

JOHN GEARY, KANSAS, AND THE 1856 NATIONAL ELECTION

by Tony R. Mullis



John White Geary during
the American Civil War

Courtesy of the Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka

"Peace now reigns in Kansas,"¹ territorial Governor John W. Geary proudly wrote Secretary of State William Marcy on September 30, 1856. Barely a month before the 1856 national elections, Geary accomplished what no territorial governor before him could—the quelling of violence in "Bleeding Kansas." The timing of Geary's success was politically significant. By denying the Republican Party its most potent campaign issue, Geary virtually assured James Buchanan and the Democratic Party success in November. President Franklin Pierce's willingness to give Geary undivided authority over federal and territorial officials, coupled with Geary's decisive leadership and prudent use of federal power, pacified Kansas long

enough to ensure Buchanan's election. Three days after the election, Geary's private secretary succinctly expressed the significance of his accomplishment: "Your fame is widely spread, and it is often said that you made the President."²

From James Ford Rhodes to James McPherson, historians agree that Kansas was the central issue of the 1856 campaign, and that it superseded local issues in all sections of the country. For months prior to the election, the Republican Party press adeptly squeezed "Bleeding Kansas" for its maximum political advantage. By mid-summer of 1856, the Democrats clearly had to ameliorate the Kansas situation or "the chances of a Democratic victory at the next election would be small indeed."³

Only a few historians, however, acknowledge Geary's role in securing Buchanan's election. Many, like Allan Nevins, suggest that electing the Democratic presidential ticket was a secondary consideration in Geary's appointment as a territorial governor.⁴ James McPherson, on the other hand, states that Geary "reportedly said that he went to Kansas 'carrying a candidate on his shoulders.'"⁵ Geary, moreover, firmly believed that Buchanan owed "his present position [the Presidency] to [his] exertions in Kansas."⁶ With Kansas pacified by early October, Geary effectively denied the Republicans their most powerful campaign issue, and contributed to Buchanan's corresponding victory.

Although President Pierce left no evidence of his exact motivation with respect to Geary's appointment, the timing of his selection, the increase of federal support for Geary before the election, and

his gradual abandonment afterward, leave no reasonable conclusion other than his primary mission as territorial governor was to deny Republicans the campaign issue of Kansas.

Prior to Geary's appointment, however, "Bleeding Kansas" had effectively ended Pierce's hopes of renomination in 1856. After he signed the Kansas-Nebraska Act into law in May 1854, the Democratic Party ardently supported popular sovereignty, whereby territorial voters would determine the status of slavery. Popular sovereignty led to intense and often violent competition between Kansas pro-slavery and free-state factions. Republican newspapers diligently exploited the turmoil in Kansas to try and win the White House in 1856. Republican off-year congressional successes in 1854 combined with strong showings in northern state elections in 1856 heightened Democratic concern. As a direct result of the political consequences of "Bleeding Kansas," the Democrats by-passed both Pierce and Stephen Douglas of Illinois, the author of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and nominated James Buchanan, a candidate with no connection to Kansas affairs.

Pierce, disappointed but still loyal to the Democratic party, realized that victory in November necessitated quelling the violence in Kansas. Pierce's efforts had failed to pacify the territory since the first fraudulent territorial election in March 1855. His first two territorial governors, Andrew Reeder and Wilson Shannon, were also unsuccessful peacemakers. A partisan Congress given its uncompromising nature during the 1850s, offered no solution. Even the U.S. Army, the only apparent impartial force in the territory, had embarrassed Pierce and the Democrats when federal troops dispersed the free-state legislature at Topeka on July 4⁷, providing the Republicans with even more campaign fodder.

To deny the Republicans their strongest campaign issue, Pierce had to

pacify the territory quickly. What he and the Democrats needed in the summer of 1856 was a territorial governor possessing the abilities not merely to stop the violence, but to earn the respect and submission of the warring factions in Kansas. On July 28, Pierce officially removed the ineffective Shannon and nominated John W. Geary of Pennsylvania to be the territory's third governor.⁸

Pierce had decided to remove Shannon at least a week earlier, as evidenced when Democratic Senator William Bigler of Pennsylvania told Geary on July 23 that he would be chosen for the job. In addition to Bigler's efforts on Geary's behalf, Shalor Eidridge, a prominent free-state Kansan, supported Geary's nomination, and pointed to his successful work on a Pennsylvania railroad contract and reputation as the first mayor of San Francisco during its formative years as suitable qualifications.⁹ Having offered Geary the Utah governorship a year earlier, Pierce was undoubtedly familiar with his reputation for leadership and courage during the Mexican War. Colonel Geary served bravely at Chalpultepec and Belen's Gate during the American siege of Mexico City. Geary was an energetic, efficient, and prudent man who almost always succeeded at any endeavor he tried. Additionally, his work with slaves in the coal mines of Virginia soothed the minds of suspicious Southerners. Acceptable to politicians with differing views and possessing a reputation for ability and savvy, the Pennsylvanian was a sound choice.

Geary was an excellent choice in a number of other ways. Born in western Pennsylvania in 1819, he possessed the personal qualifications and background Democrats wanted in a territorial executive. Pierce could have found no man better fitted to serve in Kansas.

Political soundness, too, was a requirement. Senator John Crittenden of Kentucky had advised Pierce in June 1856 to make General of the Army Winfield

Scott "dictator" of the Kansas territory until it could be pacified. General Scott had the necessary leadership abilities, and such general qualities as integrity, impartiality, and fairness, but he was a Whig.¹⁰ Pierce found in Geary a solid and loyal Democrat who possessed essentially the same leadership abilities as Scott. Perhaps even more important to Pierce, Geary was a staunch Jacksonian Democrat who believed that men were capable of self-government through "expression of their will, in free and equal elections."¹¹ He believed in the sanctity and the perpetuity of the Union and despised anyone who threatened its existence. He opposed "inobocracy and violence."¹² Geary was not an abolitionist, but neither was he an ardent supporter of the peculiar institution. He supported California's entry into the Union as a free-state, but showed no interest in equal rights for blacks, slave or free. Geary was thrilled at the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and firmly supported the principle of popular sovereignty.¹³ In John Geary, Pierce had not only a proven leader but a moderate Democrat whose commitment to the party and its principles was unquestioned.

Sensing an opportunity to help his party, his country, and perhaps his future political career, Geary accepted the President's offer. The Senate confirmed Geary's nomination unanimously on July 31. Pierce must have been pleased with public reaction to his appointment. *The (St. Louis) Republican*, summarizing the nation's reaction to the new Kansas Governor, observed, "He possesses all the qualifications, both in civil and military affairs, to fit him in an eminent degree for this responsible situation."¹⁴ Even a pro-Southern editorial noted that, "Colonel Geary is a Pennsylvanian, a Democrat, and a constant supporter of the Constitutional rights of the South."¹⁵ Reaction in the politically important "Keystone State" was especially pleasing. According to *The*

Pennsylvanian, "[Geary's] appointment is a most excellent one, and will give satisfaction throughout the country, particularly in Pennsylvania, where Colonel Geary is well known and highly esteemed by troops of friends."¹⁶ Even Secretary of War Jefferson Davis approved of Geary's selection. His aforementioned work with slaves in Virginia coal mines proved to Davis that "[Geary] was neither ignorant in relation to that kind of property nor prejudiced against it."¹⁷ Geary seemed to represent all things to all men concerned with Kansas. To free-state supporters he was a Union man who supported free and fair elections; to pro-slavery men he understood slavery, or at least property rights, and supported law and order. All that remained was for Geary to go to Kansas and pacify the territory in time to aid Buchanan in November.

Before Geary arrived in Kansas, however, Pierce ordered another native Pennsylvanian, Brigadier General Persifer Smith, to the territory as Commander of the Department of the West. Pierce hoped Smith's reputation as an effective leader would persuade both free-state and pro-slavery factions to stop fighting. Smith appeared in the territory on July 7, three days after Colonel "Bull" Sumner used federal troops to disperse the free-state legislature at Topeka. Fortunately for Pierce and the Democrats, Smith would reestablish the credibility of the Army as an impartial force and not, as Republicans claimed, the tool of pro-slavery Democrats.¹⁸

Violence persisted in Kansas even with Smith at Fort Leavenworth and in command of the Department of the West. To complicate matters, Shannon, upon hearing rumors of Geary's appointment, quit his post on August 18 complaining that he was "without moral power . . . and . . . destitute of any adequate military force to preserve the peace of the country."¹⁹ The governorship fell upon Daniel Woodson, appointed the territory's Secretary of State by President Pierce in 1855. An avid pro-

slavery man, Woodson, as Acting Governor while Shannon was out of the territory in July, had condoned Sumner's actions at Topeka. Pierce had ample reason to be concerned about the immediate future of the territory with Woodson as governor. The last thing Pierce and the Democrats needed in August of 1856 was another July 4 incident.

Congress for its part seemed to be doing its best to compound the potential for disaster in Kansas. The anti-slavery members of the House of Representatives attached a rider to the Army appropriations bill preventing Pierce from using any federal troops to enforce "any enactment of the body claiming to be the Territorial Legislature of Kansas, until such enactment shall have been affirmed and approved by Congress."²⁰ Pierce could not halt the violence in Kansas by military force, if so restricted without yielding to the dictates of the anti-slavery-dominated House, but neither could he achieve peace in Kansas without the Army.

The Democratic controlled Senate balked at the appropriations bill with the House rider, and the 34th Congress adjourned in mid-August without providing funds for Army operations. Pierce immediately called for a second session of the Congress to persuade it to save the Army and, as he saw it, the country. Pierce cited hostilities with Indians in Oregon and Washington as the primary threat to the peace and tranquility of the nation, but he also made a vague reference to the situation in Kansas.²¹ Seemingly convinced by Pierce's appeal to national security, Congress passed the Senate version of the Army Bill on August 30 without restrictions on the use of federal troops in Kansas.

Events in the troubled territory, however, soon overshadowed Pierce's victory in Congress. On August 22, General Smith expressed his concern over the lack of sufficient troops in the territory. He informed Colonel Samuel Cooper, Adjutant

General of the Army, that only a "large force might prevent any violence; a small one might tempt the commission of it."²² Smith knew the small Army contingent scattered throughout Kansas could not keep the free-state and pro-slavery forces from fighting--but how many troops would be enough? There were an estimated 1,300 soldiers available for duty in the territory.²³ If states needed more, they traditionally called out their local militia; that option however, was extremely dangerous in Kansas in 1856.

That danger materialized on August 25 when Acting Governor Woodson declared the territory to be in open rebellion. He then called out the pro-slavery territorial militia to suppress the "rebels" (free-state men).²⁴ As head of the territorial government, Woodson could not legally be stopped. General Smith and the Army could only watch and obey their civilian masters.

The pro-slavery members of the Kansas militia from both Kansas and Missouri clearly intended to eradicate the free-state "rebels," and the Army was powerless. General Smith correctly warned Colonel Cooper:



"Free-State prisoners on their way to Leecompton"

Courtesy of the Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka

As the Army can only act in aid of, and subordinate to, the civil authority, it cannot array itself against the representatives of that very authority (Kansas militia), and I see no way in which it can prevent a collusion brought about

by the government of the territory itself, and in the exercise of its function.²⁵

With Woodson in charge and Geary still over a week from the territory, the situation looked bleak for a peaceful Kansas and subsequent Democratic hopes for victory in November.

Legally powerless, the Army could as well, exert little moral influence on the militia. As Lieutenant Colonel Philip St. George Cooke, Commander, 2nd Dragoons, stated, "I suspect that my presence [and that of the Army] emboldens the militia and others to these outrages."²⁶ Since Pierce subordinated the Army to the territorial governor, Cooke was helpless to use his troops impartially as long as Woodson was in charge. Despite Pierce's hopes that General Smith would prevent violence, Woodson effectively rendered the Army virtually useless. On September 1, the Acting Governor ordered Colonel Cooke to march on Topeka and disarm the insurrectionists and armed invaders. Cooke refused on the grounds of previous instructions that authorized Army interference "only when armed resistance is offered to the laws and against the peace and quiet of the territory."²⁷ Explaining his refusal to Woodson, the Colonel summarized the Army's dilemma in Kansas:

If the Army be useless in the present unhappy crisis, it is because in our Constitution and laws, civil war was not foreseen, nor the contingency of a systematic resistance by the people to the government of their own creation.²⁸

Cooke rightly regarded Woodson's order as merely a "call . . . to make war upon the town of Topeka,"²⁹ but forwarded Woodson's request to General Smith for consideration.

General Smith, meanwhile, had received new instructions from Jefferson Davis in response to his August 22

complaints of inadequate manpower. Davis informed the General that the President had authorized the use of militia units from Kentucky and Illinois should the Army need them.³⁰ Smith never called on either state's militia, but Pierce's decision authorizing additional forces within three months of the presidential election revealed his increased willingness to impose peace on Kansas through increased military pressure.

General Smith also supported Colonel Cooke's rejection of Woodson's order to disarm the free-staters at Topeka. He directed all subordinate commanders to carry out only direct orders from the President that were transmitted through proper channels.³¹ More importantly, however, Smith's support of Cooke regarding Topeka effectively prevented unbridled civil war in the territory prior to Geary's arrival.

John Geary made his first appearance in the Kansas territory at Fort Leavenworth on September 9. Tension between free-state and pro-slavery factions in the territory had never been fiercer. News of the initial failure of the Army appropriations bill on August 18 appears to have encouraged increased resistance by pro-slavery and free-state forces alike. The possible absence of federal intervention inflated the willingness of both factions to resolve the slavery issue by direct violence. With the election nearing and colder temperatures on the horizon, each side believed it was its last opportunity in 1856 to determine the territory's future status. Fortunately for Kansas, Pierce, and the Democrats, John Geary had arrived in time to prevent a potentially bloody encounter.

Secretary of State William Marcy instructed Geary to maintain order and quiet in the territory and punish offenders of the peace.³² If he succeeded in pacifying quickly the territory, Buchanan's chances for the presidency would markedly improve. To aid Geary, Marcy authorized the raising of a territorial militia to suppress whoever

resisted the "legitimate" laws of the territory.³³ But Geary wanted impartial federal forces, not partisan militia that would only increase tensions. According to the new Governor: "The presence of additional government troops will exert a moral influence that cannot be obtained by any militia that can here be called in requisition."³⁴ The statement reflected his belief that a strong military presence would substantially reduce friction in the territory. Jefferson Davis, meanwhile, also issued new instructions for General Smith:

It is the purpose of the President to secure to you all the military force necessary to maintain order and suppress insurrection, and that no military operations shall be carried on in the Territory of Kansas otherwise than under your instructions and orders. You will not permit the employment of militia, or of any bodies of men; unless they have been regularly mustered into the service of the United States.³⁵

Pierce's order centralized control of all authorized federal and territorial military forces under General Smith and Governor Geary.

With Geary as Governor and Smith as Commander of the Department of the West, Pierce had capable civilian and military leadership in Kansas. The two native Pennsylvanians worked well together. Smith had indicated his disdain for Woodson, who, "did not seem . . . to take a right view of affairs."³⁶ Despite Smith's and ultimately Geary's low opinion of the Acting Governor, Woodson stayed on as Secretary of State throughout Geary's administration. Smith, on the other hand praised Geary and stated that the new Governor could count on him as a "sure ally . . . - for all is at stake in the coming election and the enemy are moving here with a view to the 4th of November."³⁷ Geary had offered his cooperation to Smith earlier, also with the

hope of "bringing about the triumphant election of Mr. Buchanan."³⁸ Geary and Smith agreed that violent partisan politics must cease if peace was to come to Kansas, and both were confident of success.



The Governor's mansion in Leecompton
Courtesy of the Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka

Arriving at the territorial capital of Leecompton on September 11, Geary consulted with Smith and issued two proclamations. The first disbanded the militia called by Woodson, and the second requested the formation of a new militia of bona fide male citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, to be organized and mustered into the US Army upon Smith's request.³⁹ Geary's proclamations, coupled with Smith's latest guidance from Davis, revealed the Governor's decisive nature and his intent to pacify the territory with federal forces.

A significant question is why did the Geary-Smith combination succeed where previous leaders had failed? Above all, instead of waiting for "armed resistance" to occur as Shannon had done with the "Sack of Lawrence" in May,⁴⁰ Geary, in using federal troops, adopted a preventive strategy. Geary was also effective because he reestablished the moral authority of the territorial government through impartial administration of Kansas affairs, and by properly employing moral suasion and the Army to restore order and maintain peace.

Geary's first crucial test as territorial

governor came quickly. In the early hours of September 13, Geary received word of possible hostilities near the free-state community of Lawrence. Using his preventive strategy, Geary ordered Colonel Cooke to send his 400 dragoons to Lawrence immediately. Geary joined forces with Cooke's soldiers at sunrise near Lawrence "to prevent bloodshed."⁴¹ Geary hoped that his presence, along with the federal troops, would prevent the outbreak of hostilities. If not, he was willing to use federal power to stop the fighting. Meanwhile, Geary also heard news of a free-state force marching to Hickory Point, a pro-slavery stronghold. Without hesitating, Geary ordered a smaller contingent of federal soldiers under Captain Thomas J. Wood to march immediately to Hickory Point and protect the citizens there.⁴² Geary's preventive strategy worked.

The Governor and Cooke's troops rendezvoused as planned about three miles from Lawrence on the Franklin Road. They encountered between 2,500 and 3,000 pro-slavery territorial militia in time to prevent an attack on Lawrence.⁴³ Geary and the Army faced down the leaders of the pro-slavery forces and effectively defused what could have sparked a civil war. According to Cooke's analysis of Geary's performance: "Authority prevailed and the Militia [called out under Woodson's Proclamation] honorably submitted to march off to be disbanded at their places of rendezvous."⁴⁴ Captain Wood's timely intervention at Hickory Point resulted in the capture of 101 free-state militia.

The psychological effect of the presence of federal forces combined with the actions of an enthusiastic, impartial, and decisive territorial governor proved, at least temporarily, to be a formula for success in turmoil-ridden Kansas. Geary's quick and decisive actions on the Franklin Road and at Hickory Point demonstrated his impartiality. Within one week of his arrival, Geary had won a major political victory for

the Pierce administration and the Democratic Party. Skirmishes between free-state and pro-slavery forces continued throughout September, but Geary did not face another close to the magnitude of September 13 and 14.

On September 17, Smith requested two companies of territorial militia to aid in policing the territory. Those territorials mustered, however, functioned only as guards, allowing the regulars to patrol the territory and maintain the peace.⁴⁵ By the end of the month, Geary had achieved peace.

With peace at hand all Geary had to do was maintain order and tranquility until the election. In the weeks prior to the election, the *New York Journal of Commerce* regarded Geary's success: "Bad News for the Black Republicans - Kansas Pacified." The *Philadelphia Public Ledger* reported, "To [those who wanted violence to continue in Kansas through the Presidential canvass] 'Peace in Kansas,' is most disagreeable news. . . ."⁴⁶ Geary's success was effectively exploited by the Democratic presses.

Both Pierce and Buchanan were undoubtedly delighted with Geary's accomplishment. Barely a month before the national election and only weeks before the key states of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana held their state elections, John Geary had pacified Kansas and denied the Republicans their most significant campaign issue. On October 29, Geary's personal secretary, John Gihon, wrote the Governor of a dinner conversation at the National Hotel in Washington where "it was fully declared that [Geary's] course in Kansas would be the means of effecting the success of the democracy in the coming presidential canvass."⁴⁷ Elections are rarely decided on one factor or issue, and the election of 1856 was no different. Neither Pierce nor Buchanan, nor any other Democrat, could deny Geary's contribution to securing a Democratic victory in 1856. Upon hearing

of Buchanan's election, Geary reminded the President-elect of that fact:

I can assure you that no man in the country felt more solicitous for this auspicious result than myself, and as the establishment of tranquility in Kansas, previous to the election, was supposed to favor you, I labored with intense energy to accomplish that object.⁴⁶

Buchanan and the Democratic Party were greatly indebted to John Geary. As for his successful, albeit temporary, pacification of Kansas, which undoubtedly aided in victory, especially in Pennsylvania where

Buchanan had less than a three thousand vote majority over Fremont and the American Party nominee Millard Fillmore,⁴⁷ Geary could be proud. With the election obtained however, Pierce gradually withdrew support from Geary. Frustrated by inadequate support, renewed conflict in Kansas, an uncooperative territorial legislature and judiciary, and concerned with threats against his life, Geary uncharacteristically resigned on March 4, 1857. He returned to his beloved Pennsylvania to enjoy a peace that was cut short by another President's call to establish domestic tranquility. It, however, came from Republican Abraham Lincoln.

NOTES

1. John Gilton to John Geary, 7 November 1856, John White Geary Papers, Western American Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University. Hereafter cited as *WAC*. I would also like to thank the Frank J. Seiler Research Center for research funding for this article, the USAF Academy Department of History, the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, and the Kansas State Historical Society for their outstanding support.
2. Geary to William Marcy, 30 September 1856, in F.G. Adams, Compiler, *Transactions of the Kansas State Historical Society Embracing the Fifth and Sixth Biennial Reports, 1886-1888*, Vol IV (Topeka, KS: Kansas Publishing House, 1890) p. 572. Hereafter cited as *KSHS*.
3. Harry Marlin Tinkcom, *John White Geary, Soldier-Statesman, 1819-1873* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940), p. 59. Tinkcom is Geary's most noted biographer. See also William Marcy to George M. Dallas, 13 July 1856, *Marcy Collection*, Library of Congress, Washington DC, for the Secretary of State's view of Fremont, Kansas, and the upcoming election.
4. Allan Nevins, *Ordeal of the Union: A House Dividing, 1852-1857*, Vol II (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975), p. 484.
5. James M. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 161. Hereafter cited as *McPherson, Battle*.
6. John Geary to Edward Geary, 13 September 1857, MG-56, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg Pennsylvania. Hereafter cited as *PHMC*.

7. For more detail on the July 4 incident see, Sumner to Woodson, 28 June 1856, *Letters Received, Adjutants General Office, 1822-1860*, RG-94, National Archives, Washington DC, Roll 548, pp. 0515-0516. Hereafter cited as *LRAGO*. See also Sumner to Cooper, 1 July 1856, *LRAGO*, p. 0518; Woodson's 4 July Proclamation, *LRAGO*, pp. 0548-0550; Sumner to Woodson, 1 July 1856, *KSIS*, p. 447. See also Roy F. Nichols, *Franklin Pierce: Young Hickory of the Granite Hills* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1931), p. 478. Hereafter cited as Nichols, *Franklin Pierce*. See also Sumner to Cooper, 11 August 1856, *KSIS*, pp. 450-451 and Davis to Sumner, 21 July 1856, *LRAGO*, p. 0785.
8. Nichols, *Franklin Pierce*, p. 479. For a more comprehensive account on "Bleeding Kansas" and related events see James C. Malin, *John Brown and the Legend of Fifty Six* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society Memoirs, Vol XVII, 1942). For a complete account of the Army's role in Kansas in 1856 see Robert W. Coakley, *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1789-1878* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1988), pp. 145-172. Other important studies on the social and political nature of Kansas include: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., *History of American Presidential Elections, 1789-1968*, Vol II (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1971), pp. 1007-1094; James A. Rawley, *Race and Politics* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1969); Alice Nichols, *Bleeding Kansas* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954); Kenneth M. Stampp, *America in 1857: A Nation on the Brink* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Larry Gara, *The Presidency of Franklin Pierce* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1991).
9. Correspondence discussing Geary's nomination include: R. McCallister to Geary, 20 July 1856, *WAC*; Senator William Bigler to Geary, Telegraph, 23 July 1856, *WAC*; Bigler to Geary, 24 July 1856, *WAC*; and McCallister to Geary, 25 July 1856, *WAC*; and Shalor Winchell Eldridge, *Publications of the Kansas State Historical Society Embracing Society Embracing Recollections of the Early Days in Kansas*, Vol II (Topeka, KS: Kansas State Printing Plant, 1920) p. 63. See also Nichols, *Franklin Pierce*, pp. 478-9.
10. Crittenden Resolution, *Congressional Globe*, 34th Congress, 1st Session, 10 June 1856, pp. 1382, 1389, 1390, and 1395.
11. *Evening Picayune*, 7 April 1851 in *Geary Scrapbook*, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Hereafter cited as *Scrapbook*, HSP.
12. John Geary to Edward Geary, 31 July 1856, MG-56, *PHMC*.
13. Geary to Pierce, 16 September 1856, *WAC*; Geary to Pierce, 1 October 1856, *WAC*; and Geary to Pierce, 8 December 1856, *WAC*.
14. *The Republican*, (St. Louis) 10 August 1856, *Scrapbook*, HSP, p. 34. States also that Geary was a "firm believer in the doctrine of Popular Sovereignty."
15. *Scrapbook*, HSP, p. 37. I'm not sure from which newspaper Geary took this article. It follows a clipping from Savannah, but there is no conclusive data on where the pro-Southern article originated.

16. Ibid. See also *Baltimore Republican, Scrapbook*, HSP, p. 34 and *Harrisburg Democrat, Scrapbook*, HSP, p. 36.
17. Speech at Mississippi City, 2 October 1857 in Lynda Lasswell Crist, ed., *The Papers of Jefferson Davis*, Vol 6, (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1989) p. 149.
18. Nichols, *Franklin Pierce*, pp. 474-5. See also Davis to Smith, 27 June 1856, *KSHS*, p. 426.
19. Shannon to Pierce, 18 August 1856, *KSHS*, p. 403.
20. Sherman Amendment, 28 July 1856, *Congressional Globe*, 34th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1790 and Army Bill, 22 August 1856, *Congressional Globe*, 34th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 9.
21. Pierce Proclamation, 25 August 1856, *Congressional Globe*, 34th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 1 and 5.
22. Smith to Cooper, 22 August 1856, *KSHS*, p. 461.
23. McPherson, *Battle*, p. 161.
24. Woodson Proclamation, 25 August 1856, *KSHS*, p. 471.
25. Smith to Cooper, 29 August 1856, *KSHS*, p. 469.
26. Cooke to Deas, 31 August 1856, *KSHS*, p. 478.
27. Woodson to Cooke, 1 September 1856, *KSHS*, p. 479. See also Cooke to Woodson, 2 September 1856, *Letters Sent and Orders Issued, 2nd Cavalry (2nd Dragoons and Riflemen)*, Vol I, RG-391, National Archives, Washington DC. Hereafter cited as *LSOI*.
28. Cooke to Woodson, 2 September 1856, *LSOI*.
29. Ibid.
30. Davis to Smith, 3 September 1856, *KSHS*, pp. 426-7. See also John Gihon, *Geary and Kansas* (Philadelphia: Chas C. Rhodes, 1857) pp. 274-5.
31. Deas to Cooke, 3 September 1856, *KSHS*, p. 482.
32. Marcy to Geary, 26 August 1856, *KSHS*, p. 521. See also Gihon, p. 272.
33. Marcy to Geary, 2 September 1856, *KSHS*, p. 521.
34. Geary to Marcy, 9 September 1856, *KSHS*, p. 523. See also Gihon, p. 120.
35. Davis to Smith, 9 September 1856, *KSHS*, p. 428.

36. Smith to Cooper, 10 September 1856, *KSHS*, p. 472.
37. Smith to Geary, 28 September 1856, *WAC*.
38. Geary to Smith, 19 September 1856, John W. Geary, Letter to Major General Persifor Smith, Western Americana Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University.
39. Geary Proclamation, 11 September 1856, *KSHS*, p. 527. See also Gihon, pp. 126-7.
40. Prior to the "Sack of Lawrence," Colonel Sumner had recommended to Shannon that he authorize the use of federal troops to prevent hostilities. Sumner wanted to take preventive action by placing federal soldiers at key locations throughout the territory in hopes they would prevent both factions in Kansas from fighting. Shannon was reluctant to follow Sumner's advice without express approval from Pierce and did little to prevent violence at Lawrence prior to 21 May. Geary would later use this strategy to achieve a temporary peace in Kansas. For more on the "Sack of Lawrence" see Sumner to Shannon, 12 May 1856, *LRAGO*, p. 0250; Shannon to Sumner, 21 May 1856, *LRAGO*, pp. 0284-5; Sumner to Cooper, 2 June 1856, *LRAGO*, p. 0345; Citizens of Lawrence to Shannon, et al, 17 May 1856, *KSHS*, pp. 397-8; Pierce to Shannon, 23 May 1856, *KSHS*, p. 414; and Davis to Sumner, 23 May 1856, *KSHS*, p. 425.
41. Cooke to Bvt Major F.J. Porter, Asst Adj Gen, Dept. of the West, 13 September 1856, *LSOI* and Geary to Cooke, 13 September 1856, *KSHS*, p. 530-1.
42. Cooke to Captain T.J. Woods, 14 September 1856, *LSOI* and *KSHS*, p. 534. See also Geary to Marcy, 14 September 1856, *WAC*.
43. Gihon, pp. 152-3. See also Smith to Cooper, 15 September 1856, *KSHS*, p. 498.
44. Cooke to Porter, 16 September 1856, *LSOI*. See also Woods to Cooke, 16 September 1856, *KSHS*, pp. 502-4
45. Smith to Geary, 17 September 1856, as quoted in Gihon, pp. 276-7. See also Geary to Donaldson, 21 September 1856, *KSHS*, p. 548 and Geary to Cooke, 27 September 1856, *KSHS*, pp. 565-6.
46. *Public Ledger* (Philadelphia), 16 October 1856, Vol XLII, No. 22, p. 1 and *Journal of Commerce*, 3 October 1856, *Scrapbook*, 11SP.
47. John Gihon to Geary, 29 October 1856, *WAC*.
48. Geary to Buchanan, 24 November 1856, *Buchanan Papers*, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
49. James Ford Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850, Vol II, 1854-1860* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1893), p. 229 and pp. 232-4.