THE LIFE, CHARACTER, AND THOUGHT OF ARTHUR MOELLER VAN DEN BRUCK: A NEO-FREUDIAN INTERPRETATION

12

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

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INTRODUCTION

In the wanton destruction of Melos in 416 B.C., Thucydides thought he perceived the very nature of man -- a stringent conformity to self-interest. Centuries later, Christian historians, with unquestioning belief in the Second Coming, declared the unfolding of human events to be God's will. In more recent times some economic determinists, with a no less fervent belief in their own peculiar Second Coming, have depicted man as an economic hedonist. Historians have, in fact, consistently made assumptions about human behavior. William L. Langer has suggested that the unwillingness of historians to apply psychoanalytic theory to their discipline has, in part, "been due . . . to the fact that historians, as disciples of Thucydides, have habitually thought of themselves as psychologists in their own right."[1]

The nature of the problem which psychological assumptions create is common to all the social sciences. Such assumptions are inevitable since they arise out of the very nature of the subject matter treated. Economic theory, for example, rests upon value judgments which are dependent upon or closely related to a subjective appraisal of human behavior. Frank W. Taussig has written:

> The questions between private property and socialism reduce themselves to questions as to men's character, motives, ideals. They are questions, in so far, of psychology. . . .[2]

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[1]William L. Langer, "The Next Assignment," Psychoanalysis and History, ed. Bruce Mazlish (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963), p. 89.

Likewise, historians have been "psychologists in their own right" because they must be. History is "the one discipline that deals especially with man's past and seeks explanation of that past largely in terms of men's motives. . . ."[3]

The methodological problem with these assumptions lies not in their existence, but in the fact that they are often hidden or casually passed over. Historians and other social scientists seldom state openly their psychological and philosophical tenets probably because they themselves have given them little thought. The result of this shortcoming is that social scientists often become accustomed to thinking within a certain system of assumptions concerning human nature. Medieval scholastics had as much difficulty seeing in man a creator of the world around him as Ranke had thinking in terms other than that of national history. At worst this may lead to a narrow ethnocentricism in which the historian considers "as natural and understandable only that which is so to our particular time and culture."[4] Another problem

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[3]Bruce Mazlish, "Introduction," Psychoanalysis and History, p. 2.

[4]Ibid., p. 3. Robert Theobald has contended that this narrowness is characteristic in present economic theory: "Much of existing economic theory elevates the emotional preferences of Western society into immutable laws. Its policy recommendations are usually achieved by using simplified assumptions and ignoring the real world" (Robert Theobald, The Challenge of Abundance, New York, 1961, p. 41).

is that the historian who accepts intuitive or "surface" psychology tends to apply to his discipline the same unexamined cliches about human behavior that he practices in everyday life.[5]

Even if the social scientist is not so naive, assumptions are practically never presented in an organized fashion. This may convey to the reader a misleading sense of objectivity that is not warranted and makes examination of those assumptions difficult, if not impossible. Talcott Parsons could have broadened his target to include historians when he wrote:

> The sociologist must face the problems of human motivation whether he wants to or not. If he does not acquire a genuinely competent theory, he will implicitly adopt a series of ad hoc ideas which are no less crucial because they are exempted from critical analysis.[6]

The above points to the need for at least some historians to examine psychological theory with the intention of applying their findings to the study of history. This will help to insure that the future writers of history do not use outdated or unrealistic assumptions. Moreover, the application of a psychological model to historical situations may bring new relationships to attention. In an article "Psychoanalysis: Model for Social Science," John R. Seeley wrote:

> Is not much of the product of present social science suggestive of that detailed knowledge of the trivial and

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[5] Maslish, "Introduction," p. 31.

[6] Talcott Parsons, "Psychoanalysis and the Social Structure," Psychoanlysis and Social Science, ed. H. M. Ruitenbeek (New York, 1962), p. 61.

> esoteric, together with a curious blindness to vital facts, obvious and near at hand, which must be neglected because fixity of method will allow no account to be taken of what most needs to be taken account of?
>
> Perhaps what is wanting is the open recognition of an identity or affinity that, like so many recognitions, has its difficulty precisely proportioned to its importance.[7]

This thesis will attempt, first, to outline a psychological theory that can be applied to history and, second, to apply this theory to a historical character, namely Arthur Moeller van den Bruck.

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[7] In Psychoanalysis and Social Science, p. 110.

CHAPTER I

THE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTION OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL

I. SELECTION OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL

It would be impossible to discuss in detail all the psychological theories that one might apply to a historical situation or subject. The author of this thesis has chosen the neo-Freudian social psychological theories of Erich Fromm and of Karen Horney both because of his personal inclination towards the social psychological approach and by the elimination of a number of inadequate theories.[1]

One of the most important criteria in the choice of a model, from the point of view of both history and psychology, is the theory's emphasis on society as a determinant of individual behavior. "Though it is logically possible to treat a single individual in isolation from others, there is every reason to believe that this case is not of important empirical significance."[2] Therefore, "all concrete action is in this sense social, including psychopathological behavior."[3]

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[1] A number of theories are either much too narrow or too incomplete for use as models in historical writing. Rogers' self theory, stimulus-response theory, factor theories, and many organismic theories fall into this category. For this reason, these theories have had little impact on the social sciences (Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of Personality, New York, 1957, pp. 329, 417, 422, 496, 548.)

[2] Parsons, "Social Structure," pp. 46-47.

[3] Ibid., p. 47.

Unfortunately, clinical psychologists are usually not acquainted with the social system and have often been unable to establish the necessary interrelation between sociological conditions and individual behavior.[4] The theories of Jung, Allport, Angyal, Rogers, Sheldon and Goldstein, in particular, have lacked this emphasis.[5] Adler and Lewin have stressed the importance of sociological determinants but "the relation between their theories and social science developments is less clear."[6]

The emphasis on social factors may help avoid the mistake of much historical writing. This is the mistake, especially common to monographs and to official biographies, in viewing the historical character as a unique, charismatic hero who, through his own determination, discovers truth and justice. An important study of ethnocentricism, Nazism and nationalism, The Authoritarian Personality, has expressed the position taken in this thesis:

> Since it will be granted that opinions, attitudes, and values depend upon human needs, and since personality is essentially an organization of needs, then personality may be regarded as a determinant of ideological preferences. Personality is not, however, to be hypostatized as an ultimate determinant. Far from being something which is given in the beginning, which remains fixed and acts upon the surrounding world, personality evolves under the impact of the social environment and can never be isolated

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[4] Parsons, "Social Structure," p. 59.

[5] Hall and Lindzey, Theories of Personality, pp. 249-50, 292, 330, 546.

[6] Ibid., p. 546.

> from the social totality within which it occurs. . . . This means that bread changes in social conditions and institutions will have a direct bearing upon the kinds of personalities that develop within a society.[7]

The above tends to detract from the possibility of applying Freudian psychology to history. Although Erik H. Erikson has had moderate success in applying a Freudian analysis to Martin Luther in Young Man Luther, he failed in this work to show the relationship between Luther's personality and success, on the one hand, and the changing economic and social conditions of the early sixteenth century, on the other hand.[8] Erich Fromm has criticised Freudian theory on this point:

> Freud's essential principle is to look upon man as an entity, a closed system, endowed by nature with certain physiologically conditioned drives, and to interpret the development of his character as a reaction to satisfactions and frustrations of these drives; whereas, in our opinion, the fundamental approach to human personality is the understanding of man's relation to the world, to others, to nature, and to himself.[9]

Along this same line of reasoning, Fromm has disagreed with Freud's contention that man is caught in a dilemma: that man either must control his aggressions and suffer frustrations, or release them and cause others to suffer. Fromm has contended, rather, that society may serve and does not have to violate psychological needs.[10]

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[7]T. W. Adorno et. al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York, 1950), pp. 5-6.

[8]New York, 1958.

[9]Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom (New York, 1966), p. 317.

[10]Ibid., p. 26.

At this point, one should note the philosophical implications of these two viewpoints. Freudian theory implies the wickedness of human nature. According to it, man strives only to fulfill physiologically induced instincts; therefore, Freud looked upon ideals as mere rationalizations of a primarily biological drive. Fromm, on the other hand, has claimed that ideals, although they have no intrinsic metaphysical character, "can be genuine strivings" which are "rooted in the conditions of human life."[11] It is at this point that philosophical preference becomes the main criteria in the choice of a psychological model. The psychological approach to history does not bypass philosophy; rather, it places philosophical speculation on a different, hopefully more ordered, level.

II. A DESCRIPTION OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL

Although there are a number of important differences between the neo-Freudian theories of Erich Fromm and of Karen Horney, the author of this thesis will treat the two as mutually supplementary. Their main difference is one of emphasis. Horney has concentrated more on the individual, Fromm, more on the social, aspects of social psychology. Karen Horney's theory, therefore, will be used to further develop Fromm's basic theoretical structure. This is the case with Horney's concepts of the "real self" and the "idealized self," both of which are only implied by Fromm. In other cases, Horney's concepts will be used to elaborate upon Fromm's theory. Horney's "expansive" and "self-effacing" solutions all have parallels in Fromm's terminology,

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[11]Fromm, Escape From Freedom, p.317.

yet, Horney, who had broad clinical experience, has demonstrated a greater perception than Fromm for the subtleties of neurotic behavior. Horney's "tyranny of the shoulds" has been used in place of Fromm's "authoritarian conscience" so as to avoid exclusive identification of Fromm's concept with the authoritarian personality. Finally, the author of this thesis has chosen to use Horney's term "basic anxiety" because it is more specific and better defined than Fromm's "sense of loneliness and isolation."

Fromm has argued that man has no fixed nature, but that he does have certain psychological, as well as physiological, needs. It is the way in which man satisfies these needs that determines his nature. Fromm developed an important psychological concept of the "existential dichotomy" to explain the existence of these needs. Man is a part of nature, but he is also separate from nature because of his realization of his own existence. Self-awareness leads to a sense of loneliness and isolation which Fromm divided into five psychological needs: the need for relatedness, the need for transcendence, the need for rootedness, the need for a sense of identity, and the need for a frame of orientation.[12] Karen Horney's concept of "basic anxiety" further illustrates the existential dichotomy. Basic anxiety, she writes, is "the feeling of being isolated and helpless in a world conceived as potentially hostile."[13] The child who gains freedom from the primary ties with parents with the result that he feels isolated and helpless" and the serf who obtains his freedom only to find himself adrift in a predom-

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[12]Erich Fromm, The Sane Society (Greenwich, Conn., 1966), pp. 35-66.

[13]Karen Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth: The Struggle Toward Self-Realization (New York, 1950), p. 18. See infra, pp. 11-12, n. 20.

inantly alien world" both experience basic anxiety which arises from man's existential dichotomy.[14]

The need for relatedness to people, institutions, and groups, Fromm's first need, arises out of the basic anxiety felt by the self-aware individual, who has been torn away from his original union with nature.[15] The narcissistic person, who has failed to establish any ties with others cannot maintain his sanity. In lesser degree of narcissism, the individual is simple withdrawn or resigned. Such a person has few goals and restricts his wishes so that he will not have to make any unnecessary effort. His relations with others are marked by detachment; he has an aversion to change and a hypersensitivity to influence, pressure or coercion upon him.[16]

There are two additional ways of relating to others. One is through domination (sadism), the attempt of the individual "to escape from his aloneness and his sense of imprisonment by making another person part and parcel of himself."[17] The need to dominate, which Horney called the "expansive solution" to basic anxiety, may express itself in several ways. One type of domineering person is in love with an idealised image of himself (but not with his real self). He may appear to have few doubts about himself, but his strong need to impress others is based on self-doubt. Another type is the perfectionist, who has a false feeling of superiority to cover his sense of inferiority as

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[14]Hall and Lindzey, Theories of Personality, p. 127.

[15]Fromm believes this happens to the child as he matures as it has happened to the human race in its evolution from the animal state.

[16]Horney, Neurosis, pp. 260-69.

[17]Erich Fromm, The Art of Loving (New York, 1963), p. 16.

well as a corresponding contempt for others. The perfectionist displays absolute certainty about his moral values, which usually are centered in a belief in economic success as proof of virtue. If he has not been successful, the perfectionist expresses strong resentment towards his "ill fortune." A third type of sadism is arrogant vindictiveness. This corresponds to a belief in the evilness of human nature by the sadist linked with a willingness to use others for his own purposes.[18]

Another way of relating oneself is by submission to them, the "self-effacing solution to basic anxiety. The masochist desires dependence because of a longing for help and protection. He fears triumph and desires failure. He has a need for human contact and fears loneliness; but his longing for love is really a longing for surrender and for martyrdom.[19]

The important thing to note about these three solutions is their similarity in spite of their apparent heterogeneity. All three neurotic solutions are caused by environmental factors, usually a disturbance of the security of the child in relation to his parents. Karen Horney wrote:

> A wide range of adverse factors in the environment can produce this insecurity in a child: direct or indirect domination, indifference, erratic behavior, lack of respect for the child's individual needs, lack of real guidance, disparaging attitudes, too much admiration or the absence of it, lack of reliable warmth, having to take sides in parental disagreements, too much or too little responsibility, overprotection, isolation from other children, injustice, discrimination, unkept promises, hostile atmosphere, and so on and so on.[20]

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[18]Horney, Neurosis, pp. 194-207.

[19]Ibid., pp. 214-29.

[20]Karen Horney, Our Inner Conflicts: A Constructive Theory of Neurosis (New York, 1945), p. 41. Horney, unfortunately, made no distinction

The outcome is the formation in the child's mind of "a tyranny of shoulds," that is, a vision of what one should be, an idealized picture of oneself.[21]

Horney has described the relation of the individual to his idealized self. In the expansive type, the individual actually pretends to be this "idealized self" despite his subconscious doubts and periods of despondency.[22] The self-effacing person realizes that he cannot achieve the ideal picture of himself and, therefore, feels inferior.[23] The withdrawn person also feels a deep sense of guilt from not having fulfilled the environmentally implanted "shoulds," but he refuses to take any action to remedy this situation, which he feels is beyond his control. He is unlike the masochist, who hopes for a better future in terms of a union with someone stronger than himself.[24]

Horney has contended that the "tyranny of the shoulds" in its emphasis on an idealized self leads to the alienation of the neurotic from his real self and, thus, alienation from the joys and sorrows of life itself.[25] Soren Kierkegaard has called this loss of self a "sickness unto death."[26] Many

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between this insecurity, which is caused by historical contradictions that are man-made and not inevitable, and the insecurity resulting from man's existential dichotomy. Erich Fromm has made this distinction in Man For Himself: An Inquiry Into The Psychology of Ethics (Greenwich, Conn., 1966), pp. 52-53.

[21]Horney, Neurosis, pp. 64-65. Fromm's parallel to the "tyranny of the shoulds" is his concept of the "authoritarian conscience," which is described in Man For Himself, pp. 143-162; however, he has not shown the precise relation of the sadist and the masochist to this conscience.

[22]Horney, Neurosis, pp. 194-95.

[23]Ibid., pp. 215-16.

[24]Ibid., pp. 262-63.

[25]Ibid., pp. 155-58.

[26]Horney, Our Inner Conflicts, p. 32, citing Soren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death (Princeton, 1941); Fromm, Man For Himself, p. 161.

philosophers, writers, and theologians have discussed alienation in recent times; however, the neo-Freudian views alienation as a psychological reaction, the result of the strategy that the individual develops to cope with intense feelings of insecurity.

Both sadism and masochism are also similar in as much as they both imply the "union of one individual self with another self (or any other power outside of the own self) in such a way as to make each lose the integrity of its own self and to make them completely dependent on each other."[27] That sadism and masochism have a common basis is demonstrated by the neo-Freudian observation that both tendencies are always present together in the neurotic individual although they are not usually of equal strength. The sadistic tendencies of the masochistic person and the masochistic tendencies of the sadist are less evident because the neurotic seldom outwardly expresses them. Fromm and Horney have shown how the expansive or sadistic tendencies of the self-effacing person are often channeled into a feeling of martyrdom which "accuses others and excuses himself."[28] Arrogant vindictiveness, on the other hand, is really an externalization of a self-degrading self-hate, and even the perfectionist expresses distrust of himself in his abject compliance to a set of moral values outside himself.[29] For these reasons, Fromm termed his theory of neurotic relatedness the "theory

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[27]Fromm, Escape From Freedom, p. 180.

[28]Horney, Neurosis, p. 235. See also Fromm, Art of Loving, pp. 51-52.

[29]Horney, Neurosis, pp. 196-97, 308; Fromm, Man For Himself, pp. 218-19.

of sado-masochism." This theory will be of great importance in the subsequent analysis of Arthur Moeller van den Bruck.

Horney has concurred with Fromm's teaching that the neurotic solutions can never be successful because the sadistic and masochistic tendencies necessarily conflict within the individual and, more important, because they operate against the very quality which distinguishes man, his self-awareness. Fromm and Horney have further agreed that there is only one solution to the need for relatedness which produces happiness. This is productive love, which is a relation that implies mutual care, responsibility, respect and understanding. This solution allows man to develop his integrity, uniqueness and individuality.[30] This solution both results from and allows the development of the individual's real self with the overcoming of alienation.[31]

The second psychological need, according to Fromm, is man's need for transcendence. Man needs to feel that he transcends his natural state of creature by becoming a creator. Man may create through art, through work, and through his relations with others. Love is man's creative orientation toward other humans. Man, if he is neurotic or if his creativity is stifled, can also prove himself superior to nature

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[30]Fromm, Sane Society, pp. 36-38; Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth, pp. 158-162, 300.

[31]Ibid., p. 36 and p. 159, respectively.

through destruction of nature and of his fellow man. Yet destructiveness isolates man from the world and from mankind; it, like sado-masochism, can only be a partial and temporary solution. Man is destructive, therefore, only when he fails to be creative. Destructiveness, Fromm wrote, is "the outcome of the unlived life."[32]

The third psychological need is man's need for rootedness. History best illustrates the different means by which mankind has achieved a sense of rootedness. Early men, like animals, were rooted in nature. The embryo and young child are also rooted in nature through their biological dependence on the mother. Fromm has said that the history of both the individual and of mankind is a history of their alienation from these primary ties to nature necessitating new rootings elsewhere. Various orgiastic rites, sensual experience, alcoholism and drug addiction have served as means by which man has attained the experience of union with a higher entity outside himself.[33] In addition, in higher cultures man has rooted himself in the concept of God, in a set of principles and in the mystique of various social groups ranging from the tribe to the polis to the modern nation-state.[34] Narrow nationalism,

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[32]Fromm, Escape From Freedom, p. 207.

[33]Fromm, Art of Loving, pp. 9-10.

[34]Man's relation to social groups solves both his need for relatedness and for rootedness. It solves his need for relatedness by providing him with relationships to individuals within the group and to the institutions associated with the group. It solves his need for rootedness in

as all forms of rootedness which do not recognise the brotherhood of man, is, to Fromm, regressive and primitive. He has written:

> Only when man succeeds in developing his reason and love further than he has done so far, . . . only when he can feel rooted in the experience of universal brotherliness, will he have found a new, human form of rootedness, will he have transformed his world into a truly human home.[35]

Man also needs a sense of identity. He has tried to achieve this identity in his religion, class, race, occupation, or political affiliations. Conformity to society is also a way to achieve identity and to escape loneliness and isolation. "If I am like everybody else, if I have no feelings or thoughts which make me different, if I conform in custom, dress, ideas, to the pattern of the group, I am saved; saved from the frightening experience of aloneness."[36] Yet, these secondary identities can never be successful. Man is the animal that can, that must, say "I"; his very nature presupposes <u>self</u> awareness, an individual identity. Thus, all the above solutions to the identity problem contribute to the alienation of the individual from his real self and, therefore, to neurosis. Fromm, Horney and many existentialists have argued man must find the solution in individualism, in the experience of "I am."[37]

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those cases when, in the minds of its members, the group becomes more than the sum of its component parts and assumes a mystical character. In these cases, the group comes to represent values and becomes an object of devotion.

[35]Fromm, <u>Sane Society</u>, p. 61.

[36]Fromm, <u>Art of Loving</u>, p. 11.

[37]Fromm, <u>Sane Society</u>, pp. 62-64; Horney, <u>Neurosis and Human Growth</u>, p. 158; Walter Kaufmann, <u>Existentialism From Dostoevsky to Sartre</u> (New York, 1950), pp. 11-12, 50.

The last of Fromm's postulated needs is the need for a frame of orientation. Unlike rootedness, identity, and relatedness, in the realm of feeling, and unlike transcendence, in the realm of action, a frame of orientation is man's way of making sense out of the perplexities of the world through the use of thought. If he allows his fears and desires to enter into his Weltanschauung, he will view the world and himself irrationally. The idealized self of the neurotic and his equally unrealistic view of the environment, mentioned above, are examples of the irrational orientation to life. On the other hand, man is gifted with the capacity of reason. To the extent that he develops this capacity he is able to view the world objectively.[38]

At this point, the continuity of the neurotic's character is evident. The neurotic is sado-masochistic and (or) withdrawn and fails to achieve either productivity or a truly individual identity. His lack of objectivity leads him to a false view of the world and, consequently, to a rootedness in narrow values. Moreover, the neurotic's solutions to the existential dichotomy are consistent. His inability to love himself, either because he does not know himself or because he hates himself, contributes to his inability to achieve a mature love of others. His vindictiveness or his abject reliance and his destructiveness alienate him further from others. His rootedness in external values or his denial of all values alienate him from himself. Circular causation between these factors--

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[38]Fromm, Sane Society, pp. 64-66.

similar to Gunnar Myrdal's concept of the "vicious circle of poverty" in economic theory--acts to maintain the entire system of neurosis.

On the other hand, love is the continuity in the character of the individual who has achieved maturity. Love, as understood by Fromm, is not primarily a relationship but an orientation or attitude towards all of life. Thus, self-love "is inseparably connected with the love for any other being."[39] Love is based on objectivity, that is, one loves himself and others for what he and they are, rather than for what he and they should be or seem to be when interpreted by rationalizations.[40] Furthermore, the mature person's love, because it is love of the essence rather than of the periphery, is necessarily a love for all human beings since all men have a common identity and brotherhood.[41] A loving orientation to life, then, precludes narrow forms of rootedness such as that nationalism which promulgates hatred of the foreigner. Moreover, love is necessary for creativity, which requires activity and care. Again these different facets relate to one another for, in creating, man "raises himself beyond the passivity and accidentalness of his existence into the realm of purposefulness and freedom."[42]

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[39]Fromm, Art of Loving, p. 49.

[40]Ibid., p. 24.

[41]Ibid., p. 39-41.

III. THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPT OF HISTORY

Erich Fromm's social psychological concept of history is a Marxist concept in that it stresses the interrelatedness between the economic and social basis of society on the one hand and the character of the man produced by that society on the other. Unlike Marx, however, Fromm has used psychoanalytic theory to explain this interrelatedness. He developed for this purpose the concept of the "social character," which Fromm defined as "the nucleus of the character structure which is shared by most members of the same culture."[43]

One can understand the social character only in relation to its function. Objective economic conditions as well as history and tradition produce the conditions under which society must operate in any given historical period. Social character shapes and channels the human energies of the members of society so that they act in accordance to the requirements of that society.[44] This social process, sometimes called socialization or enculturation, is largely unconscious. The individual learns to want to act the way he must act if he is to receive the approval of his society. In this process, the family is the psychic agency of society because it transmits the social character to the child.[45]

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[43]Erich Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My Encounter With Marx and Freud (New York, 1962) p. 76; Fromm, Sane Society, p. 76.

[44]Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, pp. 778-79; Fromm, Sane Society, pp. 76-77.

[45]Fromm, Sane Society, p. 79.

Fromm has contended that economic factors predominantly determine the social character. Fromm has not, however, seen man as a "blank sheet of paper on which culture writes its text."[46] Society cannot frustrate human psychological needs beyond a certain point; however, a wide range of societies can satisfy these needs enough to maintain social stability.[47]

The social character is "the basis from which certain ideas and ideals draw their strength and attractiveness."[48] Through the process of rationalisation, the individual often discards evidence supporting ideas contrary to those common to his society. Like all rationalisations, this is an irrational way of thinking based on fear of isolation from society for non-conformity. This does not mean that ideas and ideals have no validity of their own. In fact, these do influence the social character and even are independent to the extent that they conform to the rules of logic, though not necessarily to reality.[49]

From the above, the social character may be best described as the "intermediary between the socio-economic structure and the ideas and ideals prevalent in a society. It is the intermediary in both directions,

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[46] Fromm, Sane Society, p. 78.

[47] Ibid., p. 78.

[48] Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 83.

[49] Fromm, Escape From Freedom, p. 326.

from the economic basis to the ideas and from the ideas to the economic basis."[50] One must avoid several misinterpretations of Fromm's concept of history. First, cultural phenomena are not simply the result of human instinctual drives modified by society, as Freud thought. Fromm has put more emphasis on economic factors in social development and has seen man more as a product of society that did Freud. Second, his theory does not mean that the desire for material gain determines history; to the contrary, Fromm, like Marx, has taught that objective economic conditions may or may not result in a social character which is distinguished by greed. Third, Fromm has disagreed with the "idealist" position that ideas and ideals determine social behavior. Although these do play a role in molding the social character, the idealist overlooks economic factors and basic psychological needs.[51]

The above is a description of historical forces operating in relatively stable circumstances. Even if social and economic institutions remained relatively stable, political change could still occur. If the external social and economic conditions change, however, in such a way that they no longer accommodate the traditional social character, an explosive situation may develop. During the transition, as new needs

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[50]Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 87. Italics in the text.

[51]Fromm, Escape From Freedom, pp. 323-24.

and anxieties appear, the individual becomes susceptible to new or more radical ideas.[52] When a social class is threatened by new economic developments:

> it reacts to this threat psychologically and ideologically; and . . . the psychological changes brought about by this reaction further the development of economic forces. . . . We see that economic, psychological, and ideological forces operate in this way: that man reacts to changing external situations by changes in himself, and that these psychological factors in their turn help in molding the economic and social process.[53]

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[52]Fromm, Escape From Freedom, p. 326; Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 81.

[53]Fromm, Escape From Freedom, p. 325.

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF GERMANY DURING THE LIFETIME OF MOELLER VAN DEN BRUCK

The thought of Arthur Moeller van den Bruck was one manifestation of a larger Konservative Revolution the beginning of which lay in the early nineteenth century. The Deutsche Bewegung, the predominant, German branch of the Konservative Revolution, was an intellectual right-wing opposition to the humanistic and rationalistic ideals of the Wilhelmian monarchy and, later, to the Weimar Republic.[1]

This movement, actually comprised of hundreds of splinter movements and organizations,[2] appealed to many German intellectuals and especially to the youth. From the point of view of the psychological model described in the preceeding chapter, this appeal was the result of specific socio-psychological conditions as revealed in the concept of social character. Since the life and thought of every human are creatures as well as creators of environment, a survey of the social character of pre-World War I and early-Weimar Germany should be important in explaining the genesis and maturation of Moeller's thought. Equally important, the

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[1]Armin Mohler, Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland, 1918-1932: Grundriss ihrer Weltanschauungen (Stuttgart, 1950), pp. 19, 21, 35-36.

[2]Armin Mohler has found ninety-seven sub-movements and four hundred thirty organizations associated with the Konservative Revolution (Ibid., pp. 89-89, 94-95).

concept of social character should help clarify the reason for the appeal of Moeller's ideas to large numbers of Germans.

I. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRIALIZATION ON THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF GERMANY

The social character of Germany was strongly influenced by the torrent of industrial development in the latter half of the nineteenth century followed by continual economic expansion before World War I. This economic expansion itself had general psychological ramifications but also a specific impact in that it meant a shifting of economic and social status between Germany's social classes.[3]

The exploitation and misery associated with Western industrialization was relatively short-lived in Germany. A tradition of state paternalism fostered an advanced body of social legislation that made Wilhelmian Germany the model for the welfare state. Still, even in the decades before 1914 many Germans expressed deep dissatisfaction with the new industrial giant. Industrialization brought alienation, the most important psychological consequence of modern economic systems.

Alienation meant, in part, the isolation of man from his fellow man. Feudalistic culture had limited social and economic freedom, but

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[3]This specific impact will be discussed in the following section.

it also had given the individual a definite place in society. The individual had experienced his class as an object of identification and, in the absence of competition, he had formed human, not simply economic, relationships with fellow members of the same social level.[4] Special interest groups, born of the new spirit of competition, only partly satisfied the individual's need for relatedness. The relationships established in the various unions for workers and for businessmen could not overcome the individual's isolation because the motivation for joining the union or employers' organization was more economic self-interest than the desire to establish human relationships and because such organizations promoted as "collective egoism" that varied little from individual egoism.[5] Furthermore, many individuals, especially those in the middle class, had no organization or union with which they associated. The result was an increasing lack of warmth in personal relationships, especially between members of different classes and groups.

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[4] In Escape From Freedom, pp. 56-81, Fromm argues that this development began as early as the Renaissance. He points out, however, that feudal restraints on competition and many feudal attitudes towards society and the economy were predominant well into the nineteenth century (Sane Society, pp. 81-82).

[5] Otto Baumgartner, „Der sittliche Zustand des deutschen Volkes unter dem Einfluss des Krieges," Geistige und sittliche Wirkungen des Krieges in Deutschland, ed. James T. Shotwell („Wirtschaft und Sozialgeschichte des Weltkrieges," Deutsche Serie; Stuttgart, 1927), p. 62.

Erich Fromm has pointed out that the modern industrial system has increased the freedom of the individual from external authority; however, it has substituted for external authority the anonymous authority of the market and of pressures to conform.[6] In his important study cited above, Otto Baumgartner described this same tendency. The industrial system and the intensive specialization of labor, he argued, led to the degradation of the individual to the position of a cog in the giant industrial machine. As such, the individual was little different from others and became very much a "mass man."[7] Thus many Germans had become alienated not only from others but also from themselves. Organization had deprived them of originality and spontaneity. As "Organisation Men," Baumgartner continued, even their thoughts were often not their own. Their ideas and beliefs came more and more to be a mere „Erheucheln gewisser Gemeinschaftsgefuehle."[8]

Creativity was also thwarted for many Germans who became "atoms" in the giant industrial complex. The trend towards industrial concentration engendered a problem that still remains in industry, the inability of the individual worker to view himself as a creator with power over things. Rather the worker becomes, psychologically, an extension of the machine and a corresponding dulling of his sense of creativity occurs.

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[6]Fromm, Sane Society, p. 93.

[7]Baumgartner, „Sittliche Zustand," pp. 62-63.

[8]Ibid., ". . . 'aping of collective feelings'." My translation.

Few occupations were excluded from this trend. White-collar workers, independent businessmen, and managers were caught in the competitive and impersonal business world and came to feel less creators than subjects to forces outside themselves.[9]

The same alienation occurred with the satisfying of human needs through the consumption of goods. A rising standard of living seemed to create more "needs" than it satisfied.[10] Alienation meant that consumption served man's neurotic needs more than his human needs; the satisfaction of the former became a psychological compensation for the condition that alienation itself had created. Thus, "conspicuous consumption" became a quasi-solution to the need for relatedness by conferring status upon the alienated person.[11] Friedrich Glum has written that materialistic Wilhelmian Germans had lost a „Gefuehl fuer Echtheit" in their search for meaning in their lives.[12]

The entire range of social values of the time demonstrates this loss of a „Gefuehl fuer Echtheit." For some, the onslaught of the industrial revolution had cast doubt on traditional values and religion.[13] With increased social mobility, young men often spent the years between

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[9]Fromm, Sane Society, pp. 114-16 et passim.

[10]Friedrich Glum, Philosophen im Spiegel und Zerrspiegel: Deutschlands Weg in den Nationalismus und Nationalsozialismus (Munich, 1954), p. 29.

[11]Fromm, Sane Society, pp. 120-25.

[12]Glum, Philosophen, p. 29. ". . . 'feeling for authenticity'. . . ." My translation.

[13]Wilhelm Flitner, „Der Krieg und die Jugend" in Geistige und sittliche Wirkungen des Krieges in Deutschland, p. 62.

school and military service working from city to city, and, for the first time, girls left home to receive special training. The result was a noticeable weakening of ties to the home, while the increased importance of women in industrial society was slowly beginning to undermine the position of the authoritarian father.[14] Nevertheless, the deterioration of traditional values only had its beginning in Wilhelmian Germany. In 1914, it appears that traditional religious and social values were still firmly rooted in the psyche of the average German.[15]

II. THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRIALIZATION ON THE KLEINBUERTUM

In addition to the direct psychological results of industrialization, a socio-economic result was most important. This was the economic and social decline of the Kleinbuergertum, which was comprised of many different occupational categories including small shopkeepers, small merchants, craftsmen, salesmen, middlemen, advertisers, government employees, and professional people.[16] Although its numbers and size, relative to other

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[14] Baumgartner, „Sittliche Zustand," pp. 70-71.

[15] Fromm, Escape From Freedom, p. 237. Fromm probably understates the importance of pre-World War I changes in German attitudes.

[16] Frederick L. Schuman, The Nazi Dictatorship: A Study in Social Pathology and the Politics of Fascism (New York: Knopf, 1935), p. 101; Harold D. Lasswell, "The Psychology of Hitlerism," The Political Quarterly, IV (1933), p. 374.

classes, increased in the first quarter of the twentieth century, its income and social position, relative to that of the workers, declined during the same period.[17] Some, such as the craftsmen and small businessmen, in particular, were threatened economically by the concentration of capital and by technological innovations.[18] Still, the main threat to the lower middle class was psychological as the petit bourgeoisie " as increasingly overshadowed by the workers and the upper bourgeoisie, whose unions, cartels and parties took the centre of the stage."[19]

The increasing doubt in religion plus the increasing economic and social insecurity in the decades before World War I led to an exaggerated feeling of rootedness in traditional values and in the mysticism of the monarchy and nation.[20] On this level, the petit bourgeois could accuse the source of his actual psychological frustration, the workers, successful Jews, and modernists, of being unpatriotic and of undermining tradition.[21] Hatred of Germany's foreign enemies further satisfied any other sadistic tendencies he might have, while the feeling of being a small part in a larger and more glorious nation was the masochistic side of the externalization.

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[17] Schuman, Nazi Dictatorship, p. 101.

[18] Schuman, Nazi Dictatorship, p. 101-102.

[19] Lasswell, "Psychology of Hitlerism," p. 374.

[20] Fromm, Escape From Freedom, p. 241.

[21] Lasswell, "Psychology of Hitlerism," p. 374ff.

This cultural fundamentalism may, at first glance, seem to contradict the conclusion that industrialization and urbanization led to a breakdown of traditional morals and values. The answer to this dilemma is that both tendencies were present in Germany. Harold D. Lasswell has explained this situation:

> Modern urban culture is fatal to the simple prescriptions of the rural and provincial consciences. . . . The middle class code of sexual abstinence, thrift, work and piety crumbles before the blandishments and the concealments of the city. The vulnerability of the conventional code provokes heroic acts in its defence.[22]

The Kleinbuerger, driven by feelings of powerlessness and guilt, was a likely proponent of fundamental values. His stress of tradition and morality was, to a certain extent, an "act of expiation" which gave him a sense of moral worth in an age of uncertainty.[23]

III. THE EFFECT OF WORLD WAR I AND THE INFLATION

Alienation and the psychological dissatisfaction of the Kleinbuergertum increased enormously during World War I and the subsequent period of inflation. The experience of the long and brutal war itself furthered man's alienation from man and from life itself. A German author who experienced the war wrote:

> Men, often horribly distorted, lie on the streets and in the fields. But of the dead we have no concern. One

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[22] Lasswell, "Psychology of Hitlerism," p. 378.

[23] Ibid.

> goes by them as if nothing had happened. All human feeling is gone. There remains only one thought: forward![24]

Later in the war the struggle for existence among the German soldiers and population alike had almost totally obliterated the nationalistic "spirit of 1914." Shortages of food, fuel, clothing, and housing fostered a narrow egoism which destroyed feelings of human solidarity.[25]

The economic position of the lower middle class further deteriorated during the war. Having been little disposed, either economically or psychologically, to take part in war profiteering, the petit bourgeoisie underwent the first of a series of crises.[26] The post-war inflation was perhaps the most severe of these. The inflation decimated the savings of all Germans, but especially of the lower middle class which had invested heavily in war bonds, that soon became worthless.[27] Those living on steady incomes, unorganized employees, and professional people suffered most as prices climbed faster than wages. In general "the Kleinbürgertum bore the brunt of loss and suffering. . . . By 1924 millions of petty-bourgeois families found themselves in a state of economic desperation," and it was not until that same year that conditions began to improve.[28]

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[24]Baumgartner, „Sittliche Zustand," pp. 16-17. My translation.

[25]Ibid., p. 63.

[26]Flitner, "Krieg und Jugend," pp. 229, 304-05.

[27]Glum, Philosophen, p. 25.

[28]Schuman, Nazi Dictatorship, p. 102.

The inflation was also a threat to the tradition and value of thrift, in which the lower middle class felt rooted. If the experience of the war had been advantageous to the profiteer, the post-war years allowed the least thrifty to make huge fortunes through speculation, while the few remaining artisans, who lived from their own toil, hardly were able to buy enough food to live.[29] Likewise, those who indulged the most in excessive consumption often retained more than those whose savings became worthless, since overpriced luxury items retained their value more than the rapidly inflating currency.[30]

The fall of the monarchy removed one of the psychological foundations of the lower middle class. Although the workers were able to identify with the new republic in the immediate post-war years and had a large role in its government, the revolution meant psychological isolation for the Kleinbuerger.[31] "While the monarchy and the state had been the solid rock on which, psychologically speaking, . . . he had built his existence, their failure and defeat shattered the basis of his own life."[32] Stripped of his old patriotic objects of devotion, the Kleinbuerger had little now in which he could put his faith. The

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[29]Flitner, "Krieg und Jugend," pp. 304-05.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Ibid., p. 344; Fromm, Escape From Freedom, pp. 238-89.

[32]Fromm, Escape From Freedom, p. 238.

Weimar Republic was born of defeat, was the product of the workers and of Allied pressure and, most importantly, lacked the strong authority, the father-symbolism, which might command respect.[33]

The importance of the family also suffered a setback as normal family life was interrupted during the war. Wives often worked in factories, many for the first time. On the other hand, the position of the father as the head of the household became less imposing because of the increased importance of women and, even more, because of his absence from home during the war.[34]

The last stronghold of middle class tradition was destroyed as the younger generation "acted as they pleased and cared no longer whether their actions were approved by their parents or not."[35] A number of factors were responsible for an almost complete dissolution of the old stratification between generations.[36] The separation of many youth from one or both parents during the war was important. So too was the mobilising of young women into the factories. In addition, some of the more adaptable youth took advantage of the possibilities for speculation during the inflation, to the bewilderment and resentment

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[33]Schuman, Nazi Dictatorship, p. 107.

[34]Baumgartner, „Sittliche Zustand," pp. 76-81.

[35]Fromm, Escape From Freedom, p. 239.

[36]Baumgartner, „Sittliche Zustand," p. 82.

of the older generation.[37] The separation of the youth from old values during the war, and the disappearance of the old symbols of social authority, the monarchy and the aristocracy, also contributed to the loss of respect by the young for the old.

The lower middle class generations were also divided in their reaction to the post-war political situation. The elders, unable to shake off their psychological ties to the monarchy, resigned themselves bitterly and resentfully to non-involvement in politics. They became apolitical and called those involved in the struggle between political interests Parteihengste.[38] The members of the younger generation, although they also came to dislike the republic, were more active in their protest. The chance to make a living in the same manner as their parents seemed dismal, and the lack of openings in the various professions further undermined their economic position.[39] It was this group, economically insecure and separated from traditional values, which most readily responded to the Konservative Revolution.

IV. THE NEED FOR IDEOLOGY

A psychological reaction to the alienation and insecurity of modern life had begun well before the war. This reaction took the form

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[37] Flitner, „Krieg und Jugend," pp. 304-05; Fromm, Escape From Freedom, p. 240.

[38] Baumgartner, „Sittliche Zustand," p. 64.

[39] Fromm, Escape From Freedom, p. 240.

of various movements which are often collectively designated as the Deutsche Bewegung. Many of these groups were content to occupy themselves with reform while accepting the existence of the Wilhelmian Reich. The imperialistic Pan-German League, the Christian Socialist movement, and other smaller groups belonged to this wing of the Deutsche Bewegung.[40] A fundamental and radical opposition to Wilhelminismus was that posed by the anti-Semitic voelkish intellectuals and by the Jugendbewegung. The former of these was utopian in its impossible demands to undo the mixing of races that had occurred over the centuries,[41] while the youth movement, having no clear ideology or goal, stressed purity, the goodness of feeling, the irrationality of life, and patriotism.[42]

The nature of these various movements, the detailed description of which lies beyond the scope of this thesis, is most clearly understood by viewing their relation to the psychological conditions in pre-war Germany. In this sense, these movements promulgated that which Georg Lukács has called der religioese Atheismus.[43] The vogue of relativism and the discoveries in science had alienated many intellectuals from traditional religion. On the other hand, the need for rootedness and

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[40]Mohler, Konservative Revolution, pp. 37-39.

[41]Ibid., p. 43.

[42]Flitner, „Krieg und Jugend," p. 253; Mohler, Konservative Revolution, p. 42.

[43]Georg Lukács, Die Zerstoerung der Vernunft: Der Weg des Irrationalismus von Schelling zu Hitler (Berlin, 1955), p. 357.

for identity intensified for the reasons stated above in this chapter. Lukács has described this need:

> My individual life, in and by itself, is fully meaningless. The outer world offers me no meaning, for scientific knowledge has taken God out of the world. The norms of social intercourse offer no purpose. Where can I now find the meaning of my life?[44]

The racial-purity ideal of the Voelkischen and the mystical life-experience of the Jugendbewegung were both objects of devotion for the individual who was trying to find meaning for his life. Furthermore, the racial explanation of reality by the Voelkischen was a frame of orientation that gave a comprehensive, if irrational, view of all occurrences. Still, before World War I, these movements had more of a quiet and contemplative character marked by pessimistic resignation rather than political activism.[45] The Voelkischen, the one group that did exercise radical opposition to the Reich, gained little support and was constantly plagued by disunity.[46] The reason for this was the rootedness of most of the German Kleinbuerger in what had been a secure system of social and national values, revolving around the monarchy and tradition. Until World War I and defeat, there was little socio-

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[44]Lukács, Die Zerstoerung der Vernunft: Der Weg des Irrationalismus von Schelling zu Hitler, p. 357. My translation.

[45]Ibid., p. 69.

[46]Mohler, Konservative Revolution, p. 40.

psychological basis, except among a number of disgruntled intellectuals and misfits, for a widespread Konservative Revolution.

The cataclysmic destruction of individual psychological and material security during and after the war created an environment favorable to a more radical and more activist-oriented ideology.[47] The years after 1919 were years of a Konservative Revolution among German intellectuals.

The ideological nature of the Konservative Revolution was decisively shaped by the experience of the war. Whereas the pre-war youth movement had been characterized by a rejection of ties to society, the experience of war and revolution led to the demand for new social and mystical ties.[48] It is interesting to note how closely the nature of these ties is related to the German war experience. The war produced a situation in which myth-building by a paternalistic government, aided by the censor and propagandist, became the rule. An illusionary and irrational view of the fatherland and of its enemies was necessary to promote unity.[49] School teachers as well as the professional propagandist constantly stressed putting the good of the fatherland above all else and depicted the enemy as the very essence of evil.[50]

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[47]Lukács, Zerstoerung der Vernunft, pp. 69, 72-73.

[48]Flitner, „Krieg und Jugend," p. 356.

[49]Baumgartner, „Sittliche Zustand," pp. 13-14.

[50]Flitner, „Krieg und Jugend," p. 261.

The Konservative Revolution of the post-war years strove to recapture the spirit of unity characterized by the early days of the war in Germany. One young author wrote that these days were like heaven on earth because they wakened within the individual a belief in that which transcended himself.[51] Beneath the superficial joy of union with the nation, there lies a deeper pessimism in the konservativ ideology, however. The konservativ doctrine was in conflict with the doctrines of Christianity and of progress, both of which presuppose a linear historical progression. Armin Mohler has called circularity the one idea underlying all the konservative thought. Circularity presupposed cosmos, which was the "'higher reality,' which inspired all that took place on earth. . . ."[52] Cosmic thought viweed the world

> as tied to the cosmos by the transfer to the 'living force' which radiated earthward and infused those who were attuned to it. As this life force flowed from cosmos to man, self-fulfillment was thought possible only to the extent to which man was imbued with this force and was in harmony with the cosmos from which it sprang.[53]

The universe operated according to a type of natural law determined by the cosmos; therefore, harmony and order were the characteristics of

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[51] Baumgartner, „Sittliche Zustand," p. 44. One characteristic of the konservativ ideology was that the individual was seen to have no intrinsic value but to be of worth only as a part of the entire nation (Mohler, Konservative Revolution, p. 154).

[52] George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York, 1964), p. 14.

[53] Ibid.

the universe even though man might foolishly destroy this harmony. History was thought to operate according to this cosmos and, thus, to repeat itself since nature determined that nations, like all organisms, should grow and die. The Konservativen compared this cyclical development with the rhythm of life as seen in birth and death and in the repetition of night and day and of the seasons in the year.[54]

Such a conception of life and history would seem to lead to resignation and fatalism. Here again the experience of the war affected the ideology of the Konservative Revolution. Post-war Konservatismus not only had a mystical ideology but also was marked by avid evangelism. The ideology of the Konservative Revolution was certainly romantic in its stress on mysticism and cosmos. Yet, there arose a tendency to bring the transcendental power of the cosmos down to earth. This was accomplished through the concept of the Volk. The Konservativen came to view the Volk as the repository of the "life force." Man should participate in this cosmic power by actively uniting with fellow members of the Volk. Thus, the term Volk itself had a mystical meaning since it signified a group of people united with the cosmos.[55]

In its concept of the state, the Konservative Revolution may be subdivided into three main groups. The post-war voelkisch movement

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[54] Mohler, Konservative Revolution, pp. 107-116.

[55] Mosse, German Ideology, pp. 4, 15.

retained its earlier view that the Volk should be the unit of political organization. The Nationalrevolutionaere, on the other hand, saw the Volk as the main source of strength behind a national state of conquest. Between these two groups were the Jungkonservativen of which Moeller van den Bruck was a leader. These also glorified the Volk as the source of all power and creativity; however, they looked to the Middle Ages for their concept of political organization. The Jungkonservativen wanted the state to take the form of a Reich which would be dominated by the strongest of its several Voelker.[56]

The Konservative Revolution, when seen from the psychological viewpoint, was largely a revolution in the demand for an object of devotion, especially the heightened craving among the politically active youth of the Kleinbuergertum. Yet, even here the term "revolution" is misleading. The Weimar Republic experienced the proliferation of a wide range of values and ideas in all phases of art, literature, philosophy, and politics. The Konservative Revolution was only one intellectual current in the Weimar culture; "widespread acceptance of moral, esthetic, and intellectual relativism" were antithetical to Konservatismus.[57]

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[56]Mohler, Konservative Revolution, pp. 172-79.

[57]Koppel S. Pinson, Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization (New York, 1956), p. 454.

On the other hand, the concept of "revolution" among German intellectuals themselves is also misleading. Some, like Thomas Mann, became more liberal in the post-war years, while most of the older intellectuals retained their pre-war views. The Konservative Revolution, then, was confined to a group of intellectuals generally displaying two characteristics. They were young and they were most often of bourgeois origin.

Those of them who were least able to bear the insecurity caused by industrialization, defeat, revolution, and financial crisis abandoned reality and prostrated themselves before a mystic ideology which seemed to satisfy their deepest longings. Many of these discontents looked upon Arthur Moeller van den Bruck as their hero. Klemens von Klemperer has written that "the sons of the always respectable but troubled middle classes might safely have taken home Moeller . . . for reading,"[58] Moeller is an important object of study not only because he helped provide a solution to the need for ideology. This function he most certainly did fill, but Moeller was also very much a product as well as a moulder of his times. His friend Paul Fechter has written that Moeller's „leidenschaftlich-nervoese Natur" made him the medium of an entire generation.[59] In spite of Fechter's hyperbole, it seems at least true that Moeller was the best example of post-war Konservatismus.

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[58] Klemens von Klemperer, Germany's New Conservatism: Its History and Dilemma in the Twenthieth Century (Princeton, 1957), p. 191.

[59] Paul Fechter, „Das Leben Moellers van den Bruck," Deutsche Rundschau, CCXXXIX (1934), p. 16.

CHAPTER III

THE LIFE OF ARTHUR MOELLER VAN DEN BRUCK

Erick H. Erikson has called the function of childhood a "universal blindspot" in the interpretation of history.[1] This is certainly true of Moeller's biographies. The lack of knowledge about his early life, especially of his family relationship, reduces any attempt to discover the factors which shaped his personality to mere hypothesis.

I. MOELLER'S EARLY LIFE

Arthur Moeller was born on April 23, 1876 in Solingen in the Prussian Rhineland. His father, Victor Moeller, came from a long line of Lutheran pastors, army officers, and bureaucrats. His mother, whose maiden name was Elise van den Bruck, stemmed from a line which had emigrated from Spain to Holland, and was a second-generation German.[2] National Socialist biographers have explained Moeller's inner conflicts as a result of the struggle between the two differing blood types of his parents.[3] From the point of view of psychological interpretation,

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[1] Childhood and Society (New York, 1950), p. 360.

[2] Cf. Paul Fechter, "Leben Moellers," p. 14; Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961), pp. 183-84; and Hans-Joachim Schwierskott, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck und der revolutionaere Nationalismus in der Weimarer Republik ("Veroeffentlichungen der Gesellschaft fuer Geistesgeschichte," ed. H. J. Schoeps; Goettingen, 1962), p. 13.

[3] Helmut Roedel, Moeller van den Bruck: Standort und Wertung (Berlin, 1939), p. 14.

however, it seems possible that the difference between the German background of Moeller's father and the Romantic Spanish heritage of his mother was a source of basic anxiety for young Moeller.

Probably more important was the paternal influence on Arthur Moeller. Moeller's father had been an officer in the Prussian army in the wars of 1866 and 1870-71.[4] This experience, as well as the strong Lutheran heritage of the family, indicates that Victor Moeller probably assumed the authoritarian family role that was typical in patriarchical Germany. This may explain Moeller's later rebellion from his parents and from the entire older generation.[5]

Moeller's father was a government architect, an occupation that places him in the Kleinbuergertum. There is nothing to indicate that he shared anything other than Kleinbuerger attitudes and values. He was a devotee of Arthur Schopenhauer, after whom he had named his son.[6] Although Schopenhauer was popular among many educated middle class families of the time,[7] the unusually strong affinity that Victor Moeller seems to have felt toward his philosophy of extreme pessimism and resignation may very well indicate that Arthur grew up under the influence of a troubled and bitter father.

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[4]Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, p. 13.

[5]Erich Fromm has pointed out that in all patriarchical societies rebellion from the father is a "permanent element of dissolution" (Sane Society, p. 49).

[6]Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, p. 13.

[7]Ibid. This popularity may be viewed as one reaction by the Kleinbuergertum to the socio-psychological situation discussed in the preceeding chaper.

Paul Fechter, biographer and friend of Arthur Moeller, has described the young Arthur as "silent," "always full of thought," and "often dreaming."[8] A laugh from Moeller surprised those who knew him since they "were so accustomed to seeing seriousness and passionate thought dominating his personality."[9] Moeller was, in fact, an outsider his entire life. Although his parents wanted him to become a military officer, lawyer, or minister, Moeller's lack of interest in his studies at the Duesseldorf Gymnasium led to his departure three years before his graduation.[10] Although the reason for this was, as even his apologists admit, at least partly because „er in der Schule nichts tat,"[11] Paul Fechter and Moeller's second wife Lucy claim that Moeller was expelled for writing an anonymous article to a Duesseldorf newspaper.[12] In light of his lack of interest in school and the evidence given by his first wife that Moeller withdrew voluntarily, having failed twice to be promoted,[13] the elevation of Moeller to academic martyrdom seems at least dubious.

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[8]Fechter, „Leben Moellers" p. 15. My translation.

[9]Ibid. My translation.

[10]Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, pp. 13-14; Stern, Politics, p. 185.

[11]Fechter, „Leben Moellers," p. 15.

[12]Ibid.; Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, pp. 13-14; Stern, The Politics, p. 185.

[13]Stern, Politics, p. 185.

II. MOELLER'S WANDERJAHRE

From Duesseldorf, the twenty year old Moeller was sent by his parents to live with relatives in Erfurt while he attended the Gymnasium there. Shortly thereafter, he left Erfurt, apparently due to his unwillingness to attend school, and went to Leipzig, where he heard a few lectures at the university.[14] Although Schwierskott claims Moeller read „ausserordentlich viel" during this time,[15] there is reason to doubt that Moeller read extensively. His widow wrote to Fritz Stern that Moeller "preferred to acquire knowledge from traveling, not from books. He used to say that he only saw things. . . ."[16] The unsuccessful end of Moeller's formal academic training--without his Abitur he was barred from officially attending a German university--led to isolation from his parents, who withheld money from him in the hope of coercing him into school once more.[17]

In August, 1896 Moeller moved to Berlin, where he married Hedda Masse, whom he had promised to marry before leaving Duesseldorf. In Berlin Moeller lived the life of a young litterateur, spending time at

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[14]Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, p. 14.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Stern, Politics, p. 185n.

[17]Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, p. 14. Although he received a notable inheritance from the death of his grandfather the next year, Moeller was unconcerned about money and spent his entire life in financial difficulty (Ibid.).

the cafés and gaining admittance to the literary circles of the day. Many of the contemporary young artists and writers shared Moeller's "cultural despair" and rejected what they termed Die Decadence of Wilhelmian Germany. Moeller himself foresaw the impending downfall of the bourgeois culture of his parents.[18] Moeller's first book, Das Variete, was an attempt to show that the contemporary art forms were a sign of the conflict between the young and the old. This conflict would result in the collapse of the saturated fin de siecle society and in the growth of a new and better culture not inhibited by social and artistic restraints.[19] Echoing the same sentiment was Die moderne Literatur (1899-1902), an 800 page critique of contemporary literature which praised Nietzsche, Liliencron, and Dehmel while criticising more traditional writers, especially Austrians, whom Moeller charged with feminism and a lack of individualism.[20]

During his years in Berlin, Moeller remained a disturbed person. His first wife, who later married Moeller's friend, the playwright

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[18]Cf. Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, pp. 16-17, and Fechter, „Leben Moellers," p. 16.

[19]Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, pp. 24-25.

[20]Die moderne Literatur in Gruppen-und Einzeldarstellungen (2 vols., Berlin and Leipzig, 1899-1902), passim. Moeller also wrote a number of newspaper essays during this time and, with his wife, translated some foreign works into German (Stern, Politics, pp. 186-87).

Herbert Eulenberg, wrote that Moeller was mostly silent in the company of others and brooded over his glass of wine.[21] She also claimed that Moeller suffered Angstvorstellungen about the fulfillment of his impending military obligations.[22] At the same time, he tried to dress and act like an aristocrate and changed his name to Moeller-Bruck.[23] Several years later in Paris, Moeller further changed his name to Moeller van den Bruck. The simultaneous characteristics of self-glorification and withdrawal became his way of coping with anxiety.

Moeller's tendency to withdraw expressed itself also through his personal actions. In the autumn of 1902, Moeller left his pregnant wife, went to Paris and eventually obtained a divorce. His desire to escape the responsibilities of parenthood, his financial difficulties, his alienation from the bourgeois atmosphere of German society, and his fear of impending military obligations were all possible reasons for Moeller's departure.[24]

During his four years in Paris, Moeller lived on the fringe of poverty with Frans Evers, a writer who had mystical leanings and who

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[21]Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, p. 16.

[22]Stern, Politics, pp. 186, 189.

[23]Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, p. 16.

[24]Cf. Stern, Politics, p. 189, Fechter, „Leben Moellers," p. 16, Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, p. 17. His son, who died in 1924, received little but silence his entire life from Moeller. (Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, p. 17n.)

aided Moeller financially.[25] Moeller met Russian-born Lucy Kaerrick, whom he later married, and worked with her sister Less on translating into German an edition of Dosteovski's works. Moeller was particularly attracted to Dostoevski's writings because of their portrayal of the passionate, melancholy brooder who is torn between self-hate and visions of glory.[26] Moeller also came to know and admire the Russian mystic Dmitri Merezkowski in Paris, and, from this time on, Moeller became an advocate of Eastern mysticism.[27]

In Paris Moeller acquired his first taste for politics. In contrast to what Moeller thought was political indifference on the part of most Germans, he found that the cafes of Paris were centers of discussion on international politics.[28] Moeller's budding political interest was illustrated by his participation in a cafe fistfight with a Frenchman, who had supposedly made a derogatory remark towards Germany and by his repeated attempts to arouse the usually complacent French police with pro-German and pro-royalist outbursts.[29]

Nationalism was not an entirely new experience for Moeller. In Die moderne Literatur he had criticised his friend, Richard Dehmel,

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[25]Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, pp. 14-15.

[26]Roedel, Moeller, p. 17.

[27]Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, p. 18.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Fechter, „Leben Moellers," pp. 17-18.

for his „nationalen Indifferens."[30] However, it was only after Moeller had become disillusioned with the "shallowness and . . . superficiality" of French culture that he considered himself a German nationalist.[31]

Perhaps most important was Moeller's combination of mysticism and politics, resulting in the mental construction of a mythological Germany divorced from contemporary political and cultural realities.[32] He used "his new-found allegiances and insights" in writing an eight-volume series of German biographies.[33] Die Deutschen was less history than mythology. Moeller attempted to show how the German Geist had manifested itself in the character and lives of famous Germans.[34]

Moeller also applied the criteria of Geistigkeit to his own times. In Die Zeitgenossen Moeller seemed to diagnose correctly the problem of the modern age by lamenting the destruction of spiritual values, while he pointed to a new faith in the form of a Germanic Weltanschauung as

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[30]Schwierskott, Revolutionäre Nationalismus, p. 30n.

[31]Roedel, Moeller, p. 19. My translation. In Das Theatre Francais (Vol. XIV of „Das Theater," ed. C. Hagemann; Berlin und Leipzig, 1905), a small volume published while he was in Paris, Moeller attacked the French theater and claimed that French and Western culture was old and decaying.

[32]I shall treat Moeller's involvement with the Germanic ideology in the following chapter.

[33]Stern, Politics, p. 191.

[34]Die Deutschen: Unsere Menschengeschichte (8 vols., Minden, 1904-1910), passim.

the solution to this alienation. In the same work, he repeated his contention that the world was irreconcilibly divided between „jungen Voelker" and „alten Voelker." Belonging to the former category were Russia, the United States, and, of course, Germany.[35]

Moeller's new Germanic faith led him to make peace with the German Reich's military officials, who seem to have considered him a deserter.[36] In autumn, 1907 he went to Kuestrin Germany to fulfill his military obligation. Ironically, Moeller's „suchende Nervosität und Ueberreiztheit," got him dismissed from the army after only several months of military service.[37]

III. MOELLER AS POLITICAL ACTIVIST

After he had left Kuestrin, Moeller married Lucy Kaerrick and settled in Berlin, his permanent home for the rest of his life, though he made extended trips to foreign countries before World War I. A result of his many foreign travels was that Moeller developed both his strong attachment to the German Volk and a conviction that Germany, innocent and unpolitical, was in the midst of a world of sly and

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[35] Die Zeitgenossen: Die Geister--Die Menschen (Minden, 1906), pp. 6-18, 59-89.

[36] Fechter, „Leben Moellers" p. 18.

[37] Ibid.

politically astute enemies.[38] Moeller concluded that the cultural achievements of the German Volk were not enough, for without political power a truly national style could not develop. This idea of the primacy of the political echoed throughout Moeller's Der preussische Stil. In this work, Moeller declared the essence of Prussia to be political, practical, and non-esthetic in contrast to the romantic, idealistic bent of the rest of Germany. Moeller hoped for a synthesis of the two spirits which would lead to a new epoch of both cultural and political achievements.[39]

Der preussische Stil was completed shortly after the outbreak of World War I, at which time Moeller returned to Berlin where he remained until his death. He responded to the war effort and re-entered the army at the age of forty, but he again received a discharge after a few months due to his excessive nervousness.[40] Through the help of his friend, Ernst Jaeckh, or possible Franz Evers, Moeller obtained a position in Army Headquarters in the propaganda department of the Foreign Division.[41] In this capacity, Moeller acquired his pronounced argumentative and pedantic style of writing.[42] Moeller's thinking

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[38] Roedel, Moeller, p. 27.

[39] 3rd. ed., Breslav, 1931, p. 75-80.

[40] Stern, Politics, p. 208.

[41] Cf. Stern, Politics, p. 208n, and Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, p. 19.

[42] Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, pp. 43-44.

became increasingly politically oriented. Never again did he write on art and literature without injecting politics. War slogans such as „Der Wille siegt" and „Viel Feind', viel Ehr'" as well as the constant propaganda to put the good of the fatherland above all else were undoubtedly conducive to myth-building,[43] and Moeller's political views continued to be irrational, abstract, and, often, illusionary.

Moeller's most famous war-time publication was an article entitled „Das Recht der jungen Voelker," which appeared in the November, 1918 issue of the Deutsche Rundschau. Moeller declared in the article that Germany's ultimate victory was inevitable since nature was on the side of the young peoples.[44] The date of its publication, on the eve of the German defeat, was especially ironical, but Moeller expanded and revised the article into a book of the same title, which was published in the interval between the armistice and the peace conference.[45] Moeller wrote Germany had fought the war for a just cause and, never having been defeated, had laid down its arms only upon the conditions of the Fourteen Points. He appealed to President Wilson, as the representative of another young nation, not to forsake his promise that the greatness of Germany would not be diminished.[46]

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[43] Baumgartner, „Sittliche Zustand," pp. 9, 13-14.

[44] CLXXCII, p. 235. Moeller tried to circumvent the fact that the other young peoples were fighting against Germany by claiming they were duped by the old peoples (Ibid., p. 221).

[45] Das Recht der jungen Voelker (Munich, 1919).

[46] Stern, Politics, pp. 216-219.

Moeller's unrealistic hopes for a favorable peace were matched by a belief that the revolution had opened new opportunities for the future of Germany. Moeller and many others on the extreme Right were favorable towards socialism as long as it was kept within the limits of national, as opposed to international, purpose and spirit.[47] The failure of the revolution to bring about economic corporatism and a national mystique, coupled with the national humiliation at Versailles, led to the estrangement of Moeller and many other German conservatives from the Weimar government.[48] Isolation from active politics was nothing new for Moeller, but now he was joined by "the many men who were adrift and homeless among the parties of Weimar."[49]

The most active channel for Moeller's opposition to the political structure of Weimar was the Juni-Klub, a non-partisan conservative organization which was named, with more than a touch of revenge in mind, after the month of the signing of the hated peace treaty. Comprising the Juni-Klub were members with various interests. Some were involved in anti-Bolshevik activities, others in protecting Germans living in foreign countries.[50] In general, all favored a national, corporative

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[47]Klemperer, New Conservatism, pp. 76, 86-88.

[48]Stern, Politics, pp. 222-23.

[49]Ibid., pp. 223-24. Supra, chap. ii, sec. III.

[50]Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, pp. 54-55.

economic and political system and disliked the West and its values.[51] Moeller received the responsibility for the publication of the Gewissen, the weekly journal of the organization. He wrote two columns for the Gewissen, one of which, the „Wochenchronik," attempted to depict the contemporary political situation as constant chaos.[52] In the post-war years, Moeller wrote scores of articles, many of which were in publications other than the Gewissen.

Although Heinrich von Gleichen-Russwurm was the formal leader of the Juni-Klub, Moeller "contributed the ideological orientation and thus became its saint and hero."[53] Still, he remained withdrawn and sensitive. He seldom spoke publicly and was difficult to understand even in conversation.[54]

Moeller's last and most famous book was Das dritte Reich, which was published in 1923.[55] Reinhard Adam has written that the experience of war and of the post-war period had aroused Moeller's emotions to the extent that he could think only of destruction.[56] There is certainly much truth in the view that Das dritte Reich was intended to be a

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[51]Stern, Politics, p. 226.

[52]Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, p. 58n.

[53]Klemperer, New Conservatism, p. 103.

[54]Ibid.

[55]Germany's Third Empire (Das dritte Reich), trans. E. O. Lorimer (Authorized English edition; London, 1934).

[56]Reinhard Adam, Moeller van den Bruck („Schriften der koeniglichen deutschen Gesellschaft zu Koenigsberg Pr.," Vol. IX; Koenigsberg, 1933), p. 17.

Zerstoerungswerk of socialism, liberalism, and reaction, for Moeller was certain that only when these false ideologies, which kept Germany disunited, were destroyed could his much desired eschatological nationalism come into being.[57] In this sense, Das dritte Reich meant "the third realm of thought" which stood between the ideologies of Reaction and of the Left, thus binding together all Germans under the banner of the Volk.[58] Still, this unification of spirit was to take both a corporative economic form and a political form, as the title of Moeller's book suggested.[59] As such, the term was utilised by the National Socialists as a propaganda slogan.

By 1924 the Weimar Republic had weathered the inflation as well as the political insurrections from both Right and Left. As conditions improved, the Juni-Klub disintegrated.[60] Heinrich von Gleichen, realising that this was no time for a mass movement, changed the group into the more exclusive and, to Moeller, more reactionary Herrenklub. Moeller regarded this transformation, made solely to obtain funds and to exert political leverage, as treason against the movement's former spirituality.

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[57] Third Empire, passim.

[58] Cf. Klemperer, New Conservatism, p. 162, and Stern, Politics, p. 253ff.

[59] Klemperer, New Conservatism, p. 162.

[60] Ibid., p. 262.

He refused to join the new organization and thus isolated himself from most of his former admirers and associates.[61] Shortly thereafter, in the winter of 1924, Moeller suffered a nervous breakdown, the first signs of which had appeared earlier that year. He entered a mental health clinic in Berlin due to a neurotic condition, and on May 30, 1925 committed suicide.[62]

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[61] Cf. Ibid., pp. 262-63, and Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, p. 72.

[62] Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, p. 20.

CHAPTER IV

MOELLER'S CHARACTER AND THOUGHT

I. MOELLER'S EARLY CHARACTER AND THOUGHT

In early 1920 Moeller, in a letter to one of his readers, expressed the hope that his early publications would be allowed to rest in anonymity.[1] The exact reason for Moeller's disavowal of his early works on art and architecture is uncertain. On the whole, they display a remarkable continuity of thought with his later, political writings. Nevertheless, there remain at least several important differences between the two, and these differences indicate a shift in the outlook and values of Moeller as he aged.

Young Moeller was isolated not only from his family and society but from an object of devotion and from a comprehensive frame of orientation as well. This is the reason that Nietzsche appealed so much to him. Both, in a sense, were outsiders of ideology and society. Although Moeller had nationalistic and mystic tendencies even in his youth, his skepticism, his hatred for Wilhelmian society, and his preoccupation with art and literature left him little opportunity for political myth-building. Unlike his later writings, Moeller's Moderne Literatur, for example, contains only occasional flights into mysticism.

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[1] Letter of February 16, 1920, to Friedrich Schweiss, cited in Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, p. 21.

On an evangelical note, Moeller later related of his early years: "As a modern man, I too was used to drifting in doubt, just as our youth today drifts, and, because of all this relativism, cannot gain a firm grip on life."[2]

II. MOELLER'S ROOTEDNESS IN COSMOS AND VOLK

A casual observer of Moeller's early life might conclude that Moeller was an individualistic dissenter. It was true that Moeller rebelled from his school, from his parents, from his society, from the ties of his first marriage, and from everything French and Western. Yet this rebellion was not from authority. Because he had a weak sense of individual identity, Moeller craved authority, and his rebellion may be characterized as a rebellion from that which had too little authority, for what Moeller desired was an object of devotion that would represent moral authority.[3] In the end, only the total devotion to mystique could help him overcome his feeling of uprootedness and anxiety. The rigid and disciplined school, his bitter and pessimistic father, the materialistic and bourgeois German society, a monarchy which lacked a strong ideology, and, above all, French individualism

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[2]Letter to Ludwig Scheman of January 22, 1908, cited in Stern, Politics, p. 203.

[3]The influence of Schopenhauer may be seen in Moeller's rejection of the existing authority. Cf. Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy: The Lives and Opinions of the Greater Philosophers (New York: 1954), p. 308-12.

all lacked moral authority and purpose strong enough to command Moeller's respect.

Moeller's early rebellion from the "authorities" left him more hopelessly isolated than ever. The height of this isolation occurred in his early Paris years when he was separated from German culture as well as from his first wife. This unbearable isolation was an ideal psychological climate, comparable to Luther's thunderstorm, for the acceptance of a new faith which would demand total devotion.

Moeller's Weltanschauung is marked by a distinct lack of clarity. He used a multiplicity of terms to describe slight variations of the same thing, and commonly the very same thing. Gott, Ewigkeit, Leben, Natur, and Urspruenglichkeit belong to those terms which can be denoted collectively as the cosmos.[4] Although Moeller did use the concept of God, it would be misleading to describe his thought in Judeo-Christian terms. In his later works Moeller very seldom referred to Gott. Furthermore, even in his early works, Moeller's use of the concept of God is vague and mystical, and he makes no distinction between God and, for example, Natur or Leben. Moeller's God, in short, has little resemblance to the Christian God.

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[4]See supra, p. 38.

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[4]See supra, p. 38.

In view of Moeller's desire for authority, it is not surprising that his cosmos was an expression of unity and entirety. He saw the fate of the entire world to be determined by cosmic forces. It was his conviction that man could never discover the exact nature of the cosmos, for it possessed a will of its own. Although man had to trust in its ultimate justice,[5] he could perceive the workings of the cosmos in the world, and, in light of the knowledge gained, form principles in harmony with the cosmos. Konservatismus was, to Moeller, a recognition

> that there are things in the world which are immutable: human, spiritual, sexual, economic factors. The great facts of human life are love, hate, hunger, need, daring, enterprise, discovery, strife, competition, ambition and the lust for power. Above all ephemeral phenomena reigns eternal immutability.[6]

Only by recognising these "facts of human life" and by acting according to the principles implicit in them could man develop fully his own character.[7] Only when man looked behind the times and saw eternity could he truly become creative.[8]

One of the principles of the cosmos was Raum, the geographical situation in which man lived. Although Moeller was never very explicit

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[5]Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, „Die versäumte Schuldfrage," Gewissen, (August 11, 1924), cited in Koedel, Moeller, pp. 55-56.

[6]Third Empire, p. 195.

[7]Ibid., p. 196.

[8]Die Deutschen, III, 226.

on this, as well as on many other points of his philosophy, he did believe that the Raum determined the characteristics of its inhabitants. In Die italienische Schoenheit, for example, Moeller compared the various aspects of Italian geography with Italy's art and style of life.[9] Within any one Raum lived a Volk, a term which Moeller indiscriminately interchanged with Nation. The concept of Volk was Moeller's most basic and most important article of faith.[10] Although Moeller again failed to make adequate definitions, his use of the Volk concept corresponded to the use of the concept by other konservativ cosmic thinkers.[11] The Volk was thus a mystical entity and did not necessarily correspond to the state.

Moeller made clear the position of the Volk in the eternal order. At the head of his work Die Deutschen, one sentence stands by itself: „Ein Volk ist ein Mittel zu den Zwecken Gottes auf Erden."[12] The Volk

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[9]Munich, 1913, pp. 3-5.

[10]Moeller did not believe in biological racism. His concept of the Rasse des Geistes was little more than a handmaiden for the faith in the Volk. (Cf. Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, „Rassenanschauung," Der Tag (August 9, 1908), reprinted in Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Das Recht der jungen Voelker, ed. Hans Schwarz Berlin, 1932 , pp. 193-96). As such, race referred to the feeling of unified cultural consciousness by a Volk. Reinhard Adam, one of Moeller's National Socialist biographers, was correct in saying that Moeller would have been well advised, for the sake of clarity, to have avoided the topic of race altogether (Moeller van den Bruck, p. 25).

[11]See supra, pp. 39-40.

[12]"A Volk is a tool for [carrying out] God's purpose on earth." My translation.

was, like the Church in Catholicism, the earthly manifestation of the Eternal Will. While the fate of the Volk lay unknown in the cosmos, man's duty was clear: he must express his oneness with the cosmos by uniting himself with the Volk.[13] Different Voelker had different values, but man must follow those values of his own Volk. The Volk was the creator of values, which served as absolutes in the midst of human need, uncertainty, and powerlessness.[14] Diversity among nations within the unity of the cosmos was just another "fact of human life."

Moeller himself was aware of the psychological appeal of his new faith. He wrote that modern man needed a belief in eternal verities. Only that which was all-encompassing, absolute, and eternal could command authority. On the other hand, modern man also needed a concrete basis for his faith.[15] The Volk provided this concreteness for Moeller and many Germans. The long tradition, and the consequent acceptance, of the Volk concept lent to this mystical entity a certain sense of objectivity. Georg Lukács has termed this illusion the „Pseudoobjektivitaet des Mythos."[16]

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[13] Die Deutschen V, 191; VII, 291-92.

[14] Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, „Nietzsches zeitliche Wiederkunft," Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (February 19, 1919, morning ed.), reprinted in Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Der politische Mensch, ed. Hans Schwarz (Breslau, 1933), pp. 101-02.

[15] Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, „Das heroische Vorspiel," Gewissen (January 28, 1924), reprinted in Moeller van den Bruck, Politische Mensch, pp. 129.

[16] Lukács, Zerstoerung, pp. 326-27.

III. MOELLER'S LOSS OF INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY

The relationship of the individual to the cosmos is an expression of Moeller's personal situation. Having earlier rejected his family and social environment, Moeller was never able to reject the self-hatred which this environment had engendered within himself. The hope which Moeller held for the German Volk was certainly different from the total resignation of Schopenhauer. Yet, aside from this obvious difference, the essence of Moeller's Weltanschauung was very similar to that of his father's favorite philosopher. Schopenhauer, like Moeller, believed in the evilness and powerlessness of man and in an Ultimate Wisdom, a World-Will which man had to follow.[17] The works of Schopenhauer furthermore, like those of his namesake Moeller, revealed that "our desires are the axioms of our philosophies. . . ."[18]

Moeller's belief in the powerlessness of man and in man's intrinsic lack of worth was, then, based on his own personal feelings of powerlessness and lack of worth. Moeller made a philosophical justification for his own personal anxiety. He claimed that the liberal deceived himself by thinking that man was the maker of his own world. The

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[17] Cf. Durant, Story of Philosophy, p. 340.

[18] Ibid., p. 350, referring to Schopenhauer. For a discussion of the objective and irrational nature of Moellers thought, see sec. IV of this chapter.

moment always came when the individual had to face his own helplessness.[19]

A basic tenet of the Konservative, Moeller illuminated, was a belief

> in catastrophe, in the powerlessness of man to avert it, in the inevitability of the march of fate and in the terrible disillusionment which awaits the over-credulous. He believes only in the power of grace and of election granted to the individual, in the sign of which men and nations and epochs must stand if success is to wait upon their will.[20]

Moeller called Nietzsche's Zarathustra a product of wishful thinking, „ein grosses wesenloses Symbol, ein . . . Phantom!"[21] He also criticised the literature of the Weimar period as being merely a platform for Ichgefuehl.[22]

Moeller's deprecation and degradation of individual identity led to his acceptance of a secondary identity. Through identifying with the Volk, he attempted to overcome his feelings of helplessness by partaking of a power greater than himself.[23] Moeller wrote that „the greatness of a man is: to be something more than his mere self."[24]

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[19]Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, „An Liberalismus gehen die Voelker zugrunde," Die Neue Front, eds. Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Heinrich von Gleichen, Max Hildebert Boehm (Berlin, 1922), p. 34; Moeller van den Bruck, Third Empire, p. 113.

[20]Third Empire, p. 237.

[21]Die Moderne Literatur, I, 51.

[22]„Vorspiel," p. 135.

[23]„To ripen a person for self-sacrifice he must be stripped of his individual identity and distinctness. . . . The most drastic way to achieve this end is by the complete assimilation of the individual into a collective body" (Hoffer, True Believer, p. 60).

[24]Third Empire, p. 257.

Man by himself was incomplete, but he could have a part in a perfection higher than himself. Neither could man, by himself, be creative. Only by submission to the cosmos and Volk could he carry on the work of the creator.[25] Only when the individual was conscious of his ties to the Volk and of his dependence upon its history and future,[26] could he understand the reason for his own existence. Moeller realized the religious nature of the relationship of the individual to the Volk. He said that those who gave up false doctrines and returned to Natur and Vaterland were "redeemed" (erlöst).[27]

If the loss of uniqueness troubled the individual, he had only to realize that he was working for the good of generations to come and thus was a part of the eternal order. Moeller summarily explained: "We live in order to bequeath."[28] The Konservative believed that the aim of life is not fulfilled in the lifetime of one man, but, rather, the Konservative "sees the individual perish while the Whole continues; series of generations employed in the traditional service of a single thought; nations busy in the building of their history."[29]

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[25]Third Empire, p. 196.

[26]Moeller's first and best volume of Die Deutschen concerned Verirrte Deutsche, those Germans who were unable to be successful because they lived at a time in which their Volk was weak. See especially Die Deutschen, I, 13.

[27]Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, "Der Sozialismus and der Grenze und die Grenze des Sozialismus," Gewissen (May 26, 1920), reprinted in, Sozialismus and Aussenpolitik, ed. Hans Schwarz (Breslau, 1933), p. 39.

[28]Third Empire, p. 201.

[29]Ibid., p. 201.

The deprecation of the present is one of the characteristics of the "true believer."[30] Moeller's mystical emphasis on eternity was one of the ways in which he demonstrated this characteristic. He claimed that Wilhelmian Germany's mistake was that it had lived only in the present and had had no goals. He hoped that the young generation would learn to orient itself to the future,[31] and declared that the "whole error" of socialism was the Marxian concept that "man set themselves only such tasks as they can fulfill." Moeller thought it was the nature of man to set himself only such tasks as he could not fulfill, for man was inspired by future hope.[32] In the chaotic situation of the post-war period, such a philosophy must have had considerable appeal, for, as Moeller himself pointed out, Germany had little in the present to be proud of and possessed "nothing but possibilities, distant and difficult of attainment."[33]

Moeller's secondary identification gave him neurotic pride. This was not pride in personal matters or in individual accomplishments but rather in attributes which he arrogated to himself largely in his imagination.[34] As a German, Moeller had a share in the strength of his

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[30]Hoffer, True Believer, pp. 66-73.

[31]Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, „Die drei Generationen," Der Spiegel (December 1, 1919), reprinted in Moeller van den Bruck, Politische Mensch, p. 40-41.

[32]Third Empire, p. 39

[33]Ibid., p. 18, 36.

[34]Karen Horney has designated this as a neurotic symptom in Neurosis, pp. 89-90.

Volk. His loss of individual identity meant that he came more and more to rely on this association. Since Germany was weak during the post-war years, Moeller took the task upon himself to lead his Volk back to a position of power and glory. It was in these years that Moeller coaxed, exhorted, and threatened Germans to join him in submitting to the cosmos. When it became evident that Moeller's call would not be heeded, and when the participants in the Konservative Revolution gradually started to drift into various political parties, thus committing treason to the Volk, Moeller was left alone and without hope.[35]

IV. MOELLER'S AUTHORITATIAN CHARACTER--SADISM

In solving his need for relatedness, his relation to institutions, groups, and individuals, Moeller was basically sadistic; however,

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[35] Shortly after Germany's defeat, Moeller thought that the dissolution of the party-system was at hand and that a new revolution would soon enable Germany to reestablish her former position of power („Der Aussenseiter," Der Tag, January 15, 1919, reprinted in Moeller van den Bruck, Politische Mensch, pp. 68-69). Three years later, his optimism was considerably dampened. He then lamented: "Something has gone wrong with everything; and when we put our hand to anything to set it straight, it breaks to pieces in our fingers. . . . The whole nation lies under an evil spell. . . ." (Third Empire, p. 22). Karen Horney has pointed out that those suffering from neurotic pride experience a declining sense of self-responsibility and that their hopelessness is often conducive to suicide (Neurosis, pp. 180-88).

elements of withdrawal, as seen in his relationship to his first wife,[36] and masochism, as will be shown below, were also present. Subservience to the cosmos served to increase his self-hatred, but it also gave him the illusion that he possessed truth. His idealized self-image (his secondary identification), that he was the prophet ordained to point his people to the Way, could only be maintained by constant acts of self-righteous assertion.[37] In addition, by expressing his intellectual, charismatic mastery and superiority over all temporal, social, and political phenomena, he overcame his sense of isolation through intellectual domination. Thus, sadism provided a solution, if not a productive one, for both Moeller's need for identification and his need for relatedness.

In one of his more honest moments, Moeller elucidated the inner necessity of the person possessed by the Dynamic to have a Devil:

> From my early years on, I have become used to struggle, struggle for being [ums Dasein] , struggle for convictions, struggle for inner development. Struggle, conflict, contrariness belongs to the nature of Germans. My books have risen from a mood of conflict. They contain this same sentiment. What is more beautiful in the world, than to have opponents.[38]

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[36]Hedda Eulenberg speaks of the „Kaelte und arktischen Karghеit" of her life with Moeller (Hedda Eulenberg, Im Doppelglueck von Kunst und Leben, Duesseldorf, 1948?, p. 7).

[37]In an article on Nietzsche, Moeller declared that the German Volk had to heed those who warned it if it were to avoid destruction. Moeller implied that he, like Nietzsche, was such a Warner („Nietzsches Wiederkunft," p. 98).

[38]Die Deutschen, II, 325. My italics and translation.

As high mediator between the cosmos and the German people, Moeller passed judgment upon many an opposing ideology and many an unfortunate individual. The punishment was the written word, which seemed to force itself from Moeller's scornful lips with satanical virulence directing itself like a dagger to the body of the opponent.[39] To Moeller: most Social Democrats were "simple minded"; Heinrich Mann was one of the "intellectual blockheads of the revolution"; Karl Kautsky "succeeded in writing books distinguished by a complete absence of thought"; Karl Marx was "a Jew, a stranger in Europe who nevertheless dared to meddle in the affairs of European peoples" and "a Judas who would fain make good his treachery to his Master."[40] In all Marx's writings there was "not one word of love for men."[41]

Although the psychological impetus behind such attacks lay largely in his contempt for those he considered weak, he was able to rationalise this contempt by charging his opponents with being unpatriotic, an allegation which also served to maintain Moeller's idealistic image of himself as protector of Germany. One of Moeller's most violent personal attacks was against Mathias Erzberger, an advocate of a foreign policy

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[39]Adam, Moeller van den Bruck, p. 16.

[40]Third Empire, pp. 24-25, 59.

[41]Ibid., p. 43. His statements on Marx here and in other places indicate that Moeller, like most, probably had not read Marx's early philosophical works.

of "fulfillment." With typical hyperbole, Moeller claimed the Centrist Leader had given away Germany's fleet. Tomorrow he would probably do the same with Germany itself. Moeller detected, from Erzberger's countenance, the incapability to experience emotions and a naive optimism. Erzberger's smile was the smile of a nation which still did not realize that it had been tricked by its enemies. As long as he remained the voice for Germany, the German Volk deserved its fate.[42]

Moeller was only slightly less harsh in his polemics against fellow Konservativen. His controversies with Heinrich Gleichen and Richard Dehmel have already been mentioned. After the "elders" of conservatism, e.g., Thomas Mann, Friedrich Naumann, Friedrich Meinecke, Walther Rathenau, and Ernest Troeltsch had rejected the Konservative Revolution, Moeller branded them "rationalists and pacifists."[43]

Moeller also applied the criteria of patriotism to historical figures and thus found flaws in personages who otherwise qualified to be fellow-prophets. Bismarck was, in general, a German hero; nevertheless, he did not inject enough Geist into his politics. He should have made the war with France in 1870-71 a war of liberation for

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[42] „Drei Generationen," pp. 33-34. Attacks by the Right such as these were an important factor in the assassination of Erzberger in 1922 at the hands of a young German nationalist.

[43] Das dritte Reich (Berlin, 1923), p. 7, cited in Klemperer, New Conservatism, p. 115.

Alsace-Lorraine.[44] Similarly, Nietzsche was correct in denouncing the German preoccupation with idealism, but he was wrong in denouncing all ideals, which were necessary to relieve human uncertainty.[45] Moeller could never quite understand that Nietzsche was not a German nationalist, and he constantly made excuses for Nietzsche's apparent lack of concern for the motherland.

Moeller claimed that Nietzsche had actually only criticized Wilhelmian society, not the German Volk itself.[46] The wish was the father of the thought, since Moeller had no desire to return to the fin de siècle and castigated those reactionaries who wanted to restore the monarchy and pre-war society. Unlike the reactionary, the Konservative should want to retain nothing of the hedonistic, superficial atmosphere of the previous generation. Moeller recounted:

> What a set of men we had become in those last generations before our collapse! Stiff, fossilised men lacking all resilience; over-disciplined, entangled in red tape, all adaptability lost! What an age it was, that of William II; mechanized, bureaucrat-ridden and yet boastful; poor for all its wealth, ugly for all its display; an age doomed to shipwreck, doomed to see the day that swept away all its successes.[47]

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[44] „Drei Generationen," pp. 26-27.

[45] „Nietzsches Wiederkunft," pp. 101-02.

[46] Ibid., p. 104.

[47] Third Empire, p. 21. See also „Drei Generationen," p. 32. Moeller explained Germany's defeat in terms of the two concepts, Vaterland and Mutterland. The former was the political and military

Moeller's tendency to deprecate the present expressed itself in his violent attacks against the Weimar Republic and against the philosophy behind constitutional government. Moeller condemned democracy as the protective coloration for everything average.[47] He further damned democracy because it promoted an individualism in which the Volk became meaningless.[48] Moeller concomitantly disliked the necessity for a democracy to compromise. Politics should not be the art of the possible, but of the necessary.[49] Besides, the entire idea of democracy was foolish, since the individual through the mere mechanical act of casting a vote deprived himself of political influence until the next elections.[50] With such arguments Moeller derided that which he considered to be a Western political import.

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basis of the Volk while the latter was its spiritual basis. William II had neglected the Mutterland so that an alienation of the souls of Germans from the cosmos and a corresponding coldness in German life, had resulted. (Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, „Vaterland und Mutterland," Die Grenzboten, January 21, 1920, reprinted in Moeller van den Bruck, Sozialismus und Aussenpolitik, 43-49 passim). The Kaiser also had pursued a course of reckless imperialism and had separated the army, which Moeller always had admired, from political decision-making. By such political blunders, he had weakened the Vaterland. („Drei Generationen," p. 30.)

[47]„Der Mangel an Maennern," Gewissen (May 30, 1920), reprinted in Moeller van den Bruck, Politische Mensch, p. 83.

[48]„Vorspiel," p. 135; „Der Aufbruch nach Osten," Der Tag (April 3, 1918), reprinted in Moeller van den Bruck, Politische Mensch, p. 154.

[49]„Unsere Entscheidung," Gewissen (February 25, 1920), reprinted in Moeller van den Bruck, Sozialismus und Aussenpolitik, pp. 102-03.

[50]Ibid., p. 129.

Moeller's most damaging onset against the parties of both the Left and the Right was contained in Das dritte Reich. Underlying this attack was Moeller's opposition to the entire party system of government. This, he claimed, had "reduced the monarchy to being the mere plaything of political parties."[51] The parties were responsible for the oppressive peace of Versailles as well as almost everything which had gone afoul since the founding of the Reich in 1871.[52] Aside from this, Moeller saw the parties as obstructions between the individual and the Volk, since an individual's loyalty to the party could conflict with his loyalty to the Volk. Only when parties were eliminated could Germans achieve unity.[53]

„An Liberalismus," wrote Moeller, „gehen die Voelker zugrunde."[54] The use of the word an indicates that Moeller attempted to portray liberalism as a disease infecting the Volk. The liberal began from a false premise by assuming the natural goodness of man, Moeller contended. Therefore, the liberal had the naive belief that man could live as an individual isolated from the community of the Volk. He did not share in the traditions, values, and ambitions of the nation.[55] Moeller

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[51] Third Empire, p. 129.

[52] „Die Ideen der Jungen in der Politik," Der Tag (July 26, 1919), reprinted in Moeller van den Bruck, Politische Mensch, pp. 118-19.

[53] Ibid., „Aussenseiter," p. 65.

[54] „An Liberalismus zugrunde," p. 13.

[55] Third Empire, pp. 90, 113.

concluded that, "the principle of liberalism is to have no fixed principle and to contend that this is in itself a principle."[56]

As intimated above in this section, Moeller branded Marxism, like most ideologies opposing his own, with the stigma of having committed treason to the Volk. He said of the Leftist youth that they were too occupied with intellectualism to have feelings, that the fanaticism of their devotion to ideology supplanted what they lacked in their relationship to Natur and to the Volk.[57] By using an argument which was curiously similar to Ranke's Primat der Aussenpolitik, Moeller criticized the Marxist idea that the exploitation of nations would end only when the exploitation of one individual by another ended. Moeller thought the truth was exactly the opposite; exploitation of individuals would end only after the exploitation of nations had ended. From his position as Volksprophet, Moeller likewise assailed the entire idea of class socialism and favored, in its place, a Voelkersozialismus which would more closely approximate the cosmic order.[58] Thus Moeller attempted to discredit socialism for not offering a true sense of community and, therefore, for not being socialistic enough.[59]

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[56] Third Empire, p. 78.

[57] "Ideen der Jungen," p. 122.

[58] "Sozialistische Aussenpolitik," Gewissen (February 11, 1920), reprinted in Moeller van den Bruck, Sozialismus und Aussenpolitik, p. 81.

[59] Third Empire, p. 150.

Another of Moeller's criticisms of Marxism arose from his confusion of Marx's philosophical materialism with materialism as an explanation of human volition. Moeller opined that Marx

> based his calculation on their [man's] common human nature and their all-too-human greed. He made his appeal, not to their strength but to their weakness, and gave no thought to the "loss of their soul." . . . Marx appealed crudely, sensually, to men's economic interest.[60]

Moeller was, thereby, able to pose as the upholder of everything human as well as the true voice of the German nation. In his attacks on the materialism and greed in modern capitalistic society,[61] Moeller was very much in agreement with Marx. But his hatred of the internationalism of Marxism led him to a crude rationalization which enabled him to reject all Marxian dogma.

Moeller's views on internationalism are most likely clear from the preceeding material. Moeller's identification with the Volk was so strong that he termed the German Weltbuerger's love for all mankind and for all nations a type of self-hate directed against Germany.[62] In more paranoiac moments, Moeller equated internationalism with a conspiracy of the old nations, who were attempting to preserve their declining power by converting their self-interest into cosmopolitan ideals with which they

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[60] Third Empire, pp. 42-43.

[61] "Aussenseiter," p. 70.

[62] "Vorspiel," p. 135.

could dupe the young nations into pacifism. Moeller scoffed at such ideals. The Italians, French, and Poles had robbed Germany under the banner of "ideals."[63] Moeller's scorn fell even more heavily upon those Germans who allowed themselves to be duped by such trickery. He assailed members of the German Left and Center who thought that a just peace would result from self-denial.[64] Combining personal attack with chauvinism, Moeller sternad:

> The German nationalist wants to preserve German nationhood; not to exchange it for the "supernational culture" of a Fr. W. Foerster--in whom the bastardization of German idealism reached its zenith. . . .[65]

Moeller's attack on socialists and internationalists continued in his reaction to Germany's defeat in World War I. On the one hand, Moeller was one of the strongest proponents of the "stab-in-the-back" thesis. He claimed that the liberal Freemasons had conspired against Germany during the entire war.[66] These, aided by the international socialists, who had been tricked by foreigners, brought about Germany's acceptance of an unnecessary peace without victory.[67] Moeller wrote

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[63] „Vaterland und Mutterland," p. 45; „Das Ende der Irredenta," Gewissen (April 10, 1919), reprinted in Moeller van den Bruck, Sozialismus und Aussenpolitik, p. 27.

[64] „Deutsche Grenzpolitik," Die Grenzboten (May 19, 1920), reprinted in Moeller van den Bruck, Sozialismus und Aussenpolitik, p. 66.

[65] Third Empire, p. 244.

[66] „An Liberalismus zugrunde," pp. 13-14.

[67] „Preussentum," p. 16.

that Germany "had been decoyed by the lure of international ideals into a Revolution to which alone the Ten [the Allies, who outnumbered Germans ten to one] owed their final triumph."[68] Moeller ridiculed the Berlin government for continuing to be deceived by such false ideals. He sarcastically wrote that the Berlin press releases were like a broken record repeating the same tired phrase, "'The interests of workers in all countries are the same--workers in all countries the same--all countries the same'."[69]

A contradictory reaction to the same situation was Moeller's belief that the defeat was a much needed lesson for the German Volk, which had previously "rested on its oars" after having achieved political unification in 1871.[70] Moeller saw the rise of a new Germany which would awake from its slumber a unified nation and which would throw off the schackles imposed by Versailles.[71] Two such opposite interpretations of defeat are clear from the standpoint of Moeller's character. Both interpretations were vindictive in nature and served to accuse Moeller's ideological opponents and foreign enemies, while

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[68] Third Empire, p. 34.

[69] "Grenze des Sozialismus," p. 36. My translation.

[70] Third Empire, p. 20.

[71] "Vaterland und Mutterland," p. 59.

at the same time, they excused the German Volk from the enigma of having been weak. The second interpretation was also necessary because it provided Germany, and thus Moeller, with hope for the future.[72]

While both of the above interpretations exonerated Germans from having been weak, these interpretations did accuse Germans of having been stupid and lazy. In his attitude towards the German masses Moeller was similar to the harsh parent who, because of personal failure, constantly belittles and disparages his child in order to maintain domination over him. Moeller thrived upon the sense of failure which many Germans experienced in the post-war years as the result of the lost national cause. The comparison between what Germany had been yesterday and what it was now made it deplorably clear how very much Germans had failed. The guilt of Germans was their lack of faith in themselves. Their guilt was not in having fought the war, but in having lost it.[73] Even in defeat, Moeller lamented, the Germans had not learned their

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[72]My interpretation disagrees with that of Klemens von Klemperer. Klemperer dismissed the two contradictory reactions merely as "symptoms of a generally confused situation." (New Conservatism, p. 77). If this were so it would be difficult to understand why Moeller would have included both explanations of defeat in Das dritte Reich.

[73]„Die Rückkehr zu Friedrich," Rough draft from Moeller's literary remains (1922), reprinted in Moeller van den Bruck, Der politische Mensch, p. 109-10.

lesson. The Revolution was "the kind of folly only Germans would be guilty of!"[74] Festering with sarcasm against the German masses, Moeller answered the question posed by the title of his article „Sind Kommunisten Deutsche?": of course Communists were Germans; their political stupidity proved it![75]

While Moeller despised Germans, he loved Germany. By using this same Platonic dichotomy between the ideal and the real, Moeller thought he was able to discover the underlying nature of Germany's enemies, the old nations of the West. This nature consisted of materialism, egoism, and a democracy which excluded the love of one's Volk. The Western economic systems constituted mass robbery in that they allowed the use of man by his fellow countryman. The West was lifeless and, having lost all ties to the Volk, stood for mechanisation and technology without a human purpose.[76] It was true that England and France had made attempts to revive nationalism during the war, but these attempts were never successful in promoting true love of nation and were doomed to failure.[77]

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[74]Third Empire, p. 116.

[75]Gewissen, III (June 27, 1921), 26, cited in Stern, Politics, p. 241.

[76]„Aufbruch nach Osten," pp. 15.

[77]„Die Abkehr vom Westen," Der Tag (October 6, 1916), reprinted in Moeller van den Bruck, Politische Mensch, p. 149.

Materialism was the main characteristic of the English. Moeller claimed the English viewed the entire world as potential booty.[78] An attitude of "every man for himself" pervaded English life so that freedom to the Britisher meant only the freedom to make money.[79] This economic hedonism reflected itself in every aspect of English life. It explained the stiff, reserved, and passive character of the English as well as the lack of good English poets. Poetry contained too much soul for the English to appreciate.[80]

Moeller hated France in particular, for to him France represented the essence of the West. He wrote of the French:

> As a nation they are the incarnation of the pettiest lust for possession, but they needed to clothe it with fairer words. For a while "virtue" sufficed them, but finally they decided in favour of "liberty."[81]

Another aspect of the French obsession with worldliness was, unlike the English trait of practicality, the French love for the esthetic. The French lived constantly in a dream world of poetic visions, of

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[78] „Preussentum und Sozialismus," Gewissen (January 7, 1920), reprinted in Moeller van den Bruck, Sozialismus und Aussenpolitik, p. 15.

[79] Ibid.; „Abkehr vom Westen," p. 148.

[80] „Vorspiel," p. 130; „Der Auslandsdeutsche," Grenzboten (April 28, 1920), reprinted in Moeller van den Bruck, Politische Mensch, p. 60.

[81] Third Empire, p. 102.

revanche, Joan of Arc, and the Miracle of the Marne.[82] Indeed, the French needed miracles, for they were incapable of working.[83] In his work depicting the banality of the French stage, Moeller concluded that all of French history was, indeed, really nothing more than a large théâtre français.[84] For the racially degraded and weak French and the other „Portugiesen" of the West, the fatherland meant little more than a status symbol.[85] Using racial symbolism again, Moeller called France "negrified"[86] and claimed that the French had ignored the far superior art and literature of the Germans. If they would take notice of German artistic accomplishments, the French would soon realize the inferiority of their own meager efforts.[87]

Moeller rejected orthodox Christianity along with the rest of Western culture. He claimed the early Roman missionaries to Germany had corrupted the pure German Geist. The cosmos had endowed the early Germans with a wonderful natural faculty for understanding. What benefit to them was Christianity, a religion which had only "the soul of a pigeon?"[88] In addition to his objections to the other-

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[82] „Vorspiel," p. 131.

[83] „Auslandsdeutsche," p. 60.

[84] Théâtre Français, p. 5.

[85] Third Empire, p. 198; „Auslandsdeutsche," p. 60.

[86] Third Empire, p. 198.

[87] Théâtre Français, p. 9.

[88] Die Deutschen, II, 9. My translation.

worldliness of Christianity, Moeller perceived the church to be an obstruction to the development of the human soul, since the church meddled in the individual's relation to the nation. What was needed, Moeller wrote, were Christian Germans to take the place of German Christians.[89]

Moeller's personal sadism and his identification with the German Volk afforded him the hope of a vicarious triumph over the West through the medium of his own nation. Moeller's authoritarian character expressed itself in the open advocacy of German aggression against her enemies. Moeller urged Germans not to sacrifice their "deepest instincts; the urge to dare, to undertake, to conquer."[90] In spite of his aversion to Christianity, Moeller saw the Thirty Years' War as one of the high points of German history. Its tragedy and destruction were more than offset by its success in preventing the spread of Romanisation and universalism within Germany.[91] Despite this rationalisation, Moeller seemed to be fascinated by the bloodshed of war itself. This fascination had taken the form of neurotic fear when Moeller himself had faced induction into the military service. In the post-war years, Moeller's militant posture in matters of foreign policy in part was due to his

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[89]Die Deutschen, V, 191; VIII, 291-292.

[90]Third Empire, p. 69.

[91]Die Deutschen VIII, 132.

attempt to build up a self-image of strength to cover over what he feared was his former display of impotence in the army.[92] From this viewpoint, it becomes understandable why Moeller declared the Japanese theater was superior to the French theater precisely because the former concerned itself with patriotic and warlike feelings and satisfied the instinct for „Blut und Greuel."[93] Moeller was very much describing his own neurotic instinct.

Moeller even offered guidelines for Germany's future victories. First, Germany should form a bloc with Austria. The Reich thus formed, under German leadership of course, would begin a border struggle with her neighbors, her goal being the inclusion of all German land and peoples.[94] Germany would regain a border which extended from Memel on the Baltic southwards through what was then Poland, Bohemia, and Carinthia, and which included the Tyrol and Alsace-Lorraine.[95] Moeller openly warned Germany's enemies that Germans would never let matters remain as they were; Germany would constantly threaten the West with a

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[92] Moeller's feelings of impotence and fear were subconscious reactions. Consciously, Moeller was always very much a "patriot." He had voluntarily returned to Germany in 1907 to enter the army and was dismissed only against his own will (Fechter, „Leben Moellers," pp. 18-19).

[93] Théâtre Français, p. 6.

[94] „Grenzpolitik," pp. 70-71.

[95] Ibid., pp. 70-72.

new world war, for she had awakened from her slumber.[96] Although Moeller thought Germany would certainly be victorious, his consideration of the unlikely possibility of another, more disastrous, German defeat seethed with nihilism:

> It is nowhere written that a people has a right to life eternal. For every people the hour at length strikes when they perish either by murder or by suicide. No more glorious end could be conceived for a great people than to perish in a World War where a world in arms overcame one single country.[97]

Moeller developed a series of rationalizations to justify his militant views on foreign policy. Aggression was a part of the natural order, he instructed. Good presupposed evil, and the Biblical Cain and Abel represented an eternal principle governing all worldly affairs.[98] In one of his few excursions into the field of anthropology, Moeller declared that primitive Voelker are gifted with a natural sense for struggle. They realize that the group must pit itself against all other groups who stand in its way.[99]

A variation of this theme lay in Moeller's concern with the population problem which he termed the problem of Germany. Germany's defeat meant that those countries with declining populations had defeated the

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[96] "Ideen der Jungen," p. 125. Moeller's use here of "has awakened" (hat erwacht) indicates his early post-war optimism. See supra, n. 35, in this chapter.

[97] Third Empire, p. 243.

[98] "Ideen der Jungen," p. 123.

[99] "An Liberalismus zugrunde," p. 20.

young peoples who had growing populations. Moeller called pre-war German imperialism, in spite of its lack of spirit, a valiant attempt to solve this problem of Lebensraum.[100] Territorial expansion was to him the only answer to overpopulation. He lectured:

> Neo-Malthusianism offers us counsel: to restrict our birth-rate. This is no heroic solution. Overpopulation is part of Nature's design. Nature must solve the problem.[101]

Moeller further rationalised aggression by claiming it was a political necessity. The policy of encirclement of Germany by the Allies had been the real cause of World War I.[102] Moeller's belief that Germany's enemies were waiting for the correct moment to attack at times reached paranoiac heights. He exclaimed: "Our political situation is terrible to contemplate. . . . We have been encaged, and the Allies strut up and down outside our bars."[103] Typically German, Moeller hated, above all, the Poles, who were trying to "rob together" (zusammenrauben) a greater Poland in the hour of Germany's difficulties.[104] There was only one answer, thought Moeller. Germany had no choice but to become a danger to Europe.[105]

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[100] Third Empire, pp. 64-65; "Sozialistische Aussenpolitik," p. 80.

[101] Ibid., p. 69.

[102] Ibid., p. 79.

[103] Ibid., p. 26.

[104] "Irredenta," p. 27.

[105] "Ideen der Jungen," p. 124.

Moeller lastly rationalised aggression by calling it a necessary defense of human values. In reference to the French use of Negro troops in the 1923 occupation of Germany's Ruhr territory, he wrote: "The ape and tiger in man are threatening. The shadow of Africa falls across Europe. It is our task to be guardians on the threshold of values."[106] Germans should remember that their oppressors were not humans but French, Belgians, and Poles.[107] Besides, war was an expressionistic phenomenon in an age of expressionism.[108]

V. MOELLER'S AUTHORITARIAN CHARACTER--MASOCHISM

The concept of the authoritarian character implies a sado-masochistic orientation to the world. In the second and third sections of this chapter, it was determined that Moeller was masochistically rooted in the mysticism of the cosmos and Volk concepts.[109] Having disposed of his unwanted, real self, Moeller created a new, idealised image of himself and, from this vantage point, condemned those individuals, groups, and institutions that opposed his dogmatic ideology. On the

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[106] Third Empire, p. 264.

[107] „Auslandsdeutsche," p. 45.

[108] „Abkehr vom Westen," p. 152.

[109] This does not imply that all forms of rootedness in mysticism or religion are of necessity masochistic. See Fromm, Art of Loving, pp. 53-69.

other hand, the masochistic solution to Moeller's need for relatedness was also an integral part of his character. These individuals whose lives, in Moeller's eyes, were in accord with the cosmos became his saints. These institutions and groups having ideologies in harmony with the Volk were, to him, inviolable. To condemn or to revere is the nature of the dogmatist and neurotic, and Moeller seldom related himself to others from the standpoint of equality and mutual respect.

The relation of Moeller to the Volk solved two of the five psychological needs postulated by Fromm. Since the Volk was the embodiment of value and Geist, it was an object for masochistic rootedness; however, to the extent that the Volk was to manifest itself in worldly forms, in political and economic institutions, it provided Moeller with a masochistic solution to the need for relatedness. Yet, even in solving the latter of these two needs, Moeller related himself to an illusion, for the political and economic structures which he desired for the German Volk did not exist during his lifetime in Germany.

Moeller hoped that Germany would adopt, for her future economic basis, a socialist system. Moeller's socialism was not class socialism, but a national socialism in which the interest of the entire Volk was supreme.[110] He agreed with Spengler's concept of national socialism in

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[110]„Lenin und Keynes," Gewissen (September 8, 1920), reprinted in Moeller van den Bruck, Sozialismus und Aussenpolitik, p. 94.

which wages would be set by the state for every type of work. The guidelines for wages would depend upon the needs of the entire economy.[111] It appears from this definition that Moeller would have done little, if anything, to change the ownership of the means of production. The emphasis was on regulation of the means of production by the state. Yet, in spite of the differences from Marxian socialism, Moeller and many others on the extreme Right, as previously stated, originally greeted the November Revolution and were strongly disappointed in its failure to bring about Richard von Moellendorf's plan for a non-communist socialist economy.[112]

Moeller thought that a corporative economic system corresponded to the German Geist. The roots of German socialism, he wrote, lay both in the future and in the guilds of the Middle Ages. He pointed back to Luther, Thomas Muenger, and the Freiherr von Stein as proponents of German socialism.[113] Moeller called the economic thought of Friedrich List eternal because it was Voelkerdenken. To Moeller, List had proved that free trade was only in the English national interest and that a national system of political economy was best for Germany.[114]

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[111] „Preussentum," p. 17.

[112] Klemperer, New Conservatism, pp. 76, 86, 88.

[113] „Preussentum," p. 18.

[114] „Die Einkehr bei Friedrich List," Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 403 (1918), reprinted in Moeller van den Bruck, Politische Mensch, pp. 89-90, 90-93.

Moeller also looked to the Middle Ages for his guide for political organization. He claimed that the medieval ties between the individual and the state constituted an achievement far superior to the trivial modern belief in progress.[115] At other times Moeller advocated a renovation of the German comitatus, his ideal of the political community. He revelled in the thought of a nation in which the people "chose. . . a 'duke' to conduct their forces to victory."[116]

Moeller's underlying desire to submit to authority clearly influenced his choice of favorite political leaders. He placed a mask of Napoleon, whom he deeply admired, in a silk-covered space on his bookshelve.[117] Moeller's Germanic idol was Frederick the Great, who by winning wars had done so well what Germans in recent times did so poorly.[118] Moeller's love of the strong Fuehrer was not only historical. He presaged:

> It is possible that we shall need a long and changing succession of such leaders . . . who in the uncertain future into which are sailing will steer a straight course and through all vicissitudes and storms will keep their bearings and pass on the chart to their successors.[119]

In light of such statements, it is not surprising that Moeller found Russian socialism very much to his liking and became one of the

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[115] Third Empire, pp. 122-23.

[116] "An Liberalismus zugrunde," p. 22.

[117] Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, p. 16.

[118] "Rueckkehr zu Friedrich," p. 110.

[119] Third Empire, p. 227.

most enthusiastic "Easterners" in Germany. He perceived Bolshevism to be an expression of the Russian Volk. The Russian revolution had been a revolution of a young people who had finally decided to overthrow the greed and materialism of the West.[120] The German defeat of Russia in the war had really been a defeat of Westlertum in the form of the Romanovs, the "liberal" rulers who had wanted to deliver the Russian fatherland to the West.[121] Moeller rejoiced in the fact that the Russians had overthrown the autocracy of the Tsar and were now working obediently under their own self-willed autocracy.[122] Moeller hoped that Germany would form a military alliance with Russia to keep from becoming the tool of the West. In his only expression of international idealism, Moeller declared that the two countries should remain bound to each other politically because both represented spirituality, myth, and mysticism, as opposed to the skepticism of the West.[123] In the post-war years, Moeller had a number of conferences with Karl Radek, the German communist who, in the negotiations leading to the Rapallo Treaty of 1922, acted as a liaison between the U.S.S.R. and the German government.[124]

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[120] „Sozialistische Aussenpolitik," p. 81.

[121] „Aufbruch nach Osten," pp. 156-57.

[122] „Sozialistische Aussenpolitik," p. 78.

[123] „Aufbruch nach Osten," p. 158.

[124] Klemperer, New Conservatism, pp. 146-47.

At the same time, Moeller warned German workers to put aside their naive belief that Russian communism could be imported. Bolshevism, he wrote, was Russian, and only Russian, for every Volk had its own type of socialism. Russian socialism was unfitted for the advanced German culture.[125]

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[125] „Sozialistische Aussenpolitik, pp. 78,82.

CONCLUSION

The author of this thesis first selected and described a psychological model to be applied to a historical character. The neo-Freudian, social psychological theories of Erich Fromm and of Karen Horney were chosen for the following reasons: (1) the personal inclination of the author of this thesis toward these theories, (2) the emphasis given by these theories to a social determinant of behavior and character, and (3) the ready applicability of these theories to a historical situation. The model thus chosen was described with particular emphasis given to Fromm's five psychological needs, to his theory of historical development, and to his and Horney's theory of sadomasochism.

The social psychological theory of history was applied to Wilhelmian and early Weimar Germany. It was determined that modern industrialization and the relative economic and social decline of the Kleinbuergertum were long-range factors which had led to feelings of alienation and insecurity among many Germans, but especially among the lower middle class. The impact of world war I and the successive inflation increased this economic insecurity. The increased sado-masochistic traits caused by this insecurity, plus the elimination of the former objects of rootedness, the monarchy and a system of relatively stable social values, gave rise to a need for ideology. This need was satisfied for many young bourgeois intellectuals by rootedness in the ideology of the

Konservative Revolution. The cosmos, an expression of ephemeral order and the Volk, the repository of the "life force" of the cosmos, were objects of devotion for individual Konservativen.

The psychological model was next applied to the life, character and thought of Arthur Moeller van den Bruck. The author of this thesis attempted to show that Moeller had suffered from neurotic anxiety. The exact causes of this anxiety were not evident, however, and must remain a matter of hypothesis. Moeller's early life showed evidence of the familial disturbances which were probably the root of his later rebellion and isolation. To how great an extent Moeller's personality was affected by the social character of the Kleinbuergertum is uncertain. His father was a Kleinbuerger and seems to have shared lower middle class values and attitudes. Arthur Moeller's feelings of powerlessness and self-hatred were characterological traits typical of the lower middle class and his writings appealed most strongly to this class. It is reasonable to conclude that "Moeller's own position was inspired by the plight of the impoverished middle classes who tried to withstand proletarization. . . ."[1]

The author of this thesis described the nature of Moeller's cosmic ideology. Moeller believed that the individual had no intrinsic worth and that all creativity flowed from the cosmos through the Volk to the individual. Moeller admired only those individuals, groups, and institutions which, to him, represented the moral authority of the cosmos and

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[1]Klemperer, New Conservatism, p. 167.

Volk. Therefore, he looked favorably upon Russian communism, a national form of German socialism, individuals in whom the strength of the cosmos resided, and the Middle Ages. For the same reason, he attacked Wilhelmian society, liberals, socialists, the German masses, and western nations. Moeller's attacks on that which represented an opposing ideology were caustic. He attempted to justify his call for a German offensive against neighboring countries by declaring that aggression was a part of nature, necessary for self-protection and a defense of human values.

In analyzing Moeller's Germanic ideology, the neo-Freudian assumption that ideas are an expression of the total character, was made. The author of this thesis has attempted to show that, in the realm of feeling, Moeller found a pseudo-solution for his needs for relatedness, identity, and rootedness in a sado-masochistic orientation to life. As Moeller came more and more to depend upon, to become psychologically rooted in, Germanic ideology, he suffered an increased alienation from his real self. In the realm of action, his lack of individual identity meant that he could not achieve a sense of creativity since he had ceased to experience himself as the center of his powers. As long as Moeller could maintain his idealized image of himself as the prophet of the German Volk, his self-hatred was externalized in two ways: sadistically, through vindictiveness towards others and masochistically, through a philosophy which stressed the inherent impotence of man.

The present author has also suggested that, in the realm of thought, Moeller largely forfeited reason along with the rest of his individuality.[2] This has been illustrated by intimating the dependence of Moeller's thought on his neurotic fears and desires.

Moeller himself openly admitted that his was an unobjective view of the world based on feeling rather than on reason. Rationalism was a western belief which he hoped Germans would reject. Moeller claimed that the Enlightenment was an intellectually unimportant era which lacked both depth and an insight into eternal values.[3] He wrote that faith in the Volk did not rest on a rational basis but rather on the power of feeling.[4] Moeller's view of all of life was similarly irrational, for, as he wrote, the world itself was mythical: "There is more turth in astrology than in astronomy. There is more truth in alchemy than in chemistry. There is more truth in metaphysics than in physics."[5] Moeller advocated a metaphysical view of history in which the historian would fit together worldly occurrences into an irrational continuity.[6] Since history was the development of the indiscernible cosmos, man could only hope to find a pattern in this development.

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[2] "Reason" here refers to man's capacity to reach objective truth, rather than to "intelligence," or man's ability to manipulate the world through thought. Cf. Fromm, Man For Himself, pp. 108-09.

[3] "An Liberalismus zugrunde," p. 34.

[4] "Grenze des Sozialismus," p. 39.

[5] "Theodor Daubler und die Idee des Nordlichtes," Deutsche Rundschau, XLVII (January, 1921), cited in Schwierskott, Revolutionaere Nationalismus, pp. 33. My translation.

[6] "Ideen der Jungen," p. 123.

When divorced from human reality, the so-called "patterns of history" can take nearly any form that the imagination will allow. It is not surprising, then, that the "patterns of history" which Moeller discovered were very much in accord with his subjective desires and may be considered rationalizations.

Moeller's desire to submit to authority led to the rationalization that history developed, in great and comprehensive moments, through the work of great men who, through submission to the cosmos, led their Volk to victory.[7] These great men were only servants of the cosmos, in which a more general historical development was embodied. Moeller was in basic agreement with Oswald Spengler's cyclical theory of history. Moeller believed that Natur favored young peoples and gave them the opportunity to expand their territories. At the height of their power and glory, the seeds of their own destruction were present. The Geist of the mature Volk would break down and individualism would emerge. The energies released by egoism would lead to the destruction of the Volk.[8] That Moeller's view of history was very much a product of his desires is evident in his rejection of Spengler's belief that the West, including Germany, was on the decline. To be sure, the West was declining, Moeller agreed, but Germany was between East and West and could

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[7] "Mangel an Maennern," p. 82.

[8] "Abkehr vom Westen," p. 147, Cf. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West (2 vols., New York, 1945), passim.

remain a young Volk by throwing off the western influences within the motherland and by allying herself with the East.[9]

Moeller's hope was short-lived. The recovery of the Weimar Republic, the acceptance of the Dawes plan, and the meager public response to Das dritte Reich destroyed not only the hope of Moeller for a konservativ revolution but also the entire basis of his existence.[10] Moeller's alienation from his friends and from the organization which he had wanted to become the wave of the future constituted the coup de grace. Eric Hoffer has written: "Those without hope are divided and driven to desperate self-seeking."[11] But Moeller had lost his self.

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[9] "Aufbruch nach Osten," p. 153-55.

[10] Cf. Stern, Politics, p. 226.

[11] Hoffer, True Believer, p. 68.

EPILOGUE

At the time of his death, Moeller's works were not widely known in Germany. In the years between his death and 1933, his works were kept before the public, and they experienced an increased popularity in the late 1920's and early 1930's. Moeller's widow and his friends wrote a number of articles which eulogised him, and Hans Schwarz in 1930 began to publish new editions of Moeller's works. Das Recht der jungen Voelker, a compilation of Moeller's political essays, and new editions of Die italienische Schoenheit and Der preussische Stil appeared before 1933.

The heralding of Moeller as the precursor of National Socialism began only after 1933. The year before had seen a number of articles which proclaimed the government of Franz von Papen to be the final embodiment of Moeller's Dritte Reich.[1] After Hitler's rise to power, a flood of articles and several books appeared which identified Moeller with National Socialism. Hans Schwarz, in his introductions to three additional compilations of Moeller's political essays, decided that Moeller was, after all, the harbinger of Nazism.[2] An English edition of Moeller's magnummopus had a swastika placed conspirucously on the front cover. In a fashion typical of the early Nazi biographies of

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[1] Stern, Politics, p. 265.

[2] See Introductions to: Moeller van den Bruck, Der politische Mensch, Sozialismus und Aussenpolitik, and Rechenschaft ueber Russland (Berlin, 1933).

Moeller, Heinhard Adam expounded that "the intellectual foundation on which the National Socialism of our day rests . . . was essentially created by one man: by Moeller van den Bruck."[3]

After more sober appraisal of Moeller's thought, most Nazi historians quickly curtailed their earlier enthusiasm. A number of official Nazi articles in the late 1930's disassociated Moeller from Nazism. Most important in this process of reinterpretation was the biography by Helmut Roedel, who openly repudiated the idea that Hitler was in any way indebted to Moeller. Moeller "never was, and also never wanted to be, the 'spiritual founder' of our National Socialist state," confided Roedel.[4] He pointed out the heresy of Moeller's concept of race and even intimated that Moeller himself had been only half-Aryan.[5]

Post-World War II historians have been similarly divided on the role of Moeller and the Konservative Revolution in the rise of National Socialism. There has been general agreement that Moeller's ideas were similar to, though by no means identical with, those of the Nazi ideologists. Moeller's rationalizations for agression, his "stab-in-the-back" thesis, his doctrines of cosmos and Volk, his non-Marxian socialism, and his support for an entente with Russia had parallels in National Socialist thought. Furthermore, Moeller did become the hero of Otto Strasser's Black Front, the abortive left wing of the early Nazi movement.[6]

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[3]Moeller van den Bruck, p. 3. My translation.

[4]Moeller, p. 164, quoted in Stern, Politics, p. 298.

[5]Moeller, pp. 14, 42-46.

[6]Stern, Politics, p. 265.

Because of such similarities and ideological ties, Roy Pascal has, emphasizing the role of Moeller, argued that the rise of Konservatismus almost entirely explains the origin of National Socialism.[7]

Pascal's "idealistic" approach has been found completely unacceptable by a number of authors.[8] These have pointed out the ideological differences between Konservatismus and Nazism. In this respect, Moeller's Rasse des Geistes was certainly different from the more mechanical Nazi view of race. Nor can it be maintained that Moeller favored a state of conquest which would annex territories indiscriminately or that he longed for world conquest. The "idealistic" position is further weakened, in the case of Moeller, by the fact that he never participated in Nazi activities and took a very cool attitude towards Hitler. Finally, Pascal's opponents have drawn a distinction between ideology and the opportunism which, they claim, was the determining characteristic of National Socialism.[9]

The social psychological approach of this thesis differs from both of the above views and offers its own explanation of the responsibility

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[8]Cf. especially Mohler, Konservative Revolution, pp. 17-18; Klemperer, New Conservatism, p. 42n et passim; and Edmond Vermeil, "The Origin, Nature and Development of German Nationalist Ideology in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," Third Reich, passim.

[9]Thus, Erich Kahler in Man the Measure (New York, 1961) has called National Socialism an "abuse of all ideologies" and "nothing but a gigantic national and international robbery, a criminal raid" (pp. 560-69).

of Moeller's thought for the rise of Nazism. Alienation and the post-war inflation brought about a need for ideology among many of the German people and especially among the lower middle class. Moeller's ideology appealed to many such individuals and, to the extent that it was accepted, intensified their sadistic and masochistic traits. These intensified traits, to the extent that they spread throughout German culture, in turn facilitated the acceptance of Nazism. They did not cause Nazism, the success of which was certainly linked to decisive political events; however, the particular traits of the German social character provided the human basis without which Nazism could not have existed.

The main question which this approach raises concerns to what extent Moeller's ideas actually influenced Germans, and this question must remain unanswered in this thesis. Gerhard Ritter has postulated that Konservatismus had little effect on the average German. He has claimed that works of Moeller and of other Konservativen were incomprehensible to the average reader of their time.[10] To the present author, George Mosse's view seems more tenable. Mosse has shown that the ideology of the Right did influence the German masses to a considerable extent and

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[10]"Historical Foundations of the Rise of National Socialism," The Third Reich, passim.

was disseminated through the organisations, schools, universities, and youth groups during the Weimar era.[11] If Mosse's view and the social psychological explanation are correct, Moeller and the Konservative Revolution must be accounted partially responsible for the rise of Nazism.

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[11] Crisis, pp. 149-233.

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