon, wrote a penetrating critique of Geopolitik even before the Nazi era, chastizing the field for renouncing its scientific spirit. As he stated:

German geopolitics . . . has taken its place in the forefront of German nationalist propaganda. It is nothing but an educational enterprize for preparing the German people for an assault upon the European order . . . a tool for war.<sup>47</sup>

A contemporary Frenchman, Jacque Ancel, not opposed to geopolitical methods, but rather the use of them by Haushofer to promote Pan-Germanism, pointed out that such usage dispossessed Geopolitik of its scientific standing.<sup>48</sup> Ancel especially objected to the extreme geographic determinism that characterized Geopolitik by the mid-thirties. Its glorification of the state, subservience to Prussian militarism, its own militaristic spirit--all were indicative of determinism in a severe form.

In essence, the distinction between political geography and Geopolitik rests with the knowledge that while the former is concerned with a historical-factual accounting of changes in the political situation of states, observing them so to speak, in a state of rest, the latter

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<sup>47</sup>Albert Demangeon, quoted in Robert Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics, op. cit., p. 134.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

observed, evaluated and prognosticated upon the influence of geographical factors or political happenings and on possible alterations of the political forms of states.<sup>49</sup> States observed as dynamic phenomena under Geopolitik constituted the "scientific foundation of the art of political transactions in the struggle for existence of political living forms on the living space of the earth."<sup>50</sup>

Systematically, Geopolitik examined the nature of the state from the standpoint that it was a living organism. The processes of birth, growth, life functions and decadence were studied empirically in order to determine operative laws. Political history provided a number of such determinants on the rise and demise of great empires according to geographic factors. The physical conditions of the earth-surface were examined thoroughly as a means of tracing the inter connections between physical phenomena and human history. The basic tenets of the school of Geopolitik included that states exhibited a tendency toward expansion; that there is an urge to move from narrow to wider spaces; and that space is the indispensable vehicle of political power.

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<sup>49</sup>Charles Hagan, "Geopolitics," The Journal of Politics, IV, (1942), p. 484.

<sup>50</sup>Carl Haushofer, Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean, quoted in Hagan, Ibid.

At this juncture, it appears constructive to contrast an outline of political geography with that of Geopolitik as most aptly depicted by Russell Fifield and G. Etzel Percy, in a chapter of World Political Geography entitled "The Substance and Scope of Political Geography."

### The Geopolitical Organism

1. Physical properties of the area
  - a. Location--accessibility and strategic quality
  - b. Size--depth and defensibility
  - c. Shape--vulnerability
  - d. Surface character--penetrability
    - (1) Landforms
    - (2) Water features
    - (3) Coastal features
    - (4) Land-water arrangements
  - e. Natural resources
    - (1) Inventory
      - (a) Soil, minerals, waters, fuels, biota
      - (b) Surpluses and deficits
2. The People
  - a. Races and ethnic groups
  - b. Population--numbers, distribution, density
  - c. The culture
    - (1) Basic cultural elements
    - (2) Skills, education, technology
    - (3) Institutional organization
  - d. The economy
    - (1) Industries
    - (2) Transport and trade
    - (3) Production and productivity
    - (4) Standard-of-living levels
    - (5) Wants and demands
  - e. Government
    - (1) Policy
    - (2) Civic attitudes
    - (3) Political behavior

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<sup>51</sup>Fifield and Percy, World Political Geography,  
op. cit., p. 14.

3. The anatomy of the political area
  - a. The capital
  - b. The core area
  - e. The domain
    - (1) The regions
    - (2) The corridors of movement
  - d. Boundaries
  - e. The buffer zone
    - (1) Buffer states
    - (2) Spheres of influence
  - f. Colonies and dependencies
  - g. The Raum or "extended domain"
    - (1) Land realm
    - (2) Sea realm
    - (3) The air sphere
4. The integrated population-area organism
  - a. The record of growth and expansion
    - (1) Historical stages
    - (2) Avenues of expansion
  - b. Vital trends in the population
    - (1) Numbers
    - (2) Health and quality
  - c. The national plan
    - (1) Population reduction for raising living standards
    - (2) Population control for maintenance of living standards
    - (3) Increasing population to be cared for by:
      - (a) Industrialization and commercialization
      - (b) Over-seas expansion
      - (c) Frontier overflow and peaceful penetration
      - (d) Conquest and plunder
  - d. The national strategy
    - (1) Trade program in the extended domain
    - (2) Military strategies
      - (a) Defense
      - (b) Offense
    - (3) Diplomatic policies
      - (a) Unilateral
      - (b) Collective

The preceding outline serves to somewhat elucidate the character of Geopolitik; the succeeding outline depicts the nature of political geography somewhat differently.

The Political Landscape<sup>52</sup>

1. The area
  - a. Location, size, form
  - b. Core areas and nuclei
  - c. Political subdivisions
    - (1) Local
    - (2) Subprovincial
    - (3) Provincial
2. The internal pattern
  - a. Differences
    - (1) Race
    - (2) Language
    - (3) Religion
    - (4) Party and political sentiments
    - (5) Other
  - b. Distributions
    - (1) Suffrage
    - (2) Parliamentary representation
    - (3) Other
3. Terminal elements
  - a. Boundaries and their configuration
    - (1) Irregularities
      - (a) Protuberances
      - (b) Embayments
    - (2) Inliers and outliers
    - (3) Disputed areas
  - b. Frontier zones
    - (1) Defensive positions
    - (2) Militarized and demilitarized zones
    - (3) Customs barriers
  - c. Boundary and terminal structure
4. The external pattern
  - a. International grouping
  - b. Colonial patterns
  - c. Other arrangements

The differences between the two conceptions of political geography and Geopolitik are readily apparent from the aforehand outlines. The one represents possibilities for a militaristic Germany bent on expansion

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<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 12.



and subjugation of its neighbors. The other represents a political geography based on democratic principles and offers a sane approach to be followed.

In summation, the answer to the question as to whether Geopolitik is a branch of geography can only be negative. That it had some rather intimate connections with geography and produced many factual studies in the traditional manner is not disputable. However, Geopolitik constituted a departure from the stable, scientific geography that had been practiced in Germany traditionally and incorporated material, theory and practices of several other sciences, including political science, anthropology, psychology, and history; and proceeded to build thereupon a "pseudo-science" subjectively orientated to the aggressive designs of German imperialism. Therein, it went beyond recognized borders of science, into the realm of predilection and prognostication, revengefully pressing for territorial aggrandizement. No longer could it be considered a static science; the very essence that it was intended to be a dynamic science that would vivify space, rendered to it an unscientific position in the final analysis.

If Geopolitik was political science, how did it happen that virtually all the adherents of the school

were geographers, untrained for the most part in that field?

Haushofer and a sizeable number of geographers regarded Geopolitik as an independent field, which it was, although representative only of a hodge-podge of combinations of various other sciences.

## CHAPTER VI

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS

#### I. SUMMARY

Glancing back in final retrospect on the evolution of Geopolitik, as sketched in the preceding chapters, a quotation by Griffith Taylor comes to mind; namely, that "probably the most interesting aspect of the whole story is the sensitive way in which geographical ideas at all periods have reflected contemporary trends in philosophic thinking."<sup>1</sup> It is not the purpose of this summary to question whether Geopolitik measures up to standard geographical ideas, but to summate important philosophical ideas that had some bearing on the field, and trace the concomitant development of Geopolitik to its inclusion in Nazi Germany. Innumerable scholars have searched for the roots of National Socialism and its acceptance of Geopolitik as a doctrine and practice in the teachings of such philosophers as Hegel, Fichte, Neitzsche, and Treitschke; political scientists such as List, Mahan, and Mackinder; and the philosophical geopolitical scientists of which Kjellen and Ratzel are representative.

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<sup>1</sup>Taylor, op. cit.

However, it should be made apparent that Hegel, Fichte, Nietzsche, and Treitschke were not mentioned to any degree throughout the early development of Geopolitik. Their significance appears to have emerged with Hitler and National Socialist Geopolitik, although much of what they had agitated for had long since become a reality in Germany.

Since ancient times in Germany, there had been handed down and enlarged an extensive body of ideas which in the first half of the twentieth century, found incursion into the alleged "science" of Geopolitik. Among other ideas that held implications for the field were those that preached a sort of "Manifest Destiny" for Germany, and those that taught the superiority of the German "race." Hegel had insisted that a strong people's duty was to impose its will on the culture of the age, although Germany was not mentioned specifically in an early passage. However, the Germans were the greatest people possessing the greatest culture; therefore, the conclusion was easily drawn that it was their duty to impose their culture on the rest of the world. Fichte similarly preached the superiority of the Germans, who were the only great race in the world. Consequently, Fichte was interpreted by twentieth century Germans as

desiring military conquest to achieve the goals he had envisaged. Therefore, that the Germans should and did develop an aggressive attitude toward neighboring countries was a far-reaching consequence.

Treitschke was the historian-philosopher, the pan-Germanist that believed the state to be the highest organ in the society of man; that war was inevitable, justifiable, moral and the basis of power.

Superimposed upon the ideas that the preceding had rendered, Germans such as Von Bulow and List implied, if not, directly, called for German expansion. Von Bulow thought that states should be allowed to obtain their rightful frontiers, and recognized that war was a continuity. List proposed a Greater Germany that would have included Denmark, the Netherland, Switzerland and Belgium, insuring Germany's frontiers and contributing significantly to its economic and political situations. In such a manner, List became an early exponent of German Lebensraum.

Mahan and Mackinder contributed substantially to landpower and seapower theories in vogue at the time.

Mackinder's Heartland, necessitating domination of Eurasia, later became the foremost objective of Geopolitik.

As is readily discernible, the list of contributors as sketched above were not exclusively Germans. As Haushofer reiterated time and time again, "Fas est ab hoste doceri," (learn from your enemies).

The essence that human affairs were conditioned by geography, and the subsequent emergence of political geography, as well as evolutionary trends in the sciences, provided a further framework from which Geopolitik or geopolitical ideas were first systematized.

In 1882, Ratzel's Anthropogeography appeared, concerned primarily with the works of man and the products of man's social life in relation to the earth-surface. Ratzel had become a geographer by way of the natural sciences, and was naturally immensely impressed with Darwinism and the evolutionary thinking of the era. The most important contribution of Ratzel as concerns later-day Geopolitik, was his Political Geography. Since the core of political geography was the state, Ratzel conceived of its form as being analogous to that of an organism. If the state functioned in much the same way as an organism, then its component parts (administrative bodies, etc.) followed a similar pattern.

The whole of Ratzel's theory is none other than the organic theory of state, which gives the static territory of the realm life and death in the processes of struggle for space. Space was the overriding consideration to Ratzel since it determined the existence of the state. Behind the organic theory as the backbone of the analogy, was the essence that a state's growth was determined by its expansion. Since the state was but an earth-bound organism, it was compelled to expand for survival. The boundaries of a state represented the first instance of whether a state was decadent or dynamic. A decrease of space over a time spelled decadence, while an increase was expected of the latter, as exemplified first in the frontier situations of countries. Expansion could take place by any of the following: emigration, economic penetration, or conquest.

A particular concern of Ratzel's was the position or location of the state, which to him more or less determined its successes or failures in history. Moreover, its struggle for space was governed somewhat by its situation, thereby creating a number of problems. Generally, under this consideration the state was examined against a background of its neighbors, topography, climate, and other geographic factors. Since space was the more important influence, a determinant of possible expansion

avenues, concern developed also over population densities, economic facets, and the like. Consequently, Ratzel was led to produce "Laws of the Territorial Growth of State," of which there were seven such laws. First, a state's space increases with its culture. Second, a state's growth could be accomplished by missionary activity, economic penetration, and other state activities carried on outside the realm. Third, the growth of states proceeds by the amalgamation, absorption, and assimilation of smaller units. Fourth, the frontier constitutes the perpheric organ of the state, a transitional area open to assimilation from either side. Fifth, states in a process of growth strive for the absorption of politically valuable sections. Sixth, the first impetus for territorial growth comes to primitive states from without. Finally, the general tendency toward territorial annexation and amalgamation transmits the trend from state to state and increases with intensity.<sup>2</sup> The seven laws, as such, constituted a broad base for the subsequent development of Geopolitik.

The constant underlying theme of Ratzel's work is the adjustment of humans to the environment, which constituted history. An American political scientist

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<sup>2</sup>Fifield and Percy, Geopolitics, p. 10.



criticized Ratzel's geographic determinism, and went further stating that "to Ratzel spaces possessed some intrinsic value independent of its content and . . . takes on what Vallaux called a metaphysical character and value."<sup>3</sup> Whatever the case, Ratzel's theory of the organismic character of the state and the indispensable value of space reappeared in Geopolitik, some decades later.

A second line of political thought and speculation that contributed materially to the content of Geopolitik stems from the work of Rudolf Kjellen, a Swedish political scientist. Apparently, Kjellen was dissatisfied with the "legal" political science of the day, and attempted to re-orient the subject upon a geographic basis. Extremely influenced with Ratzel's methods of analyzing the behavior of the states, Kjellen proceeded to make geography the explanation for world affairs, and thus turned to Ratzel for a deeper understanding of world politics. Ratzel's treatise on political geography closed the gap between natural science and political science, and therefore, Kjellen attempted to incorporate Ratzelian concepts into a new geopolitical science of the state. However, his adaptations of Ratzel's work were somewhat of a

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<sup>3</sup>Hagan, op. cit., p. 480.

metamorphosing, inasmuch as the state was declared to be an organism, no longer only analogous to one. The state was, in actuality, a biological organism, consisting of bodily parts, including a head, limbs, and organs. The head represented the main administrative agencies of the state in its capital; railroads and highways were designated arteries; and the frontiers, other organs.

Although Kjellen adapted Ratzel's organic theory of state to his own liking, he went further than Ratzel and systematized his ideas into a five-point political system, consisting of the following: Geopolitik (geography and the state); Demopolitik (population and the state); Oekopolitik (economic resources of the state); Sociopolitik (social structure of the state); and Kratopolitik (governmental organization.) The five aspects are somewhat self-explanatory and need no further examination than presented in the second chapter. However, it might be re-emphasized that Geopolitik, the first aspect, was of paramount importance and in terminology came to describe the system as a whole. Throughout, Kjellen practices a type of geographic determinism, similar to Ratzel, that evaluates the history of geographical influences on the shaping of foreign policy. Size, position, location, and area, as considered by the Swede, are not much of an innovation from Ratzel's similar considerations. Nor was the status of boundaries given

pronouncedly different examination. They remained as the peripheric organs of the state, that were closest to the external forces that threatened a state. On the attribute of space, Kjellen once again in the Ratzelian vein, saw a prerogative for strong states to extend their Lebensraum, at the expense of possible decadence if they failed to do so. Further, Kjellen recognized the significance of this attribute and Germany's position in Europe. As a strong Germanophile, Kjellen predestined Germany to a leading role in European and world politics, should she follow a system of expansion in space as outlined by him.

It might be mentioned that under Kjellen's new geopolitical system, the attainment of autarkie became an ultimate ideal. Kjellen further contributed to the day when Geopolitik would become a German reality, by publishing a book on The Powers of Europe, although his main geopolitical ideas were contained in two volumes: The State as a Form of Life and Foundations for a System of Politics, the former published in 1917 and the latter in 1920. According to Robert Strausz-Hupe, all of the principal theories of Geopolitik can be found in Kjellen's writings. At any rate, Geopolitik to Kjellen, was "the science which conceives of the state as a geographic

organism or as a phenomenon in space."<sup>4</sup> The state under this conception possessed powers of action superior to, and aside from that of its inhabitants, comparably somewhat to the position taken by Treitschke. As Strausz-Hupe reflected, Kjellen gave German political philosophy the "respectability" of a new natural science, and deemed it a geopolitical science.

At this juncture in the evolution of Geopolitik, Ratzel's foundations, especially the "organismic theory of state" and related "dynamics of space," were now clothed in a nomenclature and elaborated into a system, the first for Geopolitik. Although Ratzel had supposedly originated the idea of the importance of a space conception, Kjellen had included it within a systematic analysis of the environmental basis of society. The "seven laws" although they were but a summation of the expansionist history of great empires and the means of accomplishing such, nevertheless the backbone of Geopolitik was laid.

Apparently, Ratzel's and Kjellen's ideas received no widespread popularity during the years before World War I, although the succeeding war years saw a renewed interest in Ratzel's theories and resulted in the translation of Kjellen's major works into German. The post-war

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<sup>4</sup>Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics, p. 42.

years, however, resulted in even more glorification of Kjellen's so-called "pedantic attempt to elevate the obvious to the rank of science--to show that world history is determined primarily by geographical situations." Apparently, to Karl Haushofer and a number of other geographers in Germany, the works of Ratzel and Kjellen had more meaning, and what is more important, a method for restoring German power lost in the war and at Versailles. The indignation of the Germans over Versailles is enough reason to explain why some Germans deserted reputable scientific fields for Geopolitik, as it was being expanded in the hands of Haushofer.

The emergence of Haushofer as the foremost Geopolitiker in Germany came about after Kjellen's death in 1922. Here was a German, a former military officer, well read on political science, strategy, war, and geography, that idolized Friedrich Ratzel, a close friend of his father. Therefore, that he should desire resurrecting Ratzel's theories on political geography and securing translation of Kjellen's elaborations, comes as no surprise. Striking similarities between his views and those of his two predecessors were compounded further by his intimate connections with the two, especially by his collaboration with Kjellen for a time. Further, the two were ardently pro-German and thought Germany destined

for a greater "place in the sun" than that allowed by Versailles. Whatever the case, Haushofer had been a military geographer of sorts long before he met Kjellen. One of his early works was dedicated to Ratzel, another reaked with the importance of geography on military strategy. A trip to Japan and the Orient presented a formative period for Haushofer, that allowed him to develop probably his most significant adaptations of the ideas of his predecessors. Appreciation for the space-farsightedness of the Japanese was not long in forthcoming, nor was respect for the Japanese adherence to geographic factors in determining political policies. The Japanese could virtually conquer at will because they thoroughly evaluated their own strategic resources as well as those of their adversaries. They examined cursorily, the features of the landscape in various parts of the Far East and Pacific, as well as climatic factors and their significance in planning military operations.

Upon Haushofer's return, many of the impressions gained in Japan were put in book form and published later in 1924 as Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean, although this work was preceded by Dai Nihon and The German Share in the Geographical Opening up of Japan and the Sub-Japanese Earth Space, and Its Advancement Through the Influence of War and Defense Politics.

Even during pre-war I years, Haushofer appeared to be pre-occupied with finding geographical explanation of why wars are won and lost, and how consequently, geographic factors can be applied to German military planning. However, his research and writing was interpreted by the war, although the succeeding four years only served to validate his ideas on geographical usefulness in war planning.

It should be mentioned at this juncture, that the war years witnessed increased measures toward securing some form of Mitteleuropa, that would extend Germany's Lebensraum to various parts of Europe, mostly Central and Southeastern regions. Additionally, Pan-Germanism assumed an increasing role, largely because it was a method of justifying German expansion in some areas.

The war years also witnessed to some uncertain degree, increasing dissatisfaction with the role geography and geographers were playing in war-time. Such a point of view led some geographers, as well as scientists in other fields, to attempt to shift the emphasis of their respective fields to a position that would assist the war effort. However, the success of such attempts is not known to the author. However, as mentioned previously Ratzel's political geography appeared to be the closest means available of effecting such a reorientation. The translation and subsequent distribution of Kjellen's

works served to thrust a new direction for German geography, although apparently no sizeable shift to Ratzel's and Kjellen's brand of geopolitics occurred. However, no small number of Germans were impressed with the Swede's method of evaluating world politics along geographic factors, and further, could hardly turn away from statements that were decidedly pro-German and encouragement for German expansion. Kjellen's insistence that geographic factors played the paramount role in world politics, and that state's possessing a lack of space such as Germany were compelled to expand, could hardly be completely ignored at this time. Further, they were to many Germans, a first acquaintance with political geography and its utility in wartime. That Kjellen held similar views to that of the Germans, namely those revolving around a fear of Russian expansion, as well as those that envisioned a Greater Germany, came as sweet music to the ears of Germans who were preparing to deal with both.

German geographers such as Hettner and Penck attempted to achieve a more reputable place for political geography in their field, apparently convinced that there was some validity to expectations that geography could play a more vital role in German military strategy. Concomitantly, the theories of Ratzel and Kjellen gained



a foothold in Germany during the war simultaneously as Germany seemed to have victory close at hand.

When the war was lost, it might have been expected that the emerging interest in political geography would wane. However, such was not the case; if anything, the defeat and its consequences fed the flames that Geopolitik emerged from; the Versailles peace terms and the accompanying distasteful reaction on the part of the Germans. However, the single most important factor in gaining acceptance for geopolitical ideas as well as their possible implications for reinstating German power and destroying Versailles, that factor was Haushofer. Subsequently it was Haushofer that harangued the German populace with the ideas of Ratzel and Kjellen and gained some acceptance or adherence to them amongst leading political circles. It was Haushofer who accepted basically the organismic theory of state and the imperativeness of space-consciousness, the latter destined to become his first objective. Three years after Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean, Haushofer published Grenzen, for the express purpose of instilling the space-consciousness that heretofore had been lacking on the part of the German people. Frontiers as such, were the first measure of a people's space-consciousness, for a people's attitude toward their boundaries displayed whether they possessed the nationalist flair or were

passive creatures at the mercy of threatening adversaries. Haushofer was determined that the Germans become the foremost space-thinkers of the time, and if he could awaken them to their relative situation, politically, with regard to space dynamics, the battle would be half over.

Geopolitik as a movement of scale can be dated from 1924, the year that the Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik first appeared to acquaint and propagandize the Germans with Haushofer's ideas. In essence, the immediate objective of the Zeitschrift and of Geopolitik was to secure revision of the Versailles treaty in its entirety if possible. The main contention in these early years was to regain "rightful" German territory such as that severed off and placed in the "corridor."

Collectively, Haushofer, the Zeitschrift, Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean and later works, and the Munich "seminar" (Haushofer's) served to render Geopolitik a respectable position in post-war Germany as well as the cooperation and services of a sizeable segment of the geographic field. Moreover, through published medium, especially the Zeitschrift, Geopolitik received public notoriety. The sane and stable scientific geography at the time apparently was not able to fill the bill of a Germany bent on revengefully regaining a position from which to expand anew.

Suffice further description of Haushofer's geopolitical ideas save to say that as regards three basic aspects, i.e., the organismic nature of the state, Lebensraum, the autarchy, he presented no altogether different ideas than those of Ratzel and Kjellen. However, he clothed such aspects into the mode of German life and thought. His insistence on life-giving space was space for Germany to expand in, justifiable from not only the standpoint of overpopulation, but also because of Pan-Germanism, the superiority of the German culture, and certain economic benefits.

If necessitated, he had but to lapse back into German history and reiterate the "encirclement of powers" theory for further justification, or tell the Germans they were being crowded out of space, space that was rightfully theirs from ethnic standpoints, space that Versailles had taken away. Further, Germany's destiny was to impose its culture on other parts of the world, or so German philosophers had stated, and only by expansion could this be accomplished. Any living organism had to expand or die, at least Ratzel and Kjellen said so, and Germany was an organism in need of growth in order to replenish her vitality. Lebensraum was in the final analysis, the answer to all the evils the allies had relegated at Versailles. It was the means of reinstating Germany's

greater power, of resurrecting its military traditions, and of securing its "place in the sun." No other race had any rightful claim to territory if the Germans had designs on it. The path to a Mitteleuropa and Drang nach Osten was through expansion, at the expense of neighboring countries, first, and ultimately, who was to say where it would end.

The aforehand were the sort of ideas that Haushofer harangued the Germans with, whether they were soldiers in his classroom at Munich or men on the street. The iron laws of space were the over-riding importance in international affairs. Haushofer saw in a linking of the spaces of Japan, Russia, and Germany a formidable land block possessing enough of the elements of seapower to render such an alliance impregnable to the western world. The reason for seeking such a transcontinental block must in any consideration, rest with Mackinder's theory of the Heartland, that vast impregnable fortress in Ekurasia, impenetrable from the outside, ultimately making possible not only dominance of the World Island, but of the rest of the earth also. With Germany's natural militaristic talents, Russia's resources, and Japan's naval strength, consolidation of the powers of Eurasia made such a goal a practical objective. Therefore, from early post-war times, Haushofer was apparently inclined to favor close

cooperation with Russia and Japan, although such an attitude toward the former was in opposition to Julius Rosenberg, the Nazi. However, if one examines Haushofer's statements in a cursory manner, at one point he states with regard to Russia, that German policy may consist of amalgamation, collaboration, or conquest. Hence, Germany had three choices in dealing with Russia from this viewpoint, the last two obtainable in practicality.

Haushofer used his economic views to further justify German expansion. The attainment of economic self-sufficiency could only be made a reality by securing the resources of other countries. Moreover, the final goal of autarchy was not self-sufficiency by itself, but that would bolster Germany's industrial potential and render her capable of fighting an extended war.

Any anatomy of Geopolitik must at some time emphasize that it directed that all the efforts of Germany be directed toward destroying the British Empire and its formidable seapower. However, the Geopolitikers and Hitler, for that matter, were not adverse to allying with Britain, since racial similarities made it a possibility. Nonetheless, a clash between the German masters of Central Europe and the "pirate of the seas" loomed inevitable.

Haushoferian Geopolitik once again revived various concepts of Pan-regions, to further its purposes and justify further expansion by the Germans, mostly on the basis of cultural, linguistic, or ethnic similarities possessed by the inhabitants of coveted areas. However, Haushofer expanded pan concerns over the width and breadth of the world, and succeeded in delimiting four Pan-regions. Pan-Asia was of course within Japan's sphere of influence while Pan-America was under the United States hegemony. Eurasia at one time was to be divided between Russia and Germany, with Germany occupying the more dominant position. However, as the fortunes of cooperation with Russia became more and more uncertain, the U.S.S.R.'s sphere of influence was forfeited.

From 1924, the school of Geopolitik apparently took form in the shape of the "Munich Seminar," which surveyed factual data from all parts of the globe, evaluated the possible strengths and weaknesses from such information, and projected strategic implications for Germany. Existing therefore virtually in the same manner as a war resources planning board, the Seminar was able to devise much of the strategy that the outlawed General Staff was forbidden by Versailles.

The Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik served as a sort of transmission belt for German propaganda at home and

abroad. A similar publication entitled "Facts in Review," was translated and sent to English-speaking countries, such as the United States and Great Britain.

Hitler was informed of the basic ideas of Geopolitik through his assistant, Hess, and Haushofer himself. Consequently Mein Kampf, especially Chapter 14, is rampant with geopolitical ideas of space, expansion, Lebensraum, and territorial aggrandizement against other nations. However, it was not until the Work Group for Geopolitik and the Zeitschrift adopted Nazi orientation, that the school moved under Nazi auspices. Nonetheless, Hitler's coup of power marked the full scale absorption of Geopolitik into the Nazi mainstream. In the succeeding years, the power behind Geopolitik was that of the National Socialist leaders, as Haushofer's hold of the movement was increasingly weakened. Moreover, in the twenties the Geopolitikers, at least Haushofer, had been wary of accepting racism in the Nazi manner as a basic theme. However, Haushofer was led to compromise his viewpoints with those of "blood and soil," and in later years became another champion of racism, although to what degree remains uncertain. It appears that Haushofer chose to remain within Nazi Geopolitik and possible influence of Hitler's foreign policy, rather than relinquish the entire movement to the National Socialists. Whatever

the case, the Nazis used what they considered vital information and constructed "strategic indexes" from geographic data. Geopolitik maps were especially adapted to suit the Nazi cause, as was the Zeitschrift, and their services were not ignored.

Further, the concept of Lebensraum was modified to suit the Third Reich, and prepare for world control, recognizing no limits to possible German expansion.

As Hitler's power rose, the prestige of Geopolitik heightened. The "strategic index" became probably the most complete and classified body of information ever assembled for military use. Nazi education was incomplete without the study of several Geopolitik text books and their maps. The German public was taught to think in terms of space and Lebensraum and to prepare for the day Germany would secure its needed and rightful space. Various journals of the Zeitschrift published articles on Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and western countries, that should have been interpreted by the West as war aims. However, such was not the case, and it was not until the Soviet Union and Germany signed a friendship pact that the Western world apparently were made aware of Haushofer and his alleged "thousand scientists." The Russo-German pact marked probably the zenith of Geopolitik and Haushofer, while it constituted somewhat of a loss of



face for Rosenberg, who opposed the idea. However, such a pact made possible one of the foremost objectives of Geopolitik--the return of parts of the shatter zone to Germany. If that intermediate zone of fragments, including expanses of Poland, could be transformed into some type of protectorates or destroyed completely, Germany would have won its major victory on the road to recovering greatness. The Geopolitikers plans for Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Finland necessitated either economic subservience, accomplished peacefully, or political pressure would be applied, as was the case with Czechoslovakia. Before the Western powers appeared at Munich, Hitler's foreign policy had apparently been to secure Greater Germany. After Austria had acceded to the Nazi cause, and "Munich" that goal was virtually accomplished. However, the "science" of Geopolitik contained plans for further conquests of space. Drang nach Osten was as yet not to be halted. Thus, the pact that insured Russia laissez faire from the Polish question was hailed as the supreme geopolitical victory, the crowning success of Geopolitik and Haushofer. However, the pact was but a lull to allow the invasion of Poland. Once that was accomplished, the pact meant virtually nothing. Later, in 1941, when Hitler decided to invade Russia, the Geopolitikers were forced to qualify their Russian

policy line by emphasizing once again that Haushofer had said Russia could be secured either by amalgamation, colonization, or conquest. Therefore, the Russian campaign was not a setback for Geopolitik. However, Haushofer immediately dropped from the scene, and apparently no longer exerted any influence on the policy makers of the Third Reich. Documented evidence in recent years has brought to light the knowledge that Hitler and Haushofer had a vital argument over the Russian campaign. Whatever the case, the Germans were defeated, at least in part, by the spaciousness of Russia, and the necessity of fighting the two-front war, both of which Haushofer had continually warned against.

One statement sums up German geopolitics. That is as follows:

Geopolitics may be summed up as an attempt to find a deterministic principle which controls the development of states. The basic determining factor upon which it has come to rest is that of geographic condition, and it is materialistic in large degree. However, the geopoliticians of the German school have interwoven with their geographic materials an incalculable amount of national psychology, history, and military strategy. The unifying purpose that runs throughout the discussions is the restoration of Germany to the position of a great power which was lost following her defeat in World War I. Practically all of the ideas and all of the suggested courses of action contribute to that ultimate goal, and that ultimate goal is a world conquest.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Hagan, op. cit.

## II. CONCLUSIONS

In retrospect, it appears that the fundamental theories of Geopolitik consisted of the organismic theory of state, as interpreted from Ratzel and Kjellen; the concept of Lebensraum, adapted from a number of precursors; the land-power versus seapower thesis, adapted mainly from Mahan and Mackinder; the doom of the British Empire, from a number of sources, some German, some Western; the ideas for Pan-regions, largely an outgrowth of German "pan" ideas; and Autarky, self-sufficiency that was not altogether a recent innovation by the Geopolitikers. The primary goals of Geopolitik appear to have been the consolidation of the Heartland and its power potential under German hegemony, and the destruction of British naval power. The first concern, outside of instilling space-consciousness in Germany, was revision of the Versailles treaty and the return of German Lebensraum taken away by those terms. Geopolitik was the means of telling why certain lands were to be taken, and made possible strategic planning by accumulating vast storehouses of knowledge, evaluating their utility, and compiling an index of their future feasibility. Therefore, a large segment of the field was devoted to the preparation of inventories of every resource, human and material

that other nations could array in wartime. Such a mass of research and body of conclusions incalculably showed the way to political, economic, and psychological infiltration of Germany's neighbors, and hastened the drafting of plans for their eventual absorption into the Reich. Geography--natural resources, climate, rainfall, water power, population pressure--heretofore static ingredients of a state's power assumed a "dynamic" role when transformed into strategic implications for waging war.

Geopolitik apparently examined the nature of a state as a living organism, transcending through stages of birth, life, and death, and devised a number of laws applicable to the growth processes. History, or rather expansionist history of empires and strong nations provided the framework for declaring that strong states expanded in space. Perhaps in summation, Geopolitik was nothing but an attempt to find deterministic principles that controlled the development of states and to apply the results to Germany's position. Therefore, geographic factors were apparently the ultimate decider of the fates of nations, and a lack of certain necessary factors necessitated Germany to strive for growth and expansion in Lebensraum. The value of Germany's imagined lack-of-space was mainly political, inasmuch as it was excellent propaganda to talk the German populace into believing

they had been cheated out of space, space that was more in keeping with their proportional amount of culture. Population pressure, although creating no real problem in Germany, was utilized to justify absorption of neighboring countries. The advantage of the Lebensraum concept was that it gave almost unlimited possibilities to an aggressive and ambitious nation. Of course, no nation had the right of living space at the expense of another state, no matter how inferior the other state can be made to appear. No nation had as much right to Lebensraum as it can control. Although there may exist some expansive urge amongst peoples, it is not the organizing principle of human society. A neighboring country, by all rights, if it possessed similar attributes to the Germans, possessed an equal right of expanding in Germany. A basic fault with Geopolitik lies with the knowledge that only the Germans were given rights.

Under Geopolitik in Nazi Germany, no international law existed except the right of the Germans to space, based on the superiority of the master race, and its alleged shortcomings in territory.

Geopolitik was permeated with aspects of the philosophical history of Germany, a history glorifying war and aggressiveness against neighboring countries. Further, the will to power and the duty to impose culture

on other peoples was not a recent innovation with Geopolitik. Geopolitik was at best an attempt to orient nationalistic belief and aspiration with a clothing of scientific reputability. The transition from science to propaganda was easily effected. There was no scientific basis justifying German expansion, no such scientific proof that Germany was overpopulated beyond its capacity for insuring a high standard of living. Lebensraum and overpopulation not only were devices for justification of German designs as elaborated by Geopolitik and later National Socialism, they were propaganda devices that served to consolidate the power structure and unify the Germans against foreign countries. Germany possessed no right to destroy neighboring cultures on any basis, whether it was alleged to be an inferior culture, or capable of sustaining Germany's surplus population.

The responsibility for the development and emergence of such a pseudo-science as Geopolitik, that in the end rationalized greed and violence on racist claims, dynamics of space, the organismic theory, etc., lies not with the treaty of Versailles, as so many Geopolitikers insisted, but was the fault of no small number of Germans who idolized the militaristic heritage of Germany, and refused to accept defeat. In addition, no such development of Geopolitik, especially the contortions the Nazis

twisted it into, would have made it to first base had the allied powers recognized their responsibility after Versailles for insuring the continual disarmament of Germany. However, the criticism is less pungent when one considers the turmoil of Germany after World War I, of which the allies were no help in solving. The Weimar Republic, the trial at democracy, was apparently ringed with its own basic frailties, which in time were compounded. The inability to quiet the violent uprisings contributed in no small way to undermining the government. The rise of radicalism at such time must surely parallel the rise of unscientific pursuits among peoples dissatisfied with their predicament. Perhaps there is insufficient evidence to account for the emergence of Geopolitik satisfactorily. However, it blossomed on the hatreds and emotions of a defeated Germany.

From 1918 to after 1938, the German people were harangued with the Geopolitikers Weltanschauung that saw German foreign policy only in the terms of territorial expansion, using whatever means that were expedient. The Geopolitikers aimed for more than a rightful amount of space for Germany; the ultimate goal was world domination for Germany, and Geopolitik was German foreign policy. Hitler found in the Geopolitik some coherent explanation as to how world powers ascended to the stage of brilliance,

how they had developed in the past and how Germany could assume her rightful position as a great power. However, Geopolitik provided only a reservoir of ideas from which Hitler, at will, could draw upon. Furthermore, his own ideas were not far removed from those of the Geopolitikers on a majority of issues, and it becomes hard to determine whether Haushofer influenced Hitler, or vice versa.

In essence, Haushofer and the geopoliticians insistence on Lebensraum was an early measure or counter-measure designed for the specific purpose of obstructing the treaty of Versailles. Throughout the course of the evolution of Geopolitik, Lebensraum was the focal point for the movement, the catchword that could do away with the evils of Versailles. What Haushofer apparently failed to realize, was that nations aren't delegated so much space on the basis of whatever culture they possess. There is no scientific validness for delineating the various areas of the world using such a base. The territory of the earth has been parceled out largely by one overwhelming factor--power. There are no consistent principles for conducting statesmanship on such a geographic basis as he expounded. There are no insurmountable laws of state behavior determined only by the environment. The air age had served to close the gap on much of such thinking. Moreover, Geopolitik failed in one significant



respect--it failed to take into account the ability of human beings to not just adjust to their environment but to substantially modify it.

The human factor was of no importance in the science of Geopolitik. The state was the all-encompassing super-being that imposed its will upon the powerless human. Further, there was no moral basis for the subject of Geopolitik. What existed was a virtual detachment from human values, as Lin Yu Tang stated, a "mechanistic concept of physical forces determining human events," and a view of the world as a jungle from which biological states were involved in a constant struggle for survival.

The author is of the opinion that Geopolitik lost its scientific aspects before it had begun, inasmuch as the organismic concept of state became the point of departure for its subsequent development. A state is not a biological organism, and one finds it hard to believe that anyone could literally believe such to be true. Darwin's evolutionary theory somehow doesn't fit into a concept of political geography or geopolitics. However, the organismic concept of state was not an invention of Ratzel's or Kjellen's. Francis Coker states that in the more practical aspects of the organismic theories the general purpose has been to antagonize arbitrariness and a capriciousness in dealing with political problems,

"showing that the state in its inescapable causal relationships with all features of its environment is not a lawless thing that can be created, transformed, or abolished in defiance of its nature and connections with other things."<sup>6</sup>

However, Coker apparently saw no justification for the Geopolitik conception of the earth-state living organism. The growth processes of state then are not earth-bound, but rather a result of cultural phenomena, of diplomacy, statesmanship, and warfare. Although statesmen have, since antiquity, considered certain elements of geography in making decisions, such factors were not the single most important ingredient, as in the case of Geopolitik. Many other factors, especially those connected with human endeavor were at least of equal importance. Therefore there appears to be no scientific basis, causal relationship, or cause-effect arrangement between geographic circumstances and expansion by political entities, at least not to the degree put forth by the Geopolitikers. Political decisions are, in the final analysis, weighed and decided in the minds of mankind, taking into consideration a variety of factors.

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<sup>6</sup>Francis W. Coker, "Organismic Theories of State, Nineteenth Century Interpretations of the State as an Organism or as a Person," Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2, edited by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1910), p. 199.

Since the idea for this study stems from the writer's conviction that the population of the United States as a whole and much of the rest of the world lacks a basic understanding of the interrelationship of geography and international relations, it, therefore, appeared relevant to survey a period in history when geography reached unparalleled heights in the fate of a nation. The country was Germany, the period, from World War I through World War II. Although the geography practiced under the guise of Geopolitik reeked with strong nationalistic overtones and pursuits of an unscientific manner, nevertheless, the Germans apparently became the most geographically informed people in the world. Although geography had held a significant position in Germany before the emergence of Geopolitik, the value of that medium was that for perhaps the first time, a people were made aware of their relative situation with regard to other nations. Through the innumerable maps, the geopoliticians produced, the Germans, the man in the street, realized the assets and potential of Germany and moreover, various aspects of the rest of the world. Regrettably, Geopolitik was adapted to serve the nationalistic and aggressive interests of National Socialism, and Hitler, and therefore lost the respect of the Western world. However, it is hard for the writer

to condemn Haushofer's purpose--to instill a geographic consciousness on the part of the German people. That he did so in the singular interests of Germany is all the more regrettable, since a Geopolitik based on establishing closer international cooperation among nations would have been encouraged.

As Haushofer reiterated again and again, "to the best informed goes the ultimate victory." How applicable is this age-old adage to the Cold War struggle today, a confrontation of Western democracy, led by the United States, against the Communist bloc headed by the Soviet Union and Red China. Documented evidence points to the awareness of the Russians to Haushofer and Nazi Geopolitik, as well as to their establishing countermeasures to defeat it. Having implicitly read the several discourses of Haushofer and others in the Zeitschrift, it is understandable why such a large segment of the U.S.S.R.'s industrial potential cropped up to eastward in the Urals, an obvious measure to counter the probability of a German Drang nach Osten. Thus, although the Germans were able to conquer vast expanses of territory in the western and southern sectors of European Russia, they were never able to silence the U.S.S.R.'s industrial might, which kept producing the strategic materials to continue the war.

If the bulk of Russian industry had been concentrated in the Moscow region, the Donets, and other European areas, no doubt the Russians would have no longer been able to continue the war after Stalingrad. Further, although Haushofer later modified his claims that the U.S.S.R.'s overwhelming spaciousness would be impossible to conquer, and declared that technology, Blitzkreig, and the air age had destroyed the effectiveness of his early theory, a combination of factors, of which no doubt the over-extendedness of German troops in an all-encompassing space, was a paramount one. The Russian winter caught the Germans ill-equipped and unable to carry the offensive any longer, and the armies of the Reich were forced to retreat.

In reviewing case examples of the effectiveness of geopolitical studies in wartime, one main point comes to mind, namely that many of the German campaigns were assisted by Geopolitik measures in securing victory. For instance, preceding the African campaign, Marshal Rommel's corps were thoroughly trained in simulated conditions to those persisting in Saharan Africa. Not only for a time did they live in over-heated barracks, digested African edibles, they were substantially grounded in the aspects of the various types of terrain they would be encountering.

A second instance concerned the Japanese Pacific and Southeast campaign. Haushofer was convinced, even prior to 1940, that the British naval base was not as impregnable as claimed. From an extensive study of the terrain at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula, Haushofer concluded that a surprise attack from the Malay mainland immediate to the north of Singapore possessed all the elements of success.

Haushofer was probably an authority on geography for military use in the Indo-Pacific area. At one time he predicted that the heterogeneous population of the Malay States and Straits would prove a millstone around the neck of the British. At the time, Haushofer was more concerned with the immediate defense of Singapore which led him to believe that the defense of such a heterogeneous city as Singapore would prove an impossible task to the British. The ethnic confrontation of Malays against Chinese was well understood at the time by Haushofer, although apparently the British have yet to learn the significance of the basic antagonisms between the two diverse groups.

It apparently can be concluded that Geopolitik was a "pseudo-science." However, it appears to have contributed immensely to the German war effort, even though Haushofer regarded the Nazi interpretation of his works

as incorrect, at least this he declared in testimony. In his "Defense of German Geopolitics," Haushofer takes note of the intensely nationalistic circumstances in which the movement originated. It was born of necessity, Haushofer later confessed. Further, Haushofer contends that Hitler and his associates grossly distorted his valid geographical parts of his doctrines and twisted them to fanatical ends. However, the question arises as to whether Haushofer was really misinterpreted or whether he sanctioned Nazi adaptations of his works. The answer will probably never be known. What is known is that for a quarter of a century or so, there was German Geopolitik to assist the Nazis in their growth. To what extent credit can be given the field for Nazi successes remains for the student of Geopolitik to conceive.

### III. IMPLICATIONS

Contrary to the belief of some, the "science" of Geopolitik would appear to have implications for today's world. While the implications may appear to be less for Europe and America than the Far East, nevertheless they exist. For one thing, Geopolitik implies a systematic and detailed knowledge of the earth prepared for use by governments. And it appears even the nuclear age has not lessened the appeal of geopolitics.

Perhaps "who rules Russia rules the world," is not a statement without any meaning, but a possible occurrence. That is not only to say that the "Heartland theory" is valid in today's air age world, but also to imply that "to the best informed to the spoils." Certainly, the Soviets are familiarly acquainted with German Geopolitik and probably are the foremost practitioners of geopolitics in the world today.

Haushofer and the geopoliticians presented the first comprehensive survey of the earth's resources ever organized. Governments today go out of their way to gain increasing control over natural resources within their grasp.

It would seem as population grows and transportation becomes speedier that there will be an even greater need for accurate and up-to-date knowledge of the earth. This is the message that German Geopolitik holds today. That "global thinking" is an enduring concept of limitless value, even in the nuclear age.

Finally, it appears that "the Heartland theory" has strategic vitalness in today's nuclear age, and certainly, geopolitics has many implications for the layman today.



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