

AN INVESTIGATION OF SOME TECHNIQUES BY WHICH INTEREST  
GROUPS EXERT INFLUENCE, WITH A SELECTIVE EXAMINATION  
OF THE INFLUENCE EXERTED UPON CONGRESSIONAL  
COMMITTEES DURING THE FORMULATION OF ONE  
ASPECT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

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## CHAPTER I

### THE PROBLEM, DEFINITIONS, AND METHODS USED

. . . But if the citizen wishes actively to participate in government, and influence it for what he regards as good, only one course is open to him; he must find his fellows who think as he thinks, join them and play the game of real politics, as the rules are laid down by practice over a century old. If he is content with one vote at the ballot box, or a vote and a half, as a member of a party, he is a pretty poor stick of a citizen. It's all right to stand proudly upon his constitutional rights and to decry the invisible government. But it is the real government. The ruling classes are those who use their craft societies, medical associations, farm bureaus, labor unions, bankers' associations, women's leagues and the like to influence government.<sup>1</sup>

William Allen White

There appears to be in the American concept of democracy a belief that the individual citizen can, if he desires, directly influence the policies and processes of government. The pressure of groups (often referred to as "interest groups") in advocating particular policies has been viewed with suspicion. It is comparatively recent that acknowledgment has been made of the fact that the interests of the citizenry are best served, and perhaps are actually served only through the activities of interest groups which provide a more formal means for the expression of the opinion

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<sup>1</sup>William Allen White, Politics: The Citizen's Business (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924), p. 16.

of their members.<sup>2</sup> The foregoing statement is true except for those few individuals who because of their stature or position, find their opinions welcomed by legislators and members of the executive branch of the government. With such individuals the paper is not concerned.

Rather, this study will concentrate upon the manner in which the common man is enabled to bring his opinions to the attention of governmental agencies in such a manner that responsible individuals of the government will give heed to his opinions and incorporate them into the deliberations by which governmental policy is formulated. Specifically, this study will examine the techniques by which interest groups exert influence upon the three branches of the government, and the role of selected interest groups in presenting to committees of the Congress their respective policy positions concerning the formulation of a specific aspect of United States foreign policy.

Because of the restrictive parameters inherent in a thesis of this type, one further purpose is considered to be of importance. During research in the preparation of this study, several areas have been discovered in which little, if any, useful information could be located. These

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<sup>2</sup>W. F. Willoughby, in Director's Preface to E. Pendleton Herring, Group Representation Before Congress (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1929), pp. viii-ix.

areas quite naturally provoke thought and raise questions which are fundamental to an understanding of the problem as a whole. Those areas requiring further research are outlined to indicate additional areas of investigation which it would be desirable to explore in a study of less limited scope.

### Definitions

In order to provide a suitable common base for discussion, it is necessary to establish the definitions of terms used in this study and to provide a background before which the interplay of the elements may be examined. The terms with which this study is primarily concerned are groups and interest groups. Whenever one of these terms is used in this study, it connotes the definition indicated below.

Group. A group is a collection of individuals sharing common interests and attitudes, and in which there is at least a minimum frequency of interaction.<sup>3</sup>

Interest Group. An interest group is a group that "makes claims upon other groups in the society." Such claims "may be asserted or enforced by means of a variety

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<sup>3</sup>David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), pp. 23-24.



of techniques and through any of the institutions of the society . . ." If and when such a group makes a claim "through or upon any of the institutions of government, it becomes a political interest group."<sup>4</sup> In this study, the word political will not be used.

#### How Interest Groups Achieve Their Purpose

In the development of this study, attention will be concentrated on the affect of interest groups upon the legislative branch of the national government. In dealing with the Congress, it is generally easier for interest groups to prevent legislative action contrary to the interest of a particular group than it is to secure legislation designed to advance the group's interests. There are many steps in the legislative process at which the application of appropriate measures may block the passage of a bill. Action designed to obtain either objective is commonly termed lobbying.<sup>5</sup>

Formerly, the attitude toward lobbyists was very unfavorable. They had a reputation of being unscrupulous and unprincipled, and willing to employ any means to achieve

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>5</sup>V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1945), pp. 214-5.

their objectives.<sup>6</sup> But the representatives of the interest groups now commonly work in the open; they have nothing to hide. It has been said "they know what they want; and they know how to get it." They are precise and efficient in advancing the cause of their respective organizations.<sup>7</sup>

There are large numbers of representatives of the various interest groups who maintain headquarters in Washington, where they are sometimes collectively referred to as the "third house of Congress," or the "invisible government."<sup>8</sup> Herring reported in 1928 there were considerably more than 500 groups which maintained representatives in Washington. This figure ignored the various trade associations, of which there were more than one hundred. Herring also reported that one observer stated there were certainly more than one thousand representatives in Washington representing organized groups, and if clerks, aids, and others were included, the figure would be nearer five thousand.<sup>9</sup> Truman refers to a 1938 report which indicated there were more than 1,500 national and regional trade associations,

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>E. Pendleton Herring, Group Representation Before Congress (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1929), p. 41.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 19.

the vast majority of which listed "governmental relations" as one of their primary activities.<sup>10</sup>

Interest groups exert influence not only upon the legislative branch of government; they operate upon the executive and the judicial branches as well. This study, however, is not concerned with their relationship with the executive and the judicial branches. The techniques by which interest groups seek to accomplish their purposes are manifold and intricate, and they will be left for examination in a later chapter.

#### Methods Employed in This Study

Following a discussion of what constitutes groups and interest groups and how they operate, this study will examine the techniques by which influence is exerted by interest groups. Although this study is principally concerned with techniques employed upon the legislative branch, Chapter IV will also include an abbreviated discussion of the more important techniques used to influence the executive branch of the government. It will also view briefly the influences to which the judicial branch is subjected. The succeeding chapter will be devoted to a short discussion of the assistance programs conducted by the United States since

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<sup>10</sup>Truman, op. cit., p. 57.

World War II. It will also delve into some specifics of the Administration's request for the Mutual Security Act of 1958, comparing and contrasting with that request the announced policy positions of four major interest groups representing respectively labor, business, industry, and the farmer.

Chapter V will analyze the expressed attitudes of the interest groups and attempt to determine if those attitudes exerted a determinative effect upon the respective committees of the Congress in the formulation of the bill which ultimately was enacted into law. The final chapter will discuss in very broad outline those areas in which additional information is needed to provide a better understanding of the effects of interest groups in the formulation and execution of national policy.

The research for this study has been conducted by examination of standard authorities in the various fields and supplemented by a series of questionnaires directed to organizations and to individuals who might be expected to possess information which would prove of value in this study. The recipients of the questionnaires are listed in Appendix I. Questionnaires were addressed to 42 senators and members of Congress; 18 replied, and of those, only ten attempted to provide some type of answers, although in no case were the answers detailed and definitive. It is of

course understandable that such individuals are extremely busy during an active session of the Congress, and the author is grateful to those who took the time from a busy schedule in order to prepare a reply.

Of the interest groups considered here, questionnaires were addressed to each. Only three replied, and only one attempted to provide even meager answers to the questions posed. The other two organizations which did reply, merely furnished printed publicity material which was of no value in the conduct of the study. Consequently, the basis for Chapters IV and V are found in large part in the Record of Hearings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in which is recorded the testimony taken by those Committees during hearings on the Mutual Security Act of 1958.

## CHAPTER II

### THE CHARACTER OF GROUPS, AND HOW THEY FUNCTION

The terms in the preceding chapter were defined to facilitate treatment of the influence of interest groups upon the formulation of national policy, of the manner in which interest groups assert claims upon other groups, and of the techniques which they employ in asserting those claims. With the definitions as a basis for common understanding, let us now explore the character of groups, how they become interest groups, and what the functions are of these groups which affect the lives of each member of society.

#### Group

"No man is much stronger than another, but a group of bold and cunning men can get together and make themselves masters of the rest."<sup>1</sup> In essence, the strength of the group is greater than the strength of its individual components. From infancy, individuals attempt to make themselves acceptable as participants in a group, or more accurately, in a set of groups which constitute their social environment.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Robert M. MacIver, The Web of Government (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 14.

<sup>2</sup>David B. Truman, The Governmental Process, p. 18.

Man is constituted in such a manner that he requires association with other men in order to live successfully and enjoyably. The qualifications "successfully and enjoyably" are elastic and vary with individuals. Nevertheless, few individuals voluntarily elect to live removed from other human association. In order to participate in human association, however, the individual must be accepted by the group to which he seeks to belong.

Acceptance by the group is not automatic nor a compulsory act on the part of the group. The individual seeking acceptance must portray the characteristics of the group or groups in which he seeks acceptance; otherwise the group will reject the applicant.<sup>3</sup> Behavior and attitudes need not necessarily conform completely to those which are characteristic of the group, but the major attitudes and behavior must be sufficiently like those of the group so that the individual does not stand out in sharp contrast against the background of the group. To differ in marked degree prevents acceptance, or if already accepted, will sever the bonds which connect the individual and the group. A measure of conformity is the price the individual must pay for acceptance in any group.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 19.

Yet man is required to live in society. He becomes characteristically human only when he is in association with other men.<sup>5</sup> Without the stimulation of interaction with other members of the society, an individual is unfulfilled. He is without purpose; his life is aimless. He cannot produce nor reproduce except in association with others who share at least some of his major attitudes and objectives. But in society as a whole, individual man is beset by a multitude of varying attitudes and by different objectives held by different individuals. To attempt to maintain a relationship with all the members of society would present the individual with an insoluble problem. David B. Truman states:

In all societies of any degree of complexity, the individual is less affected by the society as a whole than differentially through various of its divisions, or groups. In the first place, even in the simplest society, it is literally impossible for any one individual to function in all the groups of which the society is made . . . In the second place the positions occupied by the individual in his society limit the effects upon him of society as a whole.<sup>6</sup>

Thus the individual is literally forced to assume a relationship and an identity with groups with which he shares some interests.

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp. 15-16.



However, the individuals comprising the membership of a group, or even individuals sharing membership in several groups, need not necessarily hold identical attitudes on all issues. No two humans are identical and no two have had identical backgrounds of experience. The behavior and attitudes of individuals are not the product solely of their current associations, but they result from a genetic process that in greater or smaller degree includes their entire life experience.<sup>7</sup>

Every interest that in any manner is shared by a number of other individuals causes the establishment of an association among the individuals sharing the interest. The modern world has produced a greater number of such groupings or associations of individuals, not the least cause of which is the greater ease of communication among people. One consequence is that government has spread its functions to regulate such associations and their relationship to one another and to the state itself. The result is that the direction of nearly all important groupings has fallen into the hands of a special category of managers or specialists, which may be referred to as the elite. The ordinary members of the group have little actual voice in the direction of the affairs of the group.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>8</sup>MacIver, op. cit., pp. 430.

Every group has two aspects. First, it is a group of individuals who share the common interests for which the group stands. But in addition it is an institutionalized system for accomplishing specific objectives. The elite operates the system in the name of the membership. Thus, a relatively few individuals occupy the determinative positions of leadership. They control the operations of the group; they are familiar with the mechanism by which the group functions, while the great majority of the membership knows little or nothing about the operation. In such circumstances, it is inevitable that the mass membership entrusts the operation to the leadership. If the group or association is organized and operated in a democratic manner, the members will probably have a final voice on major policies, but the implementation of policies will be in the hands of the managers of the organization.<sup>9</sup>

Groups function not only as a collection of individuals sharing the same general attitudes and interests, but will invariably form and guide the attitudes and therefore the behavior of the members. The completeness and finality of such guidance will vary from individual to individual, but it is certain to occur. It will depend in part upon the frequency and persistence of interaction of

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<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

the members of the group, and of course these factors will have great bearing upon the strength which the group can display in striving toward its objectives.<sup>10</sup>

To compose a force in society, the group must be characterized by a relatively high degree of stability, uniformity, and formality.<sup>11</sup> It must have established an equilibrium; that is, a normal pattern of interaction which holds a sufficient attraction upon its members to ensure its survival over a period of years. The established equilibrium does not infer a group mind that remains static and eventually suffers, changes, and dies,<sup>12</sup> but rather one that experiences a healthy growth and a replacement of out-moded interests and objectives with new ones that continue to hold attraction for the membership.

It is necessary to bear in mind that group membership does not imply that all members think alike on all matters upon which they experience interaction. They must conform to the general attitudes of the group, but allowance must be made for individual differences of opinion. Such differences cannot become too strong, however, or the vitality of the group is endangered by fragmentation.

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<sup>10</sup>Truman, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 26-27.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 29.

The term group has two common connotations. The first is in the catorgic sense, used to include a given age level, or individuals of a particular area, or a similar general accumulation of individuals possessing no particular community of interest nor shared attitudes. When used in this sense, the term omits consideration of behavior patterns. A second and more proper meaning of the term is that in which there is interaction of the members. There must exist a minimum frequency of interaction before a group can be said to exist in this sense.<sup>13</sup>

#### Interest Groups.

The term interest group is the focal point of this study. It is with a limited area of the actions and the influences of these groups that this study is particularly concerned. But what is the basis for the establishment of interest groups?

Ideologies are the bodies of doctrine through which the aims of a group are defined. Values constitute the elements of ideologies. They determine what ideas, situations, or institutions are desirable, acceptable, or abhorrent to the group. When values are defended or advocated in the competitive life of democratic politics,

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 23-24.

they become interests. In other words, interests are values expressed in action. As we shall see, each politically active group makes demands on other groups; it thus becomes an interest group. Within the interest group, the values and attitudes of the membership constitute the general guidelines which limit the freedom of action of the leaders. Insistent demands of the members must be heeded if the leaders wish to retain their control of the group. Within these bounds, however, the political demands of interest groups are defined by the leaders, rather than by the members.<sup>14</sup>

It is desirable to lay to rest some old-wives' tales concerning interest groups, or the term which has accumulated more opprobrium, pressure groups. (This study will employ the term "interest group.") Both terms suffer to some extent as representation of a value judgment by those who disapprove of the actions or objectives of certain groups, but the term "pressure group" has acquired a more odious connotation. It has been "absorbed into the language of political abuse" and carries a load of emotional connotation indicating irresponsible insistence upon special privileges.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, Dynamics of International Relations (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956), p. 27.

<sup>15</sup>Truman, op. cit., p. 38.

Such value judgments, however, do disservice to the nature of man--the desire to live, to interact with others of his kind. Man cannot in honesty be said to be evil in all he does and represents. It follows that the associations which he maintains are likely to be just as good, and just as evil, as is man himself. If men of high moral character associate, their association is almost certain to conduct its affairs upon a high moral plane. If men of evil congregate in one association, then the objectives and attitudes of that association are likely to reflect the individual characters of the members. And if men associate together who are neither better nor worse than most of the rest of humanity, the interests and objectives of their association are not likely to be less salutary than are the individual interests and objectives of the individual members. The very fact of association in a group of individuals of like interest may lead an individual to cloak some of his baser impulses with a mantle of respectability.

It is impossible for the "average" man to live removed from others of his kind. He therefore comes into daily contact with others,<sup>16</sup> and those with whom he comes into contact are inevitably affected by that contact. They

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<sup>16</sup>E. Pendleton Herring, Group Representation Before Congress, p. 6.

receive pleasure from such contacts, or they are irritated. They discover they share like interests and attitudes or they find they oppose the interests and attitudes which another individual espouses. MacIver states the thought in homely language.

A man cannot ventilate his opinions, cannot write a popular novel, cannot even worship his God without having some influence on others . . . One man influences another . . . because the other is freely responsive to that influence. We may adjudge the influence good or bad. We may condemn and oppose it. That also is our right. Opinions and creeds are forever in conflict. Every man must find and respond to his own. There is no other way save compulsion.<sup>17</sup>

Therefore, as man is a "social animal," and exerts influence of one kind or another upon other individuals with whom he comes into contact, the formation of groups sharing similar attitudes is an indication of the health of the society. The many cultural organizations of the society cannot possibly have a single focus; cannot without losing their identity and their function be amalgamated and absorbed as mere departments of the state which governs the society.<sup>18</sup> Only a totalitarian society could justify its existence upon a basis of near-complete convergence of the attitudes of the individual members upon the goal of the state. Democracy

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<sup>17</sup>MacIver, op. cit., p. 425.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 426.

demands freedom of belief and a vehicle to express that belief. Such is the function of interest groups.

Man has always sought to advance his cause by alliance with others holding similar interests. But today the group has become dominant.<sup>19</sup> Although interest groups existed at the time this nation was founded, it was not envisaged they would play a major role in the processes of government. But the development of an increasingly diverse population during the history of this nation has caused the formation of a growing number of groups to meet the demands of diverse interests. Today, interest groups provide attitude and vocational representation rather than geographical representation<sup>20</sup> because they possess the means to exert influence upon the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government.

William Allen White reported in 1924, however, that such an influence-system is of relatively recent introduction into the American political scene. He wrote of these ". . . new forces in our politics which organize, direct and institutionalize public sentiment . . ." He added that these forces, or interest groups, have exerted almost a fundamental change upon American political life, and that

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<sup>19</sup>Herring, op. cit., pp. 7-12.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.



"no constitutional amendment has done more to modify the importance of Congress, and to a certain extent, the executive and through it the judiciary."<sup>21</sup>

Yet Alexis de Tocqueville, observing America in 1831-32, wrote "Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations." And again, "Thus the most democratic country on the face of the earth is that in which men have, in our time, carried to the highest perfection the art of pursuing in common the object of their common desire and have applied this new science to the greatest number of purposes."<sup>22</sup>

True, de Tocqueville did not indicate these American "associations" had become politicized, but he did state ". . . all the citizens are independent and feeble, and none of them can oblige his fellow men to lend him their assistance. They all, therefore, become powerless if they do not learn voluntarily to help one another." He continued by remarking, ". . . what political power could ever carry on the vast multitude of lesser undertakings which the American citizens perform every day, with the assistance of the principle of association."<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>William Allen White, Politics: The Citizen's Business, pp. v-vi.

<sup>22</sup>Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Phillips Bradley (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), I, 114-6.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

It should be apparent . . . that the political interest group is neither a fleeting, transitory newcomer to the political arena nor a localized phenomenon peculiar to one member of the family of nations. The persistence and the dispersion of such organizations indicate that we are dealing with a character aspect of our society.<sup>24</sup>

The situation being as it is, it should be readily apparent to the student of political science and of sociology that the existence of interest groups is not a blight on the political growth of the state, but is itself a manifestation of the growth that has produced that state.

The Framers of the Constitution of the United States and of the great majority of the statutes did not foresee the organization of individuals of like attitudes in interest groups. Although the American political scene has long been accustomed to various associations which have sought to influence public policy, it has been during the last four decades that interest groups have reached their full development.<sup>25</sup> Professor Key speculates that the impressive demonstration of the ability of propaganda to mold public opinion during World War II gave to the leaders of interest groups a cue as to how they could mobilize public opinion and employ it to exert influence upon the process of government. At

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<sup>24</sup>Truman, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

<sup>25</sup>V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1945), p. 200.

any rate, with the aid of public relations specialists, they have been remarkably successful in selling their programs and policies to the public and in turn influencing the decisions of state legislatures and of the Congress.<sup>26</sup>

There can be little argument that interest groups perform an important representative function in American politics. This function arose in part because of the inadequacy of geographical representation in a more and more diversified society. With the growth of diversification, there has been increasing specialization of occupation and interests. As long as the constituents of a particular congressional district, for example, were engaged in one primary industry or occupation, or in tributary occupations, the representative of that district could speak with comparative assurance that he enjoyed the support of a majority of his constituents and spoke in their interests. But with the advent of greater diversification, the representative cannot be so assured, and must beware that he does not antagonize important segments of his constituency.<sup>27</sup>

The increase in specialization has made more and more difficult the task of the representative selected from a geographical area. It is difficult for him to be aware of,

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., pp. 202-3.

let alone speak for the multitude of interests which comprise his constituency.<sup>28</sup> The result is a net reduction in the representation in the legislative bodies for an increasingly specialized society.

One United States Senator has expressed the fear that representative government may be endangered by the special pleadings of a multitude of "pressure groups."<sup>29</sup> Such a view appears to ignore that interest groups are in fact representative of the desires and attitudes of specific segments of the population. Far from endangering representative government, the benign activities of interest groups appear to enhance the opportunity for representation in the national government of the diverse elements of the Nation.

In an effort to secure that representation which special interests believed necessary for the common good, the individuals with special interests organized in order that those with like interests might have representatives who could present their attitudes to the public and to the government.<sup>30</sup> True, such representation is not official in the sense that it is a part of the formal system of government, but it cannot be denied that such representation is

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<sup>28</sup>Key, loc. cit.

<sup>29</sup>Allen J. Ellender, United States Senator, Louisiana; letter to the author dated March 18, 1960.

<sup>30</sup>Key, loc. cit.

effective. It does manage to create a body of opinion both within the public at large and within the government which gives consideration to the expressed attitudes and objectives of the special interests. If these expressed attitudes and interests are not contrary to those interests generally conceived to be for the welfare of the society as a whole, a favorable climate is created for the adoption by governmental bodies of the interests of the specialized groups, and the incorporation into law of the objectives of those special interests.

In order to determine with some precision the attitudes and interests of the specialized segments of the society and to permit them to express their wishes, the segments must develop a kind of government within the greater government of society as a whole.<sup>31</sup> There must be some means for the elite to determine what constitutes the best interest of the group; a means to acquaint the mass membership with the necessary information and recommendations concerning those measures which are considered to be in the best interest of the group; and finally, some means to assure the leadership that the membership accepts the decisions of the elite and that the membership will follow its leaders in any display of strength which the group may be called upon to make.

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<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

Group organization may be simple or complex, depending in part upon the size and the objectives of the group. For this study, it is sufficient to point out that group organization enables the group to compromise internal differences and permits the group to approach the public and the government with a united front. The mere fact that differences can be reconciled in this manner facilitates the work of legislatures and the Congress by reducing the number of conflicts with which the representatives have to deal, as well as giving the formal government an authoritative statement of group attitudes. The formal government is then left with the task of ironing out conflicting demands of larger groups.<sup>32</sup> But the type of group government which is selected is important to the group. The group's relationship to the governing process of the state is in part a function of the group's internal structure and of the political behavior within its ranks.<sup>33</sup>

Even though interest groups are not always represented by their leadership with accuracy and discernment, the leaders nevertheless are considered to speak for the group in its relations with the executive and the legislative bodies.<sup>34</sup> As previously noted, if the leadership strays

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<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Truman, op. cit., p. 13.

<sup>34</sup>Key, op. cit., p. 204.

too far from the attitudes held by the group, then the group will lose its cohesion.

The question logically arises that if the group attitudes are sufficiently similar to warrant the formation of an organization to represent those attitudes, why does not the organization evolve into a new political party, assuming that the group was formed, among other reasons, to bring influence to bear upon political parties which the group did not believe provided adequate representation for its views in the existing governmental structure. Professor Key answers this question with the explanation that

. . . The history of third parties has demonstrated rather conclusively that new groups have slight chance of success in the election of their candidates. Their chief opportunity to exert influence in elections is through coalitions or fusions with one of the existing parties, and coalition generally results in assimilation. Moreover it has often been necessary under our governmental scheme to convert both major parties to a policy before there is chance for adoption of the idea. This has been especially true of new policies that require constitutional change for effectuation. The groups favoring prohibition and woman suffrage were compelled to convert both parties; to do this they had to go behind the parties and speak to the people without regard to party affiliation.<sup>35</sup>

Interest groups continue to work on regardless of the political party in power, as the interest groups are seeking the adoption or rejection of a principle, not of a particular

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<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

candidate for office.<sup>36</sup> In essence, the interest groups have no direct interest in grasping political power. By the very nature of the shared attitudes which caused them to organize initially, they are relatively uninterested in the broad day-to-day conduct of the business of government except as the activities of government relate to the interests of the group. This is not to say that all interest groups are completely uninterested in activities other than those with which the group is intimately concerned. Many groups are aware that a particular benefit for the community as a whole is a benefit for the interest group itself. But it is unnecessary for the interest group to engage in the arena of political combat in order to accomplish its purposes. Such groups are interested in advancing the specific principles in which the group believes, and uses the political party organizations to this end.<sup>37</sup> As noted previously, because of the need to educate and convince both major political parties of the desirability of a particular policy, interest groups might place their objectives in serious jeopardy if they were to engage too openly in the process of political elections.

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<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 210.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid.



There can be little doubt that interest groups serve a useful purpose in the legislative process. One Congressman views the representations of interest groups as the "bloodstream of democracy" and as the absolute essential of effective legislation.<sup>38</sup> The large number of people represented in each Congressional district and their diverse needs and interests make it impossible for the representative to be acquainted with the wide range of their desires and attitudes. The same Congressman states that in his opinion the "good Congressman" is the one who effectively accommodates conflicting interests within his constituency and successfully relates the needs of his constituents to those of the people as a whole, responding to the demands made upon him in harmony with the dictates of his conscience.<sup>39</sup>

In the preceding pages, we have discussed the "interests" of interest groups. It is time to examine such interests generically. Men have many different kinds of interests; some of them are universal in that they are shared by all men (such as the satisfaction of elemental needs), while others are particular in that they appeal to some men and not to others. Some interests are purely distributive,

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<sup>38</sup>Emmanuel Cellar, "Unofficial Government: Pressure Groups and Lobbies," The Annals, 319 (September, 1958), 2-3.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

such as most economic interests, and as the organization of individuals conveys power, men learn to organize in order to secure these interests more effectively. By working together, each individual tends to receive that which he seeks by ensuring that all members of the organization are also recipients of the same dividends. Such interests are the benefit of organization which accrue to each member separately and the proceeds are private dividends enjoyed privately by each member. A wage increase is in this category. Other interests are common in the sense that what each receives is not divided from the whole; the product of collectivity does not divide nor lessen the benefits available to all the other members.<sup>40</sup> The blessings of liberty fall in this category.

Interest groups range across a broad spectrum. They represent business, labor, agriculture, the professions such as law, medicine and education; there are regional, racial, religious, and nationality groups; there are groups of war veterans. The range represents almost every type of interest known to man. The strongest and most effective are those based upon man's economic interests in earning a living and in acquiring, holding, and using property. Those which have most influenced government in the United States have

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<sup>40</sup>MacIver, op. cit., pp. 421-2.

represented business, labor, and agriculture. But some organizations that appear to be noneconomic in character often display strong interests in economic issues. For example, racial and religious groups and organizations of war veterans have kept a constant watch over governmental policies as they affect the interests of their respective membership.<sup>41</sup>

We have seen that the group becomes an interest group when on the basis of shared attitudes it makes specific claims upon other groups in the society. Such claims may seek the establishment, the maintenance, or the enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes.<sup>42</sup> A characteristic feature of such groups is that the claims they make upon other groups in the society may be asserted or enforced by means of a variety of techniques and through any of the institutions of the society, not merely the government. But if and when a group makes claims through or upon any institution of the government, that group becomes a political interest group.<sup>43</sup> However, this distinction is overly precise in the modern context in which

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<sup>41</sup>Robert K. Carr, et al., American Democracy in Theory and Practice (third edition; New York: Rinehart and Company, 1959), pp. 197-201.

<sup>42</sup>Truman, op. cit., p. 33.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., p. 37.

interest groups operate, and for brevity the term "political" will not be used here.

Bear in mind that the objectives of any interest group are subject to value judgments, and may be considered good or bad. "The group may be animated by the highest moral purposes, or it may be driving for the narrowest kind of class gain."<sup>44</sup> Remember also that in those instances in which the term "pressure" is used that it possesses a mere figurative meaning and suggests a method or category of methods that may be used by an interest group to achieve its objectives.<sup>45</sup>

As we have observed, any group may at times function as an interest group. One kind of group which almost invariably operates as an interest group is the association, usually a grouping of groups. The association develops among those groups which have tangential relations established within institutionalized groups or because individual participants of the groups participate in more than one of the groups forming the association. The relationships are

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<sup>44</sup>v. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (second edition; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1947), pp. 16-17, quoted in Truman, op. cit., p. 39.

<sup>45</sup>Robert M. MacIver, "Pressures, Social," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), XII, 346.

tangential because of, or through the individuals who participate in two or more of the groups. Professor Truman expresses the idea that

When a disturbance occurs within two or more of these tangent groups, or subdivisions, the affected individuals are likely to seek an adjustment through interaction with others in the tangent groups with whom they have 'something in common,' . . .

For example, General Motors and International Harvester might interact to form a tangential relationship as the result of extreme demands by a labor organization with which both corporations held work contracts.<sup>46</sup>

For all practical purposes the associations which are the specific focus of this study, operate as interest groups. They consist of many separate groups. But their size and their composition do not alter the attitudes and objectives of the associations. For this reason the associations examined in this study will be referred to as interest groups. The term "association" is discussed herein simply for the purpose of fuller understanding.

Associations of the type with which this study is concerned have developed tremendous power. Social groups and classes that were once nearly powerless, such as farmers, laborers, and individual small businesses and industries, have through organization gained for themselves new economic

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<sup>46</sup>Truman, op. cit., pp. 39-40.

power of far-reaching significance. Perhaps of even more significance is the power that such associations deliver into the hands of the elites which dominate the associations.<sup>47</sup> The leadership of a small group can plead with government and be only a faint voice; the elite of an association can speak softly but can easily be heard over the clamor of many smaller organizations by reason of the power developed through access to and the influence on the tremendous numbers which compose the mass membership.

In the next chapter, we will examine some of the techniques by which interest groups exert influence upon the legislative, the executive and the judicial branches of government in their attempts to secure the objectives they hold to be desirable.

## CHAPTER III

### HOW INFLUENCE IS EXERTED

In the preceding chapter, fleeting reference was made to the methods by which interest groups exert influence upon the legislative and the executive branches of the government. In the short space available in this thesis, little more than a summary of the various methods can be made. However, they should be outlined in order to provide a more complete exposition of the manner in which interest groups influence the formulation and execution of national policy.

In order to exert influence, interest groups must locate the targets to which their efforts will be directed. Let us first consider the Congress and the points of contact in that body which are available to the representatives of the interest groups seeking to achieve the objectives of their particular group.

Obviously, a primary target of the interest group lobbyist is the individual legislator. The nature of the contact is determined largely by whether the attitude of the legislator is friendly or indifferent. Every well-organized interest group knows it can depend on a few congressmen who are "all right," that is, they may be relied upon to support the cause in which the group is interested. There are legislators themselves who are members of, or

predisposed to support the labor groups, or the farm groups, or the groups representing industry. Legislators who are "right" can watch committee appointments, urge committee members to report out favorable bills, and speak for the group on the floor of the House or of the Senate.<sup>1</sup>

For the congressman who is not receptive to the efforts of the interest group, the lobbyist attempts to gather all possible information that might assist in understanding the legislator and determining an approach that would be fruitful. The more the lobbyist knows of the congressman, the better the chance of successfully exerting influence. The influence may be exerted by means of letters and telegrams from the constituents of the legislator or directly upon the legislator by individual contact.<sup>2</sup> The direct individual contacts may be made in a multitude of surroundings; in the Capitol, in the office of the legislator, or at a social function, to name a few.

In addition to contacts with the individual legislators, the hearings of the various committees of the two Houses of the Congress offer opportunity for the expert lobbyist to show to advantage. The capable lobbyist is an

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<sup>1</sup>E. Pendleton Herring, Group Representation Before Congress, p. 41.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 69-71.



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expert with the competence to discuss authoritatively those technical questions which are obscure to the average congressman. As the real work of legislation is done in committees, it is here that the best results can be obtained in support of a particular bill, or in an attempt to defeat it.<sup>3</sup>

The pressures brought to bear upon the legislators may be more or less apparent, but it is not always recognized that the agencies of the executive branch are also a target of the interest groups. This result has occurred in part because of the growing complexity of government; legislative bodies have been compelled to delegate quasi-legislative authority to administrative agencies of the executive branch.<sup>4</sup> Administrators become legislators by the issuance of regulations. They also interpret the broad directives provided by the Congress; they can enforce the legislation vigorously or not, and pressure can be brought to bear to influence the choice of policy.<sup>5</sup> Although an interest group may secure

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 71-72.

<sup>4</sup>In the presidential system of government, interest groups will concentrate their influence in an effort to persuade the legislative branch to adopt the objectives of the groups. In a stable cabinet system of government with strong party discipline, the interest groups will concentrate their attention upon the executive branch.

<sup>5</sup>v. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, pp. 215-239. Unless otherwise indicated, the techniques of influence outlined in this chapter are derived from Key's description.

passage of legislation it desires, it may be necessary to follow through with pressure, aid, and encouragement to ensure effective administration from the viewpoint of the interest group. It is at this point that the activities of the interest groups impinge upon the executive branch. Although this thesis is concerned solely with the application of influence by interest groups upon the legislative branch, it is considered desirable to include a short discussion of the means by which influence may be exerted upon the executive branch.

The President is, of course, one of the primary targets of influence in the executive branch because of his leadership role and his means of influencing administrative units and officials.<sup>6</sup> Below the President, any level of the administrative hierarchy which has the power of decision, however limited, can also be the target of influence by an interest group.

#### I. INTEREST GROUPS AND THE CONGRESS

There are several different methods, or techniques, by which influence can be exerted upon a member of the Congress. These techniques of influence are employed by the

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<sup>6</sup>David B. Truman, The Governmental Process, p. 426.

lobbyist in an effort to secure the objectives of the interest group he represents. Not all lobbyists will use all of the techniques; and several techniques will probably be used in concert. For the sake of exposition, the more important techniques of influence are categorized here, but in actual practice it probably would be difficult to label all of the various methods employed, as the expert lobbyist will blend several techniques into one plan for attaining the desired objective. With this thought in mind, let us briefly examine some of the techniques of influence employed by interest groups to exert influence upon the legislative branch.

#### "Old-Pro" Technique

The larger interest groups maintain representatives in Washington, at least during the time the Congress is in session. These representatives, sometimes referred to as lobbyists or as legislative counsel, have often had legislative experience in the Congress or in a state legislature. They are well informed concerning legislative procedure and tactics. In all probability, they have had longer experience in Washington than has the average legislator, and in the course of their experience they are likely to have gained the confidence and respect of those legislators whom they seek to influence. The mission of these representatives of

the interest groups is to keep watch on legislation and to promote and protect the interest of their respective principals.

### The "Official Legislator" Technique

Every important interest group has what amounts to its own representatives in the Congress. These are individual senators and representatives who share the attitudes of the interest groups. From the farm states there are legislators who aid the American Farm Bureau Federation in its legislative program. From industrial states there are legislators who are allies of the AFL-CIO or of the National Association of Manufacturers. The interests championed by the legislator may be those interests which are expressed by a majority of his constituents, or the interests may be advocated by the legislator because of a more personal relationship existing between him and the interest group.

The legislators friendly to the interest groups take the lead in introducing legislation favorable to the organization or in obstructing legislation that is considered unfavorable. In the process of organizing the Congress for the conduct of its business, such as the appointment of members to committees, the interest groups are often successful in achieving the appointment of those members considered to be favorable to the interests of the group. For example, a

manufacturer's organization will attempt to secure the appointment to the House Committee on Education and Labor of those representatives favoring the attitudes of the manufacturers. Labor organizations will attempt to secure the appointment of members known to favor the attitudes of labor. One observer has written, "There is a tendency for committees to represent special interests, leaving the guardianship of the general welfare to the full house and the Executive."<sup>7</sup> Each of the committees is likely to have a larger percentage of its membership particularly concerned with the sphere of interest of the committee than would be true of the house as a whole.<sup>8</sup>

#### The "Special Pleading" Technique

When committees of either house of the Congress hold open hearings concerning legislative proposals on which interest groups have a special interest, they seek to present their arguments. Arguments are presented in one or both of two general methods.

One method is the personal appearance before the committee to present a statement (usually both oral and

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<sup>7</sup>O. C. Altman, "First Session of the Seventy-fifth Congress," American Political Science Review, XXXI, No. 6 (December, 1937), 1076.

<sup>8</sup>Robert C. Carr, et al., American Democracy in Theory and Practice, p. 315.

written) supporting the views of the interest group. The legislative representative (or lobbyist) of the group may present the statement setting forth the group's position. More and more, however, the lobbyist operates as a "hired man,"<sup>9</sup> or a technician, and calls upon the organization to furnish official representation before the committee. The president or some other high official of the group may make the actual appearance before the committee, but he will have received expert coaching by the lobbyist concerning the bill and the testimony to be presented.

Another method employed by interest groups is the presentation to the members of the Congressional committees of factual data bearing on the proposal under consideration. Some of the interest groups maintain effective research organizations which prepare studies of real value to the committee members in determining the effects which the proposed legislation might have. Other organizations are not strong on facts, but nevertheless assemble studies designed to advance the interests of their respective groups. Well-prepared studies containing adequate factual information can be of real assistance to the committee and to individual legislators. Granted that the formal appearances and studies are biased to the extent they seek to present the views of

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<sup>9</sup>Key, op. cit., p. 217.

the sponsoring organization in the most favorable light possible, such activities nevertheless present the views of a portion of the citizenry possessing a direct interest in the proposed legislation. The presentation of these views enables the committees to give consideration to the attitudes of those groups most intimately affected and to achieve a workable compromise among the various group views presented.

Hearings before legislative committees assume great importance in the legislative process. The committee stage is the most crucial in the life of a bill. It is at this point that most bills die, never to be heard of again. It is also here that those bills which are finally reported to the respective Houses, are carefully examined and the final language often determined.<sup>10</sup> Thus it is readily apparent that the presentation of interest group attitudes to a committee can be determinant if a majority of the members of the committee can be convinced of the desirability of those attitudes after considering all competing claims made against each member.

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<sup>10</sup>Carr, op. cit., p. 329.



### The "Digital Pressure" Technique

This technique is the practice by an interest group of placing its figurative finger upon the point at which the legislator is most susceptible to pressure and thus bringing him under the control of the interest group, or at least securing his favorable vote upon pending legislation. To provide the information necessary in order to know where or how to apply the needed pressure, many of the interest groups maintain detailed records concerning the activities, attitudes, and interests of the legislators. Such records are of value to the interest group in two ways. First, the record provides information of the stand taken by the legislator in the past in reference to legislation, and may be used as one basis for the application of influence by means of correspondence from the constituents to the legislator, sent at the suggestion of the interest group. The second use of the records is for the benefit of the lobbyist, to permit him to apply direct pressure by such means as interviews and persuasion, or indirect pressure through other individuals who are believed to be in a position to demand support of the legislator.

The application of direct pressure by the lobbyist is the method particularly applicable by the "Old Pro's" who are familiar with the legislative processes and tactics,

especially those lobbyists who have served in the Congress. Former members of the Congress have access to the chamber of the House in which they formerly served, and their knowledge and respect gained through the years plus their ready access to the members of the Congress makes the former legislator particularly adept at the application of the digital "pressure" method.

Indirect pressure is exerted in many different ways. The interest groups' records will furnish information concerning who or what is likely to be influential with the legislators whom the group may desire to influence. Information may be filed which will indicate the habits and tastes of a particular legislator if through these he might be influenced in the casting of his vote. The record will list individuals friendly toward the interest group through whom an approach may be made to a legislator. The objective is to influence the legislator's vote through friendship or by other pressure which the friend of the group can exert. The pressure may result from the known control by the friend of a block of votes in the legislator's constituency, or because the legislator owes a moral or a financial debt to the friend.

In addition to the highly personal pressures, other pressure can be generated by the stimulation of a flood of letters, telegrams, and telephone calls from the constituents

to the Congressman. This type of pressure often develops as a result of a call for help by the Washington headquarters of the interest group. The call is made to state and local organizations of the group, which in turn notify their respective members to express the attitudes of the group to "their Congressman." The results of such appeals sometimes flood the communication facilities of Washington.

### The "United Front" Technique

An interest group or an association of groups that is well-organized and united in its objectives is likely to be able to get what it wants from the Congress if there is no significant opposition. Professor Key states that the process of arriving at an agreement within the group in this situation is virtually a part of the legislative process. In fact, it is difficult to determine at what point private association ends and government begins.

Professor Key quotes D. D. McKean to illustrate the manner in which interest groups, in the absence of opposition, can produce the compromises usually necessary in government, and at the same time save considerable effort on the part of the legislature.

At one stage in the passage of the milk control act the general farmers and the dairy farmers had different plans, and the leaders of the majority told them that the legislature would not touch the problem until the farmers were substantially agreed; when the various

interests got an agreement on a bill it was quickly passed. When the conflicts within an organization are deep enough so that the members will not compromise, the group can only split. While struggles go on within it, it cannot struggle with the legislature; and if it splits, the legislature will play one faction against the other.<sup>11</sup>

Key also refers to another facet of this technique which indicates the amount of activity by interest groups in their attempts to secure the passage of favorable legislation. A study made of bills introduced into the Senate of the Ohio State Legislature indicated that in one year only 26 percent of the bills were originated by members of the Senate, and that the other 74 percent had originated with, and usually were drafted by, outside groups and interests. An analysis made ten years later of the same Legislature indicated the same proportions continued to exist, and the situation in Ohio probably is not significantly different than that found in other state legislatures nor in the Congress. True, a portion of the bills came from public or administrative agencies at state and local level, but the interest groups were well represented by bills which they had fathered.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, it would be surprising if some of

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<sup>11</sup>D. D. McKean, Pressure on the Legislature of New Jersey (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), pp. 224-5, quoted in Key, op. cit., pp. 219-220.

<sup>12</sup>Harvey Walker, "Where Does Legislation Originate?" National Municipal Review, 18 (1929), pp. 565-7; Walker, "Well Springs of Our Laws," National Municipal Review, 28 (1939), pp. 689-693; and Walker, "Who Writes Our Laws?" State Government, 12 (1939), pp. 199-200, all quoted in Key, op. cit., p. 221.

those bills originating with governmental and administrative agencies were not drafted or suggested by interest groups.

### The "Log-Rolling" Technique

This technique might be called "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." It involves the manipulation of pressures among interest groups, one or more of which have a definite interest in securing passage, or in obstructing passage of a particular bill. The groups directly interested negotiate with other interest groups which have little or no particular interest in the proposed legislation, but which are willing to line up in support of those seeking its passage in return for a like favor when the respective positions are reversed.

Such negotiations can result in the elimination of opposition by other interest groups; and the removal of such conflicts greatly facilitates the action of legislative bodies. Either aspect of this technique actually constitutes "lobbying" among the interest groups themselves.

## II. INTEREST GROUPS AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Although interest groups make their most spectacular appearances when supporting or opposing legislation, their continuous relationship with the administrative agencies of the government are equally important. The introduction to

this chapter sketched the reason for the growing importance of the administrative agencies in assisting the interest groups to achieve their objectives. This fact has been caused by the increasing complexity of government and the concomitant tendency of the Congress to legislate in broad outline and to delegate to the administrative agencies the authority to make rules and regulations. This quasi-legislative authority is a powerful force in the ultimate determination of policy within the broad guide-lines established by the Congress.

Where there is power, pressure will be brought to bear in an attempt to influence the manner in which that power is exercised. Interest groups may seek to influence any administrator possessing the authority to decide whether legislation or administrative regulations will be enforced vigorously or otherwise. The interest group cannot rest after it has secured the passage of legislation which it favored, but it must continue to pressure, aid, and encourage the governmental agency charged with the responsibility of enforcing or executing that legislation. Let us now examine some of the techniques of influence which may be directed toward the executive branch.

### The "Expert Advice" Technique

There is need of frequent interchange of ideas and opinions between administrative officials and the representatives of interests affected by the rules and regulations issued or to be issued by administrative agencies. Some statutes even provide that prior notice shall be given of the issuance of contemplated regulations, and that affected interests shall have the opportunity to be heard. However, even in the absence of such requirement, it is common practice of the administrative agencies to ascertain the attitudes of affected interests prior to the promulgation of new rules.

Attitudes of the various interest groups are usually ascertained by means of formal hearings or informal conferences, much in the same manner as the legislative hearing by a Congressional committee on proposed legislation. Such hearings serve an important function. By the interchange of ideas and opinions, the administrators can more closely gauge the probable acceptance of new regulations--an important item of knowledge to the administrator practicing the art of governing. Perhaps of even more significance is the fact that even though the attitude of the interest groups toward the proposed regulations is not favorable, at least they have had an opportunity to express their views, and the fact they have had an opportunity to "blow off steam"

may temper their criticism. In any event, the administrator is aware of the trouble that may arise and can move to counteract it.

Another important result of contacts between the representatives of interest groups and the administrators is the provision of detailed information concerning complicated problems under consideration by the administrators. No administrator, probably no individual, can possibly possess all the detailed knowledge which is required to arrive at a logical decision on some of the more complex matters which today face the government. Interchanges of ideas, facts, and opinions between administrators and representatives of affected interests facilitates the assembly of the requisite knowledge upon which a sound decision may be based.

#### The "Emissary" Technique

Organized groups can sometimes gain control of an agency of government with which the group has intimate concern. That control may be exercised through informal pressure exerted upon those legally responsible for the conduct of the agency, or it may be a formal arrangement provided by statute. The latter type is exemplified by some state agencies on which the membership as established by law is composed of representatives of various interests



directly affected by the activities of the agency.

Professional associations have been especially desirous that members of professional examining or licensing boards be appointed from nominees furnished by the associations. For example, some state laws provide that pharmacists will examine pharmacists, dentists will examine dentists, with similar provisions for other professions.

However, when friction exists or can develop among several powerful organizations which are intimately concerned in the administration of a particular type of activity, the appointment of the legal officials responsible for the conduct of the agency must remain the responsibility of public authority. Nevertheless, there is always great pressure exerted to influence such appointments. For example, organized labor is greatly interested in the appointment of the Secretary of Labor, and organized business is as greatly interested in the appointment of the Secretary of Commerce. Although such interest groups may not put forward an "official" candidate, they generally depend at least on informal consultations to obtain an acceptable appointment. It is impossible for any official, appointive or elective, to ignore completely his personal background of experience. Thus an official will be predisposed to support the objectives of those interest groups which represent his experience and his interests.

Arrangements as outlined above provide benefits both to the government and to the interest groups involved, and the general public is not necessarily the loser. The government benefits by having as members of the administration individuals who are intimately acquainted with the problems with which they will come into contact in the course of their official duties, and who enjoy the confidence of the interest groups most intimately concerned with the administrative activities of the agency. Such an arrangement operates to remove many of the tensions which might otherwise develop between government and interest groups.

#### The "Legislative Pressure" Technique

This is a simple technique, and one often used both by individuals and by interest groups. It consists simply of persuading the appropriate representative or senator to use his influence with the appropriate agency of the government in an attempt to secure the objective sought. Although the coefficient of effectiveness may not be as great as for other techniques discussed here, it has the virtue of simplicity and in general is less expensive than the others.

## III. INTEREST GROUPS AND THE JUDICIAL BRANCH

Judicial officers of the United States are subject to the influence of interest groups in much the same manner as are members of the executive branch and of the legislative branch. The difference is of degree rather than of kind in the relationship between judges and interest groups in comparison with the relationships which occur between interest groups and the members of the other two branches of the government. There is, however, a certain decorum expected of a judge which the community will enforce upon him, in part because of the respect accorded to the position of a judge. For the same reason, persons and groups outside the judiciary cannot indiscriminately attempt to interfere with the judge's conduct in defiance of the expectations concerning his role.<sup>13</sup>

But some pressures are not only respectable and permissible; they are expected in the course of the normal operation of the courts. Although not often considered to represent the activities of interest groups, the oral pleadings and the briefs filed by attorneys representing group attitudes actually constitute a part of the influence exerted upon the judiciary. For example, the National

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<sup>13</sup>Truman, op. cit., pp. 479-498.

Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) fights the cases of individuals in the courts to protect their legal rights.<sup>14</sup> In doing so, the attorneys perform the functions of lobbyists, but do so in a court rather than in a legislature.

Like the executive and the legislator, the judge cannot remove from his experience all associations and their attendant attitudes. By virtue of his experience, he will retain an inclination toward those attitudes and associations with which he has had previous experience, whether they be the bar association, a veteran's organization, a farm organization, or any of a host of others. Such experience is significant, because the judge has broad freedom to interpret the statutes when they are called into judgment. As the legislature leaves to the administrator much of the responsibility for interpreting the details of a broadly outlined policy, so it leaves to the judiciary an equally broad freedom to interpret the statute.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>Key, op. cit., p. 159.

<sup>15</sup>For a more complete treatment of the influence upon, and the access to, the judiciary, see Truman, op. cit., pp. 479-498.

## IV. INTEREST GROUPS AND PUBLIC OPINION

Interest groups seek to cultivate support among individuals outside the membership of the group. To provide a solid foundation for dealing with political parties and with the agencies of government, an interest group must enjoy a favorable public opinion. Rare now is the attitude of "the public be damned," at least insofar as public utterances of interest group leaders is concerned. Instead, the public is cultivated with all the resources and arts at the command of the modern propagandist in order to gain support and to decrease enmity or prejudice toward the group.

Because of the limitations inherent in this study, it is impossible to examine in detail the techniques employed to shape "public opinion." It is sufficient to suggest that they cover the range of "public education" activities such as advertising campaigns, news releases, public speeches, and preparation and circulation of specially prepared reports.

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This chapter by no means represents an exhaustive discussion of the techniques of influence available for employment by an interest group. Rather, it is only a survey of those more important techniques employed by interest groups in their endeavor to achieve their objectives

through the exertion of influence upon the legislative and the executive branches of the government.

As is true in any profession, the techniques employed overlap and are used in concert; no one technique is employed exclusively all of the time, and probably not even at one time. The exertion of pressure is an art that requires the display of skill like unto that of an organist at the console of a great organ. The elite of the interest groups must know when to "pull out all the stops," and when to be selective; when to blare forth, and when to play softly.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM AND SOME EXPRESSION OF INTEREST GROUP ATTITUDES

During World War II, the United States provided assistance to foreign nations in the form of lend-lease on the theory that the necessary material for waging war should be made available among the Allies in accordance with the need and with the ability to supply. After the end of the war, postwar relief in the form of transportation and agricultural equipment, raw materials, tools, food and clothing were furnished by the United States to needy nations through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).<sup>1</sup>

The next major step in United States foreign policy was the Greek-Turkish aid program. The importance of this program lies in the fact that it inaugurated postwar United States foreign aid with American money and materials as a means of opposing indirect Soviet aggression. That it was successful is attested by the fact that both Greece and Turkey remain free nations, yet the Soviet Union was at their

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<sup>1</sup>United States Congress, House Document No. 116, U. S. Foreign Aid: Its Purpose, Scope, Administration, and Related Information, 86th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 2.

borders seeking control of their territories. The Greek-Turkish aid program later became part of the Marshall Plan and ceased to exist as a separate program in 1948 when it was merged with the planning and administration of the European Recovery Program.<sup>2</sup>

Then in 1947-48, the United States embarked on an assistance program quite different from the earlier programs. This was the European Recovery Program, or Marshall Plan, which, like its predecessor the Greek-Turkish aid program, was developed in response to a crisis. Although on the surface it appeared to be in response to a purely economic crisis, the situation was perilous in the American view because of the danger of economic collapse of Western Europe, which in turn could lead to political collapse and the consequent threat of Soviet domination through internal subversion.<sup>3</sup>

The European Recovery Program was first outlined by then Secretary of State George C. Marshall in a speech at Harvard University on June 5, 1947. He stated that America had underestimated the dislocations caused in the European economy by the war, and that Europe's requirements for food and other products during the succeeding three or four years

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 31-35.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 35.



could not be met without American assistance. This plan differed from its predecessors in two important aspects: it was not to be just another relief program, but was to be geared to aid Europe in overcoming its economic ills, and it required the European nations to join in a collective and cooperative effort at solving their problems.<sup>4</sup>

At the suggestion of the United States, sixteen Western European nations took the initiative in 1948, and prepared a report of their needs and resources for economic reconstruction based on regional cooperation. They formed the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) (with the accent on "cooperation") with which to accomplish the joint recovery program upon which the United States aid was contingent. The Soviet Union and its satellites refused to participate. The United States program was enacted into law in the spring of 1948 and provided for aid on the basis of bilateral agreements between the United States and the receiving nations. The latter were to pledge an increase in production, to establish monetary stability, and to cooperate with other nations in reducing trade barriers. They were also to assist in the accumulation of materials in the supply of which the United States was deficient, in addition to giving publicity to the American aid program and

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. 36-37.

establishing counterpart funds in local currency equal in amount to the value of the aid received from the United States.<sup>5</sup>

A radical change began to take place in the objectives of the program with the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950. Economic recovery increasingly became subordinated to rearmament, and economic aid was justified to the extent that it contributed to the defense effort. This change became formal at the end of 1951 by the replacement of the Economic Cooperation Administration with the Mutual Security Administration (more recently the International Cooperation Administration.) The Economic Cooperation Administration was formed at the time the European Recovery Program was instituted to provide the United States an agency for administering the program.<sup>6</sup>

The shift in aid from economic recovery to rearmament did not imply the original goals of the European Recovery Program had been achieved. Rather, the economic goals were now considered not to be as important as was the goal of military security. The program, however, had been fairly successful in achieving its economic goals in the short time it had been in operation. European industrial production

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 37-38.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 43.

rose to more than 35 percent above its prewar levels. Agricultural production rose to more than 10 percent above its prewar levels, but merely matched a like increase in population. In addition, severe inflationary pressures were brought under control and confidence was restored in European currencies.<sup>7</sup>

That the program was successful was due in large part to the initiative displayed by the recipient nations and by their cooperation. The Marshall Plan appeared to many people on both sides of the Atlantic to serve the common interests of both the United States and Europe, and in the United States it enjoyed widespread support from all political and economic groups. Congressional hearings in 1948 indicated a virtually unanimous support from representatives of business, labor, church groups, and scholarly research organizations.<sup>8</sup>

The change from economic assistance to military alliance and assistance is a complex series of events requiring a complex explanation. Very briefly, however, it stems from the fact that after the close of World War II, the

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 43-44.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 45. The support for the Marshall Plan was probably based as much on humanitarian motives as upon recognition of the economic value of Europe to the United States.

United States and its allies disarmed and sought to maintain peace through the United Nations. The Soviet Union, however, was skeptical of the sincerity of the Western allies, and in addition was bent upon its territorial aggrandizement and the spread of Communist domination.<sup>9</sup> Because of the economic, political, and military activities of the Soviet Union, the United States in particular and the other Western allies with varying shades of conviction believed it necessary to rearm and to organize a system of alliances designed to halt the spread of Communism and its influence.

During 1948 and 1949, the Soviet Union made increasingly menacing actions, and it became apparent that militarily impotent Europe must rebuild its military security as well as its economic strength. One step in the process of strengthening Europe was the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although depending heavily upon the American possession of nuclear bombs, it was evident that European rearmament was a necessity. Rearmament on the necessary scale could have been achieved without American assistance only at the sacrifice of the economic reconstruction which had already been achieved.

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<sup>9</sup>United States Congress, House Report No. 551, Report on Foreign Policy and Mutual Security, 85th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 23R.

The United States' answer to the problem was the passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.<sup>10</sup>

The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 was replaced in 1951 by the Mutual Security Act of that same year, which in turn was repealed by the 1954 Act of the same title. The latter act, as amended, is the present basis for the economic and military assistance programs administered by the United States Government.<sup>11</sup>

Under the terms of the Act of 1954 (as amended) military assistance may be furnished to any country whose increased ability to defend itself the President shall have determined to be important to the security of the United States, if that nation is otherwise eligible to receive assistance.<sup>12</sup>

The official purpose of United States foreign assistance programs is "to foster a world environment that is conducive, not only to our survival, but to the continuation of our free society." The Mutual Security Program is only one tool of American foreign policy; a policy which must meet a two-fold test. First, it must prevent a relative reduction

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<sup>10</sup>United States Congress, House Document No. 116, op. cit., pp. 46-47.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 47-48.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

of United States military strength which might encourage a potential hostile power to conclude that it could defeat the United States either in a major war or by the threat of war; it must minimize the danger of war by "miscalculation;" and it must ensure retention of a capability of winning a war forced upon the United States. Second, the United States must ensure that in retaining the capabilities indicated above, the values, procedures, and institutions of the nation are not sacrificed.<sup>13</sup>

#### Types of United States Foreign Assistance

United States foreign assistance is offered in three broad fields to other nations. For ease of reference, these areas are described below.<sup>14</sup>

Military Assistance. This form of assistance is designed to increase the ability of the recipient nation to construct better military defenses than it otherwise could achieve if required to support the entire cost from its own national income. It is also intended to provide a measure of political defense against subversion by making available

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>14</sup>The description of the various types of foreign assistance is derived from United States Department of State, Mutual Security Program, Fiscal Year 1960, A Summary Presentation, dated March, 1959, pp. 27, 33, 47, 56, 64, and 75-82.

some materials and manpower for civilian use, thus alleviating poverty and improving the standard of living. Military Assistance consists of furnishing military equipment, training, supplies and services to selected foreign military forces. This assistance is directly related to and interdependent with the United States defense effort.

Defense Support. Under the heading of Defense Support falls that economic assistance provided to a nation in addition to Military Assistance in order to permit that nation to make a specific contribution to the common defense. For the receipt of Defense Support Assistance, the recipient nation must provide significant military forces for the common defense effort.

Economic Assistance. Economic Assistance covers several different types of support provided to other nations, and is in addition to that economic assistance offered as Defense Support. The more important types of economic assistance are Technical Cooperation, the Development Loan Fund, and Special Assistance.

Technical Cooperation is that portion of the program which provides for the international interchange of technical knowledge and skills, designed primarily for the benefit of the underdeveloped nations. This type of assistance is intended to contribute primarily to a balanced

and integrated development of the economic resources and productive capacities of the lesser developed areas.

The Development Loan Fund is a United States government corporation which was established to support long-range growth in the underdeveloped areas by means of direct loans and other forms of credit. It undertakes the financing of projects in recipient nations only when financing is not available on reasonable terms from private investment, from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, from the Export-Import Bank, or from other financial sources outside the Communist Bloc.

Special Assistance is economic aid which is considered necessary by the United States in order to achieve political, economic, humanitarian, or other objectives in any nation in which the United States is not providing military assistance in support of significant military forces. It is also used as a source of funding regional or world-wide programs which serve important United States interests but which are not appropriately funded by other categories of assistance.

In addition to the above types of assistance, there exists the President's Contingency Fund, a special fund used to meet requirements which arise each year for which the need cannot be foreseen. Other programs provide for the purchase and export of surplus agricultural products



from the United States in exchange for foreign currencies; for Atoms for Peace; for contributions to the United Nations Children's Fund, to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and to the Escapee Program; and for the Ocean Freight provision for paying the cost of overseas shipment of relief items contributed by American voluntary agencies.

I. THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1959

On February 19, 1958, President Eisenhower sent to the Congress a message in which he requested enactment of the Administration's program for Mutual Security for Fiscal Year 1959.<sup>15</sup> The President made his request in strong language which indicated his belief in the vital nature of the program, and that its vigorous continuation was essential. He pointed out that continuation was the only logical course for the United States; the alternative of discontinuation or sharp reduction would be followed by serious consequences which he listed as -

A severe dislocation and basic impairment of free-world power;

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<sup>15</sup>Although the purpose of the legislation considered here was to provide authorization for the Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 1959, the Act was entitled Mutual Security Act of 1958.

A certain crumbling, under Sino-Soviet pressures, of our strategic overseas positions and a forcing of these positions progressively back toward our own shores;

A massive increase in our own defense budget, in amounts far exceeding mutual-security appropriations, necessitating increases in taxes;

A heavy increase in inductions of American youth into our own Armed Forces, and;

Ultimately a beleaguered America, her freedoms limited by mounting defense costs, and almost alone in a world dominated by international communism.<sup>16</sup>

The President emphasized that the means of the mutual security program are military, economic, and technical cooperation with other nations. The objective remains that of preserving peace and freedom for the United States and for other free nations of the world. The achievement of the program is what its name declares--the mutual security of the United States and of the other free nations. He stressed that military assistance and defense support help to prevent the expansion of Communism by force of arms, but that the United States must be equally concerned with the danger of Communist absorption of entire nations by subversion or economic penetration.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup>President Dwight D. Eisenhower, quoted in United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Mutual Security Act of 1958, Hearings, 85th Congress, 2d Session, on S. 3318, March 19-April 2, 1958 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 1.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 1-6.

The President went on to state that military strength alone is insufficient to prevent the expansion of Communism by subversion and economic penetration; that economic progress is also essential. For this latter purpose, the technical and economic development programs of the Mutual Security Program have been designed. The latter portions of the entire program are directed primarily toward the less developed areas of the world, for it is in such areas that freedom is most precarious.

In the President's outline of the program for Fiscal Year 1959, he requested a total of \$3,942,100,000. This amount was divided among the major categories of assistance as follows:<sup>18</sup>

Military Assistance . . . .	\$1,800,000,000
Defense Support . . . . .	835,000,000
Special Assistance . . . . .	212,000,000
Development Loan Fund . . . .	625,000,000*
Technical Cooperation . . . . .	163,500,000*#
Contingency Fund . . . . .	106,600,000
Other . . . . .	106,600,000*
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TOTAL	\$3,942,100,000

\*Although the President requested the total sum indicated, authorization for elements of the program had been granted in previous years. (See PL 665, 83rd Cong, 68 Stat. 832, as amended.) The items for which authorization had been granted required only appropriation of the

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<sup>18</sup>Ibid. See also United States Department of State, The Mutual Security Program, Fiscal Year 1959, A Summary Presentation, dated February, 1958, p. 1.

necessary funds by the Congress. The items for which authorization had been granted included the Development Loan Fund (Sec. 203), Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (Sec. 405/a/), civilian expenses for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Sec. 408), and administrative expenses for the Department of State in connection with the Mutual Security Program. Therefore, the President actually requested new authorization of \$3,297,900,000, which is the amount considered in Chapter IV.

#Included in the total of \$163.5 million for Technical Cooperation was the sum of \$142 million to have been used to finance United States bilateral (United States-to-recipient-country) technical cooperation programs, with the remainder to have been used to finance the United States costs of multilateral programs operated under the auspices of the United Nations (\$20 million) and the Organization of American States (\$1.5 million).

## II. PRESENTATION OF PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

When one considers the attitudes of various interest groups which had an interest in the Mutual Security Act of 1958, the role of the executive branch must not be forgotten. When seeking legislative action, the Administration seeks authorization and, if necessary, appropriations from the Congress. The private interest groups support or oppose the request of the Administration, depending upon the philosophy of the group concerned.

In Chapter III it was mentioned briefly that agencies of the executive branch sometimes function as interest groups. One of the times in which they so function is when they present proposed legislation to the Congress and are called upon to provide to the committees of the Congress

reasons for the adoption of the proposed legislation. On these occasions, the executive agencies may be supported by interest groups representing private citizens or organizations, or there may be strong contention between the public and the private organizations.

The executive agencies possess several elements of strength in comparison with the private interest groups. First, the government has at its disposal information which is superior to that available to the private groups.<sup>19</sup> This

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<sup>19</sup>There is minor disagreement on this point. In a letter to the author, former Congressman John M. Vorys stated that "Congressmen know that those groups have little detailed knowledge of the facts involved in considering programs for various countries . . ." (Letter, March 18, 1960.) Congressman Clement J. Zablocki agreed in general, but stated that "Some of the groups possess sufficient information to formulate realistic positions in reference to specific programs or undertakings . . ." (Letter dated March 14, 1960.) Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, however, stated that all of the organizations considered in this thesis can secure all necessary and relevant information on all domestic questions, and in addition, they can also obtain from federal agencies information on proposals in the foreign policy field. (Letter dated March 14, 1960.)

However, it is obvious that private interest groups are not privileged to receive classified information, and as the military phases of the Mutual Security Program were to receive approximately 75 percent of the total amount requested by the President, it is equally obvious that much of the information upon which the Administration's proposal was based was classified. This is attested to by statements made by Committee members during the Hearings (See United States Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mutual Security Act of 1958, Hearings, 85th Congress, 2d Session, on H. R. 12181, February 18-April 16, 1958 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 948.), as well as by

information is superior as to source, as to quality, and as to quantity. No other organization could possibly afford the expense of the information-gathering agencies operated by the government. Moreover, in general only those elements favorable to the Administration's viewpoint need be presented to the Congress and to the nation, and the remainder can be protected from disclosure by providing it the protection afforded by a security classification.<sup>20</sup>

A second element of strength in favor of the executive branch is the position of the President as the leader of a powerful political organization which can and does dispense patronage.<sup>21</sup> There is no senator or congressman oblivious to the political benefits of patronage and who is not

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relatively frequent deletions from the published records of the committee Hearings--deletions made for security purposes (See above Hearings, pp. 307, 308, 313, 316, 317, 362, 427, and 430 for examples). Reason argues, therefore, that the private interest groups did not have access to all the information needed to enable them to debate the feasibility of specific elements proposed by the Administration.

<sup>20</sup>Although not a problem with which this thesis is concerned, the subject of classification of information is one which causes much discussion. The essential problem is to protect that information, the disclosure of which would harm the nation, and yet permit the disclosure of information needed to create a well-informed public.

<sup>21</sup>Wilfred E. Binkley and Malcolm C. Moos, A Grammar of American Politics (third edition; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), p. 232.

desirous of some of those benefits for the gratification of his own constituents. Additionally, the President has the capability of taking to the people of the nation any question for which he feels the need of support of the people as a whole to convince the Congress of the desirability of adopting that course of action which the President considers most desirable. He is often successful.<sup>22</sup>

Interest groups of course, also represent great strength, even in comparison with the President and the agencies of the executive branch. The interest groups often include large numbers, and each individual is a constituent of some members of the Congress from his state. When large numbers of constituents hold similar attitudes, the members of the Congress are likely to react toward proposed legislation in harmony with those attitudes. In addition, we have seen how the interest groups employ professional lobbyists, or legislative counsel, who practice all the arts of persuasion upon the congressman in an attempt to convince him of the worth of the cause supported by a particular group.

The pressures generated by the interest groups are reinforced or are weakened, depending upon the personal inclinations of each legislator based upon his own affiliations with interest groups. He belongs to organizations

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid., pp. 323, 328.

which function as interest groups; he belongs to organizations in the community which is his constituency. From such associations and consequent predilections he cannot dissociate himself. But even assuming a predisposition toward one side of the question or the other, it is logical to assume that the average legislator is impressed with the superior sources of knowledge which are available to the Administration concerning proposals such as the Mutual Security Program, and also with the impressive parade of witnesses before the committees, who present testimony, statements, and charts supporting the program recommended by the President.<sup>23</sup> However, it is also a warrantable assumption that legislators are impressed by the voting strength of interest groups, and possibly are impressed by the reasons which those interest groups propound for the acceptance or rejection of particular legislative proposals.

But on balance, it appears the weight is in favor of the Administration when one considers the conditions surrounding the adoption of the Mutual Security Act of 1958. In the first place, the proposal of the Administration was but a continuation of a program which had met with general

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<sup>23</sup>This statement, of course, assumes an open mind on the part of the "average" congressman; that he seeks information upon which to base a judgment as to the best course of action, both for the welfare of the nation and for the satisfaction of his constituents.



acceptance and approval since its inception ten years previously. This fact alone probably weighed heavily in favor of the Administration's proposal. In addition to the superior information available to the government as compared to that available to interest groups, the presentation and defense of the Administration's request was accorded much greater opportunity than was that of the private interest groups. In the Senate, the private interest groups were allotted approximately one-eighth of the total time available for presenting testimony and the remainder was utilized by the Administration for presentation of its request.<sup>24</sup> In the House the difference was even greater--the private interest groups enjoyed less than one-tenth of the time allotted to public hearings by the committee; the remainder was occupied by the presentation of the Administration's program.

The proposal advanced by the Administration enjoyed the personal support of the President of the United States, and personal appearances before the committees of the two Houses of the Congress of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported by an array of lesser luminaries. They

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<sup>24</sup>One interest group objected mildly to the fact that only ten minutes were allotted for presentation to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

were provided the privilege of employing approximately 90 percent of the total time available for testimony before the committees of the two Houses of the Congress. It would seem logical, therefore, that the proposal of the Administration would be approved in essentially the form in which it was presented to the Congress. That such was not true is attributable to the actions of interest groups, in the opinion of this author--not just the interest groups which made presentations before the committees, but also other groups (and individuals) which presented testimony, as well as those other interest groups with which members of the Congress had been affiliated or were sympathetic.

### III. ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PROGRAM EXPRESSED BY SELECTED INTEREST GROUPS

In general, testimony presented before the respective committees of the two Houses of the Congress indicated broad agreement and support for the Mutual Security Program. The differences expressed were those of degree rather than of principle. For purposes of comparison, this study will consider the positions presented by four of the large interest groups which made their policy position known to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and/or to the House Committee

on Foreign Affairs.<sup>25</sup> These organizations are

The American Farm Bureau Federation  
 The American Federation of Labor and Congress  
 of Industrial Organization (AFL-CIO)  
 The Chamber of Commerce of the United States  
 The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM)

This chapter will present only the expressed policy positions for the selected interest groups indicated above. An analysis of their respective positions, and an examination to discover if their positions were determinative in arriving at the final form of the act will be reserved for a subsequent chapter.

The American Farm Bureau Federation. In general, the American Farm Bureau Federation supported the program requested by the Administration, but contended that some of the amounts requested were excessive, and stated that substantial savings could be effected.<sup>26</sup> It also expressed the

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<sup>25</sup>In addition to the four organizations listed here, 14 others presented testimony or statements to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and 33 other organizations and seven individuals made presentations to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

<sup>26</sup>The Policy position of the American Farm Bureau Federation is extracted from United States Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mutual Security Act of 1958, Hearings, 85th Congress, 2d Session, on H. R. 12181, February 18-April 16, 1958 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 985-1002. (See also United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Mutual Security Act of 1958, Hearings, 85th Congress, 2d Session, on S. 3318, March 19-April 2, 1958 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 728-735.)

fear that some of the funds expended in previous years were actually for expenditures that were not entirely in keeping with the intent of the act.<sup>27</sup>

The Farm Bureau stressed that programs should be designed to assist in the development of projects which would effect a lasting contribution to the economy of the recipient nation. The policy position of the organization stated that economic aid should emphasize loans rather than grants, that it should be made clear that public loans are limited, and further, that they are unsatisfactory substitutes for private investment. It was explicitly stated that loans made under the provisions of the program should be made only after it had been clearly demonstrated that financing was not available through private investment, the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, or the United States Export-Import Bank. The Farm Bureau also recommended that those nations which receive economic aid should promote internal conditions which attract private investment in industry and commerce.

Addressing itself directly to the Administration's request for the Mutual Security Program, the Farm Bureau

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<sup>27</sup>The most nearly specific complaint registered in regard to the alleged use of funds for purposes other than those authorized dealt with the desire of the Farm Bureau to ensure that funds appropriated for technical assistance were not employed to provide economic assistance to recipient nations.

suggested a total appropriation of \$3,102,000,000, a reduction of \$839,500,000. The total suggested figure was divided as follows:

Military Assistance . . .	\$1,500,000,000	
Defense Support . . . . .	725,000,000	
Special Assistance . . . . .	212,000,000	
Development Loan Fund . . .	400,000,000	
Technical Cooperation . . .	159,000,000	
Contingency Fund . . . . .	(Nil: Included in Spec. Assist)	
Other . . . . .	106,000,000	
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TOTAL	3,102,000,000	

The reduction recommended in Military Assistance was made on the basis of a reported carryover of \$4 billion from previous appropriations. It was the Farm Bureau position that military assistance should be used to assist allies of the United States to build their own defense resources and thus reduce their dependency upon the United States.

In the category of Defense Support, the Farm Bureau held that the Administration's request was excessive, and that in principle it is best for the mutual security of the United States and of recipient nations that allies attain true political and economic independence. It was the Farm Bureau position that actual independence would be retarded if the recipient nations became overly dependent upon the United States. It was implied that the United States attitude was too paternalistic toward some of the nations receiving Defense Support, and that such an attitude lessened

the abilities of those nations to develop their own economics. It was pointed out that four of the twelve nations receiving Defense Support (South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Turkey) received 70 percent of the total appropriation in this category.

The Farm Bureau position apparently confused Special Assistance and the President's Contingency Fund.<sup>28</sup> The statement was made that other appropriations of funds were made from which the President could draw funds in the event of need, such as natural disasters. It was also believed that Public Law 480<sup>29</sup> provided the President with sufficient funds for meeting emergency situations. It was on this basis that the Farm Bureau apparently recommended the reduction of Special Assistance by the amount of \$200 million, although the testimony indicated that the organization

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<sup>28</sup>For a discussion of Special Assistance and of the Contingency Fund, see pp. 66-67 supra.

<sup>29</sup>Public Law 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 454), as amended, provides for the sale of surplus agricultural commodities for foreign currencies. The currencies thus accruing may be used for, among other purposes, loans to promote multi-lateral trade and economic development, and for assistance to meet emergency or extraordinary relief requirements. The full text of the Act is contained in United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, and House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Legislation on Foreign Relations with Explanatory Notes, 86th Congress, 1st Session, December, 1959 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), pp. 172-186.

in fact was aiming at the elimination of the Contingency Fund. This recommendation was made as a result of the belief that funds for the purposes contemplated were available to the President through the use of funds available in other departments of the government, or that funds could readily be made available by means of supplemental appropriations if the need should arise. The latter two sources apparently were intended for use if the funds available under Public Law 480 were insufficient.

The reduction in the appropriation for the Development Loan Fund was made as a result of a reported unobligated balance in that Fund of \$225 million, and the expressed doubt that loans from that Fund could judiciously be increased in one year's time to the level of \$625 million previously authorized and now requested by the President.<sup>30</sup> It was therefore recommended by the Farm Bureau that the Congress appropriate only \$400 million, which with the carryover of \$225 million, would bring the total amount of useable capital to a level of \$625 million which the Farm Bureau believed was the highest level of authorization which could judiciously be employed.

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<sup>30</sup>The Development Loan Fund was authorized by the Mutual Security Act of 1957. Capitalization was authorized not to exceed \$1.8 billion, of which not to exceed \$700 million were to be provided prior to July 1, 1960.

For the Technical Cooperation category, the Farm Bureau position held that the request for \$142 million for bilateral assistance (Point 4 Program)<sup>31</sup> was excessive, but nevertheless supported the request of the President. However, the request for \$21.5 million to be used in multilateral programs (that is, in programs under the auspices of the United Nations or of the Organization of American States)<sup>32</sup> was considered excessive and the Farm Bureau recommended a reduction to \$17 million. It expressed some fear of multilateral programs. The Farm Bureau position stated that technical assistance should be continued as an important part of the United States foreign policy, but that its primary objective should be to aid underdeveloped nations to develop their manpower and natural resources and expand their production and commerce through improved technology and practices rather than through loans and grants. An interesting aspect of the Farm Bureau policy position was that the recipient nations should place maximum emphasis on the development of industries which complement national

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<sup>31</sup>So-called because it was the fourth item of President Truman's treatment of foreign policy in his inaugural address of January 20, 1949. It envisaged the provision of technical cooperation to other nations. See United States Congress, House Document No. 116, U. S. Foreign Aid, op. cit., p. 72.

<sup>32</sup>For a discussion of Technical Cooperation, see pp. 69-70 supra.



economies rather than on agricultural development. This recommendation is not too surprising for a farm organization, however, as it perhaps envisages that industrial development of recipient nations would not compete with American farm production, but instead would enable those nations to purchase the surpluses of American farms. This thought is supported by the recommendation that the Mutual Security Program should be administered in such a way as to make use of American agricultural surpluses wherever they can be utilized for furtherance of the program.

Apparently the major concern of the Farm Bureau in regard to the Technical Cooperation category was to ensure that the funds appropriated were actually spent for the payment of salaries and expenses of personnel technically trained to assist recipient nations, and that the funds were not used as a substitute for economic aid.

American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations. The AFL-CIO stated in its testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that the labor movement vigorously supported the extension of the Mutual Security Program on a continuing basis. It stressed the need for greater effort to develop the economies and to weaken the force of Soviet totalitarianism. It was the opinion of the AFL-CIO that United States efforts in foreign assistance were lagging in relation to those expended by

the Soviet Union. Testimony presented indicated the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO urged expanded and coordinated economic and technical assistance to the industrially underdeveloped nations to assist them to increase production capacities, raise their living standards, and to strengthen their democratic institutions.<sup>33</sup>

The AFL-CIO policy position emphasized that foreign assistance was an essential part of United States foreign policy, and that a fair appraisal of the relationship between the United States domestic economy and foreign assistance would indicate the need for the expansion of the foreign assistance program, rather than its abandonment or reduction. Although the primary purpose of foreign assistance was recognized to be the development of the underdeveloped nations, it was pointed out that the benefits of the foreign assistance program are significant in their contribution to the domestic economy. The representative of the AFL-CIO testified that 80 cents of each dollar of mutual security funds appropriated was spent directly in the United States (and under examination by a committee member, it was agreed that every penny is ultimately spent in the

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<sup>33</sup>The policy position of the AFL-CIO is extracted from the records of Hearings of the House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mutual Security Act of 1958, op. cit., pp. 969-985. (See also Senate Hearings, same title, op. cit., pp. 589-598.)

United States.) He further estimated that 600,000 American workers are provided employment as a direct result of Mutual Security expenditures.

It was stated, in commenting on the need for expanded foreign economic assistance, that "there is every evidence that the funds which have been made available, and even the additional amounts requested by the President, are extremely inadequate."<sup>34</sup> This comment was based on the contention that nations which for the first time see an opportunity for stimulating their economic growth will exploit all possible sources of assistance. If the United States does not make available the necessary assistance, the Soviet Union will gladly provide that assistance in the hope of attracting such nations into the Soviet orbit. It was therefore believed clearly in the interest of the United States to block the development of strong economic bonds between the Soviet Union and the free nations; this could only be done, according to the AFL-CIO testimony, with continuing, effective, and adequately financed economic and technical assistance to the underdeveloped nations.

The AFL-CIO presented no concrete recommendations as to the amounts of funds which should be authorized by category of assistance. It stated that military assistance and

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<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 971.

defense support should be determined on the basis of military considerations, but that these categories must not be permitted to detract from adequate provision of economic and technical assistance. The need for such assistance was emphasized, according to the AFL-CIO representative, by consideration of the United States economic situation, the requirement to assure economic growth of the underdeveloped nations, and the urgent need to enhance the welfare and security of free nations against the political and economic encroachment of the Soviet Bloc. In addition to loans available through the Development Loan Fund, it was recommended that funds be made available for grants for technical assistance and for economic projects which were beyond the capabilities of underdeveloped nations to finance through loans when their own resources could not be spared for repayment of those loans.

The labor organization also pressed for expanded use of multilateral assistance through the United Nations to provide grants and loans to the underdeveloped nations. It was stated that such cooperation would spread the burden among other nations to the extent of their capabilities. It also urged that encouragement be given to the development in the recipient nations of strong democratic institutions such as trade unions and cooperatives.

The extent of the assistance which the AFL-CIO believed should be provided by the United States is indicated by the statement of the representative that the labor movement had gone on record that it was of the opinion that it would not be amiss to develop a \$10 billion international development loan program. This statement was made in response to a question by a committee member as to the meaning of AFL-CIO testimony which urged the Congress to authorize substantially larger amounts for the Development Loan Fund and for Technical Assistance.

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States. Like the AFL-CIO, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States was less definite in its recommendations than was the American Farm Bureau Federation. In its testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Chamber of Commerce reiterated its endorsement of the principle of mutual security because of its interest in advancing the security of the United States and of all free nations against the threat of Communist expansion. A specific statement of policy by the board of directors of the Chamber was quoted as urging Congressional support of the Mutual Security Program as an instrument of United States foreign policy with the purpose of providing security for the United States and other free nations; to provide for the development of the economic resources and

the living standards of the people of the free world through cooperation and self-help; to encourage the growth of political freedom and stability; and to seek the fulfillment of the humanitarian aspirations of the American people.<sup>35</sup>

The Chamber also went on record as advocating that the Congress should ensure that the returns recognized from the Mutual Security Program should be commensurate with its cost; that the resources of private enterprise should be utilized to the maximum extent to supplement the Mutual Security Program; and recommended that the cost of military assistance be included in the appropriations of the Department of Defense.

The Chamber recommended a reduction of the Administration's request for Fiscal Year 1959. A total reduction of \$259,750,000 was suggested, making the cost of the entire program \$3,682,350,000. This reduction was based on the belief that greater economy of operation and administration could be achieved by inclusion of the military portions of the program in the budget of the Department of Defense. The Chamber therefore recommended a reduction of 5 percent for direct Military Assistance and for Defense Support, for

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<sup>35</sup>The statement of the policy position of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States is derived from Ibid., pp. 932-950, 1783. (See also Senate Hearings, same title, op. cit., pp. 715-728.)

a total reduction of \$131,750,000. For "Special and other assistance," the Chamber suggested a reduction of \$128,000,000 because it lacked sufficient information to justify what it considered to be a large, unexplained increase over the amount authorized for this category the previous year.

As did the Farm Bureau and the AFL-CIO, the Chamber recommended support for the Development Loan Fund, but qualified this support with the recommendation that it should encourage private enterprise by a shift in the emphasis in Development Loans from a government-to-government basis to a basis which would encourage private enterprise. It was also recommended that the Fund should provide a basis for long-term planning of United States economic assistance to recipient nations, and should aid in the creation of basic economic development and economic stability which would enable the lesser developed nations to promote greater investment of private capital and encourage private enterprise. In this regard, it was stated there should be no "undue emphasis upon industrialization" in the less developed nations. On the contrary, it was believed that planning should provide for an orderly and balanced expansion of all segments of their economies, with operation by private enterprise rather than by government to be encouraged to the greatest extent possible.

Specific support was registered for the Administration's request for a total of \$163,500,000 for Technical Cooperation. It was pointed out that technical assistance is most essential if other peoples are to acquire the techniques and skills needed for their economic development, and that this category was a vital adjunct to the United States economic assistance programs.

The National Association of Manufacturers. By far the greatest reduction recommended by any major organization which addressed itself to the entire Mutual Security Program was that of the National Association of Manufacturers. The Association submitted only a statement to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and did not offer testimony.<sup>36</sup> It made no presentation to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. A total reduction to a level of \$2,429,000,000 was recommended by means of withholding obligational authority<sup>37</sup> and a direct reduction of amounts authorized. The recommended authorizations are indicated below:

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<sup>36</sup>Ibid., pp. 1779-1783.

<sup>37</sup>Obligational authority is granted by the Congress to the executive branch to permit long-range procurement planning for which funds cannot be appropriated at the time because of the limitation on the length of time for which funds can be made available. Obligational authority is necessary because funds cannot be retained indefinitely by the executive branch for meeting obligations contracted several years prior to the time that settlement will become due. It provides authority to contract, but does not appropriate the funds necessary to meet the cost of that contract.



Military Assistance . . . . .	\$1,384,000,000
Defense Support . . . . .	575,000,000
Economic, Technical, and Other Assistance . . . . .	370,000,000
Development Loan Fund . . . . .	<u>100,000,000</u>
TOTAL	\$2,429,000,000

The Association statement averred there was no intent to indict the goals of the Mutual Security Program, but that there was serious question whether the operations and high costs of the Program actually served in attaining those goals. The statement quoted the 19th Report of the House Committee on Government Operations in support of its contention that wastage was great in the administration of the program, and that it was dangerous to assume that United States dollars had purchased more security than they in fact had done. The NAM expressed the conviction that the dissipation of American national resources through foreign aid should be reduced substantially.

The NAM was also concerned that many of the nations receiving assistance under the Mutual Security Program were then, or were about to become socialist economies, and stated that the only difference in socialism and Communism was the difference in the means employed to attain the goal of state ownership of the means of production. This was held to mean that socialist nations would not be allies of the United States in the event of a showdown with Communism,

as such nations could not be expected to side with a nation which practiced private ownership and private enterprise.

The statement of the NAM is difficult to correlate with the presentations made by the other organizations which presented testimony before the Congressional committees, as well as with the Administration's request. This is caused by the method of presentation and by the tendency to lump the figures for the various categories of assistance and the use of sums attributed to the Administration which do not in fact agree with Administration figures.

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In the next chapter we shall compare and contrast the positions of the interest groups with the Mutual Security Act of 1958 in an endeavor to discern those areas, if any, in which the influence of the interest groups might be considered as having been determinative. Certainly we cannot expect concrete evidence that the influence was or was not determinative. But the old-time frontier scout did not need to see the horse and rider to know that they had passed along the trail. He could read in the dust the evidence of their passage.

## CHAPTER V

### THE MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1958, CONTRASTED AND COMPARED WITH THE ATTITUDES OF SOME INTEREST GROUPS

The preceding chapter sketched the positions adopted by some of the larger interest groups which presented their respective policy positions to the appropriate committees of the Congress. This chapter will examine briefly the Mutual Security Act of 1958<sup>1</sup> as enacted by the Second Session of the Eighty-fifth Congress, and will compare and contrast with that law the positions of the interest groups outlined in the previous chapter.<sup>2</sup> It will attempt to estimate if any or all of the interest groups exercised a determinative influence upon the final Act.

#### I. THE PROGRAMS COMPARED AND CONTRASTED

Deleting from the President's request those sums for which authorization had previously been provided by the Congress,<sup>3</sup> the Administration's proposed program for Fiscal

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<sup>1</sup>This Act provided authorization for the Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 1959.

<sup>2</sup>This chapter will not consider the Development Loan Fund, as authorization had been provided in 1957 for this portion of the total program.

<sup>3</sup>For explanation of those items which had been authorized previously, see p. 69.

Year 1959 totaled \$3,297,900,000. This examination will consider only the major categories of assistance proposed in the request and authorized by the Congress. The table on the following page illustrates the amounts requested, proposed and authorized.<sup>4</sup>

Military Assistance and Defense Support. The House had proposed authorizing a total of \$2,415 million for Military Assistance and Defense Support; the Senate amendment to the House bill had proposed an authorization totaling \$2,435 million, but had imposed a restriction of \$2,400 million on the total amount which could be expended, and provided authority for the President to transfer funds from either category to the other not to exceed \$235 million.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>The comparisons contained in this chapter concerning the sums recommended by each House of the Congress, and those recommended by the Committee of Conference, are contained in United States Congress, House, Report No. 2038, Mutual Security Act of 1958, Conference Report, to accompany H. R. 12181, June 26, 1958, pp. 17-31.

<sup>5</sup>There is no indication in the available records why the Senate set a spending limit which was \$35 million less than the total authorization, but the Senate Report of the committee action does indicate the reason for authorizing the President to transfer up to \$235 million between the two categories of assistance. The Senate version of the bill had reduced by \$235 million the authorization for the two categories requested by the President. The effect of authorizing the transfer of funds between the two categories was to permit the President to determine how the cut should be divided between Military Assistance and Defense Support. (See United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Mutual Security Act of 1958, Report No. 1627, on H. R. 12181, May 26, 1958 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 1-2.

<u>Category</u>	<u>Administration's Request</u>	<u>Recommended by House</u>	<u>Recommended by Senate</u>	<u>Authorized</u>
Military Assistance	\$1,800,000,000	\$1,640,000,000	\$1,600,000,000	\$1,605,000,000
Defense Support	835,000,000	775,000,000	835,000,000	810,000,000
Technical Cooperation	163,500,000	171,500,000	171,500,000	171,500,000
Special Assistance	212,000,000	185,000,000	212,000,000	202,500,000
Contingency Fund	200,000,000	100,000,000	200,000,000	155,000,000

By conference, the two Houses of the Congress agreed to authorize a total of \$2,415 million, the same figure as proposed by the House, but which represented a reduction of \$35 million below the House figure for Military Assistance with an equal increase in the amount recommended by the House for Defense Support. The Senate had proposed authorizing \$5 million less than the compromise figure for Military Assistance, but had recommended \$25 million more for Defense Support than was finally authorized. Thus, the combined total for the two categories was \$20 million less than had originally been proposed by the Senate.

Was the final figure determined by the Committee of Conference the result of deliberation on facts presented by the Administration in support of its request? One would assume this were true if the statement made by an influential member of the Congress in a letter to the author were to be accepted at its face value. The member stated that insofar as the Mutual Security Program was concerned, the legislation passed by the Congress basically reflected considerations of United States foreign policy as evaluated by the executive branch of the government rather than being a reconciliation of the pressures of conflicting interest groups.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>Letter to the author from a Member of the Congress who did not wish to be quoted.

Acceptance of this hypothesis would lead one to anticipate that a total of \$2,635 million would have been authorized by the Congress as the executive branch had requested for the categories of Military Assistance and Defense Support. In fact, however, the President's request was reduced a total of \$220 million, a reduction which would indicate that in fact the Congress paid little attention to the policy "as evaluated by the executive branch of the government." Perhaps the following table will assist in casting some light upon this subject:

Amounts Recommended by Selected Interest Groups for  
the Mutual Security Act of 1958

(In millions of dollars)

<u>Category</u>	<u>Farm Bureau</u>	<u>AFL-CIO</u>	<u>CofC</u>	<u>NAM</u>
Military Assistance	\$1,500	Not specific, but supported	\$1,700	\$1,384
Defense Support	<u>835</u>	<u>Administration.</u>	<u>793.25</u>	<u>575</u>
TOTAL	\$2,335	\$2,635	\$2,493.25	\$1,959

If the above totals are averaged, the result appears to offer some support for the idea that such interest groups do in fact play a determinative role in the formulation of national policy. The average recommended figure of the four selected groups is \$2,355 million. If the National Association of Manufacturers is excluded from the computation (on the basis that it presented only a statement to the House

Committee on Foreign Affairs, did not present testimony, and made no presentation to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, it might not have been as effective as the other groups in the presentation of its position),<sup>7</sup> the average is \$2,421 million, a mere six million dollars difference from the final authorization approved by the Congress. This figure is much closer to the amount recommended by the interest groups, and should be compared with the difference of \$220 million between the authorization and the request which had been submitted by the executive branch as a result of its evaluation of needs.

Technical Cooperation. The President had requested for Fiscal Year 1959 a total of \$163.5 million for Technical Assistance to the lesser developed nations. This was the only major category of assistance for which the Congress authorized more funds than were requested by the Administration. The Congress increased the authorization to \$171.5 million. What was the basis for the increase?

The Farr Bureau believed that the total amount requested by the Administration for this category of

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<sup>7</sup>This supposition is supported by a statement made by a Member of the Congress in a letter to the author in which he stated the attitude of the National Association of Manufacturers was probably least positive and effective. For obvious reasons, the name of the member is not indicated here.



assistance was excessive, but was willing to support the request of the President. The Chamber of Commerce recommended maintenance of technical assistance at the level requested by the President. The AFL-CIO did not make a specific recommendation, but contented itself with urging the expansion of economic and technical assistance to the lesser developed nations. The National Association of Manufacturers recommended a reduction to a level of \$370 million in the authorization for all categories of assistance not included in Military Assistance and Defense Support. It is impossible to be accurate in comparing the NAM position with that of other interest groups, with the request of the Administration, and with the recommendations of the two Houses of the Congress because of the manner in which the NAM recommendation was presented, that is, by lumping together several different categories.

Again, it would appear that this category of assistance would have been authorized funds for Fiscal Year 1959 in the range of \$163.5 million if the Mutual Security Program were in fact essentially the evaluation of the executive branch. Indeed, in human experience it is unusual for one to be given more than the sum for which one asks. Yet the Congress authorized (and subsequently appropriated)<sup>8</sup> the sum of

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<sup>8</sup>United States Congress, Mutual Security Appropriation Act, 1959, Public Law 85-853, 85th Congress, 2d Session, H. R. 13192, August 28, 1958.

\$171.5 million, an increase of \$8 million or almost 5 percent above the request made by the President.

The authorization made for this category of assistance reverses the trend noted in the provision of funds for Military Assistance and for Defense Support. The two categories previously considered were the subject of recommended reductions by three of the four interest groups considered, and the fourth stated merely that the size of the programs should be determined by military needs. For the Technical Assistance category, however, a farmer's group recommended no cut be made (although it stated it thought the President's request might be excessive); the Chamber of Commerce specifically recommended against a reduction in this category of assistance; a labor group, the AFL-CIO, recommended an unspecified increase. Only the National Association of Manufacturers recommended a reduction in the general area which included Technical Assistance, and that recommendation was very general in nature.

In reference to this category of assistance, perhaps no conclusion can be drawn concerning influence exerted by the four groups under examination. However, the comment submitted in a letter to the author by one of the representatives of the AFL-CIO might offer at least a hint as to why the Congress authorized an increase over the funds requested by the President. The individual remarked that the AFL-CIO

found it advisable and effective to work closely with other groups which shared a position similar to that of the labor organization.<sup>9</sup> Of course, this increase could as well have been the result of the personal attitudes of the members of the committees; attitudes based on their personal experiences and opinions.

Special Assistance and the Contingency Fund. The two categories, Special Assistance and the Contingency Fund, were lumped together by three of the four groups examined, and for the sake of simplicity will be so considered here. Three groups recommended that rather large reductions be made in these categories. The Farm Bureau recommended a reduction in the total of \$412 million requested by the Administration to \$212 million, a decrease of almost 50 percent. The Chamber of Commerce recommended a reduction of \$128 million, essentially all of which should be taken from these two categories.<sup>10</sup> The AFL-CIO made no specific recommendation, but its general position indicated it was against reductions in the program.

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<sup>9</sup>Hyman H. Bookbinder, Legislative Representative of the AFL-CIO, Washington, D. C. in letter to the author dated March 14, 1960.

<sup>10</sup>United States Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mutual Security Act of 1958, Hearings, 85th Congress, 2d Session, on H. R. 12161, previously cited, p. 942.

As was explained in the discussion of Technical Cooperation, the National Association of Manufacturers recommended that all categories of assistance other than Military Assistance, Defense Support, and the Development Loan Fund, be authorized a total of only \$370 million. Because of lumping several different categories of assistance, it is impossible to determine the precise reduction recommended by the NAM for the two categories of Special Assistance and the Contingency Fund. A comparison can be made, however, which provides some indication of the size of the recommended reduction.

The President requested a total of \$662.9 million for all categories of assistance other than Military Assistance, Defense Support, and those portions of the Program for which Congress had previously made authorization.<sup>11</sup> The Congress ultimately authorized a total of \$616.4 million<sup>12</sup> for the portions of the Program for which the President had requested \$662.9 million. It is obvious that the NAM recommendation of \$370 million for all of these programs would have provided only a very small amount for the two categories of Special Assistance and the Contingency Fund.

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<sup>11</sup>See p. 97 supra.

<sup>12</sup>United States Congress, Mutual Security Act of 1958, Public Law 85-477, 85th Congress, 2d Session, H. R. 12181, June 30, 1958.

To recapitulate, the following table represents a very rough estimate of the reductions recommended by the organizations examined:

<u>Requested by</u> <u>President.</u>	<u>Organizations</u>	<u>Recommended by</u> <u>Interest Group</u>	<u>Difference</u>
	(In millions of dollars)		
\$412	Farm Bureau	\$212	- \$200
	Chamber of Commerce	284 (approx.)	- 128
	AFL-CIO	412	0
	NAM	Cannot be determined	?

The two Houses of the Congress differed by \$125 million in the sums recommended for all of the categories excluding Military Assistance and Defense Support. Because of the manner in which the interest groups made their recommendations, some including all technical and economic assistance, and others including only the categories Special Assistance and the Contingency Fund, it is difficult to present figures which are meaningful. Inasmuch as Technical Cooperation has already been examined, however, and to provide a uniform basis of comparison, the respective figures presented below for the two Houses of Congress exclude Technical Cooperation. The table presents a comparison with the sum of \$499.4 million requested by the President for all categories of assistance other than Military Assistance, Defense Support, and Technical Cooperation:

Committee of Confer-  
ence: authorized by  
PL 85-477

Senate House  
(In millions of dollars)

Total recommended by:	\$497.4	\$372.4	\$444.9
Difference between amount recommended and that requested by President	-2.0	-127.0	-54.5

From the above, it is readily apparent that the interest groups making somewhat specific recommendations for reductions were far below the amounts which were recommended by either House as well as the sum which was finally authorized by the Congress. This fact might provide some basis for conjecture that the interest groups were unable to exert effective influence in the two committees if only the two categories of Special Assistance and the Contingency Fund are considered. However, the sums ultimately approved by the two committees and by the Congress may in fact represent a compromise position between the request of the Administration and the rather drastic cuts recommended by the interest groups. Had the interest groups not made recommendation for large reductions in the Administration's proposal, it is entirely conceivable that the Congress would have authorized a higher figure that would have come much closer to that contained in the President's request.

## II. DO INTEREST GROUPS EXERT DETERMINATIVE INFLUENCE?

Is there any basis for concluding that interest groups do in fact wield determinative influence in the formulation of United States policy? The answer to this question of course depends upon the definition used and what "groups" are included as interest groups. Certainly, the agencies of the government which prepared the Administration's request for the Mutual Security Act of 1958 and which defended that proposal before the committees of Congress can be termed interest groups. In this sense, then, there can be little question that interest groups directly affect the formulation of policy.

However, this study has considered only private organizations representative of particular interests, whether labor, the farmer, business, or industry. Do groups such as these have the power to influence the Congress as it fashions a policy that expends great sums of American wealth; one which the President of the United States terms as of "transcendent importance" to the security of this nation?<sup>13</sup> Although from the information available it is impossible to make a definitive statement that interest

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<sup>13</sup>United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Mutual Security Act of 1958, Hearings, 85th Congress, 2d Session, on S. 3318, previously cited, p. 5.

groups do or do not exercise determinative influence in the formulation of policy, there is sufficient information to permit one to draw some logical conclusions. There are, of course, many areas of influence open to exploitation by interest groups which have not been and cannot be examined in this study, for many reasons other than the natural reticence of members of the Congress and of the interest groups to discuss their more private and intimate activities which occur outside the public hearings of the committees of the Congress.<sup>14</sup>

This study of necessity has considered only those overt attempts to exercise influence upon two committees of

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<sup>14</sup>Such reticence is not surprising, as Americans tend to equate "influence" with an underhanded attempt to secure unwarranted favors; an illicit exercise of power. Surely this attitude is not consistent with the values which most Americans hold, however. As the late Senator Richard L. Neuberger stated, a government "...free of all influence is probably what Americans, in their heart, want least. One of the proudest boasts of an American citizen is that his government can be influenced by public opinion..." He added that the difficulty arises if one attempts to classify when the exercise of influence is permissible, and when it passes the bounds of propriety. Senator Neuberger believed that if each attempt to wield influence were reduced to writing and the individual seeking to exercise that influence were willing for his attempt to be made a part of the permanent public record, it would be likely that there would be made only legitimate attempts at influencing public officials. (In Richard L. Neuberger, "When Influence is Good - and Bad," New York Times Magazine, July 27, 1958, p. 9.)



the Congress of the United States. It is impossible to document the many other forms of influence which undoubtedly were employed by the four interest groups examined. The Honorable Clement J. Zablocki, Member of Congress from Wisconsin and a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, stated that oral testimony before that committee was the most effective form of influence, but that letters to members of the committees, personal conversations between members of the committee and representatives of the interest groups, and preparation of fact sheets by the interest groups for members of the Congress were among other forms of influence which were employed during consideration of the Mutual Security Act of 1958. Mr. Zablocki added that none of the techniques was completely ineffective, even though he considered the oral presentation to be the most effective.<sup>15</sup>

Although this study has been concerned solely with the influence exerted by four interest groups, it should be obvious that these groups are not necessarily typical interest groups. They are large, well-organized associations which represent four major segments of the economy of the United States. It would be unfortunate if this study were to give

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<sup>15</sup>Clement J. Zablocki, Member of Congress (4th District, Wisconsin), in letter to the author dated March 14, 1960.

the impression that these groups alone wielded influence in the consideration of the Mutual Security Act of 1958. There were numerous other groups, such as the voluntary and the religious organizations, which Congressman Zablocki believed had considerable impact upon the form and operation of some of the elements of the Program due to their opportunity to observe closely American foreign aid programs abroad.<sup>16</sup> In addition to the organizations considered in this study, 14 other organizations or groups representing similar interests offered testimony or statements before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and 33 organizations and seven individuals made similar presentations to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.<sup>17</sup>

There is no question that the interest groups, both those examined herein and those others which offered testimony to the Congressional committees, did in fact exert influence. The question which cannot be answered is when that influence was exerted. For example, the four groups considered have been organized for a period of several years; three (the AFL-CIO, the Farm Bureau, and the Chamber of Commerce) have maintained essentially the same policy

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on S. 3318, op. cit., and House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on H. R. 12181, op. cit.

position in reference to the Mutual Security Program for a period of at least five years.<sup>18</sup> They contact congressmen and senators on many other matters in addition to the one policy under consideration in this study. Local organizations and individual members of these groups contact their respective representatives in the Congress at times other than that period during which the Mutual Security Act of 1958 was under consideration. Such varied and repeated contacts cannot but impress upon the minds of the Congressman the attitudes of those groups which have great voting strength in his constituency; attitudes which are general in character but which the legislator can nevertheless translate into a specific attitude in reference to a particular bill under consideration.

Continued exposure of the legislators to the attitudes of the various groups may account for the belief that some members of the Congress have expressed that the four groups considered in this study were able to exert little or no influence upon the form of the Mutual Security Act of

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<sup>18</sup>See the Records of Hearings, 1953-58, concerning the Mutual Security Act, listed in the Bibliography. In reference to the NAM, there is no indication it made a presentation prior to 1958 to either the Senate committee nor to the House committee concerning the Mutual Security Act. Neither did it furnish in response to a request by the author, information concerning its policy position in reference to that Act.

1958.<sup>19</sup> In effect, the legislators had been influenced prior to the hearings on the 1958 Act and possibly were actually unaware that their personal positions on the proposed legislation were compounded of the attitudes previously expressed by interest groups either in their constituency or before committees of which they were members. This would indicate that the hearings before the two committees essentially offered the interest groups an opportunity to reinforce the previous expressions of their attitudes. But it seems unduly naive to accept without qualification such statements that the groups did not influence the attitudes of Congressmen, both the members of the appropriate committees and the other members of the Congress as expressed in their floor votes.

In considering claims by members of the Congress that the policy position of the four interest groups had no effect upon the attitudes of the Congressional members, it is only necessary to recall that a member of the Congress cannot separate his attitudes and opinions from his background experience any more than can the administrator, or any citizen. Members of the Congress are also members of

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<sup>19</sup>Marguerite Stitt Church, Member of Congress (13th District, Illinois), in letter to the author dated March 15, 1960, and John F. Kennedy, United States Senator (Massachusetts) in letter dated March 5, 1960.

interest groups, and they are members of their home communities. The associations which must accompany these memberships are certain to influence the personal attitudes of the member of the Congress just as those similar associations influence the rest of us.

In particular, an individual capable of securing the requisite number of votes to be elected to a seat in the Congress, almost of necessity must be an individual who enters rather easily into association with other individuals, in general sharing their interests and their attitudes. It is patently impossible for an individual to be sufficiently motivated to enter the political arena and yet remain completely isolated from interest groups. Chapter II has demonstrated that practically all human activity classifies in some manner as interest group activity. Members of the Congress differ in no respect from other members of the society from which they are drawn except they have been chosen to represent in the Congress those individuals of their constituencies who share the same general interests as the elected representatives.

In Appendix II is listed the membership of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. It will be noted that each member represents a constituency in which at least one and often two or more of the four interest groups could be expected

to include considerable voting power among their members. Obviously, members of the Congress will strive to acquire as many of the votes of their constituents as possible. To do so, they will attempt to portray to the voters that the voter's best interest is served by the election and the retention of that member in the Congress. It follows, therefore, that members of the Congress have sought to establish precisely the attitudes of their constituents, and in doing so have absorbed many of those attitudes if the member did not previously hold those attitudes by virtue of his own background of experience.

This statement is not intended to mean that congressmen do not vote on particular items of legislation as seems correct in their personal estimation. Congressmen should, and undoubtedly do seek to express by their votes in Congress an opinion which is believed to be a consensus; one which attempts to comprise elements of the many differing attitudes to be found in their constituencies. Such expressions by congressmen may in their minds reflect only the considered opinion of the individual congressman of that course of action which is best for the nation and best for his constituency. It is extremely doubtful, however, that such expressions of congressmen have been contrived in a political vacuum. Knowingly or not, they must in fact reflect the attitudes

of interest groups within their constituencies, including the attitudes of the four groups considered here.

There is a further indication that interest groups do in fact exert influence upon members of Congressional committees. One congressman stated in his answers to questions submitted to him by the author that the presentation before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs of one of the interest groups considered here was the "least positive and effective."<sup>20</sup> That the attention of one of the members of this committee, one who displayed great interest in the Mutual Security Act of 1958, was drawn to comment upon a group which in his judgment was the least effective of the groups considered argues that the groups did in fact wield sufficient influence to make their policy positions attractive to some members of the committee. If one group was "least effective," then others must have been more effective, and one was probably "most effective."

If interest groups do then in fact exert influence upon Congressional committees, it is therefore logical to conclude that they likewise exert influence upon the membership of the two Houses of the Congress. Legislation is actually conducted in the Congressional committees in the American system of government. The respective Houses tend

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<sup>20</sup>See p. 97 supra.

to accept proposed legislation that is recommended for passage by the committees. In addition, those members of the Congress who are not members of the committees which considered the Mutual Security Act of 1958 are no less subject to the influence of the interest groups in their constituencies as indicated above. The attitudes of such members are formed in the same fashion as are those of the members of the committees with which this study is particularly concerned. In general, members of the Congress are not inclined to alienate voters because of personal principle in regard to an item of pending legislation. It is therefore unrealistic to accept as probable that members of the Congress vote on items of legislation as an expression of their personal views alone. Indeed, as they are elected representatives, it seems only proper that they reflect by their votes a compromise position representative of the interest groups of their constituencies.

The difficulty of assessing the influence of interest groups upon the Congress is readily apparent when one considers the wide variation of opinions on the subject held by members of the committees which held hearings on the Mutual Security Act of 1958. For example, former Congressman John M. Vorys of Ohio states: "while the general recommendations for or against MSA (Mutual Security Act) are



welcomed and weighed, the hearings afforded such groups are a matter of routine courtesy, or of Constitutional right, rather than for any help they give the Committee."<sup>21</sup> On the other side is the statement of Senator Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana, who writes, "I may state in answer to your second question that all of the organizations you name, plus many others, have in the past used their influence to have enacted much legislation to assist foreign countries."<sup>22</sup> Yet Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts, states, "...I can say quite frankly that in my own case none of the organizations you mentioned had any significant influence on my position; nor, in almost every instance, did they attempt to do so."<sup>23</sup>

It is apparent that even the members of the Congress are not agreed on the answers to the question "Do interest groups exert determinative influence upon the formulation of American foreign policy?" But in spite of the contentions of some members of the Congress, it appears that interest groups do in fact exert influence, although their

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<sup>21</sup>Letter to the author dated March 18, 1960.

<sup>22</sup>Letter (to the author dated March 18, 1960.

<sup>23</sup>Letter to the author dated March 5, 1960. Senator Kennedy added that on the Mutual Security Act of 1958, the pressure came from smaller groups upon specific items in the bill.

appearances before the committees may not be determinative. Perhaps it is significant that of the 42 senators and members of Congress to whom questionnaires were sent, only 18 provided replies. Of the replies, only ten attempted to provide answers to the questionnaire. The remainder stated essentially that they were too pressed by events to attempt to provide answers, or that they did not believe interest groups played an important role in the formulation of the Mutual Security Act of 1958.

It is understandable that members of the Congress are fully occupied and are unable to devote the amount of time needed to answer completely a questionnaire. But it is not understandable that an influential member of one of the major committees of the Congress would apparently believe that a specific policy was the result of the evaluation of the executive branch of the government when in fact the sums actually authorized by the Congress for the Program differed so greatly from those requested by the President and compared very favorably with the sums recommended by interest groups which presented their views to the Congress; interest groups which admittedly did not have all the information necessary to permit them to understand fully the complete needs of the Mutual Security Program.<sup>24</sup> This

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<sup>24</sup>United States Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, op. cit., pp. 934, 942, and 994.

argues in favor of the suggestion that members of the Congress are unwittingly influenced by pressures constantly stemming from interest groups and which actually form an unconscious basis for voting positions adopted by the members of the Congress.

Some support for this assumption is provided by a comparison of the amounts of time provided in committee hearings for presentation and defense of the proposed program made by the Administration with that allocated for presentation of recommendations of interest groups. The records of hearings held by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the subject Act consumed a total of 27 hours, 13 minutes.<sup>25</sup> Of that time, only 4 hours, 55 minutes were given to testimony by individuals and all of the various interest groups which desired to present their views to the committee. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs held hearings totaling 93 hours, 10 minutes, according to the record of hearings.<sup>26</sup> Of this time only 10 hours, 35 minutes were devoted to the testimony of interested individuals and all interest groups, not just those considered in this study. Yet in spite of the comparatively small amount of

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<sup>25</sup>United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, op. cit.

<sup>26</sup>United States Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, op. cit.

time made available to interest groups, the Act finally enacted by the Congress was more nearly in keeping with the recommendations of the four interest groups considered here than it was with the program recommended by the Administration. Surely the Congress did not devise its own program after receiving that proposed by the Administration and give no heed to recommendations of the various interest groups which sought to influence the form of that legislation.

Perhaps the answer is partially found in the statement of Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen that interest groups submit data and information and on occasion make personal visits to legislators, seeking to persuade members of the validity of a particular course of action. Senator Dirksen adds that these efforts are fortified with printed materials which are usually mailed to members' offices, as well as by encouragement of organization members to correspond with their own senators and congressmen.<sup>27</sup> This provides basis for an assumption that the influence of interest groups is exerted outside of the committee hearings, rather than during the comparatively short time afforded for presentations before the committees. This is supported by Senator Ellender's statement that, "There is no doubt in my own mind

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<sup>27</sup> Everett McKinley Dirksen, Minority Leader, United States Senate, in letter to the author dated March 14, 1960.

but that much of the data that was used by advocates of our mutual security program emanated from organizations such as you have named...plus many others."<sup>28</sup> As was stated in Chapter II, the behavior and attitudes of individuals are not the product solely of their current associations, but result from the totality of their entire life experience.<sup>29</sup> Thus it must be expected that members of the Congress develop their respective positions in reference to pending legislation on the basis of their previous association plus the urgings of interest groups during consideration of particular items of legislation.

Then is there any basis for concluding that interest groups exert determinative influence upon the formulation of United States foreign policy? This question cannot be answered upon the basis of only one case study. There are certainly good indications that the policy positions of the interest groups considered in this study strongly affected the shaping of the Mutual Security Act of 1958, but there is insufficient evidence to support a claim that such influence was determinative.

In the legislation under consideration, the majority of the testimony presented favored the passage of the bill.

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<sup>28</sup>Ellender, op. cit.

<sup>29</sup>David B. Truman, The Governmental Process, p. 22.

The differences were matters of degree in most instances, and not a difference of principle. The exercise of influence perhaps can best be weighed as to effectiveness when there is evidence of competing claims advanced by other interest groups. Although there was some competition of claims discernible, the competition rested chiefly on the amounts of money to be authorized rather than whether an authorization should be made.

The primary conclusion which can be drawn from this study is that there exists almost no information in useable form which would permit a determination of the precise effects of interest groups upon the formulation of United States policy. Many areas require detailed exploration before such determination can be made, if indeed an accurate measure can ever be devised. The succeeding and final chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the questions still unanswered; questions to which the answers are necessary in order to more fully understand the roles which are played by interest groups in their endeavor to influence legislation.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The principal difficulty encountered during the preparation of this thesis was the relative absence of valid information which would provide evidence of the manner in which interest groups exert pressure upon the legislative process, and why the Congress is receptive to that influence. Even the members of the Congress apparently are not agreed upon the answers to the questions of concern to this thesis, as is depicted by the range of their answers. For comparison, the following extracts of letters are interesting:

"My own experience...is that the actual form and content of the bill is based on facts brought out during the hearings or from reports of Committee Study Missions to all parts of the world--and that, although outside organizations are listened to eagerly and with gratitude, they (play a collaborating rather than a formulating part in drawing up legislation and the plans which it is supposed to implement."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Marguerite Stitt Church, Member of Congress (13th District, Illinois), letter to the author dated March 15, 1960.

"None of the interest groups...had much influence in shaping MSA (Mutual Security Act) in 1958, or any other year that I remember."<sup>2</sup>

"...I must assume for others as I do for myself that legislators are willing to examine any pertinent data which comes to their attention and always reserve an independent judgment when the matter finally comes to a decision."<sup>3</sup>

"...their (interest groups) observations are helpful and can be very constructive. This does not mean, however, that a Congressman should be guided exclusively by the recommendations of pressure groups. He has the obligation to evaluate potential impact of a particular bill on the people who are not organized in pressure groups, and on the overall national interest."<sup>4</sup>

"The views of these groups were food for thought and I would certainly say that they received consideration."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>John M. Vorys, former Member of Congress (12th District, Ohio), letter to the author dated March 18, 1960.

<sup>3</sup>Everett McKinley Dirksen, Minority Leader, United States Senate, letter to the author dated March 14, 1960.

<sup>4</sup>Clement J. Zablocki, Member of Congress (4th District, Wisconsin), letter to the author dated March 14, 1960.

<sup>5</sup>A. S. J. Carnahan, Member of Congress (3th District, Missouri), letter to the author dated March 1, 1960.



It is obvious that not enough is known concerning the influence of interest groups and why and how that influence is exerted if the members of the Congress themselves disagree so widely in their assessment of the pressures which are focused upon them. The scope of this study is so limited that it prevents a more definitive treatment; a treatment which could be accomplished only by means of a research program of considerable time and length, and conducted at the basic sources. To be meaningful, the research should be performed at the seat of the Congress and in the constituencies of selected members of Congress.

One further limitation of this study should be recalled. It deals solely with the effects of interest groups upon the formulation of foreign policy. The comments of this chapter have specific application to that area of national policy, although much of the material acquired in a research program such as would be necessary to deal with problems outlined here would provide much useful information concerning the activities of interest groups in other areas of national policy formulation.

Two broad areas of research are indicated. One deals with the members of the Congress and with their respective constituencies. The other is concerned with the interest groups themselves, their leadership and their membership. Acquisition of this information would permit the presentation

of a more complete picture of the activities of interest groups and of their effectiveness in the shaping of legislation.

To restrict the research to an area of manageable proportions, it would be necessary to limit the investigation to selected members of the Congress. The selection should be given careful consideration, and should ensure that it constitutes a representative sampling of the attitudes and interests generally held in the Congress. For further inquiry into the subject of this thesis, the investigation should include leaders of the Congress and the membership of the Foreign Relations (or Affairs) Committee and of the Appropriations Committee of each House.

A thorough study must of necessity take into consideration the background experience of each member of Congress included in the survey in order to determine their attitudes. A member holds attitudes based on his membership in various groups, and because of present and previous associations and experiences. The behavior of a legislator is understandable only in terms of the groups with which he identifies himself, the groups with which he affiliates and with which he is confronted.<sup>6</sup> Without such information, it would be impossible to recognize whether the vote of a

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<sup>6</sup>David B. Truman, The Governmental Process, p. 502.

legislator reflected the results of influence exerted by one or more interest groups, whether it was an attempt to compromise the conflicting pressures of two or more such groups, or whether it reflected an independent position determined by the legislator. This information concerning the members of the Congress could best be obtained by interviews with the members themselves, and by interviews with a representative sampling of their constituents.

A second part of the investigation should determine the interest groups which are active in the respective constituencies, the attitudes of the local organizations toward foreign policy questions, and whether those local attitudes conform to those advocated by the national organizations. This is merely an extension of the investigation of the background of the members of Congress. It would also be desirable to know the type of individual member belonging to each interest group; that is, his relative economic level in relation to the other elements of the community, his education, and his general background. It would be necessary to determine if the average member were politically active or relatively quiescent in reference to political affairs. The relationship of these local organizations with the legislator should be the subject of particular attention.

A third area of research should deal with the techniques of influence and the relative effectiveness of

those techniques in the opinion of each member of the Congress. A natural corollary to this line of investigation would be the determination of each member's opinion of the reason for the effectiveness of each technique.

Included in this portion of the research should be an examination and an analysis of the correspondence of the individual members of the Congress with whom the study would be concerned. The analysis should seek to determine if there is a recognizable pattern; if the correspondence could be recognized as stemming from stimulation by interest groups; and if the correspondence played a determinative role in the formation of the legislator's opinion.

A fourth area of research should be undertaken to determine why the selected members of the Congress vote as they do. Does each member's vote attempt to express a compromise of several differing attitudes expressed in his respective constituency, or does the member believe it represents a consensus of his constituents? Or perhaps the legislator expresses his personal conviction based upon his own experience and knowledge of the situation. If the legislator's vote is an expression of a compromise or a consensus, the study should indicate the manner in which the legislator makes that determination. In other words, do interest groups enter into the formulation of the opinion

of the legislator, perhaps unknown to, or unrecognized by, the legislator.

In conducting this portion of the research, it would be necessary to understand the reason for a particular vote by each of the selected legislators. For example, a legislator might support the objective of a particular interest group, yet cast a vote against legislation favorable to that group, not because the legislation does not represent an advance toward the desired objective, but because the legislation does not advance sufficiently far. This situation might occur if the legislator feared that passage of the pending legislation might militate against the passage at a future date of legislation which might more nearly approach the desired objective than the immediate bill.

A fifth area of investigation in reference to the Congress appears to possess some merit. During research in preparation of this thesis, there have been some faint indications that the House of Representatives might be more receptive to influence by interest groups than the Senate. These impressions were gained partly through the indications in the Records of Hearings of the manner in which witnesses were questioned in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs as compared with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>The impression was obtained that witnesses before the Senate Committee were treated somewhat curtly, and that

The impression received some reinforcement through examination of the sums recommended by the House Committee for the Mutual Security Act of 1958 when compared with the sums recommended by the Senate. The sums recommended by the House were more nearly in accordance with those suggested by the interest groups than were the recommendations of the Senate.<sup>8</sup> Admittedly, such indications are far from conclusive, but it is believed the possibility outlined here merits additional investigation. If found to be true, the reason for the heightened receptivity by the House should be determined.

In addition to the research concerning the Congress and its reaction to interest groups, it was indicated above that the interest groups themselves should be the subject of further investigation. In order to understand the activities of the interest groups in relation to the Congress, it is desirable to determine how interest groups establish their policy positions concerning the various aspects of foreign policy. Is the policy of the group determined by

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they were rushed to present their testimony. In contrast, the witnesses before the House Committee were given friendly greetings. Committee members displayed interest by questioning the witnesses, and there seemed to be no feeling of haste. There is also a slight indication that a larger percentage of the members of the House Committee attended committee hearings than was true for the Senate Committee.

<sup>8</sup>For comparison, see Chapter IV, pp. 76-92 and Chapter V, p. 121.

the elite, the leadership, and then transmitted to the membership and the support of the membership sought for a policy already established? Or does the policy position reflect the popular attitudes of the membership, and if so, how are those attitudes determined?

It is also desirable to know how effective the policy position of the interest group is in attracting the loyalty and support of the membership, regardless of the manner in which that position has been determined. This information is important for an assessment of the effectiveness of interest groups. Can the group actually affect the voting of a significant portion of its membership to support an elective official who has supported the objectives of the group, or to oppose an official who has allegedly acted against the group's interest? This information would go far toward indicating whether interest groups attempt to wield more power than they can legitimately claim, or whether they in fact possess more power than that for which they are given credit by some legislators.

It would also be of considerable interest to learn from the interest groups their own assessment of the relative effectiveness of the various techniques of influence. As with the legislators, it would be useful to learn why the interest group regarded certain techniques as more valuable than others.

Finally, it would be highly desirable to determine why interest groups such as have been considered in this study, concern themselves with the formulation of foreign policy. In particular, farmers and laborers are not usually directly involved in the activities which comprise foreign relations. Is the interest displayed in the Mutual Security Program, for example, generated solely by the national organization, and if so, why? Or does that interest stem from the membership and local organizations of the national associations? Is the reason for the interest in foreign policy based upon a materialistic philosophy in which these groups see an opportunity to improve the welfare of the national organization and its membership? Is the motivation enlightened self-interest, in which the interest groups recognize that the improvement of the conditions of others ultimately reflects in the improvement of the circumstances of all? Or is humanitarianism the major force, a desire to ensure that other peoples enjoy some of the benefits to which this nation has grown accustomed?

It is granted that information collected as a result of investigation in the research areas outlined above would not provide a constant measure whereby public opinion could be accurately measured and its preference determined concerning a particular course of action. It would, however,



provide a better understanding of the operation of the Congress and of interest groups, and of the role that each of us plays, often unknowingly, in the processes of democratic government.

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APPENDIX



## APPENDIX I

### List of Members of the Eighty-fifth Congress to Whom Questionnaires Were Addressed

#### UNITED STATES SENATE

George D. Aiken (R-Vt)	Lyndon B. Johnson (D-Tex)
Styles Bridges (R-NH)	John F. Kennedy (D-Mass)
Homer E. Capehart (R-Ind)	William F. Knowland (R-Calif)
Dennis Chavez (D-NMex)	Russell B. Long (D-La)
Everett McKinley Dirksen (R-Ill)	Mike Mansfield (D-Mont)
Allen J. Ellender (D-La)	John L. McClellan (D-Ark)
J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark)	Wayne Morse (D-Ore)
Theodore F. Green (D-RI)	Karl E. Mundt (R-S Dak)
Carl Hayden (D-Ariz)	Charles E. Potter (R-Mich)
Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-Iowa)	Richard B. Russell (D-Ga)
Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn)	H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ)
Irving M. Ives (D-NY)	Margret Chase Smith (R-Maine)
	Alexander Wiley (R-Wis)

#### HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Frances P. Bolton (R-Ohio)	Melvin R. Laird (R-Wis)
Omar Burlison (D-Tex)	Chester E. Morrow (R-NH)
Clarence Cannon (D-Mo)	Thomas E. Morgan (D-Ill)
A. S. J. Carnahan (D-Mo)	Otto E. Passman (D-La)
Marguerite Stitt Church (R-Ill)	Erret P. Scrivner (R-Kan)
Leonard Farbstein (D-NY)	John Taber (R-NY)
Brooks Hays (D-Ark)	Albert Thomas (D-Tex)
Walter H. Judd (R-Minn)	John M. Vorys (R-Ohio)
	Clement J. Zablocki (D-Wis)

APPENDIX II

MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS

Theodore Francis Green, Rhode Island, Chairman	
J. W. Fulbright, Arkansas	Alexander Wiley, Wisconsin
John Sparkman, Alabama	E. Alexander Smith, New Jersey
Hubert Humphrey, Minnesota	Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Iowa
Mike Mansfield, Montana	William Langer, North Dakota
Wayne Morse, Oregon	William F. Knowland, California
Russell B. Long, Louisiana	George D. Aiken, Vermont
John F. Kennedy, Massachusetts	Homer E. Capehart, Indiana

MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS

Thomas S. Gordon, Illinois, Chairman	
Thomas E. Morgan, Pennsylvania (26th)	D. S. Saund, California (29th)
A. S. J. Carnahan, Missouri (8th)	Robert B. Chipenfield, Illinois (19th)
Clement J. Zablocki, Wisconsin (4th)	John M. Vorys, Ohio (12th)
Omar Burleson, Texas (17th)	Frances P. Bolton, Ohio (22nd)
Brooks Hays, Arkansas (5th)	Chester E. Morrow, New Hampshire (1st)
Edna F. Kelly, New York (10th)	Walter H. Judd, Minnesota (5th)
Wayne L. Hays, Ohio (18th)	James G. Fulton, Pennsylvania (27th)
Robert C. Byrd, West Virginia, (6th)	Donald L. Jackson, California (16th)
Armistead I. Selden, Jr., (Alabama (6th)	Karl M. LeCompte, Iowa (4th)
J. L. Pilcher, Georgia (2nd)	Edmund P. Radwan, New York (41st)
Barratt O'Hara, Illinois (2nd)	Albert P. Morano, Connecticut (4th)
L. H. Fountain, North Carolina (2nd)	Marguerite Stitt Church, Illinois (13th)
Dante B. Fascell, Florida (4th)	E. Ross Adair, Indiana (4th)
Frank M. Coffin, Maine (2nd)	Winston L. Prouty, Vermont (at Large)
Leonard Farbstein, New York (19th)	Alvin M. Bentley, Michigan (8th)
	Laurence Curtis, Massachusetts