

View of the April 23, 1884 tornado in Anderson County, Kansas. Stereograph view. Photo courtesy Kansas State Historical Society.



A farmer and his wife in a Kansas windstorm (*Harper's Weekly*, May 30, 1874 Frenzeny and Tavernier.)

## **THE 1913 OMAHA TORNADO: A CALAMITY OVERCOME**

**by Sally Torpy**

On an unusually warm and humid Sunday in March 1913, many families had already attended Easter services celebrating the feast of the resurrection of Christ. Thousands of Omaha's 140,000 citizens were participating in evening worship when, at approximately 5:50 p.m., a tornado bore down on the city without warning.<sup>1</sup> In a matter of twelve minutes, this devastating twister left a path of destruction six to seven miles long and one-quarter of a mile wide, replacing those people's thoughts of a new life and springtime with the real images of death and massive ruin.<sup>2</sup>


Initial figures indicated that 650 homes had been destroyed, 1,129 houses damaged, 2,100 persons left homeless, 109 persons killed, and 355 persons seriously injured.<sup>3</sup> In spite of the enormity of the destruction, Omaha proved to have a resiliency that brought the city back to life in a remarkably brief period of time. There were many factors to explain how a city that sustained such vast destruction and loss of life could so quickly and efficiently restore itself to a thriving metropolis.

In 1913 Omaha had a corps of successful businessmen whose leadership skills helped to organize an efficient and fair relief system.<sup>4</sup> Likewise, able leaders from the United States Army and the Nebraska National Guard established a security system within the stricken area that lent protection and aid to victims within hours of the storm.<sup>5</sup> Civic organizations and individual citizens also assisted in numerous acts of charity which helped to bind the wounds of the community. If the tornado had hit the business district, Omaha might not have had the tremendous financial support of those men and institutions, nor the benefit of their organizational skills.<sup>6</sup> Conversely, had the storm struck the business district rather than residential sections, lives certainly would have been saved, but long term economic devastation would have been far greater. Since the primary economic zone had been spared, this presented an opportunity for the businessmen to concentrate their energies and resources toward the revitalization of the residential districts. One can only speculate whether these businessmen would have felt as compelled to come to the aid of the community if the financial district had also been struck by the tornado.

The heaviest concentration of casualties took place in the 24th and Grant Street area which was primarily populated by African-Americans and recently-arrived immigrants. A temporary morgue was set up at 2213 Lake Street in the

Webster Telephone Exchange to handle casualties from this section of the city. Ironically, this building sustained little damage when compared to the majority of dwellings surrounding it. Fortunately, the twenty women assigned there remained on duty for twenty-four hours, and provided invaluable service for this otherwise isolated section of the metropolis.<sup>7</sup>

For the majority of Omaha citizens it had just been a rare, sultry day for March. But the weather data for that day indicated that conditions were favorable for a tornado. The barometric pressure steadily dropped throughout the day from 28.51" at 7:00 a.m. to a low of 27.93" between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. L. A. Welsh, a local Omaha meteorologist for the U.S. Weather Bureau, which at that time was located at 16th and Capitol Street in the Post Office Building, observed the path of this storm. Welsh, who was only a mile and a quarter from the tornado's path, saw the pendant-funnel shape of the twister.<sup>8</sup>



PATH OF THE TORNADO

3-5-73

—World-Herald Map.

Tornado . . . ripped through city from southwest.

The tornado did not originate over Omaha, but began in Cass County where it first struck Yutan, Waterloo, and Ralston before roaring into Omaha at its southwest city limits. The brunt of the storm was felt first in Omaha at 54th and Frances Street, the city's southwest boundary. From there it raged on in a northeasterly direction across the western and northern areas of town, to Cutoff Lake by the Missouri River. It moved on to Council Bluffs, Iowa and eventually dissipated over Weston.<sup>9</sup>

The path of the storm was not selective about matters of wealth or race; the affluent, the poor and middle class alike experienced the tornado's devastating force.<sup>10</sup> The tornado caused the most damage in the Bemis Park area, 24th and Lake neighborhood, and the older fashionable Gold Coast area of west Farnam Street.<sup>11</sup> Total property damage was greatest in the Gold Coast area due to the high value of the homes and surrounding grounds, while the greatest concentration of fatalities centered in the poor section of 24th and Lake Street.<sup>12</sup> There, homes were built close together and many victims were trapped under fallen beams. Many died from the direct trauma, from gas escaping broken lines, or as victims of the fires that ignited due to leaking gas.<sup>13</sup> Since virtually all telephone lines were down in this area, survivors had to travel by foot or horseback to contact the fire department directly.<sup>14</sup>

Litter and debris from demolished houses, uprooted trees and overturned cars, and fallen utility poles initially impeded the progress of fire engines attempting to reach the fires. The firemen, undaunted by the obstacles, hoisted their hoses onto their backs and walked the rest of the way toward the blazes. After reaching the burning buildings they encountered a further hindrance—fire plugs buried under the storm's wreckage. Luckily, the rains accompanying the storm lasted long enough to assist the firemen in their work, thus helping to prevent the conflagration from consuming the entire neighborhood.<sup>15</sup>

Before the fires were brought under control, Major Carl Hartman, commander of the Signal Corps of the U.S. Army at Fort Omaha, which was within three miles of the disaster area, received word of the tornado's rampage. Rather than waiting for orders from his superiors, Hartman, anticipating the need of his immediate services, took advantage of his proximity to the area, gathered his entire command together and hastened to the tornado site. Upon arrival, he stationed his troops throughout the stricken area and ordered them to protect the victims' property from the mobs of curious people, but foremost to lend aid to the injured. Hartman had acquired experience in dealing with disasters when he was stationed in San Francisco shortly after its 1906 earthquake. He had participated in the recovery efforts there and his knowledge was utilized often in the coming weeks.<sup>16</sup>

False rumors that hundreds of people were trapped in a movie theater spread during those first few hours following the tornado's fury. Rescuers rushed to the theater and discovered the falsehood, but ironically, in the immediate area,

they found the greatest concentration of fatalities. North Omaha's Idlewild Hall was a popular pool hall, as well as the headquarters for the Black Lodge of the Knights of Pythias.<sup>17</sup> Fourteen African-Americans and one white person who had rushed into the hall to escape the storm were found buried under the rubble.<sup>18</sup> Within the four block area surrounding Idlewild Hall almost half of the total fatalities occurred.<sup>19</sup> Colonel Edward Turner of the Knights of Pythias wrote to the Pythias headquarters in Chicago that 800 African-American families were homeless as a result of the tornado.

While rescue efforts continued into the night, Governor J. M. Morehead and Adjutant General Phillip L. Hall of the Nebraska National Guard waited in Lincoln to board a train specially chartered to take them to Omaha. When the train arrived shortly after midnight, Major James C. Dahlman, Police Commissioner John Ryder, Major Hartman, and Sheriff McShane met the two at the Omaha depot. By 4:30 a.m., the officials attempted to enter the area by car, but could not travel far before they found the road impassable. At this point Hartman and Hall divided the area between the two of them and Hartman assumed command over the north side, while Hall took charge of the south side. As they walked through their respective districts and assessed the damage, the smell of gas from broken lines at times was so strong it almost overpowered them. Many victims were still outside of their homes in a state of shock, unable to respond to concerned rescue workers' questions. After two hours Hall returned to the mayor's office and immediately wired his assistant in Lincoln to send seven companies of National Guard troops who had been awaiting his orders.<sup>21</sup>

While Hall waited for his troops to arrive, the mayor quickly called a citizens' meeting to be held in his office to organize formally a relief committee. The general committee consisted of fifty people, but this number was deemed too large to be efficient. Consequently the committee elected a smaller executive committee of seven which included T. J. Mahoney, attorney, as chairman; V. C. Rosewater, newspaper editor, as secretary; Robert Cowell, merchant, as treasurer; and E. F. Denison, Y.M.C.A., as secretary; Reverend A. L. Williams, J. M. Guild, Commissioner Commercial Club; and T. C. Byrne, wholesaler. These committee members were elected for their leadership and managerial skills.<sup>22</sup>

After the general meeting adjourned, another meeting took place at the Commercial Club of Omaha where the relief committee divided the disaster region into twenty-eight districts. Approximately 125 young men set out with maps of the storm district and census cards in hand canvassing their respective territories. They obtained information regarding both personal injury and property damage sustained by each homeowner and recorded the data on their cards. By 1:00 p.m. these young men were prepared to collect the important data which would aid the relief committee in estimating how much financial support would be needed.<sup>23</sup>

Meanwhile, as they collected data, General Hall's troops arrived and immediately went to the storm site. Over 400 men had come from Lincoln, combining with Hartman's troops to total more than 600 troops guarding the area. By 2:00 p.m. Hall had established relief stations in his district and encircled it with soldiers. At this time he began to issue passes to the victims in his region which allowed the appropriate people to leave and re-enter the site. These passports were used throughout the tornado site and served as identification, allowing the soldiers to keep the curious at a distance and to deter potential thieves. Hall also ordered several of his men to watch for looters and arrest anyone acting suspiciously. Hall called this group of men "skirmishers," and assigned two trained signal corps men from Hartman's troops to handle any situations involving fallen electrical poles with live wires.<sup>24</sup> After one week of duty, Hall replaced his tired First Regiment with a fresh regiment of 400 men. After his tour of duty officially ended on April 7, Hall praised the mayor and governor for the efficiency and speed in handling the relief and recovery work.<sup>25</sup>

As Hall's men set up their stations Monday, March 24, the census takers had already finished their task and returned their information to a committee composed of stenographers and accountants who compiled the raw data. This group, mostly volunteers, worked until midnight to index and file the statistics with the relief committee. Armed with this knowledge, the relief committee devised a plan that divided the seven-mile strip of destruction into six districts. They quickly established a relief station in an area of each district where the most damage had occurred, using partially ruined buildings for this purpose.<sup>26</sup> Hartman had suggested this strategy and it proved highly effective in the distribution of aid. He realized that if only one central relief station had been set up for the entire area, that the length of the disaster strip would deter many needy people from seeking help, either out of pride or as a result of incapacitating injuries.<sup>27</sup>

At each relief station, aid was given out in the form of information, supplies, and medical attention. Each station had a manager who had total authority over it, and who was chosen for the job for his strong business and administrative skills. The manager did not give money to victims, rather he issued vouchers for any items or services a family needed. For example, if a family was homeless, the manager issued a voucher for one month's rent, and the landlord would redeem the voucher for cash. Groceries and medical supplies were handled in the same way. This system worked quite well under the close supervision of the managers. At the end of the day, orders were sent to the central relief office where duplicates were made. Each station received copies of all orders so that a victim was unable to go to more than one relief station and obtain extra aid.<sup>28</sup>

The stations ran smoothly in part due to the unlimited power the managers wielded. Decisions had to be made quickly in order to help the injured and

homeless; consequently, managers did not have to go through channels for approval of their decisions.<sup>29</sup> In addition, two doctors, two trained nurses, two or three Red Cross and Associated Charity workers, and fifteen to thirty volunteer workers and investigators were allotted to each station. Records showed that approximately \$20,000 worth of food, clothing, and other necessities was distributed by each district within the first twenty days.<sup>30</sup>

The Civic Auditorium was designated as the central depot for receiving donations of food, clothing, furniture, and household items. Here teams of workers sorted through the contributions, cleaned them, and marked them for the various stations. Hartman had recommended the central depot concept, borrowing from his San Francisco experiences once again. Hartman placed Captain F. G. Stritzinger, another veteran of the San Francisco earthquake, in charge of the auditorium, along with Dr. Dennison from the executive committee. The auditorium was also used as a lunchroom, a shelter for the homeless, and as a storage place for furniture and personal items left from the storm.<sup>31</sup> W. S. Jardine, the head of a moving company, was placed in charge of transporting household belongings from the storm site to the auditorium, or to another address of the victim's choice. Jardine moved the possessions of over 400 families in one week and graciously donated his services if a family could not afford to pay. The relief committee provided free storage for the victims' household belongings.<sup>32</sup>

Church organizations and various lodges also generously assisted the community. The Elk's Club of Omaha offered food services for the homeless in many of their lodges. Woodmen of the World and other fraternal clubs offered assistance to their members. A dozen different churches opened their doors and provided shelter. Free legal aid was donated to the storm victims on matters concerning insurance, landlords, and mortgages. Lumber and building supplies were provided by several companies.<sup>33</sup> Bakeries donated bread and Creighton College medical students volunteered their medical skills.<sup>34</sup> Some businesses such as Hartmen Furniture actually cleared their ledgers of debts owed by persons who lived in the storm district. The *Omaha Bee* newspaper reported that the Hartmen board of directors wanted to aid the victims in some way and decided what better way than to alleviate the worry of unpaid bills. An estimated \$12,000 worth of bills ultimately was erased.<sup>35</sup> Orkin Brothers advertised in the papers that they would contribute five percent of the gross sales of the entire store Saturday and Monday to the relief fund. They offered special sales on popular items as an extra incentive to the customers.<sup>36</sup> McCord Brady Company donated all of its large auto delivery trucks to the relief committee for a three day period to accommodate delivery of supplies to the relief stations, while over 100 automobiles were loaned to the committee by private citizens.<sup>37</sup> W. H. Connell, the City Health Commissioner, appealed to doctors and surgeons for volunteer medical services. Their response was overwhelming.<sup>38</sup>

The ingenuity of the community brought in \$3,000 on Tag Day, March 31, a day when approximately 50,000 sightseers were expected to arrive in Omaha to view the tornado site. Marion Marston foresaw the occasion as an opportunity to collect relief money and had over 20,000 tags designed and manufactured, ready for sale. Prices for the tags were arbitrary and ranged from \$1 to \$10. In addition to this fund raiser, collection boxes were posted at fifty different locations, and though sightseers were the immediate target, Omahans also contributed. From sale of tags and the collection boxes, almost \$4,000 was donated.<sup>39</sup>

The enthusiastic support and generosity of the people of Omaha lent a spirit of renewal and hope to the victims. Many of the families were initially too proud to ask for aid, but with determination and patience, relief workers returned to the disaster area to ensure that all victims were provided for. One group that stood out for its perseverance and dedication were the some 250 school teachers who volunteered to canvass the area. The teachers divided the area among themselves and set out on March 19 to contact each family personally. They sought out the families who had refused assistance previously, and with consideration and tactfulness, offered them the relief committee's services. It was fortunate that this second campaign occurred since hundreds of cards were turned into the relief stations at the end of the day. The success of this canvass was due in large part to the fact that the teachers knew many of these families through their school age children, and also to the diplomatic and compassionate manner in which the teachers handled each case.<sup>40</sup>

A similar responsible group of citizens tackled the most difficult problem facing the restoration of Omaha—rebuilding.<sup>41</sup> The Commercial Club of Omaha was a group of concerned businessmen who supported the public welfare of the city.<sup>42</sup> This organization assumed its task with aggressive determination, and appointed a Restoration Committee charged with raising money to rebuild and repair the storm-damaged homes.

This committee was separate from the Relief Committee which used its money for essential supplies such as groceries, clothing, shelter, and medical aid. A sub-committee for the Restoration Committee was established for the actual purpose of raising funds. This committee consisted of C. E. Yost, President of the Commercial Club, as chairman; J. L. Kennedy, attorney; C. M. Wilhelm, retailer; Sam Burns, Jr., stocks and bonds; W. D. Hosford, wholesaler; W. H. Bucholz, banker; H. A. Tukey, real estate; and C. C. Belden, retailer. They planned to obtain money by having a bill proposed to the State Legislature in Lincoln for a million dollar bond appropriation.<sup>43</sup> To this end they worked with Governor Morehead and on April 1, the governor introduced House Bill No. 889 to the legislature. On April 21, the bill was approved and put into immediate effect. This bill allowed the various counties to issue bonds, the proceeds of which would assist in restoring dwellings.<sup>44</sup> The governor had



introduced another bill to the legislature March 25, two days after the tornado struck, which requested \$100,000 for the maintenance of the militia and any other expenses from the storm.<sup>45</sup> House Bill No. 887 was quickly passed and put into effect on April 3, to give immediate and necessary financial assistance. In addition to these bills, the committee also proposed to solicit large businesses, banks, and railroads for contributions. They approached three Omaha banks which pledged \$40,000 each to the committee. A group was designated to visit Chicago and possibly New York to seek donations from railroads, packing houses, and other businesses that had interests in Omaha.<sup>46</sup>

The Restoration Committee next utilized a committee of the Real Estate Exchange to provide information on the value of each storm victim's home. Any owner who had a house damaged or destroyed by the tornado could fill out a form containing forty to fifty questions, including the age of the house, whether there was presence of tornado insurance, the amount of equity value of the property, and any outside financial aid. With this information, and the estimates of costs to rebuild or repair houses, the apportionment began. As with the relief committee, no money was given out. Rather, labor and materials were furnished for repair and reconstruction. Upon completion of the work, the Building Department of the committee inspected the houses and issued vouchers for payment.<sup>47</sup>

In most instances, however, the homeowner used his own money and provided the labor for rebuilding or repairing. This was encouraged by the committee so that the victims could feel some sense of self-sufficiency and less dependency on charity. The Reconstruction Committee assisted in 722 cases. Cost of repairs ranged from \$17.25 to \$41,250; the average was \$397. The money was given out in the form of a loan, a cash advance on security, or as a gift or advance, with the understanding that it would eventually be repaid.<sup>48</sup>

In addition to the enormous undertaking shouldered by the Reconstruction Committee, the General Relief Committee helped approximately 500 homeowners who were unable to pay for repairs on their partially damaged homes. Grant Parsons, President of the Builders' Exchange, was in charge of this plan, and he organized crews according to the type of repair work for which they were best suited. For example, one crew might place a house back on its foundation, while another crew would replace its roof. Approximately \$25,000 worth of labor was thus performed by about one hundred carpenters and workmen.<sup>49</sup>

Money for the Relief Committee came in large part from contributions from Omaha businessmen, private citizens, other state governments and organizations, and even foreign countries. Forty-two states and several countries, including Canada, England, and Austria, donated a total of over \$400,000.<sup>50</sup> The Jewish Foundation collected \$8,271 for the 150 Jewish families affected by the storm.<sup>51</sup> The Red Cross donated \$40,000, the largest single contribution to the

relief fund, and upon their advice, the Association of Commerce of Chicago gave \$10,000.<sup>52</sup> By April 20, a grand total of \$1,155,687 had been collected, with \$85,000 in cash paid out in aid.<sup>53</sup>

Although for the most part the relief and restoration committees ran smoothly there was a potential problem that occurred at the very beginning of the relief work that could have altered the success of Omaha's recovery. When President Woodrow Wilson wired Mayor Dahlman to offer his support, Dahlman, on the advice of the Commercial Club, declined the offer by proudly stating, "We can handle the situation."<sup>54</sup> This message was conveyed to other cities and to the Red Cross when representatives were sent to offer their services. R. C. Bicknell, the National Director of the Red Cross, sent E. T. Lies, representative of the Chicago chapter, and C. M. Hubbard, representative of the St. Louis chapter, to meet with the relief committee. Lies noted that his offers were politely declined and he commended the people of the midwest for their spirit of "selfhelpfulness." At this time, the Ohio River floods were creating extensive damage in that area, and the two representatives left Omaha thinking their services were not needed.<sup>55</sup>

While it was true that Omaha businessmen wanted to protect the city's credit and reputation for self-sufficiency and believed they really could handle the situation, there was another reason that the Red Cross offer was so hastily rejected. In a letter to Bicknell from Mabel W. Porter, general secretary of the Omaha Associated Charities, she wrote that the citizens of Omaha had been maligned when the Red Cross insisted that they take charge of the relief operations. Instead, Porter wrote that an offer should have been made to work alongside the relief committee until the emergency of the situation had passed, at which time the Red Cross could take over. Porter urged Bicknell to return to Omaha and instigate some of these ideas.<sup>56</sup>

At the same time that this correspondence was taking place, the various committees were coming to the realization that they could not raise enough money on their own to provide a solid reconstruction of the tornado-stricken section of Omaha; they also needed the financial support from the Red Cross. Fortunately, Bicknell did send Lies back with a monetary offer of aid three weeks after his first offer, and on April 21, Lies met with several committees again. This time the committee accepted a \$40,000 contribution.<sup>57</sup>

After this meeting, four experienced relief workers were brought in to represent the Red Cross. Marion Tebets, Florence L. Clark, Mary Griggs, and Alice J. Barker were sent by the Associated Charities of Omaha, but the Red Cross paid their salaries and expenses. After the women inspected the work of the relief committee and their extensive card indexing system, they complimented the staff on the quality and completeness of their files and conceded that there was very little the Red Cross could have done differently. Consequently, hurt feelings were assuaged and Omaha received a very essential contribution to its

relief fund.<sup>58</sup> Also, Dahlman, after he retracted his original statement which declined outside aid, began to receive money and provisions from around the nation. The federal government sent a train of twenty cars to delivery 4,000 tents, 20,000 blankets, 11,000 cots, and also a complete hospital outfit including 400 separate tents for patrols.<sup>59</sup>

One of the last tasks left to complete the recovery was the immense task of clean-up. It was virtually impossible for the homeless to clear away the enormous amount of debris and litter that was confined to their own property, let alone the streets that were strewn with fallen trees, wrecked vehicles, remains of houses and downed telephone poles. But once again the community rallied together and designated Saturday, April 6, as clean-up day. An estimated 5,000 men and boys, many recruited from jobbing houses and factories, donated their time and energy to remove the wreckage of the storm. The city saved an estimated \$15,000 worth of labor, and what they were not able to clear away on Saturday, 2,000 other men accomplished on Sunday.<sup>60</sup> The only complaint about the day came from members of the Ministerial Union Committee. They visited the relief committee and expressed their dissatisfaction with men working on the Sabbath. The committee pointed out to them that since God had allowed a tornado to wreak such devastation on a Sunday, He probably would think it reasonable to use a Sunday for clean-up. No further comment was made.<sup>61</sup>

On Monday, April 7, the day Hall's tour of duty officially ended, supplies from the six relief stations were taken to the auditorium where the remaining relief work was handled. Subsequently the stations served only as information centers, and except for the reconstruction of homes, the majority of the relief work had been accomplished.<sup>62</sup> The success of Omaha's recovery was not the result of one committee or one large donation, but the result of a community with a sense of pride and determination to use all of its resources. This unity can be seen in each area of recovery, from the relief stations with the dedicated business managers, to the teachers who patiently sought out storm victims and offered them aid. Another important aspect that contributed to the success of Omaha's recovery was the actual structure and organization of the various committees and their leaders. For example, the relief stations each had a manager who had full autonomy and could make his own decisions without the approval of anyone else. Authority was entrusted to managers and members of the committees because of the exceptional business skills they possessed.<sup>63</sup> These men had only the welfare of the community in mind and the community responded to their guidance with not only trust, but also manpower, financial and material contributions, and determination. The numbers of hours volunteered by doctors, nurses, carpenters, truckers, business executives, and teachers were incalculable.

The fact that the storm was confined to a narrow strip of the city allowed the surrounding area to physically and financially support the recovery program

and its survivors. Since the storm spared the financial district, those area leaders were free to channel their skills and resources into the relief effort.<sup>64</sup> Money was generously donated from within and without the city. Fortunately, Dahlman and the Commercial Club did not allow their pride to go too far, and they soon realized the city's limitations. Continued refusal to accept outside assistance would have seriously hampered quick recovery for Omaha.

Two of the leaders of the recovery program who stood out were Hartman with his invaluable experience attained in the San Francisco earthquake, and Hall, who, with his military training and discipline, lent a sense of strength and security to the storm-shocked survivors. These men worked side by side without a thought of competition, united by a common goal, to aid and protect the citizens of Omaha.

The countless acts of kindness and generosity exhibited by the community knew no social or economic boundaries, and the disaster experienced by everyone bound the people together, eliciting a spirit of unity and rejuvenation. Omaha citizens already had a deep pride in the city's economic prosperity before that Easter Sunday tragedy occurred. Their stockyards comprised the second largest livestock market in the world, the Union Pacific Railroad was at its height, and the city served as the hub of many other railroads. It was also one of the top three pork producing cities in the United States.<sup>65</sup> From this era of prosperity emerged the many outstanding business leaders who helped to shape a solid and successful relief program. Their talents and organizational skills led the community to unite and work together efficiently. Few jobs were lost as a result of the storm, and in fact, job opportunities were boosted during the reconstruction phase when carpenters and laborers were in demand.<sup>66</sup>

V. C. Rosewater, one of Omaha's many exceptional leaders during this period, wrote a letter to the citizens appealing for cooperation and aid. The message of this letter, meant as motivation for a community to unite during its time of catastrophe, in fact became a reality: "We do not want our city to be known as *Omaha-the-tornado-wrecked city*, but as *Omaha-the-Wonder-of-the-West—Destroyed in a Night Restored in a Day*, the city that turned a calamity into an era of immense prosperity."<sup>67</sup>

## NOTES

I would like to thank Dr. Michael L. Tate, Professor of History at University of Nebraska at Omaha, my advisor, for his expert assistance and guidance.

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