

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN CUBA: A STUDY IN POLITICAL
UPHEAVAL, ANTI-CLERICALISM, EDUCATIONAL
RECONSTRUCTION, AND SOCIAL DISRUPTION

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Division of Social Sciences
Kansas State Teachers College

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirement for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Philip Reed Rulon
August 1965

William H. Seiler
Approved for the Major Department

James C. Boylan
Approved for the Graduate Council

222563

FOREWORD

My sincere appreciation is extended to the following administrative, faculty, and staff members of the Kansas State Teachers College, Emporia, Kansas:

First, to President John E. King, who supported this study, and appointed a special ad hoc committee; secondly, to Dr. William H. Seiler, who served as chairman of the committee, and contributed many valuable suggestions concerning the actual construction of the thesis; thirdly, to Dean Laurence C. Boylan, Dr. Robert McAdoo, Dr. Robert Lee, Dr. Jack Carter, and Mr. Tom Ladwig, who served as members of the committee.

A debt is also acknowledged to Mr. Douglas McMillan of Oklahoma State University for his assistance in translating many pages of Cuban exile literature.

Lastly, gratitude is conveyed to the Cuban exiles. They devoted much time and energy in providing the writer with information about their homeland, their relatives, and their experiences in Cuba prior to the revolution.

P. R. R.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION	1
The Historical Background of the Revolution .	2
The Problem and the Technique	6
II. FIDEL ! FIDEL ! FIDEL !	10
The Student Movement	12
The Structure and Mission of the 26th of July Movement	22
III. THE CHURCH AND THE FATHERLAND	36
Participation in the Revolutionary Movement .	37
The Initial Impact of the Revolution on the Churches	40
"The Camps of Battle Are Now Being Laid Out Between the Church and Its Communist Enemies"	49
Religious Consequences of the Bay of Pigs . .	57
IV. THE PERVERSION OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM	60
"F" is for Fidel	63
The Becados	72
Technical Schools	76
Terror Schools	81
The University of Havana	82

CHAPTER	PAGE
V. THE DEATH OF A SOCIETY	88
Something Old - Something New	88
The Status Revolution	91
The Courts of the Revolution	96
VI. CONCLUSIONS	101
BIBLIOGRAPHY	104
APPENDIX	110

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In surveying the recent histories of the Latin American and Caribbean nations one can only conclude that revolution and counter-revolution are not unusual occurrences. Since 1948, revolts have erupted in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and Venezuela. The traditional pattern of these conflicts has usually centered upon the substitution of one strong man for another strong man, with each of the contestants dedicated to the preservation of the patrician class. An individual could gain ultimate political ascendancy by control of the national army, and by convincing the people that he had the desired messianic qualities that Latin Americans look for in their government personnel.

The latest revolution in Cuba is somewhat contradictory to the characteristic mold set by her sister nations. It is true that the battle between the strong men existed in Cuba in the early 1950's, but instead of both of the contesting leaders representing the aristocratic land-owning class, one was devoted to upholding the status quo, while the other allegedly championed the aspirations of the

lower income groups. This intensified the political quarrels, and class war was initiated.

When the government in Cuba finally changed hands, social, political, and economic changes resulted. To the serious student of civilization, these alterations are worth more attention than has been previously given to them. If they prove to be an unqualified success, then those nations, especially in South America, that live in perennial unrest, may attempt to imitate the Cuban cultural revolution. This could bring far-reaching consequences.

I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE REVOLUTION

The tragedy of modern Cuba began to unfold on March 10, 1952, when a military coup d' état headed by Fulgencio Batista grasped control of the government. From that date until the first months of 1959, many individuals, groups, and political coalitions sought to overthrow the illegal regime in order to restore constitutional rule. An early, persistent leader advocating revolution was a young Havana lawyer named Fidel Castro. On October 16, 1953, during his trial on charges of treason for his bloody assault on the Moncada Barracks, he clearly stated his case. Before Judge Manuel Urrutia, he reasoned:

The first revolutionary law gives back to the people its sovereignty and proclaims the 1940 Constitution to be the true and supreme law of the land until the people decide to change or modify it; for the purpose of re-establishing that Constitution and of punishing in an

exemplary way such as have betrayed it, and in view of the inexistence of any popularly elected instrument to carry out said purposes, the revolutionary movement, considering itself the momentary incarnation of that popular sovereignty that is the only source of legitimate power; assumes all the rights inherent to popular sovereignty with the sole exception of the right to modify the Constitution, but including the power to execute, the power to legislate, the power to judge.¹

Many such extreme political statements unfolded and matured in the late fifties. To counteract them, President Batista gradually permitted token liberties to the populace, while simultaneously intensifying efforts to persecute organized political opposition. In order to keep this unsavory news from the citizens, the dictator exercised periodic censorship over the various mass communications media in Cuba. Only occasionally would brave individuals report that people "had fingernails ripped off . . . eyes gouged out . . . [and that] fathers and husbands [were] tortured and beaten until they were dead."² Toward the end of the decadent decade secret societies were formed to counteract such atrocities. The organizers of the groups obviously hoped they could either force the former army sergeant to cease using these methods or that they could compel him to abdicate. Suffering seven years of governmental turmoil, laced with sporadic

¹Quoted from Manuel Antonio de Varona, The Drama of Cuba (Miami: Royal Palm Printers, 1962), pp. 13-14.

²Harold H. Martin, "Can Castro Save Cuba," Saturday Evening Post, Vol. CCXXXII, No. 5 (August 1, 1959), p. 40.

military encounters, Batista decided on the latter course of action. The President once again raided the nation's treasury and ended his political migraine for good by fleeing to the Dominican Republic.

The news of the flight of the Bastianas quickly reached Major Fidel Castro, who was tucked securely away in the mountains of the Sierra Maestra. In order to appear as the man-of-the-hour, Castro hurriedly made plans for a victory parade. Along with his bearded and weary revolutionary entourage, he began a seven-day march to Camp Columbia, which conveniently passed through the small rural villages that dot the interior of the island. Although he did not deserve all the honors accorded him by the townspeople, he graciously accepted the enthusiastic cheers of the inhabitants. To the older generations of Cubans, he was likened to a political messiah -- one who would at long last restore peace and stability. The younger generation saw Fidel as a shining and noble hero -- one who might don with honor the mantle left by Jose Marti almost a century before.

Peace and tranquility did not return to Cuba. As time passed, and political and social conditions did not return to normal, the professional and intellectual segments of society became disenchanted. They had only loosely supported the revolution in the first place, and now with the new government refusing to hold elections, they feared the worst. Some of this group quietly, but significantly,

asserted that Castro was not interested in restoration. Instead, it was rumored that he was plotting to expand the original revolution.

Gradually this disillusionment spread to the other classes. As days lengthened into months, and conditions became even more chaotic, the concept of revolution was again coming to the conversational surface of everyday life. Numerous secret societies sprang up all over the nation dedicated to the destruction of the revolutionary government. Seeing his position threatened, Castro responded with severity. He determined to wipe out the disloyal elements, just as his predecessor had done. As persecution and terror cast its long shadow over the island of paradox, new bands of exiles fled from Cuba. With heavy hearts, they searched the adjacent parts of the world for a more untroubled home.

American immigration gates were lowered. Anxious refugees crowded into Miami, Florida. At first their temporary existence was bearable, because they believed that they would be returning to Cuba. But the news from the island was not encouraging. As the heavy Iron Curtain began to descend on their native land, the exiles realized that they must spend a prolonged time in the United States. Their jobs as dishwashers, hotel bellhops, and janitors were no longer endurable in the light of long tenure in the new land. In addition, as new refugees arrived bearing tales

of the most recent economic and social ruin, the transplanted Floridians were even more discontented with their nomadic life. They now looked toward the government of the United States with hopeful eyes, and wondered if it would provide them with an opportunity to live a more useful and productive life.

The American government did respond to their desires. In 1963, under the auspices of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, a variety of programs were designed to assist the immigrants to improve their occupational status. In February, 1964, the Kansas State Teachers College of Emporia became a part of this endeavor. A select group of exiles from the Miami area, endowed with National Defense scholarships, were invited to come to the campus and be retrained for eventual positions as language teachers or as librarians.

II. THE PROBLEM AND THE TECHNIQUE

This study was initiated within the Division of Social Sciences, Kansas State Teachers College. The arrival of the Cuban refugees suggested two important reasons for such a study. First, the future students were a unique collection of highly educated and respected professional men who formerly resided in a country in which formal diplomatic relations had ceased with the United States; secondly, from a socio-historical

viewpoint these people possessed a first-hand knowledge of what occurs in a sovereign nation, which by duress and revolution, has been transformed into a communistic totalitarian state.

With the foregoing in mind, permission was obtained by the writer from the appropriate and responsible authorities to interview the exiles and determine whether a study was feasible. Two group meetings confirmed its potential value. To secure a geographic sampling, care was exercised to locate refugees from each of the provinces in Cuba.³ Finally, sixteen people were selected to be interviewed, each voluntarily agreeing to participate. Fifteen of the subjects held post-graduate degrees from the University of Havana and the other from Jose Marti University. Fourteen were recipients of the degree of Doctor of Civil Laws and the other two men held the Doctor of Pedagogy degree.

The interviews were accomplished during the months of March, April, May, June, and July of 1964. The "work sessions" lasted from two to six hours each, depending on how much information the individual could provide. Except in rare circumstances, all of the data were obtained in one sitting. In order to eliminate exploratory interviews, the

³All provinces were represented: Camaguey, Havana, Las Villas, Mataneses, Oriente, Santa Clara.

refugees were visited in advance to enable the writer to determine their qualifications and to decide in what subjects they possessed the most information. For the first five sessions a semi-structured approach was used. Then these data were organized, and checked with other sources for accuracy. In the next five sessions a tighter semi-structured technique was employed. The final interviews were totally structured, although after the formal interview was terminated, time was allotted for discussion of related information. All told, approximately 40,000 words were recorded.⁴

This thesis was designed (1) to gain further information about how the Cuban political revolution was accomplished; (2) to identify any changes which occurred in the religious life of the Cuban people; (3) to gain further information on the type of educational system devised by the Provisional Government; (4) to discover what effect the revolution had on the Cuban society.

Since a wealth of material on the revolution has already been published, attention was given to the investigation of aspects which have not been studied and reported in detail. With the exception of number one above, the time

⁴For a complete survey of the merits of the unstructured, semi-structured, and totally structured interview see Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1964), pp. 15-34.

period covered was limited from January 1, 1959 to April 17, 1961, although some overlap does occur in each of the sub-divisions. Periodically, additional sources have been brought into the thesis (in spite of the case study methodology) to verify, expand, and provide background knowledge on the data obtained.

CHAPTER II

FIDEL ! FIDEL ! FIDEL !

Even with world publicity, the true personality of Fidel Castro has remained much of a mystery. Since Castro's individualism has greatly influenced the eventual direction of the revolution, it is important to become at least superficially familiar with some of his characteristics. On the surface he has left the impression that he is nervous and restless. When he was interviewed by the press in 1959, he often preferred to have only one reporter confer with him at a time. Apparently this was because he liked to sit close to the journalist, and occasionally touch him with his hands.¹ This personal diplomacy turned out to be not only good salesmanship, but it also established excellent press relations for him -- a press that became most sympathetic and devoted to his cause.²

In addition to warm personal mannerisms, Castro also possessed a magnetic public image that was displayed prior and subsequent to the revolution in mass media speeches. He was capable of holding an audience spellbound for long

¹Herbert Matthews, "Now Castro Faces the Harder Fight," New York Times Magazine, Sec. VI, Part 1 (March 8, 1959), p. 71.

²A survey of the New York Times for a six-month period disclosed that both the man and the revolution received extraordinarily favorable coverage.

periods of time. Nothing was left to chance. Before these speeches, the man from Oriente would personally inspect the electronic equipment, and see that every microphone and loud-speaker was properly placed for maximum effectiveness.³

One of the most unusual characteristics of the bearded revolutionary leader was his likeness to the proverbial will-of-the-wisp. In one day he would often appear in several provinces of the island, conducting different types of business in each one. Although not an active member of the Roman Catholic Church since his boyhood days, close-up photographs reveal that he would occasionally wear a small religious medal -- one that he would chew on when he was giving the lower tip of his beard a rest.⁴ Again, this was part of a sensitivity in giving the people what they wished. Religious leaders were not unwelcome in Cuba.

The most dominant aspect of Castro's personality is his tremendous capacity for hard work. The former Latin American editor of the New York Times has observed, "It is hard for some to understand how he . . . can work so feverishly for twenty or twenty-one hours a day, every day without

³Statement by Dr. Robert Cohen, personal interview, December 1, 1964. Dr. Cohen has interviewed Castro twice, and has prepared two documentary films for lecture tours, and for showing on educational television channels.

His last visits to Cuba were in September and October, 1963, and again in July and August of 1964. Prior to these visits he obtained information from an uncle who had migrated to the United States after living all of his previous life in Cuba.

⁴Matthews, "Now Castro Faces the Harder Fight," p. 71.

a break."⁵ This trait was exhibited in his student days in Havana. At the university he received an appropriate nickname which exemplified his long endurance and physical strength -- the Horse. By employing these above-described assets strategically, he was able to win fame as a student leader, and thereafter to travel extensively in the United States, Mexico, Central America, and Latin America to solicit personnel and money for his cause.

I. THE STUDENT MOVEMENT

Fidel started his rise to political prominence as a university student, a common technique with most Cuban political leaders of the thirties and forties. At Havana University he became a familiar figure to the student body by his extraordinary baseball accomplishments, and he developed his participation in student groups such as the Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria. In addition, he achieved a degree of notoriety by his unorthodox and daring exploits to gain spending money.

In 1942, after leaving the Colegio La Salle and Colegio Dolores, both Catholic private schools, Castro enrolled at Colegio Belen for his high school training. Upon graduating in 1945, the yearbook for that institution

⁵Ibid.

recorded this statement about his athletic ability, as well as briefly commenting on his scholastic endeavors:

1942-1945. Fidel distinguished himself always in all subjects related to letters. His record was one of excellence, he was a true athlete, always defending with bravery and pride the flag of the school. He has known how to win the admiration and affection of all.⁶

This interest in athletics, particularly baseball, continued at the university; however, he did not have the self-discipline needed to properly train, and to regularly report for scheduled practices. Instead he began to engage in semi-professional games, where training procedures were less rigorous. By 1946, he showed enough promise that the St. Louis Cardinal baseball organization offered him a professional contract.⁷ For unknown reasons he declined the invitation, but it probably could be assumed that his interest in politics had already been whetted, and that it looked more exciting than playing ball.

In his sophomore year, Fidel joined a group of obscure ruffians who together acquired the name "balls of dirty grease."⁸ These ten to fifteen students carried on an unusual program of extra-curricular activities. First, to obtain spending money they would roam the rural areas around

⁶Quoted from Jules Dubois, Fidel Castro (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1959), p. 15.

⁷Statement by Dr. Robert Cohen, personal interview.

⁸News item in the Miami Patria, March 15, 1960.

Havana and rob defenseless peasants.⁹ Secondly, they invariably wore sidearms to classes, and were capable of using them to settle quarrels, to intimidate fellow classmates they did not like, and to coerce unsympathetic faculty members into supporting their points of view.¹⁰

On March 15, 1960 the official Cuban exile newspaper, published in Miami, printed a revealing photograph of Castro during these younger years. The "hero" was depicted in a sitting position massaging his feet, and the caption underneath, in part, read as follows:

This is the Fidel whom nobody remembers. The one with the ugly and dirty habit of taking off his shoes everywhere. With sweating feet and patched and torn socks. Always touching them. They were as filthy as his feet.¹¹

According to one who knew him in high school and as a law student belonging to the Manicatos organization, Castro's first flirtation with politics occurred in 1945. At that time

⁹Personal interview, see Appendix A, biographical sketch number 2. Since many of the exiles interviewed for this study have relatives still living in Cuba either imprisoned or threatened with prison (some are threatened with jail sentences simply because they have relatives who have migrated to the United States), it has been decided not to reveal the true identities of the persons involved. To acquaint the reader with some biographical details of each subject, a brief sketch has been placed in the appendix.

Henceforth, personal interviews that were conducted with the exiles will be cited as personal interview, number ____.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Photograph and news item in the Miami Patria, March 15, 1960.

Dr. Carlos Frio-Soccoras, the President of Cuba, increased the "Havana bus rates from eight to twelve cents per fare."¹² This act discriminated against university students. As a result of this legislation, Castro visited several student political organizations and pleaded with leaders to exhort the government to repeal the abusive law. In addition, he gave several speeches to groups of independent students.¹³

Approximately two years later, the political bug bit Fidel much harder. A close friend, Rafael Diaz Balart, introduced him to his sister, Mithra. She was from the same province as Fidel, and, curiously, her father was an important politician. Perhaps in an attempt to appear more respectable to her family, Castro agitated, not campaigned, for the presidency of the Havana University student body. Not being a patient man, Fidel had his own system of power politics. An acquaintance related the following episode:

Castro attempted to gain power by terror. While he was a student, we called him a gangster. In 1947, I saw him shoot Leonel Gomez, the president of the student body of Havana High School. Gomez, associated with the insane Insurrectionary Revolutionary Union, was not killed, but only wounded in the thigh. After this,

¹²Personal interview, number 8. It should be remembered in this instance, that in Latin American schools on-campus housing is usually not provided for students. Therefore, the most convenient and most inexpensive method of transportation was the city busses.

¹³Ibid.

Castro immediately headed for the university grounds to claim immunity.¹⁴

Momentarily failing in student politics, Fidel turned to international affairs. Because of police pressure, he took a brief leave from Havana and sought refuge in the home of an ancient general named Juan Rodriguez.¹⁵ General Rodriguez had exiled himself from his native land in order to raise an armed force with which he hoped to erase the Trujillo power structure in the Dominican Republic. The new army was to be called the Caribbean Legion, and was in training on the island of Cayo Confite. Castro was invited to join it. Shortly after his arrival, however, the Cuban navy discovered what was happening and invaded the stronghold, capturing many of the mercenaries. Fidel was taken prisoner along with the others and loaded on a boat to be returned to the mainland. But not caring for two political defeats in a row, and since he was already wanted by the government in connection with the Gomez incident, he jumped over the side of the ship shouting, "I prefer sharks to arrest."¹⁶ After a lengthy swim to shore, he was interviewed

¹⁴Personal interview, number withheld by author. It will be noted that Gomez was a high school leader, but these young men were closely associated with university leaders. Thus they were within the political framework that Fidel was struggling against.

¹⁵Nathaniel Weyl, Red Star Over Cuba (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1960), p. 65.

¹⁶Personal interview, number 8.

and photographed by several Cuban newspapermen. The open defiance of the federal officials, the exhibition of athletic prowess, in addition to a generous portion of foolish courage, captivated the hearts of many citizens when the story was published in newspapers. As one refugee stated, "Even at this early date, Castro received the title of the 'man who stood alone'."¹⁷

By 1948 Castro commanded a larger following. He made a new attempt to gain a position in student government. Never lacking for issues, he initiated a campaign to improve the lot of Negro students. This race had obtained a better economic position under President Batista's first administration, perhaps because he was part Negroid, but still was discriminated against socially.¹⁸ The particular grievance at the university stemmed from the fact that "Negro students were barred from official representation on athletic teams."¹⁹ After putting up a hard fight, and attempting several of his unique political maneuvers, he admitted defeat. But in the years that followed, Fidel has held these people in special

¹⁷Personal interview, number 6.

¹⁸Personal interview, number 5. For example, Negroes were prohibited from working in large banks, from entering nightclubs, and from joining such exclusive organizations as the Mid-America Yacht Club. (A Yacht Club in Cuba would be the equivalent of a Country Club in the United States.)

¹⁹Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1960), p. 27.

esteem, and has prided himself in keeping their betterment a continuing goal.²⁰

Just prior to the pitch for the Negro vote, Fidel decided to revert to his own brand of power politics. The only immediate problem was to create an opening, for all of the offices in which he was interested were filled. After thinking it over, he decided to again work toward the presidency of the student federation. This position was currently held by Manolo Castro Campos. If the files of the Cuban National police may be trusted, Castro handled the situation in the following manner:

22 January 1948. On the night of the day in question and at the corner of San Rafael and Consulado Streets, in front of the 'Resumen' cinema theatre, the ex-president of the University Federacion, Manolo Castro Campos and Carlos Puchó Samper were killed by gunfire. Fidel Castro Ruz was named as the intellectual author of the crime and was arrested on the 26th of the same

²⁰After the Bay of Pigs invasion, while Castro was interviewing prisoners, he was particularly rude and arrogant to Ramon Quintana, one of the Negro leaders of the brigade. He was also disappointed that Erneido Oliva had joined the invaders. More than once he stated that he was the worst betrayer of all. For further details see Haynes Johnson with Manuel Artime, Jose Perez San Roman, Erneido Oliva, and Enrique Ruiz-Williams, The Bay of Pigs Invasion (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1964), pp. 185-186.

In more recent times, Castro has permitted Robert Franklin Williams, the Negro refugee from the American F. B. I. to make inflammatory broadcasts from Cuba on Radio Free Dixie. This station urges the Southern American Negroes to arm themselves and win civil rights battles by violence. Statement by Dr. Robert Cohen, in his lecture "Inside Castro's Cuba," Oklahoma State University, December 1, 1964.

month when walking along San Lazaro Street in front of Maceo Park.²¹

Later in the same year, he finally accomplished his goal. He was elected to the vice-presidency of the federation, and moved into the number one spot when the president conveniently resigned.²²

The serious transition to national politics was achieved by hanging on to the coattails of the fanatical reformer Eduardo Rene Chibas. He, in many respects, was the Cuban equal to the late Senator Joseph McCarthy. Along with his brother Paul, and Roberto Agramonde, Chibas formed the "Orthodoxo" political party to combat the more traditional "Autentico."²³ In 1951, in preparation for the coming elections, the Orthodox party was attempting to obtain the resignation of Aureliano Sanchez Arango, the incumbent Minister of Education. Chibas charged that the Minister was guilty of graft and political corruption, and promised to disclose his hitherto secret facts on his Sunday evening radio broadcast over station CMQ Havana. On the evening of August 5th, he requested the owners of the radio station to grant him a few extra minutes of air time. The owners,

²¹Quoted from Weyl, Red Star Over Cuba, p. 64.

²²Huberman and Sweezy, Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution, p. 27.

²³For a complete breakdown of the Cuban political parties see Cuba and the Rule of Law (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1962), p. 277.

however, after viewing the alleged evidence, concluded that he did not have an airtight case and refused his request. As time for the program neared, Chibas despaired. He did go on the air as usual. But at some point in the afternoon, he came up with a more striking protest than he had originally planned. In the closing minutes of the broadcast, he drew a pistol and shot himself in the head.²⁴

The suicide of Chibas set Cuban politics ablaze. The public, and in particular the students of Havana University, decided to rise up in protest themselves. After fifteen years of peaceful government, the word revolution started to crop up in everyday conversations. Castro, now a student leader, and a devoted follower of Chibas, also concluded that it was time for action.²⁵ Since he could not get along with the new leaders of the Orthodox party, he reasoned that it would be much more effective to begin a new one. This idea culminated in the birth of an organization called "Youth of the Centenarian," principally composed of university students. Small, but selective, the youthful members pledged themselves to political purification by violence. Their meetings were held in secret. In Tom Sawyer-Huck Finn fashion,

²⁴Edmund A. Chester, A Sergeant Named Batista (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1954), pp. 250-252.

²⁵Personal interview, number 6.

they met at mid-night in the cemetery where Chibas was buried, and commemorated his death by swearing allegiance to his ideals.²⁶

Events accelerated in the next year for both Cuba and Fidel Castro. Eight months after the radio suicide, Fulgencio Batista took advantage of the political muddle and assumed leadership of the island. There was no organized opposition.²⁷ The "Youth of the Centenarian" movement was not well prepared, so it also accepted the coup d' état. But by July, 1953, it was ready to impose the second disaster on the peaceful Caribbean island. Toward the end of the month, Fidel and two hundred of his newly formed group attacked a federal arsenal located at the Moncada Barracks. Before morning arrived, the Batista soldiers had claimed a quick, but brutal, victory. Yet the rebels ultimately took the glory. As a result of the courageous, but foolhardy raid, and as a result of the subsequent treason trial, Castro gained nation-wide fame. His name became synonymous with political freedom. The date of the battle is now a national

²⁶Personal interview, number 12. The name of the group was adopted because it was the 100th anniversary of the death of Jose Marti.

²⁷This is not to imply that there was no opposition at all. Manuel Antonio (Tony) Varona did call the university to encourage students to raise arms and prevent Batista from entering the Palace, but the call to arms was too late.

holiday. In addition, the date has served as the name for the Castro revolutionary machine -- the "26th of July."²⁸

II. THE STRUCTURE AND MISSION OF THE 26TH OF JULY MOVEMENT

The important difference between the "26th of July" and other political organizations in Cuba stems from the fact that it was a movement. There were no tight political philosophies, that is, none except a dedication to sponsoring a change in the government. Beyond this, it was especially attractive to people who had formerly belonged to discredited political organizations. The "26th of July" had no past, hence there was never any need for explanations of political blunders. Additionally, since the movement was composed of people of college age, it "had all the dynamism of a young group."²⁹ Finally, the lodge-type secrecy gave it an attractive romantic and humanistic coloring.

²⁸The reason for the attack on the Moncada Barracks has been interpreted in different ways. For three contemporary accounts, by people living in Cuba at the time, see Teresa Caruso, Cuba and Castro (trans. by Elmer Grassbery) (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 98-100; R. Hart Phillips, Cuba: Island of Paradox (New York: McDowell, Oblensky, 1960), pp. 266-269; and Nicolas Rivero, Castro's Cuba: An American Dilemma (Washington: Luce, 1962), pp. 31-32. Another reason that the date has become famous is due to the fact that both sides committed infamous atrocities. Prisoners in an army hospital were ruthlessly slaughtered, and rebel limbs were separated from their bodies and hurled at other members of the attacking party.

²⁹Cuba and the Rule of Law, p. 38.

It is well-established that the "26th of July" originated in Cuba after the Moncada incident, and in spite of the fact that it was chartered in the United States, the movement actually fermented in Mexico. During the summer of 1956, Castro personally recruited the leaders of the military and propaganda aspects of the organization in Mexico City.³⁰ The first important leader added to the payroll was Dr. Ernesto (Che) Guevara.³¹ He was appointed Chief of Personnel, but was, in reality, much more than that. Besides being a medical doctor, and a first-class revolutionary, he also is "believed to have been the principal link between Castro and International Communism."³² Having been active in Guatemala, Panama, and the Dominican Republic, Guevara added a wealth of knowledge and experience to the idealistic Castro. To illustrate his practical worth to the "26th of July," Guevara built a series of cells in Guatemala that has been estimated as having a membership of over 8,000 people.³³

³⁰A news item in Report on Cuba, September, 1958, p. 2. This newspaper-bulletin originated in Washington D. C., and was published monthly by Universal Research and Consultants, Inc. The organization sponsoring it was an official branch of the Batista Cuban government. In part, its chief purpose was to report on Cuba's economic condition in a manner that would attract American investors. As the writer's frequent citations indicate, it often carried news concerning the progress of the revolution.

³¹Report on Cuba, October, 1957, p. 1.

³²Report on Cuba, May, 1958, p. 2.

³³Report on Cuba, September, 1958, p. 2.

The oldest member of the movement to be recruited in Mexico City was a curious one-eyed, self-styled general named Alberto Bayo-Giroud. He had called himself a colonel until Castro appointed him as Director of Military Training, and then he promoted himself.³⁴ General Bayo was an outcast of the Spanish Civil War with a revolutionary background quite similar to "Che" Guevara.³⁵ But even with the addition of Bayo to the staff, Castro was presented with two perplexing problems. Initially he had to obtain large-scale financing. This situation had no easy solution for Castro was away from Cuba where he could presumably have raised it without much difficulty. Secondly, he had to build up a fighting army. This would prove easier to solve.

The first of Castro's initial two problems were solved by Juan Berenguer. He operated under the code name of "Johnny the Mexican." Spending most of his time in the United States, Berenguer solicited funds from wealthy Cuban

³⁴Report on Cuba, October, 1957, p. 1.

³⁵ibid. According to the biographical sketch of Bayo in this issue, he was, "Born in Cuba and later commissioned in the Air Force of the Spanish Army at the time of the Monarchy, he is known to have been dismissed from the service and to have become part of a manufacturing and smuggling ring supplying bombs and arms to Madrid units rioting against the Government." After the war was over, he fled to Mexico under the "patronage of the Junta de Auxilio a Los Republicanos Espanoles, as a political refugee. He is known to have been involved in a Communist-inspired revolutionary movement to overthrow President Somoza of Nicaragua in 1948 and later to have been an officer in the Caribbean Legion, along with his two sons."

exiles, and from purely American sources. Although the facts are scanty, it is believed that "Johnny the Mexican" came through with enough money to finance the original Gramma expedition.³⁶

As money flowed into Castro's hands, he began a search to locate soldiers that could be enlisted in his army. Recruits were eventually obtained from the coast cities of Tampico, San Luis Potosi, and the northern part of Vera Cruz. The men, drawn mainly "from Communist elements and malcontents . . . were offered \$500.00 per month and a large insurance policy to . . . join Castro's forces. . . ."³⁷ The favorite class of people sought were ex-soldiers, because they already possessed the rudiments of military discipline and cost less money to train.³⁸ When the Mexican manpower well dried up, the recruiting area was expanded to the United

³⁶Report on Cuba, June 1958, p. 2. Biographical information in this issue indicates the birthplace of "Johnny the Mexican" was unknown, although he was expelled from the Juan Bautista school in Cuba for preaching Communism. He also was identified by the Mexican police as a Latin American agitator.

³⁷Report on Cuba, September, 1958, p. 2. It is interesting to note that the editors estimate that over 200 of these mercenaries were killed in Cuba by 1958.

³⁸The Report on Cuba indicates that military men were preferred, but "Che" Guevara was of the opinion that loyalty was the most important ingredient to look for in recruiting. For his views see Che Guevara (trans. Major Harries-Clichy Peterson, USMOR), Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), passim.

States, Argentina, the Dominican Republic, and Guatemala.³⁹ Although it can not be established in every case that the soldiers were all Communists, the Mexican police after a surprise raid on Castro's headquarters on June 21, 1956, concluded that the "Movement was . . . under the patronage of the Communist . . . party."⁴⁰

The "26th of July" movement in Cuba was much different than the Latin American cells. Excluding the fighting members in the mountains, the units located in the cities were clothed in secrecy, so no actual numbers are available. Nevertheless it can be concluded with reasonable certainty that they were entrenched in every region in Cuba. Generally, the principal duties of these cells were (1) to provide money for the purchase of arms and the payment of troops; (2) to create confusion by causing small and numerous local disturbances; and (3) to spread propaganda by word-of-mouth and printed materials.

To illustrate the preceding generalizations information is available on the activities of several cells in differing localities. One extremely active cell in Havana carried on a variety of duties. First, since this unit had access to a printing press and other duplicating processes,

³⁹Report on Cuba, September, 1958, p. 1.

⁴⁰Quoted from Report on Cuba, October, 1957, p. 1.

it contributed to the revolutionary cause by issuing three separate newspapers. These underground papers were given patriotic names such as the Revolution, the Sierra Maestra, and the Vanguardia Obrera.⁴¹

The format of the newspapers was similar to American papers, but occasionally when it had to be printed in a hurry, because of an anticipated police raid, they were printed on a single sheet of newsprint. A member of this particular cell recalled:

These papers supplemented Castro's radio reports on the progress of the revolution, encouraged enlistments in the Rebel army, publicized, in detail, some of Fidel's reform programs [such as the Agrarian reform], and always attempted to obtain funds from persons sympathetic to the cause.⁴²

Because some of the other cells printed their own newspapers, the circulation was limited to Havana and the surrounding localities. The actual distribution was made by placing the papers on doorsteps at night or by hand on street corners.⁴³

The printing presses were also utilized to print revolutionary bonds. Most of the cells in Cuba assisted in raising money for the Sierra Maestra, but each had a slightly different technique. In Havana, the bond system was most

⁴¹Personal interview, number 12.

⁴²Personal interview, number 12.

⁴³Ibid.

practical. To accommodate people in all income brackets, the securities were issued in 1, 5, 20, 100, 200, and 1,000 dollar amounts. The members then sold them directly to the public. Often it was a dangerous business. The ever-alert police would be tipped off that they were being peddled, and track down the salesman with drastic consequences.⁴⁴ For this reason, members of one cell were not permitted to know the names of the members of another cell. Even the monies raised were turned over to unidentified personnel.⁴⁵

An important final duty was to create local disturbances. These activities were closely patterned after the methods used by the 1930 Student Directorate when they were attempting to unseat Geraldo Machado, the businessman president of Cuba.⁴⁶ After keeping some areas of Havana in perpetual turmoil, the cell was instructed to go after bigger game. It was decided to sponsor a nationwide strike

⁴⁴Personal interview, number withheld by author. This exile was picked up and tortured intermittently for a two-week period. His back four years later still bore evidence of his inhuman treatment.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Personal interview, number 16. This exile, one of the older members, had been a leader of the "1930" group. He related the following items concerning the procedures used at that time. "We threw stones in store windows, and made noise on the street corners in the early morning hours. We shouted tyranny and corruption in government. When the police came we fought with our fists. The jails were filled with students. . . . Students would run into a theater and shout, 'People are dying in the streets.' We kept the people uneasy at all times."

scheduled for April 9, 1958.⁴⁷ Since the fighting in Oriente province was going poorly for the rebels, a successful strike would present a unified show of strength to the uncommitted people. On the eve of April 8, certain "members of the cell believed to have been Communists, informed the authorities."⁴⁸ On April 9, in the early morning hours, the police began making mass arrests of union leaders who had agreed to cooperate with the "26th of July." Also key members of the cell were rounded up and placed behind bars. With the heart of the movement destroyed, the attempted strike ended in a dismal failure.

Another interesting branch of the "26th of July" was located in Colon, Mataneses. The originator of the cell, Dr. Mario Munoz, became one of the martyr's of Moncada.⁴⁹ In the latter part of the attack he had hidden in a hospital, pretending that he was a staff physician. He was discovered and killed. The Castro movement in Mataneses was then taken over by the other individuals, but the name of Munoz was not forgotten.

In 1958, the cell received instructions from the Sierra Maestra that Castro needed money to open a second

⁴⁷The best treatment of the strike is by the former Provisional President of Cuba. See Manuel Urrutia Lleo, Fidel Castro & Company Inc. (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964), pp. 18, 88.

⁴⁸Personal interview, number 12.

⁴⁹Personal interview, number 7.

front in the province of Camaguey. He did not have enough men to take the area by force, so he needed to obtain large amounts of cash for bribing the Batista soldiers in the province to defect, or at least to remain passive in the event a small number of men invaded the area.⁵⁰ The amount needed was 100,000 dollars. Although this sounds like a staggering sum, it proved very easy to obtain in Matanzas. The members of the Colon cell visited wealthy American sugar-mill owners and asked them to contribute.⁵¹ As an enticement, credits were issued to donors that could be applied on their income tax, if the revolution was successful.⁵² One who participated in this fund raising drive estimated that over 5,000,000 dollars was collected for the revolution in the province.⁵³

In Oriente province, close to the fighting front, the main purpose of at least one of the cells of the "26th of July" was to provide manpower for the guerrillas. They also assisted the headquarters in the Sierra Maestra in sending agents to the other parts of Cuba for propaganda

⁵⁰Personal interview, number 4. The bribe accomplished the desired results. Major Huber Bates, now imprisoned in the Isle of Pines, was appointed as military commander of the province.

⁵¹Personal interview, number 8. Contributions were received in varying amounts. Some as high as 5,000 dollars.

⁵²Personal interview, number 7.

⁵³Ibid.

purposes. For example, in Santiago de Cuba where the cell was under the joint control of Oscar Ortiz Dominquez, a secondary school teacher, and Juan Tachequel, a union leader, not only were high school boys recruited for fighting, but they sent such men as Dermido Escalo and William Galvez to Pinar del Rio and Matanes provinces, respectively, to coordinate the revolutionary cause.⁵⁴ In addition, they also raised money by tapping mill owners, members of social clubs, wealthy individuals, and by urging village priests to "ask for contributions from their parishioners."⁵⁵

In a cell in Las Villas, an effort for the revolution was performed in still another manner. Under the leadership of Dr. Frances Varona Duque - Estrada cells were formed in groups of ten people.⁵⁶ Code numbers were issued to prevent identification by the Cuban police.⁵⁷ A long time member of one unit described their work as follows:

This was a working organization. We did not solicit money in large amounts. But we did manufacture "25th of July" buttons that we offered for sale. This was to obtain money to finance our own activities. We made hammocks for soldiers and forwarded them to the mountains. We also purchased a mimeograph machine and reproduced

⁵⁴Personal interview, number 11.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Personal interview, number 14.

⁵⁷The members were assigned an alphabetical and arabic designation. The usual combination was something like H-1, A-2, or H-3. Different units were given similar combinations.

letters in favor of the revolutionary movement. These letters were then mailed to soldiers in the Batista army. We urged that they not fight against the rebels.⁵⁸

For the most part it is unclear just how a system of coordination was established between the numerous cells. Two major methods have been uncovered, but these are not the ones that supervised everyday activities. First, Castro operated a radio station in the mountains called the Voice of the Sierra Maestra.⁵⁹ Usually this station was concerned with publicizing the ideals of the revolution, and passing along news of combat encounters.⁶⁰ But interspersed in these efforts there were often pleas to the people to cooperate with the "26th of July" cells, and also an exhortation to the members to work hard at whatever tasks had been assigned to them. Another contribution of the station was to keep the populace talking and thinking about revolution when the fighting front was quiet.⁶¹

The second method of unifying the operation of the cells came about by the dispersion of a newspaper known as

⁵⁸Personal interview, number withheld by author.

⁵⁹Personal interview, number 1.

⁶⁰Report on Cuba, September, 1958, p. 1. This issue relates that on August 20, 1958, Fidel reported that his army had won "the greatest victory in the history of the American continent." Such exaggerations are typical.

⁶¹Personal interview, number 8.

Organizacion Autentica.⁶² The editor, M. Kelyn, made the scandal sheet serve a dual purpose. The top side of the paper concerned items of only ordinary interest, however, the November, 1957 issue of the Report on Cuba related:

The reverse side of the sheet contains illustrated instructions for the manufacture of crude, homemade bombs, as well as the instructions for the destruction of homes and other property by fire. One method suggested is to attach white phosphorus or flaming cotton balls to the tail of a rat, cat, or other small animal. As the animal runs amok in agony and panic, the incendiary will ignite the cane, tobacco, or other crops.⁶³

Other similar methods of destruction were available to the fighting members of the "26th of July." The Chief of Military Training authored a handbook on sabotage that was later used as a textbook in the Cuban Terror Schools.⁶⁴ The Chief of Personnel prepared a handbook also, but this was aimed at training guerrilla fighters. In one portion of the book, he details instructions on how to make a "M-16" when a "Molotov cocktail" would not do the job. He explained:

This is what we called a special contraption we rigged up from a shotgun; it was made up of a cartridge with a long wooden rod substituted for a projectile; and the cocktail fastened on to the forward end of the rod.

⁶²Report on Cuba, November, 1957, p. 1.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Juan De Dios Marin, "Inside a Castro 'Terror School'," The Reader's Digest, LXXXV, No. 512 (December, 1964), p. 120.

Using a simple bipod of two sticks, we attained surprising accuracy and effectiveness up to 100 meters.⁶⁵

Together the Rebel Army and the 26th of July Movement were able to give Fidel Castro more control of the island than is popularly imagined. The Rebels struck with surprise and terror, not always taking time to distinguish between Bastianas and innocent civilians. Consequently, perhaps one-third of the population of Cuba, especially those who lived near the fighting fronts, had to be in constant fear that either their lives would be snuffed out or that their property would be damaged. Most of the government officials were aware that Fidel had the national army in his hip pocket. Therefore they were hesitant to support many of Batista's policies, particularly those that might directly offend Major Castro. In addition, the "26th of July" was able to reach nearly every ear in Cuba with some type of propaganda. The newspapers, radio broadcasts, and word-of-mouth rumors eventually took their toll. Unless the President could find support from the populace in a hurry, he would have to exile himself for the second time in ten years.

In November and December of 1958, the government attempted to rally the people against the rebels. It was too late. The people resisted Batista and his subordinates.

⁶⁵Che Guevara, Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare, p. 41. From descriptions given of the handbook, the writer has assumed that this particular book, written after the revolution ceased, was patterned after the original.

Now Castro would have his chance. After fifteen years of agitation for respect and national prestige, he had won his fight. The political revolution was over, but the cultural revolution was still struggling for birth.

CHAPTER III

THE CHURCH AND THE FATHERLAND

Prior to the culmination of the revolutionary effort, the Roman Catholic church was predominant in Cuba, as well as the rest of the Caribbean archipelago. The Protestant churches were also represented, but their position was subordinate, much resembling the station of the Masonic Lodge and other semi-religious organizations. There is indication that they represented something of a status symbol, but this would be difficult to prove. Nevertheless, the combined churches of Cuba were quite important. They not only added to the moral fiber of the people, but they were also responsible for a large percentage of primary, secondary, and adult education.¹ Technically these educational facilities were classified as private, not parochial schools. Thus, the state was able to exercise slightly more control over them than if they were strictly religious schools.

¹Severin K. Turosienski, Education in Cuba (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 83. Private schools in Cuba could legally exist under article 55 of the Constitution of 1940. This article read in part, "Centers of private instruction shall be subject to regulation and inspection by the State, but in every case shall retain the right to give . . . the religious instruction which they desire."

I. PARTICIPATION IN THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

Fidel Castro was cognizant that the collective churches could play a powerful role in bringing the desired revolution to a successful conclusion, and could assist in sustaining the principles of the revolution once it was an accomplished fact. As early as 1953, he accepted help from the Church, and worked closely with it thereafter until he believed that it might curtail his hold over the Cuban people. Upon being convinced it was working against him, he tried to destroy it by any means at his disposal.

The first service rendered by the Roman Catholic church was not intentional, but perhaps it caused some of the Cuban church members to express sympathy to, and identification with, the revolutionary cause. In the months subsequent to the assault on the arsenal at Moncada, President Batista placed the few rebels who survived the ordeal on trial for their lives. After all of them were convicted, the trials became controversial and were having repercussions all over the island, when the Bishop of Santiago de Cuba, Enrique Perez Serantes, made a public appeal to Batista to end the shedding of blood. The appeal, in form of a pastoral letter, pleaded for sparing the life of the leader of the insurgents. Because of this public intervention, and due to other minor political factors, Castro received a light sentence at his trial. The next year the remainder of the unserved jail term

was commuted. To the Cuban people, already restless under the heavy thumb of the self-imposed dictator, the pastoral letter was not without significance. The Church was sympathetic to the revolutionary movement.²

There is no indication that the "26th of July" leaders solicited the support of priests in Mexico, but they did accept their assistance after the Gramma expedition. Altogether, eleven chaplains were permitted to join the forces at the Sierra Maestra, in order to render a variety of services to the fighting men.³ The leader of the chaplains was Father Sandrinas. In July, 1957, he obtained special permission from his superiors to join the outlaw band. This was shortly after he had witnessed the persecution of a fellow priest by Batista henchmen.⁴ To identify himself with the rebels, he wore civilian clothes and accompanied them on as many of their missions of terror as possible.⁵

²Edward Glick, "Castro and the Church," The Commonweal, October 13, 1961, p. 67.

³La Persecucion De La Iglesia Catolica En Cuba (Quito, Ecuador: Directario Revolucionario Estudiantil De Cuba, 1963), p. 3.

⁴Richard Gilman, "A Man in Havana," The Commonweal, February 19, 1960, pp. 567-568.

⁵Whereas many of the priests denounced Castro after the true nature of the revolution was known, Father Sandrinas continued his support. As late as 1960, he condoned the seizure of Diario de la Marina, a religious newspaper. Later when the same thing happened to La Prensa Libre, he is quoted as saying, "It was inconceivable that La Prensa Libre should oppose the very nation that made it great." For further information see Time, May 30, 1960, p. 24.

Most of the chaplains of the Sierra Maestra were Franciscans.⁶ Largely Basque refugees from Franco's Spain, they were accustomed to political turmoil. They also knew that political dictators often attempted to extend their authority over the Church, therefore, to work for constitutional government was a just cause. It also might be conjectured that they were sympathetic to the rebels because large numbers of the combatants were of Spanish Loyalist origins.

Many of the village priests also assisted the revolutionary movement. The most common method was to request that parishioners donate money, foodstuffs, and clothing to the patriots of the Sierra Maestra. In addition, priests often served as recruiting officers, or those who did not feel that they could go quite this far would at least not prevent members from serving in or assisting the Rebel army. One pamphleteer concluded that the church had given the revolution "all the men it needed."⁷

The Churches of Cuba judged the Batista administration cruel and immoral. This meant also that they moved closer to revolutionary principles, and then finally made physical and spiritual contributions to the Castro cause. But there were strings attached. After the new government

⁶Time, November 28, 1960, p. 30.

⁷La Persecucion De La Iglesia Catolica En Ouba, p. 3.

took over, the religious personnel expected to become advisers in building the new society. When they attempted to make their views known, they became a threat to Castro and his Provisional Government.

II. THE INITIAL IMPACT OF THE REVOLUTION ON THE CHURCHES

By February, 1959, Major Castro had established himself in Havana. There his immediate objective was to consolidate his power, reward the righteous, and punish the unbelievers. Although it is often forgotten, Castro, on July 20, 1958, had signed the ill-fated Pact of Caracas.⁸ He had agreed to share the administration of the new government with the Revolutionary Civic Front. However, because he was the military commander of the coalition, he had captured the esteem of the people. Having obtained this affection, he was reluctant to surrender it to others. Therefore, he began to exclude those people and organizations who might checkmate his authority. The collective churches of Cuba fell into this category.

The first move against the churches was subtle, not openly hostile. It was an attempt to "divide and conquer" and to "neutralize, not dissolve." First, Raul Castro, presumably acting for his brother, ordered all newly-appointed

⁸de Varona, The Drama of Cuba, pp. 14-15.

department heads to be of the Protestant faith.⁹ The initial reaction to this order was mixed. Some Protestant leaders were convinced that Cuba was only nominally Roman Catholic, and they accepted jobs feeling that this would be a good springboard for mass conversions.¹⁰ Others of the Protestant persuasion were disgusted with the indifference to the poor or former governmental regimes, and "sick of finding bullet-ridden bodies in the streets."¹¹ These men looked upon the new job offers as an opportunity to help the lower classes of the Cuban people. Not all of the favors offered were accepted. A former school teacher in Cuba commented, "The Presbyterians, who predominate in government circles, i.e., as far as Protestants are concerned, . . . turned down an offer of free land for a campsite from the government, insisting on paying for it in cash."¹² The showing of preference to Protestant leaders, especially after they had not significantly contributed to the revolutionary cause, was an open insult to the majority church. Such acts dampened Roman Catholic enthusiasm, and began to drive a wedge between the dominant church and the new government.

⁹Hiram Hilty, "Report of a Visit to Cuba," Understanding Cuba (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1960), p. 5.

¹⁰Kyle Haselden, "Cuba: A Study of Contrasts," Christian Century, LXXVII (November 29, 1960), pp. 1307-1308.

¹¹Kyle Haselden, "Cuba's Revolution: Yes and No," Christian Century, LXXVII (December 7, 1960), pp. 1438-1439.

¹²Hilty, "Report of a Visit to Cuba," p. 5.

The next attack on the Catholic church was even more penetrating. Using the "26th of July" organization as a convenient grapevine, Fidel suggested that they talk to the village priests and inquire if they desired that religion be taught in public schools. Naturally these priests discussed this subject with their parishioners. As the controversial subject permeated Cuba, Castro then pulled an unexpected maneuver. He directed the "26th of July" newspaper, the Revolution, to publish an editorial entitled "Why Catholic Education?"¹³ Coming out in February, 1959, the article charged that the Catholic church wanted to take over the public school system. Obviously, then, the Church was guilty of wanting to violate the Constitution of 1940. By such activities, Castro hoped that the people would urge the government to "control" the churches.

Other minor incidents occurred in February of 1959. First, the word "God" was deleted from the preamble of the Constitution, and any references to the Deity were excluded from civil oaths.¹⁴ In April, the intimidations became a little more personal. At Managua Military Camp, 120 Catholic teachers were denied the right to give religious instructions to the soldiers of the establishment.¹⁵ Simultaneously,

¹³La Persecucion De La Iglesia Catolica En Cuba, p. 4.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 7.

orders were given that priests and teachers no longer would be permitted to hold religious services for the prisoners at La Cabana.¹⁶ There is some evidence also that the latter order applied to all prisons. For example, according to the knowledge of one of the persons interviewed, a Magistrate in Oriente province was not permitted to enter Preson De Boniato and render his usual services.¹⁷

Another interesting anti-religious technique was employed to counteract the credibility of the churches. Signs and posters were placed on church walls, and along the highways where visibility was good. In a way these resembled the American Burma Shave commercial posters. Two of the most popular slogans were: "He Who Betrays the Poor Betrays Christ"; "Leave the Temples and Go Out and Serve."¹⁸ A more flagrant piece of propaganda depicted a Nativity Scene with Revolutionary leaders replacing the customary saints. In one particular scene that was noted by several people, Major Castro, Major Guevara, and Major Juan Almeida, represented the wisemen reverently gazing into the cradle of the Christ child. In the top of this outdoor display,

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Personal interview, number 15. Certain judges prior to the revolution were required to periodically inspect prisons and to listen to the complaints of inmates.

¹⁸Hilty, "Report of a Visit to Cuba," pp. 1-5.

a small picture of Lenin was substituted for the Star of the East.¹⁹ This type of propaganda, admittedly crude, probably did not sway the educated classes of Cuba, but it must have appeared convincing to the illiterate masses. With only 800 priests in Cuba prior to the revolution, many of the campesinos had not been able to obtain the services of the priests when they were needed. Such imagery only intensified their already hostile feelings toward the church.²⁰

As late as November, 1959, Castro still had not advocated an open public break with the Church. The closest that he had come was to offer a substitute. At a hitherto undisclosed date, Fidel had met with a certain renegade priest, Father Lence, and together they planned to create a National Catholic Church.²¹ A slogan was devised to publicize the movement, and thus the words "For the Cross and Fatherland" became familiar to people all over Cuba.²²

¹⁹Edward Glick, "Castro and the Church," p. 68; personal interview, number 14. A photograph of this scene is presented in La Persecucion De La Iglesia Catolica En Cuba, p. 11. Related to techniques of this nature, the frontispiece for this pamphlet exhibits a picture of an altar in Belen. Above the altar, someone has replaced the face of an unidentified saint with a portrait of Fidel.

²⁰Newsweek, August 22, 1960, p. 50.

²¹Personal interview, number 4.

²²Time, May 30, 1960, p. 30; personal interviews, numbers 1 and 16.

The major purpose of the new movement was in line with Castro's previously stated policy. He did not advocate destruction, but just wanted to modify the old Church, so it would be more in harmony with the principles of the revolution.

The National Catholic church attempted to do two things. First, it urged the people to distinguish between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary priests.²³ Those who were working against the government should be boycotted and persecuted. At least, such was the justification given for kidnapping a priest in Barroca.²⁴ Secondly, the National Catholic church attempted to emphasize the good effects of the revolution. Among the accomplishments cited were the crack-down on the national lottery, the elimination of open prostitution, the confiscation of gambling equipment, and finally all of the good work that was being done for the poor. Moises Arrecheu, an over-enthusiastic Havana priest, came to the point where he could say that Castro's humanism was the "work of God himself."²⁵

²³Glick, "Castro and the Church," p. 67.

²⁴Personal interview, number 8. Many of the parish members protested the kidnapping, and consequently the militiamen returned and "stormed the church, desecrated the relics and statuary, and finally burned the church down to the ground."

²⁵Time, May 30, 1960, p. 30.

The over-all effect of the National Catholic church is difficult to assess. Naturally it aroused the wrath of the legitimate Roman Catholic leaders, but it was subtle enough, so that they could not thoroughly condemn it. There was just enough truth, so that it made sense to at least some of the populace. It is interesting to note, however, that one exile did have the occasion to talk personally with Father Lence. On the evening the refugee was to leave Cuba, he gave a party for a few of his friends. Someone in the group brought along the notorious priest. He commented on him in the following manner:

I prepared his drinks. He looked and talked like an alcoholic. He said that the Catholic church was wrong on many points, and the Communists are right on many points. He was a hell of a priest.²⁶

²⁶ Personal interview, number withheld by author. In several interviews it was pointed out that the National Catholic church often referred to Christ as a Communist. Such statements cropped up prior to the time that Castro openly admitted the marriage.

The goals of the National Catholic church were most effectively presented, at least in written form, in the teacher's handbook called Alfabetizamos. However, they are not ascribed by name to that organization. To illustrate, the following sample is submitted:

Our Revolution is democratic and therefore respects all religious sentiments. If religion includes noble and just ideals, if it follows the precepts of Christ in equality, love and work for all, the Revolution, which embodies all these ideals, is therefore the culmination of the doctrine. Revolutionary law has been equally favorable to catholics, protestants, and atheists; that is to say there has been no discrimination in putting its benefits within the reach of all. The Revolution is convinced that the poor, irrespective of their religious ideals, are willing to defend principles and laws. However, the Revolution can't allow evil-minded groups,

During the month of November, 1959, the Catholic church was dealt another indirect blow. Toward the middle of the month many priests were planning to attend the Congress for the Unity of the Working Class in Havana. When they arrived, however, they discovered that government officials would not accept their credentials. In place of the priests, known Communists were appointed as representatives. To retaliate, the Church leaders decided to found their own organization. To properly associate it with the above-cited government group, they called it the Catholic Congress for the Unity of the Working Class. And to show the government that the Church was not easily intimidated, they decided to hold their meeting later in the same month and in the same city.²⁷

On November 28th the meeting was held as scheduled. It has been alleged that the people's attendance was of such proportions that it was the largest group meeting that had ever occurred in Cuba.²⁸ After the crowds disbanded, the

shielding themselves behind false religious sentiments, to carry-out counter-revolutionary acts.

Quoted from Dudley Seers (ed.), Cuba: The Economic and Social Revolution (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1964), p. 59.

²⁷La Persecucion De La Iglesia Catolica En Cuba, p. 6.

²⁸Ibid. The author of this pamphlet estimates that over one million Cubans assembled for the meetings. Naturally this figure is too high, but it does indicate the Church had not lost its influence with the people.

leaders were quite pleased with the results. It was decided to continue the organization on a permanent basis, making it a quasi-secret establishment. A password was devised to identify members. If the signal "Cuba Si - Russia No" was acknowledged by "Social Justice Si - Communism No", the inquirer was assured that he was in loyal company.²⁹

Because the Castro government was sprinkling Communist indoctrinations upon the school youth of Cuba, the Catholic church decided to create its own youth organization to keep them from being contaminated.³⁰ The local churches often had different names for such units, but all of them belonged to a national organization called Catholic Youths for Action. This group lived up to its name, and did attempt to curb the power of the state by action. But before it could become very effective, the G-2 destroyed the registry office in Havana.³¹ With the membership disclosed, the national influence of the group lessened. Presumably, it was also infiltrated with informers.

The end of 1959 meant that conservative and methodical Catholic church leaders were aware that they had a real fight

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Personal interview, number 4.

³¹La Persecucion De La Iglesia Catolica En Cuba, p. 16. The completeness of the destruction is exhibited by a photograph.

on their hands. Their adversary was strong. The stakes were high. The future of a whole way of life was threatened. What should they do? Cooperate with the government and perhaps retain their superiority? Or should they prepare for all out war? The point of no return was quickly approaching.

III. "THE CAMPS OF BATTLE ARE NOW BEING LAID OUT
BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND ITS COMMUNIST ENEMIES"

One year after the state-church controversy began, Fidel Castro authorized the use of violence to curb the voice of the churches. Following a speech to a labor union in which he called the clergy "vultures", Castro, in a nationally televised speech, urged the expulsion of foreign-born Falangist priests. He added, "The cassock is soiled with dust and medieval cobwebs. It is covered with the blood of the people of Spain."³² Thus the cycle was now complete, the priests who had contributed the most to the revolutionary effort, were now being told that they were a threat to the nation. Archbishop Servantes, with the government rebuke still ringing in his ears, wrote a pastoral letter in retaliation. In it he stated, "The camps of battle are now being laid out between the Church and its Communist enemies."³³ The Church was willing to fight.

³²Glick, "Castro and the Church," p. 68.

³³Quoted from Newsweek, May 30, 1960, p. 56.

Still not quite to the point of asking for the complete abolition of all churches and all priests, Castro again asked the people to divide the church leaders into two groups: (1) the "low" clergy, the native born, who were loyal to the revolution, but exploited by the hierarchy; (2) the "high" clergy, the foreign born, who were ambitious for wealth and power.³⁴ Concentrating on the ones in the latter category, the government started deporting all foreign-born priests and nuns and closing all religious orders that were sponsored by outside sources. The American Dominican Order and the Sisters of the Bleeding Heart were the first to go. It was the Franciscan order, however, that felt most of the wrath. A priest of the San Antonio de Paula church testified that prior to the revolution there were 105 Franciscan priests. "Now only ten monks and 14 priests of our order remain in Cuba."³⁵

The Protestants received equal treatment. In Christo, Oriente, the International Baptist college was closed, and worship was restricted in the adjacent Baptist church. The Methodist and Seventh Day Adventists, in the same city, also were told to close their doors. In nearby Omaha, the temple of the Mormons was placed off-limits to its members. Since they also conducted a school, it was closed too, and the

³⁴La Persecucion De La Iglesia Catolica En Cuba, p. 7.

³⁵Cuba and the Rule of Law, p. 229.

teachers were told that their services were no longer needed.³⁶ Churches in every part of the island were the butt of similar oppressive measures.

In addition to outright closures, the government used the age-old technique of harrassment. At the early services of a Catholic church, a member of the Committee of Friends would attend to hear the priest's sermon and see if a pastoral letter would be read. If either were derogatory, he would report it to the militia or G-2. Then at the later masses these organizations would send men to cut the microphone wires and/or create general confusion.³⁷ Another group of men would take down the license numbers of the automobiles parked nearby, and place the names of the owners of them on lists of bad security risks. In one instance, in Havana, church members became incensed, and after the mass "they took the weapons of the militiamen, hit them against the wall of the church, killed two men, and overturned a state car."³⁸ The priest of this congregation was arrested twice, and intermittently interrogated both times. After the second visit to police headquarters, he sought asylum in the Venezuelan embassy. Markedly, this was not the only consequence. Before the riot had occurred, the G-2 had

³⁶Personal interview, number 11.

³⁷Personal interview, number 8.

³⁸Ibid.

succeeded in taking the license numbers of the parked cars. In a subsequent investigation, they discovered that many of the parishioners involved in the fight belonged to the Mid-America Yacht Club. As a result, the club was temporarily closed down. When it did reopen, it was no longer a private establishment.³⁹

Not all of the visits of the militiamen were to create confusion. A Franciscan priest, the same one who had previously testified on how many of his order remained in Cuba, related:

Once when we were celebrating mass about 20 armed militiamen and militia-women came in through the main door of the church. They closed all the doors and refused to allow anybody to leave. . . . The priests were locked up in the vestry. After that the congregation was allowed to leave the church one by one through a small door. Both the men and women were searched by militiamen and this went on for an hour or a hour and a half. After that they began to search the church, the vestry, the parish hall and even the ciborium, but found nothing anywhere.⁴⁰

Not content with disrupting the church services, the church structures themselves suffered millions of dollars in losses. An example was made of the Sagrado Tabernaculo of the Fathers of the Carmelite in Soledad. What was left of

³⁹Ibid. Upon reopening, the club was available to the general public, and its activities were supervised by Negroes. One member, who returned to the club after it was opened again, said that people from the streets were carving initials in tables, had their feet on expensive furnishings, and simply did not know how to treat the "finer things in life."

⁴⁰Cuba and the Rule of Law, p. 28.

the church revealed "the brutal fury of the acts of violence. . . ." ⁴¹ First, the door of the church was used for target practice by the militiamen. Secondly, the official records of the church were scattered all over the floor. Beside them lay a broken crucifix, and the torn garments of the priests. Thirdly, the hat of one of the fathers was elevated on a stick, and served as a joke for the military. The Carmelite churches in the city of Camaguey suffered an even worse desecration. In fact, after the destruction was completed, several of them were turned into dance-halls and warehouses for sugar. ⁴² Also in Camaguey, the convent of Las Mercedes was broken into, and the "habits torn and scattered all over the floor, the same with the books and images." ⁴³

In Camaguey, violence extended even to the living quarters of the priests. The persecution was of a twofold nature: First, the priests were personally intimidated, with an accompanying destruction of their property; secondly, they were forced to flee the community, and often the country. One priest, living near the Senado sugarmill, was

⁴¹La Verdad de la Persecucion de Fidel Castro, p. 1. In connection with the acts of violence described above, several interesting photographs on pages 1-6 illustrate the extent of the damages.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 5-6.

⁴³Ibid., p. 6.

visited in the early hours of the morning by a restless and unruly mob. They started to "shout all kinds of insults and abuses, slandering a couple of ladies living on the plantation and making vicious remarks about my mother."⁴⁴ After a harrowing experience, the priest escaped through a window, but stayed long enough to see his house burned.⁴⁵ A monk of an unidentified order, was actually seized in the early hours by a mob armed with rifles and machine guns. He was held prisoner, and forced to stand with his hands over his head for more than three hours. After a search of his premises, he was forcibly placed on the steamer Cavadanga, which took him out of the country.⁴⁶

As mob violence grew in the provinces, it was encouraged in every manner possible by the government. Castro personally made more speeches on radio and television, and often touched upon the topic of churches.⁴⁷ The Minister of the Interior, who was the official in charge of religious activities, did on one occasion interfere with the attempt of church leaders when they tried to conduct a traditional festival. In September, the Virgin of Charity (the Cuban

⁴⁴Cuba and the Rule of Law, p. 227.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Personal interview, number 5.

patroness saint) annual procession, normally held in the afternoon, was ordered to start at nine o'clock in the morning. Because of the early hour assigned, Bishop Masvidal of Our Lady of Charity Church, decided to cancel the parade. But by dusk, a crowd of 4,000 people had gathered outside his church. In defiance of militiamen, who were watching the building, a small boy picked up a picture of the Virgin, and began to run toward the Governmental Palace. He was shot and killed by the soldiers.⁴⁸

In the months preceding the Bay of Pigs invasion, the authorities made several last desperate efforts to subvert the influence of the churches. In Matanzas province, a Canadian-sponsored seminary was permitted to remain open after some trouble had developed. This was a clever and deceptive trick. The local officials had discovered that the seminary was expecting some money from Canada to do more building, so they waited until the funds arrived in Cuba before they closed it.⁴⁹ Taxes were also used as a lever against hostile churches. The amount paid by one congregation was boosted from 800.00 dollars to 32,000.00 dollars.⁵⁰ Needless to say, this was an effective control. Finally

⁴⁸Time, September 22, 1960, p. 46.

⁴⁹Personal interview, number 7.

⁵⁰La Persecucion De La Iglesia Catolica En Cuba, p. 15.

the government upped the amount of propaganda placed in teacher manuals. Traje y Lucha, a syllabus for secondary teachers, accused the priests of supporting the old regime, because, it asserted that this would permit them to feather their nests with a softer lining.⁵¹

The government's position concerning religion was aptly stated by an underground freedom fighter, who wrote an anonymous letter to a group of American students visiting Cuba. He declared:

The Communists have left a few churches open and have allowed a few hundred Catholic priests and Protestant clergymen to exercise a few limited functions. These are pure Communist tactics. Many more countries remain to be conquered in Latin America, and religion there is very important.⁵²

⁵¹Seers, Cuba: The Social and Economic Revolution, p. 113-114.

⁵²Anonymous, A Letter from Cuba's Student Freedom Fighter to Fidel Castro's American Student Guests (Coral Gables: Service Offset Press, 1963), p. 10. This document has an interesting history in itself. When an American delegation of students headed by Levi Laub visited Cuba in 1963, this letter was given to the students in an unique manner. The anonymous freedom fighter, after calling Mr. Laub three times by telephone, being careful to make each call less than 100 seconds (because of the monitor system), entered the Hotel Havana Riviera at 1:45 AM, and placed the eighteen-page letter in a fixture in the men's room. Laub received the letter, but his reaction has not been made public. Florida exiles received a copy of the letter on August 4, 1963, and decided to publish it shortly thereafter.

The number of churches in Cuba that are still operative is perhaps impossible to determine, but figures are available on the number of personnel left in Cuba in 1963. The following

IV. RELIGIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF THE BAY OF PIGS

Castro was not caught napping at the invasion of the Bay of Pigs. The G-2, and the Committee of Friends, had been alerted well in advance. Before the attack force landed, they had made rather extensive preparations to roundup and quarantine anyone whose loyalty was suspected. It was also decided, since many of the Cuban prisons were operating at near capacity, to detain the false patriots in confiscated houses, and in unoccupied government buildings.⁵³

On the morning of April 17, 1961, the search began in earnest. Priests, along with hundreds of other groups, were placed in the improvised jails without any charges being preferred. The average duration of these enforced visits was somewhere between ten and fifteen days, with violent cases being transferred to regular prisons. While the churches were vacant, more looting took place -- even the poor boxes were cleaned out while the priests were gone.⁵⁴

estimates are taken from La Persecucion De La Iglesia Catolica En Cuba, p. 28.

<u>Province</u>	<u>Bishops</u>	<u>Priests</u>
Finar del Rio	1	7
La Habana	1	56
Matanzas	1	17
Las Villas	1	14
Camaguey	1	11
Oriente	1	18

⁵³ Personal interviews, numbers 7, 9, and 14.

⁵⁴ Personal interviews, numbers 7 and 14.

The militiamen used the Bay of Pigs invasion as an excuse to further discredit religious people and priests in the eyes of the civilians. In fact, their treatment in April was worse than it had ever been. For instance, in Soledad the military drank the sacred wine, danced on the altars, and ran through the streets in frocks singing "Cha - cha - cha."⁵⁵ In Camaguey, a congregation in worship was ridiculed, denuded, and searched by militia-women for weapons.⁵⁶ In nearby Pinar del Rio, the Vicar-General of that province and three of his associates were seated at a table with lewd pictures in front of them. As curiosity seekers passed by, they were informed that a search of the priest's quarters had produced the photographs.⁵⁷ At La Salle college, militiamen dressed in the clothes of the La Salle Brothers, jokingly imitated the words and gestures of an old Mexican priest. This man had been standing ready to administer the Last Sacrament to prisoners who were being held on the roof top of a building of the college.⁵⁸ Even after the battle had been won by the Cuban forces, the ridicule continued. Father Macho, who had made himself available to treat the wounds of the unsuccessful

⁵⁵La Persecucion De La Iglesia Catolica En Cuba, p. 20.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Cuba and the Rule of Law, p. 198.

invaders, was taken into custody also. "His guards told him to ask his savior for help and said they would test his priestly vows of celibacy by putting a naked fifteen-year-old in his cell."⁵⁹

From April through September of 1961, the Cuban government closed as many churches as time, men, money, and public opinion would permit. The clergymen were so reduced in number that they had to practically create circuits, much like the Asbury Methodists of an earlier American era. With long distances to cover, and masses to be said in several churches each Sunday, the priests were forced to withdraw from political activity. They became known as "men of silence."⁶⁰ Not the silence of cowardice, but the silence of patience and long-suffering. Not the silence of timidity, but the silence of the industrious fighting the battle of time. Not the silence of the hesitant, but perhaps the silence of remorsefulness -- wondering, in reflection, if complacency, not Castro, was the cause of the Cuban topsy-turvy world.

⁵⁹Johnson, The Bay of Pigs, p. 296-297.

⁶⁰Statement by Richard Cardinal Cushing. Recorded in Gilman, "A Man in Havana," p. 568.

CHAPTER IV

THE PERVERSION OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

In the eyes of professional educators and intellectuals no school is ever classified as perfect, but perhaps it is fair to say that compared to other Latin American schools those in Cuba ranked near the top. Some serious deficiencies existed in the early decades of this century, but the Constitution of 1940 did make an education finally available to almost everyone.¹ By advancing steadily, Cuba had in 1950, according to a United Nations survey, an illiteracy rate of 22.1 per cent, which placed it just below Argentina (13.6), Uruguay (15.1), and Chili (19.9).² These figures do leave

¹Under the provisions of the Constitution of 1940, a student entering a state college would pay a flat yearly fee of thirty dollars, in addition to a ten dollar laboratory fee, and a five dollar charge for matriculation. For further information, see Turosienski, Education in Cuba, p. 47.

²Quoted from Jose Rodriguez Espada (ed.), Can This Happen to the Americas? (Miami: Moviento Unidad Revolucionaria, 1963), p. 22.

To serve the population of Cuba, which fluctuated around the eight million mark, the government provided the following school services: three state universities located at Havana, Santa Clara, and Santiago de Cuba; 21 secondary high schools; 6 normal schools; 9 commercial colleges; 11 domestic science schools; 108 pre-high schools; and 40 educational missions; 1 fine arts school; 4 plastic art schools; and 3 technical industrial schools. In the cities 1,824 city primary schools and 1,597 kindergarten schools were established; in the rural areas, 4,114 primary schools were available. These figures were compiled from Main Facts on Cuba (Havana: Cuban Tourist Commission, 1956), p. 3, citing Cuba Economica y Financiera, passim.

room for improvement, but remembering that the island has only been completely liberated since 1934 the record was a creditable one.³

To Fidel Castro, the school system of Cuba was recognized as the bedrock of national identity, and could be most useful in propagating the ideals of the revolution. Thus it was entirely logical when he urged the Provisional Government to declare the first year of the revolutionary reign as the "Year of Literacy."⁴ At least, part of this philosophy was founded on sincere desires, because, after all, Fidel had a long record of enrollment in schools and colleges. The initial plan that was conceived included not only the education of children, but it also contained provisions for stamping out adult illiteracy, particularly those who lived in the isolated mountain regions.

The amount of money earmarked for educational purposes in the first year of the revolution is rather vague, but it can be stated with certainty that the overall budget for 1964 hovered around two and a half billion dollars, with "Cuba's free educational system accounting for two hundred fifty

³Roger Umphers, "The Relations Between the United States and Cuba Under the Platt Amendment" (unpublished Master's thesis, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, 1933), pp. 1-65.

⁴Personal interview, number 12.

thousand dollars. . . ."5 Considering that the Alfabetizadores and Bridadistas did not accept pay, and remembering that when new buildings were needed they simply could be confiscated, the quarter of a million dollars represented a substantial sum.⁶

In 1959 no one in Cuba knew what would be the consequences of the revolution. Some people claimed that as known Communists were appointed to government posts, there were developing plans to spirit young children from their parents and send them to Marxist-Leninist schools in foreign countries. Through a process of cultural and political reconstruction they would be taught to "deny God, hate their home and abhor their parents."⁷ On the other hand, certain

⁵Philip Geyelin, "Cuba's Economy," The Wall Street Journal, Vol. XLIV, No. 222 (August 21, 1964), p. 9.

⁶In 1964 the government claimed that it had tripled the educational budget in each of the last three years. It also claimed that it had sent out over 1 million adults and student teachers to stamp out illiteracy. For additional details see Seers, The Social and Economic Revolution in Cuba, p. 161.

It is not meant to imply that the Castro government did not build any new schools. However, some of these activities were designed for showplaces. For a good survey of what improvements were made see documentary photographs by Henri Cartier-Bresson, "This is Castro's Cuba Seen Face to Face," Life, LIV, No. 11 (March 15, 1963), pp. 28-48; and written summary by Robert Freeman Smith, The United States and Cuba, Business and Diplomacy (New York: Bookman Associates, 1960), pp. 176 ff.

⁷Espada (ed.), Can This Happen to the Americas?, p. 18. An exile related that a friend showed him an official government publication stating that all children over eight years old would be taken from their parents. No indication was

scholars believed that the populace viewed the revolution with complete optimism. The Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico, Dr. Jaime Benitez, conjectured:

The Cuban Revolution was a veritable Sermon on the Mount. . . . Who can be against a creed that reads: Distribute the land, give to the poor, educate the unlettered, care for the sick, share the wealth, make public what is private, make the strangers your own, raise the humble, and level the proud.⁸

The truth probably was in between the two points of view. The professional segment of society realized that they could not gain much, but the underprivileged certainly had cause for hope.

I. "F" IS FOR FIDEL

Immediately after the Provisional Government took office, the persons in charge of education were summarily discharged and new faces were appointed to direct the educational system. The individual appointed as Director of Primary Education was Dulce Maria Escalane-Almeida, a well-known Communist. Her position was subordinate to the Minister of Culture, Vincentina Antuna. Since neither of these new

given what would then happen to them. Apparently the government came to believe that this plan would alienate the people toward the revolution, and cancelled the idea before it was put into practice. Personal interview, number 8.

⁸ Jaime Benitez, The United States, Cuba, and Latin America: An Occasional Paper on the Free Society (New York: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1961), p. 5.

leaders possessed special training in the field of education, the Government created an ad hoc committee to assist them in formulating policies. Of more interest, however, is the fact that this committee was also in charge of surveying the textbooks used in the primary schools. Those books which were found unacceptable to the aims of the revolution were destroyed, and new ones written to replace them. The head of this group, and the man who did most of the editing and rewriting, was Dr. Antonio Nunez-Jimenez, the same individual who later assumed partial leadership of the Agrarian Reform. Working as a tightly-knit group, these people were able to formulate plans that drastically altered the system of primary education on the island.⁹

A former schoolteacher in Cuba, presently serving on the faculty of Guilford College in North Carolina, made a return trip to Cuba in 1960. After a six-week visit he concluded, "The school . . . is undergoing basic changes. . . . The old 8 - 5 (or 6 plus exam plus 5) system is being replaced with the 6 - 3 - 3. . . ." ¹⁰ Thus, the authorities were patterning organizational structure after the American system, in spite of anti-American propaganda.

⁹Cuba, Department of State Publication 7171, Inter-American Series 66 (Washington: Bureau of Public Affairs, 1961), p. 15.

¹⁰Hilty, Understanding Cuba, p. 9.

One of the first tasks of the Director of Primary Education was to eliminate those teachers of questionable loyalty to the revolution. Associated with this problem was the replacement of those who were disqualified. Secondly, provisions had to be made to give training to illiterate adults. Whereas it might be supposed these people would be placed in a special category, the officials decided not to do so. In fact, the older illiterates were among the most important to be given training because they represented the initial strength of the state. Lastly, an inspection system had to be devised for constantly checking the instruction that was being given, and further to ascertain whether revolutionary principles were being incorporated into the curriculum.

As the nature and intent of the revolution became clearer, the schoolteachers "went into exile in enormous numbers. They were the first professional group to leave Cuba."¹¹ The task of screening was made much easier than anticipated. In areas where teachers did not leave of their own accord, they were fired. In Oriente province, it was estimated that 700 out of 1,000 primary teachers were replaced, and only 150 out of 2,000 secondary teachers were retained.¹² The new teachers came from two categories: some

¹¹A Letter From Cuba's Student Freedom Fighter to Fidel Castro's Student Guests, p. 16.

¹²Personal interview, number 11.

vacancies were filled with persons to whom the revolution owed political debts; others by "students [who] were brought into Havana from the farms and hills, living in commandeered mansions, wearing shoes for the first time, giving training and indoctrination, and sent out to become teachers in remote areas."¹³ Training schools were established in the Sierra Maestra and Escambrey mountains at later dates, thus saving transportation and certain living expenses.¹⁴ Although males and females were trained, the government preferred the former, as they were easier to handle.¹⁵

The retraining of adult teachers came about in a different manner. An elementary teacher in a state school had the occasion to attend a retraining institute in the summer of 1960. The classes were presided over by Dr. Florencio Carbo, with the meetings taking place in the auditorium of the Camaguey High School. Dr. Carbo was assisted by a social studies teacher from the regular high school staff. The retraining exercises were conducted from 8:00 to 12:00 in the morning, with the session divided into two equal periods. During the first block, the teachers received special instruction on the teaching of science and

¹³News item in the Kansas City Star, August 5, 1964, p. 28.

¹⁴Personal interview, number 11.

¹⁵Ibid.

mathematics. New materials and new methods were introduced. After a short break, during which many of the teachers left, another two-hour period was inaugurated. In the latter session a stress was placed upon (1) the principles of socialism, (2) the necessity of acquiring a good bibliography of socialism, and (3) anti-American propaganda. At least one book was given to the teachers without charge. It was entitled Principles of Socialism in Cuba; also an extensive syllabus, prepared by Elias Roca, was distributed.¹⁶

As the teacher shortage grew more acute, the government decided to drop the need for teacher certification. Many of the faithful teachers, those who had tried to stay on and do a good job in spite of trying circumstances, became discouraged and quit. There were also other factors that contributed to their decision. For example, the classrooms often became a place for propaganda exercises to be conducted. On one occasion an over zealous militiaman stepped into a room, and requested everyone to rise and join him in singing the "Internationale."¹⁷ Those teachers who protested these

¹⁶These facts were largely obtained from the wife of one exile. Since she only contributed information in this one category, her name has not been included in the appendix.

It is interesting to note that in 1959, the word Communism was carefully used. Socialism seemed to be more respectable, providing the assumption that the Government was not ready, or rather did not feel that the people were ready, for the more extreme ideology.

¹⁷Personal interview, number 1.

type of activities were fired or given lengthy jail sentences.¹⁸ The walls of the classroom were also used for indoctrination. In Santa Clara, two pictures were hung in a kindergarten room. One picture depicted a stately Russian soldier, standing erect and emitting an aura of goodness and strength. Beside this portrait, hung a second picture exhibiting two drunken Americans. Both were obese and dressed in crumpled clothing. One of the Americans held a half-empty bottle of whiskey, while the other apparently had had his fill and was lying on the floor.¹⁹ To immature minds, the lesson was effectively presented.

The textbooks used in the primary schools have been evaluated in both a positive and negative fashion. Dr. Hiram Hilty talked to several young teachers, while he was visiting Cuba, and they reported that the texts were essentially adequate, and did not contain excessive anti-American propaganda.²⁰ On the other hand, an exile, whose sister-in-law was a primary teacher, described them as containing too much revolutionary history. For example, the most popular primary reader, written by Dr. Nunez-Jiminez,

¹⁸Ibid. In an instance that was cited a person was confined for a five-year jail term because he opposed such outside intervention.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Hilty, Understanding Cuba, p. 10.

was illustrated with pictures of Nikita Khrushchev, Fidel Castro, and Raul Castro. A student then would associate the pictures with the captions underneath -- such as "F" is for Fidel, "K" is for Khrushchev, and "R" is for Raul.²¹ Finally, a French newspaperman, Serge Lafauve, visited Cuba and was able to make a somewhat comprehensive study of primary books. The following two questions are representative of what he found:

1. In 1959, in the city of New York, about 6,112 youths were arrested for murder and 4,331 for other crimes. How many juvenile delinquents were arrested in New York in 1959?

2. The Ku Klux Klan was founded in the United States to maintain by terror the supremacy of the white race. For how many years has this infamous society existed in our neighbor's land?²²

The desired answers to such questions carry widespread implications. Small children are exposed to anti-American propaganda in a manner unnoticeable to them, and at a time when they are eager to learn. Further, this method of propaganda does not only affect children. An ambassador from one of the western nations has commented to the effect

²¹Personal interview, number 1. The title of this particular primer was Vinceremos, and over two million copies were printed by the government. The book was used in both primary and adult education, thus the pictures were effective propaganda for both age groups.

²²Seers, The Social and Economic Revolution in Cuba, pp. 358-359.

that every Cuban school child has two parents and one grandparent.²³ Thus, if school lessons were discussed in the home, then they too received anti-American propaganda. In fact, some of the older generation learn the lessons better than the children. An old, gnarled, illiterate mountaineer adequately expressed his gratitude to the revolutionary leaders by commenting, "Fidel Castro and Karl Marx are good men. I will kill anyone who tries to harm Fidel Castro and Karl Marx."²⁴ This man could have used some classroom hours himself, but his statement reflects the success of the educational propaganda.

The most heartwarming sight in Cuba in 1959 was the attack on adult illiteracy. The director of the literacy campaign, Dr. Paul Fernandez Caballas, accomplished small miracles in recruiting and outfitting teachers to travel to remote areas and give the light of knowledge. In spite of success, however, the government did try to attempt to conceal exact statistics.²⁵ Thousands of Alfabetizadores and

²³Philip Geyelin, "Fidel's Cuba: Castro Hangs onto his Big Following Despite Rising Economic Woes," The Wall Street Journal, Vol. XLIV, No. 217 (August 14, 1965), p. 12.

²⁴News item in the Topoka Capitol-Journal, August 23, 1965, p. 1.

²⁵A Letter From Cuba's Student Freedom Fighter to Fidel Castro's Student Guests, p. 16. In this letter it was alleged that the government had permitted 200,000 workers to copy their names on work cards, thus claiming these individuals were fully literate.

Brigadistas, armed with copies of their manual Alfabetizamos, "two uniforms, including shirts, trousers, three pair of boots, a beret, a haversack, and a hammock" dramatically trudged the mountains and valley's searching for the faithful.²⁶ Along with their personal equipment, 145,000 paraffin lamps, and 104,000 pairs of spectacles were issued to peasants needing them.²⁷ The "Year of Literacy" did indoctrinate, but it also brought light to the dark, and sight to the handicapped. These acts of humanity, often accompanying genuine compassion, instilled a trust and devotion to the new government. To the recipients of these gifts, Fidel Castro had accomplished what religion and republicanism had long neglected.

Adult education was also offered to those who had already acquired a primary education. Gloria Mason, a Havana resident who had abandoned a secretarial course in 1958 to assist the rebels in the Sierra Maestra, now works in a confiscated Proctor and Gamble factory; but, for two hours a day, she is permitted to attend classes at the University of Havana.²⁸ Paul Valdez, a thirty-five-year-old executive, had

²⁶Seers, The Social and Economic Revolution in Cuba, p. 198.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Philip Geyelin, "Cuba's Economy," The Wall Street Journal, Vol. XLIV, No. 222 (August 21, 1964), p. 9.

studied in night school for twenty years and still had not finished his secondary education. Now, having completed it, he was rewarded by being appointed the head of the largest cigar company in Cuba.²⁹ The success of such people inspire others to continue their education. Perhaps it is true that many of the semi-illiterates will be replaced by the "New Cubans", but for now they fill the gap between promise and decay.

II. THE NEGADOS

The most important educational program that was undertaken in Cuba after the revolution centered upon the indoctrination and the academic training of children in the secondary school age group. They offered the greatest challenge to the creation of a Communist state. Unlike the smaller children, and unlike unlettered adults, these children had the rudiment of an intellect, but they also possessed a knowledge of republicanism. Therefore, a program had to be devised that would gain their loyalty and in addition would cause them to be impervious of parent's pleas: Pleas that might caution them to be suspicious of the new regime.

From the standpoint of getting the job done, Pedro Abril was a good choice to hold the title of Director of

²⁹Ibid.

Secondary Education. After carefully analyzing the problems of secondary education, he decided not to proceed in the manner that had been taken in the primary area. Instead, he believed it would be more beneficial to select a core of 100,000 students and concentrate on them.³⁰ These young men and women "would owe everything to the revolution . . .

[and] nothing to the past."³¹ Because of the importance of the project, great care was used to select the right candidates. As it turned out, students not only came from Cuba, but from all over Latin America.³² A scholarship was awarded by the Department of Culture that generously gave "free room, board, and education."³³ In order to keep the New Cubans from too close an association with their parents, officials brought them to Havana for their schooling. There they occupied luxurious hotel rooms and the vacated lavish homes in the lush Miramar and Vedado districts.³⁴ The girls were provided

³⁰Personal interview, Dr. Robert Cohen, December 1, 1964.

³¹The New York Times Magazine, June 21, 1964, p. 5.

³²Jose Rodriguez Espada (ed.), To Keep Democracy and Preserve Society (Miami: Movimiento Unidad Revolucionaria, 1963), p. 1; Espada, Can This Happen to the Americas?, p. 16.

³³The Topeka Sunday Capitol-Journal, July 5, 1964, p. 3.

³⁴The New York Times Magazine, June 21, 1964, p. 5.

attractive uniforms, with blue, green, and gray blouses.³⁵ The rations allocated for the students were of the highest quality, and, as an extra benefit, they were permitted to attend the theaters, movies, and concerts at token rates.³⁶ These were the Becados.

The parents of the Becados looked with pride at what was happening to their children. Morris Rosenberg, an American journalist, interviewed many Cubans throughout the provinces. In their responses to his questions, they were quite adamant about the affects of the revolution. A Santiago hotel sentry exclaimed, "Fidel gave me a good job at the hotel and gave me a good apartment. We have free medical care. My daughter is getting a free education."³⁷ A Negro cab driver was even more enthusiastic. He replied, "I live a hundred thousand times better since the revolution. . . . My son is getting a technical education that doesn't cost a cent. That is worth more to me than food."³⁸

The reaction of students, who had either completed the program, or were close enough to it so they could also offer an evaluation, was just as favorable. Even those of the middle and upper classes passed through a metamorphosis.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷The Topeka Sunday Capitol-Journal, July 5, 1964, p. 3.

³⁸Ibid.

A sixteen year old girl from Camaguey commented, "Before the revolution I never realized there was a society around me where people died of poverty and disease."³⁹ Another young student replied in the same vein, "We do not support the Revolution, we are making it."⁴⁰ A former shipping clerk, now studying engineering, agreed by announcing, "We have turned from our private concerns to work for society. The technical revolution -- to war against nature -- can be a motive of personal enthusiasm."⁴¹

The specific Plan of Education for the Becados remains obscure. But fragmentary evidence leads to the supposition that excellent teachers were provided, and that a close governmental eye supervised the curriculum. Military personnel served as liaison officers, occupying important positions in the various student organizations.⁴² Physical education courses were dropped in favor of militia training.⁴³ A special emphasis was placed on loyalty -- it was to be given first to the state, then to the family.⁴⁴

³⁹The New York Times Magazine, June 21, 1964, p. 181.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²de Varona, The Drama of Cuba, p. 18.

⁴³Personal interviews, numbers 9 and 14.

⁴⁴As in the case of the clergy, schoolteachers were rounded up and quarantined during the Bay of Pigs invasion. The wife of one exile was taken to the house of Dr. Zayas-Bazan,

Finally, just as in the primary school program, the textbooks were carefully scrutinized. Textbooks for courses in government were all rewritten, and in some cases printed in Russia. Although they appeared to be truthful to some observers, it was noted that there were no references to the United States. When a foreign country was needed to illustrate a certain point, it was likely that Russia, Albania, or Poland was used. Marxist-Leninism became a required course. The new texts, generally, as well as the new courses, were subtle and effective.⁴⁵

III. TECHNICAL SCHOOLS

Prior to the revolution a large number of technical colleges existed throughout Cuba. Though small, they served an important function. As a rule, these schools operated only in the evenings and were served by a part-time administrative staff and faculty. By employing a limited curriculum,

former governor of Camaguey. During this time, the lady, also a teacher, was given a very personal search, her jewelry was taken, and any money or other valuables were confiscated to contribute to the revolutionary effort. This person noted that several of her students conducted many of these activities. Unknown to their teachers, and perhaps their families, these young men and women were secretly members of the Friends of the Revolution. It is also interesting to note that a Becados program was also instituted in Camaguey. The Catholic private school, Immaculate Conception, was closed, the teaching nuns released, and the buildings converted to public high school use. Personal interview, number withheld by author.

⁴⁵A Letter From Cuba's Student Freedom Fighter to Fidel Castro's Student Guests, p. 11.

many of the smaller communities could offer a technical education in such subjects as economics, business law, and clerical training. The faculty usually consisted of teachers employed on a full time basis elsewhere, or from members of the legal profession. For services rendered, the professors could earn from 100.00 to 295.00 dollars per month for instructing, and, in addition, for serving as principal, an extra 60.00 dollars was added to the monthly check. The poorly-paid teachers welcomed the "moonlighting" income, and the legal profession often found that the graduates were potential clients once they were established in the business world.⁴⁶

In 1959 many of the teachers in the technical schools began to experience difficulties with the newly-appointed district supervisors. The Principal of the Commercial College of Marinanao found himself in trouble as soon as the fighting had subsided. A female supervisor chatted with him, and in the course of conversation made it quite clear that the revolution frowned on dual employment. This lawyer, very familiar with the promises offered on the Voice of the Sierra Maestra, decided that teaching, though it paid much less money, was a more secure profession than the practice of law. A short time later, however, the subject was appointed to a

⁴⁶Personal interviews, numbers 2, 7, and 8.

judgeship, probably because he had not offered serious resistance to the new supervisor's instructions. Then, too, in 1959 the Provisional Government was still paying lip service to the law. Nevertheless, before leaving his post at the commercial college, the lawyer was able to observe several changes in the curriculum. First, it was decided that all extraneous courses would be dropped. A hard core of simpler subjects would be used in their places. For example, "Customs and Duties" was replaced by a basic economics course. Since the leaders of the government would handle complicated problems like customs, duties, and tariffs, the individuals did not have to worry about these things anymore. Secondly, the older texts were reviewed, and Russian-printed books were substituted. In evaluating one of the new editions, the exile commented:

The Ten Years War (1868-1878) in former texts was depicted as a patriotic revolt and our leaders were built up. The new text, for the course that I taught, compared this fight with the American Revolution, stating both were fought for capitalistic-economic-interests. They did not want Spain and England telling them what to do. Wars were not for the love of liberty, but for the landed aristocracy. The reputations of the Cuban Patriots were tarnished.⁴⁷

This excerpt effectively illustrates one of the main theses of the New Cuban officials. The old leaders, the traditions, the native customs, all of those factors which blend in a

⁴⁷Personal interview, number 2.

magical formula to develop sensible nationalism, had to be discredited. But always a plausible and semi-rational manner was attempted.

In addition to the same type of changes as those described above, a Matanzas lawyer and government economist, who also served as principal of a Catholic private school and as an instructor in an institute of technology, had trials of a different nature. At the private school, trouble arose because laborers, who were building additions to the school from funds donated by a Canadian religious order, demanded that the college owed them back wages of over 50,000.00 dollars. In order to avoid complications, the school settled out of court. A faculty member, after viewing the timidity of the administration over the dispute, decided that his pay was in arrears also. Again the principal wrote out a check. With constant trouble beseeching the officials, some sighed relief when the institution was closed in April, 1961.⁴⁸

At an institute of technology in Matanzas province more serious problems arose. Beginning in 1960, the curriculum was revised and Russian texts, which were simple and

⁴⁸Personal interview, number 7. Similar changes to those of Marinanao occurred in transferring to a more limited curriculum. For example, a course called "Enterprise Organizations" was dropped, and a basic business course substituted.

attractive, and which readers could understand, were purchased by the government. In this school, however, the serious interruption of scholastic endeavors came from the students. The following is typical:

In the classroom next to mine an older professor was conducting a class in literature. Two militia men sprang out of their chairs during the lesson with drawn pistols, and shouted, "Now we must study Marx." With violent fist fights starting over this interruption, the professor completely lost control of the class.

Hearing the noise in the classroom I immediately ran into the room to see what was the matter. As acting principal, I expelled the two unruly students. But when the regular principal returned, he said I had incorrectly analyzed the situation. He wanted to reverse my decision and expell all of the students, except those who wanted to study Marxism.

At a faculty meeting held later, and to which the female district superintendent was invited, I proposed a compromise. Since the older instructor could not handle his class, I suggested that he be replaced, and that all the students should be permitted to stay in school. The principal refused. I told the Educational Supervisor that she could choose between the principal and me. She said I could go. From that time on, my life was in danger.⁴⁹

Some other minor changes occurred. Most of the faculty members, who were not under surveillance for one reason or another, were offered raises in salary of up to one hundred dollars per month, providing that they voluntarily forfeited any other jobs that they were holding. In addition, the name of the school was changed to honor a revolutionary patriot who was killed during the course of the fighting.

⁴⁹Ibid.

IV. TERROR SCHOOLS

In the schools already mentioned, it has been noted that physical education courses were dropped, and a type of universal military training was substituted. This program was designed to create a minuteman army. In addition to the informal instruction in military procedures, the regular military colleges of Cuba were opened for formal training. At "El Mariel," the Naval Academy in Pinar del Rio, there were "11-and 12-year-old children learning how to combat arms."⁵⁰

In addition to "El Mariel" and its army counterpart, "El Morro," the government created nine other military schools, since dubbed "Terror Schools." Two examples were located at Tarara and Mindos de Frio.⁵¹ As in the case of the Becados, students were solicited not only from Cuba, but from all of Latin America. According to one graduate, the purpose of the schools were to "train revolutionaries in sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla warfare."⁵² To supervise the basic training at Tarara, General Alberto Bayo, who had assisted Castro in Mexico, was brought in. Putting in long hours, sometimes as many as sixteen a day, seven

⁵⁰Personal interview, number 5.

⁵¹Marin, "Inside a Castro 'Terror School'," p. 119.

⁵²Ibid.

days a week, the recruits studied from Bayo's handbook, 150 Questions for a Guerrilla. Upon receiving a "diploma" from this institution, the students went to an advanced course lasting for four months at Mindas del Frio.

Commanded by General Enrique Lister, the advanced school specialized in "field training in the use of heavier arms, antiaircraft guns, and other weapons."⁵³ Since most of the agents would be sent to other Caribbean and Latin American nations, it was also decided to incorporate more subtle topics into the curriculum. Among the more interesting minor fields were political blackmail, how to rob banks, hijack payrolls, how to sabotage industrial plants, the destruction of natural resources, how to foment strikes and riots, and finally how to effectively use political assassination. All in all, the combined graduating potential of the nine schools was in the neighborhood of five-to-six thousand graduates a year. Sufficient unto the day to keep Cuba's geographical neighbors on constant guard!⁵⁴

V. THE UNIVERSITY OF HAVANA

The most famous school in Cuba was founded jointly by the Papal Bull of Pope Innocent III (December 12, 1791), and the Decree of the Spanish Royal Council of the Indies

⁵³Ibid., p. 20.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 119.

(April 27, 1792).⁵⁵ Approximately six years later, the first students were admitted. As the school developed into an important institution, the students, with a typical Latin American passion for politics, demanded a larger voice in the affairs of the national government. During the period of time from 1930 to 1935, the university was officially closed twice for revolutionary activity.⁵⁶ In 1937, however, it was reopened and granted full autonomy, and could proceed with a faculty and curriculum over which the federal government had no control.

In 1956, President Batista again found it necessary to stifle the academic life. The University of Havana, de las Villas at Santa Clara, and the University of Oriente were all closed. This may be one reason why Castro had so much success in enlisting the aid of students for his movement. In order to reward the students for their contribution to the revolution, Castro, fourteen days after he came to power, urged the Provisional Government to pass Public Law 11, which in effect, invalidated the degrees issued by private colleges.⁵⁷ In addition, it was announced that all students

⁵⁵Turosienski, Education in Cuba, p. 46.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Joseph S. Roucek, "Pro-Communist Revolution in Cuban Education," Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. VI, No. 3 (July, 1954), pp. 328-335.

who had received degrees during the period November, 1956, to January, 1959, would have to wait one year before they would be permitted to practice their professions, as "they should have been helping in the revolutionary movement, not attending classes."⁵⁸ In discrediting private schools, Castro effectively stimulated enrollment in state-supported institutions.

During the first quarter of 1959, the new government gave a primary emphasis to higher education. In February and March, the Universities of de las Villas and Oriente were reopened. Much more care was used, however, before the University of Havana was permitted to come back into the service of the state. First, military troops occupied the physical plant from January to May, making sure that the previous officials did not reopen the schools by their own directive. Secondly, the statutes of the university were examined and many rewritten. Thirdly, former faculty members who wished to return to their jobs were carefully screened. Lastly, attention was given to providing the students, the right students that is, with more power within the area of university administration.⁵⁹

The revolutionary laws reopening the universities were popular ones. Enthusiastic young people from all over Cuba

⁵⁸Personal interview, number 4.

⁵⁹Roucek, Journal of Inter-American Studies, pp. 328-335.

rushed to Havana to begin classes. In fact, the enrollment which reached a peak of 16,000 doubled the last enrollment statistics issued in 1956.⁶⁰ The growth was not without conflict, especially in the student organizations. The most colorful controversy was over the elections for the leadership of the Federacion Estudiantil Universita. The two candidates, Pedro Boitel and Rolando Cubuela, campaigned furiously for votes, but shortly before election day, Boitel decided to withdraw. Cubuela had apparently succeeded in obtaining the assistance of his close friend Raul Castro to intercede for his cause.⁶¹ With the vote officially declaring Cubuela the winner, a former army Major, Angel Quevido, was selected as secretary of the organization.⁶² Both men were revolutionaries, and seemed to be willing to use their influence for the furthering of the revolutionary principles.

The changes in the educational patterns at the University of Havana were similar to those of other levels. The curriculum, having been tightened, offered fewer courses; the professors found it most difficult to control unruly students; and, finally, academic standards seriously dropped. After continued harrassment by the government and revolutionary

⁶⁰The New York Times Magazine, June 21, 1964, p. 5.

⁶¹Cuba and the Rule of Law, p. 248.

⁶²Urrutia, Fidel Castro & Company Inc., p. 92.

students, many "professors resigned, others were dismissed, and some retired. . . ."63 As late as October, the Junta was still looking for qualified men to fill seventy-eight vacancies in the school of Architecture.64 Medical professors were just as scarce. Early in 1960, a solution was found. The "friendly" hand of the Soviet Union offered to locate capable teachers and transport them to Cuba. Later, when Soviet military personnel invaded Havana, the city acquired a somewhat cosmopolitan atmosphere.65

Student conduct at the university reached an all-time low. Whereas before the revolution only "gangsters" wore sidearms to classes, now it was the accepted standard. With the admission of students to the colleges, some of whom had never finished high school, all types of methods were employed to pass courses. In the Engineering College, one faculty member dismissed a student on academic grounds. This caused a furor that lasted for months. On another occasion, "Engineering students asked the professor to leave the room, because his presence made copying more difficult."66 How good such students will be at their chosen professions, is a question that only time can answer.

⁶³Ibid., p. 98.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 99.

⁶⁵Personal interview, Dr. Robert Cohen, December 1, 1964.

⁶⁶Urrutia, Fidel Castro & Company Inc., p. 95.

In conclusion, it seems necessary to say that the early revolutionary educational system was paradoxical. There is no doubt that more people were receiving an education in 1961 than in any previous year in Cuba's history. But, the quality of classes, instructors, textbooks, and physical facilities had dipped sharply downward. In addition, the school under Castro's supervision became a social agency for cultural reconstruction. There are American philosophers, like Theodore Brameld, who would defend the right of the state to use schools in this manner, however, he probably would agree that the education of the children should not be neglected because of it. Nevertheless, schools in Cuba will be the instrument that will either make or break Castro's ambitious plans.

The Minister of Education, Armando Hart, after surveying the entire educational movement proclaimed, "Everyone seems to be in school."⁶⁷ In a sense this was true. The statement would have been more correct, perhaps, if he had said, "Fidel Castro has given everyone in Cuba an 'education'."

⁶⁷Laura Berquist, "My 28 Days in Communist Cuba," Look, Vol. XXVII, No. 7 (April, 1963), pp. 15-27.

CHAPTER V

THE DEATH OF A SOCIETY

In spite of the vast amount of popular and scholarly literature that has been produced on the effect of the Cuban revolution on the lives of the Cuban citizen, no one has succeeded in portraying the total devastation of the revolt on everyday life. While it is true that well-known words and phrases such as Paredon, Agrarian Reform, the Bay of Pigs, and the Quarantine all have taken their toll, there have been more subtle changes that have altered life. It is the purpose of this chapter to record this impact.

I. SOMETHING OLD - SOMETHING NEW

After being released from the shackles of the Platt Amendment, the nation of Cuba began to achieve some degree of economic independence. Yet, as she advanced in this direction, the financial bonds between her and the United States tightened. For example, prior to the revolution Cubans used over 250,000 American automobiles in accomplishing the tasks of everyday life. With the severance of diplomatic relations, spare parts and trained technicians were difficult to obtain for necessary repairs to these vehicles. Consequently, when a Cuban businessman hails a taxicab, there is an unwritten law to the effect that he

must help push the auto if it stalls. Some spare parts are available, but they are constructed out of melted-down pots and pans in a Russian-built factory. The life span of such parts have been estimated at six months. In addition, more than fifty per cent of the air conditioning units in Cuba are in need of American parts and technical skills. No solutions have been found to overcome this inconvenience.¹

Humor is sometimes found in deepest pathos. Those peasants who had been assigned apartments on the twelfth floor of the new apartment houses in East Havana perhaps have wondered, underneath their breath, if American-made elevators would really be such an evil influence. Some of the Cuban workers who stop at a neighborhood tavern on their way home from work in the evening may soon be driven to abstinence, because, after listening to the same 1959 American phonograph records for several years on well-worn jukeboxes, they may develop the feeling that they are experiencing an extended "lost weekend." The recent World Convention of Architects, meeting at the beautiful Libre-Havana (formerly the Havana-Hilton), may also have caused some of the participants to comment about the benefits of Communism. They complained to the hotel manager about the lack of hot water, but soon

¹Personal interview, Dr. Robert Cohen, December 1, 1964; also his documentary film "Inside Castro's Cuba" and lecture of the same date.

the problem was solved. Inexperienced engineers had hot water coming from both hot and cold faucets, as well as the commodes in the rest-rooms.²

On the more serious side, the aftermath of the revolution brought acute food shortages. Particularly meat and dairy items were scarce. It became a common custom for city dwellers to journey to the country in an attempt to persuade farmer relatives and friends to sell excess supplies.³ The shortages became so acute that correctional judges were instructed to impose stiff penalties on persons who illegally possessed or transported foodstuffs.⁴ Clothing and shoes were just as hard to obtain. An employee of a Havana plant estimated production in that plant decreased by one-half after the year 1959.⁵ Government restrictions soon followed.

²Ibid.

³Personal interview, number 5.

⁴Public Law No. 1013 provided a penalty of three years privation of liberty for persons "selling, transporting or in any manner trading with beef not acquired in legally established slaughterhouses, cooperatives, 'granjas del pueblo', or in zones authorized by I.N.R.A." Such acts were considered counter-revolutionary. A subsequent law, No. 1035, expanded this to "sundry farm products over the country and ruled that severe penalties -- six month privation of liberty -- would be given to anyone who would acquire any farm products in excess of 25 pounds." The penalty also applied to anyone transporting them. In the case of transporting illegal foodstuffs, the automobile was subject to confiscation. The complete text of these laws may be consulted in There Is Not Any Legal Foundation In The Administration Of Justice In The Cuba Of Today (Coral Gables: Judicatura Cubana Democratica, 1965), pp. 10-12.

⁵Personal interview, number 5.

Refugees leaving Cuba were only permitted to take "three suits, three shirts, three sets of underclothing, and two pairs of shoes."⁶ In addition, other shortages were alleviated by forcing refugees to turn over their automobiles, homes, furniture, and other business and personal possessions to the state before they could get passports to leave the country.⁷ The signing over of these personal possessions to the government often brought frustration and anxiety. A Matanzas lawyer almost ready to leave for the United States called a state inspector to come to his home and sign the necessary papers. Before the man could arrive, however, the exile noted that a drain in the house was clogged. He momentarily panicked. He recalled that he had stuffed two hundred rounds of ammunition down that particular drain in order to dispose of them. Fortunately, a tight-lipped plumber was found, and all repairs were made by the time the state inspector came.⁸

II. THE STATUS REVOLUTION

In 1959, with the Provisional Government firmly in control of Cuba, the soldiers of the Rebel army returned to their homes. Not all were content to pick up the pieces of

⁶Personal interview, number 1.

⁷Personal interviews, numbers 1, 2, and 3.

⁸Personal interview, number withheld by author.

a former life. Some of them heard opportunity knocking, and proceeded to establish a name and reputation for themselves.

Such was the case with Julio Suarez:

Late in 1958, Julio left his home in Havana to join the Rebel army at Santa Clara. This was the area where Che Guevara was opening a second front. Julio fought for two days, promoted himself to captain, and decided that he had had enough of war. He then left Santa Clara province and headed for Mataneses. That was about as far from the fighting as he could get.

When the fighting ceased, Julio did not return to his prewar job as a hospital orderly. Instead Captain Suarez was appointed Chief of the Agrarian Reform for Mataneses province. Suarez, an Italian immigrant, was now an important man. He wanted to impress people with his new power. In view of this, his favorite pastime was to visit the homes and estates of once-influential families and ask them, "What lands are you going to give to the revolution?" One day this question led to trouble. The son of a former Senator became incensed and started an argument. He was taken to jail.

I was called to assist the Senator's son. But when I got to police headquarters, Julio had me thrown into jail also. Eventually the police permitted us to make a telephone call to Havana. There, members of Fidel's staff vouched for us, and indicated that we should be released until the charges were brought to trial.

Before the trial convened, I was commissioned to investigate Julio's background. After doing so I discovered that he had changed his name, fought only two days for the revolution, and was not a true officer. I read from the documents of my investigation at the court trial. The room filled with laughter, which irritated the presiding judge. Finally, he declared, "Everyone is free. Everyone get out."⁹

Nothing but Julio's pride was hurt in the Suarez case, but others had more tragic endings. The fate of a high government official, who had been appointed by President Batista,

⁹Personal interview, number 7. This narrative has been edited by the writer to slightly add to the readability.

illustrates a more serious development. The son of this official related this brief incident:

With the people streaming in from the hills it was hard for my father to know what to do. He went into hiding for a week. In his absence, the acting administrator and the Chief of the Province interceded with Castro officials for his life. Finally the Chief of Police visited me and said, "Your father has done no wrong. Why is he hiding?" In the course of our conversation we made a deal. My father would surrender, and if no charges were filed against him within three days, he was to be set free. Later he did give himself up, and was subsequently released.

On the night of his release we held a party. It was interrupted by Major Huber Matos, the military governor of the province. He, and his men, carried sub-machine guns. He arrested my father, and as they hustled him to the waiting car, I could see that the former Chief of Police was under arrest also. He had freed my father without asking permission of the new government. . . . Many people did not want to understand. Father's houses, ranches, and boats had all been taken by the government. According to the law, an official of the Batista government was required to pay back what he had received in salary for his term of office. Thus my father would owe \$90,000.00. However, property worth several hundred thousand dollars had been taken. I wanted to get one shrimp boat back. A friend took me to see a Communist Maritime official, who had once been an officer in the Batista navy. He told me the shrimp boat was being taken care of -- but he couldn't do much to help. Later my friend and I went to get a Coca-Cola. I told him, "This is only propaganda." He replied, "Oh, no! They will do what is right." This man, a college graduate and a good Catholic, eventually became a Communist.¹⁰

Provisions had been made in the Constitution of 1940 for Agrarian reform. Technically anyone who owned over

¹⁰ Personal interview, number withheld by author. The father was released again, and was given back a small 140 acre farm. Later he was imprisoned for the third time. The man's wife, due to the stress of worrying over her husband and children, has been committed to an asylum for the insane.

two-thousand acres of land was subject to its provisions, but no records are available to show whether these articles were ever enforced. Naturally, this plan included compensation. The Agrarian Reform as practiced by the Revolution was not as conservative. A Havana lawyer related the following incident:

A client owned 1200 acres of land near San Antonio de Las Vegas. Before he contacted me, a government man armed with a machine gun ordered him to leave his land. The owner had a brother who was working closely with Fidel, and he called him to try and obtain assistance. Castro promised help, but it failed to materialize.

As his lawyer, I went to the new plantation owner and informed him that he had three days to legally leave the premises. I took along a court order and had taken the precaution of providing two witnesses that could verify my statements to the man. When I gave him a copy of the court order he seemed pleasant and understanding, but said he could not comply. I was never able to remove the man from the land, nor obtain compensation.¹¹

The owner of a large automobile agency described the processes employed by the government in confiscating his business. He had been doing \$200,000.00 worth of sales and services a year prior to the revolution, but in 1959 he began to have trouble. First, the discipline of the employees decreased. Then officials of the Automobile Union came in, and assisted him in creating better working conditions . . . working conditions so good, in fact, that it was difficult to show a profit! On October 13, 1961, the government passed a series of regulatory laws. These almost destroyed the

¹¹Personal interview, number 10.

business. Yearly sales dropped from the previously mentioned figure to just under \$50,000.00. Later in the same year, the individual's bank account was frozen. Shortly thereafter, armed members of the G-2 entered the office, and ordered that the shop be closed. The workers and equipment were spread all over the city. A lifetime of work was crushed in a few hours.¹²

The consequences of such acts caused once-responsible people in Cuba to despair and to change their whole pattern of living. A sister of one of the exiles threatened to inform the police, if the man took a picture of his deceased parents from their home.¹³ Businessmen were afraid to carry a briefcase on the streets, as they were constantly stopped and searched to verify that it did not contain weapons.¹⁴ A Notary Public, who was authorized to perform marriage ceremonies, had on one occasion to stop during the service and permit the enthusiastic couple to sing the "Internationale."¹⁵ Fourteen laborers working on the newly constructed Havana tunnel, enraptured with the ideals of the revolution, decided to ask their union steward to request a raise from the

¹²Personal interview, number 13.

¹³Personal interview, number 5.

¹⁴Personal interview, number 3.

¹⁵Personal interview, number 1.

government. The next day all the men were jailed. Tucked away securely for several years, they would no longer be a menace to society.¹⁶ Finally, one exile, after viewing the prospects for the future in Cuba, decided to bring his family to the United States. So prior to leaving, he and his wife periodically visited the Mid-America Yacht Club and spent from \$50.00 to \$500.00 per evening. "It was the best time I ever had in my life," he related.¹⁷ Thus, the revolution had widespread social implications. In many respects, even if Fidel Castro and his puppets were dethroned, society could not revert to an earlier era. What had been done, was not to be undone.¹⁸

III. THE COURTS OF THE REVOLUTION

The Cuban Revolution struck a death blow to the traditional judicial system. Prior to the installation of the Provisional Government, the nation had had a responsible complex of courts. In fact, even during the illegal tenure

¹⁶Personal interview, number 5.

¹⁷Personal interview, number 8.

¹⁸To provide another concrete illustration of this conclusion, it might be recalled that all deeds to property and businesses were burned. So, if a new and democratic government was installed, it would almost be legally impossible for people to prove ownership of former possessions. Personal interview, Dr. Robert Cohen, December 1, 1964.

of Batista, the courts had a relatively free hand in deciding cases on their own merits. One of the most distinguished jurists in Cuba stated that before "the revolution . . . justice was administered in 95 percent of the cases."¹⁹ The revolution blemished that record. The first public law enacted abolished the Tribunales de Urgencia, and transferred to the regular courts all of the criminal cases.²⁰ On the surface this was within the framework of the 1940 Constitution, but in reality it provided for the establishment of the feared "revolutionary courts."

These courts were manned by untrained civilians and ex-members of the Rebel Army.²¹ Records of these courts have been examined by reputable foreign jurists, and conclusions have been offered which state they have legalized mass murder, torture, and, in general, perverted justice.²² What has not been touched upon is how lawyers were curtailed

¹⁹Personal interview, number 16.

²⁰There Is Not Any Legal Foundation In The Administration Of Justice In The Cuba Of Today, p. 1.

²¹Personal interview, number 2.

²²For case histories of many of these violations of justice see, Cuba Escarnio De Un Continente (Violaciones De Derechos Humanos Cometidas Por El Regimen Comunista De Cuba) (Miami: Unidad Revolucionaria, 1963), pp. 3-46; A Disgrace to the Americas Communist Cuba (The Flagrant and Uninterrupted Violation of All Human Rights By the Castro Regime) (Miami: Unidad Revolucionaria, 1963), pp. 5-24; Cuba and the Rule of Law, pp. 114-141.

from serving the best interests of their clients. A trial lawyer, who resided in one of the largest cities in Cuba, was able to provide some insight into this area. He commented:

The G-2 were in complete charge. In one case I made several trips to the jail to see my client, but each time was informed that he was with the G-2, and I would have to wait. As it turned out, I was not allowed to see him until we reached the courtroom on the day of the trial.²³

In another case, this lawyer's client was locked in a closet for five days with only bread and water to eat and drink. The man confessed before he could talk with his counsel. On other occasions, he was permitted to see his clients, but, often, since they were locked in a small room with forty to fifty other persons, who were all naked, it was impossible to conduct any business. Finally this refugee reported that Public Law No. 998 allowed prisoners to be arrested, tried, and convicted within a twenty-four hour period. These people did not have time to even contact an attorney, and their cases were not subject to review.²⁴

There is some indication that in the outlying provinces "justice" was not that swift. In fact, trials were so chaotic it was difficult to even finish one. One man related:

A woman was brought to trial by an old man who owned a mortgage on her property. One of the opposing lawyers pointed out to the judge that the mortgage was in error, and that he would be offending Castro if he did not rule

²³Personal interview, number 5.

²⁴Ibid.

in favor of the lady. In the midst of the great confusion that developed, the magistrate threw up his hands and announced, 'I wash my hands of this case. Everyone is free! Everyone out of the courtroom.'²⁵

In another instance, a district judge in a province near Havana indicated that even the regular judges were hindered in attempting to administer justice in correctional cases. He said, "When the testimony on a case was finished I would retire to my office to decide on the sentence. Quite often a Castro man would be stationed there, and would caution, 'Oh Judge, remember times have changed. You must help the revolution'."²⁶ Under these circumstances, it was impossible for any system of jurisprudence to be followed. On November 12, 1960, Dr. Jose Morrell-Romero in a letter of resignation from the Supreme Court aptly stated the situation. He wrote:

The revolutionary tribunals have been permitted to judge the judges and magistrates to whom the Constitution adopted by the sovereign people gave special privilege and statute for the safeguard of their independent exercise of their functions. They are rendered defenceless and the entire judicial system is threatened.²⁷

Writing in 1960, the Justice proved to be a good prophet. The judicial system steadily declined until the invasion of the Bay of Pigs. Then almost overnight all resemblance to Western justice disappeared. To replace the courts, which

²⁵Personal interview, number 7.

²⁶Personal interview, number 9.

²⁷Quoted from Cuba and the Rule of Law, p. 74-75.

in effect were the watchdogs of the government, the Committee of Friends was organized to watch the people. One was created in each city block and for each rural section. It had the power to punish offenders on the spot. In addition, with the committees serving as official officers of the law -- there was not much possibility for gross misconduct, hence there was no longer a real need for regular courts to exist. Civil liberty and justice are concepts that have now passed into the pages of Cuban history.

In review, the cultural revolution in Cuba has affected society more than the political revolution. Not one facet of life has remained untouched. Familiar institutions are now foreign. Family ties often have been split. In many cases, friends have become foes. Luxuries have ceased. Necessities are scarce. The rich have become poor. The poor have become ambitious. The birth of Communism has brought death to a society.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The seeds of the Cuban revolution of 1959 were planted firmly before Fidel Castro cultivated a taste for political power. By taking advantage of governmental turmoil and social unrest, Castro was able to move into the national limelight. It is true, however, that to acquire control of the Cuban sovereignty, he temporarily aligned himself with coalition groups such as the Civic Front. Nevertheless, let there be no mistake. The revolution was his brain child. It was successful, if for no other reason, because the Castro image and ideology as portrayed to the people by radio, newspapers, and word-of-mouth propaganda appealed to the public. Fidel, the man, was compatible with the messianic tradition that Latin Americans hold so dear.

There were two separate revolutions occurring in Cuba in the late fifties and sixties. For the political revolution, Castro depended upon an organization of dubious international reputation -- "the 26th of July." Through the support that this group extended to him, he was able to fight, finance, and force his way to a predominant position on the island. To sustain the second revolution, the cultural revolution, Castro depended upon an unorganized concept that permeated all parts of the island -- "the Revolution." By giving the people an ultra-nationalistic identity, Castro

was able to perform excessive acts without repercussions. Everything was justified because it was necessary for the success of "the revolution." This type of reasoning gradually enabled the government to usurp the power and authority that at one time had been vested in the Roman Catholic church. Morality, industriousness, and peace of mind no longer had a religious connotation, but were now a by-product of the revolution.

The first year of the reign of the Provisional Government was marked with confusion. Many unlearned and inexperienced people were not able to provide the leadership that Cuba needed. They tried to build the utopia too quickly. Because of this, a twofold reaction set in. First, the economic stability of the nation, which was already soft and nervous, came close to collapsing; secondly, the elite portion of the society became rebellious. Their once secure social and economic position was severely threatened. Thus, in 1959, the government was besieged with difficulties.

Partial solutions to both problems were found in the coming year. Financial assistance by the Soviet Union in the form of long term credits and direct aid alleviated the economic problems. Although it was necessary to ration some items, the productivity of the island took an upward swing. The second question was somewhat resolved by violence. The leaders of the government decided to halt its critics once and for all. In addition, the outward show of force was

enough to convince the fence-sitters that they had best declare themselves as confirmed revolutionary patriots. By the time the Bay of Pigs invasion took place, Cuba was a unified nation.

In conclusion, the Cuban revolution was born of discontentment. Existing evidence indicates that there was adequate justification for it to take place, but the new leaders were secretly dedicated to accomplishing more than just correcting former social and political evils. They were intent upon bringing a whole new philosophy to the nation -- the philosophy of Communism. There is no doubt that it has already affected the people in diverse ways, but whether it can erase the memory of democracy remains to be seen.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. BOOKS

- Berelson, Bernard and Steiner. Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1964.
- Caruso, Teresa (trans. Grassberg, Elmer). Cuba and Castro. New York: Random House, 1961.
- Chester, Edmund A. A Sergeant Named Batista. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1954.
- Dubois, Jules. Fidel Castro. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1959.
- Guevara, Che (trans. Peterson, Harries-Glichy). Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1961.
- Huberman, Leo and Sweezy, Paul M. Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1960.
- Johnson, Haynes, et al. The Bay of Pigs Invasion. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1964.
- Phillips, R. Hart. Cuba: Island of Paradox. New York: McDowell, Oblensky, 1960.
- Rivero, Nicolas. Castro's Cuba: An American Dilemma. Washington: Luce, 1962.
- Seers, Dudley, et al. Cuba: The Economic and Social Revolution. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1964.
- Smith, Robert Freeman. The United States and Cuba, Business and Diplomacy. New York: Bookman Associates, 1960.
- Urrutia, Lleo, Manuel. Fidel Castro & Company Inc. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964.
- Weyl, Nathaniel. Red Star Over Cuba. New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1960.

B. PAMPHLETS

- Anonymous, La Persecucion De La Iglesia Catolica En Cuba.
Quito, Ecuador: Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil De
Cuba, 1963.
- Anonymous. La Verdad De La Persecucion De Fidel Castro.
- Anonymous. A Disgrace to the Americas Communist Cuba: The
Flagrant and Uninterrupted Violation of All Human Rights
By the Castro Regime. Miami: Unidad Revolucionaria, 1963.
- Anonymous. Cuba Escarnio De Un Continente: Violaciones De
Derechos Humanos Cometidas Por El Regimen Comista De
Cuba. Miami: Unidad Revolucionaria.
- Anonymous. There Is Not Any Legal Foundation In The Adminis-
tration Of Justice In The Cuba Of Today. Miami: Judicatura
Cubana Democratico, 1963.
- Anonymous. A Letter From Cuba's Student Freedom Fighter to
Fidel Castro's American Student Guests. Coral Gables:
Service Offset Press, 1963.
- Benitez, Jamie. The United States, Cuba, and Latin America:
An Occasional Paper on the Free Society. New York:
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1961.
- de Varona, Manuel Antonio. The Drama of Cuba. Miami: Royal
Palm Printers, 1962.
- Espada, Jose Rodriguez (ed.). Can This Happen to the Americas?
Miami: Movimiento Unidad Revolucionaria, 1963.
- Espada, Jose Rodriguez (ed.). To Keep Democracy and Preserve
Society. Miami: Movimiento Unidad Revolucionaria, nd.
- Hilty, Hiram and Matthews, Herbert L. Understanding Cuba.
Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1960.

C. PUBLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENTS, LEARNED
SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

- Cuba. Department of State Publication 7171, Inter-American
Series 66. Washington: Bureau of Public Affairs, 1961.

Cuba and the Rule of Law. Geneva, Switzerland: International Commission of Jurists, 1962.

Main Facts on Cuba. Havana: Cuban Tourist Commission, 1956.

Turosienski, Severin K. Education in Cuba. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1943.

D. PERIODICALS

Berquist, Laura. "My 28 Days in Communist Cuba," Look, XXVII (April, 1963), 15-27.

Cartier-Bresson, Henri. "This is Castro's Cuba Seen Face to Face," Life, LIV (March 15, 1963), 28-48.

Gilman, Richard. "A Man in Havana," The Commonweal, February, 1960. 567-568.

Glick, Edward. "Castro and the Church," The Commonweal, October, 1961, 67.

Haselden, Kyle. "Cuba: A Study of Contrasts," Christian Century, LXXVI (November 29, 1960), 1307-1308.

Haselden, Kyle. "Cuba's Revolution: Yes and No," Christian Century, LXXVII (December 7, 1960), 1438-1439.

Marin, Juan De Dios. "Inside a Castro 'Terror School'," The Reader's Digest, LXXXV (December, 1964), 119-120.

Martin, Harold H. "Can Castro Save Cuba," Saturday Evening Post, CCXXXII (August 1, 1959), 40.

Matthews, Herbert. "Now Castro Faces the Harder Fight," New York Times Magazine, Section VI (March 8, 1959), 71.

Newsweek, August 22, 1960, 50.

Roucek, Joseph S. "Pro-Communist Revolution in Cuban Education," Journal of Inter-American Studies, VI (July, 1954), 328-335.

Time, May 30, 1960, 24.

Time, November 28, 1960, 30.

Time, September 22, 1960, 46.

E. UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS

Umphers, Roger. "The Relations Between the United States and Cuba Under the Platt Amendment." Unpublished Master's thesis, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, 1933.

F. NEWSPAPERS

Kansas City Star, August 5, 1964.

Miami Patria, March 15, 1960.

The New York Times, January, 1959 - June, 1959.

The Wall Street Journal, January, 1964 - January, 1965.

Report On Cuba, January, 1956 - January, 1959.

Topeka Sunday Capitol - Journal, July 5, 1964.

Topeka Capitol-Journal, August 23, 1965.

G. PERSONAL INTERVIEW

SCHOLARS:

Personal interview, Dr. Robert Cohen, Oklahoma State University, December 1, 1964.

CUBAN EXILES:*

Personal interview, number 1.

Personal interview, number 2.

Personal interview, number 3.

Personal interview, number 4.

Personal interview, number 5.

Personal interview, number 6.

- Personal interview, number 7.
- Personal interview, number 8.
- Personal interview, number 9.
- Personal interview, number 10.
- Personal interview, number 11.
- Personal interview, number 12.
- Personal interview, number 13.
- Personal interview, number 14.
- Personal interview, number 15.
- Personal interview, number 16.

*For further biographical information see Appendix A. The interview numbers on this page correspond to the numbers of the biographical sketches.

H. DOCUMENTARY FILMS

Cohen, Robert. "Inside Castro's Cuba." Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, December 1, 1964.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

ABBREVIATED BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF CUBAN EXILES*

1.

Place of birth:	Province of Santa Clara.
Occupation of father:	Legal profession.
Occupation of subject:	Lawyer and Notary Public.
Education:	Doctor of Civil Laws, University of Havana.
Where last employed:	Province of Santa Clara.
Average monthly income:	\$1300.00
Political affiliations:	None.
Professional organizations:	Local Bar Association and Notary Public Association.
Social organizations:	Knights of Columbus and various recreational clubs.
Year of migration:	1962.

2.

Place of birth:	Province of Havana.
Occupation of father:	Legal profession.
Occupation of subject:	Lawyer, professor, and magistrate.
Education:	Doctor of Civil Laws, University of Havana.
Average monthly income:	\$1160.00
Where last employed:	Havana and Pinar del Rio provinces.
Political affiliations:	None.
Professional organizations:	Local Bar Association. Held various national positions in it and related organizations.
Social organizations:	Various, including Masonic Lodge.
Year of migration:	1961.

*Since the interviews were scheduled for specific purposes, occasionally some of the above questions were not asked of every subject, or for various reasons a reply was not obtained. When biographical data is not available the notation "no data" has been entered at the appropriate place. It should not be implied, however, that this brands the subject as unresponsive. Also the writer has purposely deleted certain information which he believed would be prejudicial to the person interviewed.

The writer has edited the biographical information given by each subject and has only placed those items in the above

3.

Place of birth:	Province of Camaguey.
Occupation of father:	Businessman.
Occupation of subject:	Lawyer.
Education:	Doctor of Civil Laws, University of Santa Clara.
Average monthly income:	\$4,000.00 (Includes wife's income.)
Where last employed:	Province of Camaguey.
Political affiliations:	Autentico party.
Professional organizations:	Local Bar Association.
Social organizations:	No data.
Year of migration:	1961.

4.

Place of birth:	Province of Camaguey.
Occupation of father:	Agricultural businessman and national government official.
Occupation of subject:	Lawyer and businessman.
Education:	Doctor of Civil Laws, Jose Marti University.
Average monthly income:	\$300.00
Where last employed:	Province of Camaguey.
Political affiliations:	Liberal party.
Professional organizations:	None.
Social organizations:	Various.
Year of migration:	1960.

5.

Place of birth:	Province of Havana.
Occupation of father:	Businessman.
Occupation of subject:	Specialist in criminal law.
Education:	Doctor of Civil Laws, University of Havana.
Average monthly income:	\$800.00 to \$1,000.00.
Where last employed:	Province of Havana.
Political affiliations:	Autentico party.
Professional organizations:	Local Bar Association.
Social organizations:	Various.
Year of migration:	1962.

descriptions that he feels will be helpful to the reader in evaluating the quality of the individual's statements. Further data can be supplied to authorized persons under approved circumstances. Requests should be mailed directly to the author.

6.

Place of birth:	Province of Matanzas.
Occupation of father:	Legal profession.
Occupation of subject:	Corporation lawyer for government utility company.
Education:	Doctor of Civil Laws, University of Havana.
Average monthly income:	\$1,000.00.
Where last employed:	Matanzas province.
Political affiliations:	Autentico party.
Professional organizations:	Local Bar Association.
Social organizations:	Various.
Year of migration:	1961.

7.

Place of birth:	Province of Havana.
Occupation of father:	National government official.
Occupation of subject:	Government official. Attorney.
Average monthly income:	\$1500.00.
Where last employed:	Matanzas province.
Political affiliations:	Orthodox party.
Professional organizations:	Local and national Bar Association.
Social organizations:	Rotary Club and others.
Year of migration:	1962.

8.

Place of birth:	Province of Oriente.
Occupation of father:	Pharmacist.
Occupation of subject:	Private law practice. Representative for national utility company.
Education:	Doctor of Civil Laws, University of Havana.
Average monthly income:	\$1,000.00.
Where last employed:	Province of Havana.
Political affiliations:	None.
Professional organizations:	Local and national Bar Associations.
Social organizations:	Mid-America Yacht Club and others.
Year of migration:	1962.

9.

Place of birth:	Province of Santa Clara.
Occupation of father:	Sugarmill worker.
Occupation of subject:	Lawyer and magistrate.
Education:	Doctor of Civil Laws, University of Havana.
Average monthly income:	\$400.00. (Had additional income.)
Where last employed:	Province of Pinar del Rio.
Political affiliations:	None.
Professional organizations:	Local Bar Association.
Social organizations:	No data.
Year of migration:	1960.

10.

Place of birth:	Province of Las Villas.
Occupation of father:	Notary Public and lawyer.
Occupation of subject:	Notary Public. Lawyer for importing-exporting firm.
Education:	Doctor of Civil Laws, University of Havana.
Average monthly income:	\$2,000.00. (Included wife's income.)
Where last employed:	Province of Havana.
Political affiliations:	None.
Professional organizations:	Local Bar Association.
Social organizations:	Various local clubs.
Year of migration:	1960.

11.

Place of birth:	Province of Oriente.
Occupation of father:	Pharmacist.
Occupation of subject:	National educational official.
Education:	Doctor of Civil Laws, University of Havana.
Average monthly income:	\$1700.00.
Where last employed:	Withheld by author.
Political affiliations:	No data.
Professional organizations:	Local and national Bar Association. Notary Public Association.
Social organizations:	Various.
Year of migration:	1962.

12.

Place of birth:	Province of Havana.
Occupation of father:	Veterinarian.
Occupation of subject:	Auxiliary lawyer. Federal income tax inspector.
Education:	Doctor of Civil Laws, University of Havana.
Average monthly income:	\$1200.00.
Where last employed:	Province of Havana.
Political affiliations:	Orthodox party.
Professional organizations:	No data.
Social organizations:	No data.
Year of migration:	1962.

13.

Place of birth:	Province of Oriente.
Occupation of father:	Planter.
Occupation of subject:	Teacher. Independent businessman.
Education:	Doctor of Pedagogy, University of Havana.
Average monthly income:	Business grossed \$200,000.00 per year.
Where last employed:	Withheld by author.
Political affiliations:	Autentico party.
Professional organizations:	No data.
Social organizations:	Various.
Year of migration:	1962.

14.

Place of birth:	Province of Las Villas.
Occupation of father:	Landlord, plantation owner, and cattleman.
Occupation of subject:	National educational official.
Education:	Doctor of Pedagogy, University of Havana.
Average monthly income:	Retired.
Where last employed:	Withheld by author.
Political affiliations:	Autentico party.
Professional organizations:	Local and national pedagogical associations.
Social organizations:	Various.
Year of migration:	1961.

15.

Place of birth:	Province of Santa Clara.
Occupation of father:	No data.
Occupation of subject:	Lawyer. National government official.
Education:	Doctor of Civil Laws, University of Havana.
Average monthly income:	No data.
Where last employed:	Oriente province.
Political affiliations:	Constitutional party.
Professional organizations:	Local and national Bar Associations.
Social organizations:	Various.
Year of migration:	1961.

16.

Place of birth:	Province of Camaguey.
Occupation of father:	No data.
Occupation of subject:	Lawyer. Judge. Government official.
Education:	Doctor of Civil Laws, University of Havana.
Average monthly income:	No data.
Where last employed:	Province of Havana.
Political affiliations:	None.
Professional organizations:	Local and national Bar Associations. Prominent in Cuban exile groups.
Social organizations:	Various.
Year of migration:	1960.