

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE
AFFAIRES DE L'ANGLETERRE ET DE L'AMÉRIQUE (1776-1779)

A THESIS

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A. W. E.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. FOREIGN MERCENARY TROOPS USED BY THE BRITISH	6
III. RECONCILIATION	20
General opposition to the war.	20
The Howe peace commission.	31
Lord North's conciliatory proposal	39
Conclusion	53
IV. FRENCH AID FOR AMERICA	55
V. THE DISPUTES ARISING FROM THE DEFEAT OF BURGOYNE AT SARATOGA.	80
VI. CONCLUSION	92
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	96
APPENDIX.	101
INDEX OF NAMES.	103

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Affaires de l'Angleterre et de l'Amérique was a French journal published during the years from 1776 to 1779 at Paris under the rubric of Antwerp. The editors are mentioned nowhere in the paper, but it is known that they were Benjamin Franklin, Robinet, Court de Gebelin, and others.¹ Edmond Genêt, of the office of the French foreign ministry, assisted Franklin.² The journal was under the guidance of the French ministry.³

The purpose of the Affaires, according to the editors' note at the opening of Volume I, was to give an impartial, chronological account of the dispute between England and her American colonies. However, the actual, though unavowed, purpose was to use the periodical as propaganda to win France's support for the American cause. The paper served to neutralize the effects of the news from England printed in other Paris journals.⁴

As set forth in the Avertissement at the beginning of Volume I, the plan of the editors was to publish the paper in issues called cahiers of which there would be numbers published at irregular intervals. The proposal was to publish a cahier whenever the material available warranted it. Each

¹ Eugène Hatin, Bibliographie historique et critique de la presse périodique française (Paris: Librairie de Firmin Didot Frères, Fils et Cie, 1866), p. 74.

² Bernard Fay, Franklin, the Apostle of Modern Times (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1929), p. 447.

³ Ibid., p. 419.

⁴ Paul Leicester Ford, "The Affaires de l'Angleterre et de l'Amérique," The Pennsylvania Magazine, 13:222, 1889.

number or cahier of the paper was to consist of a chronological journal and a section entitled Lettre d'un Banquier de Londres à M. * * * à Anvers. The name of the banker was never given. The chronological journal presented news only, and the lettre from the London banker served to a certain extent the same purpose as do the editorials in modern newspapers.

Much of the original plan was not actually carried out. The journal was fairly impartial in the early issues but the banker's letters were obviously partial. Indeed, in Volume VI, the editors asked their public to note that their claims to impartiality applied only to the stated facts in the chronological sections. The London banker was not bound by the editors' obligations (VI, 26, pp. 1-2).*

Neither was the chronological order of the paper long maintained. The early issues did not err in this respect, but later the editors apparently began to insert their news just as they received it without regard for the dates of the events. The chronological sequence was also somewhat disturbed by the fact that both a journal and a lettre were included in the same number. The journal contained news of events which had taken place as much as five or more months in the past, the age of the news depending upon the distance it had to travel and other factors. On the other hand, the banker's letters usually contained news of a comparatively recent date. For example, the first report in the journal of the first cahier was dated January 9, 1776 (I, 1, p. 1), and the last report in this issue was dated March 5, 1776

* Acknowledgment for material taken from the Affaires de l'Angleterre et de l'Amérique will be made in parentheses in the body of this thesis. Read the references thus: Volume VI, cahier 26, pages 1 to 2 inclusive.

(I, 1, p. 36). In the same issue the banker's letter carried the date of May 4, 1776 (I, 1, p. 81), and his first report was of an incident of March 24, 1776 (I, 1, p. 102).

No dates save those of the year of publication were affixed to the various issues. In the early numbers of the journal the date of the incidents recorded on each page was placed in the outer margin of that page. This practice was discontinued after a comparatively short time. All of the banker's letters were dated at the time of writing. In the later issues there was no other plan for inserting dates.

Apparently the editors did not have regular sources upon which they could draw for news. As early as Volume III they announced that they were going to discontinue the news reports for several numbers (III, 12, pp. 41-44). They proposed to fill in the interim with the publication of Doctor Price's famous pamphlet entitled Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty.⁵ This required three numbers (III, 12-14, pp. 43-88 and 113-231), and four more consisted of the publication of a report made to the House of Lords in 1774 by a committee investigating the causes of the rebellion in the Massachusetts Bay colony (III, 15, pp. 233-272 and IV, 16-18, pp. 5-70). Eight more issues (IV, 18-20, pp. 71-159 and V, 21-25, pp. 1-110) were employed in a presentation of brief summaries of the public lives of the principal members of Parliament.

Other changes in the original plan of the Affaires were also made. Only in the first two volumes were the journals and the lettres published

⁵ Infra, pp. 25-26.

alternately. Beginning with Volume III, the journals were published in groups of five to a volume and the lettres were published in another group of five in the same volume. Thus, approximately the first half of each volume consisted of journals, and the second half consisted of lettres. Another change was also made at this point. Beginning with Volume III, the pagination of the lettres was given in Roman numerals while the journals continued to be issued in Arabic numerals. The publication of volumes consisting of approximately one-half journals and one-half lettres was discontinued with Volume VI. Thereafter each volume consisted of either all journals or all lettres. In the set studied Volume VII consisted of lettres and Volume VIII contained journals. No more journals were included after Volume VIII. According to Paul Leicester Ford⁶ the Affaires contained eighty-two journals and eighty-two lettres.

The editors of the Affaires obtained their material for publication from a great variety of sources. Much of the news was taken from English newspapers, especially the London Court Gazette. When such news did not serve the purpose of the Affaires, it was accompanied by remarks to show the editors' doubts as to its authenticity. Often the London banker included such reports in his letters and added derogatory remarks concerning their veracity. He frequently accused the Court Gazette of playing up favorable news and suppressing unfavorable reports.

Other sources of material were American newspapers. The authenticity of the reports in these papers was never questioned unless the paper was pro-British. Letters from persons in America, Great Britain, and the

⁶ Ford, op. cit., p. 222.

continent of Europe were often used. Much of the material concerning battles was taken from letters written by men, especially officers, in the British armed forces in America. Considerable space was also taken up by reports on proceedings in Parliament, reprintings of American state constitutions, laws passed by Parliament, Congress, and state assemblies, speeches by influential persons, and petitions by groups interested in the conduct or outcome of the war. The London banker often wrote his own impressions on events and usually included in his letters a report on ships captured or lost.

Since the purpose of the Affaires was to aid in bringing about the French alliance, there was little need for continuing the publication after February, 1778. The paper did suspend publication in December, 1779, and the propaganda was distributed between the Mercure de France, which received the larger part, and the Journal historique et politique de Genève (XV, supplement, p. 2). The editors announced their intention to suspend publication in an Avis at the end of Volume XV (XV, supplement, pp. 1-5).

The purpose of this thesis is to study the American Revolution as it is presented by the Affaires de l'Angleterre et de l'Amérique. Only those matters treated at length in the Affaires and not discussed completely in most American histories will be studied. Well known events in the history of the American Revolution included in this thesis are for the purpose of clarifying the discussions.

CHAPTER II

FOREIGN MERCENARY TROOPS USED BY THE BRITISH

On January 9 to 15, 1776, Great Britain successfully closed negotiations with three German rulers, the Duke of Brunswick, the Landgrave of Hesse, and the Count of Hanau, for auxiliary troops to aid them in putting down the uprising of the American colonies. These treaties provided that a total of 17,362 men, including some cavalry, should be supplied by these German rulers, the Landgrave of Hesse supplying by far the largest number, in return for various financial considerations on the part of Great Britain (I, 1, pp. 1-3). A few months later a similar treaty was concluded with the Prince of Waldeck (II, 7, p. 45).

The Affaires de l'Angleterre et de l'Amérique show that much criticism of these acts came from Britain as well as from America. On February 29, 1776, less than two months after the signing of the treaties, debates on the subject of the mercenaries were already in progress in the House of Commons (I, 1, pp. 3-16). Lord North upheld the treaties, saying that the mercenaries were a necessary, cheap, and rapid means of terminating the war without much bloodshed (I, 1, pp. 3-4). The opposition was led by Edmund Burke, who with his usual fine oratory accused Lord North of frequent contradictory statements in regard to American policy (I, 1, pp. 12-13). Lord Cavendish, also a member of the opposition, claimed that it was dangerous to have foreign soldiers under foreign control serving in the domains of the British Crown (I, 1, pp. 4-5). Hartley, a member of the House of Commons, said that such actions degraded England in the eyes of

foreign powers and harmed its financial credit (I, 1, pp. 5-6). Temple Luttrell of the same body feared that the German soldiers might fraternize with and uphold their former countrymen who were to be found in large numbers in Pennsylvania (I, 1, p. 6), and General Conway felt that this act would destroy any hope of reconciliation (I, 1, pp. 10-11). Another member of the opposition introduced figures to show that the cost of the mercenaries was almost twice that of the national soldiers (I, 1, pp. 14-16). In the end, however, Lord North's proposition for the acceptance of these treaties was easily passed.

Again on March 4, 1776, the subject of the rental of soldiers came up because of the presentation of some bills for payments due the mercenaries (I, 1, pp. 27-32). The opposition claimed that full payment would go on even if many soldiers were killed. The ministry made the rather weak reply that such payments should be left to the future for worry. These payments referred to the annual subsidies to be paid the German princes. In the case of Brunswick the subsidies were to continue for two years after the return of the soldiers and in the cases of the Landgrave of Hesse and the Count of Hanzau for one year (I, 1, pp. 1-3).

On the following day, March 5, 1776, in the House of Lords, the Duke of Richmond proposed an address to the King in which he complained that the use of the German mercenaries was an open confession to the world that Great Britain could not supply its own armies (I, 1, pp. 36-39). The address also stated that they would rather see Britain give in to the colonies than have such mercenaries used. It suggested that the use by Britain of foreign troops might drive the Americans to seek alliances in Europe

and complained that the treaty with the Landgrave of Hesse carried the provision that, in case he were attacked, the British should come to his aid. Thus, the reasoning went on, for the mere employment of troops Britain was placing herself in a position to be dragged into a continental war. The proposition to the King closed thus:*

Ainsi, nous supplions très humblement V. M. de donner, sans délai, des ordres pour arrêter la marche des troupes de Hesse, de Brunswick et de Hanau, et pour suspendre les hostilités en Amérique, afin de parvenir à une réconciliation prompte et durable entre les deux grandes parties contendantes de ce malheureux Empire (I, 1, p. 39).¹

The Duke of Richmond, speaking for his plan, charged that Britain was buying soldiers as one would buy cattle to butcher (I, 1, pp. 40-41). He feared that by hiring these troops his country would not only lose its honor, but also America, if the conquest were not successful (I, 1, p. 42). He reminded the Lords that no good had come from treaties with the Landgraves of Hesse since the turn of the century (I, 1, p. 42). The Duke of Manchester criticised the ministry for garrisoning such strongholds as Gibraltar with foreigners (I, 1, pp. 49-50).

Lord Carlisle upheld the ministry by citing the impossibility of the small home island furnishing enough soldiers for the protection of the extensive British possessions (I, 1, pp. 56-57). Lord Townshend said that the use of the mercenaries would bring the war to an early end, thus reducing

* Throughout this thesis the notation & is written et. Otherwise the original spelling, capitalization, italicizing, and punctuation are maintained.

¹ Thus, we very humbly entreat Your Majesty to give without delay the orders to stop the march of the troops of Hesse, Brunswick, and Hanau, and to suspend the hostilities in America, in order to arrive at a prompt and durable reconciliation between the two contending parts of this unfortunate empire.

expenses and lessening the danger of foreign attack on the British Isles (I, 1, pp. 66-68). Lord Suffolk also spoke in behalf of the ministry (I, 1, pp. 68-71). Lord Shelburne went into the spiritual angle of the affair by stating that the Hessians would fight only as machines and not for their country. Britishers, he said, would volunteer for service in larger numbers if the treatment of the soldiers were more humane (I, 2, p. 5). Even though Lord Suffolk had earlier assured the assembly that the alliance clauses in the German treaties were mere formalities (I, 1, p. 69), Shelburne said that such clauses could well draw England into a general European war (I, 2, pp. 9-11). He requested haste in reconciling the quarrel so that it might be done before the Hessians arrived in America and made reconciliation impossible (I, 2, p. 11).

The strength of the North ministry in the House of Lords at this time was shown by the fact that the proposition of address to the King as read by the Duke of Richmond was easily rejected (I, 2, p. 11).

The chronological journal of the Affaires reported, under the date of March 15, 1776, the fact that the shipping of the German mercenaries to America was not going forward at all well (I, 4, pp. 2-3). In fact, only a very small number had even left the German territories. Their transports were delayed by such difficulties as the lack of kegs for water and the bad condition of many of the ships, at least one of which had to be condemned. It was reported that the Brunswick mercenaries, while actually at Spithead, in southern England, were being held up by an extreme shortage of the most essential articles, one of which was shoes. The discussion of these difficulties entered into the Parliamentary debates, where, in the House of Lords on

March 15, 1776, Lord Suffolk, negotiator of the German treaties (V, 21, p. 12) and ordinarily an administration supporter, raised his voice, along with those of the opposition, in criticism of the condition of the British navy (I, 4, pp. 3-9).

On March 22, 1776, the mayor, aldermen, and common council of London offered a request to the King to stop the war (I, 5, pp. 16-17). In the course of the reasons for their demand they submitted the idea that many calamities would result from the employment of mercenaries.

In the house of Commons, March 25, 1776, a bill to permit foreign sailors, not to exceed three-fourths of the crew of a ship, to serve aboard merchantmen occasioned this comment by Luttrell of the opposition party:

Nos armées en Amérique . . . seront composées d'étrangers: la plupart de nos garnisons en Europe seront confiées à la garde des étrangers: les deux tiers de nos bâtimens de commerce seront équipés par des étrangers et ils auront en leur possession les ports de Portsmouth, de Plimouth et le centre même de votre Empire (I, 5, p. 25).²

Later, after the passage of the bill, Luttrell proposed a modification stating that no French or Spanish citizens be hired to serve on British ships. France and Spain were Britain's traditional enemies, and it was already feared that they might enter the war against England. Luttrell also remarked that Englishmen hated so much to fight their American countrymen that the government was forced to hire foreigners to do it (I, 5, pp. 26-27).

Apparently little success in moving the mercenaries was being achieved at this time. The Affaires, in a report dated April 25, 1776, noted that the transport ships carrying the Hessian troops had arrived off the Isle of

² Our armies in America . . . will be composed of foreigners and most of our garrisons in Europe will be entrusted to the guard of the foreigners. Two-thirds of our merchant ships will be manned by foreigners and they will have in their possession the ports of Portsmouth, Plymouth and the very center of your empire.

Wight (II, 7, p. 23). A report dated April 27, 1776, told of the London Court Gazette's story of the same event (II, 7, p. 29). This story added that the Hessians were in very good condition and were anxious to leave for America. However, under the date of April 30, 1776, the Affaires stated that the Hessians did not wish to leave for America until the remainder of their army arrived (II, 7, p. 38). Although the treaties stipulated that all Hessians should go together to America, the King requested that they embark without their comrades. The Affaires implied criticism of the Court Gazette by recalling that this paper had reported earlier the readiness of the Hessians to continue their journey.

That the first division of these troops would be in England for some time, unless they complied with the King's request to continue without the second division, was shown by the report, under date of May 2, 1776, that the second division of the Hessians and the regiment from Hanau were ready to leave Germany but could not do so because of a lack of transports (II, 8, pp. 2-3). They were thus not expected to be at Spithead before June 1, 1776, because the Dutch and Hamburg ships rented for transporting them were as yet occupied in discharging cargoes along the Thames River. That this estimate was not far wrong is shown by a report dated May 22, 1776, which told of the arrival of two Hessian regiments on the previous day (III, 11, pp. 22-23). However, the first division did not wait for them, as is noted by an extract of a letter from Spithead, May 2, 1776. This letter stated that the fleet of transports carrying foreign troops and conducted by Commodore Hotham and six warships would leave Spithead on the following day (II, 8, p. 3). The London banker, in his letters of

May 4 and 17, 1776, gave much the same report of the activities of the Hessians (I, 1, pp. 101-103 and I, 2, pp. 78-79). He tried to throw scorn on the use of the mercenaries by telling that some of the Hessian officers had brought coaches with them (I, 1, p. 101).

The criticism by the opposition did nothing to halt the use of mercenaries. Under the date of May 1, 1776, in reporting that another treaty for mercenaries had been made, the Affaires said:

Le Lord Suffolk remet à la Chambre une copie du Traité conclu par le Roi avec son Altesse Sérénissime le Prince de Waldeck, pour prendre au service de sa Majesté, un corps de troupes de ce Prince: cette copie est laissée sur le bureau pour être lue par les Lords (II, 7, p. 45).³

In connection with this, the Affaires printed a footnote giving the entire treaties made with the Duke of Brunswick, the Landgrave of Hesse, and the Count of Hanau (II, 7, pp. 46-47). At the same time it printed in the regular section the text of the treaty with the Prince of Waldeck (II, 7, pp. 46-49). On the same date, May 1, 1776, Lord North submitted this treaty to the House of Commons (II, 8, p. 2).

The London banker's letter of May 17, 1776, discussed the effects which the news that the Hessians were coming might have on America. It was his theory that Howe's evacuation of Boston was caused by Washington's efforts to drive the British out (I, 2, p. 71). These efforts, he felt,

³ Lord Suffolk remits to the House a copy of the treaty concluded by the King with his Most Serene Highness the Prince of Waldeck. This treaty takes into the service of his Majesty a body of troops of this prince. This copy is left on the desk to be read by the Lords.

were increased by the news of the coming of the Hessians. He also expressed the opinion that Georgia, generally considered loyal, was driven to revolt by the news that Britain was going to use mercenaries. With Georgia on their side the Americans would be able to capture the Jamaica commerce which always followed a route past Georgia (I, 2, pp. 71-72).

The journal for May, 1776, noted the departure for America of several transports carrying two Hessian regiments (VI, 26, p. 3). These were probably the same two regiments whose arrival in England from Germany was noted earlier. They had arrived in England on May 21, 1776 (III, 11, pp. 22-23). This journal for May, 1776, also noted that the only thing holding up the arrival of the remainder of the German auxiliaries was an insufficient supply of transports. Other movements of the mercenaries were noted in the same journal when the report was made of the embarkment in Germany of a division of Brunswick troops and a regiment from Waldeck and the arrival at the port of embarkment of another division of Hessians (VI, 26, p. 6). The journal for June, 1776, told of the arrival at Portsmouth of these Brunswick troops. At this time it was announced that all the troops from Brunswick and Hanau were then at Portsmouth (VIII, 32, p. 84). On June 18, 1776, all the transports carrying the second division of the Hessians also arrived (VIII, 32, p. 99), and on June 20 the troops from Waldeck arrived (VIII, 34, p. 115). The troops did not remain long at Portsmouth for by June 28, 1776, all these troop transports, convoyed by several warships, had left for America (VIII, p. 159-160). At the same time the Affaires printed the announcement of the Admiralty that all was well with the transports and convoys then at sea carrying the first division of Hessian troops (VIII, p. 161). These troops arrived at Halifax on June 23, 1776 (II, 7,

pp. 76-77). It was rumored that American privateers had captured two transports containing seven hundred of these troops (II, 7, p. 88). An extract of a letter from Plymouth, July 7, 1776, told of the arrival of the second division of Hessians there from Portsmouth (VIII, p. 179). This fleet continued its journey on July 19 (VIII, p. 232).

This ended the Affaires' reports on the movements of the foreign troops. This chapter will now consider the effects on England and America of the use of the mercenaries and the conduct of these troops in America.

The work of the Hessians in America was mentioned usually only incidentally. In his letter of November 8, 1776, the London banker told of dispatches dated September 21, 23, and 24, 1776, from General Howe to the ministry (III, 12, p. lxxxij). These dispatches told of the British capture of New York and of an encounter which took place on September 15 between some Hessians, marching toward New York, and some American troops. The section designated Gazette patriotique in the banker's letter of January 21, 1777, contained the remark that many Hessians were killed or reported missing in the taking of New York. The same section of his letter of February 8, 1777, decried the loss of men in America and accused the ministry of paying for 54,000 troops in America when less than 30,000 were actually there (IV, 16, pp. xxx-xxxj). This shortage of men caused the government to hire 10,000 more German mercenaries (IV, 16, p. xxxij).

The letter of February 24, 1777, reported Washington's surprise attack of December 26, 1776, on the Hessian brigade at Trenton and the total defeat of two British regiments by an American detachment a week later (IV, 17, p. lx). At the time of the attack on Trenton Washington captured all of

the Hessian flags and various munitions. Twelve hundred Hessians were killed, imprisoned, or reported missing. In this attack the Hessian Colonel Rall was mortally wounded and both of his regiments were captured as was that of his fellow officer, Knyphausen. All three regiments, together with their equipment, were then removed to the Pennsylvania side of the Delaware River. General Howe laid the blame for this capture on Colonel Rall for having allowed himself to be drawn out to battle rather than remaining to guard the village (IV, 17, p. cxxiv). The Americans released these Hessian prisoners to spread through the country where many German settlers were living (IV, 17, pp. cxxix-cxxx).

At this point the banker printed a letter written by a Hessian soldier in Pennsylvania to his cousin in Germany (IV, 18, pp. cliv-clxij). This soldier was one of those captured at Trenton who subsequently took up his residence with a German-American family in Pennsylvania. He described the horrible trip across the Atlantic in which one-sixth of his regiment died. In spite of their illnesses the soldiers were forced to undergo severe marches as soon as they landed. They were always placed in the front lines when fighting was to be done but were not allowed much of the booty. The writer blamed their defeat at Trenton on the strange type of warfare employed by the Americans and the heavy snow. He expressed sorrow over the death of Colonel Rall at Trenton. The Americans, he wrote, supplied them with clothing from huge stores captured from the British. They they were released to live among the German residents of Pennsylvania. His new life was so wonderful that he and his comrades had decided to remain in America.

A totally different impression but not a different story of the Hessians was given in another letter, written this time by an Englishman at New York on January 17, 1777. He wrote:

Il faut convenir que les Rebelles se sont comportés de maniere à nous donner d'eux une opinion très-différente de celle que nous avions prise si généralement jusqu'à ce moment-là; et malheureusement nous ne sommes que trop fondés à penser différemment aussi sur le compte des Hessois et de quelques autres troupes étrangères. Il est certain que le Congrès n'a négligé aucun moyen pour les débaucher: qu'ils ont mis bas les armes à la première attaque, et n'ayant eu que sept hommes tués: qu'ils ont été reçus à Philadelphie plutôt comme amis que comme ennemis; qu'ils y ont marché dans les principales rues de Philadelphie, tambour battant et drapeaux déployés (IV, 18, pp. clxxv-clxxvj).

In connection with Washington's capture of the Hessians, the banker again found occasion to discredit the London Court Gazette. He wondered if the Hessians had no arms, munitions, or provisions because the Court Gazette said nothing about them (IV, 18, pp. clxxiv-clxxv). Yet when General Howe captured anything it was accounted a glorious success.

On April 30, 1777, the banker reported that disputes were taking place between the British and German troops (IV, 20, pp. ccxlvj-ccxlviij). A report of an affair of this kind was given in his next letter when he wrote that General Howe was forced to rush to Brunswick, New Jersey, on February 21, 1777, to halt a lively quarrel between the British and Hessian troops (IV, 21, p. xl). The dissension was again mentioned in the report

⁴ It must be agreed that the rebels have behaved in such a manner as to give us a different opinion of them than we have had so generally until this moment. Unfortunately we are forced to think differently also in the matter of the Hessians and of some other foreign troops. It is certain that Congress has not neglected any means of debauching them. They lowered their arms at the first attack, having had only seven men killed; they were received at Philadelphia more as friends than enemies; and they marched in the principal streets of Philadelphia, drums beating and flags unfurled.

of the American attack on Staten Island on August 24, 1777 (VI, 30, p. cxviiij).

The next letter from the London banker, that of May 28, 1777, told that after the British captured Fort Washington near New York they renamed it Fort Mifflin in honor of the Hessian officer of that name (V, 22, p. xcij). In a political pamphlet sent to the people of Bristol, Edmund Burke wrote that this name brought no charm to the ear of an Englishman (V, 23, p. cxxxv). He preceded this statement by saying that he could not be happy over British victories in which names familiar to him since his childhood were among the lists of dead and captured, especially when they were massacred by the mercenaries. He added that victories⁵ such as that gained by Colonel Hall at Fort Washington, New York, on November 16, 1776, did not cause him to rejoice (V, 23, pp. cxxxiv-cxxxv).

In speaking of the difficult time the ministry had to finance the war, the London banker, on October 18, 1777, mentioned that they would have a more difficult time getting funds in 1778 because twelve thousand more German troops had been hired for the campaign of that year. Thus the total of mercenaries was raised to thirty-seven thousand (VI, 29, pp. clv-clvj).

In his letter of December 9, 1777, the banker wondered if the German rulers would not be sorry that they had exhausted their countries of soldiers in order to wage war against the Americans (VII, 33, p. c). He went on to say that many of the Hessians would remain in America to aid in driving the

⁵ George Bancroft, History of the United States of America from the Discovery of the Continent (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1879), Vol. V, pp. 451-453.

English from that country.

Now and then notices which tended to criticize the usefulness of the Hessians to the British cause were printed. One such notice was that of the speech of Lord Shelburne in the House of Lords on December 5, 1777, when he said that he had heard indisputable reports of how a battalion of Hessian grenadiers, the élite of the German troops, with twenty-two officers, was cut to pieces by six hundred Americans defending a fort (VII, 34, p. clviij). Another such report was that made by the banker on December 18, 1777. Here he reported that a certain British general had been killed at more than a hundred paces ahead of the corps of Germans which he commanded and which he had never been able to get to follow him (VII, 34, p. ccix). The letter of August 28, 1778, told of the attack of the Americans, June 28, 1778, on the rearguard of the British, who were nearing New York after evacuating Philadelphia. An American report of the affair said that the Hessians absolutely refused to fight, saying that it was too warm (XI, p. cclxxij). In the same letter an extract taken from another letter read as follows:

Il est pourtant vrai que les Hessois ont déserté par compagnies entières pendant tout le mois de Juin. On en a compté jusqu'à dix-huit cents vingt, qui ont tous demandé à être envoyés dans le pays, ce qu'on leur accorde toujours (XI, p. cclxxv).⁶

Another report concerning the friendliness of the Hessians to America was given on December 22, 1778. Here the London banker announced that Burgoyne's

⁶ It is, however, true that the Hessians have deserted by entire companies during all the month of June. As many as one thousand eight hundred twenty have been counted who have all demanded to be sent into the country. This favor has always been granted them.

troops were being moved from Boston to the south to save money in keeping them. The Hessians in this army were reported to be more peaceful than the English (XIII, p. lxvij).

After a careful study of the problem of foreign mercenaries as presented by the Affaires, one concludes that the opposition in England to the use of such soldiers was of no very great extent. Probably a large amount of this opposition was more a matter of opposition to the ministry rather than actual opposition to the use of the mercenaries. That the Parliamentary opposition was relatively small was shown throughout by the small number of opposition votes on proposals concerning the German soldiers. However, the casting of the opposition in such a formidable role by the Affaires was entirely in accordance with the unavowed but evident plan of trying to bring about French aid for the Americans.

From the reports given in this periodical on the conduct of the foreign troops in America, it is difficult to ascertain their actual value in aiding the British. These reports indicate that their assistance was of small importance. From the comparatively large number of foreign troops employed, one would conclude that they must have aided the British considerably. However, the hiring of these troops served to rouse the Americans to greater resistance.⁷ The reason for reporting their conduct in the manner used by the Affaires was probably to discredit the English forces and to impress the French with the good chances for an American victory.

⁷ George Wrong, Washington and His Comrades in Arms, Vol. VII, part 2, The Struggle for Independence. Allen Johnson, editor, The Chronicles of America Series, Benjamin Franklin edition (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1921), p. 180.

CHAPTER III

RECONCILIATION

The purpose of this chapter will be to study the criticism in England of the efforts of the government to force the Americans to submit to British rule. Special emphasis will be placed on concrete proposals for reconciliation. The study will be divided into three main sections. The first part will be concerned with the general opposition to the war as reflected in debates in Parliament, in Price's pamphlet on civil liberty, in petitions from various groups, and in opinions expressed by the London banker. The second section of the chapter will discuss the peace commission of the Howe brothers, and the last division will be a study of Lord North's conciliatory proposals of 1778.

General opposition to the war. In the House of Lords on March 5, 1776, the Duke of Manchester¹ expressed his opinion that the Americans would submit to the British if England would only assure them a fair and cooperative government and the right to levy their own taxes (I, 1, p. 56). America, he said, was a powerful nation and Britain should cease considering them rebels (I, 1, p. 52). Lord Coventry said that America's natural resources made her too great to remain under English control. Since the most important connection between Britain and America was, in his opinion, their commerce, the English should insure the future friendship of the

¹ Supra, p. 8.

Americans (I, 1, p. 58). Lord Camden asked for haste in reconciling the difficulties with the Americans before the Hessians² arrived there and aroused the Americans to a greater fighting fury and made reconciliation impossible. It was also his opinion that the Americans would never be happy without freedom (I, 2, p. 11). Lord Effingham did not believe that England had enough troops to conquer America and still defend the British Isles (I, 1, pp. 59-61). Lords Carlisle and Talbot disagreed with these speakers. Carlisle felt that nothing but ruin could result for England from a cessation of the hostilities and that such action would bring at least a moral victory for the Americans (I, 1, pp. 56-57). Talbot considered that the loosening of British control over America would mean that the Americans would become more insolent. Furthermore, he argued, the right of taxation must rest with the sovereign (I, 1, pp. 62-63).

In the House of Lords on March 14, 1776, the Duke of Grafton presented a motion to address a resolution to the King. According to this petition, the King was to promise the Americans a suspension of warfare until they could present a petition of rights and grievances and Parliament could examine and reply to this petition. In support of his motion Grafton said that Parliament should give up the idea that America must be forced to submit unconditionally. He also laid before the Lords the threat of a war with France and Spain (I, 3, pp. 20-28). The Duke of Richmond charged that all efforts to reconcile the dispute failed because the ministry refused to negotiate with Congress when that body was the only one which had authority to conduct negotiations. He promised to support the complete use of force

² SUPRA, pp. 7-8.

if Grafton's resolution were presented to the Americans and they refused it (I, 3, pp. 39-45). Lord Sandwich replied that the use of force was the only just method of treatment for America (I, 3, p. 38). Lords Hillsborough and Littleton declared that Britain's sovereignty included the power of taxation of the colonies (I, 3, pp. 45-51 and 56-58). Littleton added that a cessation of hostilities would only serve to give the colonies time to provide for added resistance (I, 3, pp. 56-58). Lord Shelburne replied to these assertions by saying that the power of taxation should reside in the colonies (I, 3, p. 52).

In the House of Commons on April 30, 1776, Mr. Wilkes made a highly emotional speech in which he decried the inhuman efforts of the British to break the indomitable spirit of freedom of the Americans, their brothers (II, 7, pp. 43-44). On May 6, Edmund Burke said that everything that Lord North's ministry had done tended to bring American independence nearer reality (II, 9, 3). On May 9, Lord Mayor Sawbridge of London proposed to the Commons that America should be organized on the same basis as Ireland with respect to taxation and internal administration (II, 9, 27). Administration supporters replied that before this could be done the rebellion in America had to be put down (II, 9, 28).

After the address of the King to the opening session of Parliament early in November, 1776, the House of Lords debated on the response. The King had stated his intention of carrying on the war until the Americans submitted (III, 12, pp. xlvj-ij). The Marquis of Rockingham proposed a contrary address which asked the King to offer the Americans a conciliatory proposal designed to reestablish peace and union between the two countries.

This address laid the blame for the revolt on the shoulders of the North ministry (III, 12, p. lv). In the debates on this proposal the Duke of Richmond said that he saw no chance of reconciliation except through British recognition of American independence (III, 12, p. lviiij). Lord Cardiff charged the Americans with ingratitude and said that the Declaration of Independence did not have the consent of the people. He laid the blame on Hancock and Adams (III, 12, pp. lvj-lvij). The contrary address proposed by Rockingham was registered under the title of a protest and signed by twelve members of the opposition (III, 12, p. lxiv). In the House of Commons at the same time George Johnstone, later one of the commissioners for reconciliation, accused the ministry of forcing America to make the Declaration of Independence (III, 12, p. lxvj).

The London banker's letter of November 17, 1777, reported a speech of Lord Chatham to the House of Lords. In this address Chatham asked that a proposal be made to the King for a cessation of hostilities in America (VII, 32, p. lxix). On the same day Lord Grenville proposed, in the House of Commons, that a petition be included in the address to the King asking him to stop the hostilities (VII, 32, p. lxxij). Colonel Johnston expressed his hope for a settlement on the basis of conditions as they were in 1760. Moreover, he felt that the whole British cause was wrong if such fine generals as they had could not win the war (VII, 32, p. lxxij). However, Lord North insisted that Parliament could not think of peace until victory was assured (VII, 32, p. lxxvj).

The banker's letter of December 12, 1777, printed the condemnation

of American conduct by former Governor Pownall of Massachusetts. In spite of this condemnation, Governor Pownall felt that coercion was impractical and that the only thing remaining to do was to recognize American independence and to build up a union existing on treaties and a reciprocity of interests (VII, 34, p. cl). The same letter told of Lord Chatham's appeal of December 5, 1777, in the House of Lords for the recall of every soldier from America (VII, 34, p. clvj). Lord Littleton, supporting the ministry as always, replied that the Americans would mock the British if the troops were withdrawn before the negotiation of peace (VII, 34, p. clvj).

Farther on, in this same letter of December 12, 1777, the London banker reported the debates in the House of Commons on December 10. One member, Wilkes, asked for a revocation of all acts concerning America which had been passed since 1763 (VII, 34, p. clix). Lord North replied that he was sure the next year would find America forced to accept British conditions and that then was not the time for such a proposal as that by Wilkes (VII, 34, p. clx). In the debates on adjournment Lord North added that he believed that America did not wish to arbitrate, while Burke insisted that America would be ready for reconciliation when Lord North and his friends were ready to sacrifice what was called the right and supreme authority of England (VII, 34, p. clxij). Lord North further assured the Commons that if he saw that the nation could not bear the expenses necessary to continue the war, he would make peaceful overtures to America (VII, 34, p. clxiv). The Duke of Richmond insisted that Britain was in no condition to conquer America and that she must forget all pretensions to supremacy and must recognize the independence of the colonies as a basis for negotiation (VII, 34, pp. clxix-clxx).

The reports on these debates in Parliament make it appear that the opposition was in a strong position. However, most of the speeches, as reported here, were made by a comparatively small number of men. The Affaires printed a large percentage of the speeches made by the members of the opposition party while printing very few of the remarks of the supporters of the ministry. It is also worthy of note that the opposition were united in their demands for a peaceful settlement of the dispute but could offer no plans for achieving this result.

In 1776 there appeared in England a pamphlet entitled Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, on the Principles of Government, and on the Justice and Policy of the War with America. This pamphlet was written by Richard Price,³ Doctor of Theology and member of the London Royal Society. This writing attained a great deal of fame in England, especially among those who opposed the war with America. The first mention made of this pamphlet in the Affaires was in the Journal of Volume I. Here was the report of the proceedings of the assembly of the East India Company on March 13, 1776. Lord Saxby introduced a resolution to offer thanks to Doctor Price for the Observations. The East India Company was anxious to stop the war because of the harm being done to its commerce. The quotations made from the pamphlet at this place were those relating largely to finance. One mentioned Britain's inestimable loss of trade with America. At this time the assembly passed two resolutions on this subject. The first was

³ Cf., Elizabeth Peters, "The American Revolution as Seen in the Gazette de Leyde (1774-83)," (unpublished Master's thesis, Kansas State Teachers College of Emporia, 1938), p. 52.

to thank Doctor Price and the other to grant him an annuity of fifty pounds sterling (I, 3, pp. 9-15). Another reference to Price's pamphlet was made by Charles Fox in the debates of May 22, 1776, in the House of Commons. Fox felt that Price had opened the eyes of the public to the imminent ruin of Great Britain (III, 11, p. 16).

The Affaires later printed the pamphlet in its entirety (III, 12-14, pp. 45-251). At this point the editor expressed his opinion that this writing was highly applicable to the Affaires' discussions of conditions in England and America because the American Declaration of Independence followed Price's political doctrine and even copied some of his expressions (III, 12, p. 42). In his pamphlet Doctor Price spent a great deal of time discussing the rights of the colonies. In all cases he found Britain's side of the quarrel to be unjust. His plan of reconciliation, given near the end of his essay, was the same as one which the banker said was proposed in the House of Lords by the Count of Shelburne. The plan involved the repeal of the troublesome laws, the reservation for England of the right to regulate commerce, and the recognition of and aid in the payment of the British national debt by all parts of the empire (III, 14, pp. 206-209).

From time to time the Affaires printed petitions from various groups to the King. These petitions usually had their origins in the financial effects of the war on the petitioning groups. The first was the petition of March 22, 1776, by the mayor, aldermen, and common council of London.⁴

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Supra, p. 10.

This request to the King set forth the poor state of the home defenses, the loss of national credit, the calamities which might result from the use of the mercenary soldiers, and the loss of business as a result of the war in America (I, 5, pp. 16-17). Concerning the Americans the petition stated:

Si on leur assure la jouissance paisable de leur chartes, elles consentent à nous continuer tous les avantages d'un commerce exclusif et régulier, auquel nous avons été long-tems redevables de notre opulence et de notre prospérité (I, 5, p. 18).⁵

The King's reply to this petition stated in effect that it was necessary that America be forced to submit (I, 5, pp. 19-20).

The next petition reported on the subject of conciliation was one of praise and support for the program as conducted by the ministers (II, 6, pp. 44-45). However, this petition from the mayor, sheriffs, common council, merchants, businessmen, and principal inhabitants of Cork, Ireland, was merely used by the editors to introduce the report of another petition from the inhabitants of the same city. The first petition, which appeared in the London Court Gazette, was discussed in the following manner by the editor of the Affaires: "Elle rappelle l'idée de ce pédant de l'antiquité qui portoit une brique dans sa poche comme un échantillon de sa maison (II, 6, p. 45)."⁶ Thus the editor felt that the first

⁵ If they (i.e., the Americans) are assured the peaceful enjoyment of their charters, they will consent to continue with us all the advantages of a regular and exclusive commerce to which we have long been indebted for our wealth and prosperity.

⁶ It recalls the idea of that pedant of antiquity who carried a brick in his pocket as a sample of his house.

petition was not a fair sample of the opinions of the residents of Cork.

The second petition from Cork, that of the inhabitants, was still in the formative stage when it was reported to the Affaires by a letter of April 13, 1776, from Cork. This address was to be entirely the opposite of the preceding one made by the leaders of the city and was to request the King to use nothing except conciliatory methods in dealing with America (II, 6, p. 45). It was probably this same petition which was presented on May 9, 1776, to the King by Lord Middleton, Colonel Barré, and Edmund Burke in the name of a group of residents of Cork (II, 9, pp. 24-27). This address complained of the loss of trade with America, of the harm done to the national honor by the introduction of mercenary troops into the war, and of the destruction of maritime towns in America. Their own loss of business in the cloth-making industry was great and Ireland was left almost without defense because so many troops were in America, it was said. These people feared that American privateers would destroy Irish coastal towns to avenge the destruction of American maritime communities by the British.

In his letter of May 4, 1776, the London banker quoted from Thomas Paine's Common Sense.⁷ Among the quotations given were the following:

"Prêcher la réconciliation, c'est prêcher une doctrine dangereuse . . . (I, 1, p. 85)."⁸ and "Le privilege de nous gouverner nous-mêmes est le

⁷ Cf., Carl Lotus Becker, The Eye of the American Revolution, Vol. VII, part I, The Struggle for Independence. Allen Johnson, editor, The Chronicles of America Series, Benjamin Franklin edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1918), p. 250.

⁸ To preach reconciliation is to preach a dangerous doctrine (i.e., for America).

droit naturel (I, 1, p. 87)."⁹ In his letter of June 5, 1776, the banker reviewed Paine's whole pamphlet (I, 4, pp. 33-103).

The letter of June 4, 1776, reported the King's message to Parliament. The King demanded that the Americans be brought to complete submission and said that the interest and well-being of the whole empire hinged on the outcome of this war. The banker considered this to mean that when America was defeated the taxes received from that country would ease the burden on the rest of the empire (I, 3, pp. 65-69).

On September 27, 1776, the banker presented his belief that a ruined commerce was inevitable for Britain if the war continued (II, 9, p. 70). A few pages later he expressed great hopes for peace (II, 9, p. 78). However, in his following letter of October 8, the banker said that he had changed his mind about the possibility of peace. Now he considered that the war might go on for several years (II, 10, p. 65).

The banker, on October 21, 1776, reprinted an article entitled Observations d'Aratus sur l'Etat des Affaires. After listing the errors made by the ministry in the conduct of the war and after describing the impracticability or even the impossibility of conquering America, the writer of this article said that the only way Britain could continue to reap benefits from America would be to stop the war and ask America to become simply an ally of Britain. Thus banded together, these two nations

⁹ The privilege of governing ourselves in the natural right.

would form the greatest power on earth (III, 11, pp. xvii-j-xix).

In this same letter he also expressed his belief that all hope of reconciliation had vanished. He pointed out that the Pennsylvania Assembly had, in August, 1776, declared its adhesion to the Declaration of Independence (III, 11, p. xxxvii-j). American governmental documents were again mentioned in the letter of February 24, 1777. Here it was reported that the Articles of Confederation had been well received in London. Many who had lost their friendship for America with the Declaration of Independence were said to have regained it with the Articles of Confederation. There was said to be increasing favor for the idea that Britain would do far better to make allies of the Americans than to try to conquer them (IV, 17, pp. lii-j-lv).

With regard to the campaign of 1777 in America the banker stated his belief that the ministry was aware of the fact that if nothing decisive were produced in the conquest of America, nothing could be hoped for from later efforts. Thus their task would be to end the war under the best conditions obtainable and to recognize American independence and make the Americans allies of Britain. The banker appeared certain that most of the supporters of independence in America thought that France would aid them and, if such were not the case, they would then be willing to accept the conditions set forth by Britain (V, 24, pp. ccxxiv-ccxxv).

In his letter of August 14, 1777, the London banker said that his hope of a year before for a prompt reconciliation or an early conquest was now gone and that he expected a general war (VI, 26, pp. j-ij). Now his hope was that the Americans would reject all offers of alliance with a

people who had sworn to subject or exterminate them. (VI, 26, p. vii). This same letter printed an article entitled Réflexions d'un Observateur. The object of this writing was to show the value of a simple union of interests between Britain and America and the harm which would come to Britain if America made such an alliance with rival powers of Great Britain (VI, 26, pp. vii-xxii). The banker believed that Benjamin Franklin had written this article (VI, 26, p. vii).

In the letter of October 18, 1777, the banker gave a discussion of American credit and commerce. Here he showed the necessity of British control over American commerce which was sure to grow rapidly as time passed (VI, 29, pp. cxxv-cxlii). A comparison of the credit of Britain and the American states was wholly favorable to America (VI, 29, pp. cxlii-cxlv). Finally, the banker, on February 8, 1778, doubted that there was any possibility that the Americans could be induced to renounce independence and return to the British fold. This could have been done, the banker believed, at the beginning of the quarrel when the Americans would have given Parliament the option of either controlling American commerce or taxing the American people (VII, 36, pp. cccl-ccclj).

The Howe peace commission. The foregoing discussion shows that the London banker's letters served a purpose much the same as do modern editorials, that of expressing opinions instead of supplying news. All other comments by the London banker on reconciliation are related to either the Howe peace commission or Lord North's conciliatory proposals and will be discussed where they apply. It was in these letters from the banker that the announcement of the granting of peace commissions to the

Howe brothers was made (I, 3, p. 70). These commissions were based on a Parliamentary resolution¹⁰ of February 20, 1775. The earliest date in the Affaires concerning the granting of these commissions came in the Journal of Volume II. Here under the date of May 2, 1776, Governor Tryon of New York province wrote a letter from his ship in North River to David Matthews, mayor of New York City. The letter was printed in the New York Gazette. It asked the people to embrace the chance to submit which was to be offered them by the King's commissioners (II, 8, pp. 29-32).

On May 3, 1776, the commission naming Lord and General Howe commissioners of the King to grant pardons to those Americans who would lay down their arms received the approval of the King (II, 8, p. 61). On May 9 in a speech to the House of Commons, Edmund Burke belittled the commissions given to the Howes (II, 9, pp. 29-30). On the following day in the House of Lords, the Duke of Manchester employed much the same procedure when he stated that the Howes would do no good if they had only the right to pardon. The Americans, he said, would not seek pardons. He further stated that Britain might soon be asking America's pardon if conditions continued as they had been (II, 9, pp. 40-41).

The following reports show that the plan to have the Howe brothers receive submissions from the Americans was not generally known. On May 22,

¹⁰ George Bancroft, History of the United States of America from the Discovery of the Continent. 6 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1879), Vol. V, p. 244.

1776, in the House of Commons, General Conway moved that the King be requested to communicate to the House the instructions given to the Howes (III, 11, pp. 5-6). He charged that North's ministry had not allowed any of the complaints of the colonies early in the dispute to reach either the King or Parliament (III, 11, p. 6). No taxation unless there was representation, he said, was the keystone of the British political organization; yet the only crime of the Americans was to insist upon this (III, 11, p. 8). Conway wondered how Parliament could aid in conducting the negotiations with America if it did not know the bases of negotiation (III, 11, p. 9). Lord North's answer was that it was against all policies of the administration to disclose to Parliament the instructions given to the commissioners (III, 11, pp. 13-14). Edmund Burke insisted that it was Parliament's business to know what was happening (III, 11, pp. 14-15). Fox doubted that the commissioners had any power except that of carrying everywhere the sword, fire, and desolation (III, 11, pp. 15-16). Adams, a member of the House of Commons, declared that he expected no success to come from this peace commission (III, 11, pp. 16-17). Finally, Lord George Germain, the secretary in charge of the department of America, arose and stated that the instructions to the Howes allowed them only to receive submissions (III, 11, p. 18). Colonel Baré closed the debate by saying that Lord and General Howe, great as they were in their respective fields, were not the proper men to carry on a conciliatory commission (III, 11, pp. 18-19). The motion of General Conway requesting the Howes' instructions was rejected (III, 11, p. 20). This same incident was reported in the London banker's letter of June 4, 1776 (I, 3, pp. 70-74).

Sometimes in May, 1776, the ministry sent new instructions to Lord and General Howe ordering them to subjugate the colonies one by one and to receive the submissions of those disposed to recognize the King's authority. Those towns whose inhabitants persisted in their rebellion were to be burned (VI, 26, p. 5).

How great the chances were for the Howes' peace commission to succeed were shown by two reports given in the journal of Volume VI. The first was that of an act passed April 16, 1776, by the general assembly of South Carolina. This act forbade all communication with the emissaries of the King. Such persons could negotiate with Congress only. If they came to South Carolina they could not remain there more than forty-eight hours (VI, 28, pp. 85-87). The second report was of a speech made by Chief Justice William Drayton of South Carolina to his grand jury, April 23, 1776. He stated that there could be no reconciliation as long as the navigation acts remained on the books or as long as British troops and fortifications remained in America (VI, 29, p. 119). Another report having a bearing on this subject was made by the banker on June 6, 1776. Here was given a letter of April 15, 1776, from Philadelphia. This letter reported that Congress was awaiting the arrival of the commissioners to see if America could count on an honorable submission. If not, Congress had decided upon a declaration of independence (I, 3, p. 92).

The letter of June 15, 1776, reprinted a dialogue entitled la Réconciliation, Dialogue entre la mère et la fille (I, 4, pp. 87-92). The mother in this dialogue represented England and the daughter was America. Commenting on the dialogue, the banker said, "Dieu veuille que les commissions

conciiliatoires ne servent pas plutôt à le reculer qu'à l'avancer."¹¹

Apparently the banker's hope for the success of the Howes in this work was no greater than the hopes of many of the members of Parliament.

It was in June of 1776 that the Howes started work on the conciliatory mission. Reports to be given later indicate that it was Lord Howe, admiral of His Majesty's fleet in America, who was doing most of the work. These reports also show what success, or lack of it, was achieved. The banker's letter of September 27, 1776, printed news taken from a Virginia paper. This news told that Admiral Howe appeared off the coast of Massachusetts June 20 and wrote a circular letter to the various British provincial governors. He stated his mission as peace commissioner and asked them to make his declaration of pardons public. On Sunday, July 14, 1776, Lord Howe¹² sent a letter to George Washington but it was refused. A second effort of July 16 to reach Washington also was refused because it was addressed to him as a private citizen rather than as commander-in-chief of the army. Congress, on July 19, 1776, approved Washington's action in refusing the letter (II, 9, pp. 73-77).

More about this same case was reported in the banker's next letter, that of October 8, 1776. The banker quoted from a letter of Lord Howe to Lord Germain on the subject of his efforts toward peace in America. Howe

¹¹ May God grant that the conciliatory commissions not serve to retard rather than to advance it (i.e., reconciliation).

¹² Op., George Wrong, Washington and His Comrades in Arms, Vol. VII, part 2, The Struggle for Independence. Allen Johnson, editor, The Chronicles of America Series, Benjamin Franklin edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921), pp. 86-87.

apparently had little hope that his messages would reach the governors to whom they were addressed. The banker added that it would have done no good if they had. He further berated Howe for not addressing Washington properly. Howe had reported that the Rhode Island government promised to send a copy of his declaration to Congress. This, the banker felt, was another error because Congress was the only body with which the British could negotiate; therefore the original declaration should have been addressed to it. The banker ended this report with facetious remarks about offering pardons to troops which the British feared to attack (II, 10, pp. 67-70).

The letter of November 8, 1776, reported the debates mentioned previously on the subject of a reply to the King's message at the opening of Parliament. In the House of Commons during this debate Colonel Barré asked what conditions of conciliation the ministry had offered to America (III, 12, p. lxxv). Lord North replied by reading the proclamation which Lord Howe had addressed to the provincial governors (III, 12, p. lxxvj). Lord George Germain blamed Washington for the failure of Howe's proposals (III, 12, p. lxxix). These proposals were printed in this same letter and a study of them showed that nothing was offered America in return for its submission (III, 12, pp. lxxix-lxx).

On November 30, 1776, the Howes published another proclamation in which they invited the communities and individuals of the various provinces to ask for the pardon of the King (III, 14, p. clxix). On March 15, 1777, the banker reprinted a letter from Lord Howe to Benjamin Franklin. Howe wrote that he desired a speedy reconciliation of the troubles between America and Britain. However, he said that Britain must first be assured of a

continuance of her monopoly on American commerce (IV, 18, pp. cxxxvj-cxxxvij). Franklin's reply¹³ was that Howe was only wasting his time trying to reconcile the dispute on the basis of American submission. The cruelties perpetrated by the British in America had destroyed every spark of affection for Britain and had rendered submission impossible. Franklin concluded with the statement that Britain might negotiate with America as with any other foreign nation and in doing so might conclude a treaty of peace before the Americans contracted a foreign alliance (IV, 18, pp. cxxxvij-cxliij). Another letter received in London from Franklin gave the same idea that peace was impossible on the basis of complete submission (IV, 18, p. clxxij).

This same letter from the London banker reported that signed and sealed pardons distributed by Governor Tryon in New York had become an article of commerce in that region. Those Americans who had affairs to conduct in the British lines bought them and then went where they pleased. The ministerial newspapers had listed the names of a large number of rebels who had come to New York to receive the pardons accorded them by Lord Howe's proclamation. The banker added that not a person of known importance or wealth was among those pardoned (IV, 18, p. clxxiv).

On April 30, 1777, the banker reported that General Howe had asked Washington for a suspension of arms but that Washington refused (IV, 20, pp. cxxliv). In this same month, on April 2, 1777, the banker had stated

¹³ Of., Peters, op. cit., p. 47.

that the Declaration of Independence had destroyed all hope of reconciliation and that Britain would have to treat America as an equal from then on (IV, 19, p.cxciv).

On May 30, 1777, Lord Chatham, taken very ill, made an appearance in the House of Lords proclaiming that the ruin of Britain was near:

Si on s'obstine à poursuivre la guerre de l'Amérique: si au contraire on ne le cesse pas sur le champ, l'Angleterre va être perdue sans ressource. La plus prompte réconciliation entre les Américains et leur Mere-patrie, est le seul moyen de salut qui lui reste. Tout délai ne fût-il, que de six semaines, rendra cette réconciliation impossible (V, 22, p. xcviij).¹⁴

Lord Chatham censured bitterly the so-called full powers given to the Howe brothers to negotiate with the Americans. He stated that nothing was more absurd than to pretend to conquer such a vast country with a few English and German soldiers. He made several more observations on the refusal of Parliament to receive petitions from the Americans and upon the insufficiency of the commissions given the Howes. He finally proposed an address to the King asking him to take steps toward a prompt reconciliation and a redress of the grievances set forth by the Americans (V, 22, pp. xcviij-xcix). After some debate Chatham interpreted his motion. By a prompt redress of grievances he meant that Parliament should revoke immediately all acts which were designed to punish the Americans (V, 22, p. clij). The motion was rejected (V, 22, p. civ).

¹⁴ If the war with America is carried on obstinately and, if on the contrary, it is not stopped immediately, England is going to be lost without recourse. The most prompt reconciliation between the Americans and their mother country is the only saving measure remaining. Any delay, be it of only six weeks, will render such reconciliation impossible.

The last report in the Affaires concerning the commission of the Howes was in the banker's letter of June 10, 1777. Here was a reprint of a pamphlet sent by Edmund Burke to his constituents in Bristol. He said that the only way to retain America was to renounce completely all efforts to force the Americans to submit (V, 23, p. cxxxix). Farther on, he wrote with disgust of the commission given to the Howes to reestablish peace by obtaining submissions (V, 23, p. cxlij).

Lord North's conciliatory proposal. These commissions held by the Howes were worthless because nothing was offered to the Americans to induce them to return to British control. The next proposal to be discussed, that made by Lord North in 1778, was not quite as hopeless as was the Howe attempt. It approached the process of reconciliation in the right manner even though it was made too late. This proposal caused a great deal of surprise in England. The London banker, however, had forecasted that such an offer would be made almost a month and a half before the announcement was made in Parliament (VII, 35, p. ccx).

The proposal made by Lord North contained three points. First, the House of Commons should, on February 19, 1778, form itself into a committee of the whole to prepare a bill to renounce totally any taxation of America. This was to be done on the condition that the colonies agree to contribute to the British treasury a reasonable amount to help defray the expenses of government and to pay for protection. Second, five commissioners should be appointed to negotiate in America for peace. Third, a cessation of arms, should the commissioners deem it advisable, should take place and

last until the expiration of the commission. Lord North explained that all this meant that the Massachusetts charter, which had been revoked in 1774, would be restored, that all acts which had been designed to punish the colonies would be repealed, and that the commissioners could negotiate with any body in authority and suspend any troublesome laws (VII, 36, pp. ccclxij-ccclxiv). He further stated that he would have the commissioners negotiate with America as with an independent nation with no discussion of the question of independence until all other difficulties were settled. His hope was that a union similar to that between Great Britain and Scotland could be effected (VII, 36, p. ccclxv).

In the debate following Lord North's proposal Fox gave his support to the proposition although he expressed regret that it had not been adopted three years earlier when Edmund Burke had suggested a similar one. He added a note of uneasiness to the debate by stating his belief that an alliance between France and the thirteen colonies had already been completed (VII, 36, pp. ccclxvj-ccclxvij). It was agreed unanimously by the Commons that Lord North's proposal should be given careful consideration (VII, 36, p. ccclxvij). The banker's comment was: "Qui est-ce qui ne voit point que son intérêt est de diviser les Américains et de leur faire perdre le moment le plus favorable qu'ils ayent eu dans cette guerre . . . (VII, 36, p. ccclxx)." ¹⁵ He further stated:

15 Who cannot see that his interest is to divide the Americans and to make them lose the most favorable moment that they have had in this war

Je croirois encore que ces projets d'arrangement . . . seront rejettés. . . le Congrès général . . . certainement exigera ces trois conditions préliminaires--que toutes les armées et escadres soient retirés, qu'il soit formé un nouveau Parlement, et que le Ministère soit changé dans sa totalité, pour voir ensuite, s'il peut y avoir lieu, à un Traité de commerce et d'amitié entre deux socurs parfaitement indépendantes l'une de l'autre, et partagées de maniere entr'elles que toutes les espérances soient du côté de la cadette, tandis qu'il ne reste a l'aînée que sa décrépitude (VII, 36, pp. ccclxxij-ccclxxij).¹⁶

This same letter of the banker carried the reprint of the bills introduced into Parliament to conform to the proposals outlined by Lord North. One of these bills provided for the commissioners and set up their powers, and the other abolished the taxation of the colonies. Both followed closely Lord North's suggestions (VII, 36, pp. ccclxxij-ccclxxvj).

In his next letter, dated February 21, 1778, the banker noted that no rise in stocks and bonds had developed in the four days since Lord North had made his proposal. He believed this to be a sign that the public had little confidence in the success of the peace plan. He again stated his belief that the peace propositions would be rejected (IX, pp. j-ij). In a postscript of February 26, 1778, was reprinted a letter from the banker's American correspondent. The correspondent remarked that Lord North's peace proposal was merely an admission that Britain's resources were exhausted, an admission which surprised no one. He wrote that the

¹⁶ I think, then, that these conciliatory projects . . . will be rejected. . . Congress will certainly demand these three preliminary conditions--that all armies and naval squadrons be recalled, that a new Parliament be formed, and that the ministry be changed entirely. Then, if it can take place, a treaty of commerce and friendship between two perfectly independent sisters can be considered. The qualities of these sisters are so divided that all the hopes are on the side of the younger while nothing except her decrepitude remains for the elder.

Americans would never give up independence. The correspondent seemed to feel that Lord North made his proposal only after he discovered that a French-American alliance was near (IX, pp. xxv-xxvij).

The progress of the conciliatory bills through Parliament was rapid. On March 3, 1778, the announcement was made that after nearly fifteen days' discussion these two bills were passed. The efforts of the opposition to repeal all of the acts which led to the separation of England and America were unsuccessful. However, they did succeed in repealing the tax on tea (IX, p. xxix). The conciliatory bills were printed by the Affaires at this point (IX, pp. xxx-xxxvij).

In the House of Lords on March 5, 1778, the Duke of Richmond said that Lord North's bills to restore peace would do absolutely no good if the first step were not to withdraw British troops. Lord Suffolk felt that America should first give up its Declaration of Independence (IX, p. li). On March 16, 1778, in the House of Commons, Fox called Lord North's proposal an absurd one, but North defended himself by saying that his propositions would cause Congress to refuse to ratify the French alliance (IX, p. cxij).

The London banker expressed a few personal opinions concerning this peace proposal in his letter of March 22, 1778. He believed that Congress would not accept Britain's offer of conciliation (IX, p. cxxix). On March 24, 1778, he stated that if the commissioners negotiated with Congress, they would be recognizing American independence. If, however, they did not recognize the independence of the colonies, the colonies would not negotiate with them. He believed that most of the members of the administration in

England would agree that little was to be hoped for in the work of Lord North's commissioners (IX, pp. clxxxvij).

On April 10, 1778, the banker's letter quoted an article which was attributed to the Duke of Richmond. Here it was shown that Britain would be ruined if she did not profit from the present chance to settle the dispute with America (IX, pp. cxxlix-cclv). The letter stated: "Il n'est pas possible de retenir à présent les Américains comme sujets: le seul espoir qui nous reste est de les regagner comme amis (IX, pp. cclj-cclij)."¹⁷ Evidently many were beginning to realize this same fact.

Propaganda was at work to make the English people believe that Britain was magnanimous in its conciliatory offer to America, and to make them believe that if the proposal failed the fault would be America's. On April 10, 1778, the banker reported that he saw a letter, said to be from Benjamin Franklin to Samuel Adams, in the English papers. This letter suggested that Congress not reject Lord North's proposal at first. It even suggested that Congress should give up independence if it could get assurance that America would never be taxed. The banker expressed his certainty that the letter was a London fabrication, and as a reply he printed a bill passed by Congress in 1777. This law provided that Congress should reject all offers of treaty or conciliation with Britain unless such offers recognized the independence of the colonies and the treaties and alliances contracted with other states (IX, pp. cclxxij-cclxxiv).

¹⁷ It is not now possible to retain the Americans as subjects. The only hope which remains for us is to regain them as friends.

That British recognition of American independence was necessary for conciliation was also acknowledged by a member of the House of Commons, Fowis, in a speech before that body on April 9, 1778. His argument was that Britain's poor financial state and a possible war with France necessitated a settlement of the American troubles. That settlement, he said, could be made only on the basis of American independence. He moved that the commissioners be empowered to recognize this independence (IX, p. cclxxxvii). Fox supported this motion but Pulteney and Johnstone, the latter one of the peace commissioners, opposed it. Henry Dundas, of the House of Commons, insisted that Britain could still force America into submission (IX, p. cclxxxix).

On April 17, 1778, the London banker reported the appointments for peace commissioners. The first named was the Count of Carlisle. Then came George Johnstone, former governor of Florida, and Mr. Eden, under-secretary of state of the department of the north. These three men embarked from Portsmouth on April 16, 1778, to go to America to join the Howe brothers who were to be the fourth and fifth members of this commission (IX, p. ccxiv). The banker gave a slightly humorous tinge to the report when he said that it was generally accepted at Portsmouth that the following three steps would be the extent of the work of the commissioners: (1) they would go to Philadelphia to present their proposals to Congress; (2) they would receive as their answer the resolution of Congress, given earlier, that there could be no negotiation without recognition of independence; (3) they would return immediately to England under pain of death (IX, pp. ccxxv-j-ccxxvi-j).

The banker's letter of May 9, 1778, gave more ideas on the necessity of recognizing American independence. He reprinted a letter found in a British newspaper and addressed to King George III (X, pp. 1j-x). In the first place it was stated that it was as foolish for Britain to expect obedience from America as for a father to expect it from a grown son (X, pp. v-vj). Britain could enjoy for centuries the advantages to be had from America if she would admit her faults, forget the impossibility of maintaining control, and concern herself with an alliance based on justice, reason, and commerce (X, pp. vj-vij). France should not be blamed for the troubles because she merely accepted a commerce despised by Britain and had waited until American independence was sure before recognizing it (X, pp. vij-viiij). Furthermore, the French treaty expressly did not exclude other nations from American commerce (X, p. ix). Britain, the letter concluded, would have to be satisfied with that part of their commerce which the Americans would grant them. To keep faith with America would safeguard other British possessions; to break faith would lose them (X, p. x).

Although at various times in the preceding letters it was mentioned incidentally that the commissioners were having no success in America, it was not until the banker's letter of July 30, 1778, that any real facts were given. Here it was reported that Congress had, on June 11, 1778, sent a letter from General Washington to a committee for examination. This letter was accompanied by a demand from General Clinton that Dr. Ferguson, secretary to the three peace commissioners then at Philadelphia, be given a passport to Yorktown, New Jersey, to present the peace proposals to Congress. Washington indicated that he did not wish to give the passport until he knew of the intentions of Congress (XI, p. cliij). On June 13,

1778, Congress was debating the committee's report when a messenger arrived from Washington. The messenger carried a packet from the commissioners. A reading of one of the letters was begun, but it was stopped by motion when some offensive remarks were made concerning France (XI, p. cliv). On June 16 the reading was continued. In the packet, among other things, was the commission given to Carlisle, Johnstone, Eden, and the Howes to reestablish peace. Also read were the three acts of Parliament, two of which have already been mentioned.¹⁸ The third returned to the Massachusetts Bay colony its charter (XI, p. clv). The letters from the commissioners were sent to a committee which returned the same day with its report (XI, p. clxij). On the following day, June 17, 1778, Congress unanimously approved the committee's report (XI, pp. clxij-clxij):

Les Actes du Parlement Britannique, la Commission de votre Souverain, et votre lettre supposent les peuples de ces Etats sous la domination de la Couronne de la Grande Bretagne, et sont fondées sur une idée de dépendance qui est entièrement inadmissible.

J'ai ordre en outre d'informer vos Excellences que le Congrès est porté à la paix, malgré l'injustice des prétentions qui ont donné naissance à cette guerre, et la manière barbare dont elle a été conduite. En conséquence le Congrès est tout prêt à entrer en pour parler pour un Traité de paix et de commerce, qui se concilie avec les Traités déjà subsistans, lorsque le Roi de la Grande Bretagne se montrera dans des dispositions sincères à cet effet. L'unique preuve solide qu'il puisse donner de ces dispositions, consiste dans une reconnaissance explicite de l'indépendance de ces Etats, ou dans le rappel de ses armées de terre et de mer (XI, pp. clxij-clxiv).¹⁹

¹⁸ Supra, p. 41.

¹⁹ The acts of the British Parliament, the commission of your Sovereign, and your letter consider the people of these States to be under the domination of the Crown of Great Britain. They are based upon an idea of dependence which is entirely wrong.

I am ordered, moreover, to inform your Excellencies that Congress favors peace, in spite of the injustice of the pretensions which have caused this war, and in spite of the barbarous manner in which it has been conducted. Consequently, Congress is entirely ready to enter in discussions for a treaty of peace and commerce which is reconcilable with the treaties now existing. This can be done whenever the King of Great Britain shows sincere inclinations to this effect. The only solid proof which he can give of these inclinations consists in an explicit recognition of the independence of these States or in the recall of his armies on land and sea.

This action by Congress had been preceded by an exchange of letters between commissioner Johnstone and Henry Laurens, President of Congress. In his letter Laurens had told Johnstone that he could expect Congress to demand first of all that Britain recognize American independence (XI, pp. clxvj-clxvij).

At this same time a bitter quarrel broke out over the statement made by Commissioner Johnstone that France had made its alliance with America to forestall Britain's conciliatory acts. William Henry Drayton, representative in Congress from South Carolina, wrote a letter to the commissioners on June 17, 1778, in which he combatted Johnstone's statement by recalling that on February 5, 1778, Johnstone himself in the House of Commons had asserted that he had heard that the conciliatory proposals would be made but that he knew none of the details. At the same time he had also stated that he had heard of some treaty proposals being sent out from France to the Americans. Drayton stated that at this same time the French treaty had been proposed and that Silas Deane was on his way to America with the proposals (XI, pp. clxxxj-clxxxij). As further proof of his point, he declared that the French treaty proposals were made by Gérard to the American envoys at Paris on December 16, 1777, and that the treaty was signed February 6, 1778. Lord North's conciliatory propositions were not made until February 19, 1778 (XI, p. clxxxiv).

After thus arguing his point, Drayton turned to the conciliatory proposals and discussed their faults. America, he said, could not trust the proposal that it be given representation in Parliament because it had profited from the example of Scottish representation there (XI, p. clxxxv).

The alternative proposal that Britain send agents to American assemblies would, he said, be rejected because such agents would probably be spies or would resort to bribery (XI, pp. clxxxv-clxxxvj). The British proposal to aid the Americans to pay their debts was absurd because Britain could not pay its own debts (XI, p. clxxxvj). No control over American commerce could be granted to Britain because America's interests demanded a free commerce (XI, p. clxxxvj). Drayton closed his letter by stating in unequivocal terms that America would never give up independence and that the powers of Europe would support her stand (XI, p. cxcj). These opinions were supported in their entirety in a letter from another member of Congress to the commissioners (XI, pp. cxcj-ccx).

Drayton again wrote to Johnstone on July 18, 1778, to refute various statements set forth by Johnstone in a letter of June 8, 1778, to a certain Francis Dana. The letter referred to had been examined by Congress. The first of the statements made by Johnstone was that Benjamin Franklin had, on March 29, said that the conciliatory resolutions were very advantageous to America and should be accepted. Drayton denied this assertion and said that Silas Deane had told of a secret British negotiator going to Paris to see Franklin. The negotiator had been unable to get a statement from him (XII, pp. excix-cc). A footnote in the Affaires at this place (XII, p. excix) stated that it was Johnstone's half-brother, Tulteney, who was said to have visited Franklin and that Franklin's answer was that America would treat only on the basis of independence and never with the present ministry. Drayton also denied again the second fact stated by Johnstone, that France's alliance was a plan to circumvent the British sentiments for peace (XII, pp. cc-ccj).

All disagreement, however, was not between the Americans and the British. The commissioners also quarrelled among themselves. It was reported in England that the main reason for the dispute was that Commissioner Eden carried, unknown to the others, orders to the British troops to evacuate Philadelphia. Johnstone had planned to make Philadelphia the base of the commissioners' operations (XI, pp. cxxiv-cxxv). After the British evacuated Philadelphia, the commissioners went to New York. Johnstone threatened to return to England because he felt that this evacuation lowered the credit of the commissioners in the eyes of the Americans (XI, p. cxxvj).

On July 11, 1778, the peace commissioners in New York wrote a letter to Congress. This letter (XII, pp. lxxv-lxxix) was read in Congress on July 18. They wrote that American independence could be recognized up to the point that Britain and America should maintain a union of forces for their mutual interest and surety (XII, p. lxxv). Britain, they felt, had to maintain its armies and fleets in America for protection against France and for protection of British friends living there. They desired, however, a cessation of hostilities (XII, p. lxxvj).

It is now apparent that these negotiations for peace were doomed from the beginning. Their failure was rendered more certain by the quarrel over the statement by Johnstone that France allied herself with America to destroy the efficacy of the British conciliatory proposals. The final straw was the effort of Johnstone to bribe Joseph Reed, member of Congress from Pennsylvania, to aid him in getting Congressional acceptance of the conciliatory proposals. Reed published the letter from Johnstone, and a denunciation of this commissioner by a resident of Philadelphia furnished the basis for the report in the Affaires (XII, pp. c1-j).

Even an English paper censured Johnstone's attempt to bribe Reed. This paper considered that such a deed could well cause the whole negotiations to fall through (XII, pp. ccij-cciv). Another English paper offered the same criticism and added that Johnstone had tried to bribe not only Joseph Reed but also a lady who was a friend of Reed's (XII, pp. cciv-ccvj). On August 11, 1778, Congress made a declaration concerning Johnstone's efforts at bribery. It was agreed that Congress should refuse henceforward to have any negotiations with Johnstone (XII, pp. ccxij-ccxiv). Johnstone's reply of August 26 to this declaration was a very heated one. He stated that he was withdrawing from all negotiations. That he did withdraw is shown by the fact that that same day, August 26, 1778, Carlisle, Eden, and Clinton sent a declaration to Congress charging again that the French treaty was made merely to cause the failure of the conciliatory proposals (XII, pp. ccxxij-ccxxv). It should be noted that this declaration was not signed by Johnstone and that General Clinton had supplanted the Howe brothers as a commissioner. The Howes had returned to England.

After the beginning of September, 1778, no one who was well informed on conditions any longer believed that the conciliatory proposals could be successful. A letter from New York, dated September 22, stated that Johnstone had left America in anger, leaving behind a protest against his treatment at the hands of Congress. His reason, he said, for leaving was that he wished to be in England when Parliament opened so that he could cast his vote against the recognition of American independence (XII, pp. ccxxlv-ccxxlvj). That a breakdown in negotiations had come was even more evident when the three remaining commissioners, Carlisle, Clinton, and Eden, pro-

claimed at New York, September 26, 1778, a suspension of the non-intercourse act in order that they might open the ports of New York and Newport for receiving prizes captured by British ships. Another indication of the failure in negotiations was a letter from General Clinton in New York to Henry Laurens, president of Congress, September 19, 1778. Clinton demanded that Congress execute the convention of Saratoga²⁰ which had been made almost a year before (XII, pp. cccliv-ccclv). The commissioners had taken it upon themselves, apparently without authorization, to negotiate for a settlement of this problem. The congressional reply to Clinton's demand was made by Secretary Charles Thompson and was very much to the point. Congress, he wrote, did not reply to insolent letters (XII, p. ccclv).

By this time the British commissioners were nearly frantic in their search for some method of forcing reconciliation on America. A letter from Boston, dated October 19, 1778, gave assurances that the British commissioners had issued a proclamation that Congress should either revoke the Declaration of Independence or be prepared to have the colonies suffer massacres, burning, and other forms of punishment. This, the writer stated, was the death warrant of the commission. It was announced by the commissioners that they soon would return to England. Not being able to get peace through persuasion, they tried to get peace by threats (XII, pp. ccclxxix-ccclxxxj).

Repercussions of this proclamation were soon evident in Parliament. On December 4, 1778, in the House of Commons, Coke moved that the King be

²⁰ Infra, pp. 90-91.

informed of the House's horror over this proclamation by the commissioners. The ministry, he insisted, should disavow this proclamation. Powis, seconding the motion, stated that British troops would never commit such atrocities (XII, p. ccccx). Generals Howe and Burgoyne, both of whom had returned from America to Parliament to oppose the ministry, upheld Coke's motion (XII, pp. ccccxj-cccxiij). The motion was rejected easily but the opposition vote was much stronger than usual (XII, p. ccccxiiij). In the House of Lords on December 7, 1778, Rockingham dwelt on the absurdity and barbarity of the proclamation. He moved that the Lords' disapproval be expressed to the King and demanded disavowal of the proclamation (XII, pp. ccccxiv-cccxcv). The motion was defeated, here also by an unusually small margin (XII, p. ccccxix).

In America there was no great fear expressed concerning this threat by the commissioners. The policy adopted there was one of threatened revenge. Thomas Paine, writing from Philadelphia, October 20, 1778, said: "Dès aujourd'hui nous sommes résolus de régler notre conduite sur la vôtre; et nous vous traiterons comme vous nous traiterez (XIII, p. vj)."²¹ He went on to quote the old proverb that he who lives in a glass house should not throw stones (XIII, p. x). Congress echoed this threat of reprisals on October 30, 1778, by a unanimous vote (XIII, pp. xxij-xxvij). However, precautions were taken by Congress on October 10, 1778, in its resolution that the recommendation be made that all inhabitants of exposed places send

²¹ From today on we are resolved to regulate our conduct by yours. We shall treat you like you will treat us.

their women and children into the interior. Furthermore, if Britain did begin its threatened campaign of destruction, Americans should treat all Tories and other enemies of America in the same manner (XIII, pp. xxi-j-xxij).

The banker also stated his opinions on the matter. In his letter of December 22, 1778, which carried the reports given above, he wrote that many political writers had denounced this barbarous plan of the commissioners. He offered his advice to the British ministry in a plan to make the commissioners' proclamation to kill, burn, and destroy more workable. His satiric proposal was that only Scotch, German, and Russian soldiers be sent to America and that they be paid only on the basis of the damage committed. For example, he proposed that a sum of five thousand pounds be paid for the burning of a town of a thousand or more houses (XIII, pp. xxvij-xxxj).

Conclusion. Lord North's conciliatory proposal, on which so much hope was placed at first, was dead within a year after it was made. Now it is relatively easy to pick out its faults. Its proposals sounded well at first, but even then it was probably a last straw grasped by the North ministry to bolster its failing power and a last chance to save America for Britain. As it now appears, it may have been a method intended to forestall the ratification of the French-American alliance rather than the alliance being proposed to destroy the chances for reconciliation, as was charged by the commissioners. Perhaps its crowning fault was the character of the men chosen to administer it. Instead of smoothing the way for peace these men seemed to cause more hard feelings between the combatants.

As to reconciliation in general, it is probably safe to say that while there was considerable sentiment in England for a cessation of hostilities, most of the sentiment was probably not motivated by altruism. Some were for peace on the basis of recognition of American independence with America tied to England thereafter by alliances and treaties. This was probably the only feasible plan suggested. Others wanted peace without the recognition of independence though none could say how that was to be accomplished. Practically no one in England was willing to admit that he would grant American independence outright. All were anxious to stop the war because of an impending conflict with France and Spain, because of the drain on the treasury, because of the loss of the valuable American trade, or because of the possible loss of British prestige in the event that America should actually win the war. Some few, as always, probably wanted peace for humanitarian reasons.

Certainly the administration majority in Parliament was never threatened, but it seems that the people were never very strongly behind the British effort to carry on the war. The strong sentiment for peace in England, even though it was a minority sentiment, furnished ample opportunity for the editors of the Affaires to help convince France that it would be advantageous to go to America's aid.

CHAPTER IV

FRENCH AID FOR AMERICA

Since the outcome of the American Revolution depended to a large extent upon the securing of aid in Europe for the Americans, it is only natural that the Affaires should contain a considerable amount of material concerning this. However, in very few places did the Affaires print whole articles devoted to the subject of foreign aid. Most of the references were largely incidental. Therefore, this chapter will present no continuous and connected story concerning the progress of America in gaining help in Europe. Instead, the discussion concerning this help will necessarily be somewhat fragmentary in nature.

Since it was primarily France which provided the European aid for America, the discussion will be largely one of French aid. Spain also figured prominently in this part of the war and will be mentioned frequently. Other countries also aided, but most of their aid was unofficial.

As France was Britain's traditional enemy in and before the eighteenth century, it was only natural that many should foresee the time when France would aid the Americans openly. Many also realized that France was giving the Americans a considerable amount of help while protesting her friendship to England. The first section of this chapter will be devoted to the predictions of the French alliance. The possibility of Spain forming an alliance with America was discussed along with the reports concerning France because it was generally believed that the two countries would act as one in the matter of aiding the Americans, and both were usually mentioned

when the possibility of an alliance was considered. However, the Spanish alliance was not made until the summer of 1779, and its completion is not mentioned in the Affaires.

On March 14, 1776, in the House of Lords, the Duke of Grafton moved that the King be requested to promise the colonies a suspension of warfare (I, 3, pp. 20-21). In support of his motion he told of receiving notice that two Frenchmen of distinction¹ had gone to America with proposals for the American Congress (I, 3, p. 28). The Duke of Manchester offered his support to the motion and remarked that the British navy was in poor condition and that France and Spain showed definite signs of preparing for war (I, 3, pp. 31-34). Another parliamentary warning of French and Spanish armaments was given to the ministry by George Johnstone in the House of Commons on April 24, 1776. However, Lord North assured the members that they need have no fear of France and Spain (II, 7, p. 17). Still again the warning was sounded on May 22, 1776, when General Conway told the Commons that France and Spain would seize the opportunity to attack which England's lack of defense offered (III, 11, p. 7). He declared that France's ministry was militaristic (III, 11, p. 12). In spite of these warnings the King tried to reassure Parliament as he spoke at the closing session on May 23, 1776, by telling of the receipt of affirmations of peace and good will from various European powers (III, 11, p. 25).

In this period of 1776 Lord Chatham issued what he believed to be

¹ Cf., Elizabeth Peters, "The American Revolution as Seen in the Gazette de Leyde (1774-83)," (unpublished Master's thesis, Kansas State Teachers College of Emporia, 1938), p. 35.

his death-bed statement concerning the American war and the possibility of French intervention:

. . . Je pense aussi qu'à moins qu'on ne prenne promptement des mesures très-efficaces pour se reconcilier avec les Colonies, la France nous attaquera avant peu d'années, et que ce n'est que par un effet de sa politique, qu'elle diffère sa vengeance: voulant attendre que nous soyons engagés plus avant dans une guerre aussi ruineuse que l'est celle que nous faisons en Amérique. La France veut aussi essayer jusqu'à quel point les Américains, aidés de la protection indirecte qu'elle leur accorde pourront nous résister avant de prendre ouvertement le parti de déclarer la guerre à l'Angleterre (VIII, pp. 194-195).

The London banker showed that he agreed with Lord Chatham when he wrote in his letter of June 4, 1776, that France and Spain were making war preparations (I, 3, p.77).

The banker's letter of October 21, 1776, contained more material along this line. Here he printed an article entitled Observations d'Aratus sur l'Etat des Affaires (III, 11, pp. vj-xxij). The central idea of this article was that France would not remain neutral even if England did succeed in conquering America (III, 11, pp. xij-xiij). Furthermore, the result of such a conquest would leave England too weak (III, 11, pp. xv-xvj). Therefore, wrote "Aratus," England should recognize American independence and make America an ally instead of forcing her to gain independence through recourse to Britain's enemies (III, 11, p. xx).

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. . . I also believe that, unless very effective steps are taken promptly to reconcile us with the colonies, France will attack us within a few years. It is only by an effect of her policy that she defers her vengeance. She wishes to wait until we are engaged further in a war as ruinous as is the one which we are carrying on in America. France wishes also to test up to what point the Americans can resist us with the indirect protection which she grants them before she openly makes up her mind to declare war on England.

Just as he had assured Parliament at its closing the previous spring that the European powers were friendly to Britain, so the King reiterated that viewpoint at the opening of Parliament early in November, 1776 (III, 12, pp. xlvj-lj). The Duke of Manchester, however, later signified his lack of faith in these assurances (III, 12, pp. lv-lvj). The Duke of Grafton accused the ministry of forcing America to seek French and Spanish aid. He stated that France was furnishing America with munitions (III, 12, p. lix). Grafton also wondered why the King asked for more armaments if France and Spain were friendly. On the other hand, he wondered why the King had waited so long to ask for armaments if these two countries were dangerous (III, 12, p. lx). Lord Shelburne believed it extremely unlikely that France and Spain should be peacefully inclined toward Britain. He insisted that too large a part of England's naval forces was in America to insure the safety of the home islands (III, 12, pp. lxi-lxii).

The supporters of the administration also had their say. Lord Sandwich denied that a major portion of England's defensive forces were in America. He considered those remaining at home to be superior to the forces of France and Spain (III, 12, pp. lvii-lix). Lord Weymouth saw no reason to fear a war with an European power. However, he felt that absolute security necessitated watchfulness lest some nation believe England weakened by her American troubles (III, 12, p. lxj).

In the House of Commons the debates following the King's address pursued much the same course as those in the House of Lords. Lord North consistently denied that the British Isles were defenseless or even mostly so. Neither did he believe that France would attack England (III, 12, p.

lxiv). Colonel Barré interrogated Lord North on the subject of the French assurances of peace received by the government, and North's reply was that he had no reason to doubt France's word (III, 12, p. lxxvij). Lord George Germain did not believe that France and Spain would encourage in America a spirit of independence which could well spread to their own countries and colonies (III, 12, pp. lxxx-lxxxj). Charles Fox appeared willing to grant the truth of Germain's statement concerning the spread of the independent spirit but insisted that Spain and France would aid the Americans for one reason only, because it would divide Britain's forces (III, 12, p. lxxij). George Johnstone, Thomas Townshend, and Colonel Barré, all speaking for the opposition, concerned themselves with the bad state of the home defenses on the eve of a war with the Bourbon powers (III, 12, pp. lxx, lxx, and lxxvij). To drive home his point concerning French and Spanish intervention, Wilkes described an incident of the seizure of an American privateer at Bilbao, Spain. The seizure by the Spanish port officials was instigated by the British consul there, but the ship was soon released on orders from Madrid (III, 12, p. lxxvij). Temple Luttrell, a member of the House of Commons, found in history precedents for expecting French and Spanish aid for America. He said that, in cases similar to the American war, history showed the more powerful nations conducting negotiations with the rebels (III, 12, pp. lxxvij-lxxix).

On May 30, 1777, Lord Chatham³ had more to say concerning the possibility of war with France. This time he appeared in the House of

³ Supra, p. 38.

Lords approximately a year after his supposed death-bed statement which was recorded earlier in this chapter. Following his request for reconciliation, he made this statement:

Les François tirent tout le parti possible de notre guerre avec l'Amérique. Le commerce de nos Colonies s'est tourné de leur côté, et ils lui donnent tout l'encouragement qui est en leur pouvoir. On dit qu'il y a un Traité sur le tapis entre la France et l'Amérique. Si c'est un fait vrai, nos Ministres doivent sans balancer, déclarer la guerre à la France. Il le faut, quand même nous n'aurions pas plus de cinq vaisseaux de guerre en état. La France trouve mieux son compte à éviter de rompre ouvertement avec nous et à entretenir notre querelle Américaine; mais c'est ce qu'il nous importe de ne pas souffrir plus long-tems (V, 22, p. xcix).⁴

In the debates following this statement Lord Camden appeared persuaded that England was menaced by an approaching war with France and Spain (V, 22, p. c). Lord Shelburne mentioned the hardships resulting from the loss of the American commerce for England. He spoke of the help which France was giving to the Americans, of the arming of American privateers in French ports, and of the prizes captured at sea and sold in these ports. He considered that France would stop these activities if she were favorably disposed towards England (V, 22, p. cj). He also contrasted the speed with which French ships were armed and manned with the slowness of Britain's efforts. Finally, Shelburne stated that American agents were continually at work with the French ministry and that the French government was giving

⁴ The French draw all the advantages possible from our war with America. The commerce of our colonies has turned their way and they give it all the encouragement they can. It is said that treaty discussions are being carried on between France and America. If this is true, our ministers should, without hesitating, declare war on France. It must be done even though we have no more than five warships in condition. France finds it most to her profit to avoid an open break with us and yet to maintain our American quarrel; but it is that which we must not endure longer.

aid to French merchants who shipped goods to America (V, 22, p. cij).

The banker's letter of June 10, 1777, printed a letter from Edmund Burke to his constituents in Bristol. Here Burke wrote:

Les Américains séparés d'avec nous, chercheront d'autres liaisons: il y a très-peu de Peuples dans le monde qui ne préfèrent un allié utile à un insolent maître (V, 23, p. cxliiv).

N'attendant plus aucun bien de nous, ils ont mis toute leur confiance en eux-mêmes; et lorsqu'ils ont senti que seule ils n'étoient pas assez forts, ils ont demandé du secours à la France (V, 23, p. cxliv).⁵

That the Bourbon powers would enter the war was also foreseen by the banker's correspondent at Emden, a city in the German state of Hanover. The writer felt that France would be foolish to neglect the opportunity which Britain's weakness offered (V, 24, p. ccxxvj). A second letter by this same writer reasoned that France should not wait to attack England because England might defeat America and then use all her forces to attack the French islands in America (V, 24, pp. ccxxxij-ccxxxij). He repeated that France's best opportunity to destroy Britain's power had arrived and that the present situation seemed to have been designed by Providence to add to the glory of France (V, 24, pp. ccxxxiv-ccxxxvj).

An article entitled Réflexions d'un Observateur, which the banker believed was written by Franklin, appeared in the letter of August 14,

⁵ The Americans, separated from us, will seek other connections; there are few people in this world who do not prefer a useful ally to an insolent master.

Not expecting any more kindness from us, they placed all their reliance in themselves. When they felt that they were not strong enough alone, they asked for help from France.

1777. The central point of this writing was that France was in a better condition than England to carry on a war (VI, 26, p. xviiij). The writer also contended that a war with France would be necessary to save the honor of the North ministry (VI, 26, p. xx).

On November 20, 1777, the King appeared before Parliament with a message in which he reported the receipt of reassurances of friendship from various European powers. He believed, however, that the continued armament of France and Spain warranted an increase in the British naval forces (VII, 32, p. lxxv). In the succeeding debates Lord Chatham dwelt on the King's failure to remark extensively on the formidable war preparations of the Bourbon powers and the aid which they were giving to the American cause. He insisted that Britain was in no condition to resist attacks by France or Spain. The troops should be returned from America (VII, 32, p. lxxviiij). Lord Sandwich replied by asking if England could do more than believe the assurances given by the representatives of France and Spain (VII, 32, p. lxxix).

No opposition to the King's speech was reported in the House of Commons. Gilbert Elliot of that body stated that the British naval forces could handle those of France and Spain (VII, 32, p. lxxj). Lord North assured the Commons that he did not believe it to be the intention of either France or Spain to enter the war against England but that their armaments necessitated maintaining the British home defenses (VII, 32, p. lxxviij). The London banker thought it strange that the ministry considered France and Spain friendly and at the same time felt that their war preparations made increased British armaments necessary (VII, 34, pp. cxxxv-cxl).

In the House of Lords on December 5, 1777, Lord Littleton said that abandonment of the project of subduing America would be an admission to the Bourbons that England was a weak nation and they would consider it a favorable moment to attack (VII, 34, p. clvj). Lord Shelburne hoped that America would not place herself under the protection of the Bourbons. He expressed his belief that the Bourbons could capture all the British possessions in the western hemisphere (VII, 34, p. clviij). December 10, 1777, in the House of Commons, Fox insisted that the Bourbons had no peaceful intentions and that the first critical news from America would bring a declaration of war from them (VII, 34, p. clxiiij).

Late in February, 1778, while the Commons were considering the North conciliatory proposal, the Lords were debating the subject of the state of the navy. The Duke of Bolton and the Count of Bristol pointed out that none of Britain's ships were adequately manned and that the safety of Britain would be in question if France and Spain declared war against her (IX, pp. xxxix-xliv). The Duke of Bolton said:

. . . nous touchons au moment d'une guerre avec la maison de Bourbon, que l'un et l'autre parti dans cette Chambre juge inévitable; et la France, je le sais avec certitude, compte quarante-quatre vaisseaux de ligne presque entièrement armés dans deux de ses ports tandis que l'Espagne en a quarante autres dans le même état (IX, p. xliij).⁶

⁶ . . . we are at the point of war with the House of Bourbon; both parties in this Chamber judge this inevitable. I know with certainty that France has forty-four ships of the line almost entirely armed in two of her ports while Spain has forty more of them in the same condition.

Bolton went on to say that England's situation would be terrible from the first moment of war with these countries. Lord Sandwich, as head of the navy, replied in a vague and evasive fashion (IX, p. xliij).

In the House of Commons, February 17, 1778, in the debates following Lord North's reconciliation proposal, Fox said that he felt certain that an alliance between France and America had been completed (VII, 36, p. ccclxvij). Lord North admitted that he had heard rumors of such an alliance but was not certain of the facts (VII, 36, p. ccclxvij). In the House of Lords, March 5, 1778, the Duke of Grafton offered the unofficial news that the treaty had been signed on February 6, 1778, at Versailles. The ministry did not reply to this assertion (IX, p. 1j).

The first authentic report in the Affaires of the completion of the French-American alliance was given by the banker on March 19, 1778. This report was in the form of a copy of a declaration given to Lord Weymouth, British foreign minister, by the French ambassador on March 13. The declaration simply announced to the British government that France had made an alliance⁷ with the United States and that King Louis was ready to protect the commerce of his people (IX, pp. cv-cvij).

It was not until June 16, 1778, that the banker gave an extensive account of the French-American treaty of alliance. This account was taken from a York, Pennsylvania, paper dated May 4, 1778. The story was that Silas Deane arrived at York, where Congress was meeting, on May 2. He was

⁷ Cf., Peters, op. cit., p. 58.

carrying dispatches which told of the French joy over the defeat of Burgoyne. It was on December 16, 1777, that Gérard, secretary to the French foreign minister, informed the Americans that his king had decided to recognize their independence on the conditions that the Americans never return to their former English allegiance (X, p. clxxj-clxxij). The treaty was finally signed on February 6, 1778 (X, p. colxxiv). The Pennsylvania paper then reprinted the principal articles of the treaty (X, pp. colxxiv-colxxv). This paper, which was quoted by the Affaires, considered it remarkable that an established nation should recognize a new nation as an equal. It also stated the expectation that other European powers would follow the example of the French in recognizing American independence since most of them were jealous of Britain's power and wished a share of the American commerce (X, pp. colxxv-colxxvj). Then it noted that the King of Prussia had promised that he would be the second power of Europe to recognize American independence (X, pp. colxxvj-colxxvij). A letter from Boston, dated April 23, 1778, expressed the belief that Spain would join the alliance and mentioned the fact that nearly all European nations desired that England be humbled (X, p. colxxx). This letter also praised the strong spirit of independence in the Continental Congress and showed that Congress was ready to fight for that independence whether France granted its aid or not. The proof of this, said the paper, lay in the fact that Congress rejected the North conciliatory proposals⁸ even

⁸ Supra, pp. 39-53.

before it knew that the French-American treaty had been completed (X, pp. cclxxx-cclxxxj).

The London banker supplemented these reports with extracts from letters written to the American deputies in France. These letters expressed the joy of the American people upon learning of the conclusion of the French treaty (X, pp. cclxxxij-cclxxxvij). These reports were corroborated by news carried to England by a Dutch merchantman. It was also reported that enlistments in Washington's army had increased with the news of the alliance and that he was gradually closing in on Philadelphia. General Clinton was said to be making ready to evacuate the city (X, p. cclxxvij).

Pertinent sections of the French-American treaty of alliance and friendship were reprinted by the Affaires (XI, pp. ij-xvj) along with the report of the unanimous ratification of this treaty by Congress on May 6, 1778 (XI, p. ij). This report also told of the joy and celebration among the ranks of the American army as news was received of the signing of the treaty (XI, pp. xvij-xxj).

On July 12, 1778, the banker printed a writing signed "Marcus Brutus" and addressed to the American people (XI, pp. xciv-cj). The banker believed that "Marcus Brutus" was Doctor Samuel Cooper, pastor of one of Boston's largest churches and a willing worker for American independence. The central theme of the address was that the United States should not even consider accepting Lord North's conciliatory proposals now that their independence was assured and they had secured recognition by Europe. A letter written by Doctor Cooper to Benjamin Franklin on June 1, 1778, presented the thought that Britain was afraid to engage in a war with France

and the United States both and that the conciliatory bills only showed Britain's weakness (XI, pp. cxlix-cl). The dispute between the conciliatory commissioners and members of Congress over the statement that France had allied herself with America to forestall the conciliatory proposals was raging at this same time.⁹

The Affaires printed the complete French-American treaty of alliance in the banker's letter of October 2, 1778 (XII, pp. ij-xxvj). Here was also reprinted an extract from a Pennsylvania newspaper of August 11, 1778, giving the story of the ceremony in Congress on August 6 as it received Gérard, minister plenipotentiary from the King of France (XII, pp. xxvj-xxix). These reports were followed by copies of a letter from the King of France to Congress, Gérard's address to Congress, and the response of the President of Congress, Henry Laurens, to Gérard's address (XII, pp. xxix-xxxiv).

Lord Weymouth went before the House of Lords¹⁰ on March 16, 1778, with the announcement that he had a message from the King to communicate the following day. Everyone knew that the message would report the French-American alliance, and the announcement threw the House of Lords into an uproar (IX, p. cvij). The Duke of Manchester proposed a motion that the ministry be dismissed for having brought so much trouble on England, but

⁹ Supra, pp. 47-48.

¹⁰ Cf., Peters, loc. cit.

his motion was rejected (IX, p. cvlij). The same day Lord North made an identical announcement about the French-American alliance in the House of Commons. Grenville observed that the subject of the message was already known and proposed an address to the King asking him to present for their examination all papers concerning the operations of France toward an alliance with America (IX, p. cvlij). Edmund Burke censured the ministry for having ignored the operations of the French until that time (IX, p. cix). Dunning, another member of the House of Commons, believed the ministers incapable of handling the government in a war with France (IX, p. cxj). Fox said that he knew of the French-American treaty long before the ministry professed knowledge of it. He felt that they should be blamed for not finding out if they did not know about the treaty, and if they did know about it, they were to be blamed for not taking defensive steps, such as the recall of experienced troops from America (IX, pp. cxj-cxij). Fox concluded his arguments by asking for the dismissal of the ministers (IX, p. cxv). Lord North replied that he believed his conciliatory propositions would cause America to refuse to ratify the French treaty (IX, p. cxvij).

On the following day, March 17, 1778, Lords Weymouth and North read the King's message to their respective chambers, the House of Lords and the House of Commons. This message reported that France and America had signed a treaty. The King also announced that he had recalled the British ambassador from Paris and asked Parliament to sustain a just and necessary war (IX, pp. cxix-cxx). In the House of Lords, Lord Abingdon made the comment that England was now going to fight France and Spain even though

she was too feeble to fight America alone (IX, p. cxxj).

After reading the message in the Commons, Lord North proposed an address to the King assuring him of that body's loyal support. Baker unsuccessfully proposed an amendment saying that the loyal support would be granted if the ministry were dismissed (IX, p. cxxij). Lord North assured the Commons that the government finances were in good condition, that France would not invade England, and that the navy was as strong as ever. He said that all members should stand ready to aid the King in wiping out this insult to England (IX, p. cxxij). On the following day, March 18, 1778, both houses approved the address to the King as drawn up by Lord North. The banker accompanied this with the report that stocks had gone still lower (IX, p. cxxij).

On March 23, 1778, the House of Lords agreed without opposition to assure the King that it was ready to support him in placing the militia in readiness to war against France (IX, pp. clxij-clxxij). The Duke of Richmond stated that he believed that France did not actually want war and that a recall of troops and reconciliation with America would forestall the war with France (IX, p. clxxiv-clxxv). Lord Sandwich believed that war with France was inevitable (IX, p. clxxvj). The banker summarized the debates in this fashion:

En général, il fut reconnu dans ses débats, par les deux partis, que la guerre étoit assurée; que la France attaqueroit ou aux Isles ou dans l'Inde, ou au Canada, peut être même dans la Grande-Bretagne ou en Irlande . . . (IX, pp. clxxvij-clxxix).¹¹

¹¹ In general, it was recognized in these debates by both parties that war was assured, that France would attack either the islands, India, or Canada, perhaps even Great Britain or Ireland . . .

The debates in the House of Commons conveyed much the same attitude as those in the House of Lords (IX, p. clxxix).

Furthermore, the banker reported on March 24, 1778, that the ministry seemed to be happy over France's alliance with the Americans because it aided extensively the enlistments in the British armed forces (IX, p. clxxx). He also reported that France had placed an embargo upon all the English vessels and sailors found in the various French ports. He considered this to be a means of forcing the English to restore a large number of French vessels captured by the British in the preceding year (IX, p. clxxxij).

On April 8, 1778, in the House of Lords, Lord Shelburne pleaded for war with France. He considered that war with France would be the surest method of retaining America. He was sure that plenty of men could be found for the armed forces and that money would be freely loaned to the government if the present ministry, whose leadership the country distrusted, were removed (IX, pp. clxxvij-clxxvii). The Duke of Richmond presented figures on the British land and naval forces to prove that Shelburne was wrong about the supply of men (IX, pp. clxxx-clxxxj). Then he asked how Britain could expect to defeat America and France combined since it had been unable to defeat America alone (IX, pp. clxxxj-clxxxij). He advocated the recall of the troops from America to stop the slaughter there and to protect the homeland from French invasion (IX, p. clxxxij).

The English were becoming apprehensive of the armed aid which the French were preparing to extend to America. Perhaps their greatest fear was that the French would invade the British Isles. The banker announced on April 17, 1778, that several English vessels had been assigned to observe

the movements of the French fleet at Toulon under the leadership of the Count D'Estaing (IX, p. ccvj). On May 9, 1778, he reported this French fleet en route to America to aid Washington in his efforts to blockade Howe in Philadelphia (X, p. viij). On May 5, 1778, the House of Commons became embroiled in a debate over the failure of the English fleet to leave Portsmouth even though D'Estaing's French squadron was already on its way to America (X, pp. xvij-xx). Townshend insisted upon the necessity of action by the English fleet before the French squadron at Brest and the Spanish fleet at Cadiz joined forces to attack the British Isles (X, p. xxiv). The quarrel continued on the following day when Lord Germain explained that the ministry did not wish to allow the British fleet to depart until Britain's internal safety was assured. He also said that the cabinet sent orders for its departure as soon as possible after hearing of the sailing of the French Toulon fleet for America (X, pp. xxxij-xxxiv). Burke warned that Howe might well suffer Burgoyne's fate unless Britain got its navy into action quickly (X, p. xxxvj). On May 8, 1778, the House of Commons passed Meredith's resolution asking that the Commons be allowed to examine all notices given the ministry relative to the armament and sailing of the French Toulon squadron (X, p. xli). The same motion presented by the Duke of Richmond in the House of Lords caused considerable surprise when it passed over Lord Weymouth's strong objections (X, p. xlv).

The banker reported that the general opinion in London was that the Count D'Estaing could do nearly what he pleased in America since Lord Howe's fleet was in poor condition (X, p. xlvi). General Howe, he wrote, would be cut off without reinforcements if D'Estaing's actual destination was

America (X, p. xlviij).

In his letter of May 22, 1778, the banker printed two writings concerning the conduct of the ministry after the departure of the French fleet from Toulon. The first of the writings praised the ministers for their speed in drawing up orders for the departure of the English fleet from Portsmouth. The fleet was help up by a stiff contrary wind (X, pp. lxxxvij-lxxxvijj). The second writing described the total lack of speed used by the ministry in drawing up the orders. Here it was reported that a lack of provisions instead of a contrary wind prevented the sailing of the fleet. This writing also reported that the ministers did not hear of the sailing of the French fleet from Toulon until fourteen days later and then none of the ministry except Germain was in London. Finally, after the interminable waste of time in getting the news and in provisioning the fleet, Admiral Byron left in the face of a contrary wind, returned the next day, and remained there long after the wind changed (X, pp. lxxxix-xo). It does appear that England should have been able to do something more than was done to hinder the progress of the French fleet.

The Lords took up, on May 25, 1778, the consideration of the notices received by the ministry concerning the armanent and sailing of the French Toulon squadron. The first notice was dated January 3, 1778, and a continuous stream of notices had flowed into the offices of the various secretaries from then on (X, p. clj). Richmond was the first to speak after the reading of the notices was completed. He expressed the opinion that the ministry should have sent a squadron to the Mediterranean to prevent the arming of the French fleet since they had known of it since January (X, p. clj). In

a comparison of the British with the French and Spanish fleets he found that of his own country lacking in many respects (X, p. clij). In closing, Richmond charged the ministers with criminal neglect of their duties in allowing the arming of this French fleet to go on. Lord Sandwich offered mathematical proof that England had a larger number of ships than France and Spain. He blamed the delay in the sailing of the English fleet on insufficient equipment and contrary winds (X, pp. cliv-clv).

On the same day, May 25, 1778, the reports mentioned above were read to the House of Commons. The conclusions reached by Heredith of the House of Commons after hearing the notices were much the same as those expressed in the House of Lords by the Duke of Richmond (X, pp. clxj-clxij). Luttrell thought that a ship should be sent to warn Lord Howe of D'Estaing's coming, although it would have been far better to stop D'Estaing at Gibraltar (X, p. clxij). Byng considered Britain lost if she could not protect Gibraltar, and Fox expressed the same idea (X, p. clxij). Lord North countered by saying that the English fleet was kept at home for protection, adding that all outlying possessions could not be protected (X, pp. clxiv-clxv).

Open warfare with France was brought nearer by the action of the British Admiral Keppel in capturing three French vessels, two warships and a merchantman. The story of this capture was taken from the Court Gazette of June 27, 1778, which printed three letters from Keppel to the Admiralty. The story was interspersed with derogatory comments by the banker (X, pp. ccclvj-ccclxij). The merchants of London, as well as the ministry, were angry with Keppel over this affair because the incident could easily open

hostilities with France (X, p. cccxiv). Keppel, a short while later, complicated matters still more by capturing two more French merchantmen, neither of which was engaged in American trade. These captures caused stocks to go lower because of fear of a French war (X, p. cccxv). On July 10, 1778, the banker reported that Keppel was still in port, and that it was believed in London that he would not be sent out again and that the ships he had captured would be returned to France with apologies (XI, p. xlv).

This danger of war caused debates in the House of Lords on June 2, 1778, on the advisability of proroguing Parliament. The Duke of Bolton moved for adjournment instead of prorogation and cited the danger of an attack by France at a time when the ministry had announced that it could not safely dispatch a small squadron to defend Gibraltar (XI, p. liv). He referred to an embargo then laid on British shipping and considered that this meant that the ministry feared an invasion (XI, p. lvii). Weymouth denied the danger of invasion and said that the embargo was imposed in order that sailors might be taken off merchant ships to man the warships (XI, p. lx). Lord Camden accused France of having secretly aided America while urging the British ministry on in its foolhardy plan of conquering the colonies. The sole purpose of this, he said, was to denude the British Isles of men and equipment in order to make a French attack easier (XI, pp. lxj-lxij). Spain's armaments, Camden said, showed that she was soon going to join France (XI, p. lxii). He feared that the British army and navy in America would be at the mercy of D'Estaing (XI, p. lxv). Lord Shelburne also spoke on the poor state of English defenses both at home

and in the outlying possessions (XI, pp. lxxvij-lxxij). Lord Bristol denounced Lord Sandwich for having promised that Britain's sea forces were capable of handling France and Spain both when he was later unable to detach a squadron to observe D'Estaing or to aid Lord Howe (XI, p. lxxij). The Duke of Richmond reiterated the often-repeated charges that the ministry was negligent, inefficient, and incapable of handling affairs (XI, pp. lxxvij-lxxx). Lord Sandwich explained that the embargo then in force was for the purpose of securing sailors for the navy. He denied that he had ever reported the navy unable to dispatch a squadron to observe D'Estaing (XI, p. lxxxj).

At this point the banker printed another article¹² written by one who called himself "Aratus" (XI, pp. lxxxix-xciv). "Aratus" feared that the ministry was so anxious to keep peace with France that it would recognize American independence (XI, pp. lxxxix-xc). This recognition, he wrote, would only cement more firmly the union between France and America because America would then be grateful to France for securing its independence (XI, p. xc). His counsel was that England should withdraw all its forces from America and employ them in an effort to defeat France (XI, pp. xc-xciv).

On August 14, 1778, the banker printed another article by "Aratus," whom the banker now believed to be Lord Shelburne (XI, p. ccxlix). The counsel given by "Aratus" above is similar to that given by Shelburne in the House of Lords¹³ on April 8, 1778. "Aratus" wrote that under no conditions

¹² Supra, p. 57.

¹³ Supra, p. 70.

could Britain accept the humiliating proposal of Congress that the thirteen colonies not only receive their independence but also that France be considered as one of the powers to approve the treaty (XI, pp. cclix-ccl). England, he wrote, could defeat both countries if it would get a new ministry (XI, p. ccl).

The long feared arrival in America of D'Estaing's French fleet came on July 5, 1778, when he appeared off the coast of Virginia. On July 6 he was in Chesapeake Bay and on July 8 at the entrance of the Delaware River, too late, however, to attack Lord Howe (XI, p. cclxvix). He then appeared off Sandy Hook on July 11 with fifteen ships (XI, p. cclxliij). Here he remained blocking Lord Howe in New York Bay (XI, p. cclxxvij). On July 18 he was still there (XI, p. ccxcj), and it was reported that several prominent inhabitants, among them Governor Livingston of New Jersey, had dined aboard his ship (XI, p. ccxcij). Commenting on the blockade of Howe, a writer in the Affaires who signed himself "Russel" saw no possibility of a happy outcome for Howe because D'Estaing's ships were new while Howe's had been in the water constantly for two years. He also asked why Lord Sandwich had not stopped the French fleet at Gibraltar soon after it left Toulon (XI, pp. ccxxliij-ccxxvj). On July 22, 1778, D'Estaing suddenly left New York and went to Rhode Island where the English were menaced by General Sullivan of the American army (XI, pp. ccxxxvij-ccxxxvij). Lord Howe followed D'Estaing to Rhode Island, leaving New York on August 6, 1778. (XII, pp. cxxxij-cxxxij). D'Estaing arrived at Rhode Island on July 29 and his presence caused the British to burn a vessel which they had there (XII, pp. cxxxij-cxxxiv). On August 11, 1778, D'Estaing observed that

Lord Howe's squadron was drawing near his position at Newport, Rhode Island. Both the French and British squadrons drew out to sea and were ready to do battle when a storm struck them, separating the squadrons and doing considerable damage (XII, p. cxi). D'Estaing eventually, on August 28, arrived at Boston to repair his ships (XII, p. cliv).

The banker's letter of October 26, 1778, reported a quarrel in letters between the two writers who designated themselves "Aratus" and "Whig Consequent." "Aratus" believed that Britain should exterminate the French fleet after first removing the ministry and then Britain would be in a position to treat advantageously with America (XII, p. clxij). The "Whig consequent" considered that a war with France would be fatal to England and would consolidate the French-American union. He also desired the dismissal of the ministers, but he wanted immediate reconciliation with America (XII, p. clxij). In a letter which he designated his last, "Aratus" said that France could not be considered a defender of American liberty because she did not enter the war until American liberty was assured after Burgoyne's defeat (XII, pp. clxvij-clxvii). The "Whig consequent" answered as usual that a war with France would be fatal to Britain (XII, p. clxxvij) and that France was America's defender because she furnished America with supplies even before the alliance (XII, p. clxxxij).

The banker's letter of November 27, 1778, reported the discourse of the King to Parliament on November 26, 1778 (XII, pp. cccxxvij-cccxxxj). In his address the King berated France first for having given secret aid to the Americans and then for contracting an alliance with them (XII, p. cccxxvij). He announced his intention of carrying on the war with America

until the Americans would submit to British control (XII, pp. cccxxix-cccxxx). In the discussions on the King's discourse Lord Coventry in the House of Lords opposed the King's intention of carrying on the war, and Lord Suffolk insisted that the remaining means of reducing America should be used only as a last resort. The Bishop of Peterborough declared that war with France and America both would mean the ruin of England (XII, pp. cccxxxij-cccxxxij). In the House of Commons Townshend signified his opposition to carrying on the war with America (XII, pp. cccxxxiv-cccxxxv). Fox insisted that Britain had not enough naval forces to hold out against both France and Spain. His counsel was that the ministry should recall all armed forces from America in order to oppose France and Spain (XII, pp. cccxxxv-cccxxxvj).

In studying the history of foreign aid for the Americans as presented by the Affaires, it is necessary to keep in mind that this periodical was written to influence the French people and government to aid the Americans. Therefore, it is only natural that the account of foreign aid in this journal should concern almost exclusively the aid given by France. With news traveling as slowly as it did in the days of the American Revolution, it is doubtful that many Englishmen were sure when they forecasted that France would ally herself with the American states. However, the account here seems to indicate that one might suspect that France, being England's traditional enemy, would aid the Americans at least secretly. There seemed to be a disposition on the part of the ministers to ignore this fact. This disposition is all the more evident when one considers that the ministers apparently knew of the French alliance for some time before they communicated

it to Parliament or took any steps to counteract it.

The ministers also feigned ignorance on the subject of the movements of the French fleets. This fact indicates that the members of the opposition were probably correct when they charged that the British navy was in no condition to stop these French fleets. However, it is doubtful whether the opposition in this case was as strong as the reports in the Affaires would seem to indicate. In the few places where the vote on various proposals and motions was given the administration was shown to have had a rather easy majority.

CHAPTER V

THE DISPUTES ARISING FROM THE DEFEAT OF BURGOYNE AT SARATOGA

The purpose of this chapter will be to give an account, as presented in the Affaires, of the acts of the British General John Burgoyne after the Battle of Saratoga which ended on October 13, 1777, with the total defeat of the British army under Burgoyne. The American commander was General Horatio Gates. This Battle of Saratoga has been called one of the fifteen most decisive battles in the history of the world.¹

The reason for including here material concerning the conditions after Saratoga is that it is rarely discussed in American histories. The material is interesting rather than important. However, it is valuable for the light which it sheds on the extreme lack of knowledge of conditions in America on the part of those who directed the war from the council tables in London.

Since the Affaires do not present the story of the events leading up to the defeat of Burgoyne at Saratoga, it may be well to give a brief account at this point.² John Burgoyne was sent to America with General William Howe as a major-general early in 1775. He was in Boston at the

¹ Edward Creasy, The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World from Marathon to Waterloo (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1902), pp. 298-326.

² The material for this account is taken from George Bancroft, History of the United States of America from the Discovery of the Continent. 6 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1879), Vol. IV, pp. 482 and 618; Vol. V, pp. 296-590; Vol. VI, pp. 5-14.

time of the Battle of Bunker Hill. In June, 1776, Burgoyne appeared in Quebec with a division of Brunswick mercenary troops to aid Carleton in breaking completely the siege of Quebec. Sometime afterward he returned to England and there sat in Council with Lord Germain to plan the northern campaign of 1777 in which the Canadian army was to go from Canada to Albany and the city of New York in order to divide the colonies.

On May 6, 1777, Burgoyne arrived at Quebec to take the command of the Canadian army from General Carleton. He immediately set to work gathering men and supplies and started the trip to New York. At first he considered the trip a simple affair. Burgoyne had a considerable number of Indians in his army and tried to keep them from scalping. On July 6, 1777, Burgoyne's forces captured Fort Ticonderoga from the Americans. His army toiled on southward through the heat of midsummer and the swamps as the men became more and more dispirited. By July 30, 1777, he had his headquarters on the banks of the Hudson River. Now progress became even more difficult; many Canadians deserted and Indian allies were leaving. Burgoyne was at this point depending upon supplies shipped from England over the tortuous route from Quebec. With greatly depleted ranks he fought his way down the Hudson River until October 6, 1777, when he was stopped by the Americans. On the eighth of October Burgoyne began to retreat, on the eleventh the Americans captured most of his supplies, on the twelfth his army was completely surrounded and exposed to the fire of the Americans, and on October 13 a council of his officers decided that it would be best to submit. General Gates, the American commander, agreed to Burgoyne's proposal that his men lay down their arms and be sent to Boston for trans-

portation to England on the condition that they not serve again in North America during the war. This agreement was signed on October 17, 1777.

The Affaires had little to say about Burgoyne until after the defeat at Saratoga. On August 16, 1776, the London banker had mentioned a plan of that year to join the Canadian army under Burgoyne with Howe's army then disembarking at Long Island. The junction was to be made by way of the Hudson River route (II, 7, p. 85). On December 10, 1776, the banker reported that Burgoyne had returned from Quebec. He indicated that it was the general opinion in London that Burgoyne would not return to Canada because he had not succeeded in making the junction with Howe's army (II, 15, pp. cxxix-cxxx). However, the postscript of December 11, 1776, noted that Burgoyne would return to Canada for the next campaign (III, 13, p. cxxx).

The Affaires did not again have a report on Burgoyne until the campaign of 1777 was well under way. On August 19, 1777, it was reported that a great deal of incredulity surrounded the idea that Burgoyne had captured Ticonderoga on July 7 as reported by the ministry (VI, 26, p. xlj). However, a comparison of this report with the account given earlier in this chapter shows the report to be true except for an error of one day in the date.³ The banker himself, on September 16, 1777, acknowledged the authenticity of the report and printed a letter from the American General Saint Clair to Congress dated July 14, 1777, on the subject of the evacuation of Fort Ticonderoga. He attributed the loss to the lack of men on the

³ Supra, p. 81.

part of the Americans (VI, 27, pp. lxi-lxii).

The first indication of what success might be expected from Burgoyne was given in the banker's letter of October 21, 1777, where it was remarked that an expedition led by Howe against Staten Island, New York, prevented his sending troops to aid Burgoyne (VI, 30, p. clxxxij). This report came after the defeat of Burgoyne had taken place but before the news was received in England. The banker wrote further that Burgoyne had reached the Hudson River on July 30, 1777, and there found his passage barred by an American army which was increasing daily (VI, 30, p. clxxxii). An interesting sidelight is the report made by General Clinton's New York Gazette. This report stated that Burgoyne on August 14, 1777, repulsed the Americans ten miles above Albany and then captured the city, routing completely the American army. This paper also reported that Burgoyne had been aided by the American General Schuyler who gave up fifteen hundred men to him (VI, 30, p. clxxxv). This event never happened and the banker stated his disbelief of the report. He went on to say that General Gates of the American army had received reinforcements from the militia of the northern states (VI, 30, p. clxxxvj). On October 22, 1777, the further report was given that General Arnold had joined Gates and that the American army was resisting Burgoyne vigorously at Saratoga (VI, 30, p. cxcj). The banker did not have much faith in Burgoyne's ability to defeat the Americans and remarked that Burgoyne was pompous, issued too many proclamations, and spent too much money (VI, 30, p. cclij).

General Burgoyne wrote a letter from Saratoga, August 20, 1777. This letter was printed in the Court Gazette of London. He told of his troubles

in moving forward and the fact that provisions were low and communications were hard to maintain. He spoke of his hopes of receiving assistance from General Howe, who seemed to have forgotten him (VII, 31, pp. xxiv-xxvj).

It was not until December 9, 1777, that the Affaires had a report of the defeat of Burgoyne at Saratoga (VII, 33, p. lxxxix). A few pages later there was printed a letter taken from a Boston newspaper. The letter was from General Gates to the president of the council of Massachusetts Bay and was written at Albany, October 19, 1777. Gates here announced the surrender of Burgoyne and that he was sending Burgoyne's army to Boston (VII, 33, p. cvj).

In the House of Commons on December 3, 1777, Lord Germain, who had planned the Hudson River campaign with Burgoyne, took upon himself the blame for Burgoyne's failure. He said that these plans would have been successful if his information concerning the true state of affairs in America had been correct (VII, 34, p. clj). Burke and Fox considered that, if Lord Germain blamed himself for Burgoyne's defeat, he should communicate to the Commons all instructions sent to Burgoyne (VII, 34, p. clij). On the theory that one should not plan campaigns unless he has all necessary information, Colonel Barré and Burke expressed their indignation with Germain for having done just that (VII, 34, pp. cliij-cliv).

Lord Chatham in the House of Lords also laid the blame for Burgoyne's defeat on the ministry. He felt that Burgoyne should be respectfully treated on his return from America (VII, 34, p. clvj). Lord Shelburne blamed Burgoyne's defeat on the fact that he continued his attempt to reach Albany in spite of the fact that more experienced men had denounced

the plan. This, Shelburne said, was not Burgoyne's fault but was due to the positive orders given him by the ministry. He believed that, if Howe's orders had been as positive, he would have gone to aid Burgoyne (VII, 34, pp. clxx-clxxj). To aid in throwing more blame on the ministry, the banker added that Burgoyne said he had positive orders to winter in Albany and was trying to get there when he was defeated (VII, 34, p. clxxxvij).

On April 10, 1778, the London banker reported that Burgoyne's army would not be allowed to return to England until King George agreed to his capitulation. Congress passed this resolution⁴ because it felt that Burgoyne might not hold to the agreement (IX, p. cclxxiv).

On May 14, 1778, it was reported that General Burgoyne had arrived unexpectedly in England. It was believed that his presence there was by the permission of Congress to allow him to persuade the King and Parliament to accept the terms of his capitulation so that his army might be allowed to return to England (X, p. liv-lv). In his next letter, that of May 22, 1778, the banker commented on Burgoyne's case by saying that he had been practically ignored since his return to England. The banker seemed to believe that little could be done to judge his case until Burgoyne had obtained his release as an American prisoner (X, pp. lxxx-lxxxij).

This letter from the London banker also contained an article written by the partisans of General Carleton. These friends of Carleton were antagonistic to Burgoyne because they felt that he had caused Carleton to lose

⁴ William Edward Hartpole Lecky, The American Revolution 1763-1783 (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1898), p. 347.

his command in Canada. Here was made the statement that Carleton had been convinced that Burgoyne's plan of reaching Albany was impossible with the forces available. To reach Carleton's superiors, Burgoyne returned to England, drew public disfavor upon Carleton, and solicited his own appointment to head the project of dividing the colonies by way of the Hudson River. Howe had warned Burgoyne that he could give him no aid, but Burgoyne went on, hoping to reap for himself all the honor of carrying out the campaign. He chose to ignore the fact that he had many obstacles to surmount before he could reach Albany, and then he tried to blame his failure on what he called his positive orders. His orders were, in fact, only general and left a great deal to his own discretion (X, pp. lxxxlij-lxxxvj).

The banker noted on May 23, 1778, that the House of Commons had set May 26 as the date to hear Burgoyne's story. He wrote that Burgoyne had placed the ministry in a predicament by complaining that the Americans had broken the rules of the Saratoga capitulation. Because of his complaint Congress demanded the approval of the British court for the capitulation. If the court gave its approval, it would amount to a virtual recognition of American independence (X, p. xciiij).

In the House of Commons on May 26, 1778, Wyner moved that the chamber be formed into a committee of the whole to consider Burgoyne's affair (X, p. xciv). Burgoyne charged that he had been left without support. In answer to Wilkes' complaint, Burgoyne announced that he had used Indians in the campaign in order to forestall an American alliance with the Indians (X, pp. cxcv-cxv). He insisted that Congress had never regarded him as a prisoner and had allowed him to come to England at his own request in order

that he might justify himself and his troops (X, p. cxcvij). With regard to the controversy over his orders, Burgoyne protested that they were peremptory and forced him toward Albany with insufficient forces and no help from General Howe. He was insistent in his demand that all papers concerning his orders be examined (X, pp. cxcvij-cxcvij). His concluding remarks contained a denial that he had any jealousy of Carleton or Howe and stated that the Americans had violated public faith in their methods of handling his troops (X, pp. cxcix-ccij).

Lord Germain considered that Burgoyne could be judged better by a military court than by Parliament, especially since he was still an American prisoner. This caused Burgoyne to state emphatically again that he was not a prisoner (X, pp. ccij-cciv). Luttrell thought it strange that a minister should be quarreling with his general instead of upholding him (X, pp. cciv-ccv). He implied his support of Burgoyne and his lack of faith in the ministry by stating that they would have protected Burgoyne if he had disobeyed their orders and quit his flag instead of being over-zealous. This attack enraged Germain and his actions threw the Commons into an uproar (X, pp. ccvj-ccvij). The dispute between Luttrell and Germain went on until early morning when the motion to consider Burgoyne's affair was declined without a vote (X, pp. ccvij-cox).

On the following day Burgoyne reiterated his statement that his orders were precise (X, p. cxxxiv). He was bitter in his complaint that the ministry was persecuting him after he had so zealously carried out their peremptory orders (X, p. cxxxvj). Rigby did not believe that Burgoyne's affair should interest Parliament because Burgoyne was still a prisoner of war. He thought that a military court formed of Burgoyne's superiors was

the only tribunal in which Burgoyne could be judged but this could not even be done as long as he was a prisoner (X, pp. ccxxvij-ccxxix). Advocate-General Thurloe, because he also considered Burgoyne an American prisoner, doubted that he had the right to his seat in Parliament. In the succeeding uproar, Burgoyne again insisted that he was as free as any British citizen. The Americans, he said, were glad for him to come in the hope that he would tell the truth in Parliament about the American war (X, pp. ccxxxij-ccxxxiv). The point concerning Burgoyne's right to his seat in Parliament was settled by the presiding officer who declared it to be perfectly valid (X, p. ccxxxvj).

Lord North also considered Burgoyne a prisoner of the Americans. However, he absolved Burgoyne, as well as the ministry, from all blame for Burgoyne's defeat (X, p. ccxlix). Later Burgoyne continued his defense whenever the opportunity appeared. At one time he charged that the ministry did not seek information from reputable officers concerning his conduct (X, pp. ccxj-ccxij). He insisted further that his orders were positive and quoted from a letter sent by Germain to Carleton in which Burgoyne was ordered to cross Lake Champlain and go as quickly as possible to Albany where he was to put himself under the orders of General Howe (X, p. ccxvij). Germain denied Burgoyne's charges that he had taken counsel from disreputable officials in Burgoyne's affair. Germain also said that it was apparent that America wanted to evade the Saratoga agreement (X, p. ccxxix). Charles Fox closed the debates on this subject with the statement that Burgoyne could not be judged by a military council because no one charged him with any fault against the rules of war (X, p. ccxxx).

Burgoyne, however, did not give up in the face of these assertions

that it was not Parliament's place to judge his conduct. On November 26, 1778, he again lodged his complaint with the Commons that his case had not been considered by the King or Parliament (XII, pp. cccxvj-cccxvij). This was followed by a debate between him and Germain (XII, pp. cccxv|-cccc). On December 1, 1778, Burgoyne made a motion to have the Commons view all papers concerning his army since its arrival at Boston. The motion was passed without opposition (XII, p. cccc). Apparently, however, little was done to settle the matter even after this motion had been passed. Several months later, on March 29, 1779, when the House of Commons passed a motion to have a committee, in the presence of several officers, examine the letters which had passed between the Howes and Germain, Burgoyne pushed another motion through the House of Commons to have his own papers examined by the same committee (XIV, pp. clij-civ). Exactly a month later, on April 29, 1779, Lord Nugent asked the House of Commons to drop all considerations of the charges against the Howes' conduct in America (XIV, pp. clxvij-clxx). When he had finished, Burgoyne expressed the hope that the Commons would not cast aside his own case this easily. His complaint that he had not been allowed to see the King caused Lord Germain to declare that this was impossible, as was judgment by a military tribunal, as long as Burgoyne was technically a prisoner of war (XIV, pp. clxxj-clxxij). Fox again closed the debates by stating that the ministers were trying to hide their own actions by blaming the generals. Burgoyne's failure, he said, was due to exact orders which did not allow him to use his own judgment (XIV, pp. clxxij-clxxvij).

The men sent to America by the North conciliatory proposals in 1778

entered the quarrel concerning the Saratoga affair⁵ on August 7, 1778, when they sent a letter to Congress asking that Boston harbor be opened for British ships to take Burgoyne's soldiers to England. This army, they wrote, was being held in violation of the Saratoga convention (XII, pp. ccvij-ccx). On August 26, 1778, George Johnstone, one of the commissioners who had aroused considerable controversy through his efforts to bribe a member of Congress,⁶ charged that Congress acted in bad faith in the Saratoga affair (XII, pp. ccxvj-ccxvij). Some time later a friend of the London banker wrote that he was unable to understand how the commissioners could charge Congress with breaking faith in the Saratoga affair when both the King and Parliament refused either to hear Burgoyne or to ratify the Saratoga convention (XII, p. ccxxxij). Another friend of the banker presented much the same idea but added that British generals had often broken agreements and cited cases in which this had happened (XII, pp. ccxxxv-ccxxxvj). He charged that Burgoyne tried to give the impression that Congress had broken the Saratoga agreement. If this idea would become general, then Burgoyne would be free to join his army to Howe's. Congress had showed its willingness to comply with the terms of the capitulation by sending the Canadian prisoners home on their promises to fight no more. Yet Carleton had forced these same men to take up arms again (XII, pp. ccxxxvij-ccxxxix). Still a third person writing to the banker said that Burgoyne's troops broke the agreement when they damaged or destroyed their arms before

⁵ Supra, p. 51.

⁶ Supra, pp. 49-50.

delivering them to Gates. He also presented five proofs of the fact that it was intended that Burgoyne's army was to join Howe's in violation of the capitulation (XII, pp. cexlj-cexliij). This writer's final argument was that Congress had a perfect right to hold Burgoyne's army because payment had not been made for the provisions furnished it by the Americans (XII, p. cexliij). The answer made by Congress to the demands of the commissioners was in the form of a resolution stating that Burgoyne's troops would not be released until Great Britain had ratified the convention clearly and explicitly (XII, pp. colxj-colxij).

This ended the reports in the Affaires on the quarrels over the alleged violations of the Saratoga convention and misconduct of Burgoyne in America. There can be little doubt in this matter that there was a great deal of faulty conduct on the part of Burgoyne as well as the ministry. The account in the Affaires illustrates well, however, the difficulty of conducting a war by orders from officials several thousand miles away.

With regard to the alleged violations of the Saratoga convention, it appears likely, considering the facts in the Affaires to be correct, that the whole matter could have been settled by a mere ratification by the King and Parliament of the Saratoga agreement. However, it may be that ratification was not as simple as it sounds since such action would probably have meant that the American states were recognized as independent by Great Britain. Then, too, the easy acceptance of this convention by the ministry and the consequent settling of the dispute with Burgoyne might have entailed a considerable admission of error on the part of British officials.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This study has been made for the purpose of presenting the attitudes of the Affaires de l'Angleterre et de l'Amérique on questions associated with the American Revolution. The journal was designed to influence the French people and government to aid the Americans. Therefore it was partial toward the Americans from the beginning. This partiality became greater as time passed. By the time the journal had reached the halfway point in its career, all semblance of impartiality had disappeared.

The Affaires printed practically nothing which was not associated with the American Revolution. At various times the London banker included in his letters reports of the proceedings of the assembly of the East India Company or similar material. When such material apparently had no bearing on the conduct of the war or matters connected with it, the banker usually explained why he considered this certain report of value in the study of the affairs of England and America. For example, at one point he prefaced his report of the proceedings of the East India Company by saying that these matters were important in the dispute between England and America because England would have to depend upon India to replace the commerce which would be lost if America received its independence (VIII, 33, p. 100). The emphasis in the periodical was on the European implications of the war and especially on those aspects which would be most likely to influence the French people and government.

Relatively little attention was paid to the military events of the war. This is in contrast with the attitude taken by the Gazette de Leyde.¹ A few engagements which received a great deal of publicity in Europe, such as the Battle of Saratoga, the siege of Quebec, and the Battle of Monmouth, were also stressed by the Affaires. The Battle of Saratoga received considerable space because it had a strong influence on bringing about the French alliance, which was the end toward which the editors were working.

The Affaires devoted little space to the Declaration of Independence² although it did print a translation of the document (II, 7, pp. 88-95). The French-American alliance received a great deal of attention.

The Affaires contained a large number of typographical errors and on the whole was rather poorly printed. Its irregularity also must have been somewhat disconcerting. That the editors realized this is shown by the Avis at the end of Volume XIV, where they stated their belief that the public would appreciate the regular appearance of the banker's letters thereafter in the Mercure de France and the Journal historique et politique de Genève (XV, supplement, p. 2).

This journal printed a fairly complete story of the effects on the British Parliament of the hiring of mercenary troops. The strength of the

¹ Cf., Elizabeth Peters, "The American Revolution as Seen in the Gazette de Leyde (1774-83)," (unpublished Master's thesis, Kansas State Teachers College of Emporia, 1938), p. 102.

² Cf., loc. cit.

opposition appeared to be great if judgment were made on the basis of the debates reported in the Affaires. However, the votes on bills concerning these German soldiers showed the majority to be in a strong position. Those in Parliament who spoke against the employment of these soldiers probably were signifying their opposition to the ministry more than to the use of the mercenaries. The Affaires tended to discredit any value which the German troops might have for the British.

In its rather lengthy reports on the history of conciliatory proposals in England, the Affaires presented the weak points of these plans in a fairly clear fashion. The journal showed that there was considerable sentiment for peace in England even though this sentiment was not manifested in Parliament. Very few of the plans suggested in England recognized that America would gain its independence eventually. Most of those who offered methods of settling the dispute were motivated by economic considerations. The Howe conciliatory commission was entirely unsuccessful because it offered nothing to the Americans to induce them to return to their British allegiance. The plan drawn up by Lord North in 1778 might have been successful if it had been presented earlier. Coming as it did at the same time as the French alliance, it was doomed to failure from the beginning. It was probably an indication that the British government was beginning to understand that the Americans were likely to win their independence. It may be also that the plan was designed to forestall the acceptance of the French alliance by the Americans.

But the Affaires showed that the British government long tended to ignore the fact that France would be likely to ally herself with the Americans.

The ministry consistently refused to heed the warnings of the opposition party. The ministry also appeared to ignore the movements of the French fleets even after it was well known that France intended to use its armed forces to aid America. As the ministerial opponents indicated, this feigned lack of knowledge on the part of the administration was probably due to the poor state of the British naval forces.

The story of the alleged violations of the Saratoga convention and the misconduct of General Burgoyne in the direction of his northern campaign points out one of the important reasons why Great Britain was unable to defeat the Americans. It is practically impossible to plan and direct effective campaigns in offices situated several thousand miles from the scene of a conflict. As to the failure of the British government to heed the request of the Continental Congress for formal ratification of the Saratoga convention, it is probably true that the ministry recognized the fact that to ratify the agreement would be to accept the independence of the thirteen colonies as an accomplished fact.

So little effort was made by the editors to conceal the partiality of the Affaires that it seems today that anyone should have been able to perceive its intention of spreading propaganda. However, the paper often included articles and discussions in which the value of an American alliance for France was so well and thoroughly presented that many people must have been impressed by the arguments.

The materials presented in the Affaires de l'Angleterre et de l'Amérique are important for the view which they give of methods of

disseminating propaganda during the period of the American Revolution.
A study of this journal is also valuable for the specific attitudes
presented and as a source of comparatively unknown material.

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
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APPENDIX

range pas toujours avec les obligations rigoureuses du retour périodique. En se ménageant plus de liberté à cet égard, on pourra retarder ou avancer la publication de chaque cahier, selon le plus ou moins d'espace dans lequel le pour & le contre se seront développés.



AFFAIRES
DE L'ANGLETERRE
ET DE L'AMÉRIQUE.
1776.

P R É C I S

Des clauses pécuniaires des Traités
pour les Troupes Auxiliaires.

TRAITÉ avec le Duc de Brunswick, signé
le 9 Janvier.

NOMBRE d'hommes d'In-
fanterie, 3964. }
Cavalerie à pied, 336. } 4.300.

Le départ d'une moitié est fixé au 15 Fé-
vrier, & de l'autre à la fin de Mars: la pre-
mière pour arriver au port d'embarquement
le 25 Février; & l'autre le 10 Avril.

N^o. I^{er}.

A

INDEX OF NAMES

INDEX OF NAMES

A

Abdington, Lord, 68
 Adams, 33
 Adams, James Truslow, 98
 Adams, Samuel, 23, 43
 Aratus, 29, 57, 75, 77
 Arnold, Benedict, 83

B

Baker, 69
 Bancroft, George, 17, 32, 80,
 98
 Barré, Colonel, 28, 33, 36,
 59, 84
 Becker, Carl Lotus, 28, 98
 Bolton, Duke of, 63, 64, 74
 Bristol, Count of, 63, 75
 Brunswick, Duke of, 6, 7, 8,
 12, 102
 Burgoyne, General, 18, 52, 80,
 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88,
 90, 91, 95
 Burke, Edmund, 6, 17, 22, 24,
 28, 32, 33, 39, 40, 61, 68,
 71, 84
 Byng, 73
 Byron, Admiral, 72

C

Camden, Lord, 21, 60, 74
 Cardiff, Lord, 23
 Carleton, General, 81, 85, 86,
 87, 88, 90
 Carlisle, Lord, 8, 21, 44, 46
 50
 Cavendish, Lord, 6
 Channing, Edward, 98
 Chatham, Lord, 23, 24, 38, 56,
 57, 59, 62, 84
 Clinton, General, 45, 50, 51,
 66, 83
 Coke, 51, 52
 Coleman, Mary Bushnell, 99
 Conway, General, 7, 33, 56
 Cooper, Dr. Samuel, 66
 Coventry, Lord, 20, 78
 Creasy, Edward, 80, 98

D

Dana, Francis, 48
 Deane, Silas, 47, 64
 D'Estaing, Count, 71, 74, 75, 76,
 77
 Drayton, William, 34, 47, 48
 Dundas, Henry, 44
 Dunning, 68

E

Eden, 44, 46, 49, 50
 Effingham, Lord, 21
 Elliot, Gilbert, 62

F

Faj, Bernard, 1, 98, 99
 Ferguson, Doctor, 45
 Ford, Paul Leicester, 1, 4, 99
 Fox, Charles, 26, 40, 42, 44, 59,
 63, 64, 68, 73, 78, 84, 88, 89
 Franklin, Benjamin, 1, 31, 36, 37,
 43, 48, 66, 98

G

Gates, Horatio, 80, 81, 83, 84, 91
 Gebelin, Court de, 1, 99
 Genêt, Edmond, 1
 George III, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 32,
 33, 36, 38, 45, 46, 51, 52, 56,
 58, 62, 68, 69, 77, 78, 85, 89,
 90
 Gérard, 47, 65, 67
 Germain, Lord George, 33, 35, 36,
 59, 71, 84, 87, 88, 89
 Grafton, Duke of, 21, 22, 56, 58,
 64
 Grenville, Lord, 23, 68
 Guthrie, Ramon, 99

H

Hanau, Count of, 6, 7, 8, 12
 Hancock, John, 23
 Harlow, Ralph Volney, 99
 Hart, Albert Bushnell, 100

Hartley, 6

Hatin, Eugène, 1, 99

Hesse, Landgrave of, 6, 7, 8, 12

Hillsborough, Lord, 22

Hotham, Commodore, 11

Howe, General, 12, 14, 15, 16, 31,

32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,

44, 46, 50, 52, 71, 82, 83, 84,

85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 94

Howe, Lord, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,

37, 58, 39, 44, 46, 50, 71, 75, 76,

77, 89, 94

I

Imbs, Bravig, 98

J

Johnson, Allen, 19, 28, 35, 98, 100

Johnston, Colonel, 23

Johnstone, George, 23, 44, 46, 47,

48, 49, 50, 56, 59, 90

K

Knyphausen, General, 15, 17

Koppel, Admiral, 73, 74

L

Laurens, Henry, 47, 51, 67

Lecky, William Edward Hartpole,

85, 99

Littleton, Lord, 22, 24, 63

Livingston, Governor, 76

Louis XVI, 64, 65, 67

Luttrel, Temple, 7, 10, 59, 73, 87

M

Manchester, Duke of, 8, 20, 32,

56, 58, 67

Marcus Brutus, 66

Matthews, David, 32

Meredith, 71, 73

Merlant, Joachim, 99

Middleton, Lord, 28

N

North, Lord, 6, 7, 12, 20, 23,

24, 31, 33, 36, 39, 40, 41,

42, 43, 47, 53, 56, 58, 59,

62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 73,

88, 89, 94

Nugent, Lord, 89

P

Paine, Thomas, 28, 29, 52

Perkins, James Breck, 99

Peterborough, Bishop of, 78

Peters, Elizabeth, 25, 37, 56,

67, 93

Powis, 44, 52

Pownall, Thomas, 24

Price, Dr. Richard, 3, 20, 25, 26

Prussia, King of, 65

Pulteney, Earl of, 44, 48

R

Rail, Colonel, 15, 17

Reed, Joseph, 49, 50

Richmond, Duke of, 7, 8, 9, 21,

23, 24, 43, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73,

75

Rigby, 87

Robinet, 1, 99

Rockingham, Marquis of, 22, 23, 52

Russel, 76

S

Saint Oclair, General, 82

Sandwich, Lord, 22, 58, 62, 64,

69, 73, 76

Sawbridge, Lord Mayor, 22, 75

Saxby, Lord, 25

Schuyler, General, 83

Shelburne, Lord, 9, 18, 22, 26,

53, 60, 63, 70, 74, 75, 84, 85

Suffolk, Lord, 9, 10, 11, 42, 78

Sullivan, General, 76

T

Talbot, Lord, 21
 Thompson, Charles, 51
 Thurloe, Advocate-General, 88
 Townshend, Thomas, 8, 59, 71, 78
 Tryon, Governor, 32, 37

V

Van Tyne, Claude Halstead, 100

W

Waldeck, Prince of, 6, 12
 Washington, George, 12, 14, 15, 35,
 37, 45, 46
 Weymouth, Lord, 58, 64, 67, 68, 71,
 74
 Whig Conséquent, 77
 Wilkes, John, 22, 24, 59, 86
 Woodburn, J. A., 99
 Wrong, George W., 19, 35, 100
 Wyner, 86

171